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Regional  governance  in  Latin  America  –  a  comparative  perspective  

Panel:  Comparing  Metropolitan  Governance  Reforms  

Klaus  Frey,  Universidade  Federal  do  ABC  

IPSA  23rd  World  Congress  of  Political  Science  

During   the   last   decades,   the   huge   Latin-­‐American   metropolises   have   suffered   grave  transformation  regarding  territorial  expansion  and  the  worsening  of  social  problems  as  well  as   shortcomings   in   terms   of   basic   infrastructure   and   the   exploration   of   economic  opportunities.  Aggravated  by   the   recent   crisis  of   the  global   financial   system,   local  political  actors  have  increasingly  become  aware,  as  already  happened  in  large  part  of  European  and  North-­‐American   agglomerations,   of   the   necessity   of   collective   and   genuine   metropolitan  replies   to   these   new   challenges   to   human   well-­‐being   in   highly   populated   metropolitan  regions.  

However,   how   to   deal   with,   how   to   organize,   to   manage,   and   to   plan   metropolitan  agglomerations   characterized   by   increasing   complexity?   How   to   tackle   with   urban  fragmentation  and  gentrification,  with  the  enhanced  spatial,  social  and  economic  diversity,  the  unequal    distribution  of  urban  infrastructure  and  the  threats  in  matters  of  environmental  quality   and   the   general   life   conditions   in   these   regions?  How   to   approach   the  progressive  dependency  on  external  factors  as  the  slithering  world  economy  or  the  global  environmental  changes,   above   all   concerning   global   warming,   that   obviously   require   adaptation   and  renewed   political   steering   capacities?   How   to   respond   to   the   challenge   working   and  articulating   public   action   on   different   scales   as   well   as   territorial   and   functional   spaces,  involving  diverse  dimensions  and  challenges:  local  communities;  neighborhoods;  ecologically  high-­‐valued   areas;   river   basins;   regional   spaces;   rural-­‐urban   transitional   spaces;  administrative  districts,   including  the  municipalities  as  generally   the  only   institution  vested  with   proper  mechanisms   able   to   guarantee   certain   democratic   legitimacy   in  metropolitan  regions;   furthermore   the   national,   international   and   global   scales   that   due   to   cumulative  interdependencies  demand  equally  new  articulated  and   inter-­‐scalar   responses  and  a  more  active  role  of  the  metropolises  or  city  regions.    

Not  by  chance  the  notion  of  governance  gained  in  importance  and  was  initially  conceived  as  a  theoretical  and  analytical  approach  to  understand  the  new  kinds  of  politico-­‐administrative  articulations  and  practices   that  emerged,  on  the  one  hand,   related  to   the  European  Union  and,   on   the   other,   the   huge  metropolitan   regions   (ver   GROTE   &   GBIKPI,   2002;   HAMBLETON,  SAVITCH,  &   STEWART,   2002;  HEINELT,   2008).   In  both  cases   institutional   structures,   formalized  by   legal   frameworks,   proved   to   be   unable   or   insufficient   to   incorporate   these   kinds   of  emergent,  mostly  informal,  politico-­‐administrative  networks,  composed  of  actors  from  state  authorities,  from  the  productive  as  well  as  non-­‐governmental  sector.  

This  new  institutional  opacity  requires  not  only  new  strategies  from  the  part  of  local,  state  or  national   managers,   but   also   new   approaches   by   the   scientific   community,   above   all   by  political   science,   whose   traditional   focus   has   always   been   the   state   authorities   and   their  analytical   methods   have   always   been   narrowly   tied   to   the   supposed   certainties   and  predictability  of  formally  established  political  institutions.    

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In  the  past,  informal  relations  in  the  political  arena,  regarded  as  a  peculiar  feature  of  Latin-­‐American  politics,  have  very  often  been  considered  as  pathologies  of   the  political  process:  either  as  expression  of  an  obsolete  kind  of  political  culture,  characterized  by  patrimonialism,  clientelism  and  corruption,  or,  at  least,  as  an  impediment  in  the  search  of  a  rationalized  and  modernized   political   practice.   However,   in   the   contemporary   debate   on   governance   new  room   is   opened   up   for   informality   in   politics,   now   seen   as   an   urgent   necessity   given   the  deficits   concerning   state   effectiveness,   the   lack   of   responsiveness   of   public   authorities   in  contrast   to   the   growing   social   demands   and,   finally,   the   observed   loss   of   democratic  legitimacy  of   formal  political   structures   and  processes.   Yet,   the  main  dilemma   inherent   to  the  theoretical  concept  of  governance  and  its  corresponding  empirical  phenomena  is  related  to  the  possibility  that  the  opening  to  informality  and  institutional  flexibility  in  politics  –  even  if  considered  unavoidable  in  the  current  context  -­‐  could  lead  to  a  revival  or  reinforcement  of  the  pretty  well-­‐known  vices  and  pathologies  of  Latin-­‐American  politics.  

So   if   we   start   from   the   assumption   of   an   inevitable   alignment   of   political   processes   and  institutions   to   the   necessity   of   coordinated   public   action   in   multiple   scales   and   sectors,  bringing  forward  more  flexible  and  interactive  political  patterns  of  articulation,  an  extended  debate   about   institutional   necessities   in   metropolitan   governance   is   definitely   needed,  without  however   ignoring   the  particular   risks  of  political   informality   in   the   Latin-­‐American  context.  

In   this   article   some   theoretical   and   methodological   aspects   are   discussed   concerning   a  research   project   about   changes   in   metropolitan   governance   in   Brazil   and   Latin   America.  Starting   from   the   international   discussion   on   the   subject,   the   focus   is   on   institutional  arrangements  –  formal  or  informal  –,  the  potential  of  network  structures  in  socio-­‐technical  coordination,   as   well   as   on   processes   of   political   participation   in   different   scales   and   the  necessities  and  difficulties  of  coordination  efforts.  

Latin-­‐American   cities   have   experienced   in   the   last   decades   significant   transformation,   old  and   new   problems,   but   by   trend   more   complex,   that   do   not   necessarily   obey   politico-­‐administrative  borders.  Such  borders  usually  mirror  a  historically  created  structure  of  social  and   political   domination.   These   heterarchic   structures   involve   conflictive   interests   and  multiples  conceptions  and  values   that  used  to  guide  the  different  administrative  and  state  reforms,  as  well  as  the  ways  these  different  countries  used  to  tackle  specific  problems,  and  therefore  shape  the  particular  historic  conditions  present  in  each  country,  region  or  city.  

Among   the   most   alarming   problems   that   challenge   customary   modes   of   metropolitan  management,   some   central   ones   can   be   highlighted:   the   social   question,   above   all   the  exacerbated   inequalities   and   urban   poverty   as   a   characteristic   feature   of   huge   Latin-­‐American   agglomerations   and,   apparently,   unconnected   to   the   performance   of   economic  growth   rates;   socio-­‐geographical   segmentation   or   segregation,   making   it   more   and   more  difficult  and  illusionary  to  arrive,  within  the  genuine  metropolitan  scale,  at  a  management  or  planning  concept  in  accordance  with  shared  and  common  interests;  the  deterioration  of  the  environment   and   overall   quality   of   life   in   huge   cities,   increasingly   related   to   global  environmental   menaces   as   global   warming;   the   uncertainties   and   volatility   of   urban  economic   development,   depending   to   a   greater   extent   on   the   global   economic   context,  requiring  however  coordinated  responses  on  the  local  and  regional  level,  lacking  very  often  the   necessary   instruments,   resources   and   political   power   to   improve   their   position   in   the  more  and  more  competitive  global  markets;  finally,  the  rising  of  violence  and  crime,  closely  

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connected   to   the   lack   of   life   perspectives,   partly   provoked   or   favored   by   the   previously  mentioned  problems.    

All   these   types   of   interscalar   or   intersectorial   problems   are   very   common   in   “functional  overlapping  competing  jurisdictions”  (FREY;  EICHENBERGER,  2001).  They  are  marked,  on  the  one   hand,   by   strong   conflicts   of   interest   and   dilemmas   of   collective   action,   on   the   other  however,   also   by   spillover   potentialities,   which   in   principle   favor   or   at   least   demand  collective   action   by   the   different   affected   authorities   or   agents   (FEIOCK,   2004),   i.e.,   the  perspective   of   possible   individual   gains   due   to   coordinated   action   pushes   these   agents  towards  cooperation  and  collective  action.  

Notwithstanding,  metropolitan  governance  goes  beyond  the  mere  necessity  to  create  a  new  planning  or  management   instance  on   the  macro  or   regional   level  endowed  with  adequate  competences  and  capacities  to  guarantee  higher  technical  rationality  able  to  overcome  the  dilemmas  of  collective  action  in  the  context  of  fragmented  institutional  settings.  In  addition  to   the   horizontal   dimension,   i.e.   the   necessity   of   promoting   integrative   and   coordinative  mechanisms   able   to   provide   intermunicipal   cooperation,   there   is   need   for   vertical  coordination   and   integration   of   metropolitan   governance,   and   that   in   either   directions:  downwards   in   the   direction   of   neighborhoods,   communities   and   districts,   as   well   as  upwards,  considering  superior  governmental  levels  as  the  states,  national  and  international  authorities  (HEINELT,  2008,  p.  159).  

The   general   tendency   of   fragmentation   and   complexification,   expressed   in   the   previously  named   phenomena,   which   frequently   lie   beyond   the   competences   and   reach   of   mere  municipal   action,   hinders   the   pursuit   of   integrative   intermunicipal   policies,   or   of   genuine  metropolitan   strategies,   in   the   sense   of   considering   both   its   horizontal   and   vertical  dimensions.  

