direct purchaser plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' …... · 2020. 7. 20. ·...

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION

In Re: AUTOMOTIVE BRAKE HOSES

CASE NO. 12-MD-02311 HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

THIS RELATES TO: ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS

2:16-cv-03601-MOB-MKM 2:16-cv-14245-MOB-MKM 2:19-cv-12720-MOB-MKM

DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES, LITIGATION COSTS AND EXPENSES,

AND AN INCENTIVE PAYMENT TO THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE

Pursuant to Rules 23 and 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Direct Purchaser

Plaintiff Emerald Capital Advisors Corporation, in its capacity as Trustee for the FAH Liquidating

Trust (“ECAC” or “Direct Purchaser Plaintiff”), hereby moves the Court for an award of attorneys’

fees, litigation costs and expenses, and an incentive payment to the class representative from the

proceeds of the settlements that have been reached with the Hitachi Metals and Toyoda Gosei

Defendants. In support of this motion, Direct Purchaser Plaintiff relies upon the accompanying

memorandum of law and the Declarations attached thereto, which are incorporated by reference.

Dated: March 9, 2020

Respectfully submitted, /s/ David H. Fink David H. Fink (P28235) FINK BRESSACK 38500 Woodward Ave, Suite 350 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 Telephone: (248) 971-2500 Interim Liaison Counsel for Direct Purchaser Plaintiff

Case 2:16-cv-03601-MOB-MKM ECF No. 21 filed 03/09/20 PageID.275 Page 1 of 26

2

Steven A. Kanner William H. London Michael E. Moskovitz FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC 2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130 Bannockburn, IL 60015 Telephone: (224) 632-4500

Joseph C. Kohn William E. Hoese Douglas A. Abrahams KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C. 1600 Market Street, Suite 2500 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 238-1700

Gregory P. Hansel Randall B. Weill Michael S. Smith PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS LLP One City Center, P.O. Box 9546 Portland, ME 04112-9546 Telephone: (207) 791-3000

Eugene A. Spector William G. Caldes Jeffrey L. Spector SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C. 2001 Market Street, Suite 3420 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 496-0300

Interim Co-Lead Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Plaintiff


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION

In Re: AUTOMOTIVE BRAKE HOSES

CASE NO. 12-MD-02311 HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

THIS RELATES TO: ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS

2:16-cv-03601-MOB-MKM 2:16-cv-14245-MOB-MKM 2:19-cv-12720-MOB-MKM

DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES, LITIGATION COSTS AND

EXPENSES, AND AN INCENTIVE PAYMENT TO THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE


TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ..................................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES .................. iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1

II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED TO DATE .................... 1

III. CLASS NOTICE .............................................................................................................. 2

A. THE PERCENTAGE-OF-THE-RECOVERY METHOD PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED BY THE COURT IN THIS MDL IS APPROPRIATE FOR ASSESSING THE FEE REQUEST............................................................................................................................... 4

B. THE REQUESTED FEE CONSTITUTES A FAIR AND REASONABLE PERCENTAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND. ................................................................ 4

C. THE FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SUPPORT THE REQUESTED FEE. ................................................................................................................ 7

1. DPP COUNSEL OBTAINED A VALUABLE BENEFIT FOR THE CLASSES. ..... 7

2. THE VALUE OF THE SERVICES ON AN HOURLY BASIS CONFIRMS THAT THE REQUESTED FEE IS REASONABLE. ................................................................... 7

3. THE REQUESTED FEE IS FAIR AND REASONABLE GIVEN THE REAL RISK THAT DPP COUNSEL COULD HAVE RECEIVED NO COMPENSATION FOR THEIR EFFORTS. .............................................................................................................. 9

4. SOCIETY HAS AN IMPORTANT STAKE IN THIS LAWSUIT AND IN AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES. ................................................... 10

5. THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS CASE SUPPORTS THE REQUESTED FEE. ....... 11

6. SKILL AND EXPERIENCE OF COUNSEL ............................................................ 11

V. THE COURT SHOULD AUTHORIZE INTERIM LEAD COUNSEL TO DETERMINE FEE ALLOCATIONS. ............................................................................................................. 12

VI. REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION COSTS AND EXPENSES .............................. 13

VII. AN AWARD OF AN INCENTIVE PAYMENT TO THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES IS APPROPRIATE. ............................................................................ 13

VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 16


ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Should the Court award Direct Purchaser Plaintiff’s Counsel attorneys’ fees of 30% of the

Hitachi Metals and Toyoda Gosei settlement funds after deduction of litigation costs and

expenses?

