cyprus in world war ii

Cyprus in World War ii

Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean

AnAstAsiA YiAngou

World War II marked a pivotal point in the history of Cyprus, yet surprisingly, this period of the island’s history has been little studied to date. Anastasia Yiangou here provides the first major study of the impact of World War II on the political development of Cyprus. In doing so she traces shifting Cypriot attitudes to the war a nd the formation of a triangular conflict in the island between the Left, Right and British colonial power. She explains how the British and Cypriots fought a war alongside each other, yet remained far apart in discussions on the future of the island. Yiangou’s original and compelling analysis highlights how the post-1945 landscape of Cypriot political struggles was shaped by forces set in motion during the war itself.

AnAStASIA YIAngou holds a PhD from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, university of London in 2009. She has taught at the university of Cyprus and the g.C. School of Careers, Cyprus.

FRont CoveR ImAge: Cypriot volunteers arriving at Piraeus Port, Athens, December 1940.

BACk CoveR ImAge: A group of Cypriot women, volunteers of the Auxiliary territorial Service (A.t.S.), serving in north Africa, reading news of war developments. Images courtesy of the Cyprus veterans’ Association, World War II.

CoveR DeSIgn: Andrew Ward

138mm 138mm20mm

216

mm

www.ibtauris.com

‘As the first major account of politics on the island during the Second World War, this book represents a tremendously important contribution to the modern history of Cyprus.

Deftly weaving together a number of different narrative threads, Anastasia Yiangou presents a comprehensive and expertly argued account of how Cyprus’s wartime experiences formed

the basis of the contemporary political situation on the island.’

JAmeS keR-LInDSAY, eurobank eFg Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South east europe, London School of economics and Political Science.

‘This book will surely take its place as a seminal contribution to our understanding of the trajectory of Cyprus’s tangled politics in the twentieth century.’

RoBeRt HoLLAnD, emeritus Professor of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, university of London.

Cyprus in World W

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Anastasia Yiangou holds a PhD from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies,University of London in 2009. She has taught at the University of Cyprus andthe European University Cyprus.

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CYPRUSIN WORLD WAR II

Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean

ANASTASIA YIANGOU

BOOK ANASTASIA FINAL_Layout 1 10/11/11 8:48 AM Page iii

New Paperback Edition published in 2012 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com

Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

First published in hardback in 2010 by Tauris Academic Studies, an imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd

Copyright © Anastasia Yiangou 2010, 2012

The right of Anastasia Yiangou to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by theauthor in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may notbe reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior writtenpermission of the publisher.

ISBN 978 1 78076 133 6

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British LibraryA full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress catalog card: available

Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YYCamera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

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CONTENTS

List of Illustrations ix

List of Abbreviations xiii

Acknowledgements xvii

Foreword xxi

Introduction 11. Britain and Cyprus: the Historical Background 1878-1939 7

2. The Outbreak of the War and Colonial Politics in Cyprus 23

3. The Revival of Enosis and the Emergence of the Cypriot Left: October 1940 – May 1941 43

4. The Beginning of the Remaking of Cypriot Politics: May 1941 – March 1942 63

5. Cypriot Politics on the Eve of the Municipal Elections of 1943 79

6. The Municipal Elections of 1943 95

7. The Effects of the Greek Crisis on Cypriot Politics: From the Onset of Civil War to the Lebanon Conference: October 1943-May 1944 113

8. The Efforts for the Unification of Greek Cypriot Politics:August-December 1944 129

9. The End of the Second World War 145

Conclusions 163

Notes and References 169

Sources and Bibliography 221

Index 235

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3

THE REVIVAL OF ENOSISAND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT

OCTOBER 1940 - MAY 1941

3.1 Cyprus and the Entry of Greece in the European WarThe deterioration of Greco-Italian relations after 15 August posed seriousproblems for the Foreign Office, which feared a potential Italian assault uponCyprus. Italian intelligence was aware of the poor defence conditions on theisland, and that an invasion of Cyprus from Italian bases in the Dodecanesewas feasible.1 Fearing the possible loss of Cyprus to Italy, as well as itsrepercussions in the Near East and Middle East, the Colonial Governmentadopted tighter defence regulations on the island2, including the formation ofthe ‘Cyprus Volunteer Force’ on 14 June.3 The events of August in Greeceroused intense indignation in Cyprus, where anti-Italian sentiment wastraditionally strong.4 After receiving the news of the torpedoed Ελλη, a centralcommittee was organized to collect funds for the Greek Navy.5 On 22September, enemy aircraft attacked Cyprus in the island’s first-ever air raid.6

Nevertheless, as hostilities between Italy and Greece escalated, Cyprus waseventually excluded from an invasion by Italian armed forces.

