dixon v pinal county 10-0325phxdkd partial documents of lawsuit with clear and convincing evidence

Case 2:10-cv-00325-DKD Document 11 .. Filed 03/08/10 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Office of the Pinal County AttorneyJoe A. Albo, Sate Bar No. 004810P.O. Box 887Florence, Arizona 85132520-866-6242520-866-6521 - FaxAttorney for the Pinal County Defendants

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9 MARK E. DIXON, NO. CIV 100325 PHX DKD

ANSWER OF THE PINAL COUNTYDEFENDANTS

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

v.

12 PINAL COUNTY, a political subdivision ofthe State of Arizona, et. al

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as follows:

occurred in Pinal County, Arizona, and within the District of Arizona.

alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff and all named defendants reside in Pinal County, Arizona, and

and laws, the factual allegations in the numbered paragraphs of the complaint fail to state a cause

Jurisdiction, standing and venue

Although plaintiff attempts to allege a cause of action under the United States Constitution

These defendants deny that this Court has subject matter to hear and decide the matters

For their answer to Mark E. Dixon's complaint against them, the Pinal County Defendants, state

of action against these defendants upon which relief can be granted. The complaint's factual

2.

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within the District of Arizona. The acts or omissions of all of the parties alleged in the complaint

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28Dixon v. Pinal County, et al

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Case 2: 10-cv-00325-DKD Document 11 Filed 03/08/10 Page 2 of 3

allegations allege neither a specific constitutional violation nor a violation of any clearly

established right caused by these defendants required to invoke this Court's jurisdiction.

3. Plaintiff has filed a similar lawsuit in this Court against several Pinal County Sheriffs

deputies in their individual capacities arising out of the same issue of the ownership and right to

possession of a dog. That matter isDixon v. Clark, et. ai, Case Number CIV 092650 PHX SRB.

4. Defendants deny the allegations in numbered paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 based on a lack of

knowledge or information upon which to form an opinion as to their veracity.

5. Defendants admit that Pinal County is a political subdivision of the State of Arizona that

has legal authority to sue and be sued. Defendants deny the rest of the allegations in numbered

paragraph 6.

6. Defendants admit the parts of the allegations in numbered paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and II

that allege that each named defendant is the current elected official serving in that capacity.

Defendants deny the rest of the allegations in those numbered paragraphs.

7. These defendants lack sufficient, specific knowledge or information upon which to form

an opinion as to the veracity of the allegations contained in numbered paragraphs 12 through 22

and therefore deny them. Defendants deny every other allegation in the complaint not

specifically admitted herein.

8. In this matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction to "sentence" defendants under 42. U.S.C. §

1988, as requested in the prayer for relief and that part of the prayer should be stricken.

9. The entire complaint, if true, fails to state a claim against these defendants upon which

relief can be granted.

Having answered each numbered paragraphs of the complaint, Defendants pray for relief

as follows:

That Plaintiff take nothing from Defendants.

Dixon v. Pinal County, et al 2

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Case 2:10-cv-00325-DKD Document 11 Filed 03/08/10 Page 3 of 3

That the complaint against Defendants be dismissed for Plaintiffs failure to state a claim

against Defendants upon which relief can be granted.

For Defendants' costs incurred.

For such as other relief as is just as to Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.

Dated this 8th day of March, 20 IO.

lsi Joe A. Albo--------Joe A. AlboDeputy County Attorney, Civil DivisionAttorney for the County Defendant

ORIGINAL filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court of theDistrict of Arizona this 8th day of March,2010.

COPY of the foregoing mailed this 8th day of March, 2010, to:

Mark E. DixonP.O. Box 12695Casa Grande, Arizona 85130Plaintiff

Dixon v. Pinal County, et al 3

MOTION - 1

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William J. Pearlman SBN # 003990

Law Offices of William J. Pearlman

1237 South Val Vista Drive, Suite 218

Mesa, Arizona 85204

Phone: 480-396-0681

Fax: 480-396-0532

Email: [email protected]


DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARK E. DIXON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

1. PINAL COUNTY, a Political Subdivision ;

2. JAMES WALSH, Pinal County Attorney,

In his Official Capacity;

3. PAUL BABEU, Pinal County Sheriff,


4. PETE RIOS, Pinal County Supervisor,


5. BRYAN MARTYN, Pinal County Supervisor,


6. DAVID SNIDER, Pinal County Supervisor,


et. al.