Suggested Answer: Yes.

2. Should the Court award Direct Purchaser Plaintiff’s Counsel litigation costs and expenses

from the settlement funds?


3. Should the Court award an incentive payment to the Class Representative from the

settlement funds?



iii

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)

Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996)

Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 1993)


iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s)

Cases Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc.,

118 F.R.D. 534 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ................................................................................................ 12 Bessey v. Packerland Plainwell, Inc.,

2007 WL 3173972 (W.D. Mich. 2007) ........................................................................................ 5 Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.,

102 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................................ 7 Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC,

822 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................................ 4 Godshall v. Franklin Mint Co.,

2004 WL 2745890 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2004) ................................................................................ 6 Hadix v. Johnson,

322 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................... 14 Heekin v. Anthem, Inc.,

2012 WL 5878032 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 2012) .............................................................................. 6 Hillson v. Kelly Servs. Inc.,

2017 WL 279814 (E.D. Mich. 2017) ......................................................................................... 14 In re AremisSoft Corp., Sec. Litig.,

210 F.R.D. 109 (D.N.J. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 6 In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig.,

2016 WL 8201516 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2016) ....................................................................... 4, 5 In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig.,

2008 WL 63269 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008) .................................................................................... 13 In Re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig.,

528 F. Supp. 2d 752 (S.D. Ohio 2007) ......................................................................................... 8 In re Cardizem,

218 F.R.D. 508 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ................................................................................. 11, 13, 14 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,

404 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005) ....................................................................................................... 13 In re Copley Pharm., Inc. Albuterol Prods. Liab. Litig.,

50 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D. Wy. 1999) ............................................................................................. 13 In re Delphi Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig.,

248 F.R.D. 483 (E.D. Mich. 2008) ..................................................................................... 4, 7, 11 In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig.,

148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993) ................................................................................................ 13 In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig.,

2018 WL 3439454 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2018) ................................................................................ 6 In re Dry Max Pampers Litig.,

724 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................... 15 In re FAO Inc. Sec. Litig.,

2005 WL 3801469 (E.D. Pa., May 20, 2005) .............................................................................. 6 In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig.,

2014 WL 296954 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2014) .................................................................................. 6


v

In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 951 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Pa. 2013) ........................................................................................... 6

In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ................................................................................................... 10

In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ........................................................................................... 6

In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ......................................................................................... 11

In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 1221350 (E.D. Pa., June 2, 2004) .......................................................................... 6, 13

In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 6209188 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 2011) ........................................................... 4, 8, 10, 11

In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 1639269 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2015) ...................................................................... 6, 11

In re Prandin Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 1396473 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2015) ...................................................................... 5, 15

In re Prudential Ins. Co. Amer. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................................... 13

In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 3282591 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 17, 2010) .............................................................................. 6

In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 2946459 (E.D. Tenn. Jun. 30, 2014) ...................................................................... 6, 15

In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 2155387 (E.D. Tenn. May 17, 2013) ........................................................................... 6

In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6577029 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2013) ................................................................................. 6

In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004) ....................................................................................................... 13

Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................................ 8

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................... 10

Klein v. PDG Remediation, Inc., 1999 WL 38179 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 28, 1999) .................................................................................. 6

Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 3505851 (N.D. Okla., Dec. 4, 2006) ............................................................................ 6

Machesney, v. Lar-Bev of Howell, Inc., 2017 WL 2437207 (E.D. Mich. Jun. 2017) ................................................................................ 15

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) ..................................................................................................................... 8

Moore v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 781 (2005) ................................................................................................................. 6

New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 627 (W.D. Ky. 2006) ................................................................................................. 6

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) ..................................................................................................................... 8


vi

Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 1993) ............................................................................................................ 4

Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 14

Standard Iron Works v. Arcelormittal, 2014 WL 7781572 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2014) ................................................................................ 6

Thacker v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 695 F. Supp. 2d, 521 (E.D. Ky. 2010).......................................................................................... 5

Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co, 2007 WL 2694029 (D. Kan., Sept. 11, 2007) .............................................................................. 6

Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) ....................................................................................................................... 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1) and (2) ...................................................................................................... 3


1

I. INTRODUCTION

Settlements in the direct purchaser Automotive Brake Hoses case totaling $4,991,667 have

been reached with the following Defendants: (a) Hitachi Metals, Ltd. (“Hitachi Metals”); and (b)

Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd., Toyoda Gosei North America Corp., and TG Kentucky, LLC (“Toyoda

Gosei” or “Toyoda Gosei Defendants”) (all Defendants referenced in this paragraph, collectively,

the “Settling Defendants”). In addition to the monetary component, the settlements provide for

cooperation with respect to the prosecution of the litigation against any remaining Defendant,

should the need for such cooperation arise.