In  the  following,  these  dilemmas  and  difficulties  of  metropolitan  coordination  are  discussed  in   three   directions:   First,   starting   from   the   debate   on   urban   and   regional   sustainable  development,   the   socio-­‐economic   dimension   and   some   corresponding   administrative   and  political   challenges   of   metropolitan   governance   are   discussed.   Second,   the   institutional  changes  that  occurred  in  Brazil  and  Latin  America  in  the  last  decades  are  briefly  discussed,  as  well   as   possible   alternative   institutional   strategies.   In   the   third   part,  we   raise   the   issue  of  new   interactive   practices   and   network   cooperation,   and   its   potential   role   in  metropolitan  governance.  In  the  last  section,  we  finish  with  some  structural  and  procedural  challenges  of  metropolitan   governance   in   Latin   America   able   to   promote   more   interactive   political  practices  between  state  authorities  and  the  civil  society.  

 

Governance  for  development  in  metropolitan  regions    

In   this   section  we  part   from  the  assumption  of  an   intrinsic   relation  between  development  and  governance.  Taking  a  look  at  some  fundamental  aspects  of  development  might  help  to  illustrate  the  challenge  at  stake  concerning  metropolitan  governance.  

Several  decades  ago  Latin-­‐American  researchers   like  Fernando  Henrique  Cardoso  and  Enzo  Faletto  as  well  as  Milton  Santos  called  into  question  the  idea  of  “development”  as  an  overall  uncontested   concept   and   simultaneously   the   notion   of   “developing   countries”.   Pretty  unrealistically,  the  term  development  suggests  that  these  countries  should  be  in  a  more  or  

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less  continuing  and  sustained  process  in  the  direction  of  levels  of  development  proper  of  the  industrialized  world   (Cardoso  &   Faletto,   2004/1969;   SANTOS,   2004/1979).   In   addition   and  under   the   influence   of   the   ongoing   debate   on   sustainable   development   the   concept   of  development,  and   specifically   its   reductionist  and  uncritical   translation   in  mere  “economic  growth”,  has  received  a  lot  of  criticism  as  being  inherent  to  hegemonic  western  thinking,  and  therefore   has   been   considered   inappropriate   to   indicate   possible   paths   to   sustainable  development   for   poor   or   peripheral   countries   (Atkinson,   2007a,   2007b;   Rist,   2001;   Veiga,  2005).  Therefore,  it  seems  necessary  to  develop  proper  concepts  of  development  in  line  with  the  specific  characteristics  of  these  countries  and  which  might  be  able  to  reconcile  economic  development   with   the   requirements   of   environmental   sustainability   and   social   justice   as  proposed  by  the  concept  of  sustainable  development.  

Where  urban  development  is  concerned,  in  accordance  to  Milton  Santos,  the  challenge  is  to  investigate   the   particularities   of   development   in   the   cities   of   these   underdeveloped  countries.   Yet,   what   are   these   particularities   of   poor   countries   that   may   justify   distinct  approaches   to   tackle   socioeconomic   problems   in   urban   agglomerations?   In   his   study   on  urban   economy   in   Third   World   countries,   Santos   (2004/1979)   distinguished   two   basic  economic   circuits:   the   upper   circuit   characterized   by   modern   technology   and   a   capital-­‐intensive   industry,   by   commerce   and   banking,   aiming   at   integration   in   the   national   and  global  economy;  and  the  lower  circuit  characterized  by  labor-­‐intensive  and  traditional  forms  of   manufacturing,   local   services,   traditional   types   of   transport,   frequently   part   of   the  informal   sector,   but   also   more   directly   responding   to   the   daily   necessities   of   the   local  population   and  more   integrated   in   the   local   communities   and   regions.   This   distinguishing  mark  of   the  economy  of  Third  World  metropolises  as  dissociated   in   two  different   fields:  a  modern  one,  progressive,  up-­‐to-­‐date,  desired  by  everyone,  receiving  all  possible  attention  by  the  political  and  administrative  system;  and  a  traditional  one,  behind  the  times  and  treated  contemptuously  or  negligently  by  public  authorities,  in  general,  held  responsible  for  its  own  underdevelopment,  represents,  according  to  Santos,  the  singular  structural  environment  of  the  dual  economy  in  southern  urban  agglomerations.  

In   contrast   to   the   dominant   position,   assuming   that   there   is   a   fundamental   opposition  between  the  economy  of  the  periphery  or  “favela  economy”  and  the  economy  of  the  center,  Santos   points   out   the   complementarity   of   both   universes   of   the   urban   economy   and   the  existing   interrelations   between   them.   According   to   Santos,   both   circuits   are   important  characteristics   of   the   current   period   of   technological   and   economic   modernization.  Therefore,  in  order  to  understand  properly  the  urban  economy  in  underdeveloped  countries,  it   is   necessary   to   investigate   existing   interrelations   and   interdependencies   between   both  circuits,  overcoming  the  traditional  practice  of  merely  focusing  and  analyzing  independently  the   peculiarities   of   each   circuit.   The   isolated   and   separate   treatment   of   the   two   spheres  ignores  that   informal  activities  represent  a  response  to  social  polarization  (KNOX  &  PINCH,  2000,  p.  384)  and  that  these  activities  have  augmented  in  the  same  degree  as  job  offer  in  the  formal   economy   declined   and   public   investments   in   infrastructure   have   diminished  (DEDECCA,   2007;   GILBERT,   2003;   SANCHEZ,   2006).   In   this   context,   consequently,   “the  boundaries   between   legal   and   illegal,   formal   and   informal,   legitimate   and   criminal   have  blurred.   In  many  ways,   informal   activities  now  constitute   an  essential   and   integral   part   of  urban  economic  structure  in  Latin  America”  (SANCHEZ,  2006,  P.  181).  

The  lower  or  informal  circuit  of  the  urban  economy  has  very  often  been  treated  by  officials  only  in  the  perspective  of  possible  strategies  how  to  get  over  it  (PERRY  et  al.,  2007).  Despite  its  undeniable  importance  for  the  urban  economy  in  underdeveloped  countries,  this  sector  

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has  been  forgotten  by  official  statistics,  which  used  to  follow  and  adopt  methods  applied  in  the   developed   world,   as   well   as   by   public   authorities   and   public   policies   that   used   to  concentrate  on  the  modern  sector  of  the  local  economy  (KNOX  &  PINCH,  2000).  Important  to  point   out   that   structures  of   domination  within   the   local   economy  are   socially   constructed  and  the  result  of  political  agreements  –  made  explicitly  or  not  –  based  on  strategic  alliances  between   different   dominant   interest   groups   on   the   local,   nation   and/or   global   level.  Therefore,  it  seems  clear  that  processes  of  political  confrontation  are  indispensable,  that  is,  the  dominant  or  hegemonic   alliances   could  only  be   challenged  by  emerging  new   counter-­‐alliances,  social  actors   from  outside  and   inside  of  the  state  apparatus,  committed  with  the  interests  of  the  urban  poor  (SANTOS,  1999).    

In   Brazil,   only   recently   efforts   on   the   part   of   the   federal   and   local   governments   could   be  identified   to   create   programs   of   support   for   economic   activities   of   the   more   vulnerable  sectors   of   the   population,   named   in   general   as   solidary   or   social   economy1.   On   the   local  level,  however,   these  kinds  of   initiatives  part  exclusively   from   local  governments,  whereas  articulated   policies   between  municipalities,   based   on  metropolitan   or   regional   aspirations  and  elaborated  on,  and  in  favor  of,  the  metropolitan  scale,  are  largely  unknown.  Therefore,  it   remains   out   of   consideration   the   fact   that   investments   favoring   the   lower   economic  circuit,   in   terms   of   both   production   and   consumption,   is   particularly   in   benefit   of   the  metropolitan  regions  as  a  whole.  Even  in  the  case  of  the  few  experiences  of  the  creation  of  specific  regional  development  initiatives,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Consortium  and  the  Agency  of  Development   in   the   so-­‐called   greater   ABC   region,   part   of   the  metropolitan   region   of   São  Paulo,   local  development   initiatives  are  much  more  aimed  at  strengthening  the  position  of  the   region   in   the   global   competition   in   order   to   attract   new   external   investments   for   the  region   and   boosting   the   upper   circuit   of   the   regional   economy,   although   in   recent   times  some  measures  are  envisioned  aiming  to  benefit  small  and  medium-­‐sized  firms,  contributing  in  some  way  to  the  lower  circuit  of  the  urban  economy  (CUADRADO-­‐ROURA  &  GÜELL,  2005;  ROLNIK  &  SOMEKH,  2003)2.  However,  definitely  there  is  no  explicit  regional  economic  policy  able  to  promote  the  integration  of  both  circuits.  

Though,  Brazilian  experiences,  albeit  in  a  quite  initial  stage,  tend  to  follow  “the  newest  wave  of  metropolitan   governance   reform   […throughout  western   Europe   that…]   is   focused  upon  economic   priorities   such   as   territorial   competitiveness   and   attracting   external   capital  investment   in   the   context   of   geoeconomic   and  European   integration”   (BRENNER,   2003,   p.  297).  According  to  Brenner,  the  European  experiences  could  only  be  understood  taking  into  consideration,   on   the   one   hand,   the   overall   tendencies   of   state   restructuring   in   territorial  terms,  or  “state  rescaling”,  related  primarily  to  the  process  of  European  integration;  on  the  other  hand,  he  points  out  the  relation  of  these  experiences  with  “newly  emergent  political  strategies   oriented   towards   a   reconfiguration   of   inherited   approaches   to   entrepreneurial  urban  governance”   (BRENNER,  2003,  p.  297).    Whereas   in   the  Brazilian  case,   it   seems  that  the   latter   aspect   has   also   gained   reasonable   relevance   in   urban   governance   in   the   last  decades   (COPANS,   2005;   FREY,   1997),   other   aspects   are   important   to   understand   the  renewed   interest   in   state   rescaling:   first,   the  debate  about   the  necessity  of   a  new   federal  

                                                                                                                         1  According  to  Sanchez  (2006:  181),  in  Brazil,  by  the  end  of  the  nineties  44%  of  jobs  have  been  provided  by  the  informal  sector.  In  the  year  2005,  44.89%  of  the  working  population  not  engaged  in  agriculture  belongs  to  the  informal  sector  (DEDECCA,  2007).  Perry  et  al.  (2007:9)  inform  that  in  Brazil  76%  of  small  firms  do  not  have  an  operating  license  and  94%  do  not  pay  taxes.    2  Recently,  the  Consortium  of  the  ABC  Region  created  a  Working  Group  “Labour  and  Income  Creation”  where  a  specific  attention  is  given  to  promote  initiatives  of  informal  and  solidary  economy.  

