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African Governance Newsletter Vol. 3, Nos. 1 & 2, January-June 2012 1

African GovernanceNewsletter

Vol. 3, Nos. 1 &

2 January - June 2012

A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ISSUES ON GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Interview with H.E. Flt. Lieutenant

John Jerry Rawlings, former President of

Ghana

UNECAGovernance and Public Administration Division

AUCDepartment of Political Affairs

Pho

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, Ken

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In this issueRegional Initiatives and Activities

Interview

Viewpoints/Think-Pieces

For the records

In this issue

African Governance Newsletter Vol.1, Issue No.4 October - December 2011 1

African GovernanceNewsletter

Vol.1, Issue No. 3, N

o.1 & 2January - June 2013

A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ISSUES ON GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Interview with H.E. Flt. Lieutenant

John Jerry Rawlings, former President of

Ghana

UNECAGovernance and Public Administration Division

AUCDepartment of Political Affairs

Pho

to: M

asai

, Ken

ya/S

tock

.xch

ng/C

amil

Mar

c V

ijeu

In this issueRegional Initiatives and Activities

Interview

Viewpoints/Think-Pieces

For the records

Consultative Advisory GroupH.E. Julia Dolly Joiner, Commissioner for Political Affairs, AUC Mr. Abdalla Hamdok, Deputy Executive Secretary, UNECA

Designed and printed by the Documents Publishing Unit-PCMS, UNECA

Editorial Committee

Co-Chairs: Said Adejumobi- ECA andMamadou Dia - AUC

Members: Gamal Ibrahim - ECA

Chrystanus Ayangfac - AUCMercy Wambui - ECAAbraham Rock Okoko Essau - AUCValerio Bosco - ECA

Editorial Comments: Said Adejumobi and Mamadou Dia, Co-Editors 3

Regional Initiatives and Activities » African Leadership and Ownership in Transitional Justice 4

» Inauguration of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa

6

» Tackling Corruption in Africa: The Business Action Against Corruption Benchmarking Initiative

8

» Reports of Pre-AGF VIII Forums on Gender, Youth and the RECs

10

Interview:Interview with H.E. Flt. Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings, former President of Ghana.

15

Viewpoints/ Think Pieces: Fighting Corruption in Africa: A Perspective from the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights- Hon. Judge Augustino Ramadhani, Judge of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, Arusha, Tanzania.

17

The Media, Diversity and the Political Construction of Reality in Africa- Prof. Adigun Agbaje, former Deputy Vice Chancellor, University of Ibadan, Nigeria and currently, Executive Director, Obafemi Awolowo Institute, Lagos, Nigeria.

21

For the Records: Statement by H.E. Mr. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister, Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the Fifth AU/ECA Joint Meeting of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 26 March 2012.

25


Editorial Comments

The World is certainly undergoing interesting times. While the World is going through a global recession,

Africa so far has been able to insulate itself from the pres-sures and challenges of the global economic crisis. The prediction had been that given the strong economic ties between Europe and Africa, as Europe reclines into crisis, African economies will feel the heat and respond the same way. However, this has not been the case. Several reasons may account for this. First, is that African economies are increasingly being better managed. Second, governance has improved remarkably in Africa. Finally, is that African countries are exploring more South-South economic co-operation with newly emerging powers like China, India, Brazil, South Korea and Singapore. The governance bit is what we explore further in this edition of the Newsletter. The events in North Africa no doubt attest to the fact that democratization cannot be taken for granted in any part of the continent. What happened in North Africa came un-expectedly, shattering the thinking that perhaps the North African sub-region is not ready for political change.

In this edition of the Newsletter, we bring you extremely interesting updates on the fight against illicit financial flows from Africa; the anti-corruption initiatives; Africa’s innovative approach to transitional justice and reports on the Pre-African Governance Forum preparatory activities in the Gender, Youth and Regional Economic Communities Forums. Our guest interview for this edition is with one of Africa’s revolutionary leaders- H.E. former President John Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. President Rawlings both within and outside office remains a passionate, committed and perhaps controversial figure; he is a Pan-Africanist per excellence. In the interview segment, he narrated his experi-ences, encounters, and challenges of the continent. In his usual candid way, the responses were frank, and forthright. Our readers will really enjoy reading the interview.

Also, there are two rigorous think-pieces from two distin-guished Africans. The first is by Justice Augustino Rama-

dhani, who is a Judge of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights in Arusha, Tanzania on how corruption is a human rights issue, which with time, the African court will have to confront. Corruption, according to him, denies people their basic social, economic and political rights. When resources meant for development and catering for the people are appropriated by a few or social services suffer be-cause of corruption, then peoples’ rights are compromised.

The second is by Adigun Agbaje, a Professor of Political Science, who looks at the role of the media in governance within the context of social and political diversity. Agbaje argues that while the media space has been liberalized and globalization has aided media outreach, the media space remains a contested space with different social forces seek-ing to appropriate it for different political and social ends.

Our ‘records section’ is a recount of the speech delivered by H.E. Mr. MelesZenawi, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Ethiopia at the joint AUC/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in Africa on 26th March 2012. In the speech, Prime Minister Meles in his usual solid intellectual fashion, engaged the neo-liberal dogma and argues quite convincingly that Africa will have to jettison the neo-liberal ideology and begin to chart its own path to the future through building development states and virile private sector on the continent.

We have no doubt that you will enjoy this rich edition of the Newsletter. Please, feed us back with comments and questions and do let us know the new things you will like to see in the Newsletter and what you would like us to improve upon.

Happy Reading!

Said Adejumobi and Mamadou Dia

Said Adejumobi Mamadou Dia

4 Vol. 3, Nos. 1 & 2, January-June 2012 African Governance Newsletter

Regional Initiatives

African Leadership and Ownership in Transitional JusticeIntroduction The African Union (AU) recognizes the imperative of a collective and coordinated approach to attaining durable peace and development in Member States emerging from conflict. Indeed, facilitating transi-tion to democracy, good governance, and promoting justice and reconciliation in Member States are central to the man-date and objectives of the AU. Hence, the Department of Political Affairs, AUC has initiated the process of developing a Policy Framework on Transitional Justice. This policy framework is in the context of greater African leadership and ownership in transition processes and post-conflict reconstruction meant to guide and facili-tate Member States efforts in undertaking Transitional Justice.

The Policy Framework seeks to articulate and encapsulate African Shared Values and Principles, linked to international human rights norms by setting practical guide to the management of Transitional Justice issues on the Continent.

Rationale and Objectives for Developing the FrameworkThe dominant transitional justice discourse approach is too narrow and places much emphasis on retributive justice. This in turn inadequately reflects on the contem-porary understanding and application of transitional justice in Africa. It is therefore necessary to broaden the scope and reach of transitional justice to include the effective realisation of socio-economic rights, gender justice, and the right to development.

In addition, the dominant transitional jus-tice discourse focuses on civil and political rights, but there is also a need to redefine “violations” beyond civil and political rights to include socio-economic rights violations such as targeted underdevelop-ment, economic crimes, corruption and

land grabbing. Moreover, in seeking durable solutions to a conflict, it is imperative to fully understand its background, especially the relationship between the violations and their underlying root causes including structural inequalities, environmental fac-tors and weak governance systems.

Gender justice is also crucial in Africa, in particular women’s experiences of violence during conflict, which have so far not been adequately addressed in the global transitional justice models. Given that war does not end with the mere cessation of hostilities, it is necessary to address the impact of conflict on women, and take into account their need for redress. Addressing the question of both immediate and durable reparations to victims of gender violence, would constitute a first step. In addition, it is important to ensure minimum levels of women’s representation, as well as the inclusion of women’s rights and access to justice in all post-conflict processes.

Local reconciliation processes should always be underpinned by accountability. For this reason, it is necessary to develop a policy framework that would strengthen positive complementarity between the na-tional and international justice systems, thus strengthening domestic accountability for international crimes and serious violations of human rights. Most conflicts in Africa are aided and/or abetted by multinational corporations and foreign powers and there-fore it is necessary to broaden the scope of accountability to include third party states, trans-national corporations and non-state actors.

While negotiating for peace, parties could consider a limited role of conditional am-nesties especially for low level perpetrators, which are issues that should be addressed in an African transitional justice policy frame-work. Amnesties remain a popular way of helping peace building in post conflict

societies in Africa and while their effects in reconciliation efforts are undeniable, those amnesties must at all times comply with principles of international and national le-gality and cannot be completely overruled.

The link between reparations and develop-ment is an important one in Africa and is in relation to the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. An African Union tran-sitional justice policy should encompass judicial, social and economic elements in order to mitigate the effects of war.

Emerging Consensus from the Process of Developing the FrameworkIn 2010, the African Union’s Panel of the Wise proposed the development of a Tran-sitional Justice framework in its seminal report titled “Non-impunity, Truth, Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa: Op-portunities and Challenges”. In support of that proposal and in a bid to contribute to the improvement of the proposed frame-work by the Panel of the Wise, the Depart-ment of Political Affairs, AUC, convened expert consultations (in Banjul, Gambia and Cape Town, South Africa) between AU organs, REC’s, AU member states, civil so-ciety actors and experts. A key objective of the consultations was to reflect on the role of the African Union (AU) in transitional justice processes taking place in member states emerging from conflict.

One of the principle points of consensus emerging is that while the term “transitional justice” may not have permeated the AU policy discourse so far, it is not a new con-cept. In fact the issues it aims to address are found in many mandates of the AU Organs. In addition to other relevant instruments and AU policy pronouncements and rec-ommendations, several AU instruments contain norms and standards that are relevant to the application of transitional justice in Africa including the Constitutive


Act of the African Union, the African Char-ter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

The consultations indeed observed that the attainment of the objectives of transitional justice in Africa – which are to deal with past human rights violations, in order to attain sustainable peace, rule of law and good governance - demand concerted ef-forts from all stakeholders. However the primary responsibility rests with states. Nevertheless, the AU can, and indeed has, contributed to the adoption and imple-mentation of transitional justice processes in various Member States by providing the normative and institutional framework and also through its offices for mediation and technical support. However, the varied nature and development of transitional justice in Africa should always reflect lo-cal ownership, context, participation and responsibility. This thus demands a unified and coordinated approach in developing a common policy framework among the vari-ous AU organs and member states.

While international legality provides a broad framework to anchor transitional justice processes and mechanisms in Africa, the national context is of utmost impor-tance. The involvement of local non-state actors such as the broader civil society and citizens should be harnessed in order to en-sure legitimacy and effective implementa-tion of a comprehensive policy framework. The AU, RECs and other regional initiatives should therefore draw on mutually reinforc-ing measures when deploying transitional justice mechanisms.

It is recommended that the AU develops long term initiatives as opposed to ad hoc measures to deal with Transitional Justice. In addition, the sequencing and spacing of peace and justice, if necessary, should be informed by local context. As such, the AU transitional justice policy framework, if developed, should not be prescriptive; but rather has to be a set of guidelines and principles to guide the process and address a range of imperatives such as the achieve-ment of peace, justice and accountability, national unity and cohesion, reconciliation, gender equity, development and victims’ right to effective remedies.

