Explain why the Weimar Republic collapsed 1929-1933.

“In a capitalist and industrialist society such as Weimar Germany, the state functions as a factor of cohesion for economic, political and cultural processes and relations.1”

“The myth of the Dolchoss, the stab in the back of the Army… was thereafter to be cultivated to the point when democratic political evolution was poisonedat its heart. This was a heavy burden for the new civilian government to bear, thrown unprepared and with an untried constitution into the deep end of democracy. Finding itself accepting the responsibility for a devastating defeat,and weak in human and material resources, it was miserably equipped to set to right the financial and fiscal legacy of the purely and arrogantly militarist establishment…2”

“The fragility of the political system and the increased potential for social conflict combined to produce fertile conditions for radicalism of the left and right.3”

The birth of the Weimar Republic in the tumultuous postwar years seemed to dawn a new era for Germany,establishing democracy to rebuild and re-establish Germanunity and prestige within the European chessboard4.However, the birth of republic out of defeat wouldultimately plant the seeds of its collapse; the instableand fragile conditions in Germany post war left the newdemocracy without a sound societal support to draw upon.The Republic was left to shoulder the blame for Germany’sdefeat in war, causing the consequent rise of theDochesslegende mentality; this mentality was fosteredfurther by the harsh penalties inflicted upon theRepublic by the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty not onlysuffocated Germany economically and politically, but itsdeep psychological scars became synonymous with the new

1 Abraham, David. The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic. Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, Print. Pg 12 Fergusson, Adam. When Money Dies. London: Kimber, 1975. Print. Pg 153 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 1144 Wheeler-Bennet, Sir John. ‘The End of the Weimar Republic’. Foreign Affairs 50.2 (Jan 1972): 351-371. Web. Pg 351

democracy and would ultimately haunt the Republic in thefragmented years of the Great Depression. Anti-republicanism would eventually poison the democracy toits heart as the influence of the industrialists and thearmy in the political arena was increasing rapidly withthe radicalisation of the electorate. According to DavidAbraham “The state needs financial resources, a capacityfor technological rationality, an already existinglegitimacy or mass loyalty and the loyalty of the ownersof the means of production”5. It was ultimately the lackof these key ingredients required for the state’s successthat rendered the Republic only one major crisis awayfrom becoming fertile conditions for radicalisation ofthe electorate. The collapse of the Weimar Republic andconsequent rise of Nazism was therefore a psychologicalreaction by the German public to the capitulation of theGerman state during the major economic crisis of theGreat Depression6.

The psychological condition of Germany society followingthe completion of the war is a significantly importantpiece in understanding the eventual downfall of theWeimar Republic. According to Sir John Wheeler Bennet,the Weimar Republic “From the first it was tagged withtwo terrible indictments which rendered it vulnerable toattack from all quarters”7. The first of these would bethe Dolchesslegende. Post war, Germany was on her knees;its people left reeling and in search for someone toblame in order to maintain the prestige of the Germanarmy. This blame would find its self squarely on theshoulders of democracy; who better to accuse then theRepublic who’s life was a result of German defeat8.Consequently, the Dolchesslegende was born; the civilianpopulation believed that anti-war politicians and

5 Ibid6 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 1147 Wheeler-Bennet, Sir John. ‘The End of the Weimar Republic’. Foreign Affairs 50.2 (Jan 1972): 351-371. Web. Pg 3528 Fergusson, Adam. When Money Dies. London: Kimber, 1975. Print. Pg 5

pacifists groups had stabbed the army in the back9. TheDolchesslegende mentality was largely directed towards theSocialists, and with the Social Democratic Party formingthe largest component of the newly elected government,the “stab in the back” myth was felt in full force by thenewly elected Reichstag10. The Dochesslegende would berecurring theme of propaganda for anti-democratic attacksthroughout the Weimar’s Republic’s existence, especiallyin times of crisis such as 1923 hyperinflation debacle(see Appendix 1). In the words of Heiber, it was a“dangerous explosive charge” waiting to be detonated bythe extreme left or right political parties and incombination with the Treaty of Versailles would be adeadly cocktail for the Republic11.

