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Republic of the Philippines COURT OF APPEALS Manila TAGUMPAY DELOS REYES, RUTH DELOS REYES, MIRIAM DELOS REYES, MOSES DELOS REYES, EDWARD DELOS REYES, Petitioner-Appellant, -- versus -- FEDERICO MARIANO & SPOUSES CARLOS RIVERA & ANGELINA RIVERA, Respondents-Appellees. x --------------------------------- -------------- x CA-G.R. CV No. 94- 70450 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT Petitioners-appellants TAGUMAPY DELOS REYES, RUTH DELOS REYES, MIRIAM DELOS REYES, MOSES DELOS REYES AND EDWARD DELOS REYES., by undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court, respectfully submit the following Brief: 1. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING AS VALID THE SALE BY AND BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS

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Republic of the PhilippinesCOURT OF APPEALS

Manila

TAGUMPAY DELOS REYES, RUTH DELOSREYES, MIRIAM DELOS REYES, MOSESDELOS REYES, EDWARD DELOS REYES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

-- versus --

FEDERICO MARIANO & SPOUSES CARLOSRIVERA & ANGELINA RIVERA,

Respondents-Appellees.x----------------------------------------------- x

CA-G.R. CV No. 94-70450

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Petitioners-appellants TAGUMAPY DELOS REYES, RUTH DELOS

REYES, MIRIAM DELOS REYES, MOSES DELOS REYES AND EDWARD

DELOS REYES., by undersigned counsel, to this Honorable

Court, respectfully submit the following Brief:

1. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING AS VALID

THE SALE BY AND BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS

2

DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1994, AS EVIDENCED BY

A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE1 AND IN IN

REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE AND DECLARE THAT

THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS POSSES

THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL OVER THE

PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT

CONTROVERSY, CONSIDERING THAT:

1. THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFFS-

APPELLANTS TO BE INFORMED AND

THEREAFTER OFFERED THE SALE OF THE

LEASED PROPERTY AS MANDATED UNDER THE

LAW WAS NOT OBSERVED BY THE

DEFENDANTS.

2. THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN

CONTROVERSY WAS DONE WITH MALISCIOUS

INTENT TO CONTROVERT THE CLEAR

PROVISIONS OF THE LAW GOVERNING SALES

AND LEASE AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE

CIVIL CODE.

1 Annex A

3

3. THE LESSOR AND THE BUYERS CANNOT

EXPLOIT THE “RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

CLAUSE” AS A VEHICLE TO DEPRIVE THE

HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS OF THEIR

RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER THE LAW.

1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. This is an appeal from the Decision2 of Branch 1 of the

Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial

Region declaring valid the sale of the leased property

by defendant Federico Mariano to defendant spouses

Carlos and Angelina Rivera.

A certified copy of the Decision of Branch 1 of the

Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region

is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex

“B”.

1.1. The plaintiffs-appellants filed a petition3 for

the “Declaration of Nullity of Sale and/or Annulment of

Sale, Reconveyance of Real Property, and Damages with

Injunction, Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary

Restraining Order” raffled to Branch 1 Regional Trial Court

of the National Capital Judicial Region.2 Annex “B” hereof; Records, pp. 339-344.3 Annex “C” hereof; Records, pp. 5-17.

4

1.2. In its Petition, petitioners-appellants asserted

that they are the legitimate tenants under a contract of

lease of a parcel of land and residential house situated at

the Pasig Line Street near Manila corner 2015 Mabuhay

Street, District of Sta. Ana, Manila, formerly owned by

spouses Exequiel Mariano and Salud Mariano since April,

1980; that they have been continuously and religiously

paying rentals since aforesaid date up to the present, with

a starting rental fee of FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (PhP 400.00.00)

per month.

1.3. That the plaintiffs-appellants have been

religiously and faithfully paying the rentals of the

aforementioned leased property since April 1980 up to the

present; That since August, 1984, the plaintiffs-appellants

have started paying the rentals to defendant Mariano’s

caretaker of the property, who also resided in the same

premises.

