The Maghreb Review, Vol. 40, ? 2015 © The Maghreb Review 2015

This publication is printed on longlife paper

Alfarabi’s Unacknowledged Legislators

Shawn Welnak,

Long Island University

Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.

—Percy Bysshe Shelley1

I. Introduction

This essay examines Alfarabi’s Book of Religion with a

view to understanding his claim that “religion is an imitation of

philosophy” (AH 40.13).2 In particular, we shall see how poetry, broadly

understood, is the essential means for communicating to the city the

opinions and actions that constitute the common custom or law in which

it must firmly believe. That is to say, I attempt to clarify the implications

of the necessity for the “first ruler” of a religious community to “bring

the inhabitants to imagine everything in the city […] so that what is

described will be examples [مثاالت] that the inhabitants will follow in

1 P.B. Shelley, A Defense of Poetry (Boston, 1890) 46.31-3.

2 Translations from the AH are adapted from Alfarabi, The Philosophy of Plato and

Aristotle (Ithaca, 2001), trans. Muhsin Mahdi. All line numbers refer to the Arabic

edition, Tahsīl al-sa’ādah (Hyderabad, 1926).

2 AUTHOR NAME

their ranks and actions” (45.20–24).3 And we shall see the importance of

the fact that the inhabitants of a religious community–its citizens–as

religious, are said to be following these images in their ranks and actions,

rather than understanding them: the images are not understood as images

of things, but rather as the things themselves. Nevertheless, although

Alfarabi considers such poetic likenesses to be, strictly speaking, false,

we must be careful not to think they are misleading in the same way as

sophistry is: poetic examples guide towards truth, where sophistry leads

away from it.

But in addition to supporting firm belief in the law, by

also guiding its citizens towards truth, Alfarabian religion contains the

seed of its own demise within the individual soul; it points its own more

astute citizens to the underlying philosophical problems in its poetic

images: things are never as clear as they ought to seem to the religious.

So although it is true that Alfarabian religion encourages its citizens to

“take seriously the spiritual and moral claims” of religion, this does not

mean that, after having taken them seriously, all its citizens should

remain content with them.4 Religious images, though guiding towards

truth, break down and thus compel movement beyond them. Ultimately,

for those able to do so, religion is to be transcended as such, insofar as it

is better to know a thing than to recognize its reflection.

3 Translations of the BR are adapted from “The Political Aphorisms” and Other Texts,

trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca, 2004). Line numbers refer to the Arabic

edition, Kitāb al-Milla wa Nusūs Ukhrā.(Beirut, 2001), trans. Muhsin Mahdi. Unless

otherwise noted, all citations refer to the BR.

4 Waseem El-Rayes, “The Book of Religion’s Political and Pedagogical Objectives,”

p.176.

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My approach, however, will not merely attempt to

articulate Alfarabi’s understanding of religion. I shall also try to show

how Alfarabi deploys his understanding within the BR itself. We shall

thus see how even a book of Alfarabi’s that “pronounces simply

orthodox views” on the surface of the text as “his own doctrine,” thus

inculcating firm belief for the pious, is far from orthodox upon careful

examination (FP 406, my emphasis).5 Particularly, we shall see how

divine revelation and “the other life” (حياة األخيرة) are paradigms of

Alfarabi’s poetic images for the many pointing to the life of wisdom—or,

strictly speaking, to the life in pursuit of wisdom—for the few. These

poetic images are embedded in an even larger comprehensive poetic

image inculcating firm beliefs in the justice of the world, the soul and the

city that support the citizens’ actions. These orthodox pronouncements

of the surface images then cause perplexity to the more astute, thus

making even this “exoteric” work truly philosophical. The exoteric and

esoteric distinction should thus be understood as a distinction of

emphasis rather than essence in Alfarabi’s BR, and in all his other works

(FP 409). That is to say, through the BR, we shall come to understand the

way in which Alfarabi made apparent to his readers:

how every class of the classes of men ought to be made to know, and

what and by what they are to be made to know, and which species of

knowledge of these things ought to be given to each class so that

every man may cognize the end for the sake of which he labours, and

thus be Rightly Directed to the Rightly Guided Way (يهتدي لرشده) and

5 Leo Strauss, “Farabi’s Plato” in Essays in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy

(New York, 1977).

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not remain dubious about what concerns him. (PA 71.5–8)

II. Religion Defined

Alfarabi begins the BR without introduction by defining

religion. The most noteworthy aspect of his definition is that religion, so

construed, provides its devotees with a solution to the epistemic problem

that arises for man regarding the aim he ought pursue in life. The first

ruler of a religion will “prescribe” an aim for his religion’s citizens by

means of particular opinions to be believed and actions to be done (43.1–

2). The man who “frequently attempts to obtain [the needed cognizance

of the human good] from others” is provided with an official source for

this cognizance, and is thus absolved from cognizing this good “from his

very own soul”–an impossible task for most people (PA 62.11–13, 68.6–

7, cp. BR 46.18-19).6 Those without independent access to knowledge of

the human good are given a second-hand cognizance that is sufficient for

living their lives. There are no particular strictures yet regarding what

may or may not be included in these opinions and actions. The definition

is entirely general, and thus entirely bold.7

It is also noteworthy that religion does not focus on what

its citizens ought believe; religion exists so that, through its citizens

practicing [إستعمال] it, the first ruler is able to achieve his aim “with

respect to them or by means of them” (43.2). Alfarabian religion is thus

6 Translations from the PA are adapted from Alfarabi, The Philosophy of Plato and

Aristotle (Ithaca, 2001), trans. Muhsin Mahdi. Page and line numbers refer to the

Arabic text, Falsafat Arisṭūṭālīs (Beirut, 1961).

7 Cf. Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy

(Chicago, 2001), pp. 98–99.

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fundamentally practical and fundamentally centered on the aim of the

first ruler. No mention is even made of how—or even if—the citizens of

the religion will benefit. Again, the generality is striking.

III. Rulerships

After his broad definition of religion, Alfarabi turns to the

essential differences between first rulers of religions based on (1) the aim

of each ruler, and (2) those for whom that aim is implemented (43.4–

44.6). That is to say, he now supplies us with the benefits (or harms) of

religion as well as those for whom those benefits (or harms) redound.

Alfarabi presents what first appear to be four distinct classes of rulership

based on this twofold distinction, beginning with the virtuous. With

virtuous rulership (43.4–9), there are two essential aspects. First, ultimate

happiness is the only aim sought after. While surely intending his Islamic

readers to think of attaining an other-worldly happiness, however,

Alfarabi quietly places his first ruler of a virtuous religion into the same

category as the Greeks, who aimed at ultimate happiness as “the final

perfection to be achieved by man;” the Greeks called this ultimate

happiness “unqualified wisdom and the highest wisdom” (AH 38.18).