Way forward and conclusionFrom the foregoing, it is apparent that devel-oping an African Transitional Justice Policy Framework offers a unique opportunity and possibility to address African concerns in a manner which takes into account the par-ticular context, cultural nuances and value systems of the continent. Such a framework would incorporate African shared prin-ciples and values such as African ownership and leadership; promotion of national and local ownership; inclusiveness and equity; primacy of victim-centred justice; coopera-tion, coherence and coordination; capacity development; as well as mobilisation, sup-port and solidarity.

A potential ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework’ would ad-dress the following key issues: realization of social, economic and cultural rights; gender justice; reparations and their link to development; accountability, positive complementarity including traditional jus-tice; national cohesion and reconciliation mechanisms and processes; truth telling mechanisms; legal and governance reforms; vetting mechanisms and processes as well as disarmament, demobilisation and rein-tegration processes.

It is important to ensure that there is close collaboration and involvement of all AU organs in developing and adopting a tran-sitional justice policy framework. However, the primary responsibility for conceptualis-ing, implementing and monitoring transi-tional justice processes ultimately rests with the Member States. It is therefore crucial for those States to be at the forefront of the process. Equally crucial is the participation and involvement of civil society organisa-tions (CSO).

In order to guide and provide input into the development of the AU Transitional Justice Policy Framework, it will be im-perative to hold further consultations with AU member states, members of the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, relevant AU organs and institu-tions, Regional Economic Communities and members of civil society. The aim of those consultations will be to develop a clear and more coherent understanding of contemporary application of transi-tional justice in Africa. The consultations should further contribute to the elabora-tion, review and overall improvement of the proposed transitional justice frame-works included in the report that was adopted by the Panel of the Wise.

It is important to ensure that there is close collaboration and involvement of all AU organs in de-

veloping and adopting a transitional justice policy framework. However, the primary responsibility for conceptualising, imple-menting and monitoring transitional justice processes ultimate-ly rests with the Member States. It is therefore crucial for those States to be at the forefront of the process. Equally crucial is the

participation and involvement of civil society organisations (CSO).


The High Level Panel on Illicit Finan-cial Flows from Africa, established by the United Nations Economic Com-mission for Africa (UNECA) was inaugurated on 18th February 2012 at the Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg , South Africa. The Panel is chaired by H.E. Mr. Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, and composed of nine other m em b er s b o t h f ro m w i t h i n an d outside the continent. The Panel Members are as follows:

1. Chair: H.E. Mr. Thabo Mbe-ki, former President of South Africa;

2. Vice-Chair: Mr. AbdoulieJan-neh, Under-Secretary General and Executive Secretary of ECA;

3. Amb. Olusegun Apata- Chair-man, Coca Cola Bottling Company, Nigeria;

4. Mr. Raymond Baker- Direc-tor, Global Financial Integ-rity, WashingtonDC;

5. Dr. Zeinab Bashir el Bakri-former Vice President of the African Development Bank, Tunisia;

6. Mr. Abdoulaye Bio-Tchane-former Minister of Finance and Economy of Benin;

7. H.E. Mrs. Ingrid Fiskaa- State Secretary for Environment and International Develop-ment, Norway;

8. Prof. El Hadi Makboul- Di-rector, National Centre for the Study and Analysis of Population and Development (CENEAP), Algeria;

9. Barrister Akere Muna- Presi-dent, Pan-African Lawyers Union, President, ECOSOC, Member, Eminent Persons Panel of the APRM, and Vice President, Transparency In-ternational;

10. Ms. Irene Ovonji-Odida- Hu-man rights lawyer and activist for over 21 years and elected member of the East African Regional Parliament for five years.

Because of the scale and their sys-tematic adverse impact on the conti-nent’s development and governance agenda, the increasing illicit finan-cial flows out of Africa have become a matter of major concern. Stifling the various efforts in the Continent to i m p rove p u b l i c f i nan ces an d enhance democratic institutional building. Draining foreign exchange reser ves, reducing tax collection, dwindling investment inflows, and worsening poverty in Africa, illicit financial outflows constitute a major source of resource leakage from the continent.

Following a resolution of the 4th Joint Annual Meetings of the ECA/AU Co n f e re n ce o f Mi n i s te r s o f Finance, Planning and Economic Development in Afr ica in March 2011 the High Level Panel (HLP) was established in order to address the debilitating problem of i l licit f inancial outflows from Africa. It is important to note that these out-f lows are estimated at about $50 billion annually which is much more in terms of scale than the usual cor-ruption channels that the world is currently focused on.

The panel, will amongst others, de-termine the nature, pattern, scope and channel s of i l l ic i t f inanc ia l outflows from the continent; sensi-tize African governments, citizens, policy makers, political leaders and development partners to the prob-lem; mobilize support for putting in place rules, regulations, and policies to curb i l l icit f inancial outf lows; and eventually influence national, regional and international policies and programmes on addressing the problem of illicit financial outflows from Africa.

His Excellency Mr. Thabo Mbeki, f o r m e r P r e s i d e n t o f S o u t h A f -rica and chairperson of the Panel, welcomed the participants to the meeting , outlined the programme of work of the meeting. Mr. Ab-doulieJanneh, UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Secretary of ECA made the welcoming remarks and opened the discussion.

In his remarks, Mr. Janneh declared his confidence in the panel’s ability to agree on a clearly defined road map that would curtail the adverse ef fects of IFF on the Continent. Mr. Janneh stressed that the panel has the tools to articulate a case for action, allow a better understanding of the underlying factors and build a coalition around a set of credible and clear actions both within and outside the Continent.

Mr. R aymond W. Baker, Director, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) made the first presentation followed by Mr. Abdalla Hamdok , Deputy Executive Secretary, ECA.

Mr. Baker provided key insight into the var ious ways i l l ic it f inancial outflows take place and highlighted

Inauguration of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa


the recent evidence on their nature and magnitude. He explained the various challenges facing the efforts to curtail the shadow Financial Sys-tems and stressed the importance of a two-way approach by both the developed and developing countries to achieve greater transparency in the global financial system.

Mr. Hamdok reflected on the recent data and analyzed the importance of IFFfrom Africa, which has turned the Continent into a net creditor to the rest of World. On Africa’s response to the challenges posed by IFF, Mr. Hamdok reviewed the pro-cess that culminated in the launch of the high level panel and outlined the various activ ities undertaken

Some of the members of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa during a courtesy call on the President of Kenya, H.E. Mr. Mwai Kibaki in October 2012.

by AUC and ECA in collaboration with the GFI and with the support of the Government of Norway. Mr. Hamdok shared the panel’s pro -posed mandate and outlined how the technical committee comprising AUC, ECA and other partners could support the HLP in matters pertain-ing to its core functions.

The first working session reflected on the major development chal-lenges to Africa posed by IFF. The panel noted the urgent need to up-scale policy research and advocacy work on the subject especially from an African perspective and also to build strong coalition and partner-ship from within and outside the continent.

It was agreed that the immediate work of the panel would focus on the communication strategy, outreach and the technical work.

The Chair of the Panel, H.E. former President Thabo Mbeki thanked al l members of the panel and re-a f f i r m e d t h e c o m m i t m e n t a n d dedication in ensuring that the panel effectively addresses the problem of illicit financial flows from Africa.


About the BAACThe Business Action against Corrup-tion (BAAC) is a collective action by government and the private sector to tackle corruption. The programme was developed at the invitation of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to improve the con-ditions for doing business and thereby promote investment and sustainable development in Africa.

The BAAC is driven by key partners such as the Commonwealth Business Council (CBC), Southern African Forum for Fighting Corruption (SAFAC), Ghana Anti-Corruption Forum (GACC), Convention on Business Integrity, Ni g e r i a (C B I ) , Hu m a n R i g h t s Development Trust of Southern Africa (HURIDETSA) and the African Institute of Corporate Citizenship (AICC).

The BAAC Benchmarking InitiativeOne of the flagship projects of the BAAC is to develop a comprehensive benchmarking system for measuring anti-corruption progress in Africa.

The idea for the tool was conceived by BAAC in 2006, following widespread interest in a framework for a new multi-sector evaluation system for Africa. For-mer President Thabo Mbeki and other African leaders had previously called for such a system to assess and guide na-tional and sector strategies with regards to anti-corruption.

Th e B e n c h m a r k i n g To o l i s a comprehensive and user-friendly system for measuring progress made in tackling corruption in African countries. The tool is developed by the BAAC and the CBC in conjunction with key official African institutions, including: The

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank (Af DB), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as well as the Africa Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

According to Tagbo Agbazue, Project Manager for the BAAC Benchmarking Initiative: “The Tool provides a broadly based, rigorous, but flexible assessment methodology. This method allows us to identify gaps and measure progress regarding anti-corruption policies. Besides, it processes at a national level in a properly contextualized manner. This is geared towards supporting long term growth and competitiveness in Africa”.

“The Tool is applicable across different jurisdictions and legal systems in Africa and is based on the fundamental pillars of good governance: accountability, transparency, responsibility and fairness, as well as the principles of discipline, independence, efficiency and social responsibility. This Tool will not be for the purpose of generating scorecards for rating countries against each other, but will provide an assessment measure in combating corruption and tracking a country’s progress over time. It will be

designed as a self-assessment tool to be voluntarily used by countries”.

According to Mr. Paulus Noa, Director of the Namibian Anti-Corruption Commission and the Chairman of SAFAC: “The tool will assist anti-corruption institutions in Africa since it provides a set of legal, regulatory, institutional and other criteria by which an overall assessment of national efforts can be made and tracked over time, including the form and substance of organizational and institutional aspects that provide significant leverage in fighting corruption on the continent”.

The initiative has been commended by firstly, the Pan African Anti-corruption Forum on “Public – Private Strategies to Improve Governance”, hosted by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Le-sotho (Maseru, 22-23 March 2011) and secondly, the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption at their Board Retreat (Mombasa, October 2011).

The purpose of the Benchmarking Initia-tive includes the following:

Assisting African countries in bench-marking their progress in fighting cor-ruption, particularly with regards to understanding their growth areas, identi-

Participants at the first Working Group meeting of the Benchmarking Initiative on Corruption in Africa convened by BAAC and hosted by UNECA in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 14-15 November 2011.

Tackling Corruption in Africa: The BAAC Benchmarking Initiative1

1 This piece was prepared by Ikechukwu O. Nwokedi and Yanick Tchamba Nima of Blandford Consulting, South Africa.


fying and addressing gaps, and monitor-ing their performance over time.

Complimenting and supporting the initiatives of official African institutions geared towards fighting corruption and improving the environment for public - private sector growth on the continent. To name a few: (a) the African Governance Report (AGR) project of the UNECA; (b) NEPAD’s APRM programme; (c) governance and private sector support programmes of the African Development Bank (Af DB); and (d) the African Union (AU) Advisory Board on Corruption.

