1

JOINT SERVICES

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STRATEGY POLICYESSAY

By

Major, W, Bashir

ADVANCED COMMAND AND

STAFF COURSE - 19

Strategy Policy Essay

Submission Cover Sheet

Student Name: Major Wasif Bashir

Student PIC Number: 15-03364

Essay Title: “Causes of Korean War”

Syndicate: C-6

Syndicate DS: Cdr John Quillinan

DSD Tutor: Amer kamel

Essay submitted towards psc(j)* and KCL MA*

KCL MA

Word Count: 4208

I confirm that this essay is entirely my own work and is properly referenced in accordance with all JSCSC guidelines. I am aware of all JSCSC policy on PCCF (Plagiarism, Collusion, Cheating and Fraud).

Signature: Wasif Bashir Date: 15th Jan 2016

*Insert, where appropriate, qualification details.

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THE CAUSES OF KOREAN WAR

On the eve of war, at least one nation misperceives another’s power. In that

sense the beginning of each war is a misperception or an accident. The war

itself then slowly, and in agony, teaches the lesson of reality1.

John G. Stoessinger, ‘Why nations go to war’

The Korean War was first in a series of conflicts during the ‘Cold war’, which spanned

almost half a century. The conflict was fought on the Korean peninsula jutting out of the

Chinese mainland roughly divided in two, by the 38 th parallel. It consumed around 3 million

lives2 and resulted in a stalemate and an armistice that continues to date. Since this war

sucked in the strongest superpower to have survived the second world war and pitched it in

a direct confrontation with the Chinese, almost resulting in an outbreak of a 3rd world war: the

analysis cannot be restricted to Korea alone. The bigger picture has to include the

interaction of major powers at the dawn of cold war: the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and China. ‘The

causes of Korean War’, therefore can be broken down into: (1) the causes of the North

Korean attack on South Korea, (2) causes of the US / UN intervention (or police action)

against North Korea, and (3) causes of the Chinese intervention in support of North Korea?3

Figure 1: Farthest extents of opposing advances during Korean War, June 1950 to July 19534

1 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 7th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). p-2152 Ibid p-763 The time period for analysis selected is from the Yalta conference in Feb 1945 to the start of Chinese intervention in Korea in 19504 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-52

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The Korean War cannot be explained in isolation from the Cold War, which was a unique

event, capable of the destruction of entire human race. This caused special interactive

behaviour of nations, because of which, it is not entirely possible to explain all the events

through the lens of one basic theory of international relations. After a process of narrowing

down selection of a theoretical framework for analysis (explained in Appendix A), the three

level analyses model from Joseph S Nye’s ‘Understanding international Conflicts’5 has been

selected which is based on Kenneth Waltz’s three images. The ‘perceptions (or

misperceptions) explanation’6 of war will also roughly run as a golden thread through

analysis.

This essay will argue that the Korean War was a result of a series of perceptions on both

sides, built due to preceding world events, resulting in miscalculations that started and then

escalated the war. To explain this, essay is divided in 4 parts: first part will round up the

events succeeding WW II resulting in start of Cold War, Next three parts will analyse each

step in the ladder of escalation, applying the three level analysis models to explain and find

causes of that particular event.

THE BIG PICTURE

North Korean attack on 25th June 1950 was immediately followed on 30th June, by President

Truman’s announcement, authorizing use of American ground troops in support of South

Korea7. This quick decision making to enter war, had its roots, more in events in Europe than

in Asia.. The WW II victors: Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin met at

Yalta in February 1945 to discuss the post war governance of Europe, resulting in the

division of Europe into two spheres of influence, under Western and Soviet control

respectively. By the end of next conference at Potsdam in august 1945, western leadership

had been changed, with Truman and Atlee, taking over as new leaders of USA and UK

respectively8. These conferences could not however conclude the proposed trusteeship of

Korea. As per agreement, USSR declared war on Japan on 9th August 19459. American

nuclear strike soon after the conference brought the war to a quick halt, when surprisingly

Japanese surrendered on 15th August 194510 . A quick proposal of dividing Korea at 38th