The Treaty of Versailles had a multi-layered impact uponthe collapse of the Weimar Republic; while mosthistorians agree on its role in the political andeconomical spheres, many fail to mention its deepunderlying psychological impact. The German publicinitially responded to the ‘disgraceful treaty’12 withrevulsion, especially regarding Clause 231 of the treaty,which stated Germany and her allies must accept allresponsibility for imposing the war upon its Europeancounterparts (see Appendix 2). The German public were notwilling to accept the reality of defeat in war, soldiersreturned home in reasonable shape and the motherland hadnot come close to being invaded in war13. According toRuth Henig “It was indeed this German strength, ratherthen weakness, which brought about such a strong reactionto the Treaty”14. German society was united in itsdenunciation of the Versailles ‘diktat’, which ultimately

9 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 3610 Wheeler-Bennet, Sir John. ‘The End of the Weimar Republic’. Foreign Affairs 50.2 (Jan 1972): 351-371. Web. Pg 35211 Ibid cited from: Helmut Heiber, The Weimar Republic, Blackwell 1993.12 Editorial from the Deutsche Zeitung, 28 June 1919 cited in: K. S. Pinson, Modern Germany, Macmillan, London, 1966, p. 39813 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 37

served to enhance the Dolchesslegende faced by theRepublic15. The German people, especially the rulingelites had been engrained for many years withnationalist, militaristic mindsets, under the command ofauthoritarian leadership, which came in stark oppositionwith measures of the Treaty, such as a reduction of thestanding army to 100,000 (see Appendix 3)16. This not onlyleft hundreds of thousands of soldiers unemployed but wasseen a direct threat to the military honour and prestigeof the German Army. Signing the Treaty of Versaillesultimately served to undermine the mass loyalty of Germansociety towards the Republic and provided the NationalSocialists with a virulent means of political propagandain the Great Depression years.

The proportional representation voting system used in theWeimar Republic, while arguably being the truestdemocracy in Europe at the time, was a catalyst of severesocietal distrust due to the perceived perception offragility it created. Many historians have credited theproportional representation system as the major catalystof political fragility in Weimar Germany; 18 differentgovernments served during the Republic, all of which werecoalitions, which on average lasted no longer then eightmonths17. Historians such as Hermes and E. Shanbacherargue that proportional representation without thresholdsallowed a large number of small parties into parliament,weakening the strength of government and opening thegateway for meteoritic rise of NSDAP (see Appendix 4)18.However, modern criticisms argue that castingproportional representation as “a main cause of thetriumphant advance of the National Socialists” fails to

14 Ruth Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, Routledge 2001, London, pg 6615 Ibid pg7216 Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto. Visions of Community in Nazi Germany, Oxford University Press 2014, p22117 Lehmann, Sibylle H. 'Chaotic Shop-Talk Or Efficient Parliament? The Reichstag, The Parties, And The Problem Of Governmental Instability In The Weimar Republic'. Public Choice 144.1-2 (2009): 83-104. Web. Pg 8318 Ibid pg96

consider that a majority voting system would have alsobeen powerless to stop radical changes in politicalperspectives of voters19. The reality of a government bornout of defeat is that it is bound to be unstable,independent of the voting system; R. Huber remarks“proportional representation in the Weimar Republic wascertainly not the cause of the rapid rise of the radicalpolitical parties”20. Moreover, the real impact ofproportional representation came from its psychologicalconflict with German society; the strong authoritarianleadership of previous years was now replaced by everchanging coalitions between parties with vastly differentideological viewpoints, creating a perception of weaknessfor the general public. Detlef Lehnert attributes thisperception of weakness to that fact that German societyhad “neither a homogenous nor dominant politicalculture”21; Paul Bookbinder continues stating thatdisparate parties with no history of co-operationhampered any aura of political cohesion.22 Ultimately,proportional representation caused a perception offragility towards the new Republic that came in directconflict with societies predominant ideology ofleadership.

