dixon lawsuit against pinal county sheriff officers in individual capacity 09-2650phxsrb.pdf

8/14/2019 Dixon lawsuit against Pinal County Sheriff Officers in individual capacity 09-2650PHXSRB.pdf

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Mark E. DixonP.O. Box 12695Casa Grande, AZ 85130(520) 705-2945Pro Se

_ ~ G 0_ RECeIVED COpy

N CLEflIKU DISTRICT ~ a U ROISTRlCi OF AI q ZONA P O ~ P U

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF ARIZONA5

CIV 092650PHXSRB

AMENDED COMPLAINTv

PLAINTIFFMark E. Dixon,

Stephen Clark, in his individual )capacity; )Travis Cote, in his individual capacity; )Andrew Goode, in his individual )capacity; )Philip Leblanc, in his individual capacity; )Eli Pile, in his individual capacity; )Carol Le e Dixon, in he r individual jcapacity; )

DEFENDANTS. )

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15 NOTICE OF IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES CORRECTIONOF PARTY NAMES AND CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS

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1. Mark E. Dixon, undersigned, and referred to hereinafter as ( Plaintiff ), as directed bythis Court, hereby submits this Amended Complaint for the purpose of clarifying the correct

19 identity, and correct spelling of the names of above listed defendants I , 2 and 5. In addition,20 clerical errors previous manually corrected in his December 21, 2009, Complaint have been21 corrected, as well as the re-nwnbering of all paragraphs as needed.22 2. Plaintiff recently received from the Pinal County Sheriff s Office, docwnents23 confirming that Gregory Clark previously identified as Defendant 1 in th e Plaintiff s24 December 21, 2009, Complaint, wa s not the deputy identified in the Complaint in 6, 14-15,25 18-19 21 41-42. The Pinal County Sheriff Deputy present and referred in said paragraphs was

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in fact Stephen Clark. Henceforth; Stephen Clark will be identified as Defendant 2 3 The correct spelling of the last name ofDefendant 2, previously identified as Travis Cody is Travis Cote, who will hereinafter be referred to as Travis Cote, or Defendant 2.4 4 Defendant 5, previollslyidentified as Pinal County Deputy, JohnDoe has been5 positively identified by the Pinal County Sheriffs Office as being Eli Pile.6 5 Plaintiff begs the Court s indulgence, and requests that this Amended Complaint be7 accepted to replace the Plaintiff s December 21, 2009, Complaint.8 6 As of the date oftms document, the only Defendants having been served the9 Summons and Complaint are Carol Lee Dixon, Philip LeBlanc, and Andrew Goode. Pursuant to

1 this Court s Order accepting this An1ended Complaint, Plaintiffwill serve a copy of this Amended Complaint to the three (3) previously served Defendants by U.S. Mail. In addition,12 the Plaintiff, upon issuance of the three cOlTected Summons, by the Clerk of this Court, to be13 properly served on the remaining three (3) Defendants, along with a copy of the Plaintiffs14 Amended Complaint.15 7 The Plaintiff further begs the Court to note that with the exception of the corrections16 noted above, the substance of the Original Complaint has not been altered in this Amended17 Complaint.18 II COMPL INT19 8 Plaintiffmakes the following allegations based on facts, \\iitnesses, as well as actions2 personally taken by the above named defendants directly against him, all ofwhich are supported21 by evidence. This matter has been brought before this Court not for any malicious purpose, nor22 to harass the Defendants, but solely in the name of Justice. This is a Civil Rights action seeking a23 declaratory judgment that the above named Defendants, did willfully and knowingly enter into a24 criminal conspiracy to extort property that was legally in the possession of the Plaintiffprior to25 December 2, 2009, and that the actions, willfully committed by the Defendants, has resulted in

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the crime of Extortion, against the Plaintiff, and has deprived him of his Civil Rights guaranteedto him by the Constitution of the United States as well as the Constitution and laws of the Stateof Arizona. The Plaintiff fmiher begs this Court s indulgence due to the length of this complaint,but due to the unique circumstances, unquestionably documented herein, and despite thePlaintiffs efforts to be as briefas possible the substance of this complaint is warranted.

III JURISDICTION STANDING AND VENUE9 The District Court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1331 and

1343(a)(l)(2)(3)(4), which confers original jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear suitsalleging the violation of rights and privileges under the United States Constitution. Additionally,pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, if the violations are found to be of a criminal nature, in theinfliction ofpunishment on the party(s) found guilty.

10. This Court has authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201(a). Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 39 (a)(b). 2 PlaintiffMark E Dixon, is a Citizen of the United States over the age of21 and

makes his primary residence in the County of Pinal, State of Arizona. 3 The Plaintiff is authorized to bring this complaint pursuant to 42 U S c 1983, and

1985, to enjoin the above named Defendants for the purpose of the redress of the actions,inactions, crimes, and conspiracies, willfully preplanned and committed against him, which haveunquestionably resulted in blatant deprivations of the Plaintiffs Civil Rights, which are securedand protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of the Constitution of the UnitedStates, the Constitution of Arizona, and other significant State and Federal Laws.

4 Defendant Stephen Clark, referred to hereinafter as ( Defendant 1 ), is a Citizen ofthe United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within theState ofArizona and within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 1 is employed as a peaceofficer with the Pinal County Sheriffs Office.


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5 Defendant Travis Cote, referred to hereinafter as ( Defendant 2 ), is a Citizen of the2 United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the State 03 Arizona, and within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 2 is employed as a peace officer4 with the Pinal County Sheriff s Office.s 6 Defendant Andrew Goode, referred to hereinafter as ( Defendant 3 ), is a Citizen of6 the United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the7 State ofArizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 3 is employed as a peace8 officer with the Pinal County Sheriff s Office.9 7 Defendant Philip LeBlanc, referred to hereinafter as ( Defendant 4 ), is a Citizen of

1 the United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the11 State ofArizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 4 is employed as a peace12 officer \vith the Pinal County Sheriffs Office.13 8 Defendant Eli Pile, referred to hereinafter as ( Defendant 5 ), is a Citizen ofthe14 United States over the age of21 and makes his primary residence in a County within the State 015 Arizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 5 is employed as a peace officer with16 the Pinal County Sheriff s Office.17 9 Defendant Carol Lee Dixon, referred to hereinafter as ( Defendant 6 ), is a Citizen18 of the United States over the age of 21, and makes her primary residence in Pinal County within19 the State ofArizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 6 is employed as a Loan2 Officer with the Pinal County Federal Credit Union.21 20. Defendants named in paragraphs 14-18 above, are Officers of the State ofArizona22 and pursuant to ARS 3 8 ~ 2 3 1 E , are required to take the following oath, do solemnly swear or affirm that will support the Constitution of the United States and the24 Constitution and laws of the State ofArizona, that I will bear truefaith and allegiance the5 same and defend them against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that will faithfully and

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impartially discharge the duties the office . In addition, ARS 38-231(F), states, For2 the purposes this section officer or employee means any p rso elected appointed or3 employed either on a part-lime or full-time basis by this state or any its political subdivisions 5 21. Defendants named in paragraphs 14-19 above are being sued in their individual6 capacity. In addition, Plaintiff, also gives formal notice, that the actions, inactions, crimes, and7 conspiracies, willfully preplanned and committed against him by sworn officers of the Pinal8 County Sheriffs Office, have unquestionably resulted in blatant deprivations of the Plaintiffs9 Civil Rights, which are secured and protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of

10 the Constitution of the United States, and that at all pertinent times the above named Defendants11 acted or failed to act under color ofArizona State Law.12 IV STATEMENT OF FACTS MEMORANDUM AND POINTS OF AUTHORITIES13 22. On December 1,2009, at 2:49 p.m., the Plaintiff received a telephone call from14 Defendant 1, of the Pinal County Sheriff s Office. Defendant 1 informed Plaintiff, that pursuant15 to a statement made by Defendant 6, that the Plaintiffwas in possession of property belonging16 to her, (a dog named Shilo) and that if the Plaintiffdid not surrender the animal, Defendant 17 would cause the Criminal Arrest of the Plaintiff for theft.18 23. The Plaintiff advised Defendant 1, that the animal in fact belonged to him, and that19 he could produce legal documentation that substantiated the Plaintiff s ownership of the animal.20 Defendant flatly refused to consider the Plaintiffs side of the story, and ended the217

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Carol Lee Dixon, is in fact the ex-wife of the Plaintiff. The two were recently divorced inApril of 2009, as a result of a divorce petition initiated and filed by Ms. Dixon, said petition wasuncontested by the Plaintiff. Prior to the divorce, despite positive efforts by the Plaintiff toobtain proper medical and psychological care for her condition, Ms. Dixon continued to displayerratic and irrational behavior, including a suicide attempt.