Ensuring that the role and perspective of the private sector regarding the fight against corruption in Africa is properly contextualised and mainstreamed.

Promoting an enabling environment f o r p r i v a t e s e c t o r g r o w t h a n d competitiveness in Africa, as well as public/private partnerships and collective action in dealing with the issue of corruption.

Research and development of the Benchmarking ToolIn 2006 / 2007, the project team, on behalf of the South African Government and the African Union Commission (AUC), developed the “Benchmarking Anti-corruption Initiatives in Africa Report”, which is the compilation of a number of good practices and/or commendable actions that are worth highlighting. The Report contributed to the discussions at the Africa Forum on Fighting Corruption (AFFC) hosted by the South African Government and the AUC in 2007, as well as the Fifth Global Forum on Combating Corruption (GFV) also hosted by the South African Government in 2007.

The Project has since included a com-prehensive desktop review to logically articulate the treatment of the key issues that are relevant to the development of the tool. This includes a review of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union Con-vention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, as well as anti-corruption diagnostic materials and instruments. In addition, the desk top research has enabled the mainstreaming of local and

international best practice, in accordance with the project objectives.

The research and development for the tool is driven by a team of researchers based in South Africa and led by Bland-ford Consulting and Influence Africa. With the support of several methodology experts, the research team developed methodological rigour in the elabora-tion of the tool. The support system is structured in a manner that involves the embedded experts working closely with the research team on the one hand, and external methodology experts reviewing and providing commentaries during the development process.

The development of the tool involves the participation of both state and non-state actors, particularly the private sector, as well as key official African institutions involved in promoting anti-corruption initiatives and improvement in business environment in Africa. This provides the opportunity for learning and shar-ing experiences regarding combating corruption and mainstreaming the views and perspectives of key actors on the continent.

A cross sector technical group of experts (referred to as “the Working Group”) has been established to strategically guide the development of the indicators of the tool and to implement outcomes of the consultative processes. The Work-ing Group includes the members of the BAAC Project Team as well as represen-tatives of the official African Institutions involved in the project. The meetings of the Working Group have provided the opportunity for consulting with African institutions, key experts and stakehold-ers throughout the conceptualisation and development of the tool.

The first Working Group meeting was hosted by UNECA in Addis Ababa (14-15 November 2011).

BAAC Working Group members at the 2nd Working Group Meeting held at the Royal Horse Guards in London, UK, 19-20 March 2012.

Recently, the Working Group gathered in London, (UK) from the 19th to the 20th of March 2012, for the 2nd Working Group meeting and review of the draft version of the developed BAAC Benchmark-

ing Instrument designed by Blandford Consulting. Deliberations at the meeting centered on methodological issues, and recommendations were made towards finalizing and piloting the Tool in at least five African Countries by the end of the first quarter of 2013.

UNECA’s InvolvementThe UNECA is a key supporter of the Benchmarking Initiative. UNECA hosted the first working group meeting at the UNECA conference Centre at Addis Ababa, 14-15 November 2011. UNECA continues to support the Initia-tive through participation in the Working Group and by providing technical input into the research and development of the Benchmarking Tool. UNECA also collaborates with the BAAC in stake-holder engagement activities relating to the issue of corruption and the private sector in Africa.

According to Prof. Said Adejumobi, (OIC, GPAD, UNECA): “The Bench-marking Tool is a governance resource tool that effectively tracks the progress made in fighting corruption in Africa, through broad based contextual and objective data collection and analytical methods that are not biased, and equally provides usable information that can aid development in African countries.”

Going ForwardAs part of the next steps, the Working Group will develop the 2nd version (2.0) of the Tool by mainstreaming method-ological changes from the first version (1.0). The Group will also organize its third meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa in July 2012 to present the second version of the Tool (version 2.0).

The Working Group will also develop the computerized version of the Tool, which will be followed by series of en-gagements with strategic BAAC chapters to determine specific countries for the pilot phase, and to ensure a seamless implementation of the Tool in respec-tive countries. Comments from the Pilot Phase will be mainstreamed as part of the inputs and recommendations to enable the Working Group to finalize the Tool by May 2013.


Introduction and BackgroundT h e E i g h t A f r i c a n G ov e r n a n c e For um (AGF-VI I I) i s being co -organized jointly by the African Union Commission (AUC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) and the United Nations Economic Co m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c a (EC A ) focusing on the theme “Democracy, Elections and the Management of Diversity in Africa”. It is scheduled for 16-18 October 2012 in Gaborone, Botswana. As part of the build-up to this event, three multi-stakeholder consultat ions have already been organized which will feed into the main forum in October. The main purpose of this brief is highlight the key issues emerging from the three pre-AGF-VIII forums (the Gender Forum, the Youth Forum and the Sub-regional forum) and some of the policy recommendations made during these consultative dialogue events.

The first consultative dialogue event was the AGF-VIII Gender Forum. The Government of the Republic of Rwanda, African Union Commission (AUC), United Nations Development P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P) R e g i o n a l Bureau for Africa (RBA), United Nat ions Economic Commi ss ion for Africa (ECA) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) jointly organized and co-hosted the Pre- Eighth African Gover nance For um (AGF-VI I I) multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue on “Gender Equality, Elections and the Management of Diversity in Africa, whichtook placeat the LeMigo Hotel in Kigali , Rwanda on 1 - 2

November 2011. The Gender Forum was attended by 64 par t ic ipants representing governments, women’s organizations, research institutes, universities, African Union, Regional Economic Communities, civil society organizations and the United Nations System. The participants were drawn from 22 African countries representing all the five regions of Africa, namely Central, East, North, South and West.

The two-day forum deliberated on challenges facing the African conti-nent in respect of gender equality, elections and the management of di-versity. It provided an opportunity for participants to share experiences and good practices in gender equality and women’s empowerment as well as representation in decision-making structures. The forum also offered concrete policy recommendations for the advancement of gender equality and women’s empowerment in gov-ernance bearing in mind the impera-tive for constructive management of diversity in Africa.

Key Issues Emerging from the Gender ForumThe Forum noted that women con-stitute more than 50% of the total population of each one of the AU’s 54 member states. Participants rec-ognized that partly in recognition of this reality, the African Union has a clear commitment to gender equal-ity which is articulated in the 2000 Constitutive Act. This commitment is further elaborated in two specific instruments namely (a) the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July 2003 and (bi) the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa adopted by the 3rd Session of

the Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 6-8 July 2004.

The Maputo Protocol is a fairly com-prehensive treatise of how AU member states intend to promote gender equal-ity and protect the rights of women. With respect to women’s role and status in democratic processes and decision-making, Article 9 is the most relevant. It stipulates that state parties shall ensure increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-mak-ing. To this end, they shall take action to promote participative governance and equal participation of women in political processes through, inter alia, affirmative action, enabling legisla-tion etc, These measures will aim to ensure that:

•Women participate without any discrimination in all elections;

•Women are represented equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes;

•Women are equal partners with men at all levels of development and implementation of state policies and development programmes;

Articles 10 and 11 focus mainly on women’s role in the promotion of peace and their protection in armed conflicts respectively. There is clear recognition that women have a right to peaceful existence and the right to participate in the promotion and maintenance of peace. Article 10, therefore, stipulates that state parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure increased participa-tion of women in:

• Programmes of education for peace and a culture of peace;

• Structures and processes for conflict prevention, management and resolu-tion;

Reports of Pre-AGF VIII Forums on Gender, Youth and the RECs2

2 This write up was prepared by Khabele Matlosa, Programme Advisor, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the AGF-VIII Coordinator


• All levels of structures established for the management of camps and settle-ments for asylum seekers, refugees, returnees and displaced persons;

• All aspects of planning, formulation and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Article 11 is devoted to commitments towards protecting women and girls in situations of armed conflicts.

The 2004 Solemn Declaration on Gen-der Equality in Africa compliments the Maputo Protocol. In the Declaration, the AU member states committed them-selves to the following, among others:

• Accelerate implementation of gender-specific economic, social and legal measures;

• Ensure the full and effective participa-tion and representation of women in peace processes including the preven-tion, management and resolution of conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction within the framework of the 2000 UN Resolution 1325;

• Launch campaign for prohibition of recruitment of child soldiers and abuse of girl children as wives and sex slaves in violation of the African Charter on the Rights of Children;

• Launch campaign on gender-based violence; trafficking in women and girls;

• Promote gender parity principle within the workings of the African Union and its organs including its NEPAD programme, RECs, political parties and national parliaments;

• Ensure active promotion and protec-tion of all human rights for women and girls including the right to devel-opment.

The Forum emphasized the significance of the firm foundation laid by the 2003 Protocol to the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights relating to the Rights of Women and the 2004 Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa for the current African Women’s Decade programme of the African Union under the theme: ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE): A

bottom-Up Approach” planned for the period 2010-2020. The ten strategic objectives of the Women’s Decade pro-gramme of the AU include (a) combat-ing violence against women and girls in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889 and (b) support for women’s participation in political and electoral processes in countries undergoing elec-tions as well as in the implementation of gender issues within the context of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the National Plans of Action (NPoAs) emanating from the reviews.

Participants commended African coun-tries that have made considerable prog-ress in gender equality and the empow-erment of women in electoral processes, decision-making and political participa-tion in Africa. The host country, Rwanda, was commended for its remarkable achievement in respect of representation and participation of women in electoral processes and their high numbers and influence in high echelons of govern-ment and decision-making. Rwanda today ranks number one in the whole World with 56.3 percent of women rep-resented in its National Assembly and 34.6 percent in its Senate. This success is attributable to, among others, visionary leadership, commitment and political will of leaders and key actors in Rwanda.

The forum observed, however, that there are still significant challenges facing other African countries as a result of – amongst others – lack of commitment

and inadequate political will; weak insti-tutional capacity; inadequate financing for women’s political participation; and lip-service and tokenism in respect to adherence to the principles of gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Participants observed, with satisfaction, a general trend whereby African lead-ers adopt, sign and ratify regional and continental normative frameworks on gender equality and women’s empower-ment. However, participants bemoaned a counter-trend whereby following adoption of these instruments, Afri-can leaders fall far short of effectively implementing them. In this regard, the meeting noted the central role of the in-stitutional architecture, transformative leadership and firm commitment com-bined with strategic actions towards achieving gender equality in electoral processes and diversity management in Africa.

Main Policy RecommendationsIn order to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment, the Gender Forum advanced various policy recom-mendations, chief among which were three. Firstly, governments and non-governmental organizations should take steps to ensure gender parity in all key state organs including the executive, judiciary, legislature, bureaucracy, se-curity establishment, local governance structures, parastatals and non-state in-stitutions including civil society organi-zations and the private sector. Secondly, governments and non-governmental

Some of the panelists at the pre-AGF-VIII Youth Forum on “Youth empowerment, elections and the management of diversity in Africa”, 28-29 November 2011, Accra, Ghana


organizations need to embark on civic education for promoting gender equal-ity and women’s empowerment in decision-making structures. Thirdly, women’s organizations need to embark on a concerted effort in lobbying and advocating for gender equality and women’s empowerment in decision-making structures.

