defining terrorism at the micro, meso, and macro levels
DESCRIPTION
An overview of a potential broad stroke approach to combating terrorism.TRANSCRIPT
Defining Terrorism at the Macro, Meso, and Micro Levels
By: Damian Niolet
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INTRODUCTION
In order to write this paper, I felt I needed to wrap my mind around the totality of the BSI
415 curriculum. In order to wrap my mind around the totality of the curriculum, I needed to
build a visual representation of all that was discussed during class. This I have done. Said visual
representation can be found in Appendix 1. There are numerous inferences that I can draw from
this particular chart, each of which carry implications at the various levels of consideration for
policymakers and analysts alike within the Intelligence Community (IC). That is, the chart
provides insights on the act of “defining terrorism” on the Macro, Meso, and Micro levels of
analysis within the IC.
Within each section below, I am first going to focus on the purpose for defining terrorism
at that level. More often than not, it is important to understand why an action is being carried out
before carrying it out, at least, that is, if you wish to carry the action out optimally. At all levels,
the overarching goal is to proactively prevent terrorism, but within each level, that goal takes a
different form. I will then emphasize one key point from the class lectures that stood out as most
vital for success at that level, supporting my assertion with various sub-arguments. As you will
see, each level can feed the effectiveness of the level next to it. The Macro can feed the Meso,
which can feed the Micro and vice versa. This symbiotic relationship is important for overall
success in the stated task. You will also notice that there is a common theme throughout, which
is: “truth is relative.” What exactly that statement entails will be articulated within each section.
MACRO
It seems to me that the purpose for proactively defining terrorism at this level must be
strategic in nature and therefore must be focused on understanding WHY terrorist choose to
commit terrorist acts. Breaking this out further, acts are the result of some motive, so we want to
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understand what drives a terrorist’s motives. Ultimately, we want to understand these things so
that we can intervene, and possibly “rewrite the narrative,” or the story that potential terrorists
buy into. In order to understand motives and driving forces within people, we have to use tools
meant for that very task, namely psychological and sociological theories on human development
and behavior. Here, we are concerned with how individuals create self-identity, group identity,
and ultimately their world views.
What stands out as being most critical for success at this level is allowing “them” to
define themselves for us. Our obtaining a copy of AQAP’s Inspire Magazine is the best chance
we will ever get at truly understanding the motives and driving forces of the most prolific
terrorist organizations of today, that can be discussed here. We covered, during discussions,
numerous sets of theories regarding human development and behavior, which find their roots in
either psychology or sociology. There are several reasons why such theories are ineffectual for
achieving success at this level. I will explain those reasons in separate paragraphs below.
First, but not foremost, no single theory can account for the myriad of factors that
influence the growth of individuals. Psychological theories, such as Maslow’s needs paradigm,
Erikson’s 8 stages, or Freud’s psychosexual development, leave several gaps in an analysis, and
worse, are wholly inadequate for analyzing some people.1 Sociological theories, such as Tajfel’s
Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses so heavily on interaction with others that it seems
individuals do not make decisions on their own, but at some point they must.2 Only when all of
these theories are utilized in conjunction with each other can an analyst hope to glean any incite
into human development and behavior. As Appendix 1 shows, this is a daunting task, but as 1 You need only ask a female how applicable Freud's theories are to her personally to see just how inapplicable his theories can be to a vast majority of people. Erikson’s theory presumes an established rationality and morality exists in humanity that just is not accurate. Maslow’s needs are very structured, human behavior often is not. 2 People have original thoughts, made completely apart from any group they may be affiliated with; for example, people have “gut” feelings all the time, a sense deep within that prompts action.
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Cronin suggested, a necessary one. Not only should analysts consider the totality of the
individual, but the organizations and state they belong to, as well as the international
atmosphere.3 An analyst does not stand a chance at appropriately plotting the typical path a
terrorist takes through such a maze of theories, space, and time.
Second, an analyst may as well not even begin to utilize such theories for proactively
defining terrorism or identifying terrorists because the process is doomed from the start.