Political policy in Weimar Germany was heavily dominatedby the interests of the capitalist class due to thestates overdependence on the means of production tostabilise the economy and the army’s support forlegitimate power, which would have dire consequences for

19 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 15020 Ibid21 Detlef Lehnert 1987 cited in: Falter, Jürgen w. 'Political Cleavages In The Weimar Republic And The Rise Of National Socialism*'. European Political Science 13.1 (2013): 106-116. Web. Pg10622 “The problems of putting disparate parties with no history of co-operation together and getting them to make significant compromises for the common interestplagued Republican leaders unremittingly”Cited in: Lee, Stephen J. The Weimar Republic. London: Routledge 1998. Web. Pg 19

democracy23. The Stinnes-Legien agreement in November 1918between the industrialists and trade unions, sought toquell revolutionary tendencies in the working populationby securing favourable working conditions such as theeight-hour day24. During times of economic crisis however,Kolb argues that the trade union’s power was weakened dueto mass unemployment, allowing the industrialists to workfor their ‘authoritarian constitution’ and ultimatelycreate ‘class struggle from above’25. In a similar vane,the Ebert-Groener pact in the short term guaranteed theguise of support of the army for the Republic; however,it allowed anti-republican elites to maintain theirinfluence over key political decisions. The Republicnever truly had the support of the army, which wasevident in the Kapp Putsch in 1920 where General VonSeeckt refused to defend the government against theFreikorps26. Ultimately, the Reichstag now had twoconservative aristocratic bodies, the army and theindustrialists, working under their own agenda outside ofRepublic control, which during the Great Depression wouldplay a major role in the fall of democracy.

The hyperinflation debacle of 1923, caused heavily by theeconomic implications of the Treaty of Versailles,imparted a distinct psychological wound onto the variousclasses of the Republic. Hyperinflation effectivelyrendered the German mark worthless; in November4,200,000,000 marks were required in exchange for 1American dollar27. According to Adam Fergusson “In October1923, it was noted in the British Embassy in Berlin thatthe number of marks to the pound equalled the number ofyards to the sun”28. The bleak picture of hyperinflation

23 Abraham, David. The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton pg 724 Stephen J Silvia, Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Post War Era, Cornell University Press 2013, pg 1625Ibid 26 Lee, Stephen J. The Weimar Republic. London: Routledge 1998. Web. Pg 5327 Fergusson, Adam. When Money Dies. London: Kimber, 1975. Print.Pg12028 Ibid pg ii

set class against class and would manifest in a growingmistrust and discontent towards the state for all but theasset rich profiteers. The bourgeoisie were forced to usetheir life savings in order to buy just a kilogram ofpotatoes, with many as a result becoming a part of theproleteriat29. The working class were gripped bystarvation and even the aristocratic junker class wereunhappy, their return to pre war incomes had laggedbehind the lower civil service30. Furthermore, recovery ofthe mark was impossible without large numbers ofbankruptcies, redundancies and further starvation thatwould certainly not be beneficial for the support of thegovernment and the democratic system as a whole31.However, these short term impacts can neither be judgedas the primary cause of the radicalisation of theelectorate32 or even in more general terms a catalyst forinstability in the Republic. Hyperinflation’s real impactwas its creation of psychological wound for society thatwould be reopened during the Great Depression.

Economically, hyperinflation also played a major role inworsening the severity of the impact of the GreatDepression upon German society, which in turn increasedthe rate of radicalisation and support for the NationalSocialists. The French occupation of the Ruhr Valley from1922 due to Germany’s failure to pay reparations, leftthe Republic’s production at a standstill. A lack ofproduction was especially problematic for Germany, as itshigh rates of inflation meant that the Republic was also

29 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 18430 Ibid pg18531 Fergusson, Adam. When Money Dies. London: Kimber, 1975. Print.Pg 14932 By examining Appendix 3, it clear so see that the major political parties of the Reichstag saw little or no loss in percentage of votes from the 1922 and 1924 elections. Furthermore, the SPD had gains totalling 10% up until the onset of the Great Depression. The NSDAP on other hand, while gaining seats in Reichstag in the 1924 election, slumped to only 2.4% of votes in 1928, discrediting any suggestion of radicalisation of electoral votes due to hyperinflation.

starved of a profitable import and export market33. ByNovember 1923, the mark was worthless and the currencyrequired foreign investment for the revival of theeconomy and for the ability of the Republic to pay itswar reparations34. The Dawes Plan initiated in 1924established the investment of U.S banks into Germany,among other economic measures, enabling the Republic topay war reparations in foreign currency while alsoenabling the growth of the mark (see Appendix 5). Whilethe Dawes Plan initially was a saving grace for theWeimar economy, in hindsight it left Germany both totallydependent upon foreign investment for economic growth andperpetually indebted to U.S banks35. In 1928, Wall Stexperienced significant stock price growth, which saw alarge number of investments by U.S banks drop out of theGerman economy to reap the benefits of their domesticmarket (see Appendix 6 & 7)36. In order to maintain U.Sinvestment, German interest rates were increased,however, this economic policy backfired and insteadsuffocated domestic investment and in turn slowedeconomic growth. Consequently, Germany’s economy wasalready heading deep into recession long before the WallStreet crash of 1929 and would plummet to new depthsduring the Great Depression.

