tamara wuerffel, plaintiff, vs. cook county sheriff tom dart (lawsuit)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TAMARA WUERFFEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 14 CV 3990

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

THOMAS DART, in his individual and

official capacity, RONALD ZYCHOWSKI,

ZELDA WHITTLER, DANA WRIGHT,

MARLON PARKS, and HELEN BURKE in

their individual capacities, and the

COUNTY OF COOK, a unit of local

Government,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Demands Trial by Jury

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff TAMARA WUERFFEL, through her undersigned counsel, complaining

against Defendants, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, THOMAS DART, in his

individual and official capacity, RONALD ZYCHOWSKI, ZELDA WHITTLER, DANA

WRIGHT, MARLON PARKS, and HELEN BURKE, in their individual capacity, and

the COUNTY OF COOK,1/ a unit of local Government, states as follows:

1. Plaintiff TAMARA WUERFFEL (“Wuerffel”) brings this action to redress

acts of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

1/ Cook County is named only as an indispensable party for purposes of indemnification.

See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Co., 324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003).

Case: 1:14-cv-03990 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/29/14 of 21 PageID #:1

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in violation of Plaintiff’s rights to free political association (Count I); to redress acts of

gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count II); to

redress acts of retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count III);

for violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights guaranteed under the United States

Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV); and for intentional infliction of

emotional distress under Illinois law (Count V).

Jurisdiction and Venue

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

3. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c)

because Plaintiff and all Defendants either reside in this district or have their principal

place of business in this district, and all events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred

within this district.

Parties

4. Plaintiff Wuerffel has been employed with the Cook County Sheriff’s

Office since 1998 and holds the rank of Sergeant.

5. Defendant COOK COUNTY is a municipality incorporated under the

laws of the State of Illinois. Cook County administers itself through departments, one of

which is the Cook County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office” or “CCSO”).


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6. Defendant COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE is a department of

COOK COUNTY.

7. At all relevant times, Defendant THOMAS DART (“Sheriff Dart”) served

in the elected position of Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois. Sheriff Dart is sued in her

official and individual capacity.

8. Defendant Dart was a policy maker for the Sheriff’s Office and has final

policy making authority with regard to conduct alleged herein.

9. Defendant RONALD ZYCHOWSKI, (“Zychowski”) is sued in his

individual capacity. Defendant Zychowski is a Commander for the Cook County

Sheriff’s Police Department (“CCSPD”).

10. Defendant Zychowski was delegated with final policy making authority

with regard to his acts and conduct alleged herein.

11. Defendant Zychowski acted under color of law.

12. Defendant ZELDA WHITTLER (“Whittler”) is sued in her individual

capacity. Defendant Whittler is the Undersheriff of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office.

13. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Whittler has served in the position

of Undersheriff solely at the discretion and pleasure of the Sheriff. Defendant Whittler is

a final policy maker and/or was delegated with final policy making authority and was a

decision maker for the Sheriff’s Office and with regard to the conduct alleged herein.

14. Defendant Whittler acted under color of law.


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15. Defendant DANA WRIGHT (“Wright”) is sued in her individual capacity.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Wright served as First Deputy Chief of Police.

16. Defendant Wright was delegated with final policy making authority with

regard to her acts and conduct alleged herein.

17. Defendant Wright acted under color of law.

18. Defendant MARLON PARKS (“Parks”) is sued in his individual capacity.

Defendant Parks is a Chief for the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Department (“CCSPD”).

19. Defendant Parks was delegated with final policy making authority with


20. Defendant Parks acted under color of law.

21. Defendant HELEN BURKE (“Burke”) is sued in her individual capacity.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Burke served as Chief, Bureau of

Administration.

22. Defendant Burke was delegated with final policy making authority with


23. Defendant Burke acted under color of law.

Administrative Proceedings

24. On December 23, 2013, Plaintiff Sergeant Wuerffel filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),

alleging discrimination based upon her sex and alleging retaliation.


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25. On or about March 3, 2014, Plaintiff received a notice of right to sue from

the EEOC on her charge.

26. Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims are timely filed within 90 days of

the receipt of the notice of right to sue.

