discussion of: “declines in the volatility of the u. s. economy: a detailed look” robert j....

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Discussion of: Discussion of: “Declines in the “Declines in the Volatility of the U. Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and Northwestern University and NBER NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting, May 2, BEA Advisors’ Meeting, May 2, 2008 2008

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Page 1: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Discussion of:Discussion of:“Declines in the Volatility “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A of the U. S. Economy: A

Detailed Look”Detailed Look”

Robert J. GordonRobert J. GordonNorthwestern University and NBERNorthwestern University and NBER

BEA Advisors’ Meeting, May 2, BEA Advisors’ Meeting, May 2, 20082008

Page 2: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

This Document ConsistsThis Document Consistsof Two Papersof Two Papers

Paper #1 is a detailed look at variance Paper #1 is a detailed look at variance across states and industries comparing across states and industries comparing 1978-84 with 1985-971978-84 with 1985-97 Base data 51 states and 63 industriesBase data 51 states and 63 industries Aggregated also into 8 economic regions and Aggregated also into 8 economic regions and

13 industry groups13 industry groups Paper #2 is an attempt to explain the Paper #2 is an attempt to explain the

variance in Real GDP 1972-97 by three variance in Real GDP 1972-97 by three explanatory variablesexplanatory variables Nothing about states or industries in Paper #2Nothing about states or industries in Paper #2

Page 3: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Makes Sense to Discuss this Makes Sense to Discuss this Document in Reverse Order, Document in Reverse Order, Paper #2 and then Paper #1Paper #2 and then Paper #1

Why?Why? Paper #2 develops an econometric equation to Paper #2 develops an econometric equation to

explain aggregate variance in real GDP without explain aggregate variance in real GDP without any state or industry detailany state or industry detail

The disaggregated data in Paper #1 are not used The disaggregated data in Paper #1 are not used in Paper #2, and so the 1978-97 constraint on the in Paper #2, and so the 1978-97 constraint on the time period can be abandonedtime period can be abandoned

Pure macro, hence can be compared with Pure macro, hence can be compared with previous macro researchprevious macro research

Main finding of Paper #1 can be better Main finding of Paper #1 can be better interpreted after learning about the causes of interpreted after learning about the causes of macro aggregate variance from Paper #2 and macro aggregate variance from Paper #2 and previous researchprevious research

Page 4: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Agenda for the DiscussionAgenda for the Discussion

G-S paper includes my 2005 paper in G-S paper includes my 2005 paper in the reference list but never actually the reference list but never actually mentions my results anywherementions my results anywhere

First I’ll summarize my results about First I’ll summarize my results about the “Great Moderation” which the “Great Moderation” which provide perspective on both their provide perspective on both their Paper #2 and Paper #1Paper #2 and Paper #1

Then some comments on Paper #2, Then some comments on Paper #2, last comments on Paper #1last comments on Paper #1

Page 5: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Qualification and Quibble:Qualification and Quibble:DatesDates

Their Paper #2 only covers 1972-97. The Their Paper #2 only covers 1972-97. The reasons (SIC vs. NAICS) that caused them to reasons (SIC vs. NAICS) that caused them to stop in 1997 for Paper #1 are irrelevant for stop in 1997 for Paper #1 are irrelevant for paper #2. They should have covered 1947-paper #2. They should have covered 1947-2007, and my results are based on 1947-2005.2007, and my results are based on 1947-2005.

My decomposition of sources of variance My decomposition of sources of variance depends on the full high volatility period 1947-depends on the full high volatility period 1947-1984, not just their 1972-19841984, not just their 1972-1984

Key example: For them, Fed government is a Key example: For them, Fed government is a source of stability, for me a core source of source of stability, for me a core source of instability. Difference: they omit the 50s & instability. Difference: they omit the 50s & 60s! 60s!

Page 6: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

My List of Hypotheses forMy List of Hypotheses forpost-1984 Reduction in Volatilitypost-1984 Reduction in Volatility ShocksShocks

Demand shocksDemand shocksFederal government: declining importance and Federal government: declining importance and

volatility of military spendingvolatility of military spending Inventory managementInventory managementFinancial Market Deregulation stabilized residential Financial Market Deregulation stabilized residential

housing at least until post-2001housing at least until post-2001 Supply shocks, and their effect on inflation Supply shocks, and their effect on inflation

dynamics and on monetary policydynamics and on monetary policy More monetary policy emphasis on More monetary policy emphasis on

stabilizing output after 1990stabilizing output after 1990 Of Lesser ImportanceOf Lesser Importance

