public managers, judges, and legislators: redefining the \"new partnership

$: Public Managers, Judges, and Legislators: Redefining the \"New Partnership$
Public Administration "Partnerships"

Public Managers, Judges,and Legislators: Redefiningthe"NewPaitneiship" . x ;

Rosemary O'Leary, Syracuse University

Charles R. Wise, Indiana University, Bloomington

what are the implications of the Supreme Court's Missouri v.

Jenkins decision for American public administration? In that

landmark 1990 decision, tbe Court affirmed a federal district

court order imposing local property tax increases for Kansas

City, Missouri, residents as a means of raising funds for desegre-

gation efforts by tbe local scbool district. In tbis article,

Rosemary O'Leary and Cbarles Wise examine tbe significance of

tbat decision for tbe "new partnersbip" tbat bas emerged in

recent decades between judges and administrators. Based on

interuiews with residents and scbool district personnel as well as

arcbival and legal researcb, tbe authors find tbat tbe decision

bas recast tbe role of public administrators operating under

court orders. In tbis case, court decisions empowered and legit-

imized actions by school administrators, as well as enhanced

resources available to tbe scbool system. Equally important were

the decision's impacts on tbe ability of local administrators to set

priorities and control implementation. In addition, interorgani-

zation relations bave become problematic and new accountabil-

ity mechanisms pose constant challenges. O'Leary and Wise also

observe tbat by sanctioning court-ordered taxation, Missouri v.

Jenkins may bave also expanded tbe new partnersbip into a

"new triumvirate" that includes legislative bodies. Wbateverform

tbese new relationsbips take, bowever, it is clear to the authors

that the courts are tbe senior partners.

Oti SeptetTiber 15, 1987, Urtited States District CourtJudge Russell Clark ordered a doubling of propertytaxes in Kansas City, Missouri, in order to aid in thedesegregation of the school system. Nine thousandKansas Citians voiced their disapproval by paying theirproperty taxes under protest, while others respondedby staging a series of "tea parties" to complain about"taxation without representation." Two and one-halfyears later in the landmark decision of Missouri v.Jenkins, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court surprisedmany by supporting Judge Clark's actions in part. Itupheld the authority of a federal judge to order a localgovernment to levy a tax increase in order to remedyconstitutional violations, even though state laws prohib-ited such a tax increase.

Although the case has immense fiscal implications,the significance of Missouri v. Jenkins for publicadministration extends beyond its consequences for fis-cal policy. It has broad implications for the increasinglyimportant aspect of American governance embodied inthe relationships between judges and public administra-tors—the so-called "new partnership." The thrust of thisarticle is that Missouri v. Jenkins demonstrates that therelationship between judges and public administratorshas evolved to a new level with profound effects.

The New PartnershipJudge Bazelon (1976), who coined the term "new

partnership," called for judges and administrators towork collaboratively to assure fair implementation ofpublic policies. The view of harmonious collaborationhas not gone unchallenged. Melnick (1985), among oth-ers, held a little over a decade later that the new part-nership had evolved into a cover for judicial usurpationof administrative power. The evolution of the new part-nership has proceeded apace in many areas of publicadministration including schools, prisons and jails, andmental health facilities. An examination of Missouri v.Jenkins, however, yields the conclusion that the newpartnership involves a more complex set of relation-ships than connoted by either simple collaboration orusurpation; rather, the case signifies a transformation ofthe positions of judges, administrators, and also legisla-tors brought about by the evolution of the new partner-ship.

316 Public Administration Review • July/August 1991 Vol. 51, No. 4

This article examines what this case implies about the evo-lution of judicial-administrative relations and their impact onAmerican governance. It focuses on the consequences for theconstitutional principles of separation of powers and federal-ism, as well as the concept of representative democracy. Theconsequences for management effectiveness and implicationsfor other public organizations beyond the school setting arealso examined.

Missouri v. Jenkins is a particularly gemiane case to scruti-nize in order to delineate the condition of the new partner-ship. It not only deals with a basic issue of government, taxa-tion and representation, but also exemplifies the types ofalternative choices before both public administrators andjudges as they cany out their partnership roles.

The Possible Impacts of the JudiciaryThe literature is replete with works by scholars arguing

about the appropriateness of judges intervening in policy andadministrative disputes. With few exceptions (Monti, 1980;Wasby, 1981; Wood, 1990), the literature suggests that judgesare becoming increasingly active in their oversight of admin-istrative agencies (Frug, 1978; Melnick, 1983; Rosenbloom,1983). Judges in many instances are no longer passivereviewers of agency actions, but are full participants, shapinglitigation and its outcomes (Chayes, 1986). Althoughresearchers have examined what happens when judges dointervene in a specific instance or two (Harris and Spiller,1976; Wood, 1982; O'Leary, 1989), they have generally beenless attentive to the impact of such intervention on theresponsibilities of public managers.

Judicial involvement in the management of public institu-tions increasingly comes about as a result of suits filed in fed-eral courts on the basis of alleged constitutional violations bystate and local officials. These are often broad based attacksalleging systemic violations requiring comprehensive pro-grammatic changes. Once the federal district court judgemakes a finding that the condition of the service constitutes aviolation of the U.S. Constitution, the judge (with the involve-ment of the various parties) fashions a series of mandatoryprogram steps to remedy the effects of the violation.

As Cooper's analysis (1988) of cases involving various pub-lic services shows, the determination of who is liable for whattype of constitutional violation as well as the specifications asto how the service is to be altered are much more complexthan a judge contemplating and then deciding what would befair and then imposing that solution on the parties. The reme-dy phase of the case can involve multiple parties includingvarious interest groups, local administrators and elected offi-cials, state officials, state legislators, the U.S. JusticeDepartment, federal district court judges, and federal appellatejudges. The final remedial program to be implemented is aproduct of a multilevel process of interaction among the par-ticipants that typically takes place over a period of years. Such"partnerships" are not short term affairs, but typically go onfor years or decades.i The results of the remedy phase are sig-nificantly affected by the perspectives of the participantsregarding their appropriate roles and responsibilities.