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pact  and  revised  agreements  concerning  the  competences  between  the  three  governmental  levels,   above   all   regarding   social   policies   (ARRETCHE,   1999);   and   second,   the   unsolved  problem  of   the  metropolitan   challenges  putting  on   the  political   and   academic   agenda   the  recentralization  of  politics  and  administration  (ROLNIK,  2003).  

The  case  of   the  greater  ABC  region   is   illustrative   for   the  preponderance  of  an  economistic  rationality  in  metropolitan  governance.  Even  in  this  case,   initiated  and  promoted  decisively  by  progressive  and  leftwing  parties  and  politicians,  the  focus  has  been,  right  from  the  start,  on  the  economic  concerns  and  interests  of  the  upper  economic  circuit.  This  focus  has  been  seen  as  a  precondition  for  mobilizing  the  local  entrepreneurship  to  engage  in  such  regional  development   forums.   There   is   a   certain   consensus,   even  within   the   academic   community,  that  “strategies  to  improve  competitiveness  and  to  instigate  its  growth  in  the  future”  require  after  all   consensual   solutions,   starting   therefore   from  the  premise  of   the  unavoidability  of  adjustments   in   accordance   with   the   interests   of   the   local   political   elite:   “The   strategic  alternatives  could  vary  […],  however,  the  selected  formula  has  to  be  acceptable  and  viable  for  the  political  class  that,  in  the  end,  represents  the  interests  of  the  citizens,  the  social  and  economic  agents”  (CUADRADO-­‐ROURA  &  GÜELL,  2005,  p.  120).  This  argument  of  a  supposed  equivalence  between  the   interests  of  the  citizens  and  their  representatives  starts  from  the  premise  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  principle  of  representation  in  the  democratic  process,  a  very   questionable   premise   in   the   Latin-­‐American   context  where   the   relationship   between  the  dominant  political  classes  and  the  political  masses  is  strongly  marked  by  patrimonialism,  clientelism  and  corruption  as  common  patterns  of  political  behavior.  

As  showed  in  a  recent  work  on  the  good  governance  approach  of  the  World  Bank  and  other  development  agencies  (FREY,  2008),  very  often  consensualist  approaches,   if  pursued  in  the  context   of   unequal   societies   and   unequal   power   relations,   bring   forth   the   exclusion   of  inconvenient  social  actors,   leading  to  “the  imposition  of  consensus”  and  the  determination  of  the  agenda  on  the  part  of  the  most  influential  agents;  or  alternatively,  there  are  proposed  parallel  agendas  and  processes  for  different  clienteles  and  interests  involved.  

Frequently,   the   duality   or   bipolarity   of   the   urban   economic   system3   is   answered   by   a  corresponding   division   of   administrative   responsibilities   in   the   political   and   administrative  sphere  of  municipalities:  traditional  administrative  agencies  of  support  to  the  local  economy  keep  on   fostering   their   customary   clientele,   i.e.,   the  modern  economic   sectors,   innovative  and  intensive  in  the  use  of  technology,  whereas  administrative  entities  in  charge  with  social  assistance  and  welfare,  in  view  of  the  growing  social  pressure,  pass  on  to  promote  initiatives  for  the  provision  of  work  and  income  particularly  for  the  more  needy  and  poor  sectors  of  the  population.  This  division  of  responsibilities,  in  our  view,  reveals  the  absence  of  an  integrated  conception   of   local   economic   development,   able   to   generate   connections   and   synergies  between  both  economic  circuits.  The  same  tendency  is  occurring  on  the  metropolitan  level,  as  in  the  case  of  the  greater  ABC  region  in  São  Paulo,  where  different  working  groups  have  been  created,  one  on  Regional  Development  attending  the  demands  of  the  modern  sector,  and  another  one  on  Labor  and   Income  Creation  focusing  on  creating   income  opportunities  for  the  informal  sector.  

Indeed,   the   pressures   of   globalization   limit   the   possibilities   of   action   on   part   of   urban  governance   (GILBERT,   2003).   At   the   same   time   and   due   to   the   obsession,   on   part   of   the                                                                                                                            3  The  “dual  city”  or  “divided  city”  is  not  a  reality  limited  to  developing  countries,  but  is  nowadays  also  discussed  as  a  more  and  more  common  phenomena  of  cities  of  the  industrialized  world,  as  for  instance  New  York  (REICHl,  2007).  

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political  system,  with  the  new  opportunities  provided  by  the  global  markets,  the  tendencies  of  fragmentation  and  segregation  are  aggravated  in  terms  of  both  the  socioeconomic  system  and   the   urban   space   itself.   As   pointed   out   by   Jordi   Borja:   “The   necessity   to   gain   a   better  position   on   international   markets   and   to   attract   enterprises   acting   within   the   global  economy  fortifies   the  tendency  to  create   ‘special  purpose’  zones,   technology  and  business  parks,   World   Trade   centers   or   telecommunication   centers,   etc.,   which   very   often   may  contribute  to  constitute  real  enclaves  without  any  integrative  effects,  neither  with  regard  to  the   city   nor   concerning   the   economy”   (Borja,   2001,   p.   23).   Economic   segregation,   in   its  territorial  dimension,  used  to  amplify  social  polarization,  bringing  forth  grave  consequences  for  people’s  quality  of   life   (REICHL,  2007).  Therefore,   local  governance  has  become  a   focal  point   of   current   development   debate:   “local   interactions   between   citizens   and   the   state  became   more   important   and   more   critical   to   the   present   life   conditions   and   future  opportunities   of   millions   of   citizens”   (GRINDLE,   2005,   p.   5).     And   with   regard   to   these  interactions  the  regional  and  metropolitan  level  gains  relevance,  according  to  Rolnik  (2003),  within  a  conception  of  governance  that  rather  favors  cooperation  for  the  benefit  of  regional  sustainable  development  over  competitive  local  strategies  for  attracting  scarce  resources,  or  putting   it   in   other   words:   governance   which   values   “cooperation   in   detriment   of   localist  individualism”  (ROLNIK  &  SOMEKH,  2003,  p.  103).  

Cooperative  approaches  –  including  the  recognition  of  the  existence  of  relevant  conflicts  and  the  necessity  to  real  political  dispute  –  are  becoming  particularly  inevitable  when  it´s  about  how  to  deal  with  the  social  question  and  the  mitigation  of  poverty   in  great  urban  centers.  Although  it  might  be  unrealistic  the  expectation  that  poverty  could  be  overcome  in  the  great  Latin   American   urban   agglomerations   only   by   new   initiatives   of   local   development   and  better   practices   of   governance,   it’s   pertinent   to   assume,   with   Nick   Devas,   that   the  improvement  of  the  quality  of  governance  can  make  a  difference,  above  all,  for  the  poorest  people   in   the  cities:  “It  can  make  the  difference  between  maintaining  a   fragile   foothold   in  the  city  and  being  swept  away  into  ever  deepening  poverty”  (Devas,  2004,  p.  1).  However,  therefore   it’s   crucial   that   “the   issue   of   polarization   can   reshape   the   substance   of   political  discourse  and  alter  the  urban  agenda”  (REICHL,  2007,  p.  660).  

At   this   juncture   it   is   of   fundamental   importance,   in   accordance   with  Milton   Santos,   that  urban   research  and  economic  policy   concentrate   their   efforts  on   the   strengthening  of   the  interdependencies  between   the  different  economic  circuits.   In  view  of   the   fact   that  global  economic   processes   used   to   have   relevant   –   very   often   negative   –   impacts   on   the   local  economy,   it   is  difficult   to   imagine  how   traditional   initiatives  based  on  only   selected   topics  could  achieve  something  more  than  a  minimal   improvement  of  the   living  conditions  of  the  urban  poor  (Atkinson,  2004).    

Thus,  in  this  paper  we  start  from  the  supposition  that  the  habitual  dualistic  way  to  think  and  act  should  be  seen  as  one  of  the  main  impediments  on  the  way  to  more  sustainable  cities.  The   need   to   overcome   fragmentation   and   sectorialization   of   political   and   administrative  action  has  revealed  even  more  urgent  in  developing  countries  in  view  of  extreme  social  and  economic   polarizations,   calling   into   question   the   possibility   of   pacific   and   democratic  coexistence  in  cities.  