5 Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th ed. (Harlow: Pearson Education (US), 2006)6 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War. Stoessinger argues that most conflicts are a result of misperceptions of leaders and nations about themselves and those of their adversaries. He writes “Thus on the eve of war, at least one nations misperceives another’s power”. Page 2157 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953, 2nd ed. (United States: Cornell University Press, 1985). Page [15] (Chronology)8 Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: p-1419 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War: V.1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945 1947, 4th ed. (Seoul: Yeogsabipyeongsa Publishing Co, 2004). P-11710 Ibid p-118

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parallel11, between American and Soviet trusteeship, was agreed by the USSR, who

honoured it by waiting for American troops at 38th parallel.12

Between August 1945 and 1948, USSR expanded into Eastern Europe and consolidated

communist regimes in its area of influence and annexed areas of Eastern Europe including

the Baltic States13. Churchill described this, in his famous Iron curtain speech in March 1946:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "Iron Curtain" has descended

across the continent. Behind that line...….all these famous cities and the populations

around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere….14

George F. Kennan, ex US Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, gave the idea of ‘Containment of

Soviet expansive tendencies’15. This was followed by President Truman’s doctrine to assist

all nations under threat of falling to communism as Bulwarks against expanding Soviet

communism, for an eventual Roll back16. Greece and Turkey were therefore immediately

assisted to check the expansion of communism.

Figure 3: Soviet expansion in Europe and the Iron Curtain line17

11 Ibid p-120. American Colonels Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel were tasked on 10 th august to propose a general line for division of Korea. 38th Parallel was selected from a national geography map at hand with Rusk that roughly divided the peninsula in two. 12 Ibid p-12113 Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts:p-14114 Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). P 18615 "George Kennan and Containment - Short History - Department History - Office of the Historian," 1945, accessed January 10, 2016, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/kennan. Accessed on 8th Jan 201616 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War: V-2. p-2417 Source : Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts:p-141

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Berlin Blockade in June 1948 necessitated creation of Western European Union defence

organization followed by creation of NATO18. Soviet nuclear test in 1949 (2 years ahead of

expected time) and fall of China to communism in 1949, were two great shocks to USA.19. By

1949, the Korean peninsula had been hardened into a communist regime under Kim Il Sung,

backed by USSR in north, and a nationalist regime of Syngman Rhee in the south, backed

by USA. The initial actions under Truman administration can be seen as, a domino theory in making, although domino theory became more famous before Vietnam war when

President Eisenhower compared the fall of states to communism as that of falling dominos.

You have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the

falling domino principle. ….So you could have the beginning of a disintegration

that would have the most profound influences.20

US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, outlined a US defence Perimeter in his Aleutians

speech in the Press club, Washington DC in January 1950. This Perimeter included Aleutian

Islands in the north, Japanese Islands in the west and Philippines in the south west, failing to

mention Korea. After Sino-Soviet pact in Feb 1950, National Security Council in USA

drafted famous NSC-68, which drastically increased the defence spending. Policy makers in

US, thus, had no more appetite to allow any democratic state, fall to communism again.

Following diagram sum up the USA foreign policy before Korean War.

Figure 3: US Foreign Policy at the Dawn of Cold War21

With this overview, after getting the bigger picture context, we will switch back to our original

framework of the three levels of analysis of the Korean War: individual, state and system; for

our three steps of escalation: N/Korean attack, US / UN police action and Chinese entry.

18 History of Nato. accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html. 19 Joseph S Nye and David A Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History, 8th ed. (United States: Pearson Education, 2012). P-174, chronology of cold war. page20 Cynthia A Watson, U.S. National Security: A Reference Handbook(Oxford: Abc-clio, 2008).p-16221 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2, p-24

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Internationalism Containment Roll back

NORTH KOREAN ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA

Although there are no clearly defined motives for the outbreak of the war, likely possibilities

are drawn from Stoessingr’s work22. They are: (1) Stalin’s probing action towards the west

exploiting the Gap in the defence parameter of the US, (2) Stalin’s plan to take China out of

any possible US influence, (3) a Chinese initiative or (4) North Korean internal affair to unite

the divided Korean people. Although it is easy to see everything in the perspective of the

larger picture and events in the global dynamics; for the purpose of three levels of analysis

we will assume the last possibility which can still be a sub set of other possibilities. The

resultant picture that emerges can be seen in the chart in figure 4.