The Roles of State and Local OfficialsState and local public administrators and elected officials

in the process are seldom passive recipients of the programremedy that a federal judge imposes on them. Instead, theyhave significant choices of roles and responsibilities which,along with the decisions of the other parties, have seriousimplications for the public service outcomes, American gover-nance, and public administration. Public administrators andelected officials do not necessarily play the role of the defen-dant in the traditional sense, resisting the challenged state ofaffairs. Nor does either automatically resist the changes thatcome with the court-imposed remedy. Either can choose tosee their responsibilities as defender and/or resister if theyfeel important values are involved. Administrators may resistif they feel the prospective judicial intervention constitutes aninappropriate interference with their administrative responsi-bilities. Officials of the executive branch of government haveconstitutional responsibilities to "take care that the laws arefaithfully executed" and to defend executive branch preroga-tives against encroachment of the other branches. They alsohave responsibilities to represent the interests and views oftheir constituents. These responsibilities, of course, must bebalanced with the responsibility to uphold the rights found inthe U.S. and state constitutions. How executive branch offi-cials see their role inevitably involves a judgment balancingthese factors. Administrators may also resist if they believejudicial involvement will exacerbate their relationships withother important governmental actors.

Alternatively, administrators can choose the role of collab-orator, either believing they can advance important constitu-tional values and/or obtain desirable program choicesthrough the federal courts that they can not achieve throughother administrative and political processes. Prominentamong these latter are additional budgetary resources. AsDiver points out:

The interests of officials with direct operatingresponsibility—for example, institutional superin-tendents and their deputies—often overlap sub-stantially with those of the plaintiffs. They aremost likely to support demands that can be satis-fied by expending more funds or hiring morepersonnel. Translating a grievance into a demandfor resources, even when alternative remedialapproaches exist, not only deflects responsibilityfor the institution's defects away from the operat-ing manager but also gives him [or her] a power-ful ally in his [or her] unending quest for addi-tional funds (Diver: 1979, pp. 70-71).

Administrators and officials, however, need to focus onmore than the likelihood of obtaining additional resources. AsAllerton (1976), Frug (1978), Hale (1979), Horowitz (1983),and Straussman (1986) contend, litigation imports consider-able loss of predictability into budgetary decisionmaking.Involvement of the courts makes calculation of the outcomesof strategies more difficult. In addition, officials should con-sider what the public wants in a possibly altered public ser-

Public Managers, Judges, and Legislators: Redefining the "New Partnership" 317

vice situation. Courts may order remedies, but public reactionand support, or lack of it, will ultimately influence the effec-tiveness of such remedies.

Additionally, administrators need to give consideration tothe effects of the remedy on relationships within the govern-mental system and constitutional values. For example, stateand local administrators often complain about a lack ofrespect for federalism in national decision making, butactions they take in liability suits can have significant conse-quences for either supporting or undermining such values.The issue is complicated by the fact that state and local offi-cials are not monolithic. They often represent different con-stituencies and have different interests. These intrastate inter-governmental differences have important impacts on thestrategies taken in the course of litigation, and conflicts inpositions among state and local litigants can invite the federalcourts to settle the issues with the resulting effect of rearrang-ing intergovernmental relationships. Thus, administrators andelected officials must weigh constitutional, political, and man-agement considerations in choosing a strategy for their partic-ipation in both liability phases and remedy-crafting phases ofsuch suits.

The Role of JudgesThe judicial side of the equation is not monolithic either,

with judges at both the trial and appellate levels in the federalcourt system adopting certain roles and responsibilities. Itshould be understood that the "sides" of the partnership arenot equal. Judge Bazelon observed that the advent of thenew partnership places the judiciary in the role of "seniorpartner," and Rosenbloom (1983) observed that this not onlyenables the judiciary to assert some control over publicadministration, but to strengthen its own power in the admin-istrative state. As Diver put it, "among the many players in thegame of reform litigation...there is one whose capacity tomanipulate its political impact exceeds all others: the trialjudge."

The trial judge's responsibilities are given effect not onlyin how narrowly or broadly he or she finds the liability andhow widely he or she casts the net of those responsible, butalso in the extensiveness of the remedy that is crafted. Thedoctrines of legal equity are broad, and the Supreme Courthas emphasized to district court judges the use of the broaddiscretion afforded. "The scope of the district court's equi-table powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadthand flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies" (Swann v.Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 1976, p. 15;Milliken v. Bradley, 1977, p. 281). As Cooper pointed out,the trial judge's remedy-crafting decisions are a function ofthe doctrinal limits constructed by the appellate courts andhow the judge chooses to see and use the resulting judicialpolicy range.

Although the Supreme Court has stated that the doctrinallimits of equitable remedies are quite broad, in the past it hasalso said this does not mean they are limitless. In Milliken v.Bradley (1974), a leading desegregation case prior to the case

Courts may order remedies, hut public

reaction and support, or lack of it, will ultimately

influence the effectiveness of such remedies.under review here, the Supreme Court, in its first of two deci-sions, overturned a district court decision that would haveconsolidated Detroit's school system with those of its sub-urbs, in part because of a fear that the lower court's actionswould "deprive the people of control of the schools throughtheir elected representatives" {Milliken v. Bradley. 1974, p.717). In its second Milliken decision {1911}, the SupremeCourt upheld a modified remedy in part because the districtcourt had not attempted "to mandate a particular method orstructure of state or local financing" {Milliken v. Bradley.Wl, p. 267). The majority said the application of "equitableprinciples" required the trial courts to focus upon three fac-tors:

[First,] the nature and scope of the constitutionalviolation...[must] be related to the conditionalleged to offend the Constitution.... Second, thedecree must indeed be remedial in nature, that isit must be designed as nearly as possible torestore the victims of discriminatory conduct tothe position they would have occupied in theabsence of such conduct....Third, the federalcourts in devising the remedy must take intoaccount the interests of state and local govern-ment authorities in managing their own affairs,consistent with the Constitution {Milliken v.Bradley, 1977, pp. 281-282).

These factors do not necessarily limit the district courtsvery much. As one analyst (Nagel: 1978, p. 713) articulated,"the judgment of what is necessary to rectify the conditionthat offends the Constitution requires an essentially imaginarydetermination of the state of affairs that would have existedbut for the violation. The consequences of the violation arespeculative and potentially unlimited."