The Great Depression was the last straw for the WeimarRepublic; the years of relative stability between 1924-1929 were not enough to wash away the psychological scarsinflicted by the various social, political and economiccrises. Unemployment rates during the Great Depression

33 From May 1921 to December 1923, Germany had a net loss of 4,364,553,000 MarksFrank Graham. Exchange, Prices and Production in Hyper-Inflation: Germany 1920-1923, The Ludwig von Mises Institute 2009, pg 26634 Need to find footnote35 Christian Saint Etienne. The Great Depression 1929-1938: Lessons for the 1980’s, Hoover Press 1984, pg xiv36 Franz Von Papen’s Speech to the Lausanne Conference June 16-July 9 1932.Cited in: Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendburg. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, University of California Press 1994, pg 83

soared, increasing from 6% in 1928 to 28% in August 1932;in the same time period National Socialists votes rosefrom 2.5% to 36% (see appendix 8). The correlationbetween unemployment and the rise of Nazism isundeniable; the German people had simply had enough ofpolitical and economic crisis. The propaganda of AdolfHitler tactically targeted the psychological scars ofTreaty of Versailles and the Dochesslegende mentality,that when combined with the economic crisis spelled theend of the Weimar Republic (see appendix 9). A majorsupport base for such a dramatic swing towards NationalSocialism derived from the disillusioned middle class whoonce again faced mass unemployment and the slide into theproletariat. According to Jurgen Falter “From anelectoral perspective, it was the fragmentation of thebourgeosis- Protestant bloc… that promoted the rise ofNational Socialism”37. In summarising De

It must be noted that the rise of National Socialism wasnot a catalyst but a consequence of the collapse of theWeimar Republic, without the Great Depression AdolfHitler would simply not have had the political leverageto radicalise the German electorate38. The determinationof the industrialist class to assert their dominance overthe political landscape and retain their economic statusduring the Great Depression saw them revoke on their co-operation with trade unions to begin an assault on thedemocratic system. According to David Abraham ““theimpetus of the state crisis came from the determinationof capitalist groups to use the economic situation totheir political advantage”39. Hindenburg would also play amajor role; now into his 80’s, he relied heavily on asmall group of advisors, with the most significant ofthese none other then General Kurt von Schleicher40. WithHindenburg now a puppet of army anti-republican elites,

37 Falter, Jürgen w. 'The Social Bases of Political Cleavages in the Weimar Republic 1919-1933'. Historical Social Research (2013) : 194-216. Web. Pg 20438 Dietmar Rothermund, The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929-1933, Routledge Publishing 2003, pg 14039 Abraham, David. The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton pg 8

Article 48 of the Constitution would spell the end fordemocracy and the start of a presidential rule. Thisarticle gave Hindenburg emergency power to pass any billthrough parliament without the support of the Reichstag,beginning with Bruning’s budget of 193041. From thismoment the Republic was doomed to collapse; with both thearmy and the industrialists in favour of the Hitler’sregime and his promises of stabilisation42, the democraticrepublic had neither the support of the president, massloyalty of the public or backing from its means ofproduction. The Great Depression therefore was thecatalyst for the Republic’s collapse, combining thepsychological scars of the early Weimar years withfertile economic and political conditions for theauthoritarian regime of the Nazi to party to rise topower.

While in hindsight it may appear as if the WeimarRepublic was predestined to failure, its future couldhave developed very differently if not for the GreatDepression. Before 1929, the National Socialist vote hadbeen steadily declining since its first appearance in theReichstag in 1923 (see appendix 9) and the political andeconomical turmoil of the early 1920’s had established asense of stability for the Republic. However, below thesurface, the economic and political conditions followingWW1 had inflicted psychological wounds and created ananti-republican mentality, which would serve as perfectpropaganda for National Socialists in a time of crisis.Furthermore, the lack of financial resources left theRepublic without the loyalty of its industrialists andafter hyperinflation created a false sense of stabilityin the economy, leading it into depths unimaginable whenWall St collapsed. The Great Depression ultimately cameat the wrong time for the Republic, bringing to thesurface the perfect psychological and economical

40 Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times, Princeton University Press 2003, pg 4041 William J Patch, Heinrich Bruning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic, Cambridge University Press 1998, pg 94 42 Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print. Pg 125

conditions for the Nazis to radicalise an electoratedisillusioned and irate with the failures of democracy.