Direct Purchaser Plaintiff’s (“DPP”) counsel now respectfully move for an order: 1)

awarding attorneys’ fees of 30% of the settlement funds after deduction of reimbursed litigation

costs and expenses; 2) awarding DPP counsel $11,575.06 for litigation costs and expenses paid

and incurred; and, 3) awarding an incentive payment of $25,000.00 to the Class Representative.

For the reasons set forth herein, DPP counsel respectfully submit that the requested fee and expense

awards, and incentive payment, are reasonable and fair under both well-established Sixth Circuit

precedent concerning such awards in class action litigation and this Court’s prior decisions

awarding fees and expenses in the Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation.

II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED TO DATE

The Automotive Brake Hoses case is part of the overall Automotive Parts Antitrust

Litigation that was centralized in this Court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in

2012. The background of the Automotive Brake Hoses case is set forth in the related Memorandum

in Support of Direct Purchaser Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Proposed Settlements,

which was filed contemporaneously with this motion on March 9, 2020, and will not be fully

repeated here. The case against Hitachi Metals was filed in December 2016 and the case against


2

Toyoda Gosei was filed in September 2019,1 and the settlements were preliminarily approved in

2017 and 2020. If the Court grants final approval of the settlements, then the Direct Purchaser

action will be fully resolved.

In this case, DPP counsel have:

Investigated the industry and drafted complaints against the Defendants;

Met with counsel for the DOJ amnesty applicant to discuss facts relevant to Plaintiff’s claims;

Reviewed, analyzed, and coded documents produced by both Defendants;

Negotiated with the Settling Defendants and prepared the settlement agreements;

Drafted the settlement notices, orders, and the preliminary and final approval

motions and briefs; and

Worked with the claims administrator to design and send the class notices and a Claim Form, and to create and maintain a settlement website.

Throughout the case, DPP counsel have sought to avoid duplication of efforts among the attorneys

and to work cooperatively and efficiently with defense counsel and the Court.

III. CLASS NOTICE

On February 7, 2020, the Notice of Proposed Settlements of Direct Purchaser Class Action

with Hitachi Metals and Toyoda Gosei Defendants and Hearing on Settlement Approval and

Related Matters, and Claim Form (the “Notice”) was mailed, postage prepaid, to all potential

members of the Settlement Classes that were identified by Defendants. (A copy of the Notice has

also been posted on-line at www.autopartsantitrustlitigation.com.) On February 17, 2020, a

Summary Notice of Proposed Settlements of Direct Purchaser Class Action with Hitachi Metals

1 Emerald Capital Advisors Corporation, Trustee for the FAH Liquidating Trust v. Hitachi Metals, Ltd., 2:16-cv-14245-JCO-SDD, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2016). On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a similar class action complaint against Toyoda Gosei, In Re: Automotive Brake Hoses, 2:19-cv-12720-LVP-MJH, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2019).


3

and Toyoda Gosei Defendants and Hearing on Settlement Approval and Related Matters (the

“Summary Notice”) was published in Automotive News, an online banner notice appeared over a

21-day period on www.AutoNews.com (the digital version of Automotive News), and an

Informational Press Release was issued nationwide via PR Newswire’s “Auto Wire,” which targets

auto industry trade publications.2

As required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), the Notice informed the Settlement Class Members

that DPP counsel would request an award of attorneys’ fees of up to 30% of the settlement funds,

reimbursement of expenses, and a service award of $25,000.00 to the Class Representative (Notice

at 4-5). It also explained how Settlement Class Members could exclude themselves or object to

the requests. Id. at 4, 5.

The deadline for objections or requests for exclusion is April 3, 2020. To date, there have

been no objections or requests for exclusion from any Settlement Class Members. DPP counsel

will provide the Court with a final report on any objections or requests for exclusion before the

Fairness Hearing.

IV. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES ARE REASONABLE

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides that “[i]n a certified class action, the court

may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the

parties’ agreement.” As discussed above, DPP counsel have complied with the requirements of

Rule 23(h)(1) and (2) (notice to the class of the attorneys’ fees request and an opportunity to

object). What remains for the Court to determine is whether the requested fee is reasonable and

2 Counsel for Hitachi Metals and Toyoda Gosei have informed Settlement Class Counsel

that the requisite notice was sent to the appropriate federal and state officials under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.