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conversation, by offering threats that he would forward a complaint to the Office of the Pinal2 County Attorney, for Criminal Prosecution. 23 24. As a result of the conversation described in 22-23 above, on December 1,2009,4 at 3:01 p.m., the Plaintiff contacted the Pinal County Sheriffs Office, and asked to speak.5 to a Supervisor after which he was advised that someone would call him back.6 25. On December 1,2009, at 3:27 p.m., the Plaintiff received a telephone call from the7 Pinal County Sheriff s Office, from an individual, who later identified himself as Defendant 2.8 26. The Plaintiff, advised Defendant 2, of his previous conversation with Defendant 1, and fWiher advised Defendant 2, that the animal was in fact his property, and again offered to

1 produce documentation that proved the Plaintiff s ownership of the animal. This conversation11 concluded with Defendant 2 stating that he would look into the matter and contact the Plaintiff12 with his findings.13 27. On December 1 2 9 at 3:33 p.m., Defendant 2 contacted the Plaintiff with his14 findings, and informed the Plaintiffthat while he disagreed with the manner in which Defendant15 1 was handling the matter, it was not within his authority to intervene or interfere with another16 Deputy s investigation. 3 4 517

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2 Pursuant to A.R.S. 13-1804 A 5 ...A person commits theft by extortion by knowinglyobtaining or seeking to obtain property or services by means ofa threat to do in the future anyoUhe following: ccuse anyone ofa crime or bring criminal charges against anyone 3 Pursuant to A.R.S. 13-1003 A) ... A person commits conspiracy i vith the intent topromote or aid the commission o fan offense, such person agrees with one or more personsthat at least one ofthem or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense andone of the parties commits an overt act infitrtherance of the offense 4 similarly, 42 u s c 1985 3j states, Jftwo or more persons in any State or Territoryconspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises ofanother, for the purpose ofdepriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class ofpersons oUhe equal protection ofthe laws, or ofequal privileges and immunities under the laws In addition, 42 Us C. 1985(3) further provides: .. .in any case ofconspiracy set forth in this section, i fone or morepersons engaged therein do or cause to be done, any act infurtherance of the object ofsuch

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28. On December 2, 2009, at 15 p.m., the Plaintiff, along with his dog6 ( Shilo ), whohas been the Plaintiffs constant 24/7 friend and close companion for the past two and one half(2 1/2) years, both left from their residence located at I0380 W Pasadena, in route to the PinalCounty Attorney s Office, located in Florence, Arizona, for the sole purpose of presenting theownership documents, previously ignored by Deputies of the Pinal County Sheriffs Office, asstated in 23 and 26 above, to put an end to the matter in controversy once and for all.

29. The Plaintiff, intentionally brought Shilo, confident that the County Attorney sOffice, would as a matter of due diligence and its duty to insure the Plaintiffs FourteenthAmendment right to due process, would summon a Pinal County Animal Control Officer, whocould electronically verify Shilo s ownership, resulting in a positive identification in favor of thePlaintiff, and take proper action, including an immediate dismissal of any criminal charges thatmay have been improperly initiated, as threatened by Defendant 1 as shown in 23 above, whohad refused to assert any due diligence or fair consideration of the Plaintiffs Civil Rights in hisconspiracy whereby another is injured in his person orproperty or deprived ofhaving andexercising any right or privilege ofa citizen of the United States the party so injured or deprivemay have an action for the recovery ofdamages occasioned by such injury or deprivationagainst anyone or more of the conspirators 5 42 U c 1986 definitively states, Everyperson who having knowledge that any of thewrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in section 98 of this title are about to becommitted and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the sameneglects or refuses so to do such wrongful act be committed shall be liable to the partyinjured or his legal representatives for all damages caused by such wrongful act which suchperson by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in anaction on the case; and any number ofpersonsguilty ofsuch wrongful neglect refus l m ve joined s defend nts in the ction 6 Because of their longstanding, and close emotional attachment, the Plaintiffhad gone to theexpense of having a computer chip, surgically implanted into Shilo by a certified professionalVeterinarian, to insure her positive identification by any other Veterinarian or Animal ControlOfficer, to insure Shilo s, quick and safe return, should she for any reason become separatedfrom the excellent care, protection, as well as the constant love and affection she is provided bythe Plaintiff, a single father who has also been awarded custody of both of his two children (onemale, and one female) by the Pinal County Superior Court.

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investigation.30. Upon leaving their residence, the Plaintiff, with Shilo in the vehicle as a passenger,

proceeded West on Pasadena, and as required by law, properly signaled to indicate hisintention to make a right hand tum, after which he made a complete stop at the intersection ofPasadena and Belaire. The pair then proceeded North on Belaire, and once again, uponapproaching the intersection of Belaire and Woodruff, as required by law, properly signaled toindicate his intention to make a right hand tum, after which he made a complete stop at theintersection of Belaire and Woodruff. The pair then preceded East on Woodruff a very shortdistance when the Plaintiff, became aware that a Red Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV), \ lith flashinglights was close behind him.

31. Quickly making the assumption that the vehicle was a Fire Department, EmergencyResponse Vehicle, responding to an emergency, the Plaintiff, as required by law immediatelysignaled to tum right, and pulled off the pavement, onto the right hand shoulder of Woodruff,and made a complete stop, in a lawful and responsible effort to allow the Emergency Vehicle tosafely pass.

32. Rather than pass, the Red SUV with lights still flashing, came to a stop behind thePlaintiff s vehicle. The Plaintiff, in his rear view mirror, then observed a white male, dressed inplain clothes, exit the Red SlTV and approach the Plaintiffs now parked vehicle whichcontained the Plaintiff and his companion Shilo.

33. Upon reaching the Plaintiff s vehicle, the plain clothed individual, (later identified as being Defendant 3) walked up to the driver side window of the Plaintiff s vehicle and withoutmaking any effort to properly identify himself to the Plaintiff, ordered the Plaintiff, to hand overhis driver license.? The Plaintiff then inquired as to the reason he had been pulled over?7 The Plaintiffs proof of insurance and registration were never requested as is commonprocedure in a routin traffic stop.