In  view  of  this  dilemma  it  is  curious  to  verify,  in  the  Brazilian  context,  that  even  in  the  case  of  left-­‐wing  governments,   led  by  the  Workers’  Party,  the  same  division  of   institutional  arenas  could   be   observed,   for   instance,   in   the   case   of   participatory   budgeting   and   local   citizens’  councils   (FREY,   2002;   FREY   &   DUARTE,   2005).   Hence,   these   experiences   have   also   come  

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under  criticism.  According  to  Castor   (2004:  262s),  such  kinds  of  participation  are  attending  basically  or  primordially  the  poorest  groups  in  the  city,  lacking  therefore  representativeness.  As   a   consequence,   the   more   crucial   (re)distributive   questions   are   excluded   from   these  participative   decision-­‐making   arenas,   whereas,   in   parallel,   the   social   and   economic   elites  continue   to   pursue   their   political   objectives   by   their   traditional  means   based   on   informal  negotiations,   or   by  means   of   differentiated,  more   elitist,   participative   processes.   This   also  applies  for  the  the  greater  ABC  region,  where  as  I  already  mentioned  the  local  development  agency   has   been   created   to   attend   first   and   foremost   the   interests   related   to   the   upper  circuit   of   the   regional   economy.   The   focus   is   on   the   negotiation   of   global   development  strategies,  without  substantial  involvement  of  representatives  related  to  the  lower  economic  circuit.   Consequently,   the  upper  economic   circuit   and   the   interests  of   the  more  privileged  social  groups  tend  to  prevail.    

The  current  tendency  of  political  focalization  as  in  the  case  of  the  initiatives  in  favor  of  social  or  moral  economy  –  focalized  in  terms  of  both  political  participation  as  well  as  the  content  of  policies,   programs   and   projects   –   should   and   could   be   interpreted   as   a   result   of   political  convictions   concerning   the  necessity   to   invert   political   priorities   in   favor  of   the  poor,   as   a  strategy   of   real   social   transformation.   As   a   consequence   a   new   political   field   of   social  initiatives   is   emerging   involving   groups   of   different   actors   committed  with   the   success   of  such  initiatives,  i.e.,  new  kinds  of  policy  network.  However,  there  are  also  possible  risks  to  be  considered.   To   the   extent   to  which   this   desired   social   transformation   encounters   limits   in  the   reality   of   the   unequal   power   structure,   the   consequence   might   be   not   only   this  parallelism  of  institutional  structures,  but  in  addition  a  process  of  progressive  alienation  and  dissociation  opposing  more  and  more  these  different  social  and  political  groups.  The  result  might   be   an   ever-­‐increasing   dependence   of   the   underprivileged   people   from   traditional  state   action,   depending   upon   these   recently   created   institutional   arrangements,   however  with  only  very  limited  strength  within  the  overall  politico-­‐administrative  realm.  On  the  other  side,  the  higher-­‐income  and  market-­‐oriented  groups  being  always  less  depend  on  the  state  in  order  to  satisfy  their  needs  and  interests.  

Even  with   regard   to   traditional   civil   services,   formerly  exclusively  delivered  by   the  state,   it  has  to  be  stated  that   local  elites   increasingly  revert  to  private  market  forces  that  are   in  an  ongoing  process  of   functional   expansion  offering  more   and  more   all   necessary   services   to  the  wealthier  citizens,  from  health  services  to  education  and  safety.  

The   city   with   its   shopping-­‐centers   and   entertainment   temples   serves   to   the   established  social   sectors   almost   exclusively   for   satisfying   their   consumer   needs,   whereas   the   “local  state”   used   to   shrink,   at   least   in   its   relevance   for   local   elites,   loosing   particularly   its  importance  as  the  favorite  sphere  for  political  confrontation  and  the  distribution  of  benefits  and   income.   Given   this   process   of   depoliticization,   democracy   and   local   governability   are  called   into   question.   Depoliticization   is   here   not   envisaged   as   a   positive   process   able   to  foster   political   deliberation   as   in   Pettit’s   concept   of   a   “Depoliticizing  Democracy”   (PETTIT,  2004),  but   rather,  based  on   the  Latin  American  empirical   context,  as  a  process  of   citizens’  withdrawal   from  the   local  political  arenas,   fortifying  a   situation   in  which   the   socially  weak  population   continues   dependent   on   the   state,   being   the   relation   between   governors   and  governed  fundamentally  based  on  clientelistic  and  patrimonialistic  political  structures.  While  social   conflicts  worsen,   special  purpose,  “pro-­‐poor”,  organizational   structures  emerge  with  the   objective   to   provide   the  more   vulnerable   social   sectors   with   basic   infrastructure   and  services.  The  focus  is  on  addressing  first  the  principal  calamities  and  the  worst  situations  of  scarcity.  However,  as  we  already  highlighted  before,  without   taking   into  consideration   the  

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interdependencies   with   the   global   modern   social,   political   and   economic   system,   these  initiatives   will   remain   limited   and   unsatisfying   and   fail   to   promote   integration   and   to  instigate   synergies   between   the   local   and   the   global,   between   the   traditional   and   the  modern.   In  this  context,  the  question  of  the  necessary   institutional  arrangements  to  tackle  with  these  challenges  in  metropolitan  regions  becomes  decisive.    

 

Understanding   institutional   change   of   metropolitan   governance   in   Latin  America  

According  to  Cuadrado-­‐Roura  and  Güell  (2005,  p.  73),  in  analyzing  metropolitan  governance  in   Latin   America   the   peculiarities   of   the   Latin-­‐American   context   have   to   be   taken   into  consideration:  “the  Latin-­‐American  metropolises  show  certain  physical,   socioeconomic  and  political   traits   that   make   them   different   from   the   rest   of   the   metropolitan   areas   on   the  planet”.  

In   recent   decades,   Latin   American   cities   have   suffered   significant   social   and   economic  transformation,   but   had   difficulties   to   deal   with   these   new   challenges.   In   this   paper   our  focus   is   not   on   the   socioeconomic   and   physical   aspects   of   these   transformations,   but  primarily   on   the  political   and   administrative  dimensions   related   to  metropolitan  problems  that   commonly   transcend   politico-­‐administrative   boundaries   and   from   our   understanding  represent   the   principal   shortcomings   for   Latin-­‐American   metropolises.   Institutional  innovations  on  the  metropolitan  level  have  been  in  general  rather  rare.  The  effectiveness  of  institutional  arrangements  and  management  practices  turned  out  to  be  quite  limited  in  view  of   the   coordination   needs   given   by   such   kinds   of   intermunicipal   and   intersectorial  phenomena.    

The  theoretical  approach  of  “path  dependency”,  as  formulated  by  Douglas  North  and  others,  might  help  us  to  get  a  better  understanding  of  the  merely  incremental  institutional  change,  or   “continuous   marginal   adjustments”   (NORTH,   1993,   p.   132)   that   seems   particularly   a  relevant  concern  with  metropolitan  coordination.  North’s  emphasis  is  on  the  importance  of  the  historical  process  to  explain  institutional  change:  “path  dependency  means  that  history  matters”,  i.e.,  choices  made  in  the  past  represent  “formal  or  informal  restrictions”  (ibid.,  31)  for  choices  made  in  the  present  time.  This  in  turn  implies  in  negotiation  costs  and  enters  in  dispute  with  existing  mental   images  and  models,  based  on  “ideas,   ideologies  and  believes”  (ibid.,  136).  These  again  shape  a  politically  complex  game  that  hinders  to  arrive  at  decisions  in  the  presence  oriented  exclusively  by  principles  of  efficiency  or   institutional  effectiveness  (ibid.,  122).  All  these  factors  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  studying  the  evolution  of  institutional   arrangements   of   metropolitan   governance   in   Latin   America   and   therefore  allowing  a  better  understanding  of  “the  large  gap  that  exists  between  intentions  and  results”  (ibid.,  136).  

Even  if  there  is  a  general  recognition  of  technical  and  administrative  necessities   in  favor  of  institutional   change,   this   does   not   necessarily   lead   to   institutional   reforms   desirable   from  the  perspective  of  technical  rationality  due  to  the  political  costs  related  to  the  negotiation  of  institutional  change:  “political  institutions  constitute  ex  ante  agreements  about  co-­‐operation  among   politicians”   (NORTH,   1990,   p.   359).   That   means   that   not   only   the   current   socio-­‐political  context,  the  actual  structural  and  ideational  conditions  matter,  but  even  the  socio-­‐political  and  cultural  context  of  the  past  –  positions,  values  and  ideas  defended  previously  –  continue  to  have  an  effect  in  institutional  decisions  of  the  presence,  delineating  the  possible  

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scope  of  action  and  decision-­‐making.  Thus,  real  institutional  realignments  may  only  occur  if  favorable  and  exceptional  conditions  for  such  realignments  are  given,  like  a  crisis  or  change  of  government  for  instance;  or  once  such  institutional  reform  have  been  implemented  under  such  exceptional  conditions,  a  process  of  adjustment  or  of  institutional  reversal,  due  to  the  institutional   heritage   and   traditional   practices,   might   emerge   in   a   way   that   after   all   the  aspired  effects  will  not  be  reached.  

North  himself  emphasizes  some  possible  reasons  to  explain  the  difficulties  of  Latin-­‐American  Nations,  after  having  gained  national  independence,  to  adopt  and  consolidate  decentralized  structures  and  patterns  of  state  action  alike  those  in  the  United  States,  whose  constitution  served   as   inspiration   for   the   new  Hispano-­‐American   Nations.     For   the   failures   concerning  federalist  practices  and  decentralization  efforts  he  holds  responsible  “a  strange  collection  of  norms   about   a   very   old   heritage   of   centralized   bureaucratic   controls   and   corresponding  ideological  perceptions”  (NORTH,  1993,  p.  134).  The  effect  of  these  norms  had  contributed  to  the  gradual  reversal  and  resumption  of  the  habitual  bureaucratic  and  centralized  patterns  of  control  in  Hispanic  America  in  the  19th  and  20th  century,  due  to  “the  persistence  of  the  institutional  agenda  imposed  by  Spain  and  Portugal”  (ibid.:  135).    