4

fair to the class members and DPP counsel under the circumstances. As discussed below, DPP

counsel believe their attorneys’ fee request of 30% of the settlement funds is fair and reasonable

under the circumstances, and well-supported by applicable law.

A. THE PERCENTAGE-OF-THE-RECOVERY METHOD PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED BY THE COURT IN THIS MDL IS APPROPRIATE FOR ASSESSING THE FEE REQUEST.

As the Court has previously observed, Sixth Circuit law gives district courts discretion to

select an appropriate method for determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in class actions.

In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 8201516, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2016)

(citations omitted). See generally Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th

Cir. 2016) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods). In this MDL, the

Court has used the percentage-of-the-fund method. E.g., In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig.,

2016 WL 8201516, at *1 (collecting cases) (holding that “the percentage-of-the-fund … method

of awarding attorneys’ fees is preferred in this district because it eliminates disputes about the

reasonableness of rates and hours, conserves judicial resources, and aligns the interests of class

counsel and the class members”). See Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513,

516 (6th Cir. 1993); In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 6209188, at *16 (E.D. Mich.

Dec. 13, 2011); In re Delphi Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 248 F.R.D. 483, 502 (E.D.

Mich. 2008). DPP counsel respectfully request that the Court apply the percentage-of-the-fund

method here, as it has in other DPP cases.

B. THE REQUESTED FEE CONSTITUTES A FAIR AND REASONABLE PERCENTAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT FUND.

DPP counsel respectfully request a fee of 30% of the proceeds of the settlement funds that

were created by their efforts and will benefit the Settlement Classes. As detailed below, there is

substantial precedent to support the requested fee.


5

A 30% fee is well within the range of fee awards approved as reasonable by this Court and

many others. To date in the Automotive Parts Litigation, the Court has approved several fee awards

of 33.33% of the settlement fund in question, finding that percentage to be reasonable. In re

Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 8201516, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2016) (awarding

counsel for the Truck and Equipment Dealer Plaintiffs 33.33% of a $4,616,499 settlement fund in

the Wire Harness and Occupant Safety Systems cases); 12-cv-00102-MOB-MKM, Doc. 401

(awarding counsel for the Auto Dealer Plaintiffs 33.33% of a $55,500,504 settlement fund in Wire

Harness).

The requested 30% award is also consistent with a wealth of authority from courts in the

Sixth Circuit (and others) approving class action fees in the range of 30% to one-third of a common

fund. See Bessey v. Packerland Plainwell, Inc., 2007 WL 3173972, at *4 (W.D. Mich. 2007)

(“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is

used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery”) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Thacker v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 695 F. Supp. 2d, 521, 528 (E.D. Ky.

2010) (“Using the percentage approach, courts in this jurisdiction and beyond have regularly

determined that 30% fee awards are reasonable”). District courts in the Sixth Circuit and elsewhere

have awarded 30% or more of settlement funds as reasonable attorneys’ fees in antitrust cases. For

example, this Court awarded 30% of the settlement funds in Wire Harness to Direct Purchaser

Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Doc. 495 in 2:12-cv-00101. Other courts have also awarded fees representing

30% or more of settlement funds. See, e.g., In re Prandin Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2015

WL 1396473 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2015) (one-third of $19 million fund); In re Skelaxin

(Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 2946459, *1 (E.D. Tenn. Jun. 30, 2014) (one-third of $73

million fund); In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 2155387, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. May


6

17, 2013) (one-third of $158.6 million fund); In re Foundry Resins Antitrust Litig., Case No. 2:04-

md-1638 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2008) (one-third of $14.1 million fund); In re Polyurethane Foam

Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 1639269, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2015) (30% of a $148.7 million

fund); In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2:09-md-02042 (E.D. Mich. June

16, 2014) (30% of $30 million fund). DPP counsel’s fee request of 30% of the settlement funds