Alfarabi, however, leaves unstated in the BR what he calls this ultimate

happiness, which is the aim of virtuous rulership. The reader is left to fill

this in for himself. Second, the virtuous first ruler seeks ultimate

happiness for both himself as well as everyone he rules. If ultimate

happiness is unqualified wisdom, however, one is left wondering whether

this is even possible for everyone under his rule.

With the virtuous first ruler set down as the highest

standard for rulership, Alfarabi turns to various deviations from that

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rulership. The second class of rulership is said to be ignorant (jāhilīya)

(43.9–15). The first major difference between the ignorant and the

virtuous is that ultimate happiness is no longer the aim of this ruler.

Rather, he seeks some aim from among the ignorant goods that are then

divided into two further categories: either the necessary ignorant goods;

or, Alfarabi implies, the non-necessary ignorant goods. Alfarabi gently

connects these ignorant goods lexically with pre-Islamic, pagan times

through his use of jāhilīya. The rulership of “ignorance” first appears as

the rulership prior to revelation.

The necessary goods, health and soundness [سالمة], seem

to be equivalent to the four things that are “desirable and sought after by

nature from the outset” (PA 59.10), namely “the soundness [سالمة] of the

human body, the soundness of the senses, the soundness of the capacity

for cognizing how to discern what leads to to the soundness of the body

and the senses, and the soundness of the power to labour at what leads to

their soundness” (PA 59.11–13). The necessary goods, and thus the

ignorant city pursuing them, satisfy only these four originary things. The

ignorant ruler, in pursuing these aims as ultimate aims, has not yet seen

their role as mere means to an even more appropriately necessary

ultimate aim. With respect to the non-necessary ignorant goods–wealth,

pleasure, honor, glory and conquest–since these are good neither as

means misunderstood as such nor as ends, they too constitute ignorant

goods. In fact, strictly speaking, it seems improper to call them “goods”

at all. And within such ignorant rulership, a further distinction is made

based on whether the ruler seeks the ignorant goods (1) for himself to the

exclusion of those under his rulership; or (2) for those under his rulership

to the exclusion of himself; or (3) for both those under his rulership and

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himself. Alfarabi carefully presents these three ignorant rulerships with

an increasingly virtuous character.

But what seems clear so far becomes more complicated

when we arrive at the third apparent class of rulership, the errant (43.15–

44.2). Alfarabi begins the errant rulership by suggesting that it is actually

a subspecies of ignorant rulership, referring the reader to “that” ignorant

rulership just mentioned (43.15). What makes the errant rulership a

species of ignorant rulership seems at first to be that our ruler not only

aims at one of the ignorant goods, but also mistakenly presumes and

firmly believes that he has virtue and wisdom. In this way, Alfarabi

explicitly introduces wisdom for the first time in the BR by means of the

errant rulership—to be an errant ruler is to presume and firmly believe

one knows what one does not know, and to have one’s citizens also

presume and firmly believe this about him. Alfarabi slowly reveals that

the virtuous first ruler has not only virtue, but also wisdom in truth. Our

earlier suggestion that Alfarabi is pointing us to the ultimate happiness of

the Greeks is further confirmed.

Alfarabi, however, drops the possibility that such an

errant ruler will use his people to obtain his aim solely for himself either

through them or with respect to them. An errant ruler as such seeks to

achieve his ignorant aim for both his citizens and himself. In this sense,

the errant ruler seems to be the third form of ignorant rulership above

who seeks his aim for both himself and those under his rulership.

Errant rulership may then be contrasted with the final

form that stands as the least virtuous of the three forms of ignorant

rulership: the deceptive (تمويه) (6–44.2). The deceptive first ruler, who

always seeks one of the ignorant goods, also excercises a clear species of

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ignorant rulership. As with the errant ruler, the deceptive ruler’s citizens

presume and firmly believe him to be virtuous and wise. However, this

ruler deceives his citizens into presuming and firmly believing that he is

virtuous and wise, thus seeking ultimate happiness for them. While his

citizens believe they are being led to the ultimate happiness of the other

life “on the surface” (في الظاهر), underneath (في الباطن) the first ruler aims

at acquiring ignorant goods for himself with no concern for the other life.

If one is not virtuous and wise, one does not seek ultimate happiness.

And yet our deceptive ruler, apparently knowing that he is

neither virtuous nor wise, is all the while using his citizens to seek one of

the ignorant goods for himself at their expense. He accomplishes his aim

by means of them. But can one really know that one is neither virtuous

nor wise and pursue an ignorant good as an ignorant good? Here, at least,

Alfarabi would have us to believe so. The deceptive ruler, supposedly

knowing what both virtue and wisdom are, chooses vice and ignorance

as vice and ignorance. Through his language, Alfarabi also connects this

sort of ruler with sophistry. As he says in the BL while juxtaposing the

arts of dialectic and sophistry: “what the art of dialectic does in

accordance with what is generally accepted in truth, sophistry does in

accordance with what is generally accepted on the basis of presumption,

the surface [ظاهر], and deception [تمويه] without it being truly so” (BL

224.14–15).8 The deceptive first ruler is a sophist.

8 Translations of the BL are adapted from The Book of Letters (Unpublished

manuscripta), trans. Charles E. Butterworth. Page and line numbers refer to the

Arabic text, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf (Beirut, 2004). Cp. also “[s]ophistry moves in the same

direction as dialectic. What dialectic does truly, sophistry does by deception and

misleading” (BL 210.16–17).

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Rather than four main categories of rulership, we actually

have only two: the virtuous or the ignorant—or perhaps it would now be

more accurate, from proper parallelism, to say the wise or the ignorant.

And of the ignorant, we have two further species, the errant or the

deceptive. We can thus rank Alfarabi’s rulerships, as presented so far,

from most to least virtuous:

1. Wise Rulership: virtue and wisdom are the ruler’s aim with respect to

his citizens for the sake of himself and everyone under him.

2. Errant Ignorant Rulership1: one of the ignorant goods is the ruler’s aim

with respect to his citizens for the sake of himself and everyone under

him.

3. Errant Ignorant Rulership2: one of the ignorant goods is the ruler’s aim

with respect to his citizens for the sake of everyone under him, to the

exclusion of himself.

4. Deceptive Ignorant Rulership: one of the ignorant goods is the ruler’s

aim by means of his citizens for the sake of himself to the exclusion of

everyone under him.

Before we present the conclusion Alfarabi draws from this

discussion, a few points are worth noting. First, there is no distinction

made in virtuousness between the ignorant regime that pursues the

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necessary goods and the ignorant regime that pursues the non-necessary

goods. We were first presented with the distinction between the virtuous

and the ignorant; then presented with the distinction between the

intention of the ruler in dispensing the ignorant goods (viz., towards

himself and his people, only towards his people, only towards himself).