Following   the   logic   of   the   path   dependency   approach,   it’s   possible   to   assert   that   the  democratic   reforms   implemented   in   Latin   America   –   most   of   them   having   experienced  severe  military  regimes  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  –  continue  under  the  influence  of   this   bureaucratic-­‐institutional   heritage   and   a   political   and   administrative   culture   with  strong   patrimonialistic   and   clientelistic   tendencies.   Nevertheless,   the   conception   of   path  dependency   does   not   exclude   the   possibility   that   the   experiences  with   new  decentralized  institutions  in  the  current  democratic  context  could  contribute  to  the  process  of  democratic  consolidation,   creating  a   renewed   social,   political   and   cultural  heritage  –  democratic   in   its  essence   –   that   fortifies   democratic   structures   and   practices   against   possible   authoritarian  contestation  in  the  future.    

According  to  the  OECD  “decentralisation  has  reinforced  awareness  of  the  need  to   improve  governance  at  the  metropolitan  level”  (OECD,  2001,  p.  16).  Anyway,  progress  in  direction  of  a  real  strengthening  of  the  metropolitan  scale  as  a  level  of  jurisdiction,  effective  and  at  the  same   time  democratic,  able   to  deal  with   the  complex  economic,   social  and  environmental  problems   of   urban   agglomerations,   has   been   quite   limited.   This   general   difficulty   applies  even  for  the  richer  countries   in  the  world  as  asserted   in  the  OECD  report:    “in  many  OECD  countries  metropolitan   areas   still   function  with   a  minimum  of   co-­‐ordination   and   strategic  planning  at  the  local  level”  (ibid.,  p.  17).  

The  Latin-­‐American  case  seems  to  corroborate  this  tendency  of  an  overall  omission  in  terms  of   institutionalization   of   effective   arrangements   in  metropolitan   governance.   According   to  Klink  (2005),  apart  from  only  very  few  exceptions,  “the  Latin-­‐American  metropolitan  regions  are   lacking  a  mature  and  consolidated  structure   for  metropolitan  governance  able   to  bear  the   challenge   to   create   urban   competitiveness,   environmental   sustainability   and   better  quality  of  life”  (176).  

The  major  part  of  the  literature  on  metropolitan  management  and  planning  starts  from  the  basic   assumption   of   a   need   for   supra-­‐municipal   institutional   structures,   or   at   least  intermunicipal,   in   order   to   be   capable   to   deal   adequately,   from  a   technical   point   of   view,  with  the  functional  problems  of  metropolitan  regions.  Favorable  conditions  of  accountability  should  ensure  congruence  between  the  technical  manifestation  of  given  problems  and  the  

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political   and   administrative   strategies   to   address   them   and   therefore   allowing   for   a  consistent  process  of  control  of  state  action  by  citizens  and  the  electorate.  

Very   often,  metropolitan   government   has   been   identified   with   centralization,   and   on   the  other  hand,  decentralized  government  with  democracy  (BARLOW,  1994).  This  has  also  been  the  case   in  Latin  America,  above  all   in  succession  of   the  authoritarian  regimes  where   local  democracy   had   been   eroded   or   almost   inexistent.   The   subsequent   municipalistic  constitutions  with  an  –  at  least  legally  –  strong  local  autonomy,  is  only  understandable,  as  in  the  Brazilian  case,  as  a  reply  to  the  previous  centralistic  regimes  in  an  overall  pro-­‐democratic  context,   leading   however   to   a   situation   of   omission   concerning   the   metropolitan   scale  (SOUZA,  2007).    

As   a   consequence  of   the   functional  dilemmas   that   resulted  of   these  processes,   frequently  the  principle  of  “subsidiarity”  has  been  applied  in  the  development  debate.  Decisions  should  be  taken  on  the  lowest  possible  governmental  level,   i.e.,  closest  possible  to  the  citizen  and  society,  though  technical  characteristics  and  requirements  have  to  be  considered  and  might  demand  for  metropolitan  or  supra-­‐municipal  structures,  if  the  metropolitan  relevance  of  the  problems  at  stake  is  given  (LEFÈVRE,  2005,  p.  258;  ROJAS,  2008,  p.  2).  Therefore,  the  focus  of  this   literature   used   to   be   the   institutional   strengthening   of   the   metropolitan   scale   as   a  general  necessity  for  huge  metropolises4.  

However,  it’s  just  this  vertical  division  of  responsibilities  that  seems  always  less  viable  in  the  light   of   the   complexity   of   given   problems   and   the   increasing   “externalities   and  transcendences”   turning  up  on   the   territorial  base.  Today’s   large  urban  agglomeration  are  characterized   by   a   progressive   multiplication   of   problems   that   used   to   go   beyond   the  jurisdiction   of   only   one   specific   territorial   entity,   irrespective   of   whether   municipalities,  urban   districts,   quarters   or   catchment   basins   are   concerned   and   thus   affecting   different  politico-­‐administrative   spaces   or   arenas.   Comprehensive   and   idealized   models   are   thus  always  less  convincing  in  view  of  the  existing  technical  and  sociopolitical  complexity.    

From  the  democracy  perspective  the  pretty  simplistic  confrontation  between  centralization  and   decentralization,   identifying   metropolitan   structures   with   centralization   and  authoritarianism   and   municipal   autonomy   with   democracy   seems   always   less   tenable,   at  least  if  we  pass  on  to  adopt  a  different  perspective  looking  at  the  metropolitan  level  also  as  part  of  national  or  federal  state  structure;  and  not,  first  and  foremost,  as  externally  imposed  intermediate  structures  with  the  primordial  aim  to  restrict  local  autonomy.  Thus,  a  new  view  is  necessary  that  considers  the  metropolitan  level  as  a  possible  result  of  both  upscaling  –  the  shifting   of   local   functions   to   the   metropolitan   level   -­‐   and   downscaling   –   the   transfer   of  responsibilities   from   the   state   or   federal   level   to   metropolitan   authorities.   From   this  perspective,   “metropolitan   government   provides   a   necessary   centralization   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   local  governments   and   a   necessary   decentralization   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   higher-­‐level   governments”  (BARLOW,  1994,  p.  328).  This  perspective  could  also  contribute  to  facilitate  support  on  part  of   local   governments,   as   their   scope   of   influence   could   be   extended   fairly   beyond   the  administrative  borders  of  their  proper  jurisdictions.    

As   I   will   argue   later   in   the   paper,   the   additional   consideration   of   informal   and   network  structures  seems  indispensable,  allowing  and  favoring  dialog,  cooperation  and  collaboration  between  and  over  different  scales,  jurisdictions  and  sectors.  It’s  this  multi-­‐level  perspective  of  network  governance  that  at  least  gained  ground  in  the  European  academic  debate  (BENZ,  

                                                                                                                         4  See  also  CENECORTE,  2009,  for  the  case  of  Mexico.  

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2007),   whereas   in   the   Latin-­‐American   context,   where   the   debate   on   metropolitan  governance   seems   to   be   still   dominated   by   the   concerns   about   physical   and   territorial  planning,  the  focus  is  still  rather  focused  on  the  technical  and  functional  rationality.  

Thus,   in   spite   of   the   difficulties   to   reconcile   technical   with   sociopolitical   rationalities,   the  emphasis   in   the   search   for   adequate   institutional   conceptions   of   urban   governance  continues   to   pursue,   first   and   foremost,   the   principles   of   functional   and   technical  consistency   and   accountability.   Lefèvre   (2005)   for   instance   conceives   what   he   names   an  “ideal   model”   of   a   “metropolitan   government”,   characterized   by:   direct   elections   of  metropolitan   authorities   and,   therefore,   politically   legitimized;   a   jurisdiction   territory  corresponding   to   the   functional   territory   of   the   metropolis;   proper   financial   resources;  relevant   responsibilities   and   competences;   and   finally,   competent   human   resources   to  elaborate  and  execute  relevant  policies  and  actions  (LEFÈVRE,  2005,  p.  201).    Depending  on  the  degree  of  fulfillment  of  these  principles,  he  differentiates  between  a  strong  and  a  weak  version   of   this  model   of  metropolitan   government.   An   equivalent   position   is   defended   by  Scheid   (2007)5   when   he   alleges   that   “only   a   metropolitan   perspective   or   one   of   a   urban  region   that   counts  on   the   restoration  of   coherence  between   the   functional   space  and   the  politico-­‐administrative   environment,   for   instance,   through   the   creation   of   one   unique  metropolitan  authority,  the  public  planning  processes  and  service  delivery  can  operate  with  a  maximum  degree  of  efficiency  and  equity”.    

The   overall   tendency   of   Latin-­‐American   metropolises   of   only   weak   institutional  arrangements   on   the   metropolitan   scale,   is   only   partly   opposed   by   the   experiences   of  Caracas,   Quito   and   Bogotá   that   could   be   “classified   as   exceptions   from   the   generalized  absence  of  a  framework  for  metropolitan  governability  in  Latin  America”  (KLINK,  2005,  171).  In   this   paper   I   argue   against   this   common   view   of   aspiring   a   comprehensive   system   of  metropolitan   governance   or   government,   guided   by   principles   of   technical   and   functional  rationality  and  unilaterally  imposed  to  municipalities  from  above,  for  basically  two  reasons:  first,  for  its  negative  implications  on  local  democratic  vitality  and,  second,  for  its  unfeasibility  in   view   of   the   historical   legacy,   the   socio-­‐political   context   and   structure   that  makes   such  attempts  unsustainable  at  least  in  the  long  term.  In  the  final  section  I  will  argue  in  favor  of  network  governance,  where   institutional  arrangements  are   conceived  and   the   result  of  an  ongoing   process   of   cooperation   that   respects   local   autonomy   and   the   plurality   of   local  societal  actors.  

