Aristotle's God: Is the Unmoved Mover An Ontological Person?

Robert M. McDonald

Phone: (814) 547-3456

E-mail: mcdonald019@gannon.edu

Gonzaga University

Abstract

There are many conceptions of the divine from humanity's myriad

religious traditions. Part and parcel with any conception of a divine Being

are concerns about such an entity's attributes, i.e. notions of

personhood, such as within Christianity broadly. Historically, Aristotle's

conception of the divine, or the Unmoved Mover, has had a significant

impact on Western thought, especially the Judeo-Christian traditions of

philosophical theology and broader philosophy of religion. While the

majority of scholars have concerned themselves with analysis of the

Unmoved Mover's place within the cosmos, especially its causal role, or

considering proofs for such a Being's existence, few have addressed the

issue of whether or not the divine Being of Aristotle's theology is an

ontological person. The aim of this paper is to explicate a potential

solution to this question. In order to do so, the author will outline several

definitions of personhood which have been proposed through the history

of Western philosophy, from which, several will be discarded as

inadequate. The author concludes that it is the Boethian definition of

personhood which best satisfies the question of attributing to the

Unmoved Mover the characteristic of personhood.

Introduction

According to William J. Mander "it is commonly said that God is a person",1 an assertion he claims

has been the case for much, if not the entirety of religious history. Rather than offering a definition of

personhood which would be consistent with the nature of God, his purpose in writing "God and

Personality" is to critique the historical application of this notion. Furthermore, his primary concern is

with how the concept of personhood has been applied to the Judeo-Christian God, not Aristotle's

Unmoved Mover. The latter is my concern.

According to W.D. Ross, Aristotle's exposition on the Unmoved Mover, "[t]hat which initiates

motion, but which is itself unmoved",2 "that kind of being which combines substantial, self-dependent

existence with freedom from all change", "is the coping-stone of the Metaphysics".3 The Unmoved Mover

is a divine being, the subject of Aristotle's theology. This "god", however, is one which is so radically

different from conceptions of the divine held by his contemporaries that it was difficult for many of them

to accept. Nevertheless, his argument is thorough.4

While there are many questions which have been asked about the Unmoved Mover throughout

history, the one which I am most interested with at this time concerns whether or not it is a person.

Ideally, I would attempt to draw a link between Aristotle's own conception of the personhood and the

Unmoved Mover, but this would be to little avail without a thorough study of his works, a project which

exceeds the scope of this paper. Assuming time and space were available, however, would likely prove

fruitless. According to Terence Irwin, there is no word analogous to 'person' in Greek. While it is true that

1 Will iam J. Mander, "God and Personality," The Heythrop Journal 38 (1997), 401. 2 Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition Revised (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2008), 242. 3 W.D. Ross, Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of His Works and Thought (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), 175. 4 Consult Appendix B: the Unmoved Mover for a brief treatment of Aristotle's argument from Metaphysics XII, as

well as segments of Physics VIII; cf. Ross, Aristotle, 176-7.

translators have often utilized the word 'person' (Irwin included), it is primarily "used on the many

occasions when Aristotle uses the masculine definite article with an adjective or participle to refer to an

agent or a possessor of a virtue or affection or state".5 The question, therefore, is how to proceed?

Within the ensuing paper I will expound upon several historical definitions for personhood,

including those of Boethius, Kant, and Karol Wojtyla. I will then explain how the Unmoved Mover fits

within each framework in order to arrive at what could be an acceptable Aristotelian understanding. As

a part of this process I will set aside a number of definitions with little treatment because they are clearly

inconsistent with the concept of the Unmoved Mover. I conclude that, while several definitions discussed

are consistent with aspects of Aristotle's account of the Unmoved Mover, it is the Boethian definition

which is most consistent, insofar as it provides the most thorough treatment of the essential components

of the Unmoved Mover, fulfilling the criteria of a definition according to Aristotle's Topics: while other

definitions may explain marginal characteristics of the Unmoved Mover, it is Boethius's definition which

adequately expresses the essence of the Unmoved Mover.

Personhood

Now, the notion of personhood remains a salient problem within modern metaphysics. According

to Simon Blackburn, any definition "ought to account for central phenomena," such as the rational faculty,

5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999), 342. Aristotle seems to lack any succinct definition for what it means to be a 'person' in a philosophical, or ontological sense. Terence Irwin points out that "the people Aristotle [no doubt] has in mind are primarily men"; perhaps the

Greek word anthropos would serve as an appropriate analog, but Irwin claims that 'Man', the common English translation for anthropos, would be misleading. As such, there remains insufficient information at this time to respond to the question at hand. Colloquially, we refer to all human beings as persons, but this may well be due simply to the fact that human beings are the only persons we have ever known. Mander goes so far as to suggest

that "the rational parrot of John Locke's Essay and the aliens of Star Trek are all recognizable to us as 'people'", or persons, but even this may be debatable. By this rationale, all human beings are 'persons', but not all 'persons' are human beings, a logical distinction. The term 'persons', as is commonly argued, is therefore a much wider category that could include more than just human beings. For Mander, it is such a category as to include all rational agents,

or all rational moral agents. Cf. Mander, 'God and Personality', 401.

consciousness, language and agency, among others.6 Aristotle, I suspect, would agree with Blackburn on

this account, since he states that "[a] definition is an account that signifies the essence" of a particular

thing or group of things (Topics 102a1). The dilemma, however, is that there is historically little

agreement concerning the demarcation of criteria for personhood.

Turning to seven definitions of personhood, Linda Zagzebski outlines five within "The Uniqueness

of Persons," William J. Mander discusses three accounts within "God and Personality", and David S.

Oderberg offers a final definition for consideration within Real Essentialism. While Zagzebski's treatment,

not unlike Oderberg's or Mander's,7 is geared toward human persons, the difference lies in the respective

purpose each has for discussing personhood. Despite these varied purposes, all are helpful, especially

Zagzebski. She does critique those definitions she outlines, but her thorough explanations are sufficient

for the purpose of this paper.

Mander

As I mentioned above, William J. Mander refers to three separate accounts of what it is to be a

person within his article "God and Personality." Two of the three definitions he mentions are also referred

to by Zagzebski, which I outline below: Boethius and Locke. He does, however, speak of a recent offering

by American philosopher Thomas Nagel from his own book The View from Nowhere: "something that it

is like to be".8 According to Mander, Nagel's position is important (especially for his own project) because

it shows that "being a person is an all or nothing affair, not a matter of degree". 9 Still, there remains little

sufficient reason to suspect that there are not different types of persons, such that personhood for God

6 Simon Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, 272. 7 Oderberg is concerned with the general ontological question of personhood and essence; Mander is concerned with whether we ought to conceive of the Judeo-Christian God as a person; and Zagzebski is concerned with ethics

and human dignity. 8 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Chapter III. Cited in Will iam J. Mander, "God and Personality," The Heythrop Journal 38 (1997), 401; his account also appears in Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83/4 (1974), reprinted in The Nature of Mind, 422. 9 Mander, "God and Personality," 402.

may be different from human personhood, rather than God being more of a person than a human person,

or one human person being more of a human person. Furthermore, Mander fails to offer any significant

definition, aside from referring to Boethius and Locke, since Nagel's definition, as mentioned by Mander,

is rather vague.

For this reason, it is important to turn to Nagel himself. Within the now famous article "What Is

It Like to Be a Bat?", Nagel explains how "[c]onscious experience is a wide spread phenomenon", likely

found in unimaginable form across our vast universe, since "[i]t occurs at many levels of animal life". 10

The notion of Nagel's which is cited by Mander as essential to his project is inextricably connected to

Nagel's assertion concerning consciousness: "[n]o matter...the form...the fact that an organism has

conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism".11

Conscious experience--mental states--are characteristics which are subjective in nature. Mander is not

himself clear on this point when he utilizes Nagel's idea, but Nagel's explanation sheds some light on what

it may mean to be a person: to be a person is to have a particular point-of-view. Of course, creatures of

different kinds may be conscious of themselves and their surroundings in similar ways, so there is an issue

with utilizing a Nagelian notion of "something it is like to be" when discussing the ontological notion of

personhood. Still, possessing a particular point-of-view entails that such a creature is a locus of agency

and perception.

Oderberg

Within his book Real Essentialism, Oderberg provides a newer understanding for what it means

to be a person: a hylomorphic one. He begins his chapter on personhood by describing how evolutionists

view humanity: "...man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in

10 Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Nature of Mind, 422. 11 Ibid.

mind".12 Still, man is different, a point recognized by G.G. Simpson himself, among other evolutionists.

But the dilemma remains what exactly makes us different: reason?; morality?; self-awareness?; or

something else entirely? Regardless of what it is, all phenomena suggested are facets of human

rationality, which appears to be "something metaphysically of a different order from what characterizes

the other animals".13 But if rationality is, as the evolutionists claim, merely an accident of the evolutionary

process, then we are no more important than other animals.

Oderberg disagrees, stating that it is the essence of humanity, that which distinguishes us as

human beings qua persons from other animals, regardless of evolutionary origins, just as the essence of

any animal is what differentiates it from humans and other animals. At the heart of his idea lies rationality

and the hylomorphic nature of humanity, or that it is "a combination of matter...and form".14 He does

admit to following the Boethian definition (outlined below); in so doing, he equates the 'rational nature'

of a human person with the 'soul' of the person. So, what makes a human being a person is the fact that

they are a creature of a certain kind, one which is an enmattered being possessing a rational nature. There

is an obvious Aristotelian thread running through Oderberg's thought at this point, and if Irwin is correct

in claiming that humans are the nearest we can come to an Aristotelian notion of personhood, then

Oderberg would appear to be in the same camp.

As I said, however, Oderberg defines personhood in hylomorphic terms, "since the sort of

rationality persons have essentially involves the use of sensation".15 He does admit that some forms of

rationality (i.e. God's) may not require the activation of senses and sensations, but it remains irrelevant

for his discussion on humans qua persons. Suffice to say that any person is an enmattered being with the

12 G.G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 345. Cited in David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: Rutledge, 2007), 241. 13 David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York: Rutledge, 2007), 242. 14 Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, 174. 15 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 248.

natural (or essential) capacity for rationality. Put another way, "the person, being a compound of matter

and form, is a compound of the material and the immaterial" (original emphasis). 16 There is an important

issue which could be raised against this claim: is materiality of ontological necessity for personhood, or

are only some persons accidentally enmattered? This question is connected to my concern over whether

or not the Unmoved Mover, as a being which is not enmattered, could be considered a person.

Zagzebski

As I mentioned above, the bulk of my discussion on personhood would revolve around Linda

Zagzebski's treatment of five different definitions, four of which she classifies as traditional, having "been

particularly important historically".17 That said, she examines the accounts of personhood from four

different philosophers within "The Uniqueness of Persons": Boethius, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and

Karol Wojtyla.

Boethius

Writing in the sixth century A.D., Roman philosopher Boethius gave the oldest definition of

personhood within the philosophical tradition.18 Among his many works, it is within his Opuscula sacra

(or Theological Tractates) that he defines a person [persona] as "an individual substance of a rational

nature".19 Setting the standard for the medieval philosophical and theological period, Boethius divides

the universe into two camps: those beings which are persons, such as humens; and beings which are not,

or non-rational animals and non-animal physical objects. Simple and elegant, the Boethian definition is

easily understood: any being qua person must be a particular substantial entity which is itself and

understood as itself, and which is essentially rational. If we consider as an example humans, each human

16 Ibid., 251. 17 Linda Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 405. 18 Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, 44; Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 405. 19 Mander, "God and Personality," 401; Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 248; Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons,"

405.

being exists on their own as an individual compound substance which possesses by their nature the faculty

of reason.

Aristotle points out that "[a]ll human beings by nature desire to know" (Meta. 980a21), and the

faculty of reason has been cited as the distinguishing factor differentiating human beings from the rest of

the sensible universe since his predecessors: while all "animals possess sense-perception by nature at

birth", "[n]on-human animals live by appearances and memories but have little share in experience,

whereas human beings also live by craft and reasoning" (Meta. 980b21, 26-27). Boethius picked up on

this thread of Aristotelian thought; however, Zagzebski finds definition dissatisfying because "some of

what is involved in being rational seems to be irrelevant to being a person". 20 Unfortunately, she fails to

adequately explain how this is the case or why this is her sentiment. Regardless of her misgivings,

Zagzebski does point to an important aspect of the Boethian definition, that rationality is the characteristic

of all persons serving to ground agency.

John Locke

Like Boethius, Locke's definition of personhood is simple enough to understand, and is quite

similar to it, as well:

...a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and

can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and

places; which it does only by that consciousness which is

inseparable from thinking and...seems essential to it; it being

impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he is

perceiving.21

20 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons", 405. 21 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Niddick (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

Cited in Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 407. Also cited in part in Mander, "God and Personality," 401.

So, "a person is a self-conscious being", or a being which is "not only conscious, but who has reflexive

consciousness".22 While others have held the same or similar views on personhood (recall Nagel), it is

Locke who is most associated with it. For Locke, however, self -consciousness is not simply an active

awareness of one's self being conscious; rather, it is preserved in memory, which allows for the continuity

of personhood over a span of time. According to Zagzebski, Locke's definition is an improvement over

that of Boethius because "it comes closer to capturing the important idea that a person is a 'who,' not a

'what'".23

Immanuel Kant

Within the section on Kant, Zagzebski offers two definitions he developed, and it is Kant whom

she argues had the most adequate understanding of personhood. The first of the two Zagzebski provides

is that of a person qua "a being with the capacity to act for ends".24 Reason continues to play a role within

this framework, since for Kant it is the mark of rationality that a being is capable of setting ends qua that

for the sake of which one acts (a finis), as well as that toward which one acts (a finitum). The other

definition she provides from Kant is like the first: "beings who can act for the sake of each other". 25 By

this definition, it would appear that persons are inherently relational, though not necessarily having to be

involved in loving or respectful relationships, though it sometimes is. This is the suggestion of Zagzebski

when she draws a connection to love and respect as emotional states. Prima facie, this claim appears

true, insofar as one person may act for another without feeling a particular sort of love (i.e. romantic love

or friendship) toward the one for whom they are acting; so too with respect. A server working at a

restaurant is a prime example of just such acting: they do not love their customers qua persons of value,

nor do they respect them except insofar as they must please them if they wish to earn a decent tip. If this

22 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 406. 23 Ibid., 407. 24 Ibid., 409. 25 Ibid., 410.

is what Zagzebski has in mind, then it would seem to mesh well with Kant, for whom it was important to

maintain a capacity to act for others relying solely upon rationality and the will.

Karol Wojtyla

Having discussed four traditional definitions for what it means to be a person, Zagzebski turns to

a final, recent definition from Karol Wojtyla's definition: "an incommunicably unique subject".26 This is

an intriguing concept, primarily due to the term 'incommunicable' being utilized, a word we do not often

see within English. 27 Zagzebski utilizes it to convey how particular individuals ex ist qua a manner unique

to them as a particular individual, a manner which they do not and cannot share with other persons. 28

This is a very different definition from the previous four she discusses (as well as from those discussed by

Oderberg and Mander) in a very particular way; specifically, the other definitions are concerned with a

particular quality which is or set of qualities which are shared by all beings which may be classified as

persons. Contrary to this, Wojtyla's definition (as utilized by Zagzebski, an interpretation I will utilize for

this paper) offers something which is nonqualitative, "since qualities are shareable" and some

incommunicable property of a particular individual is not by its definition something unique to them, i.e.

not shared among others.29 This definition is most appealing to Zagzebski because it is a definition which

applies to any individual who has not yet attained self -consciousness, or may have lost their self-

consciousness.

26 Ibid., 414. 27 Persona est sui juris et alteri incommunicabilis ("A person is a being which belongs to itself and which does not share its being with another" (quoted within Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 414). 28 Again, a connection can be drawn to the Nagelian notion of "something which it is to be like"; in particular, he speaks of how differing rational agents (or animals) with their own subjective points of view may be able to develop some understanding of how another rational agent experiences the world: "[t]he point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual [but] is a type"; cf. Nagel, "To Be a Bat?", 424. 29 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 415.

The Unmoved Mover as a Person

Having explicated seven definitions of personhood, the original question posed remains: is the

Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics XII a person? As I mention above, a number of the definitions are

definitively unacceptable if we accept Aristotle's account of the Unmoved Mover, whereas there are

others which are plausible, but fail to adequately address all of the facets of this being. Finally, there are

two which are ideal, but only one which seems to be most consistent with the Aristotelian account.

Nagel, Oderberg, and Wojtyla

I return first to Oderberg and Nagel; these two are clearly unacceptable for the purpose of

describing the Unmoved Mover, especially Oderberg, though Nagel may seem less obvious. As I mention

above, Oderberg holds to a hylomorphic conception of personhood, with his primary focus being the

human person. If, as I suspect he would claim, all persons are "compound substances...namely, a

substance composed of matter and form",30 then the Unmoved Mover is clearly inconsistent with such a

definition. The only way to make the Unmoved Mover fit within such a framework would be to suggest

that it is also comprised of both matter and form; to do this, however, is to suggest that it is both

essentially actualized while entirely potential. Some may suggest that it is materia prima, but such a claim

is prima facie incorrect, as Aristotle himself states that "the primary essence has no matter, since it is

actuality" (Meta. 1074a36; emphasis added), where the primary essence is the Unmoved Mover.

Furthermore, the Unmoved Mover is "something that is itself unmoved and outside all change, either

unqualified or coincidental...initiating motion in something else" (Phys. 258b14-16); but "what comes to

be is composite" (Phys. 190b11-12). Since the Unmoved Mover is itself unmoved and unchanging, which

30 Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 260.

is to say that it does not come to be (or pass away), it cannot be composite. Such a substance as the

Unmoved Mover "must be immaterial, since it must be eternal".31

Moving on to Wojtyla, some may suspect that his definition is excellent one, especially for its

simplicity. I will grant that it is a wonderful account of personhood, to say that "a person is an

incommunicably unique subject", and this is so for two reasons concerning the Unmoved Mover. First, it

is certainly unique: no other mover, moved or otherwise, within the Aristotelian schema is wholly

indivisible, self-contained, and completely self-thinking thought. Furthermore, it is a subject because

"[t]he subject is substance" (Meta. 1042a27), and the Unmoved Mover is a substance of a certain kind.

But have I not thus communicated what it is which makes the Unmoved Mover unique? As with the latter,

we often express the incommunicable by stating that we know-not-what it is about a person, but "perhaps

we really do see something...in a person's face, voice, manner...that is inexpressible, but that leads us to

think that nobody else is, or even could be, like that person".32 A beautiful sentiment, but there is no way

for us to determine on these same grounds whether or not the Unmoved Mover possesses some

inexpressible characteristic from which it derives its value. As such, I would disregard this definition as

well.

Nagel's definition, as Mander speaks of it, is also off the table; however, this is the case for a very

different reason. At first, it may be thought that the Unmoved Mover is "something that it is like to be".

This is true, after a fashion, since all other movers and spheres within Aristotle's cosmology are moved in

a teleological manner; specifically, "the movements of nature are inspired by the things of nature being

drawn towards it".33 According to Mander, however, Nagel's definition of personhood is of a very

different sort, since "being a person is an all or nothing affair, not a matter of degree". This interpretation

31 Ross, Aristotle, 176. 32 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 414. 33 Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, 242.

poses a problem for an Aristotelian kosmos because different beings, or substances, are more or less

substantial than one another: the Unmoved Mover, as pure actuality, is more substantial than a human,

a being who strives to be more like the former; and both are more substantial than materia prima since

they are both actualized to some degree, whereas the prime matter is pure potentiality.

There may be a way to salvage Nagel's definition. As I mentioned, the Unmoved Mover is pure

actuality, and all other things within the kosmos strive to be more like the Unmoved Mover. If we allow

that Nagel's notion of personhood does not preclude degrees of personhood, then we may say that the

Unmoved Mover is a perfect person, fully actualized and pure rationality qua nous, whereas all other

persons are less perfect persons to one degree or another. Furthermore, if we take into account the

purpose Nagel outlines for his notion, then it becomes more amenable to Aristotle's Unmoved Mover: if

being a person means to be an organism qua the type of organism which it is like to be, "something it is

like for the organism" to be, then we may claim that the Unmoved Mover is a type of being which it is like

to be, namely a final cause of the kosmos qua pure rationality-itself.34 Nevertheless, this notion would

seem to be inadequate, as it fails to offer a proper definition of what it is for a person to be like.

Kant

The Kantian definitions provided by Zagzebski are like Mander's treatment of Nagel's notion of

personhood insofar as it is possible that we may be able to interpret them in a particular way, as well as

interpret Aristotle's account in a particular way, so as to make them partially compatible. I would turn

first to the second definition she provides, as it is the least favorable of the two.

Assuming it is correct to posit that persons are "beings who can act for the sake of each other",

how may we address the question of the Unmoved Mover. Zagzebski, as I point out, explains that

34 Nagel, "To Be a Bat?", 422.

personhood by this definition is relational. Certainly there is some relation between the Unmoved Mover

and the kosmos, but what is this relationship? Thinking back to Aristotle's cosmology, each sphere is

connected to the one above it, thus being moved by it out of a desire to be more like it, and this desire to

be more perfect like the spheres above carries forward all of the way to the Unmoved Mover. It moves

these other spheres by moving the other unmoved movers, not locally in the same way which they move

the celestial spheres, but "by inspiring love and desire":35 "[t]he <end> initiates motion by being an object

of love and it initiates in the other things by <something else's> being moved" (Meta. 1072b4). This

relationship, however, is one of less perfect beings acting in such a way as to emulate more perfect beings.

In this case, the Unmoved Mover, while being pure actuality, is not acting for other beings in quite the

manner which Kant is suggesting a person acts, since it exists as self-thinking thought; however, "it

initiates motion for an infinite time" (Meta. 1073a8).

Based on this examination, is there some way to adjust Kant's definition or Aristotle's account,

such that they are more consistent with one another? Philosophers in the past have sought to revise the

concept of the Unmoved Mover so as that it may act as an efficient cause, as well as a final cause.

Unfortunately, there is no easy way to adequately "tweak" his conception of the Unmoved Mover so as

to ameliorate the theological misgivings of Aristotle's medieval commentators. At the same time, I further

suspect that their so-called misgivings are themselves unwarranted. In discussing this debate over

Aristotle's Unmoved Mover as God, Ross makes the claim that "God is the efficient by being the final

cause, but in no other way"; he elaborates: "[the Unmoved Mover] is the final cause not in the sense of

being something that never is but always is to be" (emphasis added).36 Thus, what happens within the

kosmos depends upon it.

35 Ross, Aristotle, 177. 36 Ibid.

I would instead turn toward Kant's definition. He says that a person is any being "who can act for

others", so I am inclined to ask: what is meant by "act"? If we consider such "acting" as one human person

preforming an action for the sake of some other human person, then the Unmoved Mover cannot, nor

does it, act for others as one human person may act for another. But what if we consider su ch "action"

simply as acting according to one's telos? If this is the case, then the Unmoved Mover may yet fit the bill,

since it clearly demonstrates rational agency of a certain kind; but acting according to its telos implies

what? The telos of the Unmoved Mover is itself and thinking of itself; furthermore, the Unmoved Mover

qua the divine is the ordinate object of wisdom and understanding. Since this is the case, the pure

actuality of the Unmoved Mover, actuality without any potentiality, inspires other less perfect beings to

think of it and strive to be more like it, thus leading them to act according to and toward their respective

ends.

Admittedly difficult, I hesitate to ascribe merit to this interpretation. While potentially workable,

I would nonetheless set aside the second Kantian definition. This leaves us with the first definition, that

"a person is a being with a capacity to act for ends". This definition is rather straightforward when we

consider the Unmoved Mover. An end is "that for the sake of which someone acts"; if this is the case,

then there must be some ultimate end toward which we act, "some person or object we value, either

oneself or another".37 What does the Unmoved Mover act for, if not itself, a being whose "understanding

is an understanding of understanding" (Meta. 1074b34-35)? As pure actuality it is not acting in the sense

of actualizing a potentiality (this would be a contradiction); rather it is the everlasting act of actualization,

and its end is itself and to contemplate itself. If we think of the Unmoved Mover in this way, then it is

possible to claim that it is a person by this definition; however, I do not think this is the best definition.

My reason for this is simple: despite the apparent acceptability of this definition, it fails the criteria for

37 Zagzebski, "The Uniqueness of Persons," 409.

definitions set out by Aristotle in Topics. True, it is a characteristic of the Unmoved Mover to act according

to that telos which is thought think itself; but this fails to address what the Unmoved Mover is.

Boethius and Locke

There are two definitions of personhood which I would argue are most accurate in accounting for

the Unmoved Mover: Boethius and Locke. Beginning with Locke, a person is "a self -conscious being".

This definition is so straightforward, but Zagzebski has her reservations concerning the Unmoved Mover

as a person by this definition or that of Boethius; however, she provides insufficient evidence to defend

her doubts concerning rationality. In that case, it is safe to say that the Unmoved Mover is self-conscious:

"if [it] is thought thinking on itself, it is self-conscious".38 As Locke points out, it is "impossible for anyone

to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive". So, the Unmoved Mover must be aware of its

thinking upon itself. If this is the case, then it is a person by the Lockean account.

But Boethius's account is more accurate. Locke comes closer with his definition to what most

thinkers today consider a person to be: a person is one who can think and refer to the "I" and "me" and

the "self". Boethius's account, however, does not necessarily preclude a person being a 'who' rather than

a 'what', but neither does it entail a 'who' over a 'what'. This, I suspect, is closer to Aristotle's conception

of the Unmoved Mover as the Principle of actuality. Consider the elements of the Boethian definition. A

person is an individual particular thing; so too is the Unmoved Mover. Furthermore, it is a substance qua

form.

And what of it being "of a rational nature"? Stephen Menn explains this well within his article

"Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and the Good". According to Menn, "[t]he god is not simply a being

which has intellectual virtue, but rather he is the intellectual virtue existing itself -by-itself".39 Menn's

38 Ibid., 408. 39 Stephen Menn, "Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good," The Review of Metaphysics 45/3 (1992),

568.

argument within the article is that most commentators have confused the term nous with "mind", such

as with a human mind, the sort of nous which possesses rationality as a virtue outside of itself. In the case

of the Unmoved Mover ("[t]he god"), nous is more appropriately understood as the virtue of rationality

itself. If this is the case, and I am inclined to agree with Menn on this point, then the Unmoved Mover

clearly possesses a particular nature which is rational; in fact, its nature is not simply rational, but

rationality-itself.

Conclusion

Aristotle's conception of God as the Unmoved Mover is perhaps one of the greatest concepts, as

well as one of the most contested in the history of philosophy. Numerous pupils and commentators, from

Alexander to Averroes to Aquinas and Duns Scotus found the notion of an impersonal God such as the

Unmoved Mover to be less than savory, thus interpreting in a theistic manner. 40 Hardest to stomach was

the idea that the Unmoved Mover as God was merely self-relational, not other-relational, a stark contrast

to the God of the Abrahamic faiths. Nevertheless, I do not think it is implausible to suggest that there

may be some notion of what we today call personhood which may be ascribed to the Unmoved Mover:

it is certainly self-conscious; it is definitely incommunicable; and most important, it is rational. As pure

rationality, nous, rather than simply a mind in possession of the virtue of rationality, we can assert that

the Unmoved Mover is rational in nature, substantially so, and it is the only wholly unique individual being

to be fully actualized as such.

40 Ross, Aristotle, 179-80.

Appendix A: Aristotle's Cosmology

Aristotle's cosmology is a complex system of concentric crystalline spheres, each one rotating

within those beyond its borders. At the heart (or bottom) of this kosmos lies the earth, the most

corruptible and changeable layer of reality, being that it is also the mortal sub-Lunar sphere. Next comes

the moon, or Lunar sphere; from the moon upward spheres of the kosmos are eternal, unchanging, and

more perfect. Continuing upward, beyond the Lunar sphere, are the spheres of Mercury, Venus, and the

Sun; following them are the other three visible planets: Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Out beyond the sphere

of Saturn is found the sphere of the fixed stars. Each of these spheres is itself in motion; however, this

motion is, as are the spheres themselves, eternal. In fact, the entirety of the universe is eternal because

"motion must be eternal and must never fail" (Physics 258b11); as such, there must be for Aristotle some

first mover which is itself unmoved by any thing outside of itself.