Shifts in shares to services (G-S correctly Shifts in shares to services (G-S correctly dismiss this)dismiss this)

Page 7: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Basic Disagreement with Basic Disagreement with G-S Paper #1 on Industries and G-S Paper #1 on Industries and

StatesStates

For most macroeconomists, shocks For most macroeconomists, shocks originate in planned private expenditures, in originate in planned private expenditures, in monetary/fiscal policy, and in supply shocksmonetary/fiscal policy, and in supply shocks

Thus we should start with C+I+G+NXThus we should start with C+I+G+NX The G-S industry composition is mainly The G-S industry composition is mainly

telling us that the important macro demand telling us that the important macro demand and supply shocks hit all industries, not just and supply shocks hit all industries, not just a few. That is why their covariance terms a few. That is why their covariance terms are so importantare so important

Page 8: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Preview of My ApproachPreview of My Approach

Demand Shocks: Composition Demand Shocks: Composition analysis across 11 components of analysis across 11 components of spending on GDPspending on GDPRole of composition shifts vs. reduction Role of composition shifts vs. reduction

in within-sector volatilityin within-sector volatilityIsolation of three sectors as most Isolation of three sectors as most

responsible for improved stability; responsible for improved stability; support for demand shockssupport for demand shocks

Emphasis on Supply Shocks that Emphasis on Supply Shocks that Drove Inflation Volatility 1972-84Drove Inflation Volatility 1972-84

Page 9: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

How to Compare Impact of How to Compare Impact of Monetary Policy with Reduced Monetary Policy with Reduced

Shocks?Shocks?Estimation of a Three-Equation Estimation of a Three-Equation

Simultaneous ModelSimultaneous ModelThree equations are:Three equations are:

My inflation equation in which supply My inflation equation in which supply shocks are explicitly entered and identifiedshocks are explicitly entered and identified

A Taylor rule that makes interest rates A Taylor rule that makes interest rates endogenous to inflation and the output gapendogenous to inflation and the output gap

An output equation depending on lagged An output equation depending on lagged interest rate changes; residuals are interest rate changes; residuals are interpreted as demand shocksinterpreted as demand shocks

Page 10: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Rolling 20-quarter Standard Rolling 20-quarter Standard Deviation of 4-qtr Deviation of 4-qtr ΔΔs in Real s in Real

GDP, GDP, 2.8 vs. 1.3 pre/post 1988:Q12.8 vs. 1.3 pre/post 1988:Q1

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Perc

en

t

Page 11: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Their Comment on Blanchard-Their Comment on Blanchard-SimonSimon

that Volatility had Declined over that Volatility had Declined over a Longer Period, interrupted in a Longer Period, interrupted in

70s70s Moving Outside of the Narrow 1978-97 Prism, Moving Outside of the Narrow 1978-97 Prism, What are the Facts?What are the Facts?

Contra Blanchard-Simon, there was nothing Contra Blanchard-Simon, there was nothing steady about decline in volatility: high 50s, steady about decline in volatility: high 50s, low 60s, high 70s-80s, low after 1988low 60s, high 70s-80s, low after 1988

How Did the Evolution of Real GDP Volatility How Did the Evolution of Real GDP Volatility Compared with Inflation Volatility?Compared with Inflation Volatility?

20-quarter Rolling Standard Deviations of 20-quarter Rolling Standard Deviations of Real GDP and GDP Deflator Real GDP and GDP Deflator Growth RatesGrowth Rates

Page 12: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Inflation vs. Output Volatility:Inflation vs. Output Volatility:Sometimes the Same, butSometimes the Same, but

Other Times DifferentOther Times Different

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Real GDP Growth Volatility

Inflation Volatility

Page 13: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Already We Have Support forAlready We Have Support fortheir Main Conclusion in Paper their Main Conclusion in Paper

#2#2Decline in the Volatility of Inflation Decline in the Volatility of Inflation

was a Major Source of the Decline in was a Major Source of the Decline in Output Volatility after 1984Output Volatility after 1984

Pattern of Decline in Output vs Pattern of Decline in Output vs Inflation Volatility was DifferentInflation Volatility was DifferentOutput Volatility was High in 1950s, Output Volatility was High in 1950s,

Lower 1960sLower 1960sInflation Volatility was Low in 1950sInflation Volatility was Low in 1950s

Page 14: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Summary of inflation volatilitySummary of inflation volatilityvs. real GDP volatility (20 qtr vs. real GDP volatility (20 qtr

stdev)stdev)1952-721952-72 1973-871973-87 1988-1988-

20052005

Real GDPReal GDP 2.692.69 2.872.87 1.251.25

GDP DeflatorGDP Deflator 1.111.11 1.671.67 0.480.48

Page 15: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Turn to My Tables for Turn to My Tables for Decomposition AnalysisDecomposition Analysis