 

Experiences  of  metropolitan  governance  in  Latin  America  

 In   order   to   arrive   to   these   conclusions,   I  will   in   the   following   section   confront   a   group   of  Latin-­‐American  cases  with  a  reasonable   institutional   framework  on  the  metropolitan  scale,  with   another   group   characterized   by   rather   weak   institutional   conditions,   where  intermunicipal  articulations  are  rather  result  of   local  governance  initiatives.  Concerning  the  first  group  I  will  have  a  more  detailed  look  at  the  Colombian  case,  whereas  concerning  the  second  the  Brazilian  experiences  will  be  highlighted,  aiming  to  sustain  my  overall  argument.                                                                                                                            5  SCHEID,  H.A.  Tres  propuestas  para  una  relación  efectiva  entre  las  escalas  regional  y  local  en  materia  de  ordenación  del  territorio.  En:  FARINÓS,  J.;  ROMERO,  J.  (Comp.)  Territorialidad  y  buen  gobierno  para  el  desarrollo  sostenible.  Nuevos  principios  y  nuevas  políticas  en  el  espacio  europeo.  Universidad  de  Valencia.  España,  2007;  quoted  from  Barrero  (2009,  p.  29-­‐30).  

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Regarding   the   first   group,   Lefèvre   (LEFÈVRE,   2005,   p.   252)   considers   Quito,   Caracas   and  Bogotá  as  metropolitan  areas   “that  have  arrangements  of  governability”.  The  cases  of   the  metropolitan   districts   of   Caracas   and   Quito   are   interesting   due   to   relatively   far-­‐reaching  competences   which   have   been   transferred   in   the   field   of   service   delivery,   infrastructure,  territorial  and  environmental  planning.  Whereas  the  experience  of  Quito,  according  to  Klink  (2005),   seems   to   show   certain   institutional   stability,   having   expanded   the   district’s  responsibilities  and  activities  recently  to  questions  of  regional  competitiveness,  the  case  of  Caracas   seems   rather   characterized  by   conflicts  between   the   local   governments,   the   state  governor  and  metropolitan  mayor  and  with   several   legal  questions  not  being   resolved  yet  (KLINK,  2005,  p.  174).  

The  Colombian  case  represents  another  of  the  few  Latin-­‐American  exceptions  with  a  formal  institutional   structure,   imposed   to   the   local  municipalities   by   the   unitary   republican   state  (KLINK,   2005;   BARRERO,   2009).   The   political   and   administrative   structure   of   Colombia   is  constituted   by   the   departments  with   limited   responsibilities   and   the  municipalities,  which  are  responsible  for  providing  most  basic  civil  services,  being  the  result  of  a  decentralization  process   implemented   by   the   national   government   (ROSENBAUM   &   RODRÍGUEZ-­‐ACOSTA,  2005).   Established   by   law   in   1978,   and   updated   in   1994,   the   institutional   framework   for  Columbian  metropolitan  regions  stipulated  a  Metropolitan  Council  (“Junta  Metropolitana”),  integrated  by   the  mayors   of   each  of   the  metropolitan  municipalities,   and  presided  by   the  Mayor  of  the  regional  metropolis  or  major  city,  the  governor  of  the  department  where  the  region  is  located,  a  representative  of  the  municipal  council  of  the  major  city,  and  one  other  representative  of  a  municipal  council  of  the  remaining  municipalities.  Other  institutions  are  the   metropolitan   mayor,   who   is   the   chief   of   the   metropolitan   administration,   a   charge  destined  to  the  mayor  of  the  major  city;  a  metropolitan  manager  as  the  legal  representative  of   the  area,  and  a  metropolitan  planning  council   (BARRERO,  2009,  p.  9).  The  metropolitan  regions   are   responsible   for   the   planning   of   a   wide   range   of   urban   services,   including   the  financial  dimensions,  being  therefore   legally  binding   for   the  municipalities   (KLINK,  2005,  p.  175).  

Due  to  the   fact   that   there   is  no  alternation  of  power  between  the  different  mayors  of   the  region,   being   the   office   of   the  metropolitan  mayor   always   occupied   by   the  mayor   of   the  capital,  resistance  and  conflicts  have  been  common  between  the  major  city  and  the  smaller  and  economically  weaker  municipalities  of  the  regions  where  metropolitan  structures  have  been  created.  In  view  of  the  wide  ranging  competences  of  the  metropolitan  area,  and  due  to  the   strong   power   position   of   the   metropolitan   mayor,   if   compared   to   the   metropolitan  council,  whose  decision  depend  on  the  mayor’s  approbation,  there  is  a  lot  of  criticism,  above  all   by   those  municipalities,   contesting   the   constitutionality   of   this   legal   arrangements   for  presumably  violating  local  autonomy  and  for  not  respecting  existing  local  interdependencies  (MARTINEZ,  2009,  p.  16).  

However,   despite   the   existing   national   legal   framework,   corresponding   institutional  structures   have   been   implemented   until   today   in   only   six   metropolitan   regions   of   minor  national  relevance.  “Thus,  the  major  urban  regions  of  Colombia  do  not  count  on  institutions  to  manage   supra-­‐municipal   affairs   as   the   provision   of   public   services   or   the   execution   of  regional  civil  works”,  what  is  the  case  inclusively  of  the  main  metropolitan  region  of  Bogotá  and  the  surrounding  municipalities  of  the  Sabana  (BARRERO,  2009,  p.  16).  

The  case  of  Bogotá  shows  very  clearly   the   insufficiency  of  national   legal   initiatives  and  the  very  importance  of  the  local  sociopolitical  dynamic,  the  structural  institutional  conditions,  as  

14    

well   as   historical   experiences   that   could   facilitate   or,   as   in   this   case,   hamper   institutional  evolution.    

It’s  quite  noteworthy  that   the  argument   in   favor  of  metropolitan  centralization  used  to  be  made  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  supposedly  superior  technical  or  functional  rationality.  This  is   evident   with   regard   to   the   law   128   from   1994   where   “coordinated   administration”   is  required   “for   development   programming   and   planning   and   for   rational   public   service  delivery”6.  Whereas  the  superior  governmental  instances  on  the  state  or  national  level  used  to  allege   technical   rationality,   trying   to   impose   restrictions   to   local   authorities,   those   local  governments   in   contrast   regard   such   efforts  with   suspicion   suspecting   an   assault   on   their  local  autonomy.    

Here   the   historical   experience   with   the   creation   of   the   Federal   District   of   Bogotá   in   the  1940s  and  1950s  seems  at  the  origin  of  this  overall  mistrust.  At  that  time,  some  peripheral  districts   and   neighboring   municipalities   have   been   incorporated   to   the   federal   district,  loosing   therewith   their   autonomy   and   becoming   mere   local   districts7.   “Therefore,   the  creation  of  a  metropolitan  area  is  considered  by  the  municipalities  in  the  Sabana  as  the  first  step  towards  becoming  a  district,  why  the  majority  of  the  municipalities  do  not  sympathize  with  such  alternatives  for  violating  directly  local  autonomy”  (BARRERO,  2009,  p.  17).  For  the  same  reason,  none  of  the  six  metropolitan  regions  has  made  use  of  the  possibility  to  become  a   district,   although   this   would   imply   enhanced   political   importance   and   fiscal   autonomy.  Barrero   (idem.,   p.   22)   holds   responsible   for   this   omission   the   low   flexibility   of   this  institutional  conception  detracting  all  political  and  territorial  rights  from  the  localities.  In  the  current   democratic   context,   with   constitutional   rights   guaranteed   to   local   governments,  such   kind   of   enforced   institutional   subordination   seems   an   always   less   promising   way   to  achieve  intermunicipal  cooperation  on  the  metropolitan  scale.  

It’s  also  noteworthy  the  very   limited  participation  of  civil   society  actors  “in   the  design  and  execution  of   the  metropolitan  governance  system”   (KLINK,  2005,  p.  176).    This  however   is  certainly  not  a  particularity  of  the  Columbian  case  and  we  will  come  back  to  this  question  in  our   final   section   on   the   perspective   of   metropolitan   network   governance.   For   the   time  being,  it’s  important  to  record  the  limits  of  metropolitan  institutional  frameworks,  imposed  by  national  or  state  governments  and  legislation,  if  the  particular  conditions  and  demands  of  the  minor  municipalities  and  of  the  civil  society  are  not  taken  into  account.  This  is  especially  relevant   if   as   in   the   case   of   Bogotá   there   is   a   highly   dominant   central   city   opposing   a  relatively   small   number   of   comparably   small,   as  well   as   economically   and   politically  weak  municipalities  

The   evaluation   of   Gerardo   Ardila,   for   instance,   is   very   disappointing   and   clear:   “The  processes   of   seeking   regional   consensus,   from   associations   of   municipalities   to   the  Roundtable  of  Regional  Planning,   and  all   other   attempts   since  1959  have   failed”   (ARDLLA,  2009,  p.  9).  He  also  holds  responsible  for  these  failures  the  neglect  of  the  political  character  of  metropolitan  governance  and  the  one-­‐sided  focus  on  the  mere  technical  aspects  of  such  accords.    

                                                                                                                         6  Quotation  in  Barrero  (2009,  p.6)  and  Martinez  (2009,  p.2).  7  Under  “local  districts”  we  understand  local  neighborhoods  or  quarters,  whereas  the  district,  in  the  sense  of  the  Federal  district  and  the  district  as  established  in  the  national  Constitution  of  1991,  corresponds  to  a  wider  administrative  unity  that  could  be,  as  in  the  case  of  Bogotá,  smaller  than  the  overall  metropolitan  region,  or  could  also  comprise  all  municipalities  of  a  given  metropolitan  region.  