1.4. That the ownership of the aforementioned leased

property was transferred to defendant Federico Mariano, one

of the children of the spouses Exequiel and Salud Mariano.

1.5. That later on, the plaintiffs-appellants have

learned that the leased property was subsequently sold by

defendant Federico Mariano to defendant spouses Carlos and

5

Angelina Rivera as per Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated February

4, 1994.

1.6. That said real property, is now transferred and

registered in the names of said defendant spouses Rivera

under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2146655 issued and

recorded by the Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila,

copy attached herein and made integral part of the records.

1.7. That the subject property of this present

controversy is within the areas for priority development and

urban land reform zones.

1.8. That the defendant Federico Mariano sold the said

real property to defendant spouses Carlos and Angelina

Rivera without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, and without

first making the proposal to sell said property to the

plaintiffs thereby depriving them their right of first

refusal to buy said property as required and provided for

under existing laws; thus the said sale having been made

against the prohibitions of mandatory and prohibitory laws,

or with an unlawful cause, the same is null and void from

inception.

1.9. That in the morning of May 6, 1994, defendant

Carlos Rivera’s Engineer, carpenters and men came to the

property subject of this case and demanded the plaintiffs to4 Annex “A”; Records, pp. 1-6.5 Annex “D”; Records, pp. 1-2.

6

vacate the premises because of allegedly some repairs to be

made by the present owner; That against the will and protest

of the plaintiffs-appellants, defendant Rivera’s men removed

the roofs and some portions of the house.

1.10. That the plaintiffs-appellants demanded from the

defendant’s men to show a court order to eject them from the

lease property, but they could not show any such court

order; Later defendant Rivera’s Engineer and men left the

premises with the threat that they will return to finish the

job and told the plaintiffs they better vacate the premises

soon.

1.11. That plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs

demanded and the whole or part of such reliefs consist in

restraining the commission or continuance of the acts

complaint of, i.e., the aforementioned acts of harassments

and the pretended repair of the premises committed, being

committed or to be committed by the defendant spouses Carlos

and Angelina Rivera upon the plaintiffs; or in the

performance of the act or acts, either for limited period or

perpetually.

1.12. That the commission of continuance of some act

complained of during the litigation aforecited would

probably work injustice to the plaintiffs.

7

1.13. That the defendants spouses Carlos and Angelina

Rivera and/or their Engineer, carpenters, workers and other

persons acting for and in their behalf are doing, threaten,

or are about to do and are procuring or suffering to be

done, some acts probably in violation of the plaintiff’s

rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to

render the judgment ineffectual.

1.14. That great and irreparable injury and damages

would result to the herein plaintiffs-applicants if the

preliminary injunction and/or the temporary restraining

order herein applied for is not granted before the matter is

heard on notice.

1.15. That the plaintiffs-appellants prayed among others

that the Deed of Sale (Annex A) hereof executed by defendant

Federico Mariano in favor Angelina Rivera over the above-

described parcel of land be declared Void ab initio”; That

the defendants be ordered to reconvey the subject property

of this controversy to the herein plaintiffs-appellants.

1.16. That the court issued the temporary restraining

order prayed for;

1.17. That during the hearing for the preliminary

injunction, the parties filed a joint motion (p. 171,

Records.) praying for the deferment of the hearing on the

8

injunction; The court granted the motion for the deferment

of said injunction hearing.

1.18. As respondents-appellees admitted all the

documents presented and marked during pre-trial, petitioner-

appellant dispensed with the presentation of witnesses. The

following exhibits were stipulated on by the parties and

admitted by the court a quo:

Petitioner’

s

Exhibits

Description Respondents’

Exhibits

Deed of Absolute Sale

Transfer Certificate of Title

“A”

“D”

“A” Deed of Absolute Sale dated

February 4, 1994

“1”

“B” Decision of Branch 1 of the

Regional Trial Court of the

National Capital Judicial Region

“C” Petition for the “Declaration of

9

Nullity of Sale and/or Annulment

of Sale, Reconveyance of Real

Property, and Damages with

Injunction, Preliminary

Injunction and Prayer for

Temporary Restraining Order

1.19. Similarly, respondents-appellees no longer

presented witnesses, having common documentary exhibits as

petitioner-appellant, as stated above.