However, we are not further provided with a comparable distinction in

virtue between whether the ruler pursues an ignorant necessary good or

an ignorant non-necessary good: both are equally lacking in virtue

insofar as they are ignorant, i.e., insofar as the ruler lacks knowledge of

what to do with these goods. The necessary ignorant “goods” do not

become authentic goods until they are subordinated to wisdom.

Secondly, all of these rulerships have been presented

hypothetically. Alfarabi has not told us that any of them actually exists,

but only what would be the case in four hypothetical scenarios: “if [the

first ruler] is virtuous and his rulership is virtuous in truth;” “if his

rulership is ignorant,” “if that rulership of his is errant,” and “if his

rulership is deceptive.” The reader is left to ponder their possibility.

Third, note how, even in a virtuous religion, the citizens

themselves are still ignorant in a decisive sense. Although they are

pursuing ultimate happiness, they do not have any better an

understanding of their aim than the citizens of an ignorant religion do of

their aim. A religion is categorized as virtuous or ignorant based solely

on the virtue or ignorance of the first ruler who is prescribing its

opinions. In fact, insofar as the citizens of a virtuous religion were to

become virtuous and wise, they would seem to become first rulers

lacking the exercise of authority over any religious community.

So having presented this preliminary set of conditionally

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posed classes of rulerships, Alfarabi draws a conclusion: “Thus the craft

of the virtuous first ruler is angelic-kingly [ملكية, m*l*kīya] insofar as it is

joined with revelation from God. And indeed, [the virtuous first ruler]

determines the actions and opinions in the virtuous religion by means of

revelation” (44.6–7). With this comment, an ambiguity arises that

continues throughout the argument of the BR: Does the first ruler

determine and restrict the opinions and actions prescribed in the virtuous

religion, as implied in the initial definition of religion? Or does God

perform that function via the first ruler as a mere intermediary? Alfarabi

playfully highlights this ambiguity by referring to the craft, insofar as it

is joined with revelation, as being ملكية —an indeterminate word meaning

either “angelic” [malakīya] or “kingly “ [malikīya] depending on its

vocalization.

If his pious readers were to begin to wonder, Alfarabi

quickly sets their questions aside: “it has already been explained in

theoretical science how the revelation of God, may he be exhalted, to the

human being receiving the revelation comes about, and how the faculty

acquired from revelation and from the revealer occurs in the human

being” (44.12–13). Apparently, a book of religion is not the proper place

in which to discuss the authentic relationship between revelation and the

human being, that place being reserved for the theoretical sciences.

Alfarabi thus explicitly directs the more theoretically adept readers to a

work outside the BR, and thus outside the scope of religion itself, in order

to understand revelation and the true nature of the first ruler.9

9 This is not unexpected if we keep in mind that “Revelation is intelligible to man only

to the extent to which it takes place through the intermediacy of secondary causes, or

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III.1. Theoretical Excursion

If we follow Alfarabi’s lead and look beyond the BR, we

find an extensive discussion of revelation in the Political Regime.10

And

though it is unlikely that the PR is a work of theoretical science proper,

nonetheless, it has more to say about revelation than the BR, and has the

honor of being the Alfarabian work recommended by Maimonides to

Samuel ibn Tibbon (FP 391), giving us a prima facie reason to hold it in

high regard. Alfarabi begins by making clear that he is discussing the

first ruler as such, i.e., “without qualification” (PR 79.3). Such a being

“does not need—not in anything at all—to be ruled by another human

being” in order to “Rightly Guide” himself; for he has attained, from his

very own soul, the sciences and cognitions (PR 79.3-4). Such a human

being does not need a first ruler to prescribe opinions and actions to him;

rather, he has the ability, based on his sciences and cognitions, to Rightly

Guide all other human beings lacking the needed sciences and

cognitions. Such a perfect human being comes about only if he reaches

this rank of perfection, his soul having been joined with the active

intellect (PR 79.8-9). Alfarabi tells us that this presupposes having

attained both the passive intellect as well as the intellect “called”

acquired (PR 79.9-10). Then, after the attainment of the intellect “called”

acquired, the conjunction with the active intellect “mentioned in the book

to the extent to which it is a natural phenomenon.” Leo Strauss, Pers. (Chicago,

1988), p. 10.

10 Cp. also On the Perfect State (Chicago, 1985), chs. 13 & 14.

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On the Soul” comes about (PR 79.10-11).11

In his language at the end of the passage, Alfarabi

accomplishes two things. Firstly, he points us to an even more theoretical

work, Aristotle’s On the Soul. Here, the doctrine of the active intellect is,

as he says, “mentioned” and made the natural ground for Alfarabi’s first

ruler. Secondly, he points us to the fact that the “acquired” intellect does

not seem to have been correspondingly mentioned in this book of

Aristotle’s—rather, it seems to be an intellect merely called acquired by

those apparently not familiar first-hand with what Aristotle actually

mentions. We are further drawn to wonder if this conditional conjunction

with the active intellect ever takes place—for one must attain the so-

called “acquired intellect” prior to the active.12

All of this ends with Alfarabi coupling two claims:

according to the ancients, the human being joined with the Aristotelian

active intellect is the king in truth; and it is he who ought to be said to

receive revelation! Again, Alfarabi directs us to the Greeks. We now

understand why an explanation of Alfarabian revelation occurs in

theoretical science, rather than in religious science; Aristotle’s natural

account in On the Soul explains revelation. An infidel (جاهلية), as it were,

provides the unvarnished truth about the virtuous religious community

and its first ruler. We can thus see the beauty in Alfarabi’s use of ملكية

(m*l*kīya) to describe the craft of the virtuous first ruler, for it is truly

11 As Butterworth notes, Alfarabi’s discussion here is derived from On the Soul,

430a10–25 and 431

a1–431

b19 (unpublished manuscriptb, p. 76 fn. 38).

12 It is noteworthy that Alfarabi ignores, without mention, Aristotle’s suggestion here

regarding an “immortal and eternal” aspect of soul (On the Soul, 430a22-23).

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both “kingly” according to the ancients (in truth) and “angelic” according

to what ought to be said (by resemblance).

IV. “Myths, Stories, Histories of Peoples and Histories of Nations”13

Turning back to the BR, Alfarabi next begins a lengthy

discussion of the opinions and actions prescribed by his kingly first ruler

that comprise a virtuous religion (44.14–46.10). He begins with opinions,

which are divided into the theoretical and the voluntary (“voluntary”

seemingly standing in for “practical”). The theoretical opinions are of six

distinct types, which can be divided into two groups of three. The first

group is as follows:

1. Those that describe God (44.15).

2. Those that describe spiritual things, their ranks in themselves, their

stations in relation to God, and what each one of them does [فعل]. (44.15–

16)

3. Those about the coming into being of the world, including most

importantly “how the things the world encompasses are linked together

and organized and that whatever occurs with respect to them is just and

has no injustice,” as well as how each part of the world is related to God

and to spiritual things. (44.16–45.5)

With these first three types of theoretical opinions we have a clear

13 See PA 61.13-14.

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descending order from God to the spiritual things, to all the non-

voluntary (natural) parts of the world. Alfarabi highlights that there is an

order of rank amongst all of these that is entirely just. That is to say,

these first three theoretical opinions form a natural cosmodicy. It is

difficult to believe that theoretical opinions about what the spiritual

things do and about the justice that exists in the natural world have no

relevance to what a human being ought to do, i.e., that such religious

theoretical opinions could be impractical.