The 28th of October marked the onset of the Greco-Italian war – it was alsoa key date with regard to the progress of internal political life in Cyprus. Thesignificance of the 28th of October in Cypriot politics lies within the followingparameters: Firstly, it marked the revival of Enosis with all its old vigour;secondly, it resulted in the abandonment of some of the illiberal laws the post-1931 regime had established. Cypriots traditionally identified themselves withthe struggles of the Hellenic state, in which volunteers from the island, as in1912, had played a part. Inevitably, therefore, the Greco-Italian war had asignificant impact on Cypriots, who also took some satisfaction from the

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overlap of British and Greek interests.7 Upon hearing of Metaxas’s response toGrazzi, Cypriots held demonstrations in all of the major towns on the island;according to the Governor, “the spirit of excitement reached the bounds ofhysteria”.8 The press featured pictures of King George II, which the Britishwould have considered a most seditious act even a few days earlier,pointing outthe need for a concentration on Greece’s war effort.9 Ελευθερία stressed thecommon Anglo-Greek interests in Europe and highlighted King George VI’smessage to his Greek counterpart. “Your struggle is our struggle,” George stated.“We are now fighting against the common enemy…”10

The Greek consulate was now situated at the centre of popular attention.Naturally, the Acting Archbishop was the central figure in the pro-Hellenicdemonstrations in the island, as the boycott against the Government hadended, and the crowds gathered to hear him in Larnaca were the largest thetown had seen in many years. That same day the Locum Tenens visited Limassolwhere, amidst performances of the Greek national anthem, he told the crowd,“the world is worth nothing without Britain and Greece,”11 – a statement thatremained memorable for Greek Cypriots.

The contribution of Cypriots to the Greek war effort in relation to theisland’s wealth was indeed remarkable.12 By the middle of 1941, the amountraised for the Greek War Fund had reached the sum of £100.000.13 Battershillconfessed in a letter to his mother that “…people are pawning their weddingrings to give money to the Greek War Fund. I’m afraid any British war charitywill fare ill here at the moment when all the local inhabitants are giving to theGreek funds.”14 Indeed the matching donations to the British R.A.F. SpitfireFund had only reached £5000.15 Nonetheless, the Governor himself admittedthat the atmosphere was wholly spontaneous, with no interference from Enosistagitators, despite an expectation that the latter would eventually seek to exploitthe situation.16 Cypriot contributions to the various funds established forGreece were, according to Battershill, proof of Cypriots’ desire to be lookedupon as ‘…Greek speaking, Greek thinking and Greek feeling individuals…’17

Cypriots now tacitly ignored much of the repressive legislation of the 1930s,and the large crowds gathering in public, the performance of the Greek nationalanthem, the public gathering of large crowds and, most significantly, the Greekand Turkish flags flying alongside the Union Jack were testimony to this. Theprominent display of Turkish flags was in itself suggestive, given the TurkishCypriot minority’s belief in its need to assert its presence and demonstrate itsloyalty to Britain when it appeared that, depending on Greece’s future successes,the colonial authorities would treat their Turkish subjects less favourably thanthey would treat the island’s Greek Cypriot majority.

The issue of flags preoccupied the British administration. Given the

CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II44


circumstances surrounding Greece’s entry into the war, the British understoodthat any effort to halt the now widespread display of the Greek flag throughoutCyprus was doomed to fail. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot community wasvital to British interests on the island, and Britain had to consider its concerns.The current diplomatic position of Turkey itself, whose role was of someimportance to British war interests, meant it was imperative not to cause anygrievance to the Turkish community by prohibiting the exhibition of the Turkishflag. Eventually, the Colonial Government amended the flag law so that the flagsof all Allied countries, such as Greece, as well as those of countries connected toBritain with a formal treaty, such as Turkey, could thenceforth fly withoutrestriction on the island. Thus the British resolved the wartime flags dilemma.18

The months subsequent to Greece’s entry into hostilities proved Cypriotsupport for ‘Hellenism in danger’ was no passing phenomenon. Financialcontributions to the Greek cause continued with the same zeal but, moresignificantly, there was also a massive movement for Cypriot recruitment tothe Greek army. Local press kept its focus exclusively on Greek events, leavinginternal issues aside for the moment. Cypriots followed the fate of Hellenism,celebrating its successes, admiring the heroic achievements of Greek soldiersand anticipating the final outcome of the struggle, with Greece victorious.19 InJanuary 1941, Metaxas issued a statement to the effect that Greece ‘cannotabandon those who belong to our race to foreign hands’.20 This resonated quitestrongly with Greek Cypriots, and when Metaxas died suddenly in late January,Greek Cypriots mourned his passing as a national tragedy.21 The resurgenceand consolidation of Enosis sentiment on the island was underlined by thepublication of an article in January 1941 by Compton Mackenzie in ReynoldsNews in which he highlighted the idea of a Greater Greece in the future. 22