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On  the  other  hand  is   it  quite  remarkable  that  recently  the  focus  has  been  shifted  from  the  metropolitan  level  to  wider  regional  scales,  strongly  brought  forward  by  economic  interests  and  superior  governmental  instances.  In  a  recent  debate  organized  by  the  Institute  of  Urban  Studies   of   the   National   University   of   Colombia   (IUS,   2010),   three   possible   institutional  arrangements   with   increasing   territorial   extension   have   been   discussed,   from   the   City  Region  (Ciudad  Región)  to  the  Capital  Region  (Región  Capital)  and  the  Central  Region  (Región  Central),   revealing   very   clearly   the   same   conflicts   and   dissensions:   on   the   one   side,   the  representatives  of  Bogotá  and  the  superior  governmental  authorities  speaking  up  for  more  centralized   authority   in   order   to   guarantee   technical   rationality,   and   on   the   other,  mistrustful   mayors   of   the   smaller   cities   concerned   about   their   autonomy   as   revealed   for  instance  in  the  speech  of  the  Mayor  of  the  small  city  of  Chía:  “We  municipalities  have  to  be  actors   regardless   of   how   small   we   may   be”   (ibid.   p.   8).   Nevertheless,   there   is   definitely  progress   to  be   registered,  as   such  kinds  of   forums  organized   to   think  and  negotiate  about  strategies  of  regional   integration  allow  for  a  wider  public  discussion,   insofar  as  the  general  public   is   involved  and  also  non-­‐governmental  actors  are  sitting  at  the  table  discussing  with  governmental  agents.    

Coming  now  to  the  second  group  of  metropolitan  regions,  Klink  (2005)  bemoans,  referring  to  other  Latin-­‐American  capitals,  particularly  Santiago  de  Chile  and  Buenos  Aires,  a   lack  of  an  adequate  institutional  structures  able  to  give  more  consistency  to  metropolitan  governance.  According   to   the   typology   of   Lefèvre   (2005,   p.   252)   only   Santiago   falls   in   the   category   of  metropolitan  regions  without  governmental  ordering.  Klink  endorses  this  judgment,  alleging  that  the  absence  of   the  necessary   institutional,   financial  and  managerial  capacities  hinders  the   development   of   an   adequate   strategic   vision,   able   to   deal   with   the   complex  metropolitan  problems  in  Santiago.    

Concerning  Buenos  Aires,  in  contrast,  he  states  “various  complex  relations  between  different  actors”  (KLINK,  2005,  p.  164),  involving  the  32  local  governments  with  limited  autonomy,  the  provincial   government,   the  autonomous   city  of  Buenos  Aires   and   the   central   government,  without  however  being  guided  by  a  clear  formal  institutional  framework.  The  consequence  is  a   kind   of   “functional   regionalism”   in   Greater   Buenos   Aires,   based   on   “efforts   to   install  functional   orders   destined   to   enhance   rationality,   being   each   of   them   characterized   by  differing  territorial  reach  and  sectorial  objectives”  (Ibid.).  The  fact  that  these  special  purpose  agencies   have   been   established   with   wide   governmental   participation   from   part   of   the  national  and  provincial  governments,  but  excluding   local  governments  of   the  metropolitan  region,   subordinated   to   the   provincial   government,   from   the   overall   process,   reveals,  according  to  Klink  (ibid.,  166),  a  deficit  of  participation  and  transparency,  reducing  political  legitimacy   and   regional   governability.   The   financial   and   political   weakness   of   the   local  authorities   in   Greater   Buenos   Aires,   being   “subjected   to   one   of   the   most   centralized  provincial  regimes  in  the  Federation”  (ibid.,  166-­‐7),  makes  them  basically  dependent  on  their  capacity  to  negotiate  and  to  exchange  favors  with  the  superior  agencies,  representing  very  unfavorable  conditions  for  establishing  a  real  governance  regime.  

The   situation   of   Argentina,   though   it   presents   similarities   concerning   the   fragility   of   the  overall   institutional   framework,   differs   very   clearly   from   Brazil   where   the   municipalities  enjoy  a  wide-­‐reaching  local  autonomy  since  the  enactment  of  the  Constitution  from  1988.    

In   the   course   of   the   democratization   process   the   Brazilian  metropolitan   regions   and   their  planning   agencies,   created   during   the   military   regime   in   1973,   have   been   extinguished,  weakened   or   reduced   to   mere   administrative   organs   without   political   power   and  

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competences   to   intervene   effectively   in   local   affairs   in   view   of   the   comprehensive   local  autonomy   provided   by   the   Constitution.   Although   23   Metropolitan   Regions   are   to   date  institutionalized   by   state   legislation,   not   necessarily   there   is   any   kind   of   metropolitan  governance  in  operation  (SOUZA,  2007,  p.  238).  In  fact,  there  prevail  quite  different  practices  of   metropolitan   governance   in   Brazil,   not   least   because   the   competences   concerning   the  regulation  have  been  conferred  to  the  provincial  states  by  the  National  Constitution.    

Thus,   “the   framers   of   the   1988   Constitution   (…)   decided   to   leave   the   metropolitan  governance  in  a  political,  institutional  and  administrative  vacuum,  limiting  the  urban  reform  to  the  creation  of  participative  mechanisms  on  the  local  sphere”  (SOUZA,  2007,  p.  238),  and  to  date  the  metropolitan  question  has  been  excluded  from  the  state  reforms  implemented  in  the  last  decades  in  Brazil,  showing  a  “lack  of  political  interest  in  the  public  management  of  the  metropolitan  areas”  (RIBEIRO,  2004,  p.  22).      

The  Brazilian  Constitution  privileged  a  situation  of  competition  between  the  different  state  levels   in  detriment  to  cooperative  structures,  what  is  true  particularly  for  the  metropolitan  regions   (SOUZA,   2007,   p.   252).   For   most   of   the   social   scientists   the   comprehensive   local  autonomy   is  seen  as  one  of   the  severe   impediments   for   the  consolidation  of  metropolitan  governance  in  Brazil  (AZEVEDO;  GUIA,  2000;  ROLNIK,  2003;  SOUZA,  2007).  The  action  of  the  Metropolitan  Regions  and  the  corresponding  planning  agencies,  created  and  directed  by  the  provincial   states,   had   already   during   the   times   of   the   military   regimes   been   marked   by  “conflicts   and   tensions   in   the   inter   and   intra-­‐governmental   relations,   deepening   therefore  the  federative  frictions  and  the  problems  of  cooperation”  (SOUZA,  2007,  p.  236).  

Celine  Souza  argues,  based  on  the  theory  of  path  dependence,  that  “the  institutional  choices  with   respect   to   the   management   of   metropolitan   regions,   shaped   by   centralization,  authoritarianism   and   by   the   absence   of   mechanisms   of   cooperation   between   the  governmental   spheres,   have  marked   their   trajectory   during   the  military   regime   and   have  turned   almost   impossible   their   survival   after   the   redemocratization”   (ibid.,   p.   257).   The  particular  reasons  she  mentioned  are  the  following:    

First,   as   the  Metropolitan   Regions   had   been   identified   as   associated   to   the   authoritarian  military  regime,   to  centralization  and  the  control  of   the  territory,   the   idea  of  metropolitan  institutions  came  into  a  general  opposition  to  the  overall  redemocratization  agenda.  Second,  the   tradition   of   relative   local   autonomy   in   previous   democratic   regimes   and   the   fear   of   a  new   subordination   of   the   local   sphere   to   the   superior   instances   contributed   to   the  unwillingness  regarding  metropolitan  planning  structures.  A  third  factor  is  that  the  already  in  1985   foreseeable   tendency  of  very  conflictive  and  competitive  electoral  processes,   related  to   the   return   to   direct   elections,   turns   the   management   on   the   metropolitan   level   very  difficult.  The  competitive  and  conflictive  political  environment  becomes  an  obstacle   to   the  necessary  cooperation,  articulation  and  the  sharing  of  resources  between  governments.  The  final   factor   is   related   to   the   relative   strengthening   of   the   municipalities   by   the   new  Constitution,   above   all   with   regard   to   financial   resources.   The   provincial   states,  constitutionally   in  charge  with   the  creation  and  regulation  of   the  metropolitan  regions,  do  not   have   any   incentives   to   foster   metropolitan   governance   and   ascribing   any   more  important   role   to   the   municipalities   in   this   process.   The   final   result   is   that   due   to   the  historical   experiences,   particularly   during   the   military   regime,   the   national   and   the   state  governments   had   been   both   unable   and   unwilling   to   promote   the   cooperative   attitudes  indispensable  for  successful  metropolitan  governance.    

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However,   it’s   on   the   other   hand   quite   notable   that   notwithstanding   the   shortcomings   in  promoting   cooperation   by   incentives   from   above,   there   have   occurred   initiatives   starting  from   the   local   governments   themselves   to   improve   intermunicipal   cooperation   within  metropolitan  regions.  Very  successful  has  been  the  figure  of  the  intermunicipal  consortium  as  a  partnership  of  local  administrations  to  tackle  with  common  problems  as  for  instance  the  collection  or   treatment  of   solid  waste,   the  delivery  of  expensive   services   in  health   care  or  environmental   services,   sharing   resources   and   efforts   and   working   together   for   common  solutions.   This   has   become   an   increasingly   important   strategy   in   view   of   the   fragility   of  regional   authorities,   ensuring   to   the   municipalities   their   municipal   autonomy.   These  consortia  are  open  to  unrestricted  participation  of  their  members  and  all  activities  must  be  approved  by   the  administrative  board  composed   in  general  by   the  mayors  of   the   involved  municipalities   (MELO   &   SÁEZ,   2007).   In   Brazil,   based   on   a   constitutional   requirement,   in  2005   a   specific   law   (Nr.   11.107),   which   provides   the   legal   framework   for   the   creation   of  public   consortia   and   therefore   favoring   a  more   cooperative   federalism,   has   passed   in   the  national   congress   (LOSADA,   2010),   creating   the   legal   conditions   for   the   expansion   of   an  increasing  “territorial  associationalism”  on  the  local  an  regional  level  (ABRUCIO  et  al.,  2010).  

