In: Everything is on the Move: The Mamluk Empire as a Node in (Trans-)Regional Networks, ed. St. Conermann (Göttingen: V&R - Bonn Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 27-59

28 Georg Christ

route (Ashtor 1983 :106). While there is strong evidence for a significant (proto-) industrial and even agricultural decline of Egypt in the later Middle Ages (Ashtor:1992), the highly profitable spice trade does not seem to have suffered significantly from whatever 'crisis' of the 14th century or depression of the Renaissance (Ashtor 1983 :71- 73, cf. Lopez/Miskimin 1962 versus Cipolla 1964). The spice trade thus continued to flourish along the maritime route linking China, Southeast Asia and the Indian Malabar coast via the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea/Egypt/Syria with the Mediterranean. Arguably, the Portuguese motives to open an alternative spice route in the 15th century were more likely linked to the fact that this trade system was a sort of monopoly, shared between Aden, Cairo and Venice, charging a monopolistic rent to the final customers. 1

It seems that the Mamluks managed to drive the bulk of the spice trade along their Southern route and created - at least for some time - a quasi-monopoly because they established an efficient macro-network of cooperation with polit­ical powers of the meso-level along this Southern route. In fact, the Mamluk Empire could only control the spice trade in cooperation, or at least symbiosis, with other (proto-)state-level players and the associated networks within the trade system including, India and Yemen, on the one side, and Venice, on the other side. By integrating representatives of these regions symbolically into the Mamluk realm of imperial power (which is the macro-level of political power : aspiring at and claiming the rule of the world), they managed to extend a very loose and superficial but functional over-lordship along a substantial part of the route. This facilitated the imbrication of the different regional networks or legs of the route on the meso-level by personal networks, intermediaries, go-be­tweens, brokers or middlemen on the micro-level.

The Venetian interventions on the Eastern Mediterranean leg of the spice route, including the state-supported galley system (cf. Lane 1963, Doumerc 1991, St6ckly 1995), the Venetian credit market (Gonzalez de Lara 2008), as well as the Venetian trade 'fair' in the Levantine emporia (e.g. Alexandria) and in Venice (Luzzatto 1954, Ashtor 1983, Heyd 1959 vol. 2, Christ, 2012a), have received considerable attention, as has the Red Sea stretch of the spice route, including Aden (Serjeant 1988; Vallet 2010; Meloy 2010). Interventions in the spice trade in the realm of the Mamluk Empire have been examined; albeit with a strong focus on Mamluk attempts to maximise tax revenue, for instance under sultan Bars bay (Darraj 1961, Labib 1965, Ashtor 1983, 1974-79). Critics emphasize the con­tinuity of policies from the beginning of the 15th century onwards and question

"The end of Mongol dominion aggravated the access to East Asian as well as Persian and Turkestan markets for Europe. The quest for alternating routes to the riches of the Orient led to the exploration of the maritime routes around Africa and the Americas." Introduction to this volume.

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 29

the topos of Barsbay's 'rapacity' (Apellaniz 2009a:80-82, 85- 88; Meloy 2003, 2010:113-115). Thus, as far as the interaction of Venetians and Mamluks in Alexandria is concerned, the historiography tends to convey an image of sepa­ration of 'Muslim' and 'Christian' traders in the wake of military clashes and despite of continuing commercial exchange. This image of Alexandria as some sort of 'predetermined breaking point' of trade connections between Latin Eu­rope and Islamic Egypt echoes the regulations contained in normative sources. According to those regulations, the passing of merchandise from Mamluk to Venetian merchants in Alexandria was supposed to be effected in a clearly structured and contained way (Thomas/Predelli 1899:passim). These normative sources thus construct clear categories and ruptures, thereby highlighting conflicts (necessitating regulatory activity aimed at reducing points of friction) rather than the messier everyday connectivity. Consequently, Mamluk ex­tortions featured more prominently than the cross-cultural co-operations en­abling continuous commercial exchange between Venice and Egypt. These ex­tortions, had they indeed been the prevailing element in Venetian-Mamluk trade relations, could be read as a strong incentive for the Portuguese to avoid this problematic passage oblige by calling directly on India.

Horden and Purcell in their seminal study, Corrupting Seas (2000), explores a different approach. They describe the Mediterranean as fragmentation cum unity. The Mediterranean would thus be a landscape of both rupture and con­nectivity. These authors provide a captivating picture of Mediterranean con­ditions of ruptured connectivity and connectedness in the longue duree on the local level. However, the connection between the micro/meso and the macro level, i.e. of local actors and the 'grand commerce' remains perhaps somewhat underexplored (Horden/Purcell 2000 :367; Algazi 2005 :230 ). How these different systems of macro, meso, and micro level were connected and which moments of rupture jeopardized this connectedness remains to be explored further (on the connection of different levels of Venetian navigation, see Christ 2010). Indeed, micro-analysis corroborates this image of ruptured, constantly threatened basic co~nectedness. It highlights the complexity and messiness of everyday inter­action on the ground, e.g.: in Alexandria, and draws a picture of encounter, of cooperation as well as conflict with the lines of conflict cutting often rather across, than along the cultural-religious divides (Christ 2012a, cf. Apellaniz 2009a).

The economic historian Avner Greif described the 'coalition' of Jewish Maghribi traders as an efficient ethnic network. According to Greif, compliance Was ensured by an internal reputation mechanism that reduced or even obli­terated the need for outside institutions in case of non-compliance (Greif 1993). Although this hypothesis was seminal for a series of studies, it remains widely controversial. Some opine that the Maghribi traders actually did refer to state-

like institutions for enforcement (Edwards/Ogilvie 2008, and the refutation by Greif 2008). Indeed, evidence has been presented that things did go wrong and that governmental institutions were involved in conflict management. (Goldberg 2012:155seq.; Ghosh 1994:304, 314 cf. 178; those compliance problems were occurring at the fringes of the network). Greif can certainly be credited for introducing a very clear and stimulating concept of trade networks to the dis­cussion. Subsequently, the term 'network' was used widely in historical studies, but in somewhat ambiguous and therefore misleading ways. The more implicit than explicit understanding of the term seems to oscillate between two types of networks. Firstly, it can be used as an analytical term in the context of social network analysis: data on connections between a set group of persons at a certain place and time are measured against a set of predefined criteria (cf. Currarini forthcoming). Secondly, 'network' can structurally describe a specific group of people interacting regularly with varying degrees of institutionalisa­tion, i.e. a structure that is a priori defined as a network such as a merchants' guild or the merchants joined by shared investments into a galley (cf. Apellartiz 2009b:583). The difference between the two types is in practice often blurred, as the second can be the result of the former (the Venetians in Alexandria growing into an institutionalized entity with taxes, a government (Council of Twelve, consul) etc. Somewhat linked to this lack of formal clarity is another pair of opposites: qualitative vs. quantitative network analysis.2

Quantitative social network analysis performed by social scientists tends to map links between individuals in a highly formalized and thus reductive way, typically handling substantial amounts of data. Historians, by contrast, might prefer a micro-analytical qualitative investigation of a web of discrete con­nections forming around an individual or a group, thus highlighting the sin­gularity of each connection, which ultimately forbids categorizing and formal­izing these relationships. These two positions are almost irreconcilable; while the former approach can be dismissed on the base of the post-structuralist/post­modern argument against complexity reduction, the latter can be criticized for being aporetic, i.e. preventing to new insights.3 In this paper, I shall take stock of some results produced by studies based on social network analysis. My inves­tigation, being a case study, is of the qualitative type and takes a micro-analytical approach. Nevertheless, this analysis should not be read as hackneyed criticism of quantitative studies, but rather as a contribution toward harmonizing the two positions. Microanalysis cannot replace but serve as corrector/error eliminator of and, perhaps, as inspiration for quantitative analyses. Social network analysis

2 For another approach to historical network analysis, see Fouquet/Gilomen 2010, mainly Gilomen's conclusion.

3 For a critique of structuralism, cf. Derridal967: 422 seqq.

has been applied to merchants in Alexandria in order to elucidate questions of connectedness, and especially to determine who mediated commercial inter­actions with Mamluk/non-Christian merchants controlling the spice supply from the Red Sea. Francisco Apellaniz highlights the 'subaltern network' (of Cretans, Cretan Jews and merchants from Southern France) contribution to Alexandrian trade. He identifies not only different Latin merchant groups but also shows how the different ethnic/national networks in Alexandria merged into one transnational merchant milieu. His research is based on data extracted from the deeds of the Venetian notaries who catered to the needs of the whole mercantile community, not only Latin Europeans but also Latin/Romaniote Jews, Greeks and even Arabs.4 Alexandria would thus appear to be a sort of node of nodes; a place where different and officially rather hostile Latin networks (e.g. Venetian and Genoese) were able to positively interact and cooperate (Apellaniz

2009b :594, 598).

