Case title: ESALYN CHAVEZ VS HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. GR number: G.R. No. 109808 Date: March 1, 1995 Petitioner: ESALYN CHAVEZ Respondent: HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. Ponente: PUNO, J. Facts: On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan Co., Ltd., through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA approved the contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with her Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion. On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6) months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989. Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months. Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion. Issue: Whether or not the there was an invalid side agreement present in the case at bar. Held: Yes, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. It was expressly stated in the employment contract that any changes or alterations made to any part of said contract without prior approval from the POEA shall be null and void notwithstanding the fact the employee had agreed to said contract.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835Ponente: CRUZ,J.FACTS:Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims. The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?HELD:YES. Petitioners contention has no merit.RATIO:Statutes should be read as a whole.Ut res magis valeat quam pereat that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.Manuela S. Catan/M.S. Catan Placement Agency v. The NLRC and Francisco Reyes G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988

Ponente: Cortes. J.

FACTS: Petitioner Catan, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm recruited private respondent Francisco D. Reyes to work in Saudi Arabia. The term of contract is for one (1) year, however, the contract provided for automatic renewal.Said contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by hi Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator.On March 30, 1983 while he was working as a crusher plant operator, his ankle was crushed under the machine he was operating.On May 15, 1983 after expiration of renewed term, private respondent returned to the Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he incurred expenses.On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi and resume to his work and on May 15, 1984, he was repatriated. And upon his return, he had ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.Private respondent filed a claim against Catan placement agency on the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment.POEA rendered judgment in favor of the complainant. Ordering the respondent placement agency to pay SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE and 60/100 (P7, 985.60), TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINTY SIX 20/100 (P29, 096.20) and 10% for attorneys fees.On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private respondent, since the time he was injured his original contract had already expired?

HELD: Yes, Catan Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private respondent.Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it was automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both parties at a month before its termination. As stipulated in their contract.M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial disability was (sic) no longer the accredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibility over the proper implementation of complainant's employment/service contract and the welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still existed, the contract of employment in question not having expired yet. This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.

ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSI0N and VIRGILIO P. NACIONALES,respondentsFacts:In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground that his performance was below par. For three (3) successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines.

Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a complaint for illegal termination against petitioner and ZAMEL.

Based on a finding that petitioner and ZAMEL failed to establish that private respondent was terminated for just and valid cause, the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA issued a decision ordering the former to pay, jointly and severally, the complainant.Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the nullification of a resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) holding it liable to pay, jointly and severally with Zamel-Turbag Engineering and Architectural Consultant (ZAMEL), private respondent Virgilio P. Nacionales' salary and vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract with ZAMEL.

Issue:I. Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad;II. Whether or not sufficient evidence was presented by petitioner to establish the termination of private respondent's employment for just and valid cause.

Ruling:I.In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license andthe implementation of the contracts of employment with the workersit recruited and deployed for overseas employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book 1, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision empowering itto sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment[Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)].II.The NLRC upheld the POEA finding that petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove termination from employment for just and valid cause. And a careful study of the evidence thus far presented by petitioner reveals to this Court that there is legal basis for public respondent's conclusion.

The Court holds, therefore, that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the POEA's finding of insufficiency of evidence to prove termination for just and valid cause.WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition.Facilities Management Corporation, J.S Dreyer and J.V. Catuira vs. Leonardo Dela OsaMarch 26, 1979 GR L-38649

Makasiar, J:

Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. with full backwages, as well as the recovery of his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials. Petitioner alleged that he was employed by respondents as, painter, houseboy and cashier. He further averred that from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily and that this entire period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from respondents. The petitioner, a foreign corporation domiciled outside the Philippines was ordered by CIR then to pay the unpaid overtime and premium pay. However, on certiorari, the petitioner contended that because it was domiciled outside and not doing business in Philippines, it could not be sued in the country. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been doing business in the Philippines so that the service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction. Held: Yes, the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts. Indeed, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not banned from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines.

685 SCRA 245 Labor Law LaborStandards -Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, 9, 10, 29, and 30 of the Migrant Workers Act or R.A. No. 8042This case is a consolidation of the following cases:G.R. No. 152642,G.R. No. 152710,G.R. No. 167590,G.R. Nos. 182978-79, andG.R. Nos. 184298-99.G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710InG.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.ISSUE:Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.HELD:The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.G.R. 167590In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the placedwhere the crime or any of its essential elements were committed;d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of RA 8042 shall bethemselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative of due process.RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declraed the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.ISSUE:Whether or not Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are void.HELD:No, they are valid provisions.a.Section 6:The law clearly and unambiguously distinguishedbetween licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.b.Section 7:The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.c.Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.d.Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic.To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.G.R. 182978-79, andG.R. 184298-99In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( aviolation of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselvesjointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.ISSUE:Whether or not Section is invalid.HELD:No. As earlier discussed, Section is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that theyere personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.

Case title: HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ GR number: G.R. No. 81510 Date: March 14, 1990 Petitioner: HORTENCIA SALAZAR Respondent: HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ Ponente: Sarmiento, J. Facts: On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar with illegal recruitment. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. Issue: Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction to validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code. Held: No. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.