Figure 4: Levels of Analysis for N / Korean attack on South Korea23

The individual level revolves around three personalities: Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong and

Kim Il Sung. Since Korea was under formal trusteeship of the USSR from 1945 to 1948,

Stalin and Kim I’ll Sung are mentioned as key in the analysis, although many authors have

argued the more important role of Mao. Kim Il Sung was a very strong Marxist-Leninist with a

22 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-53,5423 The flow chart is inspired by the joseph Nye’s flow chart of Three level of analysis model used for Cold war in his book ‘Understanding Global conflicts’. The main theme i.e ‘Misperception of a Quick victory’ has been drawn from Stoessingr’s, ‘Why nations go to War’ chapter 3, ‘temptations of Victory: Korea’. US defence perimeter was defined by Dean Acheson in his famous Aleutians speech that did not specify South Korea (or Asian mainland in the US defence perimeter i.e Alaska, Aleutians, Japan to Philippines. National press club Washington 12 Jan 1950

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way of his own24, it is however most certain that it was not possible for him to take this

decision in isolation. Kim was confident of a quick victory, and repeatedly tried to convince

Stalin of this fact; who in turn, never allowed him in view of possible repercussions of a third

world war with USA, for which USSR was not ready25. By 1950, Stalin was more confident

after USSR had conducted the nuclear test.

The domestic settings of North and South, also favoured this critical time frame if the

Korean solution (from North point of view) had to be a military one. South Korea was

governed by Nationalist in an administrative legacy of Japanese imperialist rule. The South

at best was a police state, with many unrests and armed resistances, between 1948 and

195026. The State’s tough police action resulted in guerrilla response and therefore brutal

tactics in retaliation. Large chunks of area in the south were controlled by Guerrillas without

much evidence of Soviet support27. North Korea had a strong, experienced army under the

leadership of Kim Il Sung and a strong economy, based on industry28. By late 1949,

withdrawal of US troops from South Korea was a reassurance that the north was fighting the

South and not the USA.

The Systemic level setting has three major components: (1) the North Korea-USSR

connection, (2) the North Korea-China Connection and (3) the absence of South Korea in

the US defence perimeter declaration in US secretary of state, Dean Acheson’s Aleutians

speech in January 195029. The North Korea-USSR connection has already been explained

above. For China, most of North Korean army members had already fought in the Chinese

civil war in support of Chinese communists and therefore had more than state on state

relations. The Chinese and Chinese leadership owed the North Koreans for their struggles

against nationalists30. Since Americans supported the Chinese Nationalists under Kai Shek

and recognized only the exiles in Formosa (Current Taiwan), as the legitimate government of

Chinese people; this resulted in convergence of interests of Chinese and Korean

communists. China’s support was therefore almost guaranteed, if Kim Il Sung went into

trouble in South. Last, but perhaps the most important cause of perceptions in all above

actors, was Dean Acheson’s famous Aleutians speech in the Press club, Washington DC in

24 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (United States: Princeton university press, 1992). ---25 Kathryn Weathersby, "Stalin and the Danger of War with America," WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS July 2002,. Citation format and page number26 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (United States: Princeton university press, 1992). p-18527 Ibid p-28228 Ibid p-33529 Paul M. Edwards, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts On File, 2006). Chronology 3530 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (United States: Princeton university press, 1992). -----

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January 1950. Absence of Korea from the perimeter was a window of opportunity for Kim

and enough reason for Stalin to misperceive the importance of Korea in the recent global

context to USA.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION UNDER UN POLICE ACTION

Henry Truman authorized use of US ground troops within 5 days of North Korea’s attack31;

this decision had its foundations in events that preceded it at the end of WWII explained

earlier. Although the events shaped the perceptions of American policy makers, it is still

interesting to get these events through our three images model to see what really

precipitated into US involvement in the War.

Figure 4: Levels of analysis for US intervention in Korean War32

At the individual level, perceptions of three personalities mattered which could result in this

quick decision making: President Truman, UN SG Trygve Lie and Gen Douglas MacArthur.