Definitions demand some semblance of underlying truth. It is not ideal to use theories to come
to definitive conclusions. Such theories as were covered in class are not “absolute” truths, which
blanket all of humanity whether humanity knows it or not; they are merely theories, based on
trends that their creators witnessed, which they witnessed only from their perspectives as well-
off, white men. To a certain degree, theories that seek to define people will be used by people to
define themselves and their world views. For example, Astrology seeks to define people by their
signs; people in turn use Astrology to define themselves. I do not believe that terrorists of the
past have been too concerned with Maslow, Erikson, Freud, or Tajfel.
Third, and foremost, we cannot hope to successfully proactively define terrorism because
“truth is relative.” This point is similar to the one made above. Maslow, Erikson, Freud, nor
Tajfel are appropriate for the task (proactive prevention) because they produced biased theories.
But, even if a potential terrorist was exposed to the theories of one or more of these men and
began using the theories as a basis for defining themselves and their world view, we still could
not possibly hope to predict their every action, thus, preventing any future terrorist acts, because
the issue of perspective still exists. We can never fully walk in their shoes. Their interpretation
of the theories may stray far and away from the original as the theories are morphed in
3 Taken from the “Tactics, Targets,Waves, Theory & the Religious Aspect” Lecture and Slides.
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accordance with their cultural contexts. They will create a truth apart from the truth that was
intended.
Even though “truth is relative,” really, it is only relative to some, just depending on what
side one stands. Despite the relativity of truth, people will none-the-less form world views. The
dangerous world views involved extremes, wherein the person holds certain things scared and
most everything else profane, and they will believe these truths to be universal, absolute,
encompassing everyone. They will likely also believe whole-heartedly that only they and their
compatriots (in-group) stand between that which they consider sacred and that which they
consider profane. Their senses of identity are completely wrapped up in their extreme visions of
the sacred and profane - the absolute and the intolerable. This imbues such individuals with a
justification for forcing these “absolute” truths on others. While, we can at least determine this
much about human behavior, we cannot know the process by which they create these world
views without material like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine.
AQAP’s Inspire Magazine is the prime channel by which we can determine the motives
and driving forces that lead a certain group of people to commit terrorist acts. Undoubtedly, that
is being picked apart at this very moment. I will not mention in what ways for obvious reasons,
but with the gleaned information from the review, we can then begin to rewrite the narrative,
countering much of what AQAP’s Inspire Magazine has to say. We will better understand what
motives can be influenced and in what directions driving forces can be steered. In the absence of
such a boon as obtaining AQAP’s Inspire Magazine, there are other avenues by which we can
learn the same information. Again, I will not delve into these avenues. The point is, if we
attempt to proactively define and identity terrorists - their motives and driving forces - we would
more than likely be off target and remain off target until proven wrong.
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MESO
In an effort to proactively prevent terrorism at this level, the operational level, it is
necessary that IC agencies, such as the NSA, which I have worked for, understand WHAT
terrorists are targeting, so that they can provide risk assessments to US entities or US allies.
Obviously, the best way to obtain this information is through sources like AQAP’s Inspire
Magazine again. However, at this point, it is possible for IC analysts to actually conduct some
note-worthy analysis. The key to success in this endeavor is to fully understand ourselves in
relation to the defined threat, which requires a sturdy springboard from the Macro level. IC
agencies should be looking at that which stands out to terrorists as vulnerabilities, centers of
gravity, or high-profile opportunities. In order to come to determinations in this way, it is
necessary to look within as if through the eyes of the threat. In other words, analysts must cross
over the “proverbial relativity line” and see the enemy’s “truth”
Having a clear understanding of what motivates and drives terrorists, analysts should
look for the “operational targets” of said terrorists. These would be incremental steps in their
overall strategic plan as outlined in the Macro level. Here analysts assess those components of
the US infrastructure, citizenry, and culture, which the terrorists consider inconsistent with their
world view, either as competition to their “absolute” truths or a direct attack upon them. So,
analysts are focusing on that which would be a glaring infarction to terrorists’ world view.
Drawing cartoons of Muhammad is an example of an intolerable offense upon that which they
have deemed sacred, hence, their targeting the cartoonists involved. At the same time analysts
should consider that which terrorists could exploit in their campaign to promote their world
view. Analysts should look for possible in roads that terrorists could widen an an attempt to
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drive a wedge between the US government and the citizenry or the US government and the
international community. An example might be staging a fake US bombing of an orphanage.