Mackenzie advocated that Britain, in any settlement, should give Cyprus and theDodecanese to Greece, in addition to permitting Greece to share in the controlof the Suez Canal. Mackenzie also suggested that the Greeks should be invited totake responsibility for the postwar Libya, hitherto an Italian possession.

British officialdom considered Mackenzie’s article highly unwise, as it arousedunnecessary speculation about the future of the island amongst Cypriots in bothcommunities. At the same time, the article caused nervousness inside the GreekGovernment, which feared the repercussions in Greece itself at a time whenclose relations in Britain were considered as vital as ever.23 Naturally, Mackenzie’seditorial made its greatest impression in Cyprus, where its suggestions for thefuture of Cyprus and Greece were warmly received. That the article itself didnot reach the island did not stop the local press from publishing a summary ofthe article and commenting on it.24 According to one newspaper, should theAllies follow Mackenzie’s prescription Cyprus and the Dodecanese would

THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 45


‘naturally re-enter the organism to which they have never ceased to belong’, anassertion which was typical of press support for Mackenzie’s ideas.25

Leontios also made use of Mackenzie’s article, referring to it during thecelebration of the anniversary of the Greek Independence on 25 March. GreekCypriots were now, in practice, free to demonstrate and fly the Greek flag, andthe celebrations for the 1941 anniversary had a special character, with moreemphasis than ever on the Hellenic descent of Greek Cypriots.26 Leontios toldone crowd, “the victory of the Allies is certain and the cession of Cyprus to theGreat Greece which will be accomplished when victory finally crowns theefforts of the allied arms is even now an accomplished fact”.27 Greek Cypriotswent so far as to criticize the colonial administration for not declaring the daya public holiday.

Enosis had evidently survived the intense persecution to which it had beensubjected beginning in 1931, and the movement now reemerged as strong asever, with the Orthodox Church of Cyprus continuing to encourage itscomeback. Beginning with Greece’s entry into the war, Greek Cypriotsexpressed their belief that Cyprus was destined to be part of postwar Greece atevery opportunity, to the growing dismay of both the colonial administrationand the island’s Turkish Cypriot minority.

3.2 The Reaction of the Turkish Cypriot CommunityIt was natural that Turkish Cypriots felt a certain anxiety as the war evolved. Itwas impossible for Turkish Cypriots to be indifferent to the atmosphere offanatic patriotism created by their Greek Cypriot counterparts and to therumour that Cyprus would become part of Greece after the war. When Greeceentered the war, Turkish Cypriots expressed their loyalty to Great Britain, notleast by the simultaneous display of both Turkish and British flags during publicdemonstrations, which included those celebrating Greece’s entry into the warand those in support of the Allied cause.

A competition between the two main communities as to which was themost ‘loyal’ to the Colonial authorities soon became evident. For his part, theGovernor made sure to assuage Turkish Cypriot feelings immediately bypraising the community’s loyalty at the Bairam festivities on 1 November1940.28 Turkish Cypriots were alarmed at these fresh events, and in responsethey began to develop their own political consciousness. To counteract thecollection of funds for the Greek army by Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriotsmade contributions to funds for the welfare of the Turkish army.29

Soon enough, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community requestedpermission for the display of the Turkish flag on mosques, which the ColonialGovernment granted. Additionally, following Greece’s entrance into the Allied



camp, Greek subjects on the island were exempted from the restrictions imposedon the movement of alien residents on the island; Turkish Cypriot leaders alsorequested the same exemption for Turkish nationals.30 While the TurkishCypriot community gained these concessions from the Colonial Government,its leadership still sought to maintain a constructive relationship with the GreekCypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots still followed a strong instinct forcoexistence with their Greek neighbours: Turkish Cypriot leaders congratulatedthe Greek consul in Nicosia on the successes of his country,31 and services wereheld in the island’s mosques in support of the Greek and British war effort.These services included the collection of money for relief in Greece.32