1.20. The parties then filed their respective

Memoranda6. On February 21, 2013, the court a quo rendered

the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which

reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants

ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs

moral damages in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS (PhP 100,000.00), and exemplary damages in

the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 50,000.00).

The complaint is dismissed in all other respect.”

6 Petitioner’s Memorandum dated September 26, 2010, Records, pp. 288-308; Respondents’ Memorandum dated October 10, 2010, Records, pp. 331-337.

10

1.21. Aggrieved, petitioner-appellant filed a Notice of

Appeal7 on March 13, 2013, which was given due course by the

court a quo in an Order dated April 17, 20138;

1.22. On August 2, 2013, petitioner-appellant received

the Notice from the Honorable Court requiring it to file its

appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt

thereof, or until September 16, 2013. Hence, this

Appellant’’s Brief was timely filed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2. Petitioners-appellants TAGUMPAY DELOS REYES, RUTH DELOS

REYES, MIRIAM DELOS REYES, MOSES DELOS REYES AND EDWARD

DELOS REYES are private persons and are the legitimate

lessees/tenants of a parcel of land and a residential

house situated at the Pasig Line Street near Manila

corner 2015 Mabuhay Street, District of Sta. Ana, Manila;

2.1. Respondents-appellees FEDERICO MARIANO, is a private

person, transferee-owner of the above-described real

property, and, SPOUSES CARLOS RIVERA AND ANGELINA

RIVERA, are private persons, herein buyer of the same

property involved in this case.7 Records, pp. 349-350.8 Records, p. 357.

11

2.2. The father of the herein plaintiff-appellant Tagumpay

Delos Reyes and one Exequiel Mariano, entered into a

contract of lease of the premises of Angeline Street

corner 2015 Sanches Street., Sta. Ana Manila, for a

period of one year, from April 15, 1980 for a monthly

rental of FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (PhP 400.00).9

2.3. The said contract of lease had expired after one

year, and was not formally renewed. But the plaintiffs

remained in the premises paying monthly rentals as

shown by “Exhibit F”10 All these receipts were signed

by certain Oladoc who is claimed by the herein

plaintiff-appellant to be the caretaker of the former

owner, Mariano.

2.4. On February 4, 1994, the premises being rented by the

plaintiffs was sold in favor of herein defendants-

appellees spouses Carlos Rivera and Angelina Rivera.

By virtue of said sale, a Transfer Certificate of

Title was issued in favor of the Rivera Spouses.

9 Annex “E” hereof.10 Annex “F” hereof; “F-12”.

12

2.5. The Riveras knew at the time of the sale that the

Delos Reyes family were the tenants of the property,

as well as the fact of the expiration of their lease

contract.

2.6. In a letter11 dated April 10, 1995, the Riveras

through their counsel demanded from the Delos Reyeses

payment of rentals at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS

(Php 500.00) from February 4, 1994. By virtue of said

demand, the Delos Reyeses paid by means of a cashier’s

check12 covering the period of February 4, 1995 to

April 4, 1995. As for the period of May 1995 and the

subsequent months in 1995, another cashier’s check13

was tendered. Said checks were never encashed.

2.7. Through the request of defendant-appellee Carlos

Rivera, Dante Sunga obtained a necessary permit14 for

repair from the city hall of Manila.

2.8. On May 6, 1994, Sunga with some 25 men went to the

house to repair the same. The occupants resisted but

Sunga and his company nevertheless started removing

11 Annex “G”12 Annex “H”13 Annex “I”14 Annex “J”

13

the roof. The herein plaintiff-appellants demanded to

show any authorization duly issued by competent

officers permitting them to demolish the house. Sunga

and his companions failed to show any permit except

for the repair permit issued to them by the City Hall.

By reason of said resistance and demand, Sunga and his

company stopped the demolition.

2.9. On May 10, 1995, Carlos Rivera, Dante Sunga and some

20-30 persons together with some policemen in civilian

attire went back to the property and started removing

the roof and cutting the electrical connection of the

house. This was reported to the police and was entered

in a police blotter of Precinct 6. A certain occupant

of the second floor also reported the same incident to

the People’s Journal.

2.10. By the time the men came back around after lunch

of May 10, 1994, certain representatives from People’s

Journal were also in the premises. The people from

People’s Journal asked for a court order but what was

shown to the, as a repair permit. The people from

People’s Journal told Sunga and company that what they

are doing is prohibited by law. Sunga and his men

left.

14

2.11. While the incident in question was going on,

photographs15 of what transcribed were taken. These

exhibits show the following:

Petitioner’

s

Exhibits

Description Respondents’

Exhibits

“J” Shown the ladder and the men

climbing. The men were

positively identified as Rivera

and Sunga

“J-1” Men who climbed the roof “1”

“J-2” Photos of the policemen present

in the premises

“J-3” to

“J-5”

men of Rivera and Sunga removing

the roofings

“J-6” The pieces of G.I. sheets and

woods removed from the house

“J-7” Shows the finished work of

removing the roof

15 Annex “J” to “J-12”

15

“J-8” The pieces of removed materials

placed on the ground

“J-9” The cut electrical connection

“J-10” Showing the roofing completely

removed

“J-12” Showing two persons, policeman

inspector Perez and Sunga. The

policeman Perez was shown in a

civilian attire with a gun

tucked in his waist.

2.12. The plaintiffs-appellants filed a petition16 for

the “Declaration of Nullity of Sale and/or Annulment

of Sale, Reconveyance of Real Property, and Damages

with Injunction, Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for

Temporary Restraining Order” raffled to Branch 1

Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial

Region.

1.1. On February 21, 2013, the court a quo rendered the

assailed Decision rendering herein defendant-appellee

liable to the Delos Reyeses payment of moral damages

16 Annex “C” hereof; Records, pp. 5-17.

16

in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP

100,000.00) as well as exemplary damages in the sum of

FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 50,000.00). The court a quo

likewise recognized the validity and legality of the

Sale of the subject property to Spouses Rivera.

Finally, the respected court declared as non-existent

the right of first refusal of the herein plaintiffs-

appellants.

Hence, this appeal.

3. ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING AS VALID

THE SALE BY AND BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS

DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1994, AS EVIDENCED BY

A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE17 AND IN

REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE AND DECLARE THAT

THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS POSSES

THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL OVER THE

17 Annex A

17

PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT

CONTROVERSY.

The right of the plaintiffs-appellants to be informed and

thereafter offered to buy the leased property as mandated

under the law was not observed by the defendants, HENCE, the

sale of the leased property to Spouses Rivera is VOID AB INITIO

------------------------------------------------------

In its Decision, the court a quo held that the

contention of the plaintiffs that they are entitled to the

right of first refusal is not tenable and without merit

because plaintiffs are lessees of the house involved in the

controversy and as such, they don’t have any such right or

privilege.

While the lessor-lessee relationship between the

defendant Mariano and herein plaintiff-appellants Delos

Reyes is never questioned, under our present Civil Code, it

is provided for, that:

Art. 1485. The preceding article shall be applied to

contracts purporting to be leases of personal

property with option to buy, when the lessor has

deprived the lessee of the possession or enjoyment of

the thing.

18

Clearly, our present laws recognize that, by express

grant in a contract of lease, the lessee enjoys the right to

be first offered to buy the leased property before the

owner-lessor can legally effect sale to a third person. The

contract of lease entered into between herein defendant-

appellee and plaintiff-appellant clearly provided for an

“option to buy” clause.

Even assuming argumendo, that the prevailing contract

of lease did not clearly stated nor recognize that the right

of first refusal is granted to the tenants, P.D. No. 1517,

in referring to the pre-emptive or redemptive right of a

lease, speaks of urban land under lease on which a tenant

has built his home and in which he has resided for ten years

or more.