All three factors still preserve considerable policy rangethat trial judges control. Just how considerable is vividlydemonstrated in Missouri v. fenkins. The third factor places aresponsibility on state and local officials to assert their inter-ests, as well as those of their constituents. The problem isthat all of their interests will not necessarily coincide, and thefederal district court judge is in the preeminent position todetermine which interests will be recognized. As Diver delin-eates, "through selective intervention he [or she] can identifyand strengthen the position of allies on whom he [or she] candepend to champion the favored remedial objectives in sub-sequent political games. Litigation presents the politically sen-sitive judge with almost limitless opportunities for politicalimpact" (Diver: 1979, p- 79). Litigation in federal courts trans-forms the normal processes and limits of the U.S. federal gov-

318 Public Administration Review • July/August 1991, Vol. 51, No. 4

mental system and opens up the fundamental decision ofwho will have what powers among appointed and electedofficials and among local, state, and federal officials. Theroles of trial judges in terms of more active or more neutraldetermination of which parties and issues will be assignedpriority will not only have effects on the policy dispute atissue, but on the wider political system in the future. If theiractions seek to enlarge the judicial policy range, then theappellate courts occupy the crucial position in further defini-tion of doctrinal limits which determines if the expansion willstand, and thus, further defines the new partnership.

The Trial Court—^Exercising andExpanding Policy Range

It is important to understand the levels as well as thedirection of the conflict at the initial stages of the litigation.All public officials do not necessarily see their roles or inter-ests in the same way. In this case, the superintendent and theschool board actually initiated the litigation. The case beganin 1977, when the Kansas City Missouri School District(KCMSD)—a creation of the state of Missouri—sued itself.More specifically, in 1977, the KCMSD's board and superin-tendent, along with several students, filed suit in federal dis-trict court against several parties, including the state ofMissouri, the state board of education, nineteen suburbanschool districts, and three federal agencies. The plaintiffsalleged that the state had failed to carry out its duty to elimi-nate racial segregation after the U.S. Supreme Court decisionBrotvn v. Board of Education (1954), and initially sought ajudicially mandated desegregation plan.

The judge to whom the case was assigned, Russell Clark,realigned the KCMSD as a defendant in the lawsuit and dis-missed several other defendants. (This action raises the ques-tion of whether there was actually a "case or controversy"under Article III of the Constitution.) KCMSD immediatelyfiled a cross-claim against the state of Missouri. KalimaJenkins and other KCMSD students stepped into the pictureas plaintiffs and reasserted the original complaint. Thus, theschool superintendent and the school board collaboratedwith the plaintiff at the initiation of the lawsuit, through thephase in which liability was found, and into court-imposedefforts to remedy the violation. Throughout the lengthy trial,the defendant KCMSD worked closely with the plaintiffs indeveloping arguments, writing complaints, and in styling therelief requested. On June 6, 1984, to the delight of theKCMSD, Judge Clark found that the state of Missouri and theKCMSD had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.Constitution by operating a racially segregated school system.The court also held in favor of the KCMSD on its cross-claimagainst the state {fenkins v. Missouri, 1984).

The district court then issued an order detailing the reme-dies necessary to desegregate the school district, includingthe finances required to implement those remedies {fenkins v.Missouri, 1985). In the original remedial order, the judgeestimated the costs to be almost $88,000,000 over three yearsof which he expected the state to pay $67,592,072 and

KCMSD to pay $20,140,472. The judge also ordered KCMSDto do something that would prove to have a momentousimpact on the case. He directed the KCMSD to prepare astudy addressing the usefulness of "magnet schools" to pro-mote desegregation {Jenkins v. Missouri, 1985). (A magnetschool is one with reputedly superior teaching, as well as bet-ter and more elaborate programs and facilities in a specificarea designed to "attract" students with interests in that area.)^

The state of Missouri appealed the judge's state allocationdecision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals alleging thatthe judge had failed to explain adequately why he hadimposed most of the cost on the state. The Eighth Circuit ulti-mately agreed with the state on that point. During the appealperiod, however, the district court's proceedings continued.In May 1986, KCMSD proposed to the court that it be orderedto operate new magnet schools. On June l6, 1986, the judgeapproved KCMSD's proposal to operate six magnet schoolsduring 1986-87, and authorized $12,972,727 for magnetschool operat ions and $12,877,330 for further capitalimprovements {Jenkins v. Missouri, 1986). However, perhapsas a harbinger of things to come. Judge Clark stated in hisopinion his long term goal "to make available to all KCMSDstudents educational opportunities equal to or greater thanthose presently available in the average Kansas City MissouriMetropolitan school district" {Jenkins v. Missouri: 1986, p. 54;emphasis added). Presumably restoring those affected by thesegregated school system meant that Kansas City Schoolswould have been superior to surrounding schools, and thecourt could order the district to go further than other schooldistricts had gone.

In August 1986, KCMSD submitted its long-range magnetschool plan and proposed an expansion of the magnetschools program to essentially make the whole school districta magnet schools system. In November 1986, Judge Clarkadopted the KCMSD plan and ordered that every high school,every middle school, and half of the elementary schoolsbecome magnet schools by the 1991-1992 school year.Exceeding original budgetary projections, the judge autho-rized $142,736,025 for operations and $52,858,301 for addi-tional capital improvements. The judge also found that thestate was 75 percent at fault and KCMSD was 25 percent atfault, and ordered them to share the costs of the remedy inthat proportion. He also found the state and KCMSD "jointlyand severally" liable for the costs of the plan. Under the prin-ciples of joint and several liability, each of the two responsi-ble parties pays a prescribed allocation, but each party also isobligated to pay more than its allocation or even all of thecosts if the other cannot pay. On September 15, 1987, thejudge boosted the amount necessary for capital improvementsto $187,450,334 {fenkins v. Missouri, 1987).

At this point, it became clear to Judge Clark that theKCMSD would lack the resources to pay for its 25 percentshare of the now more expensive plan. The court confrontedthe fact that the Missouri Constitution (Art. X, Sec. ll[b][c])limits local property taxes to $1.25 per $100 of assessed valu-ation unless a majority of the voters in the district approve ahigher levy, up to $3.26 per $100. The levy may be raised

Public Managers, Judges, and Legislators; Redefining the "New Partnership" 319

above $3.26 only if two-thirds of the voters agree.Complicating the situation was another provision of theMissouri Constitution (Art. X, Sec. 22[a]) which states that norevenue increase may be obtained through increases in theassessed valuation of real property. Further exacerbating thecase was Missouri's "Proposition C" (Missouri Rev. Stat. Sec.137.073.2 [1986]) which allocates one cent of every dollarraised by the state sales tax to schools, but had the effect ofdiverting nearly one-half of the sales tax collected in theKCMSD to other parts of the state.