Fig. 1: Networks of Latin merchants in Alexandria 1399-1401, mapped according to occurrences of cooperation in Venetian notarial deeds (Apellaniz 2009b: 595; courtesy

F. Apellaniz)5

4 Apellaniz suggests that post-1440 the Alexandrian merchant networks were becoming even more open for Arab merchants (2009a : 597) .

5 Blue= French, yellow= Catalans, pink= Genoese, green= Ancona, light green= Papal state, white= Tuscan, grey= smaller actors/statelets, red= Cypriots and Rhodiots, black= Venetians,

incl. Cretans.

32 Georg Christ

It is puzzling that Venetians are not very well represented in the notarial deeds while we have strong evidence suggesting that Venetians constituted the most numerous Latin European group in Alexandria. Apellaniz explains this phe­nomenon as follows:

Cela s'explique par leur faible interaction avec les autres communautes, ainsi que par le fait qu'ils sont la nation la mieux placee en Egypte, et celle qui dispose de plus de moyens. Le marchand venitien ne doit pas rechercher le nolis parce qu'il dispose du service de galeres, et n'est pas oblige de se rendre chez le notaire pour signer des commissions, puis qu'une bonne partie des marchandises voyagent seules sur Jes convois publics, et sont canalisees par des reseaux presents sur place, prealablement designees.

Barcelona also ran public shipping lines, albeit less regularly (Coulon 2004:152 seq.). The Venetians, more importantly, shipped a great deal, if not the bulk, of their merchandise on ships other than the state galleys (Christ 2010, 2011). The 'predetermined networks channelling the merchandise', if alluding to the tightly regulated Venetian normative framework in Alexandria, existed certainly in theory (but arguably in similar ways also for other nations). We will see below to which extent such regulations could be enforced (see also Christ 2012a:passim). Additional reasons have to be sought for what seems to be a Venetian reluctance to use their own notaries. I suggest two more reasons : Firstly, Venetians, compared to other Italians, tended to rely on the family rather than formalized company structures for their business ventures (Morche 2013, cf. Christ 2012a).6 Secondly, the more complex Venetian deals often violated regulations and would perhaps for that reason not be concluded recurring to the Venetian notary (cf. Christ 2012a), while this was arguably less of a problem for the non-Venetians.In any case, the paradox of underrepresentation of Venetians in the deeds of the Venetian notaries modifies the assumption that Latin Eu­ropeans used notaries as a transpersonal enforcement mechanism and instru­ment of ensuring trust, while others, such as Levantine Jewish merchants, relied on communitarian (i.e. interpersonal) enforcement mechanisms (Udovitch 1977).7 It also casts some doubt on how representative notarial data can be, especially for the reconstruction of the Venetian network (cf. Apellaniz 2009b :595). Therefore, I argue that a study of the connections between Venetian and Mamluk trade networks must seek complementary sources, such as Vene­tian private archives.

Social network analysis produces colourful maps and thus constructs its very

6 Morche's 2013 thesis shows convincingly that also Venetians relied heavily on family ties. 7 Furthermore, the important Venetian court for trade matters, the Gudici di Petizion, was not

excluding non-notarial evidence from the procedure, thus also relativizing the importance of the notary in business matters to some extent.

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 33

own spatiality. This gives rise to the question on the analytical level of how_ the 'real' maps of interaction would look like. How do per~onal ne~works bndge

eographical distances and relate to geographies? How d~d ~enetian ~erchants g rceive trade-related problems with reference to spatial mformat10n (what ~:re their maps in mind, Downs/Stea 1977) and how did they relate tempo~al­

tial information on spices in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea to a possible

:~~act on commodity prices and, thu~, thei: p~tential gains: This chapt~r roposes to explore these questions by mvestigatmg one Venetian merchants

~ctivity in Cairo in 1419. This merchant, Angelo Michiel, linked several netwo~ks _the Karimis and Meccan trade systems (around the Red Sea sector of the sp~ce

te) and the Mamluk trade (around the Egyptian section) with the Venetian rou . h" 1 trade system (based on the Mediterranean section) - via is own persona network that transcended the Venetian community and therefore connected different networks. In this way, people like Michiel (and there were many of them, as will become clear below; albeit in the shadow of the offici~l and more accessible sources), knitted together the meso-networks on the micro-level of their personal network. Thus these meso-networks could form a sub-glob~l spice trade network on the macro-level (cf. fig. 4). The present case stu~_Y is based on seven letters of Michiel to the Venetian consul Dolfin and auxiliary documents from the latter's bequest.9 The documentation is completed by no-

tarial deeds and normative sources. . I argue that Venetian merchants in Cairo were a crucial asset to the operat10n

of a functional node to link sub-systems or meso-networks of an 'archaic' glo~al trade network on the macro-level. Paradoxically, they established these crucial links in partial violation of Venetian regulations. Indee~, the lawmaker~, somewhat short-sightedly, tried to limit spice trade operat10ns to Alexandria and to curb the influence of intermediaries in order to avoid problems naturally occurring in the course of these interactions. They did not see t~at in t~e long run this non-contact trade arrangement, if successful, would Jeopardize the efficacy of the very same flow of spices they tried to con~rol. Particular attentio_n will be given to the role of strategic information on spice supply, and how ~is information was operationalized on the level of personal and transpersonal, Le.

official Venetian business. 10

A few words on the terminology: I am speaking of networks as units of analysis on three levels; micro, meso and macro, as depicted in fig. 3 and 4. I use the term "network" thus in a rather traditional sense for networks of transport

8 For more information on this group of merchants, see below. . 9 Michiel's letters have been used summarily for studies on the Levant trade (Apellamz

2009a:76; Christ 2012a:passim). . . 10 This paper is part of a series of studies ?n th~ conne~tion of different levels of Venetian

navigation and on Venetian go-betweens m CaJro (Chnst 2010, 2011 , 2012b).