In the case of Estate of Orlando Llenado and Wenifreda T. Llenado

vs. Llenado, the Supreme Court said:

Heirs are bound by the contracts entered into by

their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights

and obligations therein are not transmissible by their

nature, by stipulation or by provision of law; A

contract of lease is generally transmissible to the

heirs of the lessor or lessee—it involves a property

right and, as such, the death of a party does not

19

excuse non-performance of the contract; As a

general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not

personal but will run with the land.

Further, in the case of in Rosencor Development Corporation v.

Inquing (354 SCRA 119 [2001]), it has been held that:

We have previously held that not all agreements

“affecting land” must be put into writing to attain

enforceability. Thus, we have held that the setting

up of boundaries, the oral partition of real

property, and an agreement creating a right of way

are not covered by the provisions of the statute of

frauds. The reason simply is that these agreements

are not among those enumerated in Article 1403 of

the New Civil Code. A right of first refusal is not

among those listed as unenforceable under the

statute of frauds. Furthermore, the application of

Article 1403, par. 2(e) of the New Civil Code

presupposes the existence of a perfected, albeit

unwritten, contract of sale. A right of first refusal,

such as the one involved in the instant case, is not

by any means a perfected contract of sale of real

property. At best, it is a contractual grant, not of

the sale of the real property involved, but of the

20

right of first refusal over the property sought to be

sold.

Considering the above-cited rulings of the Honorable

Court, it is manifest that the purported sale of the leased

property to Spouses Rivera transferred no right of ownership

as the vendor, herein defendant-appellee Federico Mariano,

while being the true and registered owner of the property in

controversy possess no absolute right to effect the sale as

he is bound by the agreement embodied in the Lease Contract

between his father, Exequiel Mariano and the Delos Reyeses.

The plaintiff-appellants are legitimate tenants of the leased

property, the non-renewal of the expired lease

notwithstanding

------------------------------------------------------

Citing Article Art. 1670 of the New Civil Code, it is

provided that:

1. If at the end of the contract the lessee should

continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen

days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and

unless a notice to the contrary by either party

has previously been given, it is understood

that there is an implied new lease, not for the

period of the original contract, but for the

21

time established in Articles 1682 and 1687.

The other terms of the original contract shall

be revived.

In the present case before this honorable Court, it has

been undisputed that the original contract of lease had

expired in April 15, 1981 or one year after it was

perfected, the fact that the tenants remained in the

premises without any objection or demand to evacuate from

the owners, it is clearly the intention of the parties to

renew the lease contract. The fact that the owners have

continuously accepted and issued receipts for each payment

of monthly rental only proves their conformity with the

implied new lease over the property. The defendants cannot

validly claim that they are of no knowledge of the extent of

stay of the tenants in the subject property of this

controversy. It has been established, and in fact

acknowledge by the court a qou that the caretaker of the

Marianos are also living in the premises of the leased

property.

The fact that no new contract was made in the

succeeding years is of no defense to invalidate the

applicability of the time-honored principle of “Implied New

Lease”. Under our New Civil Code:

22

Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been

fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the

rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if

it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;

and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.

However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no

period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix

a longer term for the lease after the lessee has

occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is

weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer

period after the lessee has been in possession for

over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may

also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in

the place for over one month.

Hence, applying the above provision of law in the case

before this Court, it is to be understood that the parties

impliedly renewed their lease agreement on a year to year

basis.

As contemplated by Article 1670 of the Civil Code,

reading:

ART. 1670. If at the end of the contract the

lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for

fithteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and

unless a notice to the contrary by either party has

23

previously been given, it is understood that there is

an implied new lease, not for the period of the

original contract, but for the time established in

articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the

original contract shall be revived.

In the recent case Zosima Inc. v. Salimbagat; G.R. No.

174376. September 12, 2012, the Supreme Court said that an

implied new lease will set in if it is shown that: (1) the

term of the original contract of lease has expired; (2) the

lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and (3)

the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for 15 days

with the acquiescence of the lessor. This acquiescence may

be inferred from the failure of the lessor to serve notice

to vacate upon the lessee. This principle is provided for

under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

The sale of the property in controversy was done with

malicious intent to controvert the clear provisions of the law

governing sales and lease as provided for under the Civil Code.