Youth Forum: The second multi-stakeholder consulta-tion was the AGF-VIII Youth Forum. The Government of Ghana, the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) and the United Nations Eco-nomic Commission for Africa (ECA) jointly organized the Pre-Eighth African Governance Forum (AGF-VIII) multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue on “Youth Empowerment, Elections and the Man-agement of Diversity in Africa, which-took placeat the Fiesta Royale Hotel in Accra, Ghana on 28 - 29 November 2011.

The forum was attended by 57 partici-pants representing governments, youth formations, women’s organizations, research institutes, universities, African Union, Regional Economic Communi-ties, civil society organizations and the United Nations System. The participants were drawn from 30 African countries representing all the five regions of Africa, namely Central, East, North, South and West.

The two-day forum deliberated on chal-lenges facing the African continent in respect of youth empowerment, elec-tions and the management of diversity in Africa. It provided an opportunity for participants to share experiences and good practices in youth empowerment and participation in democratic process. The forum also offered concrete policy recommendations for improving youth empowerment and participation in gov-ernance bearing in mind the imperative for constructive management of diversity in Africa.

Key Issues Emerging from the Youth ForumThe forum noted that the youth (i.e. peo-ple between ages 15-35) constitute about 60% of the total population of Africa. Like women, the youth comprise one

of the marginalized social groups. In an attempt to redress this marginalization, the 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union adopted the African Youth Charter in Banjul, The Gambia on 2 July 2006. It is a wide-ranging commit-ment towards promotion and protection of the rights of the youth. Article 10 of the Charter is devoted to the rights of the youth in development. It stipulates that state parties must protect and/or promote:

• The right of youth to social, economic, political and cultural development;

• Involvement and leadership of youth programmes by young persons and youth organizations;

• Development of youth media for dis-semination of information to young people;

• Access to information and education and training for young people to learn their rights and responsibilities, to be schooled in democratic processes, citizenship, decision-making, gov-ernance and leadership such that they develop the technical skills and confidence to participate in these processes.

The Charter lays emphasis on youth par-ticipation in Article 11 and declares that every young person shall have the right to participate in all spheres of society. To this end, state parties commit to taking the following measures to promote ac-tive youth participation in political and democratic processes:

• Guarantee the participation of youth in parliament and other decision-making bodies;

• Facilitate the creation or strengthen-ing of platforms for youth participa-tion in decision-making at local, na-tional, regional and continental levels of governance;

• Ensure equal access to young men and young women to participate in decision-making and in fulfilling civic duties;

• Give priority to policies and pro-grammes including youth advocacy and peer-to-peer programmes for marginalized youth, such as out-of-

school and out-of-work youth to offer them an opportunity and motiva-tion to re-integrate into mainstream society;

• Provide access to information for young people to be aware of their rights, providing them opportunities to participate in decision-making and civic life thereby contributing to youth empowerment;

• Enhance institutional capacity of youth organizations;

• Include youth representatives as part of delegations to ordinary ses-sions and other relevant meetings to broaden channels of communication and enhance the discussion of youth related issues.

The Forum further took cognizance of the fact that the 2006 African Youth Charter has been ratified by more than 15 AU member states and is currently in force. The African Youth Charter has been ratified by 23 countries. The irony here is that in Africa today, one of the most marginalized social groups in the democratization process is the youth, yet the AU has committed to redressing this imbalance through relevant protocols and charters. This reality points to the gap between development of the nor-mative framework on the one hand and domestication and application of these instruments at country level on the other.

Be that as it may, the forum recognized notable progress made so far in the empowerment of youth in electoral processes, decision-making and political participation in Africa. This progress is attributable to, among others, visionary leadership, commitment and political will of some AU Members States and the efforts of youth organizations them-selves. The forum observed, however, that there are significant challenges fac-ing African countries as a result of – amongst others – weak institutional capacity of states and youth formations; a yawning gap between existing norma-tive frameworks and policy practice at national level; inadequate financing for youth empowerment; tokenism towards youth empowerment and po-litical manipulation of youth especially during election periods and the overall mismanagement of diversity leading to


election-related political violence with devastating consequences for Africa’s development, governance, peace and security.

Participants observed a general trend whereby African leaders ratify regional and continental normative frameworks on youth empowerment; however they are never fully domesticated and implemented. In this regard, the meet-ing reaffirmed the central role of the institutional architecture and the role of youth formations to ensure youth empowerment in elections and electoral processes in Africa. It was unanimously agreed that the socio-economic condi-tions of the continent and African youth need to improve for youth to be effective and positively contribute to democracy building, electoral processes, and the constructive management of diversity.

Main Policy RecommendationsWith a view to advance youth empow-erment at the national, regional and continental levels, the Forum proposed a number of policy recommendations. Firstly, AU Member States must main-stream youth participation in all deci-sion-making processes at community, district or provincial to national levels in government, civil society and private sector and other important governance domains and processes. Secondly, AU Member States should take steps to ensure youth empowerment and par-ticipation in all key state organs includ-ing the executive, judiciary, legislature, bureaucracy, security establishment and parastatals. Thirdly, AU Member States and civil society need to promote civic education to promote widespread youth empowerment, political tolerance and Pan-Africanism as part of the vision of the AU. Fourthly, AU Member states, youth formations, civil society, private sector and development partners must all ensure the equal participation of young women in all decision-making processes and put in place programs to mitigate their marginalization. Fifthly, AU Member States must promote the mainstreaming of youth issues and mandatory interaction of the ministry of youth and the national youth council with all other ministries. Sixthly, AU

Member States must inculcate a culture of democracy and peace in line with the African Charter on Democracy, Elec-tions and Governance through civic, human rights and peace education tar-geting particularly the youth with a view to promoting political tolerance and the spirit of unity in diversity. Seventhly, AU Member States must ensure that politi-cal party laws and electoral laws provide for greater and sustainable youth em-powerment and development especially in relation to electoral processes and diversity management. Eighthly, AU Member States and civil society should promote more research on youth gener-ally and in particular in their role in elec-tions and management of diversity and assist in building the capacity of youth related policy-think tanks. Ninthly, AU Member States and development part-ners must promote youth exchanges and networking programs, internships and fellowships through established youth formations at national, sub regional and regional levels.

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) Forum: The third and final consultative policy di-alogue was the AGF-VIII Sub-Regional Forum for the Regional Economic Com-munities (RECs). The African Union (AU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA), United Nations Eco-nomic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) and the East Africa Community (EAC) jointly organized and co-hosted the Pre- Eighth African Governance Fo-rum (AGF-VIII) Sub –Regional Policy Dialogue on “Democracy, Elections and the Management of Diversity in Africa, whichtook placeat the Ngurdoto Mountain Lodge in Arusha, Tanzania on 30 – 31 May 2012. The forum was at-tended by 80 participants including Re-gional Economic Communities (RECs), Election Management Bodies (EMBs), Sub-regional Networks of EMBs, Civil, Society Organisations, Media, Gover-nance think tanks and experts as well as various UN agencies. Participants were drawn from different countries includ-ing Tanzania, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Nigeria, Dji-

bouti, Senegal, Ghana, Congo Republic, Chad and USA.

The main purpose of the two-day multi-stakeholder dialogue was to examine and deliberate on the state of democracy, elections and diversity management in each of the 5 sub-regions of the African continent. The deliberations highlighted challenges, profiled best practices and of-fered concrete policy recommendations aimed at propelling appropriate gover-nance reforms with focus on electoral engineering and appropriate measures aimed at constructive management of diversity. Cross-cutting issues of gender equality and youth empowerment were mainstreamed throughout the dialogue.

Key Issues Emerging from the RECs Forum Overall, the deliberations rotated around three thematic areas: (i) par-ticipatory and inclusive democracy; (ii) credible and peaceful elections and (iii) constructive management of diversity.

Firstly, there are two basic assumptions of democracy, namely, that all people are equal (equality) and that all people are free (liberty). This is the intrinsic value of democracy. However, democracy also has an instrumental value, which is located within the framework of the democracy-development nexus. The forum recognized the symbiotic nexus between democracy, peace and human development.

The forum emphasized that democ-racy is context- specific. In this regard, African history, traditions and cultural heritage have had a bearing on democ-ratization in all the 54 Member States of the African Union. In almost all cases of political violence and instability, winner-take–all models, poor leadership and weak institutions have contributed to re-versals on the continent’s democratiza-tion path. The forum raised concerns re-garding the creeping militarism in Africa illustrated by the recent military coups in Mali and Guinea Bissau. It urged the African Union and Regional Economic Communities to take stern and prompt measures to arrest this trend.

Secondly, elections are a double-edged sword: they can either contribute to democracy-building or shield authori-


tarian regimes. They can contribute to peace-building much the same way that they can trigger protracted politi-cal violence, insecurity and instability. They can enhance and solidify the le-gitimacy of government as much as they can also lead to a legitimacy crisis of a government if the process is not fair, transparent and free and the outcome is not credible and acceptable. They can either assist a country weave together a nation with multiple socio-cultural diversities or tear it apart along different socio-cultural identities. They can either provide a solid political platform for a country to experience economic growth and sustainable human development or they can lead to a crisis that undermines a country’s economic progress. While an election constitutes a key ingredient of democracy, in and of itself an election is not synonymous with democracy. A country can hold regular elections even if its governance is autocratic. An elec-tion is just one of the key ingredients of democracy and democratization.

Both elections and democracy are jeopardized the moment politicians mo-bilize votes using diversity as a political vehicle. While it is the responsibility of the society at large to ensure construc-tive management of diversity during elections, key institutions are supposed to play a leadership role, including the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Political Parties, Parliament, the Me-dia, Security forces, the Bureaucracy, etc.

Thirdly, Africa comprises diverse so-cieties. This has been so since time immemorial. It should be noted that even pre-colonial African societies were marked by diversity. Africa’s socio-cultural diversity has been further ac-centuated by slavery, colonial conquest and colonial domination resulting in arbitrary apportionment of the conti-nent in such a way that in some instances various identity groups were mingled together without a shared history or cultural heritage. Thus, nation-building in post-independence Africa has had to grapple with fragile societies divided along various identity fault-lines. These fault-lines tend to become more ac-centuated during moments of political contestation over state power through elections. The forum was unanimous that diversity need not lead to adversity

and violent conflicts during elections. In other words, well managed, diversity is a resource for nation building.

The forum recognized that with regard to democratization, challenges that diversity poses for the African conti-nent are located at two levels. Some are located within the electoral cycle while others are structural in nature, such as socio-economic inequality. Diversity management is the responsibility of all actors in society at different levels (cut-ting across grassroots to the national level).