Facts Upon Which Claims Are Based

27. Plaintiff Wuerffel has had an exemplary record with the Sheriff’s Office

for over 15 years. Sergeant Wuerffel is a highly decorated Sergeant and received letters

and commendations for her outstanding performance as a supervisor with the Sheriff’s

Office.

28. Plaintiff Wuerffel has never been disciplined.

29. At all relevant times, Sergeant Wuerffel satisfactorily fulfilled her assigned

duties.

30. Sergeant Wuerffel scored second in rank after the Lieutenants

promotional process in or about December 2012.

31. There are only 4 female sergeants on the Cook County Sheriff’s Police out

of 55 sergeants and there are no female Lieutenants.

32. Four days after the promotional interview for lieutenant, Commander

Zychowski began harassing Sergeant Wuerffel about her overtime for court

appearances.


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33. On November 18, 2012, Commander Zychowski denied paying Sergeant

Wuerffel the full overtime request for the court appearance on the Coulter case.

However, he paid two male officers who also attended court for their full overtime.

34. On December 26, 2012, Commander Dwyer made comments in roll call

that they were watching Sergeant Wuerffel.

35. In January 2013, Commander Zychowski began singling Sergeant

Wuerffel out, stating only he could approve benefit time for her to use, even though he

was not her immediate supervisor, and he refused to approve overtime for her, whereas

similarly situated male employees were able to have their overtime cards approved by

their immediate supervisor.

36. On January 12, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel complained to Chief Parks

regarding Zychowski harassing her.

37. Commander Zychowski did not permit Sergeant Wuerffel to adjust her

schedule to reduce overtime, whereas other male employees were permitted to adjust

their schedules.

38. On January 19, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel complained again to Chief Parks.

39. In June 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel was denied being a Field Training Officer

supervisor by Chief Parks.

40. On June 25, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel learned that Chief Parks initiated a

complaint against Wuerffel with the Sheriff’s Office of Professional Review (“OPR”) in


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January, falsely accusing her of submitting improper overtime requests, even though he

had admitted to her that he knew she did nothing wrong.

41. All of Sergeant Wuerffel’s overtime requests were signed off on and

approved by her supervisors, including Chief Parks and Commander Zychowski.

42. In August 2013, Commander Zychowski denied permitting Sergeant

Wuerffel to work a roadside safety check and regular overtime, while two male

sergeants with less seniority than her were allowed to work overtime.

43. Sergeant Wuerffel was again denied the opportunity to work a roadside

safety check on August 28, 2013.

44. In August 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel complained to OPR about being

harassed by Commander Zychowski. OPR did not take any steps to investigate her

complaints.

45. In September 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel was denied training for the Hostage

Negotiations team that she had been a part of since 2003.

46. On October 11, 2013, Sheriff Dart promoted four male employees to

lieutenant. Sergeant Wuerffel was passed over for promotion even though she scored

higher than three of the males promoted.

47. Defendants passed Plaintiff over in favor of a less‐qualified candidate for

the promotion to lieutenant.


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48. Defendants passed Plaintiff over in favor of a candidate who was

politically connected, had “clout,” and/or contributed to Dart’s political campaign.

49. The promotions decisions for the Cook County Sheriff’s Police for

positions of Lieutenant are ultimately made by Defendant Dart.

50. Defendants Burke and Wright participated in and approved the

promotion of less qualified and politically connected employees over Sergeant

Wuerffel.

51. Sergeant Wuerffel is objectively more qualified than other individuals that

Defendants promoted to Lieutenant.

52. Defendants initiated the false OPR investigation against Sergeant

Wuerffel, in part, in order to promote male employees and employees with clout

instead of her.

53. On November 20, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel requested to meet with

Defendant Wright to discuss the false OPR investigation and discrimination. Defendant

Wright refused to meet with Sergeant Wuerffel.

54. On or about December 3, 2013, Commander Zychowski again denied

Sergeant Wuerffel overtime by taking her off a scheduled hire back.

55. On December 4, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel contacted Sergeant Little from

her Union regarding Commander Zychowski removing her from the scheduled


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overtime assignment. Sergeant Little informed Sergeant Wuerffel that he would contact

Chief Parks regarding the ongoing issue with Commander Zychowski.

56. On December 5, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel was told there would be a

meeting to address the issues of harassment with Zychowski on December 11, 2013 in

Chief Parks’ office.