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1. Defendant 3, alleged that the Plaintiff had made an illegal right hand tum, and further stated the2 Plaintiff failed to signal a right hand turn before preceding East on Woodruff after stopping at th, intersection of Belaire and Woodruff.8 Upon receiving this questionable explanation, the4 Plaintiffcomplied with the Officer's request to examine the Plaintiffs driver license, at which5 time Defendant 3, with the Plaintiffs driver license in his possession, returned to his unmarked6 vehicle with the Plaintiffs driver license.7 34. The Plaintiffwas then startled by a second plain clothed individual,9 later8 identified as Defendant 4, who appeared outside of the Plaintiff's Driver side window.9 Defendant 4, having deliberately postured himself immediately outside of the Plaintiff's

1 vehicle, stood with his gun hand readied on his side-arm in a threatening, calculated manner,12

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as if his true intention was to draw his weapon and fire upon Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was thenstartled by an t ir plain clothed individual (Defendant 5), [ who also unexpectedly appearedoutside of the Plaintiff s passenger side window, and postured himself in a threateningmanner similar to that of Defendant 4 l2

8 The Plaintiff was in fact never issued a citation or warning for the alleged illegal right handwhich also implies that the deputies in fact staged the traffic stop, resulting in a brazen criminalscheme, executed in excess of the deputies' authority.9This individual was unquestionably the Supervising Officer in charge, who directed theactions of the other Deputies.1 The identity of this third plain clothed Deputy refen-ed to herein as Defendant 5, has yet to bedetermined.It A.R.S. 13-1804 A. l A person commits theft by extortion by knowing/v obtaining orseeking to obtain propertv or services by means ofa threat to do in the future any ofthefollowing: 1 Cause physical injury to anyone by means ofa deadly weapon or dangerousinstrument These same facts when considered within the provisions ofA.R.S. 13-1804 C.. .Theft by extortion as defined in subsection A paragraph 1 is a class 2 felony. Othenvisetheft by extortion is a class 4 feLony In addition, A.R.S. 13-1804 C when examined in thecontext of the facts stated above unquestionably provides clear and convincing evidence thatDefendant 4, and Defendant 5 are guilty of nothing less than a class 2 felony within the meaningofA.R.S. 13-1804 C Further, as provided by A.R.S. 13-1003 C A person who conspires

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35. The Plaintiff asked Defendant 4, if his actions were in regards to the Plaintiffs dog2 and Defendant 4 stated that it was. Defendant 4 then asked the Plaintiff if he would surrender

3 Shilo, and the Plaintiff infonned Defendant 4 that he would not, and that he was already in route4 to the County Attorney s Office to properly address the pending Criminal charges, and to5 provide the County Attorney with documentation to resolve the matter ofShilo s true6 ownership.l3 47 36. Defendant 4, then infonned the Plaintiff that his driver s license was suspended and8 he had the authority arrest the Plaintiff, as well as impound his vehicle (a significant tool9 necessary for the Plaintiff to provide a living for himself and his children) for a minimum of 30

1 days, if the Plaintiff refused to submit to his threats, and sWTender Shilo. Defendant 4 then11

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to commit a number ofoffenses is guilty ofonly one conspiracy if the multiple offenses are theobject of the s me greement or relationship n the degree of the conspiracy shall bedetermined by the most serious offense onspired to

The Plaintitl1ater ascertained that these two individuals had approached his vehicle from anunmarked blue sedan they had concealed behind the Red SUV driven by Defendant 3

42 u s c 1985(2) H.Obsrructing justice; intimidating partv, witness, or juror - two or Imore persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, anyparty or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or tram testirying toanv matter pending therein, freely. fully, n truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in hisperson or property on account ofhis having so attendedor tesNfied. or to influence the verdict,presentment, or indictment ofany grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such jurorin his person orproperty on account ofany verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assentedto by him, or ofhis being or having been suchjuror; or i{tvlio or more persons conspire for thepurpose of impeding. hindering, obstructing, or defeating. in an}' manner, the due course ofjustice in any State or Territory. with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection o{thelaws, or to injure him or his 2roDertv for lawfull}' enforcim . or attemDtim to enforce. the ri.ht aany person, or class ofpersons. to the equal protection ofthe laws: 4 Defendant 4, notified the Plaintiff of the Suspended License while Defendant 3, was stillrunning the Plaintiffs Driver License.

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implied that he would refrain from such actions if the Plaintiff agreed to surrender Shilo to him. ls37. Defendant 3, then approached from the Red SUV and notified the Plaintiffthat his

Arizona Driver License was in fact suspended. Faced with the option of being deprived of hisliberty or submitting to the illegal seizure and unconstitutional deprivation of Shilo, the Plaintiffreluctantly agreed to submit to the extortion conspiracy, and surrender his companion Shilo toDefendant 4.

38. After further discussion, Defendant 4 agreed to follow the Plaintiff back to hisresidence so the Plaintiff could obtain Shilo s leash and surrender her. After arriving at hisresidence,16 the Plaintiffagain politely asserted that Shilo legally belonged to him and assuredDefendant 4, that he could produce credible witnesses that could confirm Shilo s ownership.Defendant 4 then informed the Plaintiff that Defendant 6 had made the allegation that Shilo scomputer chip would confirm she was the legal owner. 17

39. The Plaintiff s son James Dixon, having arrived at the Plaintiffs residence at thesame time as his father and the Pinal County Sheriff Officers, also pleaded with Defendant 4 toallow him the opportunity to produce vvitnesses as well. The Plaintiff then produced credible

5 A.R.S. 13-1804 7 , which states that ...A person commits theft by extortion byknowingly obtaining or seeking to obtain property or services by means ofa threat to do n thefuture any o h following ake or withhold action as a public servant or cause a publicservant to take or withhold action .6 The fact that these three deputies instructed the Plaintiff to illegally operate his vehicle with asuspended driver license to obt in le sh for the dog is proofpositive that a pre-conceivedplan had been made for the sole purpose of obtaining the Plaintiffs dog. Pursuant to A.R.s. 28-351 (Aj ... peace officer shall cause the removal n either immobilization orimpoundment ofa vehicle the peace officer determines that a person is driving the vehiclewhile either of the following applies: The person s driving privilege is suspended or revokedfor any reason17 No attempt was made to summon an Animal Control Officer to electronically scan thecomputer chip and determine the ownership of the dog.


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documentation, including a certificate, that lists the Plaintiffas 8hilo's registered owner, whichwas issued by the Veterinarian who surgically implanted Shilo s computer Chip, a Licenseissued by the Pinal County Animal and Control, a Rabies Vaccination Celtificate issued by theCasa Grande Animal Hospital and an invoice issued by the Casa Grande Animal Hospitalreceipting that the PlaintitJhad invested over One Hundred and Fifty Dollars ( 150.00) to ensureShi10 was well and would continue to be healthy. All of these documents provide apreponderance of incontrovertible evidence establishing that the Plaintiff is, and continues to beShilo's legal owner.

40. None of the evidence swayed Defendant 4, in his unrelenting resolve to illegallyseize Shilo from her owner. Further, Defendant 4, failed to produce any Court issued Warrant,Writ, Civil Standby Order, or any other valid Order signed by a Judge, which would have giventhe Defendants the authority to seize Shilo from her legal 0 WTIer Defendant 4, after examiningthe Plaintiffs ownership documents, took dO\vn some written notes and then advised JamesDixon that ifhe could produce affidavits that proved Shilo belonged to the l i n t i f t ~ Shilo wouldbe returned to James' father. James Dixon then inquired to Defendant 4, as to what he wasgoing to do with Shilo, and Defendant 4 advised him that it was his intention to deliver Shilo toDefendant 6 i9

No reasonable person, nor Judge nor Jury, in good conscience, can deduce that the allegedillegal right tum discussed in 33, constitutes probable cause which would legally authorizethe Deputies to seize the Plaintiffs property \vithin the scope of the Fourth Amendment of theUnited States Constitution, especially in the absence of any Court issued documents.9 As suggested by the statements made by Defendant 1 in 22 above, this matter wasallegedly the result of a Criminal investigation. Proper procedure would be to confiscate andsecure the animal as evidence until the matter could be decided by a Judge. Defendant 4 5actions have effectively broken the chain of evidence, which suggests that Defendant l s allegedcriminal investigation was nothing more than a fraudulent unfounded threat ofExtortion.