Main Policy RecommendationsThe RECS Forum proposed policy interventions needed at the national, re-gional and continental levels in order to promote democracy building, credible elections and constructive management of diversity. Firstly, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities must harmonise the normative frame-works on governance, ensure that their Member States ratify, domesticate and effectively implement these agreed shared values on democracy. Secondly, the International Community, especially the United Nations system, must play a more proactive role in supporting capac-ity building for Africa to better manage elections and diversity. Thirdly, in order to better assess progress on Africa’s democratisation path and challenges posed by elections and diversity, AU

and RECs need to put in place effective mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and reporting. This will deepen account-ability of Member States to AU and RECs and their own citizens in living up to their commitments.

ConclusionThe choice for the three pre-AGFR-VIII consultative and policy dialogue events was premised on a number of factors. Firstly, it was decided early in the preparatory stages by the AGF-VIII Steering Committee and the AGF-VIII Reference Group to mainstream gender and youth issues throughout all AGF-VIII processes. This is because when democracy fails and elections turn violent, two social groups that are often on the receiving end are women and youth. Secondly, besides governments, a number of regional and sub-regional inter-governmental organizations also play an important role in Africa’s efforts at ensuring democracy promotion, peace building, credible and transparent elections and constructive management of diversity on the continent. These in-clude the African Union and its Regional Economic Communities-its main build-ing block for its vision of an integrated, united and prosperous Africa. It is for these two reasons that the Gender, Youth and RECs forums were organized to set the momentum towards the main AGF-VIII in Gaborone, Botswana in October 2012.

Elections are a double-edged sword: they can either contribute to democracy-building or shield

authoritarian regimes. They can contribute to peace-building much the same way that they can trigger protracted political vi-olence, insecurity and instability. They can enhance and solidify the legitimacy of government as much as they can also lead to a legitimacy crisis of a government if the process is not fair, trans-parent and free and the outcome is not credible and acceptable.

They can either assist a country weave together a nation with multiple socio-cultural diversities or tear it apart along different socio-cultural identities. …… A country can hold regular elec-

tions even if its governance is autocratic. An election is just one of the key ingredients of democracy and

democratization.


Interview:

Interview with H.E. Former President, Flt. Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings of Ghana

This interview was conducted by Said Adejumobi, Co-editor of the African Governance Newsletter and Abraham Okoko Essau, member Editorial Board on 31st January 2012 at the Radission Blue Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

1. Sir, you are a well-known distin-guished personality in Africa, but can you share with us in brief, some infor-mation on your background, interests and motivations in life that propelled you to what you achieved, and where you are today?

As a young man, I wanted to be either a pilot or priest, but finally, I joined the air force. Flying has always been my passion, and I thought the air force was the best place to start. The politicians appeared quite corrupt and civil life was not too attractive to me; I wanted to join the armed forces and assimilate military discipline. So, I joined the air force and after six years of training, I started flying. My training in the military academy was quite fulfilling and measured up to my standard and dream of perfection. In my life, I have always felt sad about injustices and deprivation because I went through painful experiences in life myself. Those injustices fired my imagination in wanting to be a priest where I can preach against social ills; but as I told you before, I ended up in the armed forces. The misuse of the military of being an instrument of oppressing civilians by the politi-

cal authorities, led to the mutiny, in which I was arrested. However, when the revolt came, I was freed and later led the country. My engagement in political life was mainly based on my spirited attempts to correct the ills and injustices in society. Fighting injustice is a long life commitment for me, and I did this with all my capacity when I was in government and even outside government.

2. When you reflect on your rule in Ghana, are there things you felt you might have done differently?

I cannot pinpoint any moment in my life as highpoint or low-point, neither can I consider any time in which I

would have done things differently in life. In 1979, the rage was much, and the people wanted change desper-ately. The cry for change was tremen-dous and we had to do what we did. When we handed over power to civil-ians, the rot continued, and they tried to assassinate me, and the soldiers could not handle it any longer, hence our coming back to power, which was a turning point in Ghana’s history. It was a point of empowerment for the people. The ordinary people understand the basics of life but the leaders deny and insult the intelligence of the people. However, the people are intelligent and know what they want in life. We use foreign languages of English,

The ordinary people understand the basics of life but the leaders deny and insult the intel-ligence of the people. However, the people are intel-

ligent and know what they want in life. We use foreign languages of English, French and Portuguese to confuse the people and deny them their rights, instead of speak-

ing to them in the language they understand. Elitism and power have assumed corrupting influences on

our society and affecting the progress of our countries.

From left: Abraham Okoko Essau, H.E. Flt.Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings, Former President of Ghana and Said Adejumobi


French and Portuguese to confuse the people and deny them their rights, instead of speaking to them in the language they understand. Elitism and power have assumed corrupting influ-ences on our society and affecting the progress of our countries.

3. What is your assessment of where Africa is today in terms of democra-tization, peace, security and develop-ment?

Many African countries have attained political freedom, but this sense of freedom is not linked to the living conditions of the people, which can be described as justifiable. There is a big disconnect between freedom, justice and equality in our progress. Many countries are enjoying political freedom but poverty is a living real-ity. The artificial development that we construct is very defective; we see modern infrastructure and buildings but the people are groaning in abject poverty and that was what led to the revolt in Tunisia. There is the savagery of capitalism currently in the World. Globalization and capitalism are im-poverishing the World.

4. As AU’s Special envoy to Somalia, what do you see as the key challenges to achieving lasting peace in Somalia?

The main challenges in archiving peace in Somalia have been identi-f ied in the Al- Shabaab elements, who have recruited people from all over the World to fight for a cause they know nothing about! A weak state situation has led to serious conflict in which various factions of the group are causing problems. One of the consequences of the w a r i s t h e d e b i l i t a t i n g p o v e r -t y a n d f a m i n e i n t h e c o u n t r y.

However, there is progress on the ground. On the security part of it, good progress has been made but there is need to complement the military progress with political ini-tiatives and reforms. The political part has to be a major component of change and reform in bringing last-ing peace and stability to Somalia. At the recent meeting of the IGAD g r o u p, i t w a s m a d e c l e a r t h a t there is need to stick to the Kam-pala Accord, and make for peace. Somet imes w hen v ictor y seems to be in the horizon, it intoxicates people and new issues come up.

5. What are your views on the last AU Summit especially in the context of the newly commissioned building of the AU?

The only regret is that the AU Chair was not elected; the election was inconclusive. This is because there are two strong candidates. W hich-ever way it goes, Africa would be better for it. Competition is good for the health of the Union and this is what we are going through. On the new AU building, I think we should be grateful to the Chinese for their lofty gift to us. The Chi-nese have a deep memory and they worked with Kwame Nkrumah but Nkrumah was overthrown and the Chinese officials were thrown out. When I was leader- Head of State, I sought cooperation with the Chinese, and asked my commanders to visit China. In Ghana, the most impres-sive structure today- the Theatre, is Chinese built. China has skilled labour and some level of technological ad-vancement and they are using that to assist the underdeveloped countries. Africa is proud of China and we should

continue to work and cooperate with them for mutual gains and for Africa’s development.

6. What are your thoughts on the idea of Pan-Africanism and Africa’s regional integration? And do you think Africa is making progress on this?

Is Africa living up to the lofty ideals of its founders as President Robert Mugabe noted during the Summit? Africa in my view is not living up to the dreams of Pan-Africanism. Our lack of integrity and discipline has made it possible for others to invade and control us. Foreign companies and countries control us and our natural re-sources. This needs to change urgently. The fact that we are being assimi-lated and not being integrated into the World is our fault and we must carr y the blame. Being integrated into the World would mean that Africa is a recognized and respected player in the global economy and politics. But this is not the case. Take a look at the Tunisian and Egyptian situations (with the uprisings), two countries with enormous potentials but with bad leadership. The lead-ership question must be addressed squarely if Africa is to make progress. This is not the Africa our ancestors fought for. However, in spite of all challenges, there is hope for Africa; when a people are about to drown, they then wake up to their reality. I pray that Africa wakes up and live up to the dreams of its founders.


Viewpoints:

IntroductionThe African Union (AU) has made major strides and bold and far-reach-ing commitments towards democracy, the rule of law, human rights, devel-opment, peace and security over the last decade. Since its establishment, at least fourteen (14) new Treaties or Protocols aimed at enhancing the socio-economic welfare and political environment of the African people have been adopted, and at least ten (10) of these have entered into force. These treaties and protocols are often accompanied by the establishment of institutions (some carried over or transformed from the previous OAU era, while many are new) which have a bearing on polic y-formulation, decision-making, implementation, enforcement and/or support for de-mocracy, good governance, rule of law, human rights, peace and security. Some of these institutions, at least those relevant to our discussion, in-clude the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2006) and the AU Advisory Board on Corruption (2009), and the forthcoming African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

In addition to the instruments and institutions referred to above, the AU Assembly has adopted several declarations and decisions, some of a general nature and others specific to certain countries or situations, which reveal an increasingly bold and proactive approach by the continent to tackle some of the pressing socio-economic and political challenges on the continent, including issues such as corruption and good governance.

While much has been done so far in standard setting and institutional de-velopment, it is now time to see how best the lofty ideas expressed in these instruments can be implemented by the institutions put in place. It is even more important to see how these institutions can, in synergy, work towards the attainment of the greater African dream – respect for human rights, peace, development.

It is on this basis and this context that I will be sharing with you the role the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights can and should play, in the fight against corruption on the continent.

But before we delve into that, it may be important to look at the relation-ship between human rights and cor-ruption, and the effects of corruption on human rights.

The relationship between corruption and human rights is only beginning to be seriously examined by both gov-ernments and international organiza-tions. In their 2009 research entitled

‘Defining the relationship between corruption and human rights’, James Thuo Gathii, Associate Dean for Re-search and Scholarship and Governor George E. Pataki, Professor of Interna-tional Commercial Law of the Albany Law School, conclude that “corruption disables a State from meeting its obli-gations to respect, fulfill and protect the human rights of its citizens”. The research revealed how individualistic and procedural measures were used to defeat investigations and prosecutions of corruption by high level governmen-tal officials, and how the enjoyment of basic social and economic rights such as health and education are compromised through corruption, and the impact this has on the poor and marginalized.

Corruption, if left unchecked, seriously paralyses the social and institutional foundation of a state and erodes pub-lic confidence in state institutions. Those who commit corrupt acts will always attempt to protect themselves

Hon. Judge Augustino S.L Ramadhan

Fighting Corruption in Africa: A perspective from the African Court on Human Rights3

Hon. Judge Augustino S.L Ramadhani4

3 Edited version of a paper presented at the Retreat for the AU Advisory Board on Corrup-tion organized by GPAD-UNECA and AU-ABC in Arusha, Tanzania, 18-22 June 2012. Views expressed herein are personal and in no way reflect the official position of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights or that of the editors and publishers of the Newsletter (UN ECA and AUC).

4 Judge of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and former Chief Justice of Tanzania.

Thinkpieces/


from detection and seek to maintain their positions of power. In doing so, they do everything in their power to destroy the integrity of institutions that are fundamental to the rule of law, including electoral and judicial processes and the objectivity of ad-ministrative decisions.