34 Georg Christ

~----- ... ""' Fig. 2: Venetian trade with Egypt (red: wine trade; ~r~en: o~er agric~ltural ?oods: cheese,_nuts, almonds, oil, honey; light blue: 'grand commerce, 1.e.: spices against finished (proto-)mdu­strialized goods and bullion)

and communication; i.e.: the sum oflinks and nodes that enable the movement of transport for persons, goods and information. Such networks would ~erve as a means of communication for a relatively closed group of merchants, sailors and bureaucrats connected by shared institutions (including families) and interests (typically expressed in reciprocal transactions), legal system(.s) _and.a li~gua franca. Thus, between the Malabar Coast and Venice we can di.stmgmsh si~ to seven such networks: Venetian, Mamluk, Meccan, Karimi/Rasulid, of the Indian Ocean including Hormuz, and of the Malabar Coast. The network is dis­tinguished from a monotone point-to-point connection by its fle~bility .and redundancy: if a node becomes dysfunctional or a link becomes impractical,

alternative connections can bridge the gap. The macro-level of grand commerce is the network of the transcontinental

spice trade, mainly of pepper, from the Indian Malabar coast to Europe. This route led through the Indian Ocean to Aden and on to the Red Sea (Haarmann/ Zantana 1998, Margariti 2007, Serjeant 1988, Subrahmanyam 1995, Vallet, 2010) and via varying routes to the Egyptian or Greater Syrian Mediterr~nean coas~s. Pepper was exchanged against a number of commodities; the most important m value probably was bullion. Indeed, the balance of payment was perhaps not as

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 35

negative as it has been proposed (Ashtor 1971; cf. Munro 2007). Besides bullion, the Venetians brought proto-industrial products, such as luxury cloth and soap, to the Levant, but also agricultural products such as wine (in considerable amounts), cheese, honey, olive oil, nuts including almonds, i.e.: regional products of the meso-level of commerce.

Levels of analysis I Eastern Mamluk Red Sea Indian regions Mediterranean Empire, Ocean

Egypt

Macro: (sub-)global/ Pepper, bullion, cloth, slaves transregional

Meso: Oil, nuts, honey, wine, I Kiswa I. Regional and interregional wood, beans, grain

Micro: Local, individual Credit, services, retail trade, information

Fig. 3: Trade goods (auxiliary units of analysis) grouped by level of analysis

Case Study: Angelo Michiel qd. Luca

Angelo Michiel quondam11 Luca was a Patrician merchant from Venice. We cannot establish exactly when he came to Alexandria, but he appears as an already well-established merchant, when he first appeared in our sources by 1418. He must have stayed at least until about 1424. After that, he was active in Nicosia, Cyprus, until at least 1432. He was one of the financially strongest Venetian merchants in Alexandria, presiding as one of the two aldermen (con­

siglieri) over the Council of Twelve governing the Venetian community in Alexandria (Christ 2012a: 70). In the summer of 1419, he was officially tasked to go to Cairo to gather operational business intelligence with regard to the spice trade on behalf of the Venetian community. His trip to Cairo was thus in dis­charge of his public function within the Venetian community in order to report on the pepper supply situation to the Venetian Consul Biagio Dolfin in Alex­andria. Furthermore, he had to call on the nii~ir al-!Jii~~ and to complain about grievances which had arisen in the context of the spice trade in Alexandria (see below, letters 1 - 7). News on the pepper supply was crucial for the delicate timing of the Venetian spice fair in the autumn, when the Venetian spice galleys moored in Alexandria. It was also indispensable for negotiation of realistic prices in the future trade (forward purchases) and regarding the forced sales of the sultan's pepper to the Venetian community. The Venetian galleys had strict orders not to exceed a set period of sojourn in Alexandria, and the admiral

11 I.e. son of the late xy - from here on abbreviated qd.

36 Georg Christ

leading the Venetian convoy was threatened by a heavy penalty for disregarding these orders. These strict regulations were motivated by the need to bring the galleys back home to Venice before the winter storms in the Adriatic made a cumbersome and dangerous return. Moreover, the galleys bound for Flanders had to set sail in January in order to profit from the same strong northerlies for their outbound voyage that would make the inbound journey of the Alexandria galleys too difficult. In order to have enough time for the unloading, auctioning and reloading of spices, the Alexandria galleys had to be back in Venice before Christmas. 12

Hence, it was essential that the galleys left Alexandria early enough at the beginning of November. However, if the new spices from the Red Sea did not make it to Alexandria in time, or only in limited quantities, the prices of the remaining spices went up. There was thus ample opportunity and incentive to speculate on expected pepper prices during the spice fair, i.e.: the arrival of the Venetian galleys in October. Merchants negotiated advanced deals buttressed by credit and down-payment. It was possible to make handsome gains, but also to lose considerable amounts of money in this future trade, which was dependent on many factors -such as the monsoon and the pilgrimage seasons, the winds in the Red Sea; political and security issues in Aden, Mecca, among the various Bedouin tribes and in Northern Egypt; flood/navigability of the Nile; quantity and quality of spices etc. Hence it was tantamount to pure gambling. The critical element in this speculative business was information about whether the spices would make it on time to Alexandria for the fair and in what quantity, i.e. at which price. Therefore, Venetian merchants had to look beyond their own direct scope of mercantile action, which did not extend further than Alexandria or, exceptionally, Cairo. They had to look into the next area beyond Egypt : the Red Sea.

The Venetian consul Biagio Dolfin was probably not personally involved in this future trade. It seems that he genuinely feared the negative collateral effects on the whole of the Venetian community in case of a speculative bubble, and the ensuing trouble for him as consul. A first negative effect of an inflated pepper price would be higher cost of the pepper imposed on the Venetians by the Mamluk authorities. The community of Venetian merchants in Alexandria had to purchase spices from the Sultan at a pre-negotiated price. If the prices were driven up by speculation, it would have jeopardized the consul's freedom of action to negotiate a favourable price for the Venetians (Christ 2012a: 229-235). Therefore, the consul tried to curb this speculation as much as possible. He passed a decision in the Council of Twelve fixing a maximum price for future pepper purchases. However, in order to fix a realistic price he needed as much

12 See, for a more detailed discussion, Christ 2010, 2012a: 187-191.

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 37

information on the spice supply as the speculators and decided with the Council of Twelve to send his own man to Cairo : Angelo Michiel. 13 His task was in part very similar to that of other agents despatched to Cairo on the private initiative of Venetian merchants engaged in speculative future trade in Cairo: He had to provide information on the situation of the spice supply in Cairo and the Red Sea region in order to assess when and in what quantities spices would arrive in Alexandria (Christ 2012a: 235). A letter of the Venetian consul in Alexandria to his counterpart in Damascus gives some further insights about the former's motivation for sending Michiel to Cairo :

For many days already I see that many of our merchants here will be deprived [lit.] from news [hearing] about the Karimi and of their arriving; that is of their spices, which are supposed to be in Ainona or to be coming via the river [Nile], because [although] up there [in Cairo] two of our [merchants] had continuously been present but it was hardly possible to get any news from them. Therefore, it was decided to send A. Michie! to Cairo at the expense of the cottimo. He must write until mid-September or until 201h

September and [he will give us to] hear about the aforesaid Karim and of any other quantity of spices that are bound to arrive at the time of our galleys [the spice fair] .14

Hence, there were already Venetian merchants present in Cairo (as we will dis­cuss below) but they were not in the service of the Venetian consulate (and did indeed not serve its purposes at all). Angelo Michiel, however, was despatched at the expense of the cottimo, a communal fund sustained by a tax on the Venetian spice trade (cf. Christ 2012a: 77-81). Nevertheless, as an official envoy he was technically bound to observe the rules fixed by Venetian legislation regulating operations in Cairo. These rules reflected a general desire to curb speculative deals and their negative effects on Venetian trade in Alexandria. With regard to Venetians travelling to Cairo, a decision of the Senate stated:

that no Venetian or subject of ours or whoever may be treated as Venetian ( ... ) could buy or let buy spices of any type in Cairo be it for cash or by forward purchase ( ... ).And

13 In fact, the situation was far more complex than that. The consul did not only have Angelo Michie! as the official envoy of the consulate in Cairo, but also the merchant Filippo di Malerbi. The latter, officially, was not commissioned by the consul himself but by his nephew. However, the Malerbi's letters leave no doubt about the consul being the ultimate com­missioner (cf. Christ, 2012b).