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41. The Plaintiffthen surrendered Shilo, leash and all to Defendant 4, who along withthe Defendants 3 and 5, appeared to be vacating the Plaintiff s premises. The Deputies, alreadyheading to their vehicles to leave, suddenly hesitated and after a short conference betweenDefendants 3 and 4, that was held out of ear shot of both James Dixon and the Plaintiff,Defendant 3, prepared a citation directed against the Plaintiff for driving on a suspended license,which he then handed to Defendant 4, who in turn, handed to the Plaintiff. Defendant 4, thenfurther offered additional threats to the Plaintiff, by stating that if any of the infomlation he hadgiven to Defendant 4 were false, or there were any problems that Defendant 4 would comeback and arrest him for driving on a suspended license.

42. The Plaintiffthen had his son James Dixon drive him to the Casa Grande City Courtand after determining that a previous civil traffic matter he previously thought had been resolved,was still outstanding, paid the required fine. Jan1es Dixon then drove the Plaintiff to the ArizonaDepartment of Motor Vehicle Office DMV). Upon receiving the required documentationshowing that the deficiency, which had resulted in the suspension of the Plaintiff s DriverLicense, had been resolved, the Plaintiffs Drivers license was reinstated.

43. On December 3 2 9 at approximately 12:00 p.m. James Dixon, as discussed in40 above, obtained several affidavits from individuals asserting that Shilo was in fact owned bythe Plaintiff. As previously instructed by Defendant 4, James delivered said affidavits to thePinal County Sheriff Office, located at Trekell Road and Cottonwood lane in Casa Grande. Thedocuments were entrusted to a Sheriffs Office employee to be given to Defendant 4, for properconsideration.

44. On December 4, at 8:32 a.m. the Plaintiff contacted the Pinal County Sheriffs Officeand left a message requesting Defendant 4, to contact him so a meeting could be arranged toresolve this matter. To date no response has been received, and this inaction has subsequentlyresulted in the filing of a fonnal notice of these violations, with service made by a professional

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process server, to the Pinal County Board of Supervisors, the Pinal County Sheriff, as well as the2 Pinal County Attorney in addition to being sent certified mail to Arizona s Governor, Attorney3 General, and Director of the Department of Public Safety all ofwhom have actively turned a4 blind eye to this whole situation.5 Conclusion6 45. The above statement of facts sadly documents a shocking and repulsive account of an-ogant abuse of authority, perpetrated by the very individuals who have been entrusted by the81 1citizens of Pinal County to abide by their solemn oath which pursuant to A.R.S. 38-231 E ,9 clearly states that they are required to ... support the Constitution of the United States n the

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Constitution n laws of the State ofArizona ... 46. Article II, Section 4, of the Arizona Constitution, definitively states that, No person

shall be deprived oflife liberty, or property without due process oflaw. In addition, ArticleII, Section 2, which precedes section 4, definitively states that, All political power is inherentin the people and govenunents derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, andare established to protect and maintain individual rights. Most importantly, Article II section1 which precedes all of the Articles of the Arizona Constitution, cited herein, definitively states,A frequent recun-ence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rightsand the perpetuity of free government.

47. There is no question that the Pinal County Sheriff s Office has the duty to investigateany matter which is brought to their attention. With this duty also comes the responsibili ty tofairly and impartially conduct all investigations in a matter that protects the Civil Rights of all ofthe parties involved. The Federal Courts have shown that they have little or no tolerance forState Officials who fail to do so. See SCREWS UNITED STATES, L325 u 91 (1945) tPage 129; with the United States Supreme Court stating:

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1 they do not, they should, for they assume that duty HJhen they assume their office. Ignorance of2 the law is no excuse for men in general. It is less an excuse for men whose special duty is to3 apply it and therefore to know and observe it their knowledge is not comprehensive, state offiCials know or should A 71 W when theypass (he limits of their authority, so far at any rate that5 their action exceeds honest error ojjudgment and amounts to abuse of their office and its function. When they enter such a domain in dealing with the citizen s rights, they should do so at7 their peril, whether that be created by state or federal law. For their sworn oath and theirfirst8 duty are to uphold the Constitution, then only the law of the state which too is bound by the9 charter

The United States Supreme Court further stated: ... officials who violate it must act in intentional or reckless disregard ofindividual rights and cannot be ignorant that they do great wrong. This being true, they must be taken to3 act at peril of incurring the penalty placed upon such conduct by the federal law as they do of14 that the state imposes 5 48. As clearly shown above, none ofDefendants 1 5 made any remote attempt to

6 exercise proper due diligence with regard to the Protection of the Plaintiffs Civil Rights. The7 callus and prejudicial manner in which this matter has been handled, implies not only that8 Defendants 1-5, had already established a questionable alliance with Defendant 6 but that they9 would go to any length to enforce their illegal position by offering severe threats and2 intimidations to physically force the Plaintiff into surrendering property which the Plaintiff2 could clearly prove belonged to him.22 49. If Defendant 1 through his investigation, had obtained evidence sufficient enough3 to compel the County Attorney s Office into seeking a Criminal Indictment, then why didn t he24 forward the matter to the County Attorney in the first place? Why didn t Defendants 1-5,25 properly refer Defendant 6, to the Justice Court who has the proper authority to decide such

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Civil matters, instead of abusing their own limited authority by improperly taking the law intotheir OWT hands?

50. The facts stated above, provide a preponderance of evidence that Stephen Clark,Travis Cote, Andrew Goode, Philip LeBlanc, Eli Pile, and Carol Lee Dixon all knowingly andwillingly committed crimes against the Plaintiff. Their motive which will no doubt cause therapid and subsequent destruction of their careers, has yet to be disclosed.

51. As shoWTI by the facts above, the Plaintiffhas made every reasonable attempt toassert his Civil Rights, each time being forcefully and intentionally denied any opportunity ofbeing afforded the equal protection of his rights guaranteed to him by the Fourth and FifthAmendments to the Constitution ofthe United States ofAmerica, by the very individuals whomthe Fourteenth Amendment commands to uphold and provide due process protection.

52. The Supreme Court and Justice Rehnquist recognized the necessity for citizens to beable to assert their Civil Rights in Federal Courts in PARRATTv. TAYLOR, 451 s 5271981 1 1 S Ct 1908 by stating: ... The Court recognized as much in Monroe v. Pape, 365us 167 1961 when we explained after extensively reviewing the legislative history of 1983,that [iJt is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passedwas to afford fe er lright in federal courts because, by reason ofprejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance orotherwise, state laws might not be enforced n the claims ofcitizens to the enjoyment ofrights,privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Page 53) Fourteenth Amendment might be deniedby the state agencies. 1d. at 18

53. Over One Hundred 100) years ago, the United States Supreme Court in UnitedStates v Lee, 106 s 96 1882), unequivocally stated:

No man in this country is so high that he is above the 1m v. No officer of the lmvmay set that 1m-vat defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highestto the lowest, are creatures of the lmll and are bound to obey it.

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The High Court then sincerely added: It is the only supreme power n our ~ y s t ofgovernment and every man who by

accepting office participates n its fimctions s only the more strongly bound to submit to thatsupremacy n to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authoritywhich gives

VI STATEMENT OF CLAIM54. As just compensation for the County's Duly Sworn Agents, intentional, malicious

and illegal actions, which in return caused the Plaintiff to deprived of the constant support,security, comfort, as well as love and affection of his companion Shilo, the Plaintiffwill acceptno less than 1,000.00 per day commencing on Wednesday December 2, 2009, until such a timethat Plaintiffs irreplaceable, companion Shil0 is safely returned to him, unharmed and in ahealthy condition.