For instance, corrupt officials who extract money from undocumented migrants lacking a residence permit in the knowledge that they cannot complain, judges who take bribes to favour one party over the other, a po-lice man or woman who collects bribe from a motorist whose documents are not in order, a lecturer who favours a student for one reason or the other, corrupt surveyors and planning of-ficers who issue building permits, do not only disadvantage the individuals who suffer as a direct result of their decisions but also undermine the authority and credibility of the institu-tions they represent. At all these levels, corruption reinforces exclusion and discrimination and tends to magnify and exacerbate pre-existing human rights problems.

The effects of corruption on human rights are even more evident in poor countries where rich private multina-tionals or elites control the economy. In such settings where unequal social relationships are deeply entrenched, corrupt private interests can capture

the state, using their influence to shape regulations, laws, decrees and judicial rulings and consolidating it further through pervasive networks that make access to career opportuni-ties, social benefits and employment contingent on complicity and obedi-ent service. Capture of a state in this manner allows a restricted group of insiders to control political processes of election and appointment and to regulate state–market relations in ways that advance their own economic and personal interests by distribut-ing public resources and services in a discriminatory manner. Viewed from this perspective, corruption tends to sustain and reproduce the exploita-tion and social exclusion of the poor and marginalized and to impede the enjoyment of their human rights.

The relationship between corruption and human rights is now well estab-lished and the effects of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights are manifold. However, the greatest chal-lenge remains how to eliminate cor-ruption, or at least reduce its impact.

Various human rights institutions and procedures exist that can hold states accountable for their policies and ac-tions. Domestic mechanisms include those provided by National Human Rights Institutions, such as human rights commissions, ombudsmen, public protectors for human rights,

etc. International mechanisms also ex-ist and include those provided by the United Nations Human Rights bodies and a range of regional bodies. These are generally non-adversarial and non-judicial mechanisms. However, several judicial mechanisms for accountability and redress might also be used to make accountable those who commit acts of corruption. They include litigation through domestic, sub-regional and regional human rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Hu-man and Peoples’ Rights.

Domestic litigation for example, can oblige states to take action against corrupt officials by requiring the cor-rupt official to be personally liable and reinstate the victim to their right. This approach is supported by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Article 35 thereof requires states “to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible in order to obtain compensation”.

But what role can a judicial body such as the African Court play in fighting corruption and enhancing the enjoy-ment of human rights? To respond to this question, it is important to under-stand the African Judicial landscape and the mandate of the African Court.

Understanding the African judicial landscapeTo understand the judicial landscape on the African continent, and the extent to which the African judicial organ can be used in the fight against corruption, one has to consider at least four instruments (treaties).

The first is the Protocol to the Afri-can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted on 9 June 1998) and entered into force in January 2004. This protocol has been ratified by 26 of the 54 African Union Member

Corruption, if left unchecked, seriously paralyses the social and institutional foundation of a state and erodes public confidence in state

institutions. Those who commit corrupt acts will always attempt to protect themselves from de-tection and seek to maintain their positions of power. In doing so, they do everything in their

power to destroy the integrity of institutions that are fundamental to the rule of law, including elec-toral and judicial processes and the objectivity of

administrative decisions.


States. It establishes the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the current Court) with its seat in Arusha, Tanzania.

The main mandate of the current Court is to ensure the protection of human rights on the continent. The current Court has two main jurisdic-tions, contentious jurisdiction (adju-dicating on allegations of human rights violations between individuals, NGOs and other entities against States) and the advisory jurisdiction (providing legal opinion on human rights related issues).

The second instrument is the Protocol to the Court of Justice of the African Union envisaged in the Constitutive Act (2003). This Court was meant to deal with matters relating to economic integration, border disputes and inter-pretation of AU treaties. It entered into force in February 2009 and has 16 rati-fications. However, this Court has not been established because the Heads of States and Government of the African Union decided that the Court should be merged with the current Court to establish one merged Court.

This brings in the third instrument, the Protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of an African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008) (Merged Court Protocol). Fol-lowing the decision of the Assembly to merge the current Court with the Court of Justice of the African Union. The Assembly in 2008 adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on the establishment of an African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008) (Merged Court Protocol) to establish an African Court of Justice and Hu-man Rights. This protocol is yet to enter into force because it has been ratified by 3 states only. This Court would have two sections – human rights and general service section.

Before the entry into force of the Merged Protocol mentioned above, the Assembly again decided that a study should be undertaken to ex-amine the implications of extending

the jurisdiction of the current Court to deal with criminal matters such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. A study commis-sioned by the African Union Com-mission however, decided to extend but the mandate of the ‘yet-to-be-established African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

In May 2012, the Ministers of Justice and Attorney Generals of AU Mem-ber States adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Amending the Merged Protocol). This protocol is to be submitted to the July 2012 Summit of Heads of State and Government for adoption. If adopted, it will be opened for signature and ratification.

The Protocol seeks to establish an African Court of Justice and Human Rights with three sections - human rights, general service and criminal sections.

The relevance of tracing this judicial history is to demonstrate the extent to which the current court and the forth-coming court can fight corruption.

The current CourtAs indicated earlier, the mandate of the current court is limited to the pro-tection of human rights, through its contentious and advisory jurisdiction. It has no direct role in the fight against corruption, since the issue of corrup-tion borders on criminal jurisdiction.

However, given the relationship be-tween corruption and human rights established above, the current court can have an indirect role in combating this virus. The Court can, for example, in its judgment, order a state that has been found to violate human rights as a result of the corrupt practices of its officials to prosecute those officials and make them personally liable for their acts.

Another indirect way of combating corruption by the current Court is through its advisor y jurisdiction. States that want to adopt anti-corrup-tion legislation could seek the opinion of the Court on the extent to which the legislation could interfere with the enjoyment of human rights.

The forthcoming CourtAn innovation in the African judicial landscape is the decision by the Afri-can Union to broaden the categories of international crimes in the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, to include crimes that African leaders consider to be a menace to the development of the continent. Thus, apart from genocide, war crimes and crimes against human-ity, the Protocol includes several other crimes such as drug trafficking, terror-ism, mercenary and corruption.

W hat this means is that the forth-coming African Court of Justice and Human Rights will have the mandate to prosecute individuals and organiza-

The fight against corruption is central to the struggle for human rights. Corruption has always greased the wheels of the exploitation and injustice which characterize our continent. From violent ethnic clashes to organize crime, political

actors have abused their entrusted powers to focus on gains for the few at great cost

for the many.


tions on allegations of corruption and pronounce sentences. The African Union will have its own prosecutors and detention facilities like at national level, and charges will be brought against persons or organizations deemed by the Court to be corrupt.

The modalities on how this will work out is not yet known, but the deci-sion to make corruption an interna-tional crime, and to give the Court the jurisdiction to prosecute, would elevate the fight against corruption to a new level. This means that those multinationals and individuals who, because of their enormous wealth have put profit before human welfare, wil l think twice before indulging in corrupt practices. Those African leaders who plunder their economies for illicit-enrichment at the expense of their people and country may be called to order, and those individuals who think they are more powerful and untouchable nationally may find that with the establishment of the Court, it will no longer be business as usual.

In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the forthcoming court will have com-petence to interpret and apply all international instruments that the state concerned has ratified, including African Union instruments such as the African Union Convention on Pre-venting and CombatingCorruption, adopted in Maputo, Mozambique, on 11 July 2003. This instrument which has been ratified by more than 30 Af-rican countries entered into force on 2006. It provides for various means of combating corruption, including the extradition of persons from one country to another to face corruption charges.

The AU Convention introduces a comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules that all countries can apply in order to strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption. It calls for measures to promote and strengthen develop-ment in Africa by each State Party, of measures required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and pri-vate sectors.

The deficiency in the Convention is the absence of a judicial enforcement mechanism. Apart from the Advisory Board on Corruption provided under Article 22, whose mandate is limited to advising States and gathering informa-tion on corruption on the continent, the Convention provides for no con-crete measures in which States Parties could be held accountable.

However, with the inclusion of cor-ruption as an international crime in the Amendment Protocol, and the possibility of the forthcoming Court having the mandate to prosecute acts of corruption, a permanent mecha-nism would be put in place to fight corruption on the continent.

ConclusionIn the words of the former United Na-tions Secretary-General, Kofi Annan: “Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish.”

The fight against corruption is central to the struggle for human rights. Cor-ruption has always greased the wheels of the exploitation and injustice which characterize our continent. From vio-lent ethnic clashes to organize crime, political actors have abused their entrusted powers to focus on gains for the few at great cost for the many.

Despite countless policy diagnoses, public campaigns to raise awareness, and institutional and legal reforms to improve public administration, research shows that corruption clearly remains a challenge and continues to flourish. The forthcoming Court alone, in spite all the best intentions and the resources placed at its dis-posal, cannot eradicate corruption on the continent.

Horizontal accountability strategies have not become less important than they were, and reforms that will make public institutions more responsive to the demands of marginalized groups remain crucial. To dismantle well-entrenched corruption systems, it will be necessary to explore new comple-mentary forms of accountability that modify unequal power relations and include the immediate victims of cor-ruption. These new approaches can complement the initiatives taken by the African Union in the fight against corruption

By connecting acts of corruption to violations of human rights, new chan-nels of action can be created, espe-cially if corruption can be challenged through the many national, regional and international mechanisms that exist for monitoring compliance with human rights.

Another indirect way of combating corruption by the current Court is through its advisory jurisdiction. States that want to adopt anti-corruption legislation could seek the opinion of the Court on the extent to which the legislation could interfere with the enjoyment of

human rights.


Adigun Agbaje6

We must…focus (on) what people ‘know’ as reality in their everyday…. lives…. It is precisely this ‘knowledge’ that constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist

Berger and Luckmann, 1973:7

(T)he media… contribute to cognitive and cultural patterns which… are not only largely unnoticed but also insepa-rable from what we call ‘social reality’.

- Dahlgren, 1986:140

Introduction: Amidst change, the familiarThe picture of Africa that has emerged in the last couple of months is one of excite-ment on the political front, highlighting the potency, even in Africa, of the idea of people’s power and the role of the media in the re-casting of history and reality in sup-port of change. At the same time, the same picture underscores the extent of continuity in certain aspects of the African reality and the media’s salience in the perpetuation of the old order. So much has changed, yet so much remains impervious to change.

Consider the narratives from the four corners of the continent: It is nightfall in Libya. Date: Sunday, 21 August 2011. ‘Rebel’ forces finally enter Tripoli with the assistance of Western forces months into the rebellion seeking to unseat Moam-mar Gaddafi’s regime of over 40 years. In Benghazi, rebel capital until then, there is jubilation in the air over the impending collapse of the ancient regime. At the city centre, a huge monitor helps to relay, for the tens of thousands gathered, events as they unfold in Tripoli, thanks to an international television news network. Every news item from Tripoli indicating the impending fall of Gaddafi and Tripoli is greeted with wide

applause and celebrations in Benghazi. The stories from Tripoli suggest that the civil war is about to end; a month on, the war rages on. Are we to expect in the near future more of discourses of despair in post-rebellion Libya in contradistinction to the discourses of change (Williams 2006:430) that powered the rebellion?