is fully supported by these and many other decisions.3

3 See, e.g., In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 3439454, at *20 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2018) (awarding one-third of $190 million settlement and $2.95 million in expenses); In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 1:09-cv-07666 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2014) (awarding one-third interim fee from initial settlement in multi-defendant case); Standard Iron Works v. Arcelormittal, 2014 WL 7781572, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2014) (attorneys’ fee award of one-third of $163.9 million settlement); In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 296954, *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Co–Lead Counsel’s request for one third of the settlement fund is consistent with other direct purchaser antitrust actions.”); In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6577029, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2013) (one-third fee from $163.5 million fund); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 951 F. Supp. 2d 739, 748-52 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (noting that “in the last two-and-a-half years, courts in eight direct purchaser antitrust actions approved one-third fees,” and awarding one-third fee from $150 million fund, a 2.99 multiplier); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 1221350 (E.D. Pa., June 2, 2004) (30% of $202 million fund awarded, a 2.66 multiplier); In re OSB Antitrust Litig., Master File No. 06-826 (E.D. Pa.) (fee of one-third of $120 million in settlement funds); Heekin v. Anthem, Inc., 2012 WL 5878032 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 2012) (awarding one-third fee from $90 million settlement fund); In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 3282591, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 17, 2010) (approving one-third fee); Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co, 2007 WL 2694029, at *6 (D. Kan., Sept. 11, 2007) (awarding fees equal to 35% of $57 million common fund); Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 3505851, at *1 (N.D. Okla., Dec. 4, 2006) (awarding one-third of the settlement fund and noting that a “one-third [fee] is relatively standard in lawsuits that settle before trial.”); New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 627, 635 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (“[A] one-third fee from a common fund case has been found to be typical by several courts.”) (citations omitted), aff’d, 534 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008); In re AremisSoft Corp., Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 109, 134 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Scores of cases exist where fees were awarded in the one-third to one-half of the settlement fund.”) (citations omitted); Klein v. PDG Remediation, Inc., 1999 WL 38179, at *4 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 28, 1999) (“33% of the settlement fund…is within the range of reasonable attorney fees awarded in the Second Circuit”); Moore v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 781, 787 (2005) (“one-third is a typical recovery”); In re FAO Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 3801469, at * 2 (E.D. Pa., May 20, 2005) (awarding fees of 30% and 33%); Godshall v. Franklin Mint Co., 2004 WL 2745890, at *5 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2004) (awarding a 33% fee and noting that “[t]he requested percentage is in line with percentages awarded in other cases”); In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 423, 433-44 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (awarding one-third of a $48 million settlement fund).


7

C. THE FACTORS IDENTIFIED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SUPPORT THE REQUESTED FEE.

Once the Court has selected a method for awarding attorneys’ fees, the next step is to

consider the six factors the Sixth Circuit has identified to guide courts in weighing a fee award in

a common fund case, which are: 1) the value of the benefit rendered to the class; 2) the value of

the services on an hourly basis; 3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis;

4) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an

incentive to others; 5) the complexity of the litigation; and 6) the professional skill and standing

of counsel involved on both sides. E.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.,102 F.3d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1996);

In re Wire Harness Cases, 2:12-cv-00101 (E.D. Mich.) (Doc.495), at 3-5. When applied to the

facts of this case, these factors indicate that the requested fee constitutes fair and reasonable

compensation for DPP counsel’s efforts in creating the settlement fund.

1. DPP COUNSEL OBTAINED A VALUABLE BENEFIT FOR THE CLASSES.

The result achieved for the class is the principal consideration when evaluating a fee

request. E.g., Delphi, 248 F.R.D. at 503. Here, as more fully discussed in Plaintiff’s memorandum

in support of final approval of the settlements, DPP counsel have achieved an excellent recovery

of $4,991,667 for the Settlement Classes. (The settlement amount may be reduced based upon the

number of valid opt-outs.) As discussed more fully below, in advance of the final approval

hearing, DPP counsel will provide the Court with a report on opt-outs and the impact, if any, on

the settlement amount.

2. THE VALUE OF THE SERVICES ON AN HOURLY BASIS CONFIRMS THAT THE REQUESTED FEE IS REASONABLE.

When fees are awarded using the percentage-of-the-fund method, this Court and others

have applied a lodestar “cross-check” on the reasonableness of a fee calculated as a percentage of


8

the fund. In Re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re

Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 6209188, at *18. Use of a lodestar cross-check is optional,

however, and because it is only a check, the court is not required to engage in a detailed review

and evaluation of time records. Cardinal, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 767. Here, the amount of time DPP

counsel have expended since the inception of the case in 2016 makes clear that the fee requested

is well “aligned with the amount of work the attorneys contributed” to the recovery and does not

constitute a “windfall.” See id.

To calculate the lodestar, a court first multiplies the number of hours counsel reasonably

expended on the case by their reasonable hourly rate. See Isabel v. City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404,

415 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, as described above, a substantial amount of time has been spent by DPP

counsel litigating the case and achieving the settlement. The work DPP counsel performed was

managed with an eye toward efficiency and avoiding duplication.