55. As just compensation for the County's Duly Sworn Agent's intentional, maliciousand injurious behavior as described in 48 above, which has caused and continues to cause thePlaintiff, constant worry, mental anguish, pain and suffering, loss of sleep, all of which hasmanifested into a noticeable decline of the Plaintiffs physical health and well-being as furthermade evident by a dangerous, and measurable increase in the Plaintiffs blood pressure, which inreturn has resulted in a decrease of the Plaintiffs ability to productively and safely operate heavyequipment, and recently culminated into a serious health condition that on December 19 2 9required the Plaintiffs children to rush him to seek emergency medical attention, due to the factthat l i n t i f t ~ a previously healthy man, aged only 5 years, was now experiencing severe chestpains, dizziness and other life threatening symptoms of Cardiac Arrest, the cause of which hasbeen determined by heath care professionals as being severe stress. The monetary costs of thenecessary medical care and subsequent overnight stay in the Hospital are yet to be detemlined,however the Plaintiff requests no less than an additional 1,000.00 per day commencing on

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Wednesday December 2 2 9 until such a time that Plaintiff s irreplaceable, companion Shi10is safely returned to him, unharmed and in a healthy condition, which the Plaintiff requests to bein addition to medical cost s mentioned above which are to be shared equally among the abovenamed Defendants.

56. As just compensation for the Defendants, including those who are duly sworn PeaceOfficers, having entered into a conspiracy to extort from him his property, by employing variousthreats as shown above which have unquestionably resulted in the blatant deprivations of thePlaintiff s Civil Rights. The Defendarlts shall pay to the Plaintiff, no less than 600,000.00composed of 1 00,000.00 for each of the above named Defendants direct involvement in thismalicious and felonious assault on the Plaintiff s Civil Rights.

VII PR YER FOR RELIEF57 The Plaintiffis authorized, purSUallt to 28 U.S.c. 2201(a), to seek equitable alld

declaratory relief.WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that this Court enter all order:a Declaring that the acts, omissions and practices of the Defendallts set forth in the

paragraphs above, constitutes a malicious disregard of the Plaintiff s Civil Rights, alld caused thePlaintiffto be forcefully, alld wantonly subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges, orimmunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, and that pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 1983 and 1985, the Plaintiff is entitled to full redress, alld to once again made to be whole.

b Permallently enjoining Defendants, their officers, subordinates, successors in office,and all those acting in concert or participation with them from continuing the acts, omissions andpractices set forth in the paragraphs above as will ensure that the Plaintiff, nor ally citizen of theState ofArizona will be subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities securedby the Constitution of the United States.

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c Ordering the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff the monetary damages as outlined inparagraphs 46-48 above, on the party(s) found guilty.

d Sentencing the Defendants under State Guidelines, if pursuant to 42 S 1988,the alleged violations are found to be of a criminal nature, and requiring the infliction ofpunishment on the party(s) found guilty.

e The Plaintiff begs the Court to enter any and all such other orders, and any furtherequitable relief including Court costs, as the Court may deem just and Proper.

iJRespectfully submitted thisolL/ day of January, 2010.

~ ~Mark DixonPro SeERTIFI TE OF SERVI E

Original filed with the Clerk s Office, and upon receipt of this Court s Order, three (3) true and3 correct copies of the foregoing will be transmitted to a professional process server along withthree (3) corrected summons, to be personaily served on each of the three (3) previously un4 served Defendants. In addition, a true and correct copy of the foregoing will be placed in theU.S. mail to the following Defendants:l5

Carol Lee Dixon6 P.O. Box 11152Casa Grande, AZ 85130

7

8 Philip LeBlancP.O. Box 21739 Arizona City, 85 32 Andrew Goode2328 W Peggy Dr.21 Queen Creek, AZ 85242

I

~ ~ Z 2 by Mark Dixon23 Pro Se24

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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRS Documenl11 Filed 1 22 1 Page 1 of4

9 Mark E. Dixon.

2345678

O[fice of the Pinal Counl) AttorneyJoe Alba. Sale Sar No. 004810P.O. Sox 887Florence. Arizona 85132520-866-6242520-866-6521 - FaxAnomey for Defendants Goode and LeBlanc

UNlTED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NO. CIV 092650 PHX SRB1I I121415

Plaintiff.v

Gregory Clark. in his individuaJ capacity.Travis Cody. in his individual caracity.Andrew Goode. in his individua capacity,Philip LeBlanc. in his individual capacity.Deputy u o n Doc . in his individualcapacity, and Carol Lee Dixon. in herindividual capacity.

Answer of Defendants Andrew Goodeand Philip LeBlanc

16 Defendants.

state as follows:For their answer to Mark E Dixon s complaint against them, Defendants Goode and Leblanc.

the complaint occurred in Pinal County. Arizona, and within the District of Arizona.Arizona. and within the District of Arizona. The acts or omissions of all of the parties alleged inthe mancrs alleged in the complaint. PlaintifTand all named defendants reside in Pinal Count .

17181920212223242526

I

2.

JurisdictionThese defendants deny that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide

Although plaintiffanempts to allege a cause of action under 42 USc. 1983. the factual2728 allegations in the numbered paragraphs of the complaint fail to state a cause of action against

Dixon Clark. Cllli


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Case 2: 9 cv 265 SRB Documen111 Filed 1 2211 Page 2 of 4

these defenda nts upon which relie f can be granted under 42 U.s.C. 1983. The complaint sfactual allegations allege neither a specific constitutional violation nor a violation o f any clearlyestablished right. as required to invoke this Courfsjurisdiction.

Statement orthe Case3 Plaintiffs complaint is based on the question of ownership o f a dog. Defendant Carol LeeDixon claims that the dog in question is separate property to which she is entitled. follo\\ing herrecent divorce from Mark E Dixon. Mark E Dixon claims that the dog is his constantcompanion. Defendants Goode and LeBlanc, are. and at all material times were. Pinal County

Sheriffs deputies. Defendant Goode s only involvement is that he briefly detained and citedMark E Dixon for a traffic offense on December 1 2009. Defendant LeBlanc. along with otherdeputies, formed an opinion that there was probable cause to believe that Mark E Dixon hadcommitted a theft from Carol Lee Dixon, by controlling property orCarol Lee Dixon the dog,Shiloh) with the intent to deprive her of such property, in violation o f A.R.S. 131802. Mark. EDixon surrendered the dog to Defendant LeBlanc Paragraphs 30 and 33 o f the Complaint). Thecomplaint alleges neithcr a specific constitutional violation nor a violation of an) clearlyestablished right. entitling PlaintifTto relief.4 The complaint fails to state a cause of action against these defendants upon which reliefcan be granted. Federal Rules o f Civil Procedurc. Rule 12 b) 6).

Answers to the umbered Paragraphs of the Complaint5 Defendants Goode and LeBlanc admit the allegations in numbered paragraphs 2and 3, 8 and 96 Defendants Goode and LeBlanc deny the allegations in numbered paragraphs 5 13.37 38 42 and 43

Dixon v Clark. et al 2


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Case 2:09 cv 02650 SRB Document 11 Filed 1 22 1 Page 3 4

7 Defendants Goode and LeBlanc deny the allegations in each of the other numbered234

paragraphs of the complaint not otherwise specifically admined or denied. because they

lack sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the convoluted5 allegations in those paragraphs.

LeBlanc upon which reliefcan be granted by this court.