Switch on to Nigeria in the Western part of Africa. A Freedom of Information Bill that has taken almost a decade to consider is finally passed by that country’s National Assembly and assented to by President Goodluck Jonathan on 28 May, 2011. The new Act makes public records and informa-tion more freely available and provides for public access to public records and infor-mation within the limits of public interest while also protecting public officers’ private lives and shielding them from disclosing specified kinds of information. Under the new Act, civil society activists have taken governments in the federation to court to compel them to disclose information on disbursements over the years from so-called security votes, often huge, shielded in secrecy and outside the purview of audit and transparency/accountability organs of governance and long fingered as a major contributor to corruption in the public sector. These, indeed, are interesting times.

Moving down to the South; contrary news relates to moves in South Africa, home to one of Africa’s first set of legislations on freedom of information, namely, the 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act, to revive a Protection of Information Bill. This has been greeted by a chorus of protest against the ANC government. The labour union COSATU is worried about the implication of this new move for whistle blowers, while the Right2know campaign is concerned about the (ab)uses which the power of document classification under the new move could be susceptible to. From the business sector, Pick’nPay chair Gareth Ackerman warns that the kind of “self-protective environment” envisaged under the initiative will be perceived negatively by international markets.

On the positive side, South Africa has just played host to a series of media-related conferences and workshops in the period 16-18 September 2011, with over 1000 participants from all over Africa and beyond in attendance. Such participants included ICT experts, media editors, journalism educators, and the UN system. Sponsor-ing partners include MTN, Telkom, Absa, Cape TownCity, and the Swedish Embassy, among others. We live, indeed, in the age of globalization, characterized by the forging of networks involving inclusions, exclusions, gainers, losers, in the pursuit of interests in which, ultimately, the prevail-ing if not determining forces are Western (Castles 2001:13-32)

Back to Nigeria and to two reports from that country. The first highlights the increasing salience in public affairs of social media, globalization and the ICT that drives them. According to that report, “on the first day of voter registration for the 2011 elections, the registration …(was) the trending event/topic on twitter. In other words, “the regis-tration …(was) the most tweeted… topic globally on that day” (Agbaje 2011:275). Civil society organizations, networks of youth, town/ethnic unions, professional bodies, even traditional chieftains estab-lish websites, sponsor radio and television advertisements, encourage blogs and take part in discussion programmes to monitor the registration exercise and liaise with the Independent National Electoral Commis-sion (INEC) to ensure success.

Prof. Adigun Agbaje

The Media, Diversity, and the Political Construction of Reality in Africa5

5 Being edited version of a paper presented at the Media Workshop on the African Governance Report, 29-30 September 2011 in Nairobi, Kenya.

6 Adigun Agbaje is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria and a former Deputy Vice Chancellor and also Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences at the same University. He is currently the Executive Director of the Obafemi Awolowo Institute, Lagos, Nigeria. Views expressed herein are personal and in no way reflect the official position of the Obafemi Awolowo Institute or that of the editors or publishers of the Newsletter (UNECA and AUC).


On the other hand, the latter part of September 2011 witnessed national and international uproar over a rape case report-edly involving a lady (who is or may not be a student) and five males (who may or may not be students) at a location report-edly affiliated (or may not be affiliated) to Abia State University. The rape incident, recorded by phone camera, has been posted on Youtube. The Abia State Government has denied that the incident happened and, second, that if it did happen, it did not oc-cur in the government -owned Abia State University, neither were those involved students of that University. The police, who first announced that no such incident oc-curred, now say that they cannot prosecute because the rapists were careful not to show their faces on camera. The lady at the centre of the incident is afraid and so far unwilling to report the crime, along with her family, thanks in part to the stigma attached to such experiences but more importantly due to threats received from certain unidentified quarters. Meanwhile, the state governor insists that enemies of his Administration are behind all this, in a bid to ‘tarnish’ the good name of the state and its people.

When does/should the private become public/political? This is a longstanding question, and in Africa it takes on a very distinct flavor, given established practices and cultural factors. It is a question that has caused media professionals much pain and job loss, among others. In the 1970s, a Ni-gerian journalist in RiversState had his head forcibly shaved in detention for reporting a story considered “unpalatable” to the mili-tary governor of the state on the governor’s birthday. In 1998, journalist Pius Njawe was sentenced to two years imprisonment in Cameroun for reporting that President Paul Biya could be suffering from a heart condition (Berger 1998:607) while editor BhekiMakhubu was in 1999 dismissed from the privately owned Times of Swa-ziland for indicating that the King’s latest wife had been expelled in the past from two schools for indiscipline (Berger 2002:37). Some of these narratives underscore the extent to which the interfaces of private and public spheres in discourses about sexuality and gender have “huge democratic implica-tions” (Berger 2002:37), for the media’s role in the political construction of reality, including our understanding of the relative visibility of cleavages in the diversities that

are played up and/ or down in such con-struction of reality.

The prefatory notes and vignettes/narra-tives above underscore certain points. The political construction of reality involves contestations in which the centrality of the media as actor, platform, and register of those contestations which occur in the context of the interpenetrations of local, national regional and global factors and forces including the increasing role of the in-ternet and ICT enacted platforms play out. It is against this background that this paper looks at the role of the media in the political construction of reality in the context of the diversity that makes up Africa. The purpose is not to provide detail from case to case; I believe media professionals are better able to provide such rich and insightful material grounded in long experience and interac-tion with the subject matter. My approach is to open for further discussion and clari-fication the outline of lessons learned and insights gained from theory and practice.

World Bank former Vice President for Africa, Obiageli Ezekwesili, at a video conference involving journalists from 25 African countries (Ezekwesili 2011:42) noted that, “without minimizing the work done by other organizations and other play-ers in the field of development, it is clear that the media, especially independent or free media, plays a central role in improving governance”. She stressed that ICT and its new gadgets could expand the reach and impact of the media and provide platform for giving more voice to ordinary citizens. According to her (Ezekwesili 2011:42),

Studies have highlighted the importance of voice. A recent survey of 6,000 poor people from across all regions of the world found that the task majority of respondents considered that they were poor not because they did not have money but because they did not have a say in how their fate was determined; in how their countries were run; in how development priorities were decided.

The ECA’s AssessmentThe first two African Governance Reports of the ECA have recorded progress on the media front in the continent’s bid for inclu-sive political spaces and social transactions across divides as being more supportive of democratic governance. The first AGR (ECA 2005: 33–36) noted the increasing

diversity of media ownership, contrary to the near-monopoly in the past by govern-ments and pro-regime interests. The result has beena media ecology more reflective of the continent’s diversities than ever before in most of the countries. Media reach has equally been more embracing, with radio penetrating rural and distant communities more than the newspaper press which has remained essentially urban and elitist.

The second report, (ECA 2009: 27–31) confirms the growing vibrancy of the media even as it highlights longstanding obstacles on the continent to the media’s ability to fully capture and reflect the voices of the continent’s peoples in discourses about political and socio-economic life. It notes increasing more toward social inclusion along gender, ethnic and racial divides (ECA 2009: 24–25), it identifies obstacles to effective public opinion as including not only governments as is commonly believed but also the fact that “many African coun-tries contain heterogeneous nationalities that pose formidable language, literacy and geographical barriers to developing an effective public voice” (ECA 2009: 28). Other factors listed include poverty, underdeveloped communication (roads, railways, airports and telecommunications) infrastructure. These ensure that there are “few lines of communication between the different ethno-regional groups, a condi-tion that prevents the exchange of ideas and information” (ECA 2009: 28). As the report notes, “the result is that most African countries do not have a common set of political beliefs – a situation that continues to hamper the development of an effective public voice in the continent” (ECA 2009: 28) – or a coherent and cohesive one for that matter even in the mainstream dis-courses of national life. Other challenges include state harassment and repression of oppositional voices and media and poor remuneration for media workers, among others.

Despite all these, the report positively com-pares the period covered by it to a past in which “government dominated the media”, when, in its words (ECA 2009: 29).

News coverage focused mostly on positive presentation of government activities. This unbalanced and biased news amounted to propaganda, leaving the general citizenry uninformed and unable to participate ef-fectively inpublic affairs.


2. There is a persistent culture of fear and state repression in a significant number of countries, although the happy news is that state repression is generally in retreat on the continent, and cultural elements that encourage media subservience (Bourgault 1993; Callamard 2010; Kari-kari 1993; Fotopslos 1999; Steenveld 2004; Nyamnjoh 2005; Kaliyango Jr. 2010; Fombad 2002; Carbone 2005; Tettey 2006; Berger 1998) are also no longer as compelling as they used to be. However, media corruption remains a major challenge, and governments continue to dangle “carrots”, including advertisements and other preferments, before oppositional media.

3. The environment for optimizing free-dom of expression has been constrained in recent times by global and local developments, including the global war on terror, communal violence, wars and widespread election manipulations (Cal-lamard 2010).

4. Beyond its perceived negative cultural consequences for the developing world, globalization has in a sense provided opportunity for self-portrayal to self and to the rest of the World by Africans who have also established international tele-vision news networks as well as digital radio stations, among others – many of them privately owned. In this category we also find the ever-expanding video industry epitomized by Nollywood (Abah 2009: 731–748. Ambler 2002: 119–136) and increasing salience of indigenous leisure (video, radio, televi-sions) media as well as the internet and social media as sites for contestation over the construction of reality. With regard to the internet and social media, youth and diasporic elements are a major force in the generation and consump-tion of communication, with much of the diasporas in Ethiopia having used such platforms rigorously in opposition

tion of consensus, consent and dissent” through majorly subtle means (Agbaje 1992: 10–11) with potentials for the use of force, requires and builds on legitimacy, contrarily, it can also be subversive of legiti-macy and the political order if not carefully executed. Therefore, care must be taken in the construction of reality that is supportive of the hegemon to ensure that hegemonial stability, involving a balance of the politics of inclusion and exclusion expressed as poli-tics of entitlement is attained, maintained and widely disseminated in the media. Second, it is wrong to theorize about the media–democracy interface as if there are no disagreements in state and society about the means, ideals and possibilities of democracy. There is also the need to con-stantly put in proper theoretical perspective on the role of the media in a democracy (Scammell and Semetko 2000: xiii).

Finally, there is also the need to unravel the nature and possible impact of media cover-age of contestations in civil and political society. Theories about the agenda-setting role of the media have to be interrogated by the fact that it is possible for specific interests to deliberately seek to purposively manipulate media agenda and coverage (Manheim and Albritton 1984: 641–657).

Lessons from PracticeWhat then, are the lessons from the field? What I present below is highly schematic, and is meant to encourage further dialogue on this important issue.