Bibliography

Abraham, David. The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. Print.

Falter, Jürgen w. 'Political Cleavages In The Weimar Republic And The Rise Of National Socialism*'. European Political Science 13.1 (2013): 106-116. Web.

Fergusson, Adam. When Money Dies. London: Kimber, 1975.

Print.

Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Print.

Lehmann, Sibylle H. 'Chaotic Shop-Talk Or Efficient Parliament? The Reichstag, The Parties, And The Problem Of Governmental Instability In The Weimar Republic'. PublicChoice 144.1-2 (2009): 83-104. Web.

Stogbauer, C. 'The Radicalisation Of The German Electorate: Swinging To The Right And The Left In The Twilight Of The Weimar Republic'. European Review ofEconomic History 5.2 (2001): 251-280. Web.

Wheeler-Bennet, Sir John. ‘The End of the Weimar Republic’. Foreign Affairs 50.2 (Jan 1972): 351-371. Web.

William J Patch, Heinrich Bruning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic, Cambridge University Press 1998

Dietmar Rothermund, The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929-1933, Routledge Publishing 2003

Frank Graham. Exchange, Prices and Production in Hyper-Inflation: Germany 1920-1923, The Ludwig von Mises Institute 2009

Stephen J Silvia, Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Post War Era, Cornell University Press 2013

Appendix 1

1924 Right Wing cartoon showing Philipp Scheidemann, the German Social Democrat who proclaimed the Weimar Republic, as well as Matthias Erzberger, an anti-war politician from Centre party, depicted stabbing the German army in the back following the hyper inflation crisis of 1923.Cited at: Harold Marcuse, ‘Review of Boris Barth, Dolchstosslegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1914-1933’. UC Santa Barbara History Department, uploaded26/9/2006, viewed 19/02/2015, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/publications/reviews/BarthRev069.htmOriginal image from ‘Vorwarts’ May 3 1924

Appendix 2

Treaty of Versailles- Article 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their na- tionals have been

subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Cited in: Ruth Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, Routledge 2001, London, pg 21

Appendix 3

Treaty of Versailles- Article 160 (1)By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. After that date the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers. The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed four thousand.

Appendix 4

Cited at: Lehmann, Sibylle H. 'Chaotic Shop-Talk Or Efficient Parliament? The Reichstag, The Parties, And TheProblem Of Governmental Instability In The Weimar Republic'. Public Choice 144.1-2 (2009): 83-104. Web pg 87

Appendix 5

Appendix 7

Chart illustrating the circulation of reparations payments under Dawes and Young plansCited in: J.Bergmann, K. Megerle and P.Steinbach,

Geschichte als politische Wissenschaft (Stuttgart 1979) p.120

Appendix 6

Cited at: Tejvan Pettinger, What Caused the Wall Street Crash of 1929?, Economics Help 5th Nov 2012, accessed 3rd March 2015, http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/76/economics/wall-street-crash-1929/

Appendix 7

Dow Jones Industrials Stock Prices 1927-1932Cited from: Unknown author, The Stock Market Crash of 1929, University of Notre Dame,

http://www3.nd.edu/~jstiver/FIN462/US%20Market%20Crashes.pdf

Appendix 8

Stogbauer, C. 'The Radicalisation Of The German Electorate: Swinging To The Right And The Left In The Twilight Of The Weimar Republic'. European Review ofEconomic History 5.2 (2001): 251-280. Web.Pg 256

Appendix 9

“Freedom and Bread”- Nazi propaganda poster 1930 (Left)

““Open the door to freedom! Put a strong man at the helm!Out of the swamp! Forward with the powers of renewal! Vote National Socialist List 2”- Nazi propaganda poster 1932

Both cited at: German Propaganda Archive, Pre 1933 Nazi Posters, http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters1.htm