As set forth in the law firm Declarations attached as Exhibit 1, DPP counsel have expended

1,675.40 hours from the inception of the case through January 31, 2020. Applying the historical

rates charged by counsel to the hours expended yields a lodestar value of $938,161.50.4

As noted above, the ultimate amount of the settlement funds may be reduced depending on

the level of opt-outs from the settlements. Assuming that the settlement funds are not reduced,

however, DPP counsel request a fee of $1,494,027.58, which represents 30% of the Automotive

Brake Hoses settlement fund after costs and expenses are deducted in accordance with the Court’s

prior fee determinations in this MDL. Such a fee would constitute a multiplier of 1.59 on DPP

4 The Supreme Court has held that the use of current rates, as opposed to historical rates, is appropriate to compensate counsel for inflation and the delay in receipt of the funds. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 282-84 (1989); see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987). DPP counsel have nevertheless submitted their lodestar information at their lower historical rates, rather than at their current (higher) rates.


9

counsel’s lodestar. After the deadline for requests for exclusion, and before the date of the hearing

on the fee request, DPP counsel will file a supplemental report updating the multiplier figure to

reflect the final amount of the settlements after any opt-out reductions and additional work by DPP

through that date.

The work done by DPP counsel is described above and in the separate firm Declarations.

DPP counsel submit that the hours expended on this case since inception, while substantial, were

reasonable and necessary. Indeed, one of the recognized benefits of using the percentage-of-the-

fund method is that it better aligns the interests of class counsel with the interests of class members

and eliminates any incentive to unnecessarily expend hours. Here, DPP counsel efficiently

achieved an excellent recovery for the class members without burdening the Court or the parties

with unnecessary expenditures of time, effort, or money.

3. THE REQUESTED FEE IS FAIR AND REASONABLE GIVEN THE REAL RISK THAT DPP COUNSEL COULD HAVE RECEIVED NO COMPENSATION FOR THEIR EFFORTS.

The Defendants are represented by highly experienced and competent counsel. Absent the

settlements, the settling Defendants and their counsel were prepared to defend this case through

trial and appeal. Litigation risk is inherent in every case, and this is particularly true with respect

to class actions. Therefore, while the Plaintiff is optimistic about the outcome of this litigation, it

must acknowledge the risk that the Defendants could prevail on certain legal or factual issues,

which could result in the reduction or elimination of any potential recovery.

The risk factor attempts to compensate class counsel in contingent fee litigation for having

taken on the risk of receiving less than their normal hourly rates, or even nothing at all. See, e.g.

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Int’l

Woodworkers of Am. AFL-CIO and its Local No. 5-376 v. Champion Intern. Corp., 790 F.2d 1174

(5th Cir. 1986); In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 6209188, at *19 (risk of non-payment


10

a factor supporting the requested fee). While there was a guilty plea to antitrust violations with

respect to certain Automotive Brake Hoses sold to certain customers, the Department of Justice

did not seek recovery for the class members, leaving that up to DPP counsel. As this Court has

observed, success is not guaranteed even in those instances where a settling defendant has pleaded

guilty in a criminal proceeding brought by the DOJ, which is not required to prove impact or

damages. See, e.g., In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig., 12-MD-02311, 2:12-cv-00103, Doc.

No. 497, at 11 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2016).

When they commenced this case back in 2016 there was certainly a risk that DPP counsel

would recover nothing, or an amount insufficient to support a fee that equaled their lodestar.

Therefore, the risk of non-payment is another factor that supports the requested fee. In re Wire

Harness Cases, 2:12-cv-00101 (E.D. Mich.) (Doc. 495), at 4.

4. SOCIETY HAS AN IMPORTANT STAKE IN THIS LAWSUIT AND IN AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES.

It is well established that there is a “need in making fee awards to encourage attorneys to

bring class actions to vindicate public policy (e.g., the antitrust laws) as well as the specific rights

of private individuals.” In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1979).

Courts in the Sixth Circuit weigh “society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who [win favorable

outcomes in antitrust class actions] in order to maintain an incentive to others . . . . Society’s stake

in rewarding attorneys who can produce such benefits in complex litigation such as in the case at

bar counsels in favor of a generous fee . . . Society also benefits from the prosecution and

settlement of private antitrust litigation.” In re Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. 508, 534 (E.D. Mich. 2003)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accord, Delphi, 248 F.R.D. at 504.

The DOJ did not seek restitution from the settling Defendants because it has recognized

that civil cases potentially provide for the recovery of damages by injured purchasers. In this


11

regard, the substantial recovery DPP counsel have obtained makes it clear that antitrust violations

will be the subject of vigorous private civil litigation to deter similar future conduct. Since society

gains from competitive markets that are free of collusion, DPP counsel’s work benefitted the

public.

5. THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS CASE SUPPORTS THE REQUESTED FEE.

The Court is well aware that “[a]ntitrust class actions are inherently complex . . . .” In re

Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 533. See also In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL 6209188, at

*19; In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 292 F.Supp.2d 631, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“An antitrust class

action is arguably the most complex action to prosecute. The legal and factual issues involved are

always numerous and uncertain in outcome.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

This case is no exception.

6. SKILL AND EXPERIENCE OF COUNSEL

The skill and experience of counsel on both sides of the “v” is another factor that courts

may consider in determining a reasonable fee award. E.g., Polyurethane Foam, 2015 WL

1639269, at * 7; Packaged Ice, 2011 WL 6219188, at *19. When the Court appointed Freed Kanner

London & Millen, LLC; Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.; Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP; and

Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C. as Interim Lead Counsel, it recognized that they have the

requisite skill and experience in class action and antitrust litigation to effectively prosecute these

claims. When assessing this factor, courts may also look to the qualifications of the defense counsel

opposing the class. Here, the quality of defense counsel is top-notch. Each firm has an excellent

reputation in the antitrust bar, significant experience, and extensive resources at its disposal.

But in the final analysis, as more than one court has observed, “[t]he quality of work

performed in a case that settles before trial is best measured by the benefit obtained.” Behrens v.


12

Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 547-48 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 899 F.2d 21 (11th Cir 1990).

As explained supra, a very substantial cash benefit was obtained for the Settlement Classes in this

case, which provides the principal basis for awarding the attorneys’ fees sought by DPP counsel.

Given the excellent result achieved, the complexity of the claims and defenses, the work

performed by DPP counsel, the real risk of non-recovery (or recovery of less than the amount of

the settlement funds), formidable defense counsel, the delay in receipt of payment, the substantial

experience and skill of DPP counsel, the multiplier on the lodestar, and the societal benefit of this

litigation, a 30% attorneys’ fee award from the settlement funds would be reasonable

compensation for DPP counsel’s work.

V. THE COURT SHOULD AUTHORIZE INTERIM LEAD COUNSEL TO DETERMINE FEE ALLOCATIONS.

DPP counsel have worked collectively on this litigation under the supervision of Interim

Lead Counsel appointed by the Court. This Court and courts generally have approved joint fee

applications that request a single aggregate fee award, with allocations to specific firms to be

determined by the lead counsel, who know the most about the work done by each firm and the

relative contribution each firm has made to the success of the litigation.5 Interim Lead Counsel

have directed this case from its inception and are best “able to describe the weight and merit of

each [counsel’s] contribution.” In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 1221350, at *17-18

(citation omitted, alteration in original); see also In re Copley Pharm., Inc. Albuterol Prods. Liab.

Litig., 50 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1148 (D. Wy. 1999), aff’d, 232 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2000). From an

efficiency standpoint, leaving the allocation to Interim Lead Counsel makes good sense, because

5 See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 533 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting “the accepted practice of allowing counsel to apportion fees amongst themselves”); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (“Ideally, allocation is a private matter to be handled among class counsel”).


13

it relieves the Court of the “difficult task of assessing counsels’ relative contributions.” In re

Prudential Ins. Co. Amer. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 329 n. 96 (3d Cir.

1998); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (lead counsel given

substantial authority to allocate fees awarded by Court).

DPP counsel therefore request that the Court approve the aggregate amount of the fees

requested, with the specific allocation of the fee among firms to be performed by Interim Lead

Counsel. See Polyurethane Foam, supra. To the extent that there are disputes that cannot be

resolved by counsel, the Court would retain the jurisdiction necessary to decide them. See In re

Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 63269, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008) (co-

lead counsel to allocate fees with the court retaining jurisdiction to address any disputes).

VI. REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION COSTS AND EXPENSES

DPP counsel respectfully request an award of litigation costs and expenses in the amount

of $11,575.06. Consistent with the Court’s prior rulings, expenses for telephone calls, faxes, and

internal copying are not included. As the court stated in In re Cardizem, “class counsel is entitled

to reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs in the prosecution

of claims and in obtaining settlement, including expenses incurred in connection with document

productions, travel and other litigation-related expenses.” 218 F.R.D. at 535.

The out-of-pocket expenses paid or incurred by each law firm are set forth in the

Declarations attached as Exhibit 1. These expenses were reasonable and necessary to pursue the

case and to obtain the substantial settlements reached in this litigation.