Table 1: Standard Deviations and Table 1: Standard Deviations and Shares of 11 SectorsShares of 11 Sectors

Table 2: Effect of Shifts in Shares Table 2: Effect of Shifts in Shares and Own-Sector Volatilityand Own-Sector Volatility

Table 3: Contributions to GDP Table 3: Contributions to GDP Change:Change:Emphasis on Residential Investment, Emphasis on Residential Investment,

Inventory Investment, and Federal Inventory Investment, and Federal SpendingSpending

Page 16: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Building the Three Equation Building the Three Equation ModelModel

Combines my “mainstream” or “triangle” Combines my “mainstream” or “triangle” approach to explaining inflationapproach to explaining inflation InertiaInertia Demand through output or U gapDemand through output or U gap Specific supply shocksSpecific supply shocks

““Taylor Rule” equation for Fed Funds rateTaylor Rule” equation for Fed Funds rate Coefficients allowed to change, 1979 and 1990Coefficients allowed to change, 1979 and 1990

Output gap equation with feedback from Output gap equation with feedback from interest rate changesinterest rate changes

Comment on Differences with Stock-Comment on Differences with Stock-Watson (2002, 2003)Watson (2002, 2003)

Page 17: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Supply-shock variablesSupply-shock variables

Changes in the relative price of Changes in the relative price of nonfood nonoil importsnonfood nonoil imports

The food-energy effectThe food-energy effectAcceleration and deceleration of the Acceleration and deceleration of the

productivity growth trendproductivity growth trendNixon-era controls, held down Nixon-era controls, held down

inflation in 1971-72, boosted inflation inflation in 1971-72, boosted inflation in 1974in 1974

Page 18: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

The Dramatic Effect of Supply The Dramatic Effect of Supply ShocksShocks

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Predicted Inflation w ith Actual Shocks, 1965-2004

Predicted Inflation w ith ShocksSuppressed, 1965-2004

Page 19: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

The Interest Rate EquationThe Interest Rate Equation

R = T* + p* + d(L)(pR = T* + p* + d(L)(ptt-p*) + f(L)(G-p*) + f(L)(Gtt))Estimated over three time intervalsEstimated over three time intervals

1960-79 (shorthand: “Burns”)1960-79 (shorthand: “Burns”)1979-90 (shorthand: “Volcker”)1979-90 (shorthand: “Volcker”)1990-2004 (shorthand: “Greenspan”)1990-2004 (shorthand: “Greenspan”)

After 1979, Fed fought inflationAfter 1979, Fed fought inflationAfter 1990, Fed fought both infl & After 1990, Fed fought both infl &

YgapYgap

Page 20: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Conclusions from My Previous Conclusions from My Previous AnalysisAnalysis

Demand and Supply Shocks both MatteredDemand and Supply Shocks both Mattered The Major Demand Shocks were Military The Major Demand Shocks were Military

Spending, Financial Institutions that Spending, Financial Institutions that Destabilized Residential Investment, and Destabilized Residential Investment, and Primitive Inventory ManagementPrimitive Inventory Management

The Major Supply Shocks were Import Prices The Major Supply Shocks were Import Prices (and Flexible Exchange Rates), Food-Oil Prices, (and Flexible Exchange Rates), Food-Oil Prices, Productivity Trend, and Nixon ControlsProductivity Trend, and Nixon Controls

Compare with Stock-Watson “Good Luck”Compare with Stock-Watson “Good Luck” Part was not luck, policy reduced size of Part was not luck, policy reduced size of

military and reformed financial markets to military and reformed financial markets to stabilize residential constructionstabilize residential construction

Page 21: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Full-Model SimulationsFull-Model Simulations

Comparing 1965-83 with 1984-2004Comparing 1965-83 with 1984-2004 Inflation VolatilityInflation Volatility

Reversal of SS Accounts for 80%, Output Reversal of SS Accounts for 80%, Output Error 20%Error 20%

SS Overexplain reduction in mean inflationSS Overexplain reduction in mean inflationOutput VolatilityOutput Volatility

St Dev 2/3 explained by OE in both periodsSt Dev 2/3 explained by OE in both periodsSS contributed about 1/3 in first periodSS contributed about 1/3 in first period

Page 22: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

The Basic Conclusion of the The Basic Conclusion of the Paper:Paper:

The Output Gap SimulationsThe Output Gap Simulations

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

1965:01 1970:01 1975:01 1980:01 1985:01 1990:01 1995:01 2000:01

All Shocks

No Output Error

No Interest Error

No Shocks

No Supply Shocks

Page 23: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Let’s Compare with G-S Paper Let’s Compare with G-S Paper #2#2

Review: Paper #2 Tests Explanations of Review: Paper #2 Tests Explanations of Reduction in Real GDP Volatility, Paper #1 Reduction in Real GDP Volatility, Paper #1 Uses State and Industry DataUses State and Industry Data

Three Hypotheses of Paper #2, Explaining Three Hypotheses of Paper #2, Explaining Moving 6-Year Variance of Real GDP Moving 6-Year Variance of Real GDP Growth:Growth: Moving 6-Year Share of Computer Investment in Moving 6-Year Share of Computer Investment in

Real GDPReal GDP Better Inventory Control, Better Planning in GeneralBetter Inventory Control, Better Planning in General

Moving 6-Year Share of Imports in Real GDP Moving 6-Year Share of Imports in Real GDP (Keynesian textbook, lower multiplier)(Keynesian textbook, lower multiplier)

Moving 6-Year Variance of Changes in GDP Moving 6-Year Variance of Changes in GDP Deflator (same construct as the dependent Deflator (same construct as the dependent variable)variable)

Page 24: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Comments on RegressionsComments on Regressions

From the Preceding Discussion, we From the Preceding Discussion, we know that Inflation Volatility is know that Inflation Volatility is Strongly Related to Output Volatility Strongly Related to Output Volatility after 1972 (not before 1972). after 1972 (not before 1972).

So It’s No Surprise that Line 7 of So It’s No Surprise that Line 7 of Table 5 has the Inflation as the Only Table 5 has the Inflation as the Only Significant VariableSignificant Variable

Recall My ChartRecall My Chart

Page 25: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Inflation vs. Output Volatility:Inflation vs. Output Volatility:Sometimes the Same, butSometimes the Same, but

Other Times DifferentOther Times Different

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Real GDP Growth Volatility

Inflation Volatility

Page 26: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Problems with Other Problems with Other VariablesVariables

Computer Share of GDP; this was flat Computer Share of GDP; this was flat 1985-95, then jumped to 2000, then 1985-95, then jumped to 2000, then collapsed. Completely different collapsed. Completely different timing from GDP volatilitytiming from GDP volatility

Import Share Looks More Promising. Import Share Looks More Promising. Its Increase Took Off after 19982. Its Increase Took Off after 19982. But it Increased Steadily after 1984 But it Increased Steadily after 1984 but Volatility leveled off, did not drop but Volatility leveled off, did not drop continuouslycontinuously

Page 27: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

The Share of ICT and Software The Share of ICT and Software Investment in GDP, 1965-2006Investment in GDP, 1965-2006

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1965-I 1970-I 1975-I 1980-I 1985-I 1990-I 1995-I 2000-I 2005-I

Page 28: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

The Import and Export Shore, 1947-2007

Imports and Exports as a Share of GDP

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1947-I 1952-I 1957-I 1962-I 1967-I 1972-I 1977-I 1982-I 1987-I 1992-I 1997-I 2002-I 2007-I

Series1

Series2

Imports

Exports

Page 29: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Comment About Style Comment About Style of Paper #2of Paper #2

While the dependent variable is graphed in While the dependent variable is graphed in Chart 4, no charts are provided showing the Chart 4, no charts are provided showing the time-series behavior of the explanatory time-series behavior of the explanatory variablesvariables

The single-equation methodology misses The single-equation methodology misses much of the substance in my alternative much of the substance in my alternative multi-equation approachmulti-equation approach Output was volatile in 1979-84 not just because Output was volatile in 1979-84 not just because

inflation was volatile, but because the Fed inflation was volatile, but because the Fed decided to fight high inflation with unprecedented decided to fight high inflation with unprecedented high levels of interest rates in 1980-81high levels of interest rates in 1980-81

Only a multi-equation dynamic simulation can sort Only a multi-equation dynamic simulation can sort through the relative role of demand shocks, through the relative role of demand shocks, supply shocks, and monetary policysupply shocks, and monetary policy

Page 30: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Paper #1 Can Be DiscussedPaper #1 Can Be DiscussedMore BrieflyMore Briefly

Decomposition of Variance over Decomposition of Variance over Disaggregated and Aggregated State Disaggregated and Aggregated State and Industry Groupsand Industry Groups

Disaggregated:Disaggregated:51 States, 63 Industries51 States, 63 Industries

AggregatedAggregated8 Area Groups, 13 Industries8 Area Groups, 13 Industries

Page 31: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Data ProblemsData Problems