14 "Zia molti zorni vezandy my che de qui questi nostri merchadanty sera molto nudi de aver sentimento de! Chereim et del so zonzer eziandio de spezie che fose in Ainone over fose per venir per la fiumera. Perche la suso de se stado continiamente do di nostri et mal da lor se a potudo aver avixo algun. In pero fo deliberado de mandar a spexe del chotimo ser A. Michie! al Chairo el qua! die scriver fino mezo setenbro over fino 20 del soradito [ .. . ] sentir del di to Cherem et de ogni altra quantitade de spezie fose per zonzer de qui al tenpo de /vi galie nostre." Letter ofDolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to a Venetian merchant in Damascus, probably 08.08.1419,ASVe,Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. e, f. [17].

38 Georg Christ

said consul might have the liberty to enquire about the truth of aforesaid doings as it might seem fit to him. 15

Venetians in Cairo were not allowed to engage in any transactions regarding spices; be it forward or direct cash purchases. It was thus implicitly assumed that one was only allowed to go there for retail trading and to gather business in­telligence. It is remarkable to note the explicit mentioning of forward purchases; i.e. future trading. We might wonder how realistic these regulations were. Would a merchant go to Cairo at considerable expense and risk and then abstain from the most lucrative trade venture available? Even if he would be willing to per­sonally comply with these rules, would his network, that is his business partners, accept his self-restraint?

Angelo Michie! set off to Cairo. Arriving around the 9•h of August 1419,

Michie! probably went to old Cairo (Mi~r al-qadfma, cf. EI2, VII, 147, c. 1) mainly

inhabited by Copts, in the vicinity of the former Roman Babylon and at the fringes of the former and now ruined Arabic al Fustat in the South of Cairo, the new Muslim city centre, which had been founded by the Fatimids.16 He took his lodgings with other Italian merchants and news agents, Andrea da Como and Filippo the Genoese. 17 In some travelogues, reference is made to a Venetian 'inn' in Cairo, and in a Karaite source a khat't' al-bunduqiyin [quarter of the Vene­tians] is mentioned (Richards 1972:122) but unfortunately these sources do not reveal anything more precise about how and where exactly the Venetians lived in Cairo and to which degree this community was institutionalized. The mere reference to a house (casa) does not necessarily corroborate the notion of an institutionalized inn (Fabri 1975). Indeed, in other letters it is suggested that at least one other Venetian merchant active in Cairo, Filippo di Malerbi, lived in a house of his own (letter 2).

15 "Quod nulius Venetus, vel subditus nostris, vel qui pro Veneta tractaretur, de beat, nee possit emere, vel emi facere speties alicuius sortis in loco Caieri ad denarios contatos, ad terminum, ( ... ), et habeat libertatem dictus consul, si videbitur sibi, pro habendo veritatem inquirendi super factis praedictis." BJ, Krakow, Bero!., Ms. Ital. Qu. 8 (Nr inw. 17640), II console dei Veneziani in Alessandria (XVI w.), from a deliberation of the Senate, 24 May 1407, repeating an older provision of9 June 1291,f. l lr-12r; cf. "Oltra di cio, sia ordinato che nisun Venetian over subdito nostro, o che per Venetian fusse trattado, dieba ne possi comprar o far comprar specie di alcuna sorte nel loco dil Caiero a denar contadi ne a termine." Biblioteca del Museo Civico Correr (B.M.C.), Ms. Cicogna, Commissioni, nr. 70, "Commissione ducale a Girolamo Tiepolo, console in Alessandria" 29 July 1498, f. 55 (with thanks to Alessio Sopracasa, who kindly provided me with a transcript of this document).

16 For the topography of Cairo in the Mamluk period, see Loiseau 2010. 17 Cf. for instance "Questa messo, siando Andrea Chazilli, Felipa el zenoexe a chaxa soa

insieme, an do a cha' soa e porta lli le vostre lettere non i lle voiando dare lor mantle per mi." Letter 1 of Angelo Michie! to Biagio Dolfin, 21. 08. 1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. d, f. (16], cf. also letter (3) of02. 09. 1419, ibid. , f. (18].

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 39

Fig. 4: The Nile Delta and Angelo Michiel's likely route to Cairo

Letters and Red Sea Intelligence

According to his commission, Michie! called immediately on the head of the Sultan's domain/fiscal administration, the nii?ir al-ba~~· In his first preserved letter, he reported back to the consul that he had discussed a matter of con­fiscated vairs (furs of the grey squirrel) with the Mamluk official (letter 1 ). 18 He alluded to problems of intercultural communication, referring to the language differential between the nii?ir and himself. While Michie! had no Arabic (mor­

esco) language skills, the nii?ir did not understand Latin, and the conversation had thus to be mediated through the above mentioned Andrea da Como. This language difference, according to Michie!, was always a problem, as illustrated by this case. He then turned to the other main issue, spices, only to announce that he would do his best to find out the 'truth' about it, i. e. the spice supply from the Red Sea (letter 1 ). In total seven letters are preserved, of which nr. 6 is an amended copy of nr. 5. Sixteen more letters did not survive but can be re­constructed from the extent letters and messenger receipts.19 In all but the first letters, Michie! reported on the situation of spice supplies. These sparse notes

18 I dealt with the confiscation of squirrel furs and the informal political economy around it elsewhere, Christ, 2012a: 221 seq., for fur trade in general see Delort 1978.

19 Cf. Christ 2012a:300-303.

Georg Christ

give rise to the picture of a highly complex, redundant system of spice supply in the Red Sea region and Egypt, consisting of different routes and switches en­abling the passage from one route to another. The information in the letters related to four segments of the spice routes affecting the spice supply in Alex­andria: 1) Yemen and the Southern Red Sea, 2) the Jeddah/Mecca area, 3) the ports in the Northern Red Sea, mainly Ainona, situated in the vicinity of the straits of Tinln, and 4) the Qusair-Nile valley, with a special focus on Qus in Upper-Egypt. ·

1) On Rasulid Yemen, which is the only information reaching back to the Indian Ocean, we find only a brief remark in one letter. It simply states that the Karimi had left Aden four months prior. There is no information on the political or economic situation in Aden, which thus seems to be the very outer limit of the Venetian sphere of interest (letter 4).20

2) We find much more information on Jeddah and Mecca. In letter 3 Michie! reported on winds holding back spice transports in Mecca (i.e. Jeddah). In letters 5 and 6 he pointed at some difficulties with the ruler of Mecca, Sharif I:fasan. The Karimi were at the large of Jeddah but did not dare to enter the port because they had no news of the ruler. 21 In subsequent letters he re­ported how the spices were transported by camel back and on smaller ships to their final destination (it remains unclear whether this would be in Syria or Egypt, letters 3 and 7).

3) The two final ports for the spices that continued their voyage by ship on the Red Sea were Ainona ('Aynt1na, letter 3, 5- 7) and Tor (letter 7). This shows that, despite the difficulties of navigation in the Upper Red Sea due to adverse winds, shallows, and the ever-present coral reefs (Wiet 1955:83; Braudel 1990: vol. II, 239; cf. map Gulf of 'Aqaba 1971), seaborne transport in the Northern Red Sea area seems to have prevailed beside caravan-borne transport. This is in line with research proposing that Tor became a desti­nation for spice ships, replacing the ports of the western shore of the Red Sea (Garcin 1974:114; 1978: 311; for a later period: Braudel 1990: vol. II, 239). Ainona seems to be attested as a port of call only by these letters and might have been only a temporary alternative to Tor. It could reflect Mamluk at­tempts to challenge and contain SharifI:fasan's hegemony over the I:figaz and to extend direct control over the Northern Red Sea region from the Sinai and 'Aqaba toward the Upper I:figaz. To my knowledge, no archaeological surveys have been undertaken in Ainona that could provide further information on

20 On this crucial emporium of the spice trade, see Haarmann/Zantana 1998, Margariti 2007, Serjeant 1988, Subrahmanyam 1995:758seq., Vallet, 2010.