From cosmodicy, Alfarabi turns to the second group of

three theoretical opinions:

4. Those about the coming into being of the human being, his soul, his

intellect, his rank in the world, and his station in relation to God and the

spiritual things. (45.5–6)

5. Those that describe what prophecy is, how revelation exists, and how

it comes to be. (45.6–7)

6. Those that describe death, the other life [الحياة اآلخرة], the happiness in

the other life to which the most virtuous and the righteous proceed and

the misery to which the most depraved and the profligate proceed. (45.7–

9)

Alfarabi attempts to preserve the apparent descent in rank by connecting

the genesis of the world (3) to the genesis of the human being (4), and

the genesis of the revelation (5). And this descent seems to come to its

completion in the final opinion (6) concerning death—i.e., not genesis,

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but corruption.

Beginning from the last of each set, we notice that just as

(3) deals with cosmodicy among the natural things, (6) deals with an

analogue of cosmodicy in human things—what we might call a

psychodicy. One of the theoretical opinions is thus that there is an other

life, and that the most virtuous and righteous proceed to the happiness in

this other life, while the most depraved and profligate proceed to

misery—nothing is said about misery’s relationship to the other life. This

other life is presented as connected to the happiness of the virtuous,

while death is presented as connected to the misery to which the

depraved and profligate proceed: the other life exists for the virtuous,

and death for the non-virtuous.14

Surely these theoretical opinions, once

again, affect what a human being can do when he knows them.

Opinions 2 and 5 can be linked together based on the

above discussion of revelation and the active intellect as well as another

comment from the Political Regime. Alfarabi claims there that “the

active intellect is that which ought to be said to be the Faithful Spirit

and it is named by the ,[روح القدس] and the Holy Spirit [روح األمين]

resemblances [أشباه] of these two from among [possible] names, while its

rank is named kingship and resemblances of this from among [possible]

14 Cf. Ibn Tufayl’s comment in Hayy ibn Yaqẓan regarding Alfarabi’s position on the

other life, 13.14–14.1. Page and line numbers refer to the Arabic text, Hayy ibn

Yaqẓan (Beirut, 1936). Alfarabi is more concealing with the audience of the BR than

the PR (and certainly than the Ethics commentary), perhaps believing that to speak

so openly in a book of religion would be “a slip that cannot be rectified, and a false

step that cannot be remedied”. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, Medieval Political

Philosophy (Cornell, 1963), p. 140.

ARTICLE TITLE 17

names” (PR 32.11–12, my emphasis).15

An understanding of revelation

and prophecy (5) constitutes an understanding of the relationship

between the spiritual (2) and the human being.

Lastly, the genesis of the human being, his soul, his

intellect, the rank of his intellect in the world, and its station in relation to

God, stand at the top of this set of three theoretical opinions parallel to

God’s station in the three former opinions. Alfarabi thus suggests that the

human being, his soul, and ultimately his intellect, are of divine rank. A

parallelism—if not synonymy—between the “virtuous first ruler” as a

man who has perfected his intellect, and the “virtuous first ruler” as God

comes to light.16

Having completed his description of the theoretical

opinions in religion, Alfarabi turns to the voluntary opinions (45.9–20).

Alfarabi divides these opinions on the basis of two fundamental themes

(thus providing four distinct discussions):17

(1) whether the individuals

discussed are virtuous or ignorant, and (2) whether they are from the past

15 Cf. Qur’ān 26:193 and 2:87, 2:253 and 5:113 for the Faithful Spirit and Holy Spirit,

respectively, cited in Butterworth (unpublished manuscriptb, note 3).

16 In the opening definition of religion (43.1-2), “first ruler” is used entirely

ambiguously. From there, Alfarabi proceeds to use the term clearly to refer to human

rulers (viz., virtuous, ignorant, etc.), until at 63.9 and 63.10 where it unambiguously

again refers to God. Having made that switch, however, Alfarabi then immediately

uses the term to refer to a human being in clear contrast to God. Rosenthal notes a

similar equivocation in Alfarabi, pointing out that the “Allah of the madina fadila

[…] is the First Cause in the siyasa madaniya” (p. 68). Rosenthal, however, is unable

to decide whether such equivocation on Alfarabi’s part is merely “inconsistency or

accident, unresolved in Al-Farabi’s mind” or, as I believe, “conditioned by the aim

and purpose of the respective treatises and their readers for whom they are intended”

(ibid.).

17 Namely: (1) 45.9–12, (2) 45.12–16, (3) 45.16–18 and (4) 45.18–20.

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or the present.

Alfarabi first presents the voluntary opinions regarding

the virtuous men of the past, which every virtuous religion must possess

(45.9–12). These voluntary opinions constitute, as it were, histories of

the virtuous prophets, kings, righteous rulers and imams of the Right

Way (هدى)18

and of truth who have existed in the past, relating what good

actions they had both in common and individually that constituted their

excellence. And lastly, such histories must relate where both these

human beings as well as their followers and emulators “ended up with

respect to the other life [في اآلخرة]” (45.12). In other words, a psychodicy

must be provided among the voluntary opinions parallel to the

cosmodicy of the theoretical opinions.

The opinions about past virtuous human beings are

followed by opinions regarding past ignorant rulers and their ilk (45.12-

16). The parallel with the prior opinions is obvious, though there are also

significant differences. Most importantly, there is no correlation to the

prophet of the virtuous men from the past. To be a prophet and have

received revelation is to have become wise, and thus not to be

“exercising authority over the inhabitants of ignorant communities”

(45.13, my emphasis). Again Alfarabi closes with the need for a history

of where the souls of such ignorant men ended up “with respect to the

other [life]” (45.13-16).19

Perhaps the most significant difference between these

18 Cp. The Qur’an, al-Baqara 2.2.

19 Cf. Mahdi (Chicago, 2001), pp. 106-107.

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passages is that the depraved kings and profligate rulers are explicitly

said to be “exercising authority over” their subjects. Surely we might

suppose Alfarabi meant for us to presume that the prophets, most

virtuous kings, righteous rulers, imams of the Right Way and of truth

were “kings” and “rulers,” etc., insofar as they wielded political power

and exercised authority over their citizens. We might equally be led to

doubt this presumption, however, owing to Alfarabi’s introduction of the

exercise of power at the stage of past depraved kings and profligate

rulers. Alfarabi does say in the AH, after all, that if no use is made of the

true philosopher—whom we are coming to understand to be the virtuous

first ruler—then:

the fact that he is of no use to others is not his fault but the fault of

those who either do not listen to him or are not of the opinion that

they should listen to him. Therefore the king and imam is king and

imam by virtue of his skill and art, regardless of whether or not

anyone acknowledges him, whether or not he is obeyed, whether or

not he is supported in his aim [غرض] by any group. (AH 46.12–16)20

We thus have reason to believe we are properly following Alfarabi’s trail

in having considered the hypothetical character of virtuous rulership and

its actual exercise of power by its virtuous rulers of the past. Perhaps

they were kings merely “by virtue of [their] skill and art.” Perhaps the

first ruler rarely, if ever, has the opportunity to prescribe to others

opinions and actions for his aim (غرض) of ultimate happiness.