57. Instead, on December 5, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel was suspended with pay.

58. On December 20, 2013, Sergeant Wuerffel was placed on leave without

pay by Defendants Whittler and Wright. Similarly situated males, have not been

suspended without pay.

59. Male officers worked more overtime in 2012 than Sergeant Wuerffel did,

but they have never been investigated.

60. Sergeant Wuerffel was questioned four times during the OPR

investigation. Sergeant Wuerffel was told during these interrogations that she could not

have a Union Representative and an attorney present during the interrogation. OPR

refused to let Sergeant Wuerffel make changes to her statement that had been

incorrectly summarized by investigators.

61. Sergeant Wuerffel had valid rights under Weingarten, the Collective

Bargaining Agreement, and the Illinois Uniform Peace Officer’s Disciplinary Act to

have both her Union Representative and her attorney present during the interrogation.


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62. Sergeant Wuerffel informed the Sheriff’s Office command staff, including

Undersheriff Whittler, of the discrimination and retaliation. To date, Sheriff Dart and

his command staff, including but not limited to Defendants Parks, Whittler, and Wright,

have not responded to Sergeant Wuerffel’s complaints of the ongoing discrimination

and retaliation.

63. No investigation was made into Sergeant Wuerffel’s complaints of

discrimination.

64. Defendants did absolutely no investigation into the complaints made by

Sergeant Wuerffel that she was being retaliated against by the OPR investigation.

65. Defendants have subjected Sergeant Wuerffel to further retaliation by

bringing additional investigations against her in an effort to find something to

terminate her for.

66. Defendants have manufactured charges against Sergeant Wuerffel and

others to retaliate against them for their political affiliation and/or complaints of

political discrimination and retaliation.

67. Defendants with the knowledge and/or consent of Defendant Dart have

also engaged in selective enforcement of charges against employees based on political

affiliation or non‐affiliation and those who have complained of discrimination.


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68. Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of retaliation against

employees based on their political affiliation and in response to their complaints about

discrimination.

69. Defendants and Defendants’ command staff and supervisors had

knowledge of the complained of conduct and refused or failed to take action to

terminate or correct such conduct, although they had the power and authority to do so.

COUNT I

(§ 1983 – Political Discrimination)

70. Plaintiff restates and realleges by reference paragraphs 1 through 69 as if

fully set forth herein against all Defendants.

71. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants acted as employees, supervisors,

and final policymakers for the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and its respective agencies.

72. The First Amendment protects a wide spectrum of free speech and

association, including a public employeeʹs right to free association, to support or not

support a political candidate of their own choosing, and to speak out and oppose

political discrimination.

73. Defendants unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff for the exercise of her

rights under the First Amendment, by including but not limited to the following:

Defendants intentionally subjected Plaintiff to unwarranted discipline, denying her


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right to counsel during OPR interrogations, denying her promotion to Lieutenant, and

issuing charges for her termination on baseless OPR investigations.

74. Defendants have acted under color of state law at all material times

hereto.

75. The conduct of Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to free association as

secured by the First Amendment to the Constitution.

76. Defendants are aware that it is unlawful to retaliate or discriminate

against someone because of their political affiliation and/or perceived political

affiliation.

77. Defendants know that employees must be treated equally regardless of

their political affiliation and/or perceived political affiliation.

78. On September 4, 2012, a federal jury found that Defendant Cook County

Sheriff’s Office and Defendant Dart in his official capacity, along with Scott Kurtovich,

who was the First Executive Assistant in the Sheriff’s Office, violated the 21 plaintiffs’

First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution in the case of Burruss, et

al. v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, et al., Case No. 08 C 6621 (N.D. Ill.). The jury awarded

$1,560,000 in compensatory (not including back pay or front pay) and punitive damages

to the 21‐plaintiff employees of the Sheriff’s Office. Defendants filed a post‐trial motion

to vacate the verdict, which the District Court denied. The District Court upheld the

jury’s verdict, and held in relevant part: “The County is liable under section 1983, just as


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Kurtovich is individually, because the jury found that the County made an official

decision to disband SORT in retaliation against Plaintiffs. . . . The court therefore will

not set aside the jury’s liability findings against Defendants.”

79. The jury in the Burruss case found that Defendants’ Director Scott

Kurtovich violated federal law and the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution by retaliating against Plaintiffs.