In a series of actions aimed at raising the needed funds tocany out the school desegregation (which included the build-ing of new state-of-the-art schools), the court ordered theKCMSD to submit to the voters a proposal for an increase intaxes {Jenkins v. Missouri, 1985, p. 45). The voters respond-ed by defeating the proposal as they had done five times pre-viously in 1971, 1974, 1983, 1986, and 1987. Further effortsto obtain funds from the city council and the state legislaturefailed.

Voters interviewed by the local paper indicated that theydid not support the proposal because the KCMSD alreadywas spending more per pupil than all but one other districton the Missouri side of the metropolitan area. Yet theKCMSD was the only one in the metropolitan area withoutthe state's highest rating, AAA, and ranked last in scores onthe state's minimum competency test {Kansas City Star, June2, 1986). The Kansas City newspaper portrayed the KCMSDas "wasteful, top-heavy, and insensitive to the needs of chil-dren."

Convinced that the KCMSD had exhausted all avenues ofraising revenue and chastised by an appeals court that a lackof money could not be allowed to impede the desegregationplan. Judge Clark took the unusual action of ordering theKCMSD property tax levy raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100of assessed valuation. Outraged residents and the state ofMissouri appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court ofAppeals.

The state argued to the appeals court that the facilityimprovements were more than was necessary to carry out theeducational components of the desegregation plan and thatthe capital improvements plan was extravagant. The EighthCircuit dismissed these arguments summarily noting only that"the district court found that the overall condition of theschool buildings adversely affects the learning environmentand continues to discourage parents who might otherwiseenroll their children in the KCMSD" {Jenkins v. Missouri,1988, p. 1306). The appeals court was quite ready to allowthe lower court judge vast policy range, dismissing for exam-ple, the state's objection that a twenty-five acre farm and atwenty-five acre wildlife area were excessive by noting thatone suburban school district had a twenty-three acre museumand laboratory {fenkins v. Missouri, 1988, p. 1306). Whatexpenditures were necessary to remedy the constitutional vio-lation were to be determined very much by the trial judge,the court said.

officials in the executive.

legislative, and judicial branches also have to

decide which of the competing constitutional

principles shall have priority and how far the

dominant constitutional principle should

extend over the others.The appeals court also upheld the tax increase, but strong-

ly cautioned Judge Clark in the future not to set the propertytax rate himself. The two-judge majority cautioned that the"least intrusive" strategy would entail authorizing the KCMSDto set a "reasonable" levy increase and then to enjoin theoperation of state laws preventing such a remedy.Acknowledging that the levy would have to be subject tosome limitation, the majority concluded "...it is best to leavethe appropriate limitation to the district court's discretion"{fenkins v. Missouri, 1988, p. 1314). Thus, the district courtwould, in effect, act as a continuing appropriations and rev-enue committee, as well as a legislature for the school dis-trict.

Judge Lay, in dissent against allowing the district court toorder the district to levy a tax increase, stated that the courthad another alternative. Noting that the trial court had foundthe school district and the state jointly and severally liable, heobserved that the court could have held the state liable forthat portion of the costs that the district could not pay understate laws {fenkins v. Missouri, 1988, pp. 1318-1319). Thiswould then have left it up to the state legislature to decidewhether it wanted to change the laws to allow higher schooldistrict taxes, raise state taxes, or to shift resources from otherprograms. The two-judge majority rejected that alternative onthe grounds it "would simply prolong the controversy."Notions of separation of powers and federalism would haveto give way to issues of rapidity.

The Eighth Circuit's decision was further appealed by thestate of Missouri to the Supreme Court. The Court denied thestate's petition for review of the scope of the remedy (thebudget) and agreed to only a limited review of that part ofthe case dealing with the tax increase, even though theEighth Circuit concluded that the remedies ordered by thedistrict court went far beyond anything previously ordered bya court.3 On April 18, 1990, the Supreme Court issued itsopinion. The Court first held unanimously that the districtcourt itself could not impose the tax directly. The opinionthen went on to uphold, in a five to four vote, the authorityof a federal judge to direct a local government body to levytaxes, despite state law limitations, in order to remedy a con-stitutional violation. Three months later. Judge Clark ordered


the Kansas City school board to bypass taxpayers and raisetaxes another 24 percent to $4.96 per $100 of assessed value.

Implications for ConstitutionalPrinciples

Many cases involving remedies based on the Constitutioninvolve competing constitutional principles, and Missouri v.Jenkins is no exception. An argument persuasively has beenmade by Rosenbloom and Carroll (1990) that competent pub-lic officials need to be aware of constitutional imperatives andconduct their affairs accordingly. However, the officials in theexecutive, legislative, and judicial branches also have todecide which of the competing constitutional principles shallhave priority and how far the dominant constitutional princi-ple should extend over the others. How the courts see therelative importance of the principles and the latitude suchprinciples create for district court judges profoundly affectspublic service outcomes and our system of governance.

Missouri V. Jenkins involves four competing constitutionalprinciples: (1) equal protection (guaranteed by theFourteenth Amendment); (2) separation of powers (implicat-ed by Article III covering the powers of the judiciary); (3)federalism (provided for by the Tenth Amendment) and prin-ciples of state and local comity; and (4) the guarantee of arepublican form of government. The primary basis for justify-ing the remedy is equal protection guaranteed by theFourteenth Amendment. At this point, there can be little dis-pute that the children of Kansas City are guaranteed equalprotection of laws in education. The guarantee of equal pro-tection for our nation's children is no less important todaythan it was when Brown v. Board of Education was decidedin 1954. Further, the judges themselves did not file suit inthis case, nor did they create the discriminatory conditions inthe KCMSD. (Indeed, the government could have avoided theentire case by not violating the Fourteenth Amendment.)

Yet, there are different ways to respond to such discrimi-natory practices. The decision as to how to meet the com-mand of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves enormous discre-tion to district court judges. Their decisions regarding whatconstitutes "equal" and how to achieve such equality are sub-ject to debate. For example, how broad in scope in terms ofprogrammatic, budgetary, and revenue decisions is it neces-sary to make the remedy? How much realignment of govern-mental authority at state and local levels is necessary toassure the remedy? The Supreme Court majority did notdelve deeply into these issues except to say that theFourteenth Amendment was sufficient justification. Instead

Tliere is no other power more central

to the legislative function than the power

to impose taxes.

the Court seemed intent on erring on the side of preservinggreat policy range for district court judges in making all kindsof decisions pursuant to the broad mandate of the FourteenthAmendment. As the dissent in Missouri v. Jenkins stated, theact of the Court's majority "seems motivated by the fear thatfailure to endorse judicial taxation power might in someextreme circumstance leave a court unable to remedy a con-stitutional violation" {Missouri V. Jenkins, 1990, p. 1675).