For reasons that will become clear, let us skip the third set

20 Cf. also the SA, §32.

20 AUTHOR NAME

of voluntary opinions to which Alfarabi turns and examine the fourth:

And there are those [opinions] that describe the profligate rulers, and

the imams of the errant way [ضالل],21

and the inhabitants of ignorant

communities in the present time; and those that relate what they have

in common with those who went before, and what evil actions are

characteristic of them, and where their souls will end up with respect

to the other [life]. (45.18–20)

In this instance, we learn that there are opinions that describe the

contemporary profligate rulers and imams of the errant way. Not only are

prophets again left out, but the depraved kings have disappeared as well.

Though it is difficult to be certain as to why Alfarabi does this, he seems

to suggest that neither past prophets nor even contemporary kings should

be described as depraved—descriptions of both depraved kings and

virtuous prophets are solely a part of the past histories of virtuous

religions. Instead, Alfarabi’s descriptions of depraved kings are replaced

with descriptions of contemporary inhabitants of ignorant communities.

Prior to this, we had only been told of the need for a description of “those

exercising authority over the inhabitants of ignorant communities”

(45.13). We are not to describe contemporary kings as being depraved to

citizens of a virtuous religion; rather, the citizens must be provided with

descriptions of the contemporary citizens of ignorant cities.

One suggestion regarding Alfarabi’s change here is that

he is implying that citizens should not be made to focus on blaming their

present kings for their situation, but rather on blaming themselves.

21 Cf. Qur’an 36:47

ARTICLE TITLE 21

Alfarabi may not want to encourage an attitude among citizens that leads

to a failure to take responsibility for their own condition. Thus he ends

this description, highlighting its importance, with where the souls of the

citizens will end up with respect to the other life (45.20).22

We can now turn back to Alfarabi’s third set of voluntary

opinions (45.16–18). Here again we find the prophet missing—not only

can there be no descriptions of errant prophets or contemporary depraved

kings, nor can there be descriptions of contemporary virtuous prophets.

The same holds true for the imams of the Right Way. Prophets and

imams of the Right Way are relegated to the histories of those who went

before. People of the present time—any present time—seem forced to

deal with the fact that they do not have access to living prophets or

imams of the Right Way. Citizens of contemporary virtuous cities,

Alfarabi suggests, must either follow in the footsteps of previous virtuous

prophets and imams of the Right Way, or follow present day imams of

the truth. Yet how Alfarabi understands the difference between the

imams of the Right Way and the imams of truth is never clarified; he

merely suggests there is a difference.23

Contemporary imams of truth

seem to be a real possibility, while those of the Right Way are a thing of

22 However, when Alfarabi turns to consider the actions of religion, contemporary non-

virtuous kings seem to reappear insofar as they would be the “opposites” of the most

virtuous kings, and thus must be blamed (46.5–6). The fact that Alfarabi fails to

explicitly mention “speeches” regarding the depraved contemporary kings, however,

leaves room for this interpretation.

23 One immediately plausible solution here would be that Alfarabi associates the imams

of the Right Way with Qur’ānic teachings, while the imams of truth are to be

associated with philosophy, relegating the former to the past. The problem with this

is that only imams of the Right Way—both of the past and of the present—show up

in the speeches (actions) of religion, imams of truth having completely disappeared.

22 AUTHOR NAME

the past.

The most striking difference between this passage and

what we have seen so far, however, is the complete lack of parallelism

regarding where the souls of these men will end up with respect to—or

“in”—the other life (في اآلخرة). The voluntary opinions regarding the

eminent men of the past included this, and Alfarabi has prescribed

descriptions of where the souls of current profligate rulers, imams of the

errant way, and their subjects are destined to end up with respect to the

other life. There is only a sudden new silence regarding the

contemporary virtuous kings and their like. Assuming such a silence may

have some relevance toward understanding Alfarabi’s intention, what

might it be?

IV.1 The Other Life in This Life of Ours

If we recall Alfarabi’s language within his description of

the theoretical opinions that describe death and the other life, as well as

their relationship to misery and happiness, respectively, the following

hypothesis may shed some light on his silence. If the virtuous proceed to

their happiness in the other life, and the depraved and profligate proceed

to their misery in death, then perhaps the contemporary imams of truth

cannot have their destination prophesied with respect to the other life,

since they have already arrived in the other life. A contradiction in the

meaning of Alfarabi’s “other life” would thus become all too visible, so

he chooses to conceal it.

Recall as well that the ignorant rulerships had two implicit

forms of ignorant goods as possible aims: the necessary, and what I have

called the non-necessary. And the former were seen to be closely aligned

ARTICLE TITLE 23

with, if not identical to, the four original aims of all people gleaned from

the PA. To put these strands together, we must turn to the SA:

The city may be necessary and may be virtuous. The necessary city is

the one whose parts mutually assist one another in obtaining only

what is necessary for a human being’s constitution, subsistence and

preservation of life. The virtuous city is the one whose inhabitants

mutually assist one another in obtaining the most virtuous things for a

human being’s substance, constitution, subsistence and preservation

of life. (SA 45.1–5, my emphases)24

We learn here that there are two “cities”, a necessary one and a virtuous

one. The first is “necessary” insofar as the aim of its “parts”—Alfarabi

suggests that it is not even proper to call them “inhabitants” yet—is the

obtaining of those things necessary for (1) the constitution, (2) the

subsistence and (3) the preservation of what we might call mere bodily

human life. The inhabitants of the virtuous city, on the other hand, assist

one another in obtaining the most virtuous things not only with respect to

those three, but also–and most importantly–for a human being’s

substance. A human being’s very substance, and thus his status as a true

“inhabitant,” does not come about until this virtuous “city” is

constituted.25

And yet surely the virtuous city must also, and

simultaneously, be a necessary city, preserving the bodies of its

inhabitants. We thus seem to have two distinct levels of human being,

24 Translations from the SA are adapted from Charles E. Butterworth (Cornell, 2004).

Page and line numbers refer to the Arabic text, Fusūl Muntaza’ah (Beirut, 1993).