In the towns of Cyprus, however, things were quite different. Thedetermination of Turkish Cypriots to show where their political sympathieslay found expression during the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, SukruSaracoglou, who visited Nicosia with Anthony Eden on 19 March 1941.Predictably, the visit received extensive publicity in the local press.33 This rareevent provided Turkish Cypriots with the chance to demonstrate their own‘national’ feelings, and during Eden and Saracoglou’s visit rumours circulatedon the island that Cyprus would return to Turkish hands. The event wasapplauded with equal ardor by Greek Cypriots, who sought to demonstratetheir enthusiasm for the Allied war effort in Eden’s presence. The excitementwas such that the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Soz, advised its readers to foregothe island’s 25th of March – a date that marked the anniversary of the GreekIndependence Day – in order to avoid any incidents.34

The beginning of the Second World War, most significantly Greece’s entryinto the war and the subsequent response of Greek Cypriot society, in additionto Turkish Cypriot concerns regarding the impact of the war on the island’sdestiny, accelerated the emergence of a political consciousness in the TurkishCypriot community. The evolution of Turkish Cypriot nationalism is beyondthe scope of this book.35 However, the wartime period was clearly critical tothis nascent political consciousness, which continued to evolve even afterhostilities had subsided.

3.3 The Movement for Cypriot Volunteering in the Greek ArmyThe prospect of a patriotic Greek Cypriot movement for enrollment in theGreek Army, instead of in the British forces of the Cyprus Regiment, broughta degree of unsettlement to Government House. Indeed, one of the immediaterepercussions, in Cyprus, of Greece’s entry into the war was the torrent ofapplications which the Greek Consul in Nicosia received from Cypriots seekingto enroll in the Royal Hellenic Forces.36 The Acting Archbishop played aprominent part in this movement, which he took under his guidance and



leadership. This movement constituted a real worry for colonial officialdom,and the regulation of these applications required the colonial administration toexert pressure on the Greek Government. The Cypriot exiles in Athens alsofollowed the situation closely.37

Upon the onset of this phenomenon, in late October, the Greek Consul,Eleftherios Mavrokefalos, refrained from taking any action until instructions onthe subject came from Athens. The Locum Tenens, however, sought to encourageenlistment in the Royal Hellenic Forces. As early as August 1940, Leontios,seeing that a Greco-Italian war was inevitable, sought the advice of the GreekConsul as to how best to supervise the volunteering process.38 In November,Leontios toured the island organizing collections for Greece, and there werepress reports, based on leaked information, that in due time the Churchintended to assist Cypriots who wished to depart for Greece39 - one local rightwing paper published letters from some of its readers advocating that Leontiosshould be the first to go.40 In each of the major towns, committees comprisedentirely of veterans of the Balkan wars were organized41 In December 1940,Leontios requested an urgent interview with the Governor on the subject ofvolunteers. His intention was to inform the Governor of the desire of GreekCypriots to depart for Greece at once, and to request the relevant travel facilities.42

The Colonial authorities were predictably opposed to such a prospect. Firstand foremost, Greek Cypriot preference for the Greek Army, rather than for theBritish forces – even though volunteers for the latter were paid – would beconsiderably embarrassing for the British. Secondly, the Cyprus Regiment itselfwas in need of many more able-bodied Cypriots and could not afford any suchdeflection of recruits. The problem facing the British was that the enlistmentof Greek Cypriots in the Royal Hellenic Forces was legal, since Greece wasallied with Britain, so the colonial authority’s initial measures to stem the tideof Greek Cypriot volunteers for the Greek army were largely administrative.At the time travel from Cyprus to Greece went through Egypt, due to theabsence of direct communication with Athens, which meant that Cypriotswishing to travel to Greece were forced to apply for Egyptian visas, whichmeant significant delay. In an effort to gain some time to consult Whitehall,Battershill agreed to Leontios’s request for an interview but for a later date,pleading other, more immediate obligations.43 At the same time, Battershillreassured his superiors in London that he doubted there was a genuine desireamong young Cypriots to join the Greek Army, especially given the personaldangers.44 Battershill was determined to clarify for Leontios that Cyprus wasa British Colony with its own Regiment, with some of its units currently servingin Greece, and this prohibited Battershill granting exit permits to the island’sBritish subjects so they could serve in another country’s army.



Leontios, however, was impatient, and on receiving the Governor’s responseto his request for an interview he issued an announcement calling all eligiblemen to present themselves as volunteers at the Archbishopric, thus making theChurch responsible for the organization of these volunteers and himself theEthnarch of Greek Cypriots.45 The widespread response to the Locum Tenens’scall proved British estimates of potential enlistment in the Greek Army hadbeen understated.46

The Foreign Office sought to approach the Greek Government discreetly,through the British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, to determineif the Greeