A P P R E N T I C E S H I P - T H E P E R I L O U S J O U R N E Y F R O M G E R M A N Y

TO T O G O 1

KEN KEMPNER, CLAUDIO DE MOURA CASTRO and DANIEL BAS

Abstract - This paper explores the economic and cultural reasons why apprentice- ship programmes imported by developing countries typically fail. The authors pursue this inquiry in a comparative manner by addressing experiences in Western Africa and by drawing on the outcomes of apprentice programmes in some industrialised countries. The authors identify major issues that explain why programmes borrowed from the West are so ineffective in Africa. Essentially, the imported apprenticeship ~programmes are decidedly Western and white concepts that link education to employ- ment through certification and individual ownership of knowledge, and that clash with African cultural traditions. Individual success is central to Western-based programmes, which is opposed to more community-based conceptions of traditional African culture. Because of this inherent mismatch, the authors conclude with several options for developing apprenticeship training in Africa that are more relevant and adaptable to the prevailing cultural, educational and economic climate. They encourage programmes that improve the educational system incrementally and caution against programmes that run counter to the predominant culture.

Zusammenfassung - In diesem Artikel werden die wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Grtinde untersucht, warum die yon Entwicklungsl~indern importierten Ausbildungs- programme typischerweise erfolglos bleiben. Die Autoren gehen dieser Frage nach durch Vergleiche von Erfahrungen in Westafrika mit Ergebnissen von Ausbildungsprogrammen in einigen Industriel~indern. Die Autoren zeigen die wesentlichen Merkmale auf, aus denen ersichtlich wird, warum vom Westen entliehene Ausbildungsprogramme in Afrika so wenig Wirkung zeigen. Haupts~chlich handelt es sich bei den importierten Ausbildungsprogrammen um auf den Westen und auf WeiBe zugeschnittene Konzepte, die Bildung und Arbeitsplatz mittels Zeugnissen und individuellem Wissen miteinander verbinden und mit afrikanischen Kulturtraditionen nicht in Einklang zu bringen sind. Individueller Erfolg ist Kernpunkt westlicher Programme, die den eher gemeinschaftsbezogenen Konzeptionen traditioneller afrikanischer Kultur entgegenstehen. Wegen dieses naturgegebenen Mil3verh~iltnisses zeigen die Autoren abschlieBend mehrere MOglichkeiten zur Entwicklung von Ausbildungsprogrammen ftir Afrika auf, die den kulturellen, erzieherischen und wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten in Afrika besser angepaBt sind. Sie befiirworten Programme zu einer stetigen Verbesserung des Bildungssystems und warnen vor Programmen, die der pr~idominanten Kultur entgegenwirken.

R 6 s u m 6 - Le pr6sent article cherche les raisons 6conomiques et culturelles pour lesquelles tes programmes d'apprentissage import6s par les pays en d6veloppement 6chouent g6n6ralement. Les auteurs poursuivent leur recherche d'une manibre compar6e en examinant les exp6riences faites en Afrique occidentale et en exploitant les r6sultats des programmes de ce genre appliqu6s dans certains pays industrialis6s. Les auteurs d6finissent les probl~mes majeurs qui expliquent pourquoites programmes emprunt6s au monde occidental sont si peu efficaces en Afrique. Avant tout, les programmes d'apprentissage sont typiquement occ~dentaux, les concepts blancs lient

International Review of Education - lnternationale Zeitschrift f i ir Erziehungswissenschaft - Revue Internationale de P~dagogie 39(5): 373-390, 1993. �9 1993 K l u w e r A c a d e m i c Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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l'6ducation ~ l'emploi grace ~ un syst6me de certificats, et la propri6t6 individuelle du savoir est en d6saccord avec les traditions culturelles africaines. Le succ~s individuel qui est central dans les programmes appliqu6s en Occident est oppos6 aux conceptions davantage fond6es sur la collectivit6 de la culture africaine tradition- helle. En raison de ce d6faut d'adaptation inh6rent, les auteurs concluent en proposant plusieurs options de d6veloppement de l'apprentissage professionnel en Afrique qui sont plus pertinentes et adaptables au clirnat culturel, 6ducatif et 6conomique qui pr6vaut darts cette r6gion. Ils pr6nent des programmes visant ~t am61iorer progressivement le syst~me 6ducatif et mettent en garde contre ceux qui vont h l'encontre de la culture pr6dominante.

Most of the educational solutions to preparing labour in wealthier nations are beyond the means of the majority of developing countries. They cannot afford to train more than a minuscule share of the relevant age cohorts at all levels of education. How then could large numbers of people in poor countries receive the training they need to improve their skills?

The apprenticeship system is an obvious candidate for the formidable job of training the millions of young people in developing countries (Rist 1986). Such programmes are relatively inexpensive, elastic in the size of intake, and can have remarkable adherence to the needs of labour markets, while offering a combination of both theory and hands-on activities. For example, the appren- ticeship system is quite successful in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. More than two-thirds of cohorts learn their trades through apprenticeship, from waiters to future bank executives.

In a world ridden with problems of mismatch between supply and demand of training, apprenticeship looks like the ideal solution. Yet it does not travel well. Germans have used much money and persuasion to export their "dual system" to developing countries, but results are indeed quite modest if not disappointing. Even when legislation is passed regulating apprenticeship in developing countries and all the appurtenances of the system are created, the programmes remain very small. In many developing countries, typically only one per cent of the age cohort enrol in formal apprenticeship programmes (Bas 1989).

Why does this proportion remain so small? This paper explores the reasons for the failure of organised apprenticeship programmes in developing coun- tries. We pursue the argument in a comparative manner by addressing the experiences in Western Africa and by drawing on the outcomes of apprentice programmes in some industrialised countries.

Our explanations for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of apprenticeship programmes are considered from two perspectives: economic and cultural. The economic reasoning is straightforward. When looking at the costs and the results, are employers being offered a bad deal which they justly dodge? Are the responsibilities for employers too high and the benefits too puny? By contrast, our cultural explanations consider that a successful system requires values and behaviours that are not to be found in these countries. Whereas

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developing countries can easily borrow modern forms of production from more developed countries, the education and training of native individuals to operate these new production systems is more problematic. As Irizarry (1980: 340) explains: "Developing countries, as latecomers to industrialisation, had to develop the capability to acquire the increasingly complex scientific and technological knowledge required for the operation and improvement of the modern forms of production." Placing new production systems in a cultural environment unadapted to modern technology, training and "foreign" values invariably leads to disarticulation among the economic, educational, and employment sectors (Irizarry 1980: 345).

Our premise here is that the potential solutions to economic and educa- tional disarticulation are culturally dependent. For example, as Castro and Alfthan (1992: 1-2) explain:

Solutions are not adopted by countries randomly or at will. Instead, they have deep cultural roots in the country . . . . Attempts to change roles and styles of operation which conflict with their nature are likely to fail. By the same token, imported institutions which are too distant from the local culture may be rejected.

This rejection occurs when change is not sensitive to the existing culture, which can be defined variously as "webs of significance" which humans spin about themselves (Geertz 1973: 5) or "forms of traditional behaviour which are characteristic of a certain society" (Mead 1961: 17). Given that culture defines how individuals behave, we question here, specifically, how effec- tively the apprenticeship system of industrialised countries can be transplanted into traditional African societies.

To help us understand the inherent cultural differences between apprentice programmes in industrialised and developing countries, we compare the outcomes of apprentice programmes in Switzerland and Germanic countries in Europe to findings from Africa that we have gathered in case-study research. Experiences with the success and failure of apprentice programmes in Latin America and the United States are also used to identify further the cultural differences and similarities between developed and developing nations.

We certainly do not propose definitive answers to all the questions we raise here. Rather, the objective of this paper is to discuss the economic and cultural factors that prevent or foster organised, educational change efforts in Africa. In this analysis we consider:

- to what extent apprentice programmes could provide a viable, cost- effective, and culturally relevant method for preparing individuals for middle and lower-level work;

- how cultural factors affect the implementation and acceptance of formal apprentice programmes; and

- which educational policies can better match the economic realities of developing countries in Africa.

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Apprenticeship training in review

Germany, Austria, Switzerland: the success of the dual system

In Switzerland, Austria and Germany well-structured apprentice programmes sponsored by government, enterprises and unions have flourished, educating up to three quarters of the age cohort. Furthermore, these programmes offer rather sophisticated training and, in most cases, respond welt to the training needs of the economy. One would, therefore, imagine that the Germanic solution of the dual system (i.e., work and practical training with an employer and theoretical training in a vocational school) seems promising for devel- oping countries. The dual system is not without its critics, however. These critics, primarily the labour unions, express concern over "the lowering of training standards, useless qualifications and above all the growing number of youth who can't get an adequate vocational training" (Dehnbostel and Rau 1986: 144).

Unlike Germany, however, France and the UK never really succeeded in training large numbers of apprentices. In the United States such training has become a means of controlling the supply of some trades, such as plumbers. Students who cannot enter the union are then relegated to attending vocational programmes (often in community colleges) where, even though training and education may be superior, they do not win the "card" that qualifies them for admission into the union and the accompanying benefits of membership. In the following sections we will examine the fate of apprenticeship in different regions.

Latin America: drifting away from the dual system

Apprenticeship has a long and practical history as a way of training artisans and skilled workers. From a planning perspective, formalised apprentice programmes theoretically can help match better educational output with the economic realities of a nation. Such planning has been effective in Switzerland where skilled craft work is highly valued, but the issue is a different one in developing nations where the main path to upward mobility has been through higher education and a position with the state bureaucracy. The risk then for those who fail in their attempts at upward mobility and higher education is that "they may end up in low level white-collar jobs that pay less than the skilled manual labour occupations they have forgone" (Castro 1988: 201).

In Latin America most training systems began with an apprenticeship system similar to that of Switzerland, but were subsequently abandoned in favour of the SENAI-type solution used in Brazil. SENAI is the cooperative venture of industry and government to fund and provide technical training for working class youths in technical areas of the contributing industries and businesses (Kempner and Castro 1988). From the beginning, Latin American

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programmes offered effective examples of vocational training because they were separate from the regular school systems.

The independent status of these vocational programmes allowed them to be better connected to the labour markets and more responsive to economic change. In contrast, the attempt to develop comprehensive high schools failed. These schools were dominated by middle-class values, which fostered aspi- rations for higher education, but failed to empower most students to compete successfully for entrance into the universities. The training systems of Latin America derived their rationale from the industrialisation model that pervaded the continent in past decades: the first priority was the preparation of skilled workers. But, it is interesting to note that while most Latin American systems started with some sort of dual system, they progressively drifted away from it. The management of such systems proved to be too complicated and taxing.

While some countries are again trying the German recipe of alternating trainees for some days in industry and the remaining days in the training centres, the overwhelming majority of programmes have abandoned this idea. German officers involved in technical cooperation freely admit today that the system, as practised in Germany, is too difficult to implement in the long run. It is hard to convince employers to take up apprentices and accommo- date their work routines to the learning requirements. Follow-up of the trainees in the factories is difficult and expensive. The closely knit relations between several enterprises and training centres is time-consuming. Furthermore, in periods of crisis the system comes to a halt if employers do not hire the apprentices. Both the quality of the programme and how it is financed are major problems for the dual system no matter where it is practised (Dehnbostel and Rau 1986).

In the system that "de facto" replaced German-style apprenticeship in Latin America, trainees are sent for internships at the end of their training in the centres. In periods of high unemployment some will not have an internship waiting for them, but this is a lesser evil than paralysing all or most training. This system is not as effective as in Germany, but it is certainly more robust. It has served Latin America well for several decades. Despite some difficul- ties, such as the stagnation of modern sector employment and the explosion of the informal sector, it still works and can probably survive with a few adaptations.

The United States: apprenticeship as an entry card

Traditionally, apprenticeship programmes in the United States are operated by unions. Their offerings are a far cry from the dual system, however. Union training programmes make few claims of being equitable and, likewise, make no attempt to serve a diverse population. Programmes exist as if to filter and restrict the supply of artisans. In some locations membership in the unions is inherited rather than awarded by merit or equity. Because of tight controls on entrance into apprenticeships, union programmes assure graduates of

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employment upon completion of their training. This situation is vastly dif- ferent from vocational programmes at community colleges, for example, which can range from training tied directly to the marketplace to programmes only tangentially connected to the realities of employment.

Whereas unions operate on a strict quota system directly related to the potential for employment and control of the labour supply, most community college training programmes function on the promise of upward mobility and eventual employment. Demand for enrolment in programmes is often based more on consumer desire than quantifiable outcomes.

Although US community colleges do offer some on-the-job training pro- grammes, the dual system proper has not been well institutionalised. A major impediment to such a system is the lack of correspondence between the workplace and the educational system. Community colleges often work effectively with local employers, but typically are not able to pay an employer for taking on or training an apprentice. Some training programmes are able to coordinate with an employer, such as contract training, where the employer bears the burden of training the apprentice, but community colleges do not typically have the financial resources to offer incentives to the employer. The federal government does sponsor large-scale vocational programmes and does reimburse colleges for training vocational students. This sponsorship and planning is, typically, not well integrated with the realities of the marketplace, nor coordinated effectively with economic development programmes that create jobs for graduates. The lack of correspondence between training and the market place prompts Grubb (1984: 441) to criticize community college vocational programmes as "training for unemployment". He explains, however, that "The vocational imperative is hard to resist. It gains support from students in search of jobs, businesses in search of trained workers, and educators in search of students" (p. 450). When programmes are not well coordinated with the realities of the workplace, students may be training for non-existent jobs.

Apprenticeship programmes in the USA have not been well developed, in part, due to the egalitarian nature of the society and the attempt to place all students under the same educational umbrella. In line with this tradition there is a single path of secondary education, the comprehensive high school that offers a broad spectrum of vocational and academic subjects. As a result, apprenticeships that for practical purposes deny access to higher education, like the German or Swiss programmes, go against the grain of US culture.

The United States provides a particularly good example of how Western culture affects the development of training programmes. Bellah and his co- authors (1985) characterize US culture as "utilitarian individualism", which provides the internal coherence of American life. This individualism, which is rooted in the structure of US education, contrasts with more collectivist notions that emphasize group orientations. Whereas individualistic behaviours focus more on self and personal goals, collectivistic behaviours are those that emphasize the welfare of the group (Hui and Triandis 1986). Whether

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behaviour is more individualistic or collectivistic depends upon cultural attitudes towards cooperation, competition, and perceptions of self (see Hofstede 1980 and Triandis 1989). Individuals do not act solely in individu- alistic or collectivistic ways, but will manifest degrees of each dependent upon their own personal characteristics, the issue under consideration, and the historical moment in which the culture finds itself (i.e., economic uncertainty, war, etc.). Rather than being mutually exclusive categories, individualistic and collectivistic orientations might be thought of as degrees of emphasis in behaviour subject to individual, cultural and environmental conditions.

Although Bellah et al. (1985: 142) state that "individualism lies at the very core of American culture", because the USA is such a diverse country, its citizens exhibit varying degrees of individualism and collectivism on the basis of their gender, age, race, ethnicity, and personality. In contrast to Bellah's characterization of US culture as individualistic, traditional African culture is often considered collectivistic (UNESCO 1982: 9-10):

African society is profoundly marked by the distinction between the generations and by intergeneration relations. Age-classes are a phenomenon almost univer- sally found, which has a profound effect upon the life of all societies. Thus, everybody, whether male or female is from childhood days a member of a group, in which he or she will traverse the various stages of social life until death.

Contemporary culture is mediating, however, the idealistic notions of collectivistic behaviours in Africa. As African countries and their citizens seek to compete in the capitalist world market, individual entrepreneurship and formal education are given a greater premium. How to balance competition and cooperation and individualistic and collectivistic behaviours is particu- larly relevant within African education as formal schooling replaces the traditional, non-formal training with the collective. To understand what specific cultural mechanisms contribute to this imbalance in schooling and to the failure of many training programmes in Africa, it is helpful to identify first what aspects within Western culture provide the character for the training systems that developing countries borrow.

Training programmes in Africa: which model?

To assess the value of training programmes in Africa and the viability of a planned, government-sponsored system, we consider cultural traditions and how these traditions affect the current economic, social, and educational climate. We follow Yin's (1989) guidelines for case-study research by inves- tigating the phenomenon under consideration (apprentice programmes) in its real-life context from data gathered from International Labour Office projects in Africa.

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Formal vocational Jraining reaches very few

"According to a study of the urban informal sector in French-speaking Africa, 84 per cent of small employers learned their trade through traditional appren- ticeship" (Bas 1989:3). Assuming this percentage to be similar in C6te d'Ivoire, it is surprising then to find that only 1.28 per cent of "manpower in the modern sector" are registered apprentices in accordance with formal legal requirements (Bas 1989: 7). Certainly, the discrepancy is great between the economic realities for those who enrol in apprenticeship programmes and the actual educational policy and planning of the government in C6te d'Ivoire, as it is throughout much of Africa.

Attempts to implement formal and organised apprentice programmes in Africa have largely been unsuccessful at the end of the programme or upon termination of funding from outside agencies. But more serious than the failure of the programmes themselves is the lack of participants. The official programmes remain underutilised from the outset, whether they are ultimately successful or not.

Formal vocational training accounts for a little more than one per cent of the enrolled children in Mauritania and 2.4 per cent of those enrolled in C6te d'Ivoire. A World Bank Policy Study (1988) shows a breakdown per type of secondary education in 39 African countries of 91 per cent of pupils in general education and only six per cent in technical secondary education. Among the eight countries ranking first in percentage trained (from 26 per cent in Rwanda and 23 per cent in Cameroon to 10 per cent in Mozambique and in the Congo), we find three of them that are former German colonies and four that are socialist countries. We see here the strong influence of German employers on training, as well as the typical traditions of socialist countries.

Dual system: West Africa's minuscule results

As far as formal apprenticeship is concerned, i.e., apprenticeship with a written contract fulfilling all legal requirements, the figures are rather bleak in West Africa. In Burkina Faso, for example, only 61 apprenticeship contracts were registered between 1978 and 1980, and 86 between 1980-82. In Mali, 28 contracts were registered between 1975 and 1978 and 28 between 1980 and 1983. In C6te d'Ivoire there were 628 registered apprentices out of 208,500 wage earners. On the other hand, informal apprenticeship is still the best way to learn a trade in Africa, at least from a quantitative standpoint. The 1987 census in Conakry, Guinea showed a figure of 25,000 informal apprentices. Literally, we speak of dozens of formal apprentices but thousands of informal apprentices.

Although not extending the apprenticeship model as far as the dual system of Germany, many African countries nonetheless try to harmonise modern legislative mandates with traditional concepts. In C6te d'Ivoire in 1977 the National Office of Vocational Training promoted a new monitoring of appren-

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ticeships: a body of advisers visited workshops at least twice a month and provided apprentices with theoretical courses. Between 1978 and 1985 the number of young people who benefited from this support went from 50 to 284. In 1985, 165 enterprises were visited by the advisers. Although inter- esting, this trend is still a very marginal phenomenon reaching only the modern sector in the capital, Abidjan.

In Togo, the 83/20 law has gone further in the dual system concept. The CRFP (Regional Centres for Professional Development) have been created to provide apprentices with theoretical training to complement their on-the- job experiences. The mix between classroom and worksite training is deter- mined through consultation with the professional in the specific training area. Generally, during the first year the apprentice spends three quarters of the time with the employer and one quarter at the training centre. This mix varies in the second year according to the degree of complexity of the training. For example, the time spent in the training centre is 25 per cent in auto mechanics and one-third for electricity. A Board of apprenticeship counselors tries to bridge the gap between education in the centres and training in the workshop. Such activities include follow-up visits to the worksite, suggestions of projects to be done by the apprentices in the workshop, creation of teaching and assessment documents for the masters, and "shuttle report cards", circulating between the centre and the worksites.

The pedagogical relations between the centres and the worksites have had some problems, however. Material constraints (fuel and vehicles) have limited the visits to the sites. Cultural constraints have also not been completely eliminated; the trainers are often seen as nuisances by employers and there is inherent conflict over authority. To whom does the apprentice listen? Is the apprentice's allegiance to the master or to the government trainer? Weaknesses and limitations of the employer's knowledge are yet a further source of conflict between the employer and the trainer and may hinder the progress of the apprentice.

Quantitatively, 600 apprentices passed through the centre in Lom6 between 1979 and 1984. The second centre was opened in the interior (Kara) in 1983. The development of these centres and the number of students educated has a considerable impact on Togolese education, but what are the prospects for the future? Only newly created, the system very quickly slipped toward a classic educational model. It is difficult to develop a dual system where the language of the training centre is French or English and the language of the workshop is a dialect or a local vernacular and where master artisans have a low level of theoretical and pedagogical knowledge. With the high pressure from the number of high-school dropouts, the trend of the centres has been to recruit young students who are literate, but poorly motivated, instead of young apprentices with low levels of literacy who are highly motivated. Hence the centres tend to drop the alternative model of education and focus, instead, on classic training preparing students for official examinations within a rigid curriculum.

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Economic and cultural explanations for failures and successes

Entrepreneurs, small or big, operate for profit and under short-run pressures, particularly in poor, less organised, and less predictable societies. Their decision to deploy this or that type of labour is an economic decision, even though it may be framed by cultural dimensions. Germanic countries operate with very high labour costs. Hiring an apprentice entails the obligation to teach a certain number of tasks and fulfil strict regulations. But it also means procuring labour that is a lot less expensive. Many employers are motivated to hire apprentices because of lower wages: apprentices may earn less than half of what a regular worker would earn, particularly in their initial years. In fact, some employers hire more apprentices than they can keep and then get rid of them as soon as they finish their apprenticeship and would start earning regular wages.

Employers in Western Europe do seem to take apprentices even during economic slumps, out of a certain sense of citizenship or obligation. But, in Germany, employers are also afraid of legislation that might be passed if apprenticeship falls below a certain level. The overall opinion among observers of the training scene in Germanic countries is that taking appren- tices is not bad business. Certainly, for some it is very sound policy from an economic point of view. The alternatives or negative consequences to taking apprentices as relatively unskilled labour are not that encouraging for employers.

The effects of community orientation

In Africa and in other regions of abundant labour, taking apprentices is a decision framed by somewhat different circumstances. Abundant labour means that adults, to whom no training obligations exist, can be easily found in the local markets. Therefore, the decision to take an apprentice is one of deciding among several inexpensive and available sources of labour. To the extent that governments try to increase the learning that takes place or try to regulate earnings, it may be driving up the costs of hiring apprentices, while the alternative costs of hiring adult workers remains constant.

The motivation for government legislation is not always directly related to training. Child labour practices are another important source of legislation that tries to protect young workers from abuse and exploitation. But the situation is such that whatever the motivation, anything that increases the costs or reduces the amount of labour that can be extracted out of a worker - young or old - increases its cost to the employer. The ridiculously low numbers of apprentices legally registered in African countries are the direct result of minors not being competitive with adults in the labour market. There is no wage differential that would compensate for the extra trouble for employers of training and fulfilling all the formal requirements for apprentices.

This last point perhaps needs some clarification. A small firm has as one

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of its most serious bottlenecks the availability of management time. The owner and a small staff perform a large variety of tasks and have to face a hostile environment that drains all the time they have. Taking care of an apprentice, with the additional red tape and the legal obligations this involves, is one more difficulty they do not need. The economic incentives to take on an appren- tice in Africa are not sufficient under the European-inspired labour laws that protect minors or regulate apprenticeship. Taking on apprentices is just not good business.

In Africa the traditional educational system fosters a collective and lifelong apprenticeship system in which "big brothers" in the subsequent age group help initiate their juniors into successive stages of development. For example, in many tribes circumcision at seven or eight years of age marks entrance into the "clan of men". The young initiates are isolated in a dormitory where they get to know one another. In this group atmosphere the youngsters are taught "virile" activities, such as archery or hunting. They band together to gain courage and try to keep from crying, so as not to look ridiculous in the eyes of the community. The circumcisions are performed by a senior member of the tribe, but he is assisted by the big brothers of the next age group.

This traditional initiation of the younger children by the older ones is found in Mali as well, where young men who are 17 or 18 are initiated into adult- hood with the presentation of a sabre and a grand feast. The young people of the next, older, age group participate in these initiation rites by assisting the younger age group. Marriage also brings the age groups together, with the older age group assisting in the marriage negotiation. The bride is symboli- cally kidnapped and hidden from her fianc6, and the friends of the young husband are in charge of finding her. Such traditions even include initiation into magic rites, again with help from the older age group. As another example, at the end of the harvest the Songhai organise battles by age groups and if a youngster tackles and pins another older youngster to the ground he moves up a class.

Such cultural traditions indicate the importance of the links that unite the youth in Africa with each other and with the next older age group, from whom they learn. This spirit of growing up together is a strong cultural heritage that binds individuals who have gone through ceremonies, initiations, and training together. Not only are the youth united, but the whole community recognises the bonds that tie the age groups together. In fact there is a certain complicity within the community; if a school master, master artisan, or the friend of someone's father corrects the child, the adult will always be supported by the father. "The idea of education, which in the African tradi- tion cannot be separated from that of training, is part of a global perception of society - as is the idea of work" (UNESCO 1982: 11).

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The return to traditional apprenticeship

Cultural traditions remain strong in rural areas and small communities, but with increased urbanisation, such supervision and control is not always possible. Apprenticeships still rely, however, on agreements between the artisan and the parents and endow the master artisan with parental expecta- tions and privileges concerning the child. Even modern laws, like the Togolese Law 80/20, maintain the master artisan-apprentice traditions. Article 8 of the law states that the master must treat the apprentice as would a good father of the family, must act like a father, and must without delay warn the parents of the child's condition in case of illness, absence, or any other act (of nature) that should require their intervention. Traditionally, parents do not pay the artisan with whom they place their child, but they give the apprentice master a gift based on their means.

Traditional approaches of payment to the master artisan are still quite evident, however, in the most modern laws. The Togolese Law, 83/20, spec- ifies that the cost of the entrance, graduation, or promotion ceremonies are the obligation of the parents. Further, the law stipulates that the apprentice's family is to pay for the ceremonies, so long as they do not exceed a given amount. Because of subsequent difficulties in application of the law, in 1987 the Conseil Sup~rieur de la Formation Professionnelle specified quite detailed amounts allowable for the ceremonies.

Given the importance of ceremonies and initiation rites for the passage of youths into adulthood, it is easy to understand the importance placed on collective ceremonies of entrance into apprenticeship and of graduation from the apprenticeship. Even more than a certificate or diploma given on an individual basis, it is the ceremony that signifies the recognition on the part of the community of the passage of the youth from one stage to the next. In Ibadan, Nigeria "freedom ceremonies" or graduation activities along with certificates and photographs of the ceremonies underscore the importance of public recognition. Such documentation is a veritable entry visa for self- employment in the informal sector in Nigeria.

Because of recent urbanisation and economic difficulties throughout Africa, parents are increasingly paying the master artisans directly for their services. Similarly, various problems arise concerning the traditional apprenticeship system. Many trainers in the centres only speak the colonial language and are unable to communicate effectively with the master artisan. They some- times do not respect the social relationships between master and apprentices, which go far beyond the simple transmission of skills and knowledge.

Not only has the relationship between master and apprentice changed in more recent times, but so has the relationship of the educational and govern- ment bureaucracy to the cultural traditions of the apprentices. For example, what do the official certificates and diplomas handed out by government officials have to do with the rich traditions of the passage of youths from one age class to the next? Bureaucratically, it is necessary to have a certifi-

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cate. Individuals want them, but the certificates do not have the sanction of the community and do not replace the cultural needs for ceremony and community acceptance. Culturally, the African traditions do not allow people to distinguish themselves as individuals, because everyone is equal. Getting a certificate with honours conflicts with the collective traditions of the culture. The concept of an individual certificate or award does not inherently fit the collectivist aspects of African culture. Traditions do not always coincide with the awarding of a certificate.

Within a predominantly collectivist culture, when an individual sticks out of the crowd, the tendency is to make that person return to the ranks. At the individual level, youths are not necessarily encouraged to seek new ways or new knowledge that would set them apart as examples of innovation rather than tradition. The present model of African development, therefore, finds itself in conflict with traditional collectivist notions. For example, the simple master-apprentice relationship has become complicated with the division of labour, expected by modern corporations and the Western world.

The efficiency of industrialisation and high technology that requires a division of labour in turn demands an educational system that stresses own- ership of specialised knowledge at an individual level rather than a collec- tive one. The imported models of technology and of education have basically been thrown into Africa without the forethought to understand and adapt these systems and make them relevant to the existing culture. The educational system borrowed from the West is based on certification by diploma to permit entry into employment. This decidedly Western and white concept that links education to employment through certification has been accepted officially by numerous African countries, but crises in structural and cultural adjustments persist. There is still a mismatch between cultural traditions and individual certification of knowledge acquisition. Parents today, unfortunately, do not understand that their children, having abandoned rural work for general schooling, are not guaranteed work in the modern sector. For many children, leaving the village to attend school condemns them to be urban workers, regardless of the work that they will actually do. A child cannot return to the village because to do so would admit educational failure. To succeed is to be employed in the urban centre, which is in conflict with cultural traditions of involvement of big brothers and the community in a child's development.

The existing situation of training and schooling in Africa indicates, on the one hand, the success of traditional apprenticeships that is deeply rooted in local culture, but it also points to the difficulty of establishing a bridge to the Western model of schooling within the traditional culture.

Whatever one does to improve traditional apprenticeship, the end result is usually to make it more complicated and less interesting for the employer (at least in the short run). Regardless of the good intentions of formal pro- grammes, the effort to protect the worker has the inevitable tendency to reduce demand (or to increase the incentive to operate outside the law). The result is not so much protection for minors as it is a significant disincentive to taking

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on apprentices. One of the reasons that traditional, informal apprentices enrol by the millions in Africa and that formal apprenticeship accounts for only a few hundred is that the traditional system makes economic sense. Protecting this incentive should be the most sacrosanct policy.

So all is well that ends well in Africa? - Not quite

The informal apprenticeship system is helpful and fills a useful function in most African societies; however, there is a need to modernise technology, theory and the capacity for abstraction among students. For example, even simple industrial products cannot be built without someone understanding mathematics. The existing state of conceptual knowledge among master artisans is therefore quite discouraging, since few have such levels of tech- nological ability. Studies in the C6te d'Ivoire indicate that 46 per cent of apprentices are placed in enterprises in which the boss or master artisan has had no formal training (Bas 1989). Similarly, 84 per cent of the apprentices are trained under managers who have had only six years of primary educa- tion.

Since the traditional culture clashes with modern school systems and advanced technology in the workplace, what then are some options for appren- ticeship training in Africa?

Train the apprentice masters to become better trainers

This is currently the case in Algeria where the National Institute for the Development of Industrial Training (INDEFE) trains the masters and provides assistance with their teaching. This is also the case in Senegal and in other parts of Africa.

Pay the masters to offer something else to their apprentices

Is it necessary to subsidise the traditional apprenticeship system? Most of the laws on apprenticeship ignore the fact that societies should not expect goodwill and cooperation from the artisans if the current system threatens their very livelihood. If a country's educators want to reinforce the existing system they have to finance it by compensating the artisans for any supple- mentary costs imposed on them by governmental regulations. If the costs of training an apprentice are higher than the revenues the artisan is going to generate by taking on an apprentice, artisans will simply stop hiring appren- tices.

When we consider that the instructional system is subsidised in part by the artisans, it is unjust to let them bear alone the cost and the burden of professional training. For example, the National Office of Vocational Training in Nigeria pays a substantial amount per student to support training. In

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Yaounde, Demol (Cameroon) little more than half of the artisans have appren- tices and they spend approximately 10 per cent of their time training them. By calculating the average income of the artisans, it would be a rather simple procedure to determine what would be a fair payment for the artisan to train an apprentice. Further, supposing a government wanted artisans to devote another 10 per cent of their time to training in order to improve the quality of training and to make it more systematic, artisans could then legitimately expect that these extra hours would be reimbursed at a price at least equal to their regular work revenue. Even by multiplying this amount by a reported average of 2.5 apprentices per artisan, the cost per student would still be considerably cheaper than educating a student in one of the training centres.

Subsidies for a master artisan should be very selective and should corre- spond to a controllable improvement in the teaching they provide apprentices. Such subsidies should be granted only on condition that the artisans perfect their vocational training techniques and undergo quality control of the training they give their apprentices. Artisans working in the modern sector would make up a substantial contingent of those masters receiving subsidies. Parents of apprentices would quickly seek out those masters most closely associated with work in the modern sector of the economy, because children trained under these masters would appear to have the best guarantee of employment. The subsidies themselves could take the form of cash payments or the provision of raw materials to the artisans at a discounted price. Subsidies could also include pocket money for the apprentices as well.

License the apprentice masters

The evolution of training programmes can lead to many of the new entre- preneurs being licensed in areas within the modern sector. At the same time that apprentices themselves are improving in their level of education and knowledge, they and their parents are demanding increased knowledge from their trainers, which is pressuring the masters to improve. For example, in Nigeria an increasing number of youths are completing their secondary education (31 per cent in 1989 compared to 4 per cent in 1977). In certain training areas of Nigeria, such as furniture making and tailoring, the revenues the artisans obtain from taking on apprentices are becoming higher than those from the business itself. Such workshops have become virtual training institutions in themselves. The corollary of this situation should be a strong motivation of a professionalisation of this very remunerative part of the artisan's activities.

Introduce new skills and concepts

The lack of theory and conceptualisation in the traditional apprenticeship programmes hinders further evolution. Current models and theories of appren- ticeship programmes in Africa are shallow, and based on verbal skills with

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no reading, writing, or mathematics - nothing beyond oral culture. As a result, programmes transmit the technology and practices that are already current and ingrained in the economy. What is needed, therefore, is to bring in appropriate new knowledge and skills that are relevant to the existing culture and adapt- able to the prevailing educational and economic climate. What is needed is a blend of the old and legitimate system with modern extensions - the essence of the dual system. This can best be accomplished through adding course work to the existing procedures and, as discussed above, both by paying the master artisans to offer something else to the apprentices and training the masters to become better trainers.

Conclusion

"All countries are faced with the formidable problem of introducing educa- tion and training policies that will buttress their development policies" (UNESCO 1982: 53). We have explored here the promise of apprenticeship programs to "buttress" Africa's development policies in dealing with the problems of youth, education, and employment. In seeking a better grasp of the economic and cultural underpinnings of apprenticeship programmes, we have reviewed some of the defects and advantages of the existing system. From our consideration of alternative models, we gain a better understanding of the effects of old apprenticeship programmes disguised in new wrappings. As we have noted, preliminary findings from C6te d'Ivoire do seem encour- aging because, like many other African countries, most skilled workers in that country learn their occupation in a "vernacular" apprenticeship. These apprentices start working with experienced artisans and progressively climb the ladder of occupational proficiency. The current apprenticeship system is imperfect - like it was in Germany one century ago - with the conceptual learning shallow, if at all existent. There may be abuse and exploitation, but it has indisputable merit since it caters to millions, not just hundreds of individuals.'As Dehnbostel and Rau (1986: 150) report, "It is indisputable that the dual system of vocational education has a number of advantages. Compared with other countries and other training systems, it provides a successful transfer into working life for a relatively great number of young people". How well the German system can be adapted to the evolving devel- opment needs of Africa is, of course, quite problematic.

Apprentice programmes can potentially link traditional culture with the emerging developmental needs of African economies. Carefully designed programmes can integrate modern theory with daily practice in the commu- nity, so long as they are sensitive to the existing culture. Such sensitivity requires awareness of the mechanisms that affected most the ability of models borrowed from other cultures to be effectively transplanted. Regardless of cultural differences, the necessity of societies to effectively address the education and employment needs of the young are similar, given the global

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influence on local markets. All countries must consider how education con- tributes to economic development and employment, what types of learning and training best facilitate this contribution, and "what social costs result from selective forms of education" (Plunkett 1986: 14).

We have identified here five major issues that help explain why pro- grammes borrowed from the West are so ineffective in Africa:

- F i r s t , Western conceptions of individualism conflict with the traditional collectivist ideology predominant in most African cultures.

- S e c o n d , Western models of education focus on individual success and foster individual ownership of knowledge, which again clashes with the com- munity conception of traditional African culture.

- T h i r d , individual success is rewarded in Western societies with certifica- tions of tacit competencies, as opposed to the community rewards for social development of traditional African cultures.

- F o u r t h , for purposes of industrial efficiency, Western cultures operate on the basis of a strict division of labour. Such division in the workplace can lead to extremes in training for skill-specific work, but the dual system model of Germany offers a solution to help overcome the narrowness of such training.

- F i f t h , as technology continues to advance rapidly, the most developed societies are becoming knowledge-based rather than skill-based. Even though most new jobs in the USA, for example, appear to be in the service sector, those individuals who acquire knowledge through training rather than skills will be able to adapt most readily to changes in the workforce. Similarly, training programmes for Africa should develop the whole indi- vidual rather than only an individual's technical skills.

Our comparative review enables us to conclude tentatively that good ideas require considerable adaptation to work in a different cultural milieu, rather than the wholesale import of European solutions inappropriate for African tra- ditions. Successful imports are those that follow local proclivities and improve on them, rather than replace them. Local conditions, attitudes and values have to be taken into account to avoid head-on collisions with mores and habits. Certainly, the most promising experiments are those that try to improve the educational system incrementally. Going against the cultural grain is too risky.

Note

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Boston Massachusetts, April 1990. Opinions expressed in this paper do not represent official views of The World Bank or International Labour Office.

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