25 Cp. PA, 66.1–67.22.

24 AUTHOR NAME

represented as “cities,” with the first closely corresponding to the

necessary ignorant goods.

Alfarabi continues:

Now Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are of the opinion that human

beings have two lives [حياتان]. One is constituted by nutriments and

the rest of the external things we require daily for our constitution,

and it is the first life [حياة األولى]. The other [األخرى] [life] is the one

whose constitution in itself is without need, with respect to its

constitution itself, of external things. Rather, it is sufficient unto its

own soul for maintaining [its] preservation, and it is the other life [ حياة

and an [أول] ”For human beings have two perfections, a “first .[األخيرة

“other” [أخير]. (SA 45.6–12, my emphasis).26

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle opined that human beings have two

“lives.”27

These two Greek lives correspond perfectly with the two

Alfarabian “cities” just mentioned. We have a “first life” associated with

the necessary goods for mere bodily well-being (the necessary city), and

we have an “other life” that goes beyond these in its self-sufficiency,

being in no need of “external things,” i.e., in no need of necessary goods

(the virtuous city) (cp. BR 58.13–15). The other life corresponds to the

26 Cp. Alfarabi’s account of the one who receives revelation in On the Perfect State

(Chicago, 1985), chs. 13 & 14.

27 As we have learned from Strauss, Alfarabi regularly avails himself of “the specific

immunity of the commentator or of the historian in order to speak his mind

concerning grave matters in his ‘historical’ works, rather than in the works in which

he speaks in his own name” (Pers. 14). I would only add that these same grave

matters, as we are seeing here, can often be arrived at—if less easily—through the

works spoken in his own name as well.

ARTICLE TITLE 25

most virtuous things of the virtuous city. Alfarabi speaks equivocally of

two “perfections,” two “lives”, or two “cities.”

There is also a logical relationship between the two

perfections or lives (or cities):

Indeed, the other [life] is attained for us in this life and the other life

when [متى] the first perfection in this life of ours [في حياتنا هذه] has

previously preceded it. […] And by means of this [primary]

perfection the other [أخير] perfection is attained for us, and that is

ultimate happiness, and the good without qualification.28

(SA 45.12–

46.6, my emphasis)

It is difficult to follow Alfarabi here because he begins with an obvious

contradiction—so much so that two strong, but contrary, manuscript

traditions have developed, with one of them obviously attempting to

remedy the contradiction.29

However, what Alfarabi says is actually quite

consistent, taking into account his equivocal use of “life”. There is the

sense in which the Greeks distinguished two “lives” of a first and second

perfection here on earth, and there is the generally accepted sense in

28 It is worth noting that Alfarabi claims that the other life may be arrived at when (متى),

rather than if (or when [إذا]), the first perfection has previously preceded the other

perfection. This should be compared to his discussion above regarding the forms of

rulership and the active intellect’s conjunction with the human being. Alfarabi here

provides a much less idealistic account: the second perfection (love of wisdom) is

possible, in contrast to the acquisition of the Active Intellect (attainment of wisdom).

29 Butterworth (Cornell, 2004) follows this reading as well. The other main tradition

reads: “Indeed, the other is attained for us not [ال] in this life, but rather [لكن] in the

other life when the first perfection in this life of ours has previously preceded it.”

Besides for the philosophical reasons which follow, the reading I have chosen is also

clearly the lectio difficilior.

26 AUTHOR NAME

which a human being has two temporal “lives”, from birth to death, and

from death to eternity.

With this distinction in mind, Alfarabi can been seen to be

claiming that the “other life” is attained for us in this temporal life of

ours through the attainment of our second perfection. The other life of

our second perfection is possible “in this [temporal] life” provided the

first life of our first perfection has been attained. The other life of the

second perfection either is ultimate happiness, or entails the attainment of

ultimate happiness;30

the first life, on the other hand, is the attainment of

merely the happiness that is presumed to be happiness but is not—or,

more precisely, the attainment of necessary ignorant goods, not

understood as “necessary” for the attainment of ultimate happiness.31

Through the language of the BR, Alfarabi thus “imitates the classes of

true happiness”–that is, the other Greek life of the second perfection–“by

means of the ones that are presumed to be happiness”–that is, the other

Qur’anic life of the soul’s immortality (AH 41.8–9).

As with revelation, we see how Alfarabi provides his

readers with subtle hints in the BR that lead far beyond themselves and

the boundaries of religion. So although the BR, a work in Alfarabi’s own

name, is surely more exoteric than those works where he could avail

30 Cp. Strauss’s claim that “happiness is not identical with human perfection or its

exercise” (FP 419, my emphasis).

31 The inspiration of this line of thought is Pers., pp. 13–14. I believe, however, that the

SA makes the point more strongly than Strauss’s observation regarding the PP’s

omission regarding the “other life.” Strauss also refers to Hayy ibn Yaqẓan where

Alfarabi’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is said to mention how a certain

aspect of human happiness—presumably ultimate happiness—is only achieved “in

this life and in this abode [في هذه الحياة و في هذه الدار],” 3–14.2.

ARTICLE TITLE 27

himself of the immunities of the commentator, this does not mean that

Alfarabi leaves no trail at all for us to follow. The BR and other such

works with pronouncements in Alfarabi’s own name merely have a

fainter trail to follow insofar as they provide their readers with

resemblances or images of the truth. In this sense, they are more exoteric

than esoteric, that is, more poetic than philosophic.

V. Imaged Opinions and Their Actions

Alfarabi concludes his section on the theoretical and

voluntary opinions in the virtuous religion with the following claim that

reveals both the ultimate aim of these opinions from the perspective of

the first ruler of the virtuous religion (the end), as well as the way of

bringing about that aim (the means):

And it is necessary that the descriptions by which the things

comprised by the opinions of religion be descriptions that image

,for the inhabitants everything in the city—kings, rulers [تخيل]

servants, their ranks, the linkage of some to others, the yielding of

some to others, and everything prescribed to them—so that what is

described to them from [everything prescribed] will be parables

–will follow in their ranks and actions (45.20 [the inhabitants] [مثاالت]

24, my emphasis).