80. Despite this finding and the District Court’s affirmation of the jury’s

verdict, Defendants in this case have not disciplined or terminated Scott Kurtovich’s

employment from the Sheriff’s Office.

81. Defendants have not disciplined or terminated Scott Kurtovich’s

employment despite Defendant Dart’s own “written policy” that political retaliation

will not be tolerated in the Sheriff’s Office and will be subject to termination.

82. Instead, after the jury’s verdict, Defendant Dart promoted Scott Kurtovich

to be the Director over the Training Academy and in charge of training, including

training on the Sheriff’s policy on political discrimination and retaliation in the

workplace.

83. Despite Shakman, Defendant Sheriff’s Office is still not investigating or

turns a blind eye to complaints of political discrimination and retaliation. The

investigations are superficial and intended to exonerate command staff, supervisors,

and the Sheriff’s Office of complaints of political discrimination and retaliation.


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Employees who violate the law and the Sheriff’s written policy against political

discrimination are not disciplined, and the message is sent that such conduct is

condoned and tolerated within the Sheriff’s Office.

84. The actions of the Defendants in violating Plaintiff’s and other employees’

Constitutional rights under the First Amendment were intentional, willful, and

malicious and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights as secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

85. Defendants’ conduct caused Plaintiff damages, including but not limited

to: loss of income, back pay, front pay, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation,

degradation, inconvenience, lost benefits, loss of job advancement, future pecuniary

losses, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and other consequential damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks the following relief as to Count I of the Complaint:

A. All wages and benefits Plaintiff would have received but for the

retaliation, including but not limited to back pay, front pay, future

pecuniary losses, and pre‐judgment interest;

B. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial;

C. A permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants from engaging in

the retaliatory practices complained of herein;

D. A permanent injunction requiring that the Defendants adopt

employment practices and policies in accord and conformity with

the requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

and further requiring that Defendants adopt and initiate effective

remedial actions to ensure equal treatment and non‐retaliation of

employees;


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E. A declaratory judgment that Defendants’ actions violate the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution;

F. The Court retain jurisdiction of this case until such time as it is

assured that the Defendants have remedied the policies and

practices complained of herein and are determined to be in full

compliance with the law;

G. Punitive damages as allowed by law as against the individual

Defendants only;

H. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation

expenses; and

I. Such other relief as the Court may deem just or equitable.

COUNT II

(Title VII – Gender Discrimination)

91. Plaintiff restates and realleges by reference paragraphs 1 through 69 above

as though fully set forth herein.

92. The actions of Defendant Cook County Sheriff’s Office as perpetrated by its

agents and as described and complained of above, are unlawful employment practices

in that they likely have the effect of discriminating against, depriving and tending to

deprive equal employment to, and otherwise adversely affecting Plaintiff because of her

sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e, et seq.

93. Defendant Cook County Sheriff’s Office has engaged in a policy, pattern,

and practice of discrimination against women.


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94. Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on her gender

by denying her equal opportunities, including but not limited to: being subject to a

hostile work environment, denying her employment opportunities, pay increases,

overtime and special assignments.

95. Defendants treated similarly situated males better than Plaintiff because of

her sex.

96. The actions of Defendants in intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff

have caused Plaintiff great mental anguish, humiliation, degradation, physical and

emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary

losses, and other consequential damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests:


discrimination, including but not limited to back pay, front pay, future


B. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial to

compensate Plaintiff for the depression, humiliation, anguish, and

emotional distress, caused by Defendant’s conduct;

C. A permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant from engaging in the

discriminatory practices complained of herein;

D. A permanent injunction requiring the Defendant to adopt employment

practices and policies in accord and conformity with the requirements

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.;

E. The Court retain jurisdiction of this case until such time as it is assured

that Defendant has remedied the policies and practices complained of

herein and is determined to be in full compliance with the law;


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F. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation expenses;

and

G. Such other relief as the Court may deem just or equitable.

COUNT III

(Title VII – Retaliation)



98. The actions of Defendant Cook County Sheriff’s Office as perpetrated by its

agents and as described and complained of above, are unlawful employment practices

in that they likely have the effect of retaliating against, depriving and tending to

deprive equal employment to, and otherwise adversely affecting Plaintiff because of her

complaints of discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

99. Defendant Cook County Sheriff’s Office has engaged in a policy, pattern,

and practice of retaliating against employees who complain of discrimination.