This fear seems baseless, however, given the fact thatthere was never a finding by any court that without the impo-sition of the tax, the constitutional violations would not beremedied. Nor was there a finding that the district court'splan was the only possible means for correcting the constitu-tional violation. If the judge or the appeals court hadassigned costs that the school district could not pay underexisting Missouri law to the state itself, then the issue ofextending the judicial power over taxation might never havearisen. In addition, as die Supreme Court dissent pointed out,"there is no showing in the record that, faced with the rev-enue shortfall, the district court gave due consideration to thepossibility that another remedy among the 'wide range ofpossibilities' would have addressed the constitutional viola-tions without giving rise to the funding crisis" {Missouri v.Jenkins, 1990, pp. l677-l678).

The unprecedented court-mandated budget increases werenot even reviewed by the Supreme Court. The dissenterstook the majority to task for not considering the scope of thebudgetary remedy (which the district court judge said gavehim no choice but to impose a tax), and stated "...attention tothe extraordinary remedy here is the Court's duty" {MissouriV. Jenkins: 1990, p. 1678). There is substantial room fordebate concerning whether the Fourteenth Amendmentrequires magnet school facilities having classrooms with:

air conditioning, an alarm system and 15 micro-computers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium;greenhouses and vivariums, a 25-acre farm withan air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people;a model United Nations wired for language trans-lation; broadcast capable radio and television stu-dios with an edition and animation lab; a temper-ature controlled art gallery; movie editing andscreening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-freediesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-foot ele-mentary school; animal rooms for use in a ZooProject; swimming pools; and numerous otherfacilities {Missouriv. Jenkins, 1990, p. 1677).

The Supreme Court majority extended the judicial powerover taxes without examining the issue of what type of pro-grammatic and budgetary remedy would justify that step, andwhether the one fashioned for Kansas City met or vastlyexceeded the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Asthe dissent put it, "if the Court takes upon itself the power totax, respect for its own integrity demands that the power beexercised in support of true constitutional principles, not'suburban comparability' and 'visual attractiveness'" {Missouriw. Jenkins: 1990, p. 1678).


There is no other power more central to the legislativefunction than the power to impose taxes. Nowhere in theconstitutional description of judicial power in Article III is theword tax included. In addition, Alexander Hamilton(Federalist No. 78) seeking to assure that legislators had noth-ing to fear from the proposed Supreme Court in terms ofthreatening their basic prerogatives, wrote: "Thejudiciary...has no influence over either the sword or thepurse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth ofthe society, and can take no active resolution whatever.'"*

The Supreme Court has said many times in other casesthat federal courts may not assess or levy taxes {Moses v.Grant County, 1961; Davis v. Michigan, 1989). Although afederal court, under certain circumstances, can order a publicentity to levy a tax which the law authorizes {Griffin v. PrinceEdward County, 1964), the Supreme Court has never beforepermitted the ordering of a tax which the state law explicitlydoes not authorize (if the state law was not found to beunconstitutional). Nowhere in Missouri v. Jenkins was thestate law held to be unconstitutional. The majority did notsignificantly examine the separation of powers question, butsimply stated "... a court order directing a local governmentbody to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within thepower of a federal court" {Missouri v. Jenkins, 1990, p. 1665).As long as the district court judge had "reason based in theConstitution," the majority saw no separation of powers prob-lem in his ordering a tax increase {Missouri v. Jenkins, 1990,p. 1666). With this decision, a majority of the Supreme Courtleft no doubt that it considers that the separation of powersprinciple does not apply to the federal courts' relationship tothe states, and provided no limitation at all to the "new part-nership. "5

The related principle of representative democracy is like-wise affected by the majority's decision. The act of the Courtbinds individuals, the taxpayers of Kansas City, who werenot directly represented in the suit. There was no notice andtherefore no opportunity to be heard, as is the case in moretraditional local government taxation efforts. There was noforum for the public to discuss the balancing of demands forresources with the. availability of resources. From this per-spective, there was no due process.'̂

With respect to federalism, the majority quickly dismissedthe state's contention that the Tenth Amendment applied,proclaiming only that the Fourteenth Amendment underlyingthe judge's decision overcame it {Missouriv. Jenkins, 1990, p.1665). The majority did recognize the principle offederal/state comity, but in an ironic way. The majorityclaimed that the appeals court's act of striking down the dis-trict court's direct imposition of the tax and substituting anorder that the local government levy the tax itself preservedfederal/state comity.^ In other words, if the district courtjudge does not pull the local tax lever with his or her ownhand, but grasps the wrist of the local official and makes himor her pull it, federal/state comity is preserved.

In sum, the Supreme Court majority in Missouri v. Jenkinsappeared to see its role as preserving as much policy rangeas possible for the trial courts in fashioning a remedy, and

not in placing any significant limits based on other constitu-tional principles. As a result, the reach of district court judgesunder the broad prescriptions of the Fourteenth Amendmenthas been extended even further into other core constitutionalprinciples.

Implications for ManagementEffectiveness

Administrators and elected officials can discern severallessons from the outcome of this litigation to date. Both pro-grammatic gains and unanticipated consequences^ result frommanaging under federal court supervision. As noted previ-ously, a district court judge can determine what interests willbe recognized and which officials will be affected. In thiscase, local school officials have been empowered, somecharge, at the expense of the state and local taxpayers. Thedistrict itself, even though a defendant in the case, has beenactive behind the scenes from the very beginning, shapingthe litigation and its outcomes. Superintendent Garcia, forexample, has been described by the plaintiffs attorney as the"lead witness" to convince the court of the appropriateness ofplans. Hence, the court decision has given power and legiti-macy to the ideas of the superintendent, as well as others,that might never have been implemented. School district offi-cials have been enabled to create new and innovative pro-grams which many consider "cutting edge reforms." Thelargest enterprise has been the creation of magnet schoolsthat specialize in areas such as computer science, the per-forming arts, and languages. Another program created pre-pares 3- and 4-year-old "at risk" children for school. Otherexamples include a "Parents as Teachers" program and anextended day-care program for the children of working par-ents.