Simultaneously, analysts at this level could assess the risk level of potential targets of
terrorist recruitment. Analysts would be looking for individuals that have yet to form strong
world views of their own, which terrorist recruiters use to their advantage. If the theories from
the chart in Appendix 1 were applied at this point, the potential terrorists would reside before the
horizontal line created by extreme world views and self and group identities. Terrorist would
look for individuals who have not had successes in life and begin to offer them the chance to
have success, if not in this life, then the next. The recruiters will attempt to indoctrinate the
young minds with symbolism, influencing them to respond courageously when one of their new
found truths are rebuke by others. Lastly, the recruiters are trying to bring the recruits to a
“tipping point,” where they feel compelled to act. Analysts would be on the lookout for recruits
who are testing their new views, perhaps by blogging. Potential recruits can then perhaps be
targeted with a counter propaganda campaign.
Generally this kind of analysis is initiated once word comes from the Micro level;
however, there is no reason why it should not begin at this level and be corroborated with
analysis from the Micro level. In fact, analysis at this level could even initiate analysis at the
Micro level. How well analysis works at this level, as in, how accurately analysts can accurately
pinpoint potential operational targets, without using shotgun tactics, depends on how thoroughly
the enemy is known. The more complete the understanding of the enemy, the fewer potential
operational targets need be analyzed and the more accurate the chosen ones will likely be. The
final analysis will center on a risk estimate for each potential operational target, which could be
used by analysts working in the Micro level to “Rack ‘n Stack” and direct collection efforts.
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MICRO
At this level, the tactical level, proactively defining terrorism entails understanding
exactly HOW terrorists intend to carry-out terrorist acts. With this information, the IC stands the
best chance at assisting in preventing planned attacks. Logistical knowledge of the enemy is of
utmost importance here. All-source analysts will need to discover what resources, from
communications to execution, are available to the terrorists in question. With this information,
analysts can direct collectors on how, when, and what to collect for better intel. NSA analysts,
for instance, will work to exploit intel regarding the enemy’s communications network, since the
NSA will be responsible for collecting on these communication lines and extracting as much
detail as possible about any planned attacks, or amplifying information. As the collection
commences, tips will undoubtedly present more leads, which will lead to a fully picture of the
terrorists complete logistical infrastructure, and all the while, planned attacks will be thwarted.
Yet again, the best source for obtaining information about a terrorist networks logistical
infrastructure is from material like AQAP’s Inspire Magazine. While they probably did not
come right out and reveal their logistical infrastructure, small pieces here and there can be
acquired that when pieced together can present the framework needed to plot a way ahead, which
focuses on filling gaps. Analysts have to be weary, however, in that, considerations at the Meso
level still need to be applied here. Analysts should consider how much the terrorist network
knows about US capabilities. Such knowledge on their part could allow them to enact Denial &
Deception campaigns that steer use away from their actual target. Here again, the common
theme of this paper surfaces, “truth is relative.” That which analysts believe to be true about a
threats planned actions might change if they viewed the matter from a different perspective, one
that incorporated foreign knowledge of us. This type of analysis would be done at the Meso
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level, but handed off to analysts at the Micro level as appropriate in order to adjust collection
efforts.
CONCLUSION
This paper has summarized the importance of proactively defining terrorism at the
Macro, Meso, and Micro levels, which the IC is tasked with performing ceaselessly. In order to
follow-through with this charge flawlessly, it is important to understand what the desired goal is
at each level. This paper has postulated what those goals are at each level. As shown, the goal
changes at each level, requiring focus on different aspects of the task. This paper then
highlighted the key(s) to success within each level, citing example instances throughout. The
summation is below.
The Macro level is concerned with the reasons WHY a terrorist chooses terrorism. The
key to understanding WHY is in allowing “them” to tell us from their own perspective. The
Meso level is concerned with WHAT the terrorists are targeting. The key to success is having a
full and accurate impression of oneself (nation) from the perspective of the enemy. The Micro
level is concerned with HOW terrorists are planning on conducting terrorist acts. The key to
success at this level is obtaining complete logistical knowledge of the enemy, in terms of their
resources, from communications to execution. The thread that ran through all of the levels was
the concept that “truth is relative.”
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APPENDIX 1
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