1. The languages of elite/official discours-es, (Egbokhare and Kolawole, eds 2006; Castells, 1997; Karikari: 1993) remain those imposed on the continent in the era of colonial rule by Western powers. While the newspaper press is dominated by publications in such languages, radio has bridged the gap and reached out to many in rural areas who are not literate in Western languages.

The report then notes that “the new mass media are facilitating a national market place of ideas, where opinions on public affairs compete for acceptance” (ECA 2009: 28). In addition, it observes that (ECA 2009: 29):

The revolution in information technology – emails, mobile phones and text mes-sages – has made communication and cam-paigning by political parties much easier. Electionresults are tracked from different constituencies andpolling stations by dif-ferent stakeholders and communicated informally through text messages,reducing election rigging in Africa.

Against this optimistic background, the rest of this paper examines further the evidence in theory and practice and outlines lessons learned with regard to the media’s role in the political construction of reality on the continent. It suggests that we need to re-think the way we conceptualize this role and, second, that beyond the conventional media (print and broadcast mass media), more serious attention needs to the paid to other media, including the more traditional media and the newer social media.

Theories as an IssueScholars in Africa and the West have pointed to the fictiveness of the perception of the media in liberal democratic theory as a more-or-less free floating, neutral institu-tion providing and securing a free market place of ideas for healthy contestations among citizens of the nation-state (Agbaje 1992: 1999: 105–139; Adebanwi 2011: 23–47; Jin 2008: 357–373; Ugresic 1994: 23–43; Bourgault 1993: 69–92; Keane 1991: 35–55). The media are thus per-ceived as anything but neutral instruments in a market place of ideas. Rather, they are perceived as affecting and reflecting the bal-ances of social, economic, political, cultural and spatial forces within any given polity, and as bearers and initiators of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic moves in state and society. Within this perspective, it becomes clear that the media are an extremely potent arena for struggles over the political require-ments and consequences of the construc-tion of “reality”, which itself have become a resource in the aspirations of groups toward hegemony or counter-hegemony.

This calls for a sensitive approach to the role of the media for two reasons. First, while hegemony, involving “the construc-

The media are thus perceived as anything but neutral instruments in a market place of ideas. Rather, they are perceived as affecting and reflecting the balances of social,

economic, political, cultural and spatial forces within any given polity, and as bearers and initiators of

hegemonic and counter-hegemonic moves in state and society.


to government while anti-government blogging has also been widely engaged in Zimbabwe (Atton and Mabweazara 2011: 667-673; Ahmad 2005: 219-231, 277. Singhal 2007: 2459 – 269). There is also room for increased role for local radio, currently not very widespread, to further democratize and decentralize the structure of the media industry on the continent.

Conclusion: whither the futureIt has been suggested in this paper that the media’s role in the political construction of reality in Africa has affected and reflected media structure, interests and capacities as well as the larger social-economic, leadership, historical, cultural and political contexts in which the media operate. This is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, albeit coloured by recent developments at the global and local levels in regard to political, technological and economic con-siderations as well as the emergence of new media. It is expected that more attention will be paid to understanding the evolving transnational forces and their (often com-plex) interconnections with local interests and spaces, the role of civic education in helping to shape the quantum and quality of contestations over the determination of social and political meaning, the political dimensions of leisure and social media as resources for re-imagining the nation-state, the strengthening of inclusive politics and other institutions of voice and accountabil-ity, and the need for national and regional policies to address challenges of the Infor-mation Age for Africa, its politics, people and places.

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Statement by H.E. Mr. Meles ZenawiPrime Minister, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia at theFifth Meeting of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development26th March 2012

Your Excel lenc y Mr. Soulaymane Cisse

Excellency Jean Ping, Abdoulie Janneh

Excellency Former Presidents Mr. Mkapa and Mr. Kohler

Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen

I wish to start my address by welcom-ing you all to Addis Ababa and wishing you success in your deliberations.

It has now become rather fashionable to characterize Africa as a potential Pole of global growth and this is so because indeed the possibility of Af-rica becoming such a pole has become quite clear for everyone to see.

A number of factors are identified to show that Africa has indeed such po-tential and the excellent issues paper prepared for this conference correctly highlights the key ones. The enormous natural resources of our continent, the demographic advantages of the so called youth bulge, better macro- eco-nomic management are in particular

identified as key sources of Africa’s potential as a pole of global growth.

While I agree that these are indeed the main sources of our potential, one has to ask why these factors have become sources of growth rather than the curses of the lost decades. After all Africa’s natural resources have always been there including in the dark days of the last decades of the last century. The Demographic advantage we talk of has also been there and indeed was until recently considered as an impor-tant source of instability and violence as the youth bulge was characterized by massive youth unemployment. The reforms in economic and political gov-ernance which Africa carried out more than three decades ago has generated not growth and transformation but deindustrialization, the enfeeblement of the African state and the associated malaise that has characterized our continent for far too long. The vital question to ask is therefore what has happened to transform these factors into potential sources of a possible global growth pole.

I can think of three important global developments that have matured in recent years and that have transformed the environment for growth in our continent.

First, over the past three decades a number of countries have grown fast and become emerging economic powers. In particular the phenomenal growth of China and later on of India each with over a billion people has dramatically transformed the demand for and prices of our natural resource product in particular that of the prod-ucts of our mineral and agricultural resources. The global terms of trade in these commodities has shifted dramatically. As a result investments in developing these resources in Af-rica have increased and continue to increase significantly. The returns to such investments to our economies have also markedly improved. These trends are expected to persist for at least a few decades giving us a unique window of opportunity to use our natural resources as a vital factor for faster growth and transformation.

For the Records:

H.E Mr. Meles Zenawi


Africa with it’s over a billion people, massive demand for investment in ev-erything from infrastructure to social services is the only untapped source of global demand that could potentially fill the gap. The massive global saving that has now become part of the prob-lem could become part of the solution if it were to be directed to investments in Africa. The current global environ-ment thus creates a unique opportu-nity for us to use our demographic and natural resources advantage to attract investments and catch this new wave of industrial relocation. This I believe is why the curses of the 80’s have now become opportunities for the future.

The key question that follows is are we Africans able to exploit this win-dow of opportunity to become the new growth pole. There is no simple

ings that cannot be productively used in the emerging countries themselves or in the developed world. The ad-vanced countries have entered a new phase in their development character-ized by anemic growth, massive public and private debt and a rapidly aging population. All attempts to overcome these global imbalances through re-trenchment in the advanced countries are doomed to failure because the emerging countries alone are unable to compensate for the loss in global growth that this implies. The world now needs a new pole of growth to allow the advanced countries to re-duce domestic demand and to reform. Reform in the advanced countries will be politically and economically unsus-tainable unless it is backed by growth in demand in new poles of growth.

Secondly, the emerging countries have reached a stage where they have to shed some manufacturing jobs and seek investment opportunities for their massive savings. The cur-rent chief economist of the World Bank who happens to have intimate knowledge of China’s economy has stated in a recent study that China alone will have to shed some eighty million manufacturing jobs mostly in labour intensive manufacturing over the next ten years. That estimate may well be on the high side but is indicative of the scale of change that is underway. At the same time, many of the emerging countries including the main oil producing nations have trillions of dollars in savings that they are unable to productively invest in their countries or profitably park in the advanced countries.

As a result of these developments Af-rica which over the past decades was de- industrializing while a number of Asian countries were engaged in mas-sive industrialization now has the op-portunity to catch the emerging wave of industrialization and relocation of labour intensive manufacturing. Our youth buldge can thus become not a source of senseless violence and in-stability but the source of cheap and productive labour that may enable us to capitalize on the emerging wave of industrial re-location.

Third, as a result of these develop-ments we now have a massive global imbalance. The emerging economies are growing fast and have massive sav-

The key message is that the neo-liberal paradigm which has devastated our economies over the past decades and which has now come

back home to roost needs to be discarded before we can do any of the things that we need to do

to transform our economies. We know what that Paradigm has done to sustain misery and under-

development in our continent. We now know what it has done to transform the financial sector of many of the advanced countries into Casino’s that have played a vital role in the current crisis.

We need to free ourselves from the constraints of that ideology and pragmatically select our own

path of development based on an empirical evalu-ation of what works and does not work for us.

- H.E. Ato Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia


is a recipe for failure and the perpetu-ation of unjust distribution of wealth. We need to discard the neo-liberal prescription and massively invest in tertiary education and technical and vocational training in addition to primary and secondary education and encourage the private sector to fill in the gaps where it can.

I can go on and on. The key message is that the neo-liberal paradigm which has devastated our economies over the past decades and which has now come back home to roost needs to be discarded before we can do any of the things that we need to do to transform our economies. We know what that Paradigm has done to sustain misery and underdevelopment in our conti-nent. We now know what it has done to transform the financial sector of many of the advanced countries into Casino’s that have played a vital role in the current crisis. We need to free ourselves from the constraints of that ideology and pragmatically select our own path of development based on an empirical evaluation of what works and does not work for us. With this few comments let me hasten to add that I agree with the issues paper prepared for your conference and would indeed recommend it for your consideration and approval.

I thank you for your kind attention.

===

need an effective state that intervenes effectively but selectively where ever there is a market failure that hinders or slows down our growth. Such a state can only emerge if we discard the bed time stories of the ideology such as that of a night watchman state.

We all agree that we need to make massive investment in infrastructure mostly through public investments. This is how the infrastructure of nearly all of the fast growing countries and regions has been built and is being built. The ideology however insists that infrastructure has to be built by the private sector and the state should limit itself to making these invest-ments lucrative and largely risk free for the private sector. This is a key reason why there has been very limited invest-ment in infrastructure in our continent for the past thirty years. We need to discard the shackles of the ideology and engage in massive public invest-ments in public infrastructure while at the same time encouraging the private sector to fill in the gaps where it can.

We all agree that we need to educate and train our people to exploit this rare window of opportunity. The neo-liberal ideology tells us that as govern-ments we should focus on primary education and perhaps to some extent secondary education. The rest is for the private sector to take care of and for individual families to finance. This

answer to that but we at least know what we have to do to exploit this op-portunity all the key points of which are mentioned in the excellent issues paper.

First and foremost we have to build effective and pro-development states in Africa, massively invest in our infra-structure, adequately train our people, promote manufacturing investment and technological capacity building and encourage growth and invest-ment in our Agriculture. Not all 54 African countries are likely to do all of the things mentioned in the issues paper but the hope is that some of our countries will do most of the things that need to be done to create a growth dynamics with continental spillover effects that could then transform the prospects of the continent as a whole.

I think it is only correct and proper for me to mention an underlying principle that is not adequately highlighted in the excellent issues paper and with-out which none of the things that we agree need to be done can be done. We have to liberate our minds from the neo-liberal ideological shackles that have impoverished our thinking and hindered our progress.

This bankrupt ideology insists that the African state should be enfeebled and limits its role to that of a night watchman. We are all agreed that we

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