As discussed, those officials choosing the collaborator rolemay be motivated by the prospect of additional resources.Additional resources are a most visible result in Kansas City.The court decision has dramatically increased the budget ofthe school district. The budget grew from $115 million in1986 to $300 million in 1988—nearly a threefold increase.Moreover, the bill just for new school buildings and renova-tions of older buildings is expected to reach $350 million ormore. Finally, the total monetary cost of implementing thedesegregation plan is estimated to be $1 billion, a significantinfusion of funds into the KCMSD. The resources haveallowed the rebuilding of the aging, asbestos-laden, mice androach-infested infrastructure of thirty-nine schools. They havealso yielded a $68 million salary increase for district teachersand support staff. This averages to at least a 20 percent raisefor every district employee. Moreover, smaller classes havebeen possible through the hiring of additional teachers. Thishas yielded a reduction in the pupil to teacher ratio.

Unanticipated consequences resulting from the court orderinclude impacts on priorities, implementation, interorganiza-tional relations, and accountability mechanisms. First therehas been a loss of control over priority-setting by school offi-cials. From a "macro" or school district-wide perspective.


compliance with the courts' orders has become the KCMSD'stop priority, at times overshadowing its educational mandate.The courts have dictated which issues get attention in theschool district. The court orders are the sole components ofthe district's strategic plan.

Second, the court decision has been an implementationnightmare, yielding "overwhelming" budgeting, planning, andstaffing problems. Simply put, the changes have been toomuch too soon. Deadlines have been devised and missed asthe district has struggled with issues such as land acquisition,school design, and lack of staff. New deadlines have beenformulated and ignored.

Moreover, while the budget grew, the staffing of the busi-ness office initially did not. Hundreds of financial transactionsflooded the antiquated business office, overwhelming thestaff. For example, millions of dollars of purchases budgetedfor the newly renovated schools in the 1989 fiscal year werenot processed before the end of the year. The court held thatKCMSD could not obtain reimbursement for these purchaseseven though similar purchases in the future might be accept-able (Court Order, January 25, 1990). Under court guidelines,money budgeted but not spent in a fiscal year may not berecovered. Teachers have complained that the purchasingdepartment has lost their records, and schools have openedwithout needed supplies.

Further, the human resources division, unequipped for itsnew responsibilities, has fumbled the recruiting of many newteachers. Reports of applications withdrawn because oflengthy waits, misplaced files, and letters of appointment senttwo weeks after the opening of schools, were rampant. Insome instances, the teachers needed to fill specialty slotshave not been located. Exacerbating the situation, thehuman resources division has been without a permanentdirector for one and one-half years.

The court decisions also put pressure on and magnifieddeficiencies in district planning processes. For example, thescheduled opening of the Metropolitan Advanced TechnicalHigh School was delayed because officials had not anticipat-ed vacating the school for renovations and installation of spe-cialized equipment. While granting the delay, the court calledthe move a "tragic result" of "KCMSD's poor planning pro-cess." Further, the court warned that "if the proper planningdoes not occur, desegregation funds will not be approved"for the school (Court Order, July 5, 1989, p. l6). In anotherproject, the officials did not plan for asbestos removal; andunanticipated costs exceeded $910,000.

Additionally, the opening of a magnet program at the Kingmiddle school was delayed by a year because KCMSDexpected less than one-third of the 125 student slots to befilled. The court again criticized the district's poor planningand threatened to withhold funds, but also threatened to holdkey district administrators in contempt of court "if the plan-ning process for King...[was] not improved" (Court Order,July 3, 1989, p. 21). Decisionmaking under court order hasoften been delayed, because all major actions have had to beapproved by the judge. A May 3, 1990, memo from the

court decision has been an

implementation nightmare, yielding

"overwhelming" budgeting, planning and

staffing problems. Simply put, the changes

have heen too much too soon.

KCMSD superintendent to the school board, for example,indicates that the standard operating procedure has been toseek "prior approval...from the court." This has often been aslow process because of the court's busy docket.

Administrators have also lost control over numerousdetails of administration. When the plaintiffs and defendantsfiled a joint motion to request an independent study to deter-mine the extent to which KCMSD was able to meet certainfinancial obligations under the desegregation plan. JudgeClark ordered that the study must include a complete analysisof organizational structure and an assessment of the "leader-ship performance of key personnel involved in organizationdevelopment within the KCMSD" (Court Order, April 13,1990, pp. 2-3). Judge Clark has also reduced architect's feesfrom 8 percent to 6 percent, and denied a district request forfurniture because he was not supplied with information hewanted concerning its quantity and quality.

All of these implementation problems have created animmense amount of stress in the workplace, and have not ledto confidence in the management capacity of the districtadministration or the school board. A governor's task forcesurvey (1990) found that in terms of how it functions ineleven areas, the KCMSD board was rated below average bythe administration in nine areas, very low by the faculty innine areas, very low by the parents/residents in eight areas,and low or very low by members of the board itself in ninecategories. The superintendent was seen functioning as aver-age by the board as well as by the administration, and verylow by parent/resident respondents. Several assistant superin-tendents, the deputy superintendent, and finally the superin-tendent himself, have resigned.

Third, the court decision has complicated the managementof interorganizational relations leading to increased conflict.The largest source of interorganizational conflict for theKCMSD superintendent has come from the thirteen persondesegregation monitoring committee (DMC), appointed bythe judge to oversee all desegregation efforts and to report tothe judge. The existence of this committee, which has nostatutory limits, has yielded a loss of administrative power forthe district's chief administrator, with the committee dissect-ing or "micromanaging" virtually everything the district does.For example, in the summer of 1990, the DMC had a one-hour discussion on the width of a creek on a proposed ele-


mentary school campus. The DMC has also intervened inappointments for key personnel responsible for desegregationplan implementation. A May 1990, memo from the superin-tendent to the school board called this particularly "problem-atic because...[the DMC members] question district actions inan area in which the administration traditionally has had widediscretion. It is unclear how the tension over personnelappointments will be resolved." The committee has alsoinvolved itself in choosing sites for the new schools, recruit-ing students for the magnet schools, and advertising for newteachers. The DMC repeatedly has questioned the superin-tendent's leadership skills, scolding him in public for notbeing "charismatic enough." A report issued in the fall of1990 by the DMC concluded that the superintendent did nothave the "administrative expertise to implement so ambitiousa desegregation plan." When the DMC threatened to takeover the administration of the school district or have the courttake it over, the superintendent replied, "if they think theycan do a better job, they should go ahead and do it" {KansasCity Star, ]u\y 10, 1990).