21 Letter 6: "Ttrovano avnchuo xe presso el Zidde e li non vuol intrar per non have novita da quello sig[ni]or." For the sharif and his policies, cf. Meloy 2010:108 -110.

Beyond the Network - Connecfors ot Networks

this transit port's importance over time. These passages emphasize the pivotal role ofJeddah as a hinge linking the Southern and Northern Red _Sea. Once the Karimi brought the spices to Jeddah, they were able to contmue their voyage in different ways: Letter 7 noted that the spices were reloaded from bigger to smaller ships in Jeddah. On these smaller boats of mori (i.e. 'Arabs', not Karimi!), it was brought to Ainona or Tor, or by caravan (in­cluding the pilgrims' caravans) to Cairo, Damascus or, illegally by-passing Cairo, directly to Alexandria. In letter 5 and 6, Michie~ further specified this, by indicating that the Sultan's merchant Siech Ali (Sayg 'AH al-Kilani, ac­cording to Apellaniz 2009a:71, 76) brought a substantive quantity of pepper to Ainona. It seems that Michie! did not think it possible that the big ships of the cherem (Karimi) could continue northwards, i.e. to go farther north than Yanbu' . The letters thus confirm the findings of Vallet's work on the spice trade in the Red Sea (Vallet 2010; cf. Apellaniz 2009a:77 seq.) in line with Fischel's (1958:163) hypothesis (cf. Goitein 1958) but somewhat contrasting with older opinions (Wiet 1955; Ashtor 1956): The term cherem/Karimi22

seems indeed specifically connected to the seaborne transport of spices in the Southern Red Sea, rather than to Egyptian or other merchants operating in Egypt or the Northern Red Sea.23

4) Then, Michie! reported on the spezie della fiumera, i.e. the spices which had been transported up the Red Sea to the Egyptian ports of al-Qu~ayr (probably not of 'Aygab anymore24

), which subsequently would be transported over­land to Qt1~, and from there on the Nile to Cairo. Michie! reported on how spices had arrived at Qu~ already, and that the nii~ir al-lja~~ had sent his customs officer upstream (letter 3)25

• This contrasts somewhat with the hy­pothesis of a decline of Mamluk rule in Upper Egypt, and hence a medi­terraneisation of the empire, basing the transit trade in spices on the upper

22 Wansbrough 2000 and Apellaniz 2009a:51-57 both propose an ancient Near Eastern/Me­sopotamian origin of the term.

23 Therefore, the "deux courants differents" of spice transports in the Red Sea area mentioned by Apellaniz (2009a:77) would not reflect parallel seaborne (operated by Karimi) and landborne (operated by Mamluk merchants) routes, but rather the division of labour be­tween two segments of the Red Sea trade route, with the Karimi taking care of the Southern part until Jeddah and the Mamluk merchants ('mori') of the Northern segment.

24 'Aydab already lost influence from the second half of the 14'h century onward (Garcin 1974:114 and passim; Peacock/Peacock 2008:46; cf. Garcin 1978:309-311), and was, ac­cording to one source, even destroyed by sultan Barsbay in 1426 (Peacock/Peacock 2008:45). Another port on the African coast of the Red Sea was Suwakin, situated further south of 'Aygab (ibid.: 33). Apellaniz (2009a:70seq., note 78 cites a letter, dated 5 March 1419 (ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 128a, Commissaria Zane) signalling ships in 'Aydab and Tor. From the fact that it is mentioned in conjunction with Tor (pretty muc? as in Michiel's letter), one might conjecture that the first toponym should be read as Amona.

25 "la so [sopra] le spezie si cargave, digo dal Cus".

42 Georg Christ

Red Sea port of Tor (Garcin 1978:310 seq.; 1974:114, passim; 1976). In fact, it seems that the Venetian merchants perceived both spice routes, the one via Qt1~ and the one via the Northern Red Sea area as equally important and that the Mamluks still detached officials from the central administration to Upper Egypt during this time.

A fifth and sixth segments of the spice trade route are not mentioned in the letters. These two inter-related routes are the caravan-borne spice transport from Mecca to Syria in the largest sense, mainly Damascus. More importantly to Alexandria, spices were smuggled from various nodes of the other systems in order to avoid interference by Mamluk tax officials in Qt1~ or Cairo. We find a few hints of smuggling to Alexandria (Christ, 2012a: 27), and Michiel talked re­peatedly about the necessity to keep the Venetians in Damascus informed about the spice supply situation in the Red Sea, as we shall see below.

• • •Alexandria

• Cairo

eMedina

'------------' IOO""'

Fig. 5: The northern Red Sea

Even though the different routes or theatres of operation added an element of redundancy, Michiel seemed to have feared that the spices would not arrive on

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 43

time. The bottle-neck was indeed the entrance to the Red Sea, and, if there was a problem at the Bab al Mandeb or in Aden, the overlap provided by the different land- and seaborne routes in the Red Sea could only do so much to remedy the problem.26 Probably, this is the reason why the spices arrived late in 1419. The letters, read in their temporal order, reflect how this rather unfavourable sit­uation evolved. It became clear rather quickly that only a limited quantity of pepper was bound to Ainona, while the rest was stuck somewhere, first between Aden and Jeddah and then between Jeddah and Yanbu'. Additional delays oc­curred in the Jeddah/Mecca area due to adverse winds, Bedouin interference and uncertainty about the political situation in Mecca (letters 3 and 5). Hence, Michiel's hope was with the pepper of the river (jiumera, i.e. coming down the Nile) that supposedly had already arrived in Qu~. However, also these spices took longer to arrive, and the quantities coming were insufficient. This explains the rather distressed tone of Michiel's last letter and his emphatic advice to take counter-measures in order to delay the arrival of the galleys: the convoy commander should stay in Damietta for three days and they 10 - 15 miles off the coast until the pepper had arrived (letter 7). The letters highlight the imbrication of information and news networks and the crucial importance of the inter­mediaries who were able to link the different networks of the Red Sea, the Mamluk Empire, and Venice. They thus extended the area of news coverage (i.e. the area of interest) beyond the area of direct Venetian mercantile operation. The letters also bear notable traces of how the acquired information was spread, although the information about the spice supply was meant to remain the ex­clusive knowledge of only a small circle of merchants.

Consular News Management and Intelligence Integration

Angelo Michie!, as one of the most senior merchants and councillors of the Venetian community in Alexandria, did not only report news, but also gave advice, and with emphasis : The news should be communicated to the Venetian community in Damascus and to the convoy commander of the Venetian galleys so that the latter could stay off the coast until some spices arrived. The rationale behind this advice is clear; the Venetian galleys were not allowed to stay longer in Alexandria than the defined thirty days. Waiting off the coast was a possible subterfuge to respect the regulations to the letter, while still putting off the spice fair until the arrival of the spices. The Venetian consul acted accordingly, but

26 ! here are obviously other and more heavily land-borne routes, through Mesopotamia for mstance, which, however, in this time were of only secondary importance, cf. Lybyer 1915: 580seq.

44 Georg Christ

whether he did this on Michiel's behest cannot be established. However, as far as informing the Venetian community in Damascus was concerned, he perhaps did not quite do what Michiel proposed. It is likely, that he wrote to the consul in Damascus, but this cannot be established for sure. However, he did write a long letter to a merchant in Damascus detailing what information on the spice supply that he could muster, including a copy of one of Michiel's letters.27 Hence, he certainly gave this particular merchant insider information and thus a prefer­ential treatment over the Venetian community in Damascus as a whole. In other cases, Michiel recommended that information was kept secret or withheld. This advice is linked to speculative attacks on the pepper price, due to the Venetian future trading (in letter 2 mentioned explicitly: "The pepper [price], I tell you, is in fury because others, which are under our regiment [i.e. other Venetians], try to buy").28 If the merchants knew that little pepper would be arriving on time, this would boost the future trade even more.