Truman always believed himself to be a true internationalist, followed the liberal tradition and

had complete trust in UN (however was determined to go unilaterally if it did not help)33. The

sign on his desk stated, “The Buck Stops here” truly defined his personality, where he would

take responsibility for all his actions. It is also believed that he might have intimidated Stalin

31 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War, chronology of Korean war p[15]32 Sources for the chart

1. Truman’s personality, MacArthur’s estimate, Trygve Lie’s action, John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-55,63

2. US perception that USSR and China will not intervene, Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War p-2323. Other boxes, Ibid chronology of Korean war p[15]

33 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-55,56.

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by mentioning possession of nuclear weapons in the Potsdam conference which speeded up

the work on Soviet nuclear weapons. From the Iron curtain to the fall of Chinese Nationalists,

his views of Stalin and Soviets became skewed. By giving away his doctrine he was

determined to put every bulwark in the way of Soviet communist expansion.

As Long as I am President, we shall support the United Nations with every

means at out command34

Harry Truman May 1950

UN SG Trygve Lie a Norwegian labour politician was famous in taking up explosive issues.

He even antagonised the US by supporting the Peoples Republic of China’s application for a

UN Security Council seat35. When North Korea crossed 38th parallel, he was quick to come

to a conclusion that ‘the UN charter had been violated necessitation collective action. The

final piece in the puzzle is the strong personality of Gen McArthur, a decorated general of

very high repute. His quick assessment of the situation convinced Truman that the South

Koreans could not sustain themselves for long unless quickly supported by US ground, air

and naval action. If South Korea were to lose, it would require a very high cost to retake.

At the state level, in the American administration there was unanimous support for Truman’s

decision due to prevailing American policy of containment36. North Korean actions were

clearly a breach of the UN charter and another step in the advance of communism into the

free world’s space. South Korean forces were in a rout with no visible signs of strength. Gen

MacArthur’s assessment of the very high cost of re-taking the Korean peninsula if there was

no rapid intervention made sense.

At the systemic level, the UN SC had no speed breakers, to call for restoration of

international peace. Chinese seat was being represented by the Nationalists under Kai Shek

in Formosa, thus China (PRC) had no voice or vote in UNSC. USSR was on a boycott from

UNSC for the same reason and did not vote to Veto the resolution. This resulted in US / UN

involvement in the Conflict.37 Truman, McArthur, and Truman administration were unanimous

that USSR and China will not intervene during this police action against North Korea38.

CHINESE INTERVENTION

34 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-55.35 Ibid, p-5736 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2 p-2437 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War, chronology of Korean war p-1538 Ibid p-234

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After American intervention and quick victory due to the genius plans of MacArthur’s Incheon

Landing; North Korean forces were in total disarray. By 30th September 1945, 38th Parallel

had been restored. Despite repeated Chinese warnings, UN forces crossed the parallel into

north to ‘restore conditions of stability throughout Korea’ and effectively start the Rollback of

Soviet expansion. This decision caused Chinese entry in the war resulting in a protracted

battle between the two sides consuming around 3 million lives and ultimately resulting in an

armistice that still holds today. The reasons can be easily illustrated with the help of following

chart.

Figure 5: Levels of analysis for Chinese Entry in Korean War

At individual level, it all boiled down to personalities of two persons; Gen Douglas MacArthur

and Mao Zedong. McArthur’s self-belief in his abilities, especially after Incheon landings and

quick victory and disrespect for enemy (Chinese army) brought him to two dangerous

perceptions: (1) that Chinese do not have will or capability to attack superior American

forces (probably mistaken by Chinese nationalist soldiers that he had seen) and (2) that if

they dare to attack, they will only get themselves slaughtered39. This conviction was then

transferred in Truman, who to realize the Rollback of Communism, saw this as the best

opportunity40. Mao a Marxist-Leninist was convinced of capitalist imperialism and believed

that Americans were up to attacking mainland china, and would ultimately help Formosa

against China. When UN forces crossed 38 parallel despite his repeated warnings, his

perceptions were reinforced. His obligation to N/Korean communists who fought in Chinese

39 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-6940 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2: p-708

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civil war and to Kim Il Sung also forced him to intervene in order to save N Korea from

complete destruction.