Relief Requested

That Plaintiff take nothing from Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.

filing of this pleading the only employees of the Pinal County Sheriffwho have been

Affirmative DefenseDefendants Goode and LeBlanc. each sued in his individual capacity. affirmatively

Defendants Goode and LeBlanc allege upon information and belief that as of the

The entire complaint. if true. fails to state a claim against Defendants Goode and

1

9.

I-laving ans1 ered each numbered paragraphs of the complaint. Defendants Goodeand LeBlanc pray tor relief as follows:

complaint. and that the complaint should be dismissed against each for failure state aclaim upon which relief can be granted.

allege that they have qualified immunity from liability based on the allegations in the

served with the summons and complaint in this case are Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.

6 87891

2 3141516 718192222232425 2 Thallhe complaint against Defendants Goode and LeBlanc be dismissed for26 Plaintiffs failure to state a claim against Defendants Goode and LeBlanc upon28

which relief can be granted.l>i:wn v Clan : aI 3


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1719202122232425262728

ase 2:09 cv 02650 SRB Document 11 Filed 1 22 1 age 4 o f 4

3. For Defendants costs incurred.4 For such as other reliefas isjusl as to Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.

Dated this 22 day of January. 2010.

ls i oe lbo _Joe A AlboDeputy County Attorney Civil DivisionAttorney for Defendant Paul BabeuPinal County Sheriff

ORI IN L filed electronicallY with the Clerk of the Court ofthe District ofArizona this 22. J day of January. 2010. PY oflhe foregoing mailed this 22 day of January. 2010.toMark E. DixonP.O. Box 12695Casa Grande. Arizona 8513laintiff

Carol Lee DixonP.O. Box 11152Casa Grande Arizona 8513Defendant

Dixon v. Clark. et:ll 4


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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark E. Dixon,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Gregory Clark, in his individual capacity;Travis Cote, in his individual capacity;Andrew Goode, in his individual capacity;Philip LeBlanc, in his individual capacity;Eli Pile, in his individual capacity; StephenClark, in his individual capacity; Carol LeeDixon, in her individual capacity,

Defendants.

)))

)))))))))))))

))

No. CV 09-2650-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants Andrew Goode and Philip LeBlancs Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Defs. Mot.) (Doc. 12). Defendants Gregory Clark

Travis Cote, Eli Pile, and Stephen Clark have moved to join Defendants Motion (Doc. 21)

The Court also resolves Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Responsive Memorandum Exhibit 8A

(Doc. 15) at this time.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mark Dixon charges that the Defendants, various Pinal County Sheriffs

Deputies (the County Defendants) and his ex-wife, Carol Dixon, conspired to deprive him

Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 56 Filed 05/19/10 Page 1 of 7


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1The Court cites to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which was filed after Defendants

Motion, because Defendants arguments apply with equal force to the more recent iteration

of Plaintiffs Complaint. (SeeDocs. 12, 17.)

2In her Answer, Ms. Dixon states that the dogs name is spelled Shiloh. (Doc. 4,

Answer 1.) For the purposes of this Order, the Court will adopt the spelling contained in

the Amended Complaint.

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of his property. (Am. Compl. 8.)1Plaintiff alleges that he received a phone call from

Defendant Clark on December 1, 2009, in which he learned that Ms. Dixon had told the Pinal

County Sheriffs Office that Plaintiff had improperly retained possession of her dog, Shilo.2

(Id. 22.) Plaintiff told Defendant Clark that the dog belonged to him, and Defendant Clarkinformed Plaintiff that Ms. Dixons complaint would be forwarded to the Pinal County

Attorneys Office. (Id. 23.) On December 2, 2009, Plaintiff left his home with Shilo and

set off to drive to the Pinal County Attorneys Office, with the purpose of presenting

ownership documents. (Id. 28.) En route, Plaintiffs vehicle was stopped by a red sports-

utility vehicle with flashing lights, and when he pulled over, a Pinal County Sheriffs Deputy

approached his car. (Id. 30-33.) The Amended Complaint states that the deputy told

Plaintiff he had failed to signal before turning right and asked to see Plaintiffs drivers

license. (Id. 33.) After checking Plaintiffs identification, the deputy informed Plaintiff that

his license was suspended. (Id. 36.) Plaintiff alleges that two deputies threatened to

impound his vehicle and arrest him if he did not surrender Shilo to them. (Id.)

The deputies followed Plaintiff back to his home and then left with the dog. (Id. 38.)

Plaintiff alleges that, at that time, he presented ownership documentation for Shilo, but the

deputies did not believe him and took Shilo anyway. (Id. 39.) Plaintiff was then cited for

driving on a suspended license. (Id. 41.) Plaintiff attempted to recover the dog from the

Pinal County Sheriffs Office. (Id. 43-44.) When that was unsuccessful, Plaintiff filed the

instant lawsuit.

Plaintiff argues that he has been deprived of property without due process of law as

a result of a conspiracy among the Defendants. (Id. 45-53.) Plaintiff seeks money damages



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and the return of Shilo. (Id. 54-57.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Join

As a preliminary matter, the Court grants Defendants G. Clark, Cote, Pile, and SClarks Motion to Join in Defendants Motion. The issues presented in Defendants Motion

are common to all the County Defendants, and it is appropriate to consider them together.

B. Motion to Dismiss

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Fed

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, dismissal for insufficiency of a complaint is proper if the complaint

fails to state a claim on its face.Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1980)

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the

lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990);Robertson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In determining whether an asserted

claim can be sustained, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). [A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and

unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))

However, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual

content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim



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entitling the plaintiff to relief.Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotingAshcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009)).In other words, the complaint must

contain enough factual content to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will revea

evidence of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Goode, LeBlanc, G. Clark, Cote, Pile, and S. Clark move to dismiss the

Amended Complaint, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions

related to the removal of Shilo from Plaintiffs possession. (Defs. Mot. at 3-4.) The

doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because qualified

immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively

lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.Id.(quotingMitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest

possible stage in litigation.Id. (quotingHunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).

When determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court

considers (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.

12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right and

(2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendants alleged

misconduct.Id. at 816 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). If the answer

to both inquiries is yes, then the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.Davis v. City

of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). If either answer is no, then the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. See Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 2009)

Pearson held that the sequence set forth in Saucier is not mandatory and that district judges

have discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis

should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. 129 S

Ct. at 818. Here, the Court will discuss the second prong first.



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A right is clearly established if a reasonable officer would know that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.Espinosa v. City & County of S.F., 598 F.3d 528

532 (9th Cir. 2010) (citingHeadwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d

1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002)). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint do not establishthat a reasonable officer in the position of one of the Deputy Defendants would have known

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. The Amended Complaint states

that Plaintiff was issued a citation for driving on a suspended license, but it does not allege

that the deputies knew that Plaintiffs license was not suspended or otherwise acted

improperly. (See Am. Compl. 41.) Likewise, the Amended Complaint essentially states that

the County Defendants gave credence to Ms. Dixons claim to ownership of Shilo, rather

than Mr. Dixons. This decision is not a violation of a clearly-established right. It was

reasonable for the County Defendants, in the course of doing their jobs, to believe one side

of a dispute over another. See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing

that officers may draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences

from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well

elude an untrained person (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th

Cir. 2002)));Kulas v. Valdez, 159 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1998) (A reasonable belief that

the conduct was lawful is sufficient to secure qualified immunity.). Here, the deputies

reasonably decided to believe Ms. Dixons version of events, rather than Mr. Dixons. Mr

Dixon may not agree with the County Defendants decision to credit Ms. Dixons story, but

the fact that they made the decision is not a violation of his constitutional rights or any

clearly-established law.