VII. AN AWARD OF AN INCENTIVE PAYMENT TO THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES IS APPROPRIATE.

DPP counsel respectfully request that the Court authorize a $25,000 incentive award to the

Class Representative. The Sixth Circuit has noted that incentive (also called service) awards may


14

be appropriate under some circumstances. Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Michigan, 825 F.3d 299, 311 (6th Cir. 2016); Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003).

In surveying decisions from other courts, the Court of Appeals in Hadix explained:

Numerous courts have authorized incentive awards. These courts have stressed that incentive awards are efficacious ways of encouraging members of a class to become class representatives and rewarding individual efforts taken on behalf of the class. Yet applications for incentive awards are scrutinized carefully by courts who sensibly fear that incentive awards may lead named plaintiffs to expect a bounty for bringing suit or to compromise the interest of the class for personal gain.

Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d at 897 (internal citations omitted).

An award to the Class Representative is appropriate here. This is not a case where a class

representative compromised the interests of the class for personal gain. The Class Representative

was not promised an incentive award. Each settlement was negotiated by DPP lead counsel and

then presented to the Class Representative for review and approval without any discussion of an

incentive award; the prospect of such an award was not among the reasons the representative

plaintiff approved these settlements. Hillson v. Kelly Servs. Inc., 2017 WL 279814, at *6 (E.D.

Mich. 2017). Moreover, this is not a case where the requested incentive award will dwarf the

amounts that class members will receive through the claims process; indeed, some class members

may receive hundreds of thousands of dollars.6

The Class Representative devoted a significant amount of time and effort to representing

the interests of the Settlement Class members, including:

6 In cases where courts have rejected incentive awards, the awards were so disproportionately large relative to the cash benefits to the class that the courts called the class representative’s adequacy into question. In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2013) (reversing $1,000 payments to representatives when class members received “nearly worthless injunctive relief”); Machesney, v. Lar-Bev of Howell, Inc., 2017 WL 2437207, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Jun. 2017) (rejecting $15,000 incentive payment that was “30 times more than the maximum that any class member could receive under the proposed settlement”). The same is not true here.


15

Assisting counsel in developing an overall understanding of the automotive parts industry generally and Automotive Brake Hoses in particular;

Discussing with counsel preservation of electronic and hard-copy documents;

Discussing with counsel collecting documents for review and potential production to Defendants;

Reviewing pleadings and keeping apprised of the status of the litigation; and

Reviewing settlement details and conferring with counsel to determine whether the settlements were in the best interests of the class.

Finally, an incentive award of this size is not uncommon in lengthy, highly complex

antitrust cases such as this. Indeed, this Court previously approved $50,000 incentive awards to

the Class Representatives in Wire Harness. 2:12-cv-00101-MOB-MKM Doc # 495, at 6, ¶23. See

also In re Prandin Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 1396473, at *5 (granting each class

representative an award of $50,000); In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL

2946459, at *1 (same). The Class Representative put in great effort and provided commendable

service on behalf of the members of the Settlement Classes to help create the settlement funds. The

requested awards are fair to the Settlement Classes and appropriate.


16

VIII. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Direct Purchaser Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court

grant its Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Litigation Costs and Expenses, and an Incentive

Payment to the Class Representative.

Dated: March 9, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

Steven A. Kanner William H. London Michael E. Moskovitz FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC 2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130 Bannockburn, IL 60015 Telephone: (224) 632-4500

/s/ David H. Fink David H. Fink (P28235) Darryl Bressack (P67820) Nathan J. Fink (P75185) FINK BRESSACK 38500 Woodward Ave, Suite 350 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 Telephone: (248) 971-2500 Interim Liaison Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Plaintiff Joseph C. Kohn William E. Hoese Douglas A. Abrahams KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C. 1600 Market Street, Suite 2500 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 238-1700

Gregory P. Hansel Randall B. Weill Michael S. Smith PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS LLP One City Center, P.O. Box 9546 Portland, ME 04112-9546 Telephone: (207) 791-3000

Eugene A. Spector William G. Caldes Jeffrey L. Spector SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C. 2001 Market Street Suite 3420 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 496-0300

Interim Co-Lead and Settlement Class Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Plaintiff


17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 9, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing document with

the Clerk of the court using the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all

counsel of record registered for electronic filing.

/s/ Nathan J. Fink David H. Fink (P28235) Darryl Bressack (P67820) Nathan J. Fink (P75185) FINK BRESSACK 38500 Woodward Ave, Suite 350 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304 Telephone: (248) 971-2500


direct purchaser plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' …... · 2020. 7. 20. ·...

Documents