We thus have three implicit levels: (1) the imaged descriptions of things,

(2) what might be called the non-imaged descriptions of things, and (3)

28 AUTHOR NAME

the things underlying the non-imaged descriptions.32

Insofar as we are

dealing with religious opinions, we are dealing with imaged descriptions

of things.33

And these imaged descriptions are precisely the prescriptions

of the first ruler (cp. AH, 33.4–8). For by them the first ruler “seeks to

teach the multitude the theoretical and practical things inferred in

philosophy, but by means of the ways that bring about an understanding

of that—by means of persuasion, imaging [تخيـ>يـ<ـل], or both” (BL

131.6–9).34

We must keep in mind that Alfarabi does not mean to

suggest that such non-demonstrative ways of leading citizens amount to

sophistical misleading as is the case with deceptive rulership. This is

particularly important since Alfarabi admits that even when dealing with

the imitation of a thing—that is, when dealing with poetic religious

statements—one is dealing with what is at root false (Canons of Poetry

2.13–14). Alfarabi carefully distinguishes the roles of imitation and

sophistical misleading as follows:

32 Cp. also 46.15–17, where Alfarabi follows this same approach with regard to a

“specific name” and the “imitated likeness” (مثال) of it.

33 Though, as we shall see below, Alfarabi leaves room for non-imaged descriptions of

some things in religion—what he calls “specific names”. Though we may not be able

to speak of God in a non-imaged way, we may be able to speak of the birth of human

beings without images, cf. Butterworth, SA (Cornell, 2004), p. 97, fn.10.

34 Cf. also BL, §144, where the “imaging forth” of the theoretical and practical things is

particularly a function of the “art of setting down laws”. Also, in focusing on the

poetic aspect of religion I have found it necessary to set aside discussion of the roles

of dialectic and rhetoric. Although I cannot defend this claim here, I believe it is

particularly justified insofar as both actually begin to transcend religion as such,

since they leave the realm of images; they are, as it were, the bridges between images

of wisdom (religion) and wisdom itself (or, more accurately, philosophy’s pursuit of

wisdom).

ARTICLE TITLE 29

Now, let no man presume that the terms ‘misleading’ and ‘imitating’

are identical: on the contrary, they are different in several [محاكى]

respects. To begin with, their aims are different: the sophist misleads

his hearer to the opposite of a thing, so that he fancies that what is, is

not, and what is not, is; the imitator, however, causes his hearer to

imagine, not the opposite, but a resemblance [شبيه]. (Canons of Poetry

2.17–3.1)

What is essential is whether the “false” image leads men towards truth

through a resemblance of that truth, or leads men away from it through

the contrary of that truth.35

We can now fully understand the character of

both “revelation” and “the other life” as religious imaged descriptions of

things leading men towards truth.

Having completed his discussion of religious opinions,

ending with their somewhat unexpected, though pre-shadowed,

connection specifically to actions—what the citizens opine being

important primarily for the sake of these actions—Alfarabi turns to the

religious actions themselves. These actions form six distinct sets, the first

five clearly corresponding to the theoretical and voluntary opinions:36

1. Regarding actions, the first of them are thus the actions and speeches

by which God is praised and extolled (46.1) [theoretical (1) [أقاويل]

44.15].

35 For this fundamental distinction between dialectic on the one hand, and rhetoric and

poetry on the other, see BL, §§249–251, lines 224.20–225.1 in particular.

36 I have noted in brackets the opinions to which these actions correspond.

30 AUTHOR NAME

2. Then there are those actions and speeches by which the spiritual things

and the angels are praised (46.2) [theoretical (2) 44.15–16].

3. Then there are those actions and speeches by which the prophets, the

most virtuous kings, the righteous rulers, and the imams of the Right

Way who have gone before are praised (46.2–3) [voluntary (1) 45.9–12].

4. Then there are those actions and speeches by which the most depraved

kings, the profligate rulers, and the imams of the errant way who have

gone before, and their affairs are blamed. (46.3–5) [voluntary (2) 45.12–

16]

5. Then those actions and speeches by which the most virtuous kings, the

righteous rulers, and the imams of the Right Way in this time are praised

and those of this time who are their opposites are blamed (46.5–6)

[voluntary (3) 45.16–18, (4) 45.18–20].

Alfarabi begins his discussion of actions by again blurring

the line between opinions and actions, for these first five sets of “actions”

are actions and speeches! Speeches, of course, being outward signs of

underlying opinions.37

The content of these five speeches focuses on the

praise or blame for what has already shown up in the opinions. All four

37 Cf. BL, 63.22–64.1 and Alfarabi’s A Magnificent Invocation in Kitāb al-Milla wa

Nusūs Ukhrā (Beirut, 2001), pp. 87–92, which “provides the reader with a good

example of what Alfarabi means by ‘speeches’ as a subdivision of religious acts,” p.

viii.

ARTICLE TITLE 31

voluntary opinions in religion must have corresponding ritual actions and

speeches of praise or blame; the two highest ranking theoretical opinions

regarding God and the spiritual things—i.e., the grounds of cosmodicy in

the world—must also have corresponding ritual actions and speeches of

praise, with the angels (مالئكة) providing the bridge between the spiritual

things and the kings (ملوك). The speeches, of course, being construed as

another form of ritual actions, solidify the opinions to which they are

connected.38

But all of this becomes most interesting when Alfarabi

turns to his sixth and final set of actions. As he says:

Then, after all this, is both [1] determining the actions by which there

are mutual dealings of the inhabitants of cities—either regarding what

it is necessary that a human being do with respect to his own soul or

regarding what it is necessary that he do in dealing with others—and

[2] bringing about cognizance of justice in each particular instance of

these actions. (46.6–9, my emphasis)

Alfarabi tells us that the final set of actions comes only “after all

this”. And though this might be taken to refer to the previous five sets of

actions and speeches alone, there was no such corresponding comment

prior to the final theoretical and voluntary opinions. Since the use or non-

use of parallelism by Alfarabi is regularly significant, and since he

immediately follows this passage with the claim that “this is the sum of

what virtuous religion comprises” (46.10); it is reasonable to assume that

Alfarabi is referring not just to the preceding actions and speeches, but

38 Cf. Mahdi (Chicago, 2001), p. 108.

32 AUTHOR NAME

also to the theoretical and the voluntary opinions. All of these things are

prior to the mutual dealings (معامالت) of the citizens. Alfarabi thus

indicates that all of the previous opinions, actions and speeches support

the mutual dealings. Just as the speeches as ritual actions support the

opinions, both opinions and ritual actions, together, support the mutual

dealings of the subjects. One might say, following Alfarabi’s own

language, that he has composed the outline for Islamic “didactic” poetry,

“a kind of poetry put to work by the authors of the nomoi [نواميس], in

which they are provided Remembrance [يذكرون] of the terrors which

await the souls of human kind if they are not refined and set aright”

(Canons of Poetry 5.8–9).39

The mutual dealings of the inhabitants of cities fall into

two categories, what a human being ought do (1) with respect to his own

soul, or (2) with respect to others. That is to say, it is finally time to

determine (1) the ethical actions and (2) the political actions. And having

said only this much, Alfarabi turns away from providing any content to

either of these. The general character of his discussion of religion (rather

than of dīn) seems to dictate this. And yet the extensive and detailed

comments regarding the prior opinions and speeches seem even more

strange in the light of Alfarabi’s reticence here. One’s first thought might

be that the actions encompassed by ethics and politics are of little value

to Alfarabi: his “religious” concern may reasonably be presumed to be

primarily about such things as God, the spiritual things, and the imams of

39 Ismail Dahiyat, rightly I think, suggests “didactic” is intended here instead of

Arberry’s “diagrammatic.” Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle

(Leiden, 1974), p. 67, fn. 4.