On the basis of this conclusion, the Court finds that the County Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity for the events giving rise to Plaintiffs lawsuit. The Court need

not address the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Therefore, Defendants

Motion is granted. The Amended Complaint is dismissed as to the County Defendants.

D. Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Responsive MemorandumExhibit 8A

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Allow Responsive Memorandum Exhibit 8A (Pl.s Mot.)



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on February 18, 2010. (See Doc. 15.) This document, filed two days after Plaintiffs

Response to Defendants Motion, appears to the Court to constitute an impermissible sur-

reply. Such a filing is not permitted under the Local Rules for this district without explicit

permission of the Court. SeeLRCiv 7.2 (providing for response and reply pleadings only)Plaintiff has not sought permission, and the Court does not grant him leave to file any further

responses to Defendants Motion. Plaintiffs Motion is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the

pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. L.A

Police Dept, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure states that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so

requires. For pro se litigants, leave to amend should be granted unless it is absolutely clear

that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.Id.; accord United

States v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, it is

absolutely clear that Plaintiffs claims against the County Defendants are precluded because

the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity for the actions that Plaintiff alleges violated

his rights. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the

County Defendants, and those claims may not be refiled.

IT IS ORDEREDgranting Defendants Gregory Clark, Travis Cote, Eli Pile, and

Stephen Clarks Motion to Join (Doc. 21).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants Andrew Goode and Philip

LeBlancs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 12) and dismissing the Amended

Complaint with prejudice as to Defendants G. Clark, Cote, Goode, LeBlanc, Pile, and S

Clark.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /



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IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDdenying Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Responsive

Memorandum Exhibit 8A (Doc. 15).

DATED this 18th

day of May, 2010.


~ u s ~ = = ~ ~United States istrict udge


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6 PLAINTIFF,7 v8 1. Stephen Clark, in his individualcapacity;9 2 Travis Cote, in his individual capacity;

3. Andrew Goode, in his individual capacity;4 Philip Leblanc, in his individual capacity; 5 Eli Pile, in his individual capacity;2 6 Carol Lee Dixon, in her individualcapacity; DEFENDANTS.

1

C ,,

JUN 220m, . _ : < o ; ~ :; C ~ - - r r : 1 : C U F ~

2Tf }1 .>;, f. /- r:; I: : Y

ByUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF ARIZONA

[Appellate] Rule 4(a)(4). ).construed as motions to alter or amend the judgment and are time tolling for the purposes of

reconsideration, federal courts generally treat such motions as a motion to alter or amendAlthough the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure do not expressly recognize a motion for

Come now the Plaintiff, having received a Order to Dismiss the Pinal County Sheriff

Mark E. Dixon,

deputy defendants moves the court to reconsider said order under Rules 59(e) and Rule 60(b),

Mark E. DixonP.O. Box 12695Casa Grande, AZ 85130(520) 705-2945Pro Se

judgment pursuant Rule 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Cockrelv.Shelby County School Dist 270 F.3d 1036, 1047 (6th Cir. 2001)(citing 12 James Wm. Mooreet aI., Moore s Federal Practice 59.30[7] 3 rd ed.ol000)); see also Moody v. pepsi-cola metro.Bottling co., 915 Fold 20I, 206 (6th Cir 1990) ( Motions for reconsideration of a judgment are

) CIV 092650PHXSRB) PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO) RECONSIDER ORDER AND MODIFY) ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTSUNDERRULE 59 e) AND RULE 60 b)

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The Plaintiffhereby apologizes to the court and begs the courts indulgence regarding the2 length of the Complaint and Amended Complaint. Although lengthy there a several facts stated which should cause the court to reconsider dismissing the Pinal County Defendants.

2

The Pinal County Defendants did in fact know that the Plaintiffs drivers license wassuspended prior to making the traffic stop on December 2 2009 and further Defendant Goodewas at the Plaintiffs residence doing surveillance for the sole purpose of performing the trafficstop which would give them the leverage of a suspended drivers license show of lethal force andthreat of arrest to extort the Plaintiffs property they had no legal means to otherwise achieve thegoal of the conspiracy.

Upon arriving at the Plaintiffs home after the traffic stop on December 2 2009 the PinalCounty Deputies were handed the only legal ownership documents for his property. Before thatpoint the Pinal County Defendants had not asked for nor received any documents from thePlaintiffwhich he had informed them on December 2009 he possessed. Further the Deputiesmade no effort to confirm the documents provided by the Plaintiffthrough the Counties ownrecords which would have taken a simple phone call. should be further noted that theDefendants after receiving the legal documents presented the Plaintiff with a traffic ticket fordriving on a suspended license with the threat that if the Plaintiff made any trouble over this theywould come back and arrest him on the ticket. The ticket was dismissed by the Pinal CountyAttorney s office for no possibility of conviction. Discovery would prove that the Plaintiffslicense was wrongly suspended under very suspicious circumstances. The Pinal CountyDefendants acted in their own interests whether motivated by passion personal gain or promiseof same with the sole intent of illegally extorting the Plaintiffs property for Ms. Dixon.

Several attempts were made to have justice done before filing this lawsuit in the FederalDistrict Court. The first attempt was submitting several affidavits and the only legal ownership

BACKGROUND56

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records to the Pinal County Sheriff s office, offering undisputable proof as to the ownership ofthe property. When absolutely no response, not even a return phone call was received, thePlaintiff filed a claim with the Pinal County Board of Supervisors, serving the Pinal CountySheriff and the Pinal County Attorney. Again with absolutely no response of any officials fromPinal County the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in order to address the injustice done. There isnothing instant about the actions taken by the Plaintiffrather all avenues available wereaddressed including a plea to the Arizona Attorney General and the Office of the Governor withabsolutely no redress for the actions of the Defendants.II Qualified Immunity

The Pinal County Defendants in no way performed any type of proper investigation, hadthere been an investigation, especially an investigation performed by an officer with specializedtraining it would have been discovered that the only license or other proofof ownership was,and had always been in Plaintiff s name as his sole and separate property.

As far as evidence, Ms. Dixon only provided a fabricated and falsified story for herversion of events, while the Plaintiffprovided not a story or version of events but rather hardevidence of ownership of his property. Any reasonable person, not to mention an individual witexperience and specialized training, would know that taking the property that was and alwayshad been the legal property of another would constitute theft. is clearly established law that adog license is the only proof of ownership for a dog in Arizona. The Pinal County Defendantsclearly knew prior to taking the dog through threats, intimidation, and extortion that the dog wasthe legal property of the Plaintiff.III Admission ofGuilt

is astonishing to the Plaintiffthat the Pinal County Defendants admit to the crimes theycommitted in their answer to the amended complaint, paragraphs 8 and Even with thisadmission the Pinal County Defendants feel they are entitled to qualified immunity. Absolutely

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IV ConclusionStarting as a child we are taught about the Constitution of the United States and further we

are taught the basic ideals of right and wrong Regardless of case law which can be used to supporteither side an r g u ~ e n t what the Pinal County Defendants conspired to do goes to the basicfundamentals ofwro ng To put it plainly the Defendants used their badge the respect and power thatcomes with that badge for their person gain breaking the law shamefully breaking the public trust

Although the complaint and amended complaint may have been lengthy the Plaintiffwasattempting to completely explain the allegation and crimes committed so there would not be anyconfusion as to the nature of the case The Pinal County Defendants have admitted to the actions

which they have been accused that admission along with the facts as stated now and previouspleadings shows the complete disregard for the law and rights of citizens The Pinal CountyDefendants did enter into a conspiracy with Ms Dixon and openly admit to that conspiracy andextortion to deprive the Plaintiffof his property all the while asking this court for qualified immunitfor their actions which they admit were illegal The Plaintiff hereby asks the court to reverse theprevious ruling granting the Pinal County Defendants qualified immunity and reset the rule 16scheduling conference all this is asked to be done in the interest ofjustice

Respectfully submitted this 2 day of June 2010

? c::=:}Mark E DixonPro Se


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ERTIFI TE OF SERVI E7

Carol Lee Dixon6 P.O. Box 11152Casa Grande AZ 85130

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Original filed with the Clerk s Office on uneL 2010 and a true and correct copy oftheforegoing was placed in the U.S. mail to each of the following:Pinal County Attorney s OfficeDeputy Pinal County AttorneyJoe A Albo State Bar No. 004810P.O. Box 877Florence AZ 85132The Appel Law Office PLLCAttn: Marc Appel10601 N. Hayden RdSuite 1 1 3Scottsdale Az. 85260

By Mark DixonPro Se

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Mark E. Dixon,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Stephen Clark, et al.,

Defendants.