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Case No.: CIV 2010-0325 PHX DGC

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS

TO LIABILITY PER RULE 56,

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE

Case 2:10-cv-00325-DGC Document 33 Filed 07/16/10 Page 1 of 5

mailto:[email protected]

MOTION - 2

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Pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Plaintiff, MARK E. DIXON, through undersigned counsel, hereby

moves for judgment as to the issue of liability.

This motion is based upon the attached Investigation of the

Professional Standards Unit, Pinal County Sheriff’s Office by

Sergeant Wayne Cashman, PCSO dated February 18, 2010, and just

disclosed to Plaintiff July 9, 2010. Exhibit 1

FACTS

The salient facts as found by the PCSO investigation are as

follows:

1. Plaintiff had possession of his dog, Shiloh, on December

2, 2010.

2. Officers of the PCSO: Sgt. LeBlanc, Detectives Goode and

Pile, employees of Defendants, stopped Plaintiff in his

vehicle, under color of law, surrounded him, and demanded

possession of the dog from Plaintiff.

3. That Plaintiff, surrounded by the 3 armed officers,

surrendered his dog.

4. That the officers did not have in their possession, had

not obtained and did not produce any order of Court,

either an order of the Pinal County Superior Court or a

search or arrest warrant issued by a neutral and detached

magistrate authorizing the seizure of this property from

Plaintiff.

5. That the Pinal County Sheriff, through his above

mentioned deputies, did then turn over the dog to a third

party, to wit: Carol Dixon, ex-wife of Plaintiff, again

without further order of court.


MOTION - 3

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MEMORANDUM

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Even accepting the purported justifications in the

Professional Standards Unit report, it is clear that the

officers of the Pinal County Sheriff’s Office

(hereinafter referred to as PCSO) seized private property

in possession of a citizen without order of court or due

process of law. While Defendants have argued as to the

ownership of the dog, Plaintiff suggests that is a ‘red

herring’ and that Federal Court is not the proper place

for a trial on that issue.

The Constitution of the State of Arizona Art. 2, §4

states:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.

Article 2, §8 provides:

No person shall be disturbed in his private

affairs, or his home invaded, without authority

of law.

The PCSO report shows that these officers did not have

authority of law, what they had was the ‘color of

authority of law’ and semi-automatic weapons issued by

Pinal County and assigned to them by Defendant Babeu.

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It is suggested that the law is settled that law

enforcement officers do not have unbridled discretion to

seize property from persons under the jurisdiction of the

Constitution. This was apparently settled in Coolidge v.

New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 450-451, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29

L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) where in a criminal matter the warrant

issued under the authority of state law by the State


MOTION - 4

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Attorney General was held to be insufficient since it was

not issued by a ‘neutral and detached’ magistrate. The

good faith of the officers is irrelevant. The officer’s

determination of ‘probable cause’ is similarly

irrelevant. The ownership of a dog even if it is at

issue in a post decree divorce case is a question for the

Pinal County Domestic Relations Court. If the Officers of

the Defendant Babeu thought they had sufficient evidence

of probable cause in a criminal matter, that question was

to be determined by a ‘neutral and detached’ magistrate.

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The Defendants failed to properly train or supervise

these officers from engaging in conduct that violated

Plaintiff’s rights even by their own investigation. The

Defendants failed to respond reasonably when informed by

their own investigation and continued the violation of

Plaintiff’s rights under color of state law. Plaintiff

suggests that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to

liability as a matter of law and that trial should

proceed solely on the issue of damages.

Respectfully submitted this 16th of JULY, 2010

__________________________

WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN

Attorney at Law


MOTION - 5

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Copy of the foregoing

Mailed/faxed/delivered/eMailed this

16th of JULY, 2010 to:

Marc A. Appel, Esq. #010759

APPEL LAW OFFICE, P.L.L.C

10601 N. Hayden Rd, Suite I-103

Scottsdale, Arizona 85260

Attorney for Defendants Pinal County,

James Walsh, Paul Babeu, Pete Rios,

Bryan Martyn and David Snider


Case 2:10-cv-00325-DGC Document 33-1 Filed 07/16/10 Page 1 of 28

MOTION - 1

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Mesa, Arizona 85204

Phone: 480-396-0681

Fax: 480-396-0532



DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARK E. DIXON,

Plaintiff,

vs.












et. al.

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MOTION IN LIMINE



MOTION - 2

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Plaintiff, MARK E. DIXON, through undersigned counsel,

hereby requests the court in Limine to not allow the Defendants

to present evidence regarding certain matters listed below as

such are not relevant to the cause of action, not material to

the issues of law, and in the interests of due process and

judicial economy.