100. Defendants intentionally retaliated against Plaintiff because of her

complaints by denying her equal opportunities, including but not limited to: being

subject to a hostile work environment, denying her employment opportunities, pay

increases, overtime and special assignments.

101. Defendants treated similarly situated males better than Plaintiff because of

her complaints of discrimination.


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102. The actions of Defendants in retaliating against Plaintiff have caused

Plaintiff great mental anguish, humiliation, degradation, physical and emotional pain

and suffering, inconvenience, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary losses, and

other consequential damages.



discrimination, including but not limited to back pay, front pay, future


B. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial to

compensate Plaintiff for the depression, humiliation, anguish, and

emotional distress, caused by Defendant’s conduct;

C. A permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant from engaging in the

discriminatory practices complained of herein;

D. A permanent injunction requiring the Defendant to adopt employment

practices and policies in accord and conformity with the requirements

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.;

E. The Court retain jurisdiction of this case until such time as it is assured

that Defendant has remedied the policies and practices complained of

herein and is determined to be in full compliance with the law;

F. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation expenses;

and

G. Such other relief as the Court may deem just or equitable.

COUNT IV

(§ 1983 Violation of Equal Protection)




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104. Defendants intentionally subjected Plaintiff to unequal and discriminatory

treatment that altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.

105. The actions of Defendants against Plaintiff violate her equal protection right

to be free from gender discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

106. Defendant Cook County Sheriff’s Office failed to provide proper training to

its managers, supervisors, and employees to prevent gender discrimination.

Defendant’s failure to train was deliberately indifferent to the rights of employees

within its purview.

107. The actions of Defendants were intentional, willful, and malicious and/or in

deliberate indifference for Plaintiff’s rights as secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

108. The actions of Defendants in intentionally engaging in and condoning

discrimination against Plaintiff based on her gender caused Plaintiff great mental

anguish, humiliation, degradation, physical and emotional pain and suffering,

inconvenience, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary losses, and other

consequential damages.



discrimination, including pre‐judgment interest;

B. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial;

C. Defendants be required to pay pre‐judgment interest to Plaintiff on


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these damages;

D. A permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants from engaging in

the discriminatory practices complained of herein;

E. A permanent injunction requiring the Defendants adopt

employment practices and policies in accord and conformity with

the requirements of the United States Constitution and pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983;

F. The Court retain jurisdiction of this case until such time as it is

assured that Defendants have remedied the policies and practices

complained of herein and are determined to be in full compliance

with the law;

G. Punitive damages as allowed by law against individual

Defendants;

H. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation

expenses; and

I. Such other relief as the Court may deem just or equitable.

COUNT V

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)



110. The intentional acts of Defendants constitute extreme and outrageous

conduct, beyond the bounds of decency, which inflicted severe emotional distress and

mental anguish on Plaintiff.

111. As a proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful acts, Plaintiff has suffered

severe mental anxiety and emotional and physical distress.


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112. Defendants acted willfully and maliciously with respect to their treatment of

Plaintiff.


A. Compensatory damages;

B. Economic losses Plaintiff sustained and will sustain as a result of

the intentional infliction of emotional distress, including

prejudgment interest on such amounts;

C. Punitive damages as allowed by law;

D. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation

expenses; and

E. Such other relief as the Court may deem just or equitable.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/ Heidi Karr Sleper

Plaintiff’s Attorney

Electronically filed on May 29, 2014

Dana L. Kurtz, Esq. (6256245)

Heidi Karr Sleper, Esq. (6287421)

KURTZ LAW OFFICES, LTD.

32 Blaine Street

Hinsdale, IL 60521

Phone: (630) 323‐9444

Fax: (630) 604‐9444

E‐mail: [email protected]

E‐mail: [email protected]


tamara wuerffel, plaintiff, vs. cook county sheriff tom dart (lawsuit)

Documents

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defendant ronald zychowski

inhisindivi defendants

hisindividual capacity

count ivand

thomas dart

d marlonparks

department ofcookcounty