None of these early spheres, however, are of the requisite perfection to explain the eternal

motion of the kosmos posited by Aristotle; what is required is one further sphere, that of the Unmoved

Mover. Within this order there are thus three "kinds of things", each coinciding with the types of celestial

spheres: 1) those things which are changeable and perishable; 2) those things which are changeable and

eternal; and 3) those things which are immutable in every way. The sub-Lunar sphere of the earth, as well

as all beings therein, fall into the first category of "things", with the second category consisting of the

spheres of the moon, sun, and planets. Only the primum mobile, "the first or outer most sphere of the

heavens" consisting of the fixed stars,41 as well as the Unmoved Mover itself, are that which fall within

the third category.

41 Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, 290.

Appendix B: the Unmoved Mover

As has been noted above, the Unmoved Mover is a divine being, a claim affirmed by Aristotle

within section 7 of Book XII of the Metaphysics. He begins Book XII of the Metaphysics by stating that

"there are three types of substance, two of them natural and one unmoved" ( Meta. 1071b3-4); his goal,

however, is to demonstrate that there must be one such substance, i.e. the third, which is everlasting as

it is unmoved. He argues this point by stating that anything which is potentially so need not be actualized;

but there remains eternal motion. In order to have eternal motion, there must therefore be some

everlasting substance, or principle, "of the sort whose essence is actuality" (Meta. 1071b20). Such a being

is unlike those within the perishable realm in that it is not enmattered, since matter is the principle of

potentiality and such a being is actuality; this being is "an everlasting unmoved substance that is separated

from perceptible things" (Meta. 1073a4-5). This is affirmed when Aristotle states that "the primary

essence has no matter, since it is actuality" (Meta. 1074a36). If it is actuality, then "it does not change...for

the change would be to be something worse, and it would thereby be in motion" (Meta. 1074b27-28).

Clearly, it is also unmoved, as I have explained above.

Now, Aristotle admits to multiple unmoved movers within his account of Metaphysics XII, each

moving one of the "<forward-> moving and counteracting spheres [the total number of which] will be

fifty-five [or] forty-seven" (Meta. 1074a11-12, 14). He also speaks of these unmoved movers within

Physics Book VIII when he asserts the necessity of "one or more than one" first mover which is everlasting

(Phys. 258b11-12). Even so, there must be one such mover which is entirely unmoved in any way, since

"it is clear that there is something that causes the self-movers to be at one time and not to be at another

time" (Phys. 258b23-24): "The principle and primary being is unmoved both in its own right and

coincidentally, and it initiates the everlasting and single primary motion" (Meta. 1073a24-25). The other

movers are "unmoved in [their] own right and everlasting" (Meta. 1073a34-35), but such movers cause

the local motions of the many concentric spheres of the kosmos, whereas

[…] there is something that embraces [all of the many unmoved

movers and self-movers] and is apart from each of them, which

is the cause explaining why some exist and some do not exist, and

why the change is continuous. This is the cause of motion in

these <other movers>, and these are the cause of motion in the

other things. (Phys. 259a3-7).

Furthermore, since "things that are numerically many all have matter", and "the

primary...unmoved mover is one in number and account" (Meta. 1074a33-34, 37), then it is not

enmattered. This distinction is important for determining the unique nature of the Unmoved Mover,

since, despite other unmoved movers, "one [first] mover is sufficient; it will be first and everlasting among

the unmoved things, and the principle of motion for the other things" (Phys. 259a14-16).

An element which is also essential for an adequate understanding of what distinguishes the

Unmoved Mover from other movers, unmoved or otherwise, is the role played by wisdom and nous. To

Aristotle, "any discipline deserving the name of wisdom must describe the first causes, i.e. the principles"

(Meta. 981b28-29). Further, "wisdom is knowledge of certain sorts of principles and causes" ( Meta.

982a3-4); specifically, "wisdom must study the first principles and causes, and the good, the end, is one

of the causes" (Meta. 982b10-11). As the divine science, wisdom is the central activity of the Unmoved

Mover, the Divine. This is clear because it is the only "science <of first causes> [which] satisfies both

conditions <for being divine>": it is "the one a god more than anyone else would be expected to have"

and it is "the science of divine things" (Meta. 983a8, 6-7). But if the Unmoved Mover "must understand

either itself or something else" (Meta. 1074b23), and "understanding seems to be the most divine of the

things we observe" (Meta. 1074b16), then it is evident that the Unmoved Mover "must understand itself",

because "it understands what is most divine and most valuable" (Meta. 1074b34, 27).

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