FACTS

The police reports and Professional Standards unit

investigation makes it clear that the dog was in Plaintiff’s

possession when he was stopped by the deputies of Defendant

Sheriff under color of state law allegedly investigating an

improper turn signal: a Lieutenant, two detectives and a patrol

officer for one turn signal. The police reports and Professional

Standards unit investigation makes it clear that the dog was

taken into possession by the deputies without a warrant or other

indicia of a court order. The police reports and Professional

Standards unit investigation makes it clear that the dog was not

taken as evidence but was turned over to the ex-wife Carol

Dixon, who was their complainant. The police reports and

Professional Standards unit investigation admit that no criminal

complaint was ever issued nor was a request for a complaint even

made to the office of Defendant County Attorney, James Walsh.

The investigation of the Sheriff’s Officer Professional

Standards Unit was conducted by Sergeant Cashman. That

investigation was completed February 18, 2010. It was never

provided to Defendant’s counsel but was discovered by the

Plaintiff after a second Freedom of Information Act request on

July 9, 2010. The report was then forwarded by Counsel for the

Plaintiff to Counsel for the Defendants.


MOTION - 3

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1

OWNERSHIP OF THE DOG

The Defendants have given notice that they intend to

litigate the ownership of the dog, Shiloh. In absence of a

search warrant, arrest warrant or a judicial determination of

ownership, the seizure of this personal property is the issue,

and the ownership of the dog is irrelevant. It was in

Plaintiff’s possession.

While he can prove ownership, where is the actual

relevance? The dog is not contraband, it is personal property.

The law of the State of Arizona is clear:

No person shall be deprived of life liberty or

property without due process of law.

Arizona Constitution, Article 2, Section 4

Due process of law is not the opinion of the employees of

the Defendant Sheriff. It is the responsibility of the employees

of the Defendant Sheriff to follow the law of the State of

Arizona. It is their sworn duty.

The ownership of the dog was then an issue for the Courts,

not the deputies of the Defendant, Sheriff.

The Sheriff is not constitutionally allowed to redistribute

property within the State of Arizona without due process of law.

The Sheriff’s own investigation disclosed this. The Sheriff by

not acting after his own investigation, and not following the

law and the Arizona Constitution committed an act in furtherance

of this violation of Plaintiff’s rights. The report of the

Professional Standards Unit is merely laughable and an

indication of how much ‘callous indifference’ to the

constitutional rights of the Plaintiff permeates the Office of

the Sheriff of Pinal County. As the Court said in Comfort v.


MOTION - 4

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Town of Pittsfield, 924 F. Supp 1219, 1231 (U.S.D.C. Maine,

1996):

Supervisory personnel are liable under § 1983, upon a

showing of a constitutional violation, when: (1) the

supervisor's conduct or inaction amounts to either

deliberate, reckless or callous indifference to the

constitutional rights of others, and (2) an affirmative

link exists between the street-level constitutional

violation and the acts or omissions of the supervisory

officials. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553,

562 (1st Cir.1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,

864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988)

Whereby, since the facts are clear that the property, the

dog, was in Plaintiff’s possession, that there was no court

order determining ownership in any other person, then it should

not be relevant or material here to take valuable court time to

prove ownership of the dog under these circumstances.

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Probable Cause

The Defendants have given notice that they will present

evidence regarding their belief in the existence of ‘probable

cause’ to believe that the dog was stolen by Plaintiff from his

ex-wife.

In doing so they ignore the applicable statute, ARS §11-

1010, which provides that the owner of a dog is determined by

the anti-rabies vaccination certificate which clearly stated

Plaintiff’s ownership.

However, the existence of ‘probable cause’ in the mind of

the deputies of Defendant Sheriff is similarly irrelevant and

immaterial to this trial. The ‘probable cause’ for the seizure

of evidence in a criminal matter when it is not ipso facto

contraband, is a matter to be determined, not by the officers of

the investigating agency, but by the Courts. Officers cannot

take personal property which is not contraband without a search


http://www.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&vr=2.0&DB=1000546&DocName=42USCAS1983&FindType=L

http://www.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=dfa1.0&vr=2.0&DB=350&FindType=Y&ReferencePositionType=S&SerialNum=1989119145&ReferencePosition=562




MOTION - 5

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warrant issued by a ‘neutral and detached’ magistrate. See

Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 450-451, 91 S.Ct. 2022,

29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)

The existence of ‘probable cause’ in the mind of the

deputies of the Defendant is irrelevant to this cause of action.