Passages in letters 5 and 6 seem to be in concealed language: "The emperor Bernard is distressing heavily", and I have no hypothesis to offer who is meant by the emperor Bernard.29 Letter 2 uses character encoding "IGADPBS/OSXI/ D8BDHI/PI7H8BI/", and I am again unable to decipher the code. Moreover, in several letters, Michiel urged the consul to keep news secret: "tegni queste nove sechrete" (letter 7), or even to hold letters back (letter 4). He detailed additional measures he took, for instance the expedition of letters by special despatch (messo proprio ), and complained about the practice of merchants, and perhaps also Mamluk officials, to intercept and retain letters, or at least to inspect them, before handing them to the rightful addressees (letters 1 - 4). 30 How did the Venetian consul verify this information? How did he ensure redundancy in his personal informational network concerning the spice supply? His above-men­tioned letter to a colleague in Damascus sheds some light on this question:

Furthermore, I thus advise you that of the na?:ir al-qa~~ of this land I am informed as follows: the same tells [me] about [the spice situation] under many oaths that, for

sure, before the arrival of our galleys here [in Alexandria] there will unfailingly be

more than I 000 sporte of pepper in the hands of the Moors. Even though one should

trust those Moors we would be misled if we [just] went by the day. Nevertheless, I tell

you in conclusion that at best it would be half of what he says, as is of the knowledge

27 "El qua! ser Anzolo me a fato per do suo letere quelo lo a sentido a chopia de la qua! ve mando introcluxa azio che de tu to sie avixado et chomo son my proprio." Letter ofBiagio Dolfin qd. Lorenzo to Venetian merchant in Damascus, cit.

28 "El piper ve dissy fo in pazia, perche altri che n'e soto el nostro rezimento tenta di conprar." 29 "L'imperador Bernardo chruzia grievemente ." 30 "Messo proprio": letter 7; "messo del cottimo" and similar: letter 2, 7, cf. also the receipts for

messengers cited in Christ 20 l 2a:300 - 303.

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 45

of A. Michie!, the saying of said Na?:ir (?) and also of certain Saracens. Thus I am advised in such way; now you can take the deliberation you deem [appropriate] .31

The consul used his own network of channels of information to verify and assess the validity of the news he received from Michiel. The processed information he diffused as a sort of intelligence bulletin to his colleague in Damascus and business partners in Venice.32

Michiel's Personal Business

Angelo Michiel repeatedly claimed that the sole purpose of his trip to Cairo was to gather intelligence on the behest and behalf of the community of Venetian merchants in Alexandria. Did he really stick to his official task and respect the letter of the Venetian regulations? There is strong evidence that he did not. Our documentation suggests that Michiel made the trip to Cairo worthwhile by engaging in personal business. In one of his letters, he responded angrily to objections raised by the Venetian council in Alexandria, who were apparently unwilling to cover all his expenses in Cairo:

To you and the merchants it does not seem <appropriate> that the costs incurred with

[i.e. calling on] the Na?:ir al-kha~~ in order to remain here should be borne by the

cottimo [communal fund of the Venetian community in Alexandria]. I am flabber­gasted by this kind of [sic] point of view because I came up here [to Cairo] for the

cottimo [here: commonwealth, i.e. Venetian community in Alexandria] and not for two velvets and three camlets. And if I had not had affair [i.e. to do] with < our> com­munity no utility would make me stay in Cairo.33

31 "Ultradezio si ve avixo, che dal Chadi nadro de questa tera se son informadi; el qua! n'el dixe con molty zuramenty, che per fermo el non manchera chavandy al zonzer de le galie nostre de qui el non (?) sia in man di mory in questa terra oltra sporte 1000 de piper. Et benche'l sia da dar fede a questy mory semo trato quando se vade a la zornada. Non de men ve concludo che per lo meio parer el sera mitade quelo ch' el dixe se per lo saver del dito ser A. Michie! chomo per lo dir del di to chadi et anchor da zerty sarain chusy son avixado voy de pode far mo quela deliberazion che ve de par." Letter of Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Venetian merchant in Damascus, cit.

32 Cf. for such bulletins: "De nuove de queste parte sie che per lo prexente in questa tera non d'e spezie da far con to. Piper e sta infugado per do di nos try et a meso a bisanti 150 et segondo my senza algun respeto, benche lor dixe, che sente, chel non zonzera le spezie al ten po de le galie. Et io sento el contrario che'l me vien dito che le zonzera siche la chosa pasa chusy. Ma concludo che meio seria ad aver conprado piper a bx. 200 la sporta al tenpo de le galie per aver meio visto quelo se avese fato, che averge conprado chomo questy do marchadanty nostri a sporte? 25 in 30 a bx. 150." LetterofDolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo to Dolfin, Lorenzo qd. Antonio, 04.08.1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Citra, b. 282, fasc. 3, f. (4].

33 "A vui et i marcadanti non parse che la spexe fexi con Nadrachas per romagnir qui suxo che la varda a cotimo. Io me meraveio di tal parer, perche qui suxo son vegnudo per cottimo e non per 2 veludi et 3 zambeloti. E se n'avesse abudo afar con comunita, alguna utillita non me ne

46 Georg Christ

Michiel thus admitted quite frankly that he did trade in cloth, but represented it as of little consequence, and certainly not substantial enough to make it prof­itable for him to stay in Cairo (letter 7). However, this was not the only business in which he was engaged. In fact, Angelo Michiel was engaged in a particularly delicate transaction: he transported considerable quantities of Cretan wine to Cairo and sold it via his middlemen, Andrea da Como and Filippo di Malerbi, to the chief-dragoman Sain, who, probably, was acting as a middleman for high­ranking Mamluk costumers. In a law-suit pushed against him later in Venice, the claimant stated that:

I want to prove ( .. . ) that (?) from the rest of an account of our company ( . .. ) of wines he

obtained in Cairo from Mr. Filippo de Malerbi 94 besants and 3 carats of the assets of this company founded in Alexandria; that is half of the debtors of wines.34

This trade was of considerable size, involving credits of 1000 ducats. Interest­ingly, in his letters to the consuls he distanced himself carefully from the above­mentioned merchants acting as his middlemen, and even denigrated their trade activities to the consul (letter 2, 3). Furthermore, as a letter of the above-men­tioned Malerbi to his brother in Alexandria indicates, Angelo Michiel was also engaged in the highly speculative business of pepper forward purchases, and increased his chances by using his informational edge regarding the spice supply in the Red Sea.35 Analysing Michiel's activity as a news agent for the Venetian commonwealth of merchants in Alexandria in a wider context, we come to realize that he did not cease to be a merchant, and that he thus still acted on his own behalf as well as for the community. His engaged advocacy of counter­measures appears in a very different light now: it was probably less about pre­venting future trades per se, but rather to preserve his competitive edge in it. This behaviour is not surprising; several elements, to be explored below, made it very

feva romagnir a la Caiere." Letter 7 of Michie!, Angelo qd. Luca to Dolfin, Biagio qd. Lorenzo, 01.09.1419, fundo cit. f. [17] .

34 "Vuoio provar ( . . . )per resto d'un conto delle nostre conpagnie ( .. . )de vini !'ave al Chayro da ser Philippa de Malerbi bx. 94 k. 3 della qua! conpagnia de' aver la mitade de debitori de vini l'a creado in Alexandria." Law suit Baldassare Rizo vs. Angelo Michie!, 4 April 1424, Venice, ASVe, Giudici di Petizion, reg. 34, f. 37r-38r; for this wine trade, cf. Christ 2012a, 172 seqq.