At state and systemic level, American foreign policy of Containment and Roll back had now

found opportunity to realize the communist roll back after quick victory in the south41. The

only dilemma was the legal and moral cover to cross 38th parallel. To overcome this hurdle,

especially now that the USSR had returned to the UNSC seat; the argument presented was

that, since North Korea attacked South by crossing the 38th Parallel, it has already destroyed

the sanctity of this line and now the conditions of stability have to be enforced in whole of

Korea42. Instead of going to UNSC again, a resolution instead was passed through UN

general assembly to restore conditions of stability in whole Korea43. UN general assembly

had given mandate to UN forces under Gen McArthur to cross 38th parallel which ultimately

led to Chinese intervention on 25th October 195044.

Chinese intervention thus stemmed out from, American policy to enforce rollback, with

misperceived calculation on Chinese intentions and capabilities and China’s misperception

about American intentions about china.

CONCLUSIONS

On a simple note, it was North Korea’s breach of sovereignty of another nation, resulting in a

UN Police action to restore international peace, perceived as threatening to Chinese, who

therefore retaliated. Things however, were not that simple. It was a series of events that

caused perceptions / misperceptions in all levels of Waltz’s images and caused in

miscalculations on enemy’s intentions to intervene. This resulted in initiation and then

escalation in war.

It was Kim Il Sung’s perception that he could secure a quick victory and that USA will not

enter war which led him to attack Korea. He convinced Stalin who also became convinced

after the announcement of the US Defence perimeter. American prevailing policy to contain

Soviet expansion around the globe by raising Bulwarks, pulled the USA into war in a UN

Police action. The American perception that crossing of the 38 th parallel to restore stability

across Korea would ensure Roll back of communism encouraged them to threaten the

Chinese. MacArthur’s perception, that the Chinese could not afford to match the strength of

US forces made him over-confident and ignore the repeated Chinese threats of intervention.

Chinese perceptions that the USA wanted to attack China and would support Formosa in a

41 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: V. 2: p-70842 John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, p-6643 Ibid, p-6844 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War, chronology of Korean war p-16

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fight against the Mainland China convinced them to enter in the war against US. These are

among the other many causes which resulted in the conflict.

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Appendix A

CAUSES OF WAR (THEORETICAL ASPECTS)

Causes of war are as numerous as their numbers of war fought in history. Debated in depth

by scholars, without great levels of agreements; therefore trying to find a single one,

appropriate to all, is futile.45 To understand the general ways in which ‘causes of war’ can be

classified and thus identified, have been thoroughly researched by scholars and few have

been explored to find a framework for this essay. During the theoretical review the logic for

arriving a framework has been done by developing following flow chart :46

45 John / Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).46 Chart has been prepared considering various sources, which, however, may not support the main concept in the diagram, which is my own. Conceptual errors in theme, if any, therefore, are entirely my own. Following sources have been considered for preparation of this chart:-

a. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), for first level understanding of basic theories of international politics

b. John / Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World, Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, John G Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 7th ed, and Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: to find out frameworks for analysis in the fourth level

c. Jennifer Milliken, The Social Construction of the Korean War: has been referred to understand the constructivist view of Korean war.

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The chart explains process of selection of a framework to analyse our essay. Basic theories

of international relations have been excluded by applying filters on the basis of; ability to

explain the whole picture, especially the cold war, and the ease of analysis due to existing

research available. Although theories of liberalism and Marxism have been excluded in the

first filter, yet they will partly be made use of, to explain elements in the framework selected

(for example: personalities of leaders, schools of thought etc). Constructivism has been

totally excluded from discussion, since it lacks broad body of research47. The major work on

Korean war by Jennifer Milliken, ‘The social construction of Korean War’48 a relatively new

work, was referred for understanding the constructivist perspective.

From the realist tradition, the work of Thucydides and Kenneth Waltz has been repeatedly

quoted in all works that explain framework for causes of war. The literature reviewed, offers

different frameworks to classify causes of war have been added in the fourth level. From

these, the main framework is picked up from Joseph S Nye’s work which, based on Kenneth

Waltz’s images, and provides three levels of analysis: Individual level, State Level and the

System level.

47 Joseph S Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th ed. (Harlow: Pearson Education (US), 2006) p-6348  Jennifer Milliken, The Social Construction of the Korean War: Conflict and Its Possibilities (Manchester, UK ; Manchester University Press: Manchester University Press, 2001).

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