Fourth, the administration has been beset by numerousdemands to install new accountability mechanisms. Onesource of challenge has been the result of the rapid influx ofmoney which has yielded a public demanding enhancedscrutiny and accountability. Such demands have been intensi-fied by allegations of corruption. One cab company, forexample, recently admitted overcharging the district by$137,000 for transporting students, while another cab compa-ny admitted overcharging by $84,800. In October 1988, morethan 6,100 Kansas City voters signed a petition calling on thestate auditor to examine district records for wasteful spendingor misuse of funds. The audit, which found inadequaterecordkeeping, lax control systems, the existence of employ-ee fraud, accounting irregularities, poor management prac-tices, and no competitive bidding in certain instances, wasreleased two years late, after most of the problems had beendetected and addressed. The DMC has also demandedaccountability to it and told the superintendent that its sup-port was contingent upon his solving the accounting andfinancial reporting problems in ways dictated by the DMC.The state also has demanded strict separation of desegrega-tion costs.9 New data systems have had to be established toaid in the internal control of spending, student record keep-ing, purchasing, insurance tracking, and security.

The Impact on Public AdministrationWhile Missouri v. Jenkins has had a great impact on the

ability of the KCMSD superintendent to manage and lead theschool district, it potentially could have an even more signifi-cant impact on public administration as a whole. The princi-ples discussed in the case are not limited to its discreet factu-al situation, or to school desegregation cases. The majoritycited 42 U.S.C Sec. 1983 (a broad-based civil rights liabilitystatute applicable to all state and local officials and local gov-ernments—see Wise [1989]) as providing the authority for theplaintiffs claim and the district court's exercise of its equi-table powers. Justice Kennedy wrote:

of our nation's local government

entities with taxing authority may be ordered to

levy taxes in access of the limit set by state

statute where there is reason based in the

Constitution for not observing the statutory

Imitation.There is no obvious limit to today's discussionthat would prevent judicial taxation in casesinvolving prisons, hospitals, or other public insti-tutions, or indeed to pay a large damages awardlevied against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. Sec.1983. This assertion of judicial power in one ofthe most sensitive policy areas, that involving tax-ation, begins a process that over time couldthreaten fundamental alteration of the form ofgovernment our Constitution embodies {MissouriV.Jenkins, 1990, pp. 1678-79).

Any of our nation's local government entities with taxingauthority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limitset by state statute where there is reason based in theConstitution for not observing the statutory limitation. In1987, there were 3,042 county, 19,200 municipal, l6,691township, and 14,721 school district governments legallyauthorized to levy property taxes. In addition, 41 percent ofspecial district governments, or 12,108 more public entitieswere legally authorized to levy property taxes (U.S. Dept. ofCommerce, 1988). Not all of these 65,762 local governmentswere subject to state imposed limits, however. Nine statesand the District of Columbia have no limits,'" while the otherforty-one states vary considerably in the type of local govern-ment entity limited by statute as well as the type of tax powerlimited (Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations, 1986). Examples of potentially vulnerable func-tions include hospitals, airports, sewerage, water supply, fireprotection, housing, and highways.

As the budgetary effects of a national policy which hasshifted responsibility for programs mandated by the federalgovernment to state and local governments becomes clearer,judicial taxation could come into play in many differentinstances. Groups unsuccessful in the legislature mayincreasingly tum to the judiciary for help. In the earlier yearsof public service litigation when federal grants were moreplentiful, courts reduced the impact on state treasuries bydirecting institutional defendants into the frequently openembrace of federal grant administrators (Cavanagh and Sarat,1980). This softened the blow to the public and diffused fed-eralism concems in that the federal govemment would helppay for what the federal courts ordered.

324 I'ublic Administration Review * July/August 1991, Vol. 51, No, 4

Given the federal fiscal situation, however, such grants arelargely extinct. This brings those seeking institutional changeface to face with legislatures. Public institutions could joinforces with interest groups to enlist the backing of a federalcourt in financing policy initiatives that do not have publicsupport. Such litigation may have less to do with constitution-al rights than with intergovernmental warfare over resources.As Justice Powell stated in his concurring opinion in MillikenV. Bradley, the plaintiffs and the defendant "have now joinedforces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from thestate treasury." Credence for this motivation in Kansas City isprovided by the school superintendent who stated in aninterview

I think one thing that's been missed by a lot ofKansas City residents is yes the property tax hasbeen doubled, but there is no other district—^wella couple of districts in the country—^where thestate, all the taxpayers in the whole state, arerebuilding our capital facilities in Kansas City. Itis unique. So the city is getting new school facili-ties and paying only about 30 percent of the cost(Rodgers, 1990)."

Local governments may be facing a dramatic change in theway that priorities are determined and funded. Local controland long established service priorities may be jeopardized asjudges who deal with only one of hundreds of competingissues facing local governments order taxes to support a sin-gle purpose. In such situations, no one person or entity willbe responsible for a total budget, yet the public will continueto demand accountability.

Conclusion: Reassessing the "NewPartnership"

If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, Missouri v. Jenkinsyields a redefinition of the role of public managers in ourlocal governments, then it also must bring with it a redefini-tion of the term "new partnership." Judges are not makingchanges in public services on their own. The on-going inter-action among multiple parties under federal court supervisionof a public service requires public managers to consider theirroles and responsibilities within the litigation context. Thedecisions they make not only will affect the priorities for pub-lic programs, but also can bring new players into the man-agement of public organizations, accompanied by numerousunanticipated consequences for management effectiveness. Itis difficult for public managers to control or adjust these con-sequences because so much decisionmaking becomes sus-ceptible to forces within the judicial decisionmaking arena.