35 "Conferixi con ser Anzolo Michael, che ho scrito a ser Piro Bernardo. Diebia eser con luy e achater de conpagnia. E per non guastar i fati de ser Piro non gli oso scriver al di to ser Anzolo niente. Ma chome ho di to, conferixi con lui mamchandete Piro. Econ pro di conpagnia per la mia parte sporte 10 in 15 almodo te ho dito. E fezando sollo prima, non tuor alltro sanserche Momsor zudio. Enon conferir con alltri, che non guastaxe i fati tuo. Fa con born descrezion et avixame discretemente per l'afebeto de! seguido. E fa i tuo fati con bona solizetudine e s< e> creti, chel non semta persona. Ser Angolo e bona persona, che te metera in bon chamin. Perche azierchamdote pero, non te partir da ser Anzolo Michie!", Copy of a letter, Filippo di Malerbi qd. Nicolo to Pietro de Malerbi, before 8 August 1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 15, int. n, f. [18], published in Christ 2012b, see also there for more information on these speculative operations.

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 47

unlikely that Michiel would cease his mercantile activity: the merchant's net­work of mutual obligations, the high risk of a Cairo trip, and the deontology of Latin merchants in Alexandria. The base of a merchant's activity is his personal

etwork, which is built on trust and honour, i.e. the reputation of the merchant n . . not to default on his obligations. Such obligations arose from contmumg mer-cantile activity over an extended period, and it was thus almost impossible to exit the network temporarily for an official mission because of a conflict of interest. Looking at Michiel's ventures, and especially his involvement in the wine trade, it becomes clear that his personal network linked him intrinsically to partners in Cairo. This probably influenced Michiel in accepting the official commission to go to Cairo, as well as for continuing his own business in violation of Venetian

regulations (cf. Christ 2012a: 101-105). Michiel's network of mutual obligations was also deeply intertwined with the

local context, as highlighted by credits granted to local Egyptian merchants.36

This is yet another example of how Venetians offered credits to Egyptian mer­chants, a practice we have noticed already in the context of the advanced pur­chases of pepper. The reverse also happened: Mamluk officials would grant credits in the form of some sort of forbearance on taxes due or for imposed purchases ofsultan's/customs' pepper. This was not a surprising phenomenon, since offering and accepting credit is the lubricant of trade, and was crucial in the marketplace of Alexandria characterised by a particularly acute seasonal fluc­

tuation in money supply.37

Generally, journeys to Cairo were not particularly coveted by most Venetian merchants. In 1418, when the consul himself was ordered to travel to Cairo at the behest of the Serenissima, he tried his very best to avoid this trip. Finally he had to succumb to the growing pressure from merchants in Alexandria and (via the Senate) in Venice. In preparation for his journey, the Venetian council in Alexandria had to coerce two merchants to accompany him (Christ 2012a: 2 73 -276). Different reasons made this journey extremely undesirable to the mer­chants, as the journey in itself was complicated and beset by problems: First, one had to ride to Abu Qir on roads that were not always safe, and in order to continue their journey to Rosetta; then one could travel by boat on the Canopic branch of the Nile to Boulaq, and from there again on horseback to Cairo (cf. Christ 2012a: 28 seq.). More importantly, Cairo was ridden wit epidemics at the

36 "E die' dar che el non me fa crededor per Abd-e-ramen bazaryoto che io Ii desegni per debitor. I qua! io le lasi a schuoder el quel xe di la raxion di mieli de! Cholfo .. El qua! Abd-e­ramen fexe una charta morescha e fexese debitor de el di to ser Anzolo per la d1ta charta. Noto che se dano intravegnise di el dito debitor tocherya qua! dito < a> ser Anzolo, < se> non Ii schuode el difeto e suo, e pero el dano tu to die' eser suo." ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, "Commissaria Angelo Michie!", b. 209 A, int. 2.

37 This was, however, characteristic for every emporium (Weissen 2002) .

time, and this was probably the most potent deterrent of all, as is clearly reflected by the Venetian consul's letters (Christ 2012a: 276-279). Finally, the missions to Cairo typically involved calling on the Mamluk sultan or one of his most dis­tinguished officials, which meant lengthy processes of admission, going from one office-holder to the other while giving and receiving gifts, until finally gaining access to the sultan's palace, and maybe even to the sultan himself (Brancacci 1881: 169-188; cf. Christ 2012a: 149-150).

A third reason might have been the deontology of the Latin merchants in the Levant. They were all "frontier runners" -some more, some less-but the longer they stayed in Alexandria and the more they were inserted into its multi-cultural milieu, the more they might have distanced themselves mentally from metro­politan rules and crossed the border to become 'Levantines' (cf. Schmitt 2005). These rules, as expressed in the deliberations of the Senate, reflected a Venetian societal consensus on what was and what was not acceptable practice. However, this was the consensus of the mercantile elite in Venice and as such was often not endorsed by the second- or third-rank merchants living in Alexandria. Hence, it is not surprising that these rules were not seen as particularly relevant or binding by those merchants ; they found themselves somewhat at the margins of the establishment setting the rules. Of course, these merchants were not outlaws with an entirely different set of morals. It is indeed likely that they could widely subscribe to mainstream mercantile ethics, as for instance those proposed in the Venetian treatise on the ideal merchant (Cotrugli 1990, cf. Dotson 1994). While central elements of this code (honour, reputation, loyalty and mutual trust) were probably binding for dealings within the merchant's in-group, the composition of this in-group varied strongly. The in-group was not necessarily the com­munity of Venetian merchants and perhaps not even the family clan, but rather Levantine peers which were the closest collaborators and friends of the mer­chant: fellow Latin merchants operating at the same location, for a long time, and under the same conditions at the fringes of their nations (cf. Zug Tucci 1993: 72 -73). Yet this was a fragile and unstable system which made violating rules and default easier.

Many of the merchants active in Cairo later left Egypt and resettled elsewhere: Angelo Michiel in Cyprus, his colleague Chiaro Arcangeli and probably Filippo di Maleribi's brother Piero in Rhodes. 38 Defaulting on obligations towards Venetians meant that Alexandria was becoming a dangerous ground, but it did

38 For Arcangeli, see Brancacci 1881 : 164. Filippo di Malerbi died in 1420. One can however, find references to a Filippo as well as a Nicolo Malerbi in Rhodes from 1475. It was customary among Venetians to name the first grandson after the grandfather ; probably this Nicolo was a nephew or son of our Filippo di Malerbi and the Rhodian Filippo perhaps his grandson, Vann 2007: 170; cf. the case of Giorgio Londachi, switching the theatre of operations from Alexandria to Rhodes, Apellaniz 2009b :587.

that trade with Alexandria had to stop: shifting the centre of activities notmean . . , . to Lusignan Cyprus or Hospitaller Rhodes and sk~fully explo1:mg one s re~10nal

. 0

/ego network assured the continuity ofbusmess. More importantly, it was ~- . a logical step to retreat to those even more remot_e fringes ~f :enetian tr~de, for Cyprus or Rhodes were traditionally the alternative emporia if Alexandria for a

reason could not be called on.39

Andrea Cazili [da Como?]

Partner in Cairo Apanet?

Saim, Dragoman

Basilius, Coptic Inn keeper in Cairo

Candiote Wine merchants

Alexandrian Inn Keepers Red=officlal commission

Blue=business commission (to an agent} Green=., following" of a experienced merchant Black= conflict/competition Arrow=agency relationship Line=partnership Dotted line=informal Interrupted line=secondary

Fig. 6: Angelo Michiel's personal network (qualitative analysis)

As the figure above makes clear, Angelo Michiel's official mission could ac­count for only a fraction of his activities in Cairo. The wine trade, arguably, was the most important constituent of his activities, followed by speculative future deals in spices. If he had wanted to respect the Venetian regulations, he could only have done so by interrupting his mercantile career completely, and this was

not possible (cf. Christ, 2012a: 101-105).