)))))

)))))))


ORDER

The Court has received and considered Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Order and

Modify Order Dismissing Defendants Under Rule 59(e) and rule 60(b).

Reconsideration is only appropriate if: (1) the court is presented with newly

discovered, previously unavailable, evidence; (2) the court committed a clear error of law and

the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) there has been an intervening change in

controlling law.Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255

1262 (9th Cir. 1993);United States ex rel Conveyor Rental & Sales Co. v. Aetna Casualty and

Surety Co.,1991 WL 495733, *1 (D. Ariz. 1991). Such a motion, however, may not be used

to re-litigate old matters or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised

prior to entry of judgment. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Agency v. World Univ., 978 F.2d 10

16 (1stCir. 1992); accord Backlund, 778 F.2d at 1388; 1 Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 2810.1 at 127-28.



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The Plaintiff does not allege that the controlling law has changed since this Court

rendered its initial decision. Rather, he argues that the Court erred in its interpretation of

both the law and the facts of this case.

Motions for reconsideration can not be used to ask the Court to rethink what thecourt has already thought through, merely because a plaintiff disagrees with the Courts

decision. Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va

1983); See Refrigeration Sales Co. 605 F.Supp. at 8. Such disagreements should be dealt

with in the normal appellate process, not on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)

Database Am., Inc. 825 F.Supp. at 1220;Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc. 605 F.Supp. at 7.

This case does not fall within one of those narrow instances where reconsideration is

appropriate. The moving party must show more than a disagreement with the courts

decision; the court should not grant a motion for reconsideration unless there is need to

correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Database Am., Inc. 825 F.Supp. at

1220;Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc., 605 F.Supp. at 7. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has

failed to set forth sufficient grounds to cause the Court to reconsider its May 19, 2010 Order

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Order and Modify Order

Dismissing Defendants Under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b). (Doc. 58).

DATED this 8thday of June, 2010.




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1Documents 54 and 55 are identical as Ms. Dixon responded to Plaintiffs Motion and

moved to dismiss in the same filing. The Court cites to Document 55, Ms. Dixons Motion

to Dismiss, in this Order.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION



Mark E. Dixon,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Gregory Clark, in his individual capacity;Travis Cote, in his individual capacity;Andrew Goode, in his individual capacity;Philip LeBlanc, in his individual capacity;Eli Pile, in his individual capacity; StephenClark, in his individual capacity; Carol LeeDixon, in her individual capacity,

Defendants.

)))

)))))))))))))

))


ORDER

The Court now resolves Plaintiff Mark E. Dixons Motion for Default Judgment

Against Defendant Carol Lee Dixon (Pl.s Mot.) (Doc. 52) and Defendant Carol Lee

Dixons Motion to Dismiss (Def.s Mot.) (Doc. 55).1

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case were set forth in this Courts Order of May 19, 2010. (SeeDoc

56.) The pertinent details will be summarized here. Mr. Dixon alleges that Ms. Dixon



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2In her Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Dixon states that the dogs name is spelled Shiloh,

not Shilo. (Def.s Mot. at 3.) For the purposes of this Order, the Court will adopt the

spelling contained in the Amended Complaint.

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conspired with several Pinal County Sheriffs Deputies to deprive him of his property

without due process of law. (Am. Compl. 8.) Mr. Dixon alleges that Ms. Dixon improperly

caused the deputies to seize his dog Shilo2and give her to Ms. Dixon. (Id. 22-23, 28, 30-

33, 38-39.) Ms. Dixon asserts that Shilo was never Mr. Dixons dog and that he was onlytemporarily caring for her. (Def.s Mot. at 2-5.)

On May 19, 2010, the Court granted the Pinal County Defendants Motion to Dismiss

leaving Ms. Dixon as the only remaining Defendant. (Doc. 56, May 19, 2010, Order at 6.)

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint was filed on March 2, 2010. (Doc. 17.) Ms. Dixon did not

file an Answer to the Amended Complaint, although she did file an Answer to Mr. Dixons

original Complaint. (SeeDoc. 4.) In responding to Plaintiffs Motion, Ms. Dixon argues that

as the Amended Complaint made only minor changes, she did not believe she was required

to answer because her first Answer addressed the substance of Plaintiffs claims. (Def.s Mot

at 1-2.) The docket does not contain proof of service of the Amended Complaint on Ms

Dixon.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment

Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires defendants to file an

answer within 21 days after being served with a summons and complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P

12(a)(1)(A)(i). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), default judgment is to be

entered [w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed

to plead or otherwise defend. Mr. Dixon moved for entry of default judgment against Ms

Dixon after she failed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint. (Pl.s Mot. at 1.)

However, as the record does not reflect that Ms. Dixon was ever properly served with the

Amended Complaint, she was under no obligation to answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P

12(a)(1)(A)(i). Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion is denied.



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B. Defendants Motion to Dismiss

Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983, Mr. Dixon alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated when he was deprived of his dog. (Am. Compl. 13.) Ms

Dixon argues that she is not an officer of the law and therefore cannot violate Plaintiffscivil rights. (Def.s Mot. at 5.)

To obtain relief under 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a violation of rights

protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by

conduct of a person (4) acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418

1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, a 1983 claim requires state action. [Section] 1983

excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quotingBlum v. Yaretsky, 457

U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). Here, Mr. Dixon does not allege that Ms. Dixon acted under color

of state law, as indeed he cannot because she is a private individual, not a state official. Mr

Dixon also does not allege that Ms. Dixons conduct could be considered state action.

Likewise, rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments can

only be violated by state action. SeeApao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir

2003) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment shields citizens from unlawful government

actions, but does not affect conduct by private entities);Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208

F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000) (expressly holding that claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments require state action); United States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080

(9th Cir. 1998) (The Fourth Amendment limits searches conducted by the government, not

by a private party, unless the private party acts as an instrument or agent of the

government.);Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1982) (The Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment applies to actions of the federal government and not to individua

activities of private actors[, unless] . . . the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that

of the [government] itself. (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Therefore, because Ms. Dixon is not a state actor and her actions cannot be considered

the acts of the government itself, Mr. Dixon cannot state a claim against Ms. Dixon for



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263 Ms Dixon requests sanctions against Mr Dixon (Def s Mot at 6 ) Although the

violations of his constitutional rights, pursuant to 1983. Defendants Motion is granted.3

IT IS THEREFORE ORDEREDgranting Defendant Carol Lee Dixons Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 55) and dismissing the Amended Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff Mark E. Dixons Motion for DefaultJudgment Against Defendant Carol Lee Dixon (Doc. 52).

IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDdirecting the Clerk to enter judgment of dismissal in

this matter.

DATED this 24thday of August, 2010.