An   important   experience   is   being   developed   in   the   metropolitan   region   of   São   Paulo,  according  to  Lefèvre  part  of  a  second  category  of  metropolitan  areas  characterized  by  “some  organization,   be   it   a   sectorial   or   ‘infra-­‐metropolitan’   scale”.  With   respect   to   the   sectorial  organization,   there   are   technocratic   relicts   of   the   military   regime   like   EMPLASA,   a   public  state   enterprise   in   charge  with  metropolitan   planning,   but   that   “in   reality,   didn’t   perform  any   activity   beyond   the   provision   of   informational   services   and   consultancy   to   local  organisms  and  to  the  state  government”  and  has  even  suffered  an  additional  dismantlement  due  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  federal  government  from  metropolitan  issues  (KLINK,  2005,  p.  159).  Klink  still  mentions  other  sectorial  experiences  as  the  committees  of  catchment  basins  composed  by  representatives  of  state  and  local  governments  and  of  civil  society  which  are  responsible  for  the  management  and  planning  of  catchment  basins8.  

With   regard   to   the   “infra-­‐metropolitan”   scale,   mentioned   by   Lefèvre,   he   has   basically   in  mind  the  well-­‐known  experience  of  intermunicipal  cooperation  in  the  “Greater  ABC”  region,  mentioned  already  before,  where  the  local  authorities  created  by  their  own  a  Intermunicipal  Consortium,   a   Chamber   and   an   Agency   of   Development   in   the   so-­‐called   ABC9.   These  institutions  have  been  created  with  the  objective  to  challenge  the  industrial  decline  suffered  by   the   region   in   the   last   decades   and   the   related   problems   of   increasing   poverty,  unemployment  and  deterioration  of  the  general  quality  of  life  (SOUZA,  2007,  p.256,  footnote  25;   KLINK,   2005,   p.   160).   In   spite   of   several   difficulties   and   setbacks   suffered   since   the  initiative  started  in  the  1990s,  the  “mobilization  from  below”  has  contributed,  according  to  Klink   (2005,   p.   160-­‐161),   to   initiate   “a   process   by   means   of   which   the   region   started   to  emphasize   progressively   its   economic,   political   and   cultural   identity”.   Klink   arrives   to   the  conclusion   that   “the   experience  of   participative   “bottom-­‐up”   and  multi-­‐sectorial   planning,  which   involves   public   and   private   actors,   has   demonstrated   to   be   an   alternative   with  

                                                                                                                         8  These  committees  are  also  increasingly  relevant  in  other  regions  of  Brazil.  With  regard  to  the  experiences  in  São  Paulo,  see  also  in  more  details:  Jacobi  (2005).  9  These  organizations  are  based  on  an  association  of  seven  municipalities  –  Santo  André,  São  Bernardo  do  Campo,  São  Caetano  do  Sul,  Diadema,  Mauá,  Ribeirão  Pires  e  Rio  Grande  da  Serra  –  located  in  the  southeastern  part  of  the  Metropolitan  Region  of  São  Paulo,  known  basically  for  being  the  major  center  of  the  Brazilian  automobile  industry.  In  this  region  there  lives  a  population  of  around  2.2  million  inhabitants  (ROLNIK  &  SOMEKH,  2003)  

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probabilities   of   success,   given   the   current   Brazilian   system   of   administrative  metropolitan  regions”   (ibid.,  p.  163).  Whereas  the  ABC  experience  shows  on  the  one  hand  the  potential  strength  of  the  civil  society  in  initiating  a  process  of  regional  integration,  contributing  to  the  development  of  a  quite  significant  institutional  arrangement  on  the  infra-­‐metropolitan  scale,  our   recent,   still   ongoing,   research   reveals   that   the   proper   success   in   terms   of  institutionalization   of   planning   and   management   structures   has   provoked,   on   the   other  hand,   as   undesirable   side   effect,   a   depoliticization   of   the   regional   social   movement,   and  therefore,  strengthening  the  Mayors  and  their  technical  stuff   in  the  cooperation  process  in  detriment  of  the  civil  society.  

   

Network   governance:   an   approach   to   tackle   the   metropolitan   dilemma   in  Latin  America?  

 In   the   international   debate,   the   new   regionalism   was   very   influential   in   recent   years  relocating   the  attention   from  governmental   structures   to   those  of  “governance”,   from  the  conception   of   hierarchic   steering   of   metropolitan   regions   to   practices   of   horizontal   and  voluntary  cooperation  (BLATTER,  2006,  p.  121).  As  we  tried  to  demonstrate  in  this  paper,  in  Latin  America  there   is  still  a  predominance  of  positions   favoring  centralized  governance  or  “government-­‐like”   structures   provided   by   national   or   state   legislations   in   order   to   tackle  effectively   and   efficiently   with   the   metropolitan   challenge.   At   least   in   the   scientific   and  technical   debate,   the   argument  of   technical   and   functional   rationality   in   the   end   tends   to  prevail  over  the  argument  of  local  autonomy  and  democratic  legitimacy.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  monocentric  metropolitan  regions  as  in  Bogotá  where  one  powerful  central  city  is  surrounded  by   relatively   small  municipalities  with  only   sparse   resources,  whereas   in  more  polycentric   regions   –   by   the   way   very   rare   in   Latin   America   –   cooperation   seems   more  possible  and  realistic.  The  case  of  intermunicipal  cooperation  in  the  Greater  ABC  reveals  very  clearly   these   possibilities,   even   though   this   cooperation   is   restricted   to   only   part   of   the  metropolitan  region  of  São  Paulo.    

The  experiences  of  the  Intermunicipal  Consortia  also  corroborate  the  opportunities  related  to   initiatives   started   from  below,   from  municipalities   concerned  with   improving   the   living  conditions   of   their   citizens,   being   to   a   certain   extent   compelled   to   cooperate   with   their  neighbors  in  order  to  solve  common  problems.  Relative  equality  between  municipalities  and  the   construction   of   relations   of   trust   are   decisive   elements   of   success,   as   well   as   the  awareness   of   interdependencies.   These   conditions   are   much   more   difficult   to   achieve   in  monocentric  regions  and  could  definitely  not  be  imposed  by  supra-­‐metropolitan  agencies  or  governments.  The  traditional  way  of  trying  to  promote  cooperation  by  force  or  by  financial  incentives   might   convince   local   authorities   to   do   what   is   needed   to   get   the   resources   in  times  of  fiscal  scarcity  and  increased  competition  between  local  authorities,  but  they  are  not  adequate  measures  to  mobilize  synergies  of  partnership-­‐oriented  cooperation  as  envisaged  by   the   concept   of   governance   or,   in   other   worlds,   to   seek   “cooperation   in   detriment   to  localist  individualism  ”  (ROLNIK  &  SOMEKH,  2003,  p.  103).  

Another  aspect   is   crucial,   the   increasing   relevance  of  new  actors   trying   to   take  part   in   the  urban  and  metropolitan  political  arena,  but  “with  different  degrees  of  political  and  financial  power  and  where  have   to  be  highlighted,  on   the  one  hand,  multilateral  and  supranational  organisms,  and  on  the  other,  manifold  communitarian  councils”  (SOUZA,  2007,  258)  –  here  

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we  could  add  social  movements  and  non-­‐governmental  organizations  –  that  influence  intra  and  intergovernmental  relations.  This  becomes  also  more  and  more  relevant  in  the  current  context   of   the   information   society,   where   network   organization   has   become   the   basic  paradigm   of   civil   society   (CASTELLS,   1996;   SCHERER-­‐WARREN,   2006),   seeking   to   interact  increasingly   with   state   agencies,   as   well   as   the   private   initiative.   The   civil   society   could  acquire  an   important  role   in   the  processes  of  political  articulation   in  metropolitan  regions,  exercising  pressure  on  administrative  authorities   to  engage  effectively   in  an  open  dialogue  and   cooperation   with   societal   actors   and   to   convince   them   of   the   necessity   to   establish  institutional   arrangements   for   allowing   increased   interaction   and   participation.   Such  innovative  institutional  arrangements  are  also  important  in  order  to  advance  in  the  vertical  integration   between   governance   structures   on   the   metropolitan   scale   with   those   on   the  municipal   level,   the   communities   and   neighborhoods.   As   Lefèvre   puts   it:   “The   creation   of  ‘supra-­‐municipal’   bodies   should   be   accompanied   by   instruments   to   connect   the  metropolitan   system  of  decision  making   to   the   local   level,   irrespective  of  whether   it’s   the  municipal  or  neighborhood  level”  (LEFÈVRE,  2005,  pp.  256-­‐257).  

Concerning   this   matter   it   is   very   important   to   overcome   the   common   discourse   of   the  exclusively  technical  rationality  that  used  to  favor  centralization  and,  instead,  open  decision-­‐making   arenas   to   political   dispute.   The   role   of   civil   society   organizations   is   crucial   in   this  context,  as  “governance   is   the  work  of  people  both   inside  and  outside  governments”,  and  progress  in  this  sense  seems  rather  consequence  of  the  organizational  and  political  force    of  civil   society,   and  much   less   the   simple  product  of   governmental  will   (OAKERSON,  2004,  p.  20).  The  case  of  the  experience  of  the  greater  ABC  evidenced  the  difficulties  to  maintain  the  mobilization   of   civil   society   over   time   and   the   risks   of   institutionalization   leading   to  demobilization   and   depoliticization.   Therefore,   the   way   to   effective   network   governance,  necessary   to  overcome  the  dilemmas  of   interjurisdictional,   interscalar  and   interdisciplinary  problems,   supposes   an   active   role   of   civil   society   and   also   of   local   governments  compromised   with   democratic   and   intensified   state-­‐society   interaction.   This   cooperative  alliance  is  indispensable,  to  create  the  necessary  and  continuing  pressure  on  the  central  city  and  the  state  or  national  governments  for  more  democratic  and  open  political  arenas  where  the  metropolitan  problems  can  effectively  be  addressed.  

 

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