Short Sample, 1978-97Short Sample, 1978-97 Lack of Data pre-1978 because of Lack of Data (can this Lack of Data pre-1978 because of Lack of Data (can this

be fixed by BEA?)be fixed by BEA?) Lack of Data post-97 due to unwillingness to merge SIC Lack of Data post-97 due to unwillingness to merge SIC

and NAICSand NAICS BUT: The Interesting Results in Paper #1 Emerge BUT: The Interesting Results in Paper #1 Emerge

from the Aggregated (Area and Industry) Datafrom the Aggregated (Area and Industry) Data No need to go to disaggregated data where SIC and No need to go to disaggregated data where SIC and

NAICS merge causes difficultiesNAICS merge causes difficulties Mistake, p. 6, line 7. They say AAGR of real Mistake, p. 6, line 7. They say AAGR of real

GDP_S is 1.6%, actual number from BEA web site GDP_S is 1.6%, actual number from BEA web site is 2.96%is 2.96%

Page 32: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Basic Results of Paper #1Basic Results of Paper #1 Decomposition of Variance into Own-Decomposition of Variance into Own-

industry Variance and Cross-Industry industry Variance and Cross-Industry CovarianceCovariance

Overwhelming Share of Decline in Variance Overwhelming Share of Decline in Variance is Explained by Covariance Term, not Own-is Explained by Covariance Term, not Own-Industry variance termIndustry variance term

You Would Expect This if the Basic Causes You Would Expect This if the Basic Causes Were Macro Demand and Supply Shocks Were Macro Demand and Supply Shocks that Impacted All Industriesthat Impacted All Industries

The Industry and State Results are The Industry and State Results are Consistent with a Macro Explanation, not Consistent with a Macro Explanation, not Shocks Originating from Individual Shocks Originating from Individual Industries Industries

Page 33: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

Most Interesting Finding:Most Interesting Finding:Increased Variance in Some Increased Variance in Some

IndustriesIndustries

Basic Conceptual Point: Variance Basic Conceptual Point: Variance Measures Deviation from Mean GrowthMeasures Deviation from Mean Growth This is Not Only Due to Business CyclesThis is Not Only Due to Business Cycles Also Due to Sharp Changes in Growth Rate Also Due to Sharp Changes in Growth Rate

during a Period, e.g., Faster Growth in during a Period, e.g., Faster Growth in ComputersComputers

Easier to Sort Out at Aggregated (13-Easier to Sort Out at Aggregated (13-Industry) LevelIndustry) Level Communications and UtilitiesCommunications and Utilities

Page 34: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

What Are the Higher VarianceWhat Are the Higher VarianceIndustries in Table 4?Industries in Table 4?

ElectronicElectronic InstrumentsInstruments CommunicationsCommunications

FinanceFinance Depository and Nondepository InstitutionsDepository and Nondepository Institutions Security BrokersSecurity Brokers Investment OfficesInvestment Offices

Special StoriesSpecial Stories TobaccoTobacco

These are “Change-in-Trend” Stories, not Business Cycle These are “Change-in-Trend” Stories, not Business Cycle Stories. Plots of Output can Distinguish the Two StoriesStories. Plots of Output can Distinguish the Two Stories

The authors need to plot the data for these “increasing The authors need to plot the data for these “increasing variance” industries and help the reader understand variance” industries and help the reader understand whether there are change trends or changed volatility whether there are change trends or changed volatility around trendaround trend

Page 35: Discussion of: “Declines in the Volatility of the U. S. Economy: A Detailed Look” Robert J. Gordon Northwestern University and NBER BEA Advisors’ Meeting,

ConclusionConclusion

The Great Moderation Was Caused by a Decline in The Great Moderation Was Caused by a Decline in the Magnitude of Demand and Supply Shocksthe Magnitude of Demand and Supply Shocks Military spending, residential construction, inventory Military spending, residential construction, inventory

investmentinvestment Food and energy prices, relative price of imports, Food and energy prices, relative price of imports,

productivity trend, Nixon controlsproductivity trend, Nixon controls Volcker-regime Fed was serious about fighting Volcker-regime Fed was serious about fighting

inflation so magnified impact of Supply Shocksinflation so magnified impact of Supply Shocks Individual industry reactions were mainly the Individual industry reactions were mainly the

multiplier effect of macro shocks, plus some multiplier effect of macro shocks, plus some increase in variance in Electronics, increase in variance in Electronics, Communications, and Finance due to Changing Communications, and Finance due to Changing Trends within 1985-97Trends within 1985-97