Conclusion

It should be taken as an uncontroversial assertion by now that the global trade system was not an invention of the early modern period (Abu-Lughod 1989, Bayly 2004, Curtin 1984, Darwin 2008 :33-39). The difference was that, before

39 Cf. Christ 2005 and 2012a for the Catalan fleet's unclear destination and trade between

Rhodes and Alexandria in 1419.

so Georg Christ

1500, supply lines were not vertically integrated. The spice route from India to Europe, for instance, as a global trade system or a network on the macro-level, was broken up in sections controlled by different political actors, with asso­ciated, but not congruent, networks on the meso-level that overlapped the sec­tion limits in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Mamluk Empire and the Eastern Mediterranean (cf. fig. 4). This chapter investigated qualitatively how networks of the meso-level overlapped and how they were inter-connected by focusing on a Venetian merchant who looked beyond the borders of his (proto-national) network. For the working of the Venetian section of the spice route, it was essential not only to extend the Venetian network's range of operations well into the next adjacent section, that is, the Mamluk Empire, but also to look in the next section beyond that, the Red Sea. This meant going to Cairo, which was at the same time at the very fringes of the Venetian sphere of operation and the heart of the adjacent, Mamluk section of the route and its respective trade system/net­work. This enabled the Venetians to extend their sphere of interest into the next but one section of the spice route: the Red Sea. This intelligence could only be provided if some Venetians ventured into Cairo a.nd sought this information, and they could only realistically do so by also engaging in their own trade and thus violating Venetian regulations. In this way, the macro-network of the great commerce connecting India and Europe was composed of a web of sub-networks on the meso-level. The latter, in return, were composed of personal or ego­networks connecting the different actors on the micro-level. Some of these players were operating only well within 'their' sectors and networks, while others operated on its margins. Those actors, such as Angelo Michiel, would venture into the next section of the spice route (the core of the Mamluk Empire) and connect directly to actors of its network (Mamluk merchants). In this way, they linked the different meso-level networks and exploited successfully their mar­ginal position in the network (cf. Granovetter 1973). Furthermore, by extending their range of activity indirectly, in this case through intelligence gathering, into the next but one sector (the Red Sea area), they would create a soft link from one section across the next to a third section, thus adding yet another, crucial layer of connectedness (cf. Darwin 2008: 6; cf. Darwin 2012).

Angelo Michiel's case also illustrates how the three levels of networks were connected by one person as far as the traded commodities were concerned. While Michiel's official mission and speculative future deals were connected to spices as a macro-level commodity travelling all the way from India to Europe, he invested substantial amounts in the regional wine trade that obviously was much more than just a complementary venture. It also became clear that Angelo Michiel was not a subaltern actor per se. He was not merely an agent for some sedentary merchants or masters in Venice. Of course, he fulfilled this role too, but he also acted as an independent master commanding his own substantial

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 51

-

Fig. 7: Imbrication of meso-level networks and sector dividers; red= Venetian, green=Mamluk,

yellow= Meccan/Karimi

business ventures, which is corroborated by the considerable sums he handled during the autumn spice fair of 1419.40 On the level of personal micro-level networks, the case of Angelo Michiel highlights the polycentric structure of these networks. As one would expect, clusters would naturally emerge in Venice, Alexandria, Cairo or Jeddah. However, the agent active at the fringes of the network (geographically and socially) was able to create and shift new centres, making, to some extent, the margin a centre in its own right (cf. Schabler 2007).

Information flows were crucial. Michiel was driving information flows by crossing boundaries. However, he did this at first for himself and then perhaps for a select group of colleagues. Information was a precious commodity, and merchants tried to keep it exclusive. In this way, Michiel could explore the full potential of his insider information, fuelling his own speculative operations in the high-risk future trade. However, one might argue that, in practice, in­formation could not be kept secret for long; bits and pieces always leaked, creating spill-overs for the whole community: negative ones if they caused a

40 See, for instance, a list with payments for the pepper auction, 2 November 1419, ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 181, fasc. 23, int. o, f. 1, cf. Christ, 2012a, passim.

52 Georg Christ

speculative bubble, positive ones if they prevented this or modestly facilitated the meeting of supply and demand in the marketplace. Angelo Michiel was breaking and brokering, i.e. interpreting rules by exploiting his liberty of action and efficiently combining private business with his official mission. Arguably, this was crucial for the success of the described intelligence operation. For Angelo Michiel, otherwise, could not have been convinced to undertake the trip to Cairo. Michiel's activity thus connected in a larger sense: 1) Different spheres: the realm of the political (Venetian community in Alex­

andria) and the commercial; 2) Horizontally and directly, two networks of the meso-level (the margins of the

Venetian with the core of the Mamluk network in Cairo); three or even four indirectly (adding the Red Sea area networks : Meccan, Karimi);

3) Vertically, networks from micro to macro : Michiel was involved in trade on all levels; macro (spices), meso (wine) and micro (his personal interactions with other merchants) .

Instead of the belles images of a pre-capitalistic, speculation-free and well­regulated trade, we look at the familiar face of futures trading and venture capitalism. It is difficult to assess whether another modus operandi of trade would have been more efficient than the informal meshing of networks effected by merchants like Angelo Michiel and marked by speculation and high risk. Venetian regulations, if taken seriously, (which to assume, perhaps, is the crux of the traditional reading of norms) would indeed provide an alternative. But­tressed by Mamluk privileges, they constructed a neat system of low-contact trade in Alexandria, leaving little room for misunderstandings, conflict or speculation.41 Yet, as tempting as this would be as an inspiration and blueprint to combat excesses of the financial industry, it rather should be read as a caveat. For it seems that there was not much choice. The Venetian patricians could regulate as much as they wanted (and indeed they did), and their consul in Alexandria with his council certainly followed suit, and with good reasons, to limit spe­culative operations. However, ultimately they all failed, and trade continued to be handled by people like Angelo Michiel, a specialist in speculation and the transgression of borders and regulations.

An alternative to this model of spice trade was developed a century later, with the Portuguese reaching India directly and thus integrating the supply chain vertically around 1500. At least in theory, they exerted a much tighter control of trade and, perhaps, even succeeded in curbing speculative practices. However, this system did not last.· Antwerp emerged as a new centre for spice trade in the 1530s, and the Venetian spice trade also recovered in the second half of the l 61

h

41 Cf. Christ 2012a: 53, 65.

Beyond the Network - Connectors of Networks 53

century, making us mindful of how ephemeral this new regime of spice trade initially was (Tellier 2009:307; Lane 1933, 1940). Connectedness in trade seems to have come at a price, and that price was the not so 'invisible hand' greedily clutching even an ephemeral (that is merely expected) gain. This led to spec­ulation, over-heated prices, and, occasionally bubbles which would eventually burst. In this case, merchants, more often than not, succeeded in collectivizing their losses and/or withdrawing from the theatre of operation when it became too risky to stay. 42 That was the end of that for the bilked creditor or taxpayer. But this was by no means the end of those merchants. The spice trade continued, and the defaulted merchants reappeared in other emporia, such as Rhodes or Cyprus, along the route of the spice trade system.

Yet, perhaps there is a quantum of prospect in such scandal. Unknowingly, dubious merchants such as Angelo Michiel, by employing the very same un­scrupulous practices leading to speculative bubbles, depleted communal funds and default, enhanced the redundancy and thus the stability of trade systems by ultimately managing trade more flexibly, and perhaps more efficiently, than a centralized government agency could ever aspire to do. Their re-routing and switching between different connections and routes perhaps created the robust connectedness that was one of the strong points of the old-world spice trade system.

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