------------------------------------------------------

The purported sale of the property involved in this

case is a clear and manifest violation of the tenants’

rights as such under the laws. Article 1676 of the New Civil

Code clearly provides that:

24

Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which

is under a lease that is not recorded in the Registry of

Property may terminate the lease, save when there is

a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale,

or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the

lease.

If the buyer makes use of this right, the lessee may

demand that he be allowed to gather the fruits of the

harvest which corresponds to the current

agricultural year and that the vendor indemnify him

for damages suffered.

If the sale is fictitious, for the purpose of

extinguishing the lease, the supposed vendee cannot

make use of the right granted in the first paragraph

of this article. The sale is presumed to be fictitious if

at the time the supposed vendee demands the

termination of the lease, the sale is not recorded in

the Registry of Property.

Herein appellants come within the protection granted by

the law to lessees of urban lands. The Rivera Spouses cannot

deny the fact that the are of the knowledge that the

property they bought is under an existing and valid lease

agreement. Hence, they are under the obligation to respect

the said contract of lease.

25

The established facts of the case, of which the court a

qou has recognized in its Decision, show that during the

time when the Rivera spouses bought the property from

Mariano, they are of full knowledge that the Delos Reyeses

are occupying the land and the house.

The acts of herein defendant Spouses Rivera of sending

through their lawyer a demand letter for payment of monthly

rental, as well as their undisputed act of accepting such

payments prove that at the outset of the transfer of

ownership, they also recognized the legality of the lease

rights of the herein appellants. The fact that the checks

were never encashed is of no merit so as to negate the

already established fact of receipt and recognition.

Further, the steps taken by the appellee spouses Rivera

together with herein defendant-appellee Mariano is a clear

indication of their intention of malicious disregard of the

rights of the tenants. By the evidences on record, it has

been clearly established that there was no notice whatsoever

that the appellants will be ejected from the leased

property. There was also no valid court order nor authority

except for the repair permit obtained by the defendants. At

most, said permit as obtained in the guise of simple repairs

to cover for their true intention of illegally and unjustly

ousting the appellants from their rented home. This fact is

26

also established by the words and threats made by the

defendants and their company.

PRAYER

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Court that the court a quo’s Decision dated February

21, 2013 declaring as valid and binding the Deed of Absolute

Sale entered into by and between herein defendant appellees

Federico Mariano and Spouses Carlos and Angelina Rivera be

set aside and MODIFIED, and that a new Decision be

PROMULGATED declaring said Deed of Absolute Sale as NULL AND

VOID. It is further prayed that the rights of the present

tenants, herein plaintiffs-appellants, to be first offered

to buy the leased property be recognized.

Petitioners-appellants pray for such further and other

reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

City of Manila, September 13, 2013.

ATTY. MA. KATRINA M. NAVAL-NAGA

Roll No. 23660

MCLE No. III-0010241 / April 14, 2010

PTR No. 3680804/ 01-11-2013/ Makati City

27

Lifetime IBP No. 09343/ 9-23-2010/

Pampanga

Counsel for Petitioner-appellants

COPY FURNISHED:

ATTY. PEDRO AFABLE

Counsel for Respondents-appellees

2nd Floor, La Trinidad Municipal Bldg.

Km. 5, La Trinidad, Manila, 2601

EXPLANATION

Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, undersigned counsel respectfully manifests

that a copies of the Appellant’s Brief were served on

respondent-appellee’s counsel and filed with this Honorable

Court by registered mail in lieu of personal service due to

distance of offices and lack of available messengers.

ATTY. MA. KATRINA M. NAVAL-NAGA

28

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

PRACTICE COURT 2

SUBMITTED TO:

JUSTICE ELOY BELLO

29

SUBMITTED BY:

MA. KATRINA M. NAVAL-NAGA

4F

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW

MENDIOLA, MANILA