In addition, the decisions by public managers in litigationcan have profound consequences for the arrangement of gov-ernmental power, priorities among constitutional principles,and relationships with other officials and the public. Theschool administrators' quest for resources, quality schooling,and equal protection in Kansas City has significant implica-tions for federalism, the separation of powers, and represen-

tative democracy. Public managers are by no means the pri-mary agents in determining the outcomes noted above. Thesenior judicial partner is in the position to arrange decision-making power over the public service among the various par-ties. Local officials are very much in a junior partner position,along with state executive officials, and other administratorsof other related jurisdictions. The choice to play the collabo-rative role, however, may bring a rearrangement of powerand priorities within state and local governments favorable tothe local jurisdiction if it fits within the goals of the judicialpartner. Nonetheless, local public managers need to considerthe implications of how their choices can reverberatethroughout the judicial system not only to affect their futuremanagement effectiveness, but the governing and manage-ment effectiveness of other state and local jurisdictions aswell. For example, it is inconsistent to call for respect for theprinciples of federalism from the federal government for reg-ulations considered oppressive, and then to ask the federalcourts to set aside state laws and the wishes of local voters toattain programmatic goals considered desirable.

Missouri V. Jenkins also demonstrates the capacity of fed-eral judges to choose their responsibilities and play theirrcrfes to determine who will have administrative, and evenlegislative power, at the state and local level. Once litigationbegins, federal district court judges are clearly in the preem-inent powerbroker position. If the judge chooses to play therole expansively, there are no hard and fast limits. Rather,the regulators of judicial policy range have demonstratedthat if they are likely to err in setting limits, they are dis-posed to err on the side of preserving an extensive rangefor judicial choice.

The judicial policy range for the federal courts may not bewithout limits, but Missouri v. Jenkins demonstrates that thoselimits are certainly fiexible enough to permit further expan-sion by the district courts. Tied in with this, state legislatureshave been welcomed to the new partnership with noticebeing served that even the core legislative power of taxationis not outside the purview of judicial decision. With theSupreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, a redefinitionof the term new partnership to include the judicial usurpationof legislative functions is needed. Perhaps the term "new tri-umvirate" is appropriate. But it must be acknowledged thatin this ruling body of three, all players are not created equal,and the formerly "least dangerous" player is now holdingmost of the cards. Clearly the "new triumvirate" will affectthe administration of our governments for years to come.

• • •

Rosemary O'Leary is assistant professor of public admin-istration at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University. Herresearch, which focuses on public administration and law, aswell as environmental policy, has appeared in several publicadministration, social science, and law journals.

Charles R. Wise is former managing editor for PublicAdministration Review and a recipient of the William E.Mosher Award for best article by an academician in PAR.


Notes

The authors thank Robin Lamott, Dan McNamara, and John Lindeman fortheir research assistance. The authors also thank three anonymous reviewersfor their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

t. The U.S. Department of Justice has a list of 235 school cases whichresulted in coun orders involving 506 school districts. Most of these caseswere decided in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Of the 506, 335 were stillunder court order in 1990 (House Select Committee on Kansas CitySchools: 1990, p. 4).

2. A recent study (Rossell, 1990) concluded that "voluntary" magnet planssuch as the Kansas City plan, characterized in part by voluntary whitetransfers to magnet schools placed in minority neighborhoods as well asvoluntary minority transfers to white schools, produce more desegrega-tion than mandatory magnet plans in which students are assigned toother-race schools.

3. The Eighth Circuit stated that the remedies had gone "far beyond any-thing previously seen in desegregation cases. The sheer immensity of theprograms encompa.ssed by the district coun's order—the large number ofmagnet schools and the quantity of capital renovations and new con-struction—are concededly without parallel in any other school district inthe country" {Missouri v. Jenkins, 1988, p. 1319).

4. James Madison (Federalist No. 48) wrote at the same time: "lln our sys-tem) the legislative depanment alone has access to the pockets of thepeople."

5. For the evolution of this doctrine, see Roben F. Nagel, 1978, "Separationof Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies." Stanford LawReview, vol. 30, pp. 661-724.

6. As the dissent stated with respect to the nature of the court order: "It hasthe purpose and direct effect of extracting money from persons who

have had no presence or representation in the suit. For this reason, thedistrict court's order imposing a tax was more than an abuse of discre-tion, for any attempt to collect the taxes from the citizens would havebeen a blatant denial of due process" (Missouriv. Jenkins, 1990, p. 1671).

7. The majority stated that the difference between having the coun imposethe tax and ordering the local authority to do it "... is far more than amatter of form. Authorizing and directing local govemment institutions todevise and implement remedies not only protects the function of thoseinstitutions, but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility forthe solutions to the problem of segregation upon those who have them-selves created the problem" (Missouri v. Jenkins, 1990, p. l663).

8. The data upon which the conclusions of this section are based werederived from interviews with KCMSD employees and residents conductedin summer, 1990, as well as an analysis of archival materials, KCMSDinternal memos, coun documents, govemment repons, and newspaperanicles.

9. A memo (May 3, 1990) from the superintendent to the school boardstates, "The District thus does not have unrestricted funds from its operat-ing budget, but should assume that operating expenditures will be scRiti-nized closely to determine whether they would more properly be used torepay the State or for other desegregation needs."

10. States which do not impose limits on local govemment tax rates or taxlevies include: Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.

11. Justice Kennedy observed, "The State's complaint that this suit representsthe attempt of a school district that could not obtain public suppon forincreased spending to enlist the District Coun to finance its educationalpolicy cannot be dismissed out of hand"(Aftoouri v, Jenkins, 1990, p.1676).

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Brown v. Board of Education, 1954. 347 U.S. 483.Davis V. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 1989. 109 S.Ct. 1500Griffin V. Prince FMward County, 1964. 377 U.S. 218Jenkins w. Missouri, 1984. 593 F. Supp. 1485Jenkins v. Missouri, 1985. 639 F. Supp. 19Jenkinsv. Missouri, 1986. 807 F.2d 657Jenkinsv. Missouri, 1987. 672 F. Supp. 400Jenkimv. Missouri, 1987. 838 F.2d 260Jenkinsv. Missouri, 1988. 855 F.2d 1295Jenkinsv. Missouri, 1988. 862 F.2d 677

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January 25, 1990Millikenv. Bradley, 1974. 418 U.S. 717Milliken v. Bradley, 1977. 433 U.S. 267Missouriv. Jenkins, 1990. 110 S.Ct. 1651Moses Lake Homesv. Grant County, 1961. 365 U.S. 744Swann v.Charlotte-Mecklenhurg Board of liducation, 1971. 402 U.S.I


public managers, judges, and legislators: redefining the \"new partnership

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