‘Probable cause’ is an issue for the Courts. It is one of our

most cherished liberties. The Defendant Sheriff, a sworn law

enforcement agent, violated the Constitutional rights of the

Plaintiff when he was advised of the facts through his own

investigation, and then either promoted the cover-up or was so

‘callously indifferent’ that he failed to act

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Good Faith

The Defendants have given notice that they will present

evidence regarding their ‘good faith’ belief in the claim of

ownership of the dog by the ex-wife, Carol Dixon.

The ‘good faith’ of the deputies of Defendant Sheriff is

only relevant if they had relied upon a search warrant or other

indicia of authority which was later overturned or proven to

lack ‘probable cause.’

The Defendant Sheriff’s deputies admit that they lacked a

warrant but want to claim they acted in ‘good faith.’ Good Faith

is irrelevant to seizures without a warrant. United States v.

Winsor, 846 F. 2d 1569, 9th Cir. 1987

The state of mind of the acting officers is irrelevant. The

Defendant Sheriff knew or should have known after his own

investigation in February, 2010 that this taking of property and

re-distribution of wealth by his deputies was without legal

authority. Sheriff Babeu then failed to act, or exhibited

‘calloused indifference’ to Plaintiff’s rights when so advised,

and in so doing furthered the violation of Plaintiff’s rights.


MOTION - 6

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Even the Defendant Sheriff’s alleged ‘good faith’ is no defense.

He has an obligation, a sworn duty to uphold the law, and he

failed to act and apparently attempted to cover-up the facts of

this matter.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff requests that the Court rule in Limine that the

Defendant’s may not present evidence as to the following:

1. Ownership of the dog,

2. Probable cause of the deputy sheriffs to believe

the Dog was stolen, and

3. Good Faith of the deputy sheriffs, in the absence

of a proper judicial warrant.

Respectfully submitted this 29th of JULY, 2010

/ s /

__________________________

WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN

Attorney at Law

Original of the foregoing electronically filed

This 29th day of July, 2010 to:

United States District Court

District of Arizona

Clerk of Court

401 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85003



29th of JULY, 2010 to:






James Walsh, Paul Babeu, Pete Rios,

Bryan Martyn and David Snider


MOTION - 1

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Mesa, Arizona 85204

Phone: 480-396-0681

Fax: 480-396-0532



DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARK E. DIXON,

Plaintiff,

vs.












et. al.

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ACCEPTANCE OF

OFFER OF JUDGMENT



MOTION - 2

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Plaintiff, MARK E. DIXON, through undersigned counsel, to

the extent it is legally possible, accepts the Offer of Judgment

offered by Defendant Pinal County, pursuant to Rule 68, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respectfully submitted this 26th of August, 2010

/ s /

__________________________

WILLIAM J. PEARLMAN

Attorney at Law

Attorney for Plaintiff Mark Dixon

Original of the foregoing electronically filed

This 26th day of August, 2010 to:

United States District Court

District of Arizona

Clerk of Court

401 West Washington

Phoenix, Arizona 85003



26th of August, 2010 to:






James Walsh, Paul Babeu,


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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark E. Dixon,

Plaintiff, vs. Pinal County, a political subdivision; James Walsh, Pinal County Attorney, in his official capacity; and Paul Babeu, Pinal County Sheriff, in his official capacity,

Defendants.

No. CV-10-325-PHX-DGC ORDER

Plaintiff Mark Dixon claims to be the sole and lawful owner of an Australian

shepherd named Shiloh. He alleges that Pinal County sheriff deputies wrongfully seized

Shiloh and turned the dog over to his ex-wife. He has brought suit against the County

itself, County Attorney James Walsh, and Sheriff Paul Babeu for allegedly having failed

to investigate, prosecute, and make arrests in the matter. Doc. 1. The amended

complaint purports to assert eight separate counts (Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11-18), but those “counts”

consist of the “statement of facts” (id. at 3 & ¶ 19) supporting unspecified civil rights

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. ¶ 5). Liberally construed, the complaint asserts

constitutional violations of due process and equal protection of the law. Plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1, 6-8.

The parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Docs. 98, 107. The

motions are fully briefed. Docs. 103, 106, 112. Oral argument has not been requested.

For reasons stated below, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants.


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I. Summary Judgment Standard.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of factually or legally

unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A party

seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Summary

judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of

summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986).

II. Discussion.

Plaintiff contends that the following undisputed facts entitle him to summary

judgment: that deputies seized Shiloh and gave the dog to a third-party without lawful

authority and while acting under color of state law, that the County received a notice of

claim detailing the facts alleged by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has the constitutional right to

not be deprived of property without due process and to not be denied equal protection

under the law, and that the County Attorney and Sheriff have a sworn duty to protect

constitutional rights. Docs. 98 at 2, 106 ¶¶ 1-6, 108 at 2. Defendants argue, correctly,

that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to require the County Attorney or the Sheriff to

investigate a particular matter, to prosecute or arrest any individual, or to even discipline

subordinates for alleged misconduct. Doc. 103 at 4. Because Defendants have been sued

in their official capacities (Doc. 60 at 1), liability will lie under § 1983 only if Plaintiff

shows that his alleged constitutional injury “was caused by employees acting pursuant to

an official policy or ‘longstanding practice or custom,’ or that the injury was caused or


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ratified by an individual with ‘final policy-making authority.’” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med.

Ctr. of S. Nev., --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2276774, at *6 (9th Cir. June 9, 2011) (quoting

Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008)); see Monell

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 385 (1989).

Plaintiff can show neither. He has identified no policy or custom of Defendants as

the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional injuries. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694;

see Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Polk County v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). Nor

has he presented evidence showing that Defendants ratified the alleged misconduct on the

part of the deputies.

Defendants’ inaction, standing alone, is not enough to create a triable issue.

Ratification is used as a theory of § 1983 liability where “an unconstitutional policy is

established by the post hoc ratification of prior actions.” Lancaster v. Carey, No. CIV S-

08-0051 LKK GGH P, 2011 WL 2198313, at *14 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2011) (emphasis in

original). Stated differently, “ratification simply makes clear that the policy was in effect

at the time of the incident and was the ‘moving force’ for the unconstitutional act.” Id.

The ratification theory cannot be so stretched to a situation where, as in this case,

“no policy is at issue, but simply a one-time event that had been completed at the time the

complaint was made.” Id.; see Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992)

(making clear that to hold municipalities liable under § 1983 for failing to overrule the

unconstitutional acts of subordinates “would simply smuggle respondeat superior

liability into [§] 1983 law” resulting in an impermissible “end run around Monell”);

Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that a “single act or

isolated incidents are normally insufficient to establish supervisory inaction upon which

to predicate § 1983 liability”); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 848


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(5th Cir. 2009) (noting that the theory of ratification is limited in § 1983 cases to

“extreme factual circumstances”).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have provided him no “post deprivation relief as

required by their respective oaths of office and statutory duties, thereby denying [him]

his Constitutional right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the law.” Doc. 60 ¶ 13.

Defendants argue, correctly, that because Arizona law provides adequate post-deprivation

remedies (including tort actions for replevin and trespass to chattels), no § 1983 claim

will lie. Docs. 103 at 6, 112 at 1-2; see Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)

(“an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not

constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is

available”); Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When

state remedies are adequate to protect an individual’s procedural due process rights, a

section 1983 action alleging a violation of those rights will not stand.”).

III. Conclusion.

In summary, Plaintiff has identified no specific policy or custom that arguably

violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Polk, 454 U.S. at 326. Nor has

he produced evidence of “affirmative or deliberate conduct by [Defendants] that may be

said to have ratified” the actions taken by the deputies. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ purported failure to support and defend the Constitution

and otherwise uphold his civil rights “constitutes [an] unconstitutional custom or policy

by the County” (Doc. 110 at 9), but the mere failure to protect an individual’s

constitutional rights is not sufficient to establish municipal liability under § 1983. See

Myers v. City of Madera, No. 1:10-CV-01398 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 2361628, at *4 (E.D.

Cal. June 9, 2011) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). The

Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Jackim v. City of

Brooklyn, No. 1:05 cv 1678, 2007 WL 893868, at *20 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007)


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(granting summary judgment on § 1983 claims where a police officer engaged in a

“single incident of wrongdoing” and mere inaction on the part of the city was not enough

to establish municipal liability); Ostroski v. Town of Southold, 443 F. Supp. 2d 325, 346

(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting summary judgment on municipal liability claim where the

plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that the alleged unconstitutional acts committed by

the police officers “were connected to any policy, custom or practice beyond mere

speculation and conjecture”).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 98) is denied.

2. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 7th day of July, 2011.


dixon v pinal county 10-0325phxdkd partial documents of lawsuit with clear and convincing evidence

Documents

named defendants

pinal county attorneyjoe

pinal county sheriffsdeputies

numbered paragraphs

factual allegations

dixons complaint

entire complaint

dkd document