ARTICLE TITLE 33

the Right Way.

However, if we understand all that has come before as the

supporting ground of these mutual dealings of man in the ethical and

political realms, then it is not that these dealings are of little value to

Alfarabi; rather, they are the final pay-off of all that has come before–

they are the aim of the preceding. This is confirmed by the second of the

two elements of the above passage. After all the mutual dealings have

been determined, then cognizance of the justice in each and every one of

the particular determined actions must be brought about—i.e.,

cognizance that the city is just: a polidicy, as it were. Virtuous religion

assures its citizens of the justice of the world, the justice of the soul and

the justice of the city.40

Our second thought regarding the difference in

importance between the mutual dealings of the citizens and what

preceded them, therefore, leads us to a different understanding. We come

to see that “up to [that] point [Alfarabi] discussed the roots of the nomoi

and the matters the legislator must care for and not neglect in any way,

namely, the canons and the roots” (PL 40.21–22, my emphasis).41

In this

way, Alfarabi–by means of his “image-making theoretical [النظرية المخيلة]

40 This aspect becomes particularly important at 61.10–63.15 where political science

that is a part of philosophy begins to bring about “cognizance of the ranks of the

things in the world and, in general, of the ranks of the beings” (61.10–61.11).

Political science provides, at that point, a more thorough imaged description of the

world and its parts as set down here in the theoretical and voluntary opinions that

ground the mutual dealings of the inhabitants of the city.

41 Translations of PL are adapted from Mahdi and Butterworth (unpublished

manuscript). Page and line numbers refer to the Arabic text, Alfarabius Compendium

Legum Platonis (London, 1952).

34 AUTHOR NAME

science”– puts his poetic histories to work ( ستعملإ ) for the people of his

virtuous religion, thus establishing clear roots supporting all the

determined actions of a virtuous religion (AH 35.1, PA, 61.14). And

everything is contrived in such a manner so that the resulting “virtuous

religion is a resemblance [شبيهة] of philosophy” (46.22).

VI. Conclusion

At this point, Alfarabi has arrived at the point in the

Philosophy of Aristotle where Aristotle:

made apparent […] how every class from the classes of men ought to

be made to know, and what and by what they are to be made to know,

and which species of knowledge of these things ought to be given to

each class so that every man may cognize the end for the sake of

which he labours, and thus be Rightly Directed to the Rightly Guided

Way and not remain dubious about what concerns him. (71.5–8)

We have come to understand the first rulers of Alfarabi’s virtuous

religion, and their character as unacknowledged legislators of the world

who prescribe a poetic species of knowledge to the religious. In this way,

the religious will properly cognize–insofar as they are able–the ultimate

aim of ultimate happiness, as well as the theoretical and voluntary

opinions that vouchsafe the cosmodicy, psychodicy and polidicy that

become the common custom or Law of their religion. And by firmly

believing in this comprehensive view of all things as their Law, the

citizens of a religion will then be Rightly Directed to the Rightly Guided

way.

ARTICLE TITLE 35

Yet we have also seen how Alfarabi provides the path,

within the species of poetic knowledge, to attaining another species of

knowledge; for the potentially virtuous and wise (potential first rulers)

will come to understand not merely the images of things but the things

themselves. And in doing so, they will transcend religion as such. They

will be able to truly cognize the end for the sake of which they labour

and Rightly Guide themselves by means of the cognitions attained from

their very own souls. The Book of Religion provides not only exoteric

poetic knowledge, i.e., religious knowledge, for the many, but the path to

esoteric scientific knowledge for the few.

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———. On the Perfect State (Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-Madīnah al-Fādilah).

Trans. Richard Walzer. Chicago: Kazi, 1985.

———. The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 2nd

edition. Trans.

Muhsin Mahdi. Ithaca: Cornell Paperbacks, 2001.

______. Political Regime. Trans. Charles E. Butterworth. Unpublished

Manuscriptb.

———. Summary of Plato’s Laws. Trans. Muhsin Mahdi and Charles E.

Butterworth. Unpublished manuscript.

———. Ta‘āliq Ibn Bāja ‘Alā Manṭiq Al-Fārābī. Ed. Majed Fakhry.

Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1994.

———. Tahsīl al-sa‘ādah. Hyderabad: Matba‘at Majlis Da’irat al-

Ma‘arif al-‘Uthmaniyya, 1926.

ARTICLE TITLE 37

Alon, Ilai and Shukri Abed. Al-Farabi's Philosophical Lexicon. 2 vols.

Cambridge: University Press, 2007.

Aristotle. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Ed. William David Ross. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1997.

———. De Anima. Ed. William David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999.

———. Ethica Nicomachea. Ed. Ingram Bywater. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1894.

Dahiyat, Ismail. Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle.

Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974.

Hesiod. Works and Days. 2nd

edition, reprint. Ed. Friedrich Solmson.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Ibn Tufayl. Hayy ibn Yaqẓan. 2nd

edition. Ed. Leon Gauthier. Beirut:

Imprimerie Catholique, 1936.

Lerner, Ralph and Muhsin Mahdi. Medieval Political Philosophy. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1963.

Mahdi, Muhsin. Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political

Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2001.

Qur’ān. Ed. and trans. Muhammad Pickthall. Des Plaines: Library of

Islam, 1994.

Rosenthal, Erwin I.J. “Some Observations on Al-Farabi’s ‘Kitab al-

milla.’” In Études philosophiques offertes au Dr. Ibrahim Madkour.

Introduction by Osman Amine. Cairo: L’Organisation egyptienne

générale du livre, 1974.

Shelley, P. B. A Defense of Poetry. Ed. Albert S. Cook. Boston: Ginn and

Company, 1890.

38 AUTHOR NAME

Strauss, Leo. “Farabi’s Plato.” In Essays in Medieval Jewish and Islamic

Philosophy. Ed. Arthur Hyman. New York: Ktav Publishing House,

1977.

———. Persecution and the Art of Writing. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press,

1988.

_________________________

Abbreviations:

The Works of Alfarabi

AH Attainment of Happiness

BL The Book of Letters

BR The Book of Religion

PA The Philosophy of Aristotle

PL Summary of Plato’s Laws

PP The Philosophy of Plato

PR Political Regime

R The Book of Rhetoric

SA Selected Aphorisms

Other Authors

FP “Farabi’s Plato,” L. Strauss

Pers. Persecution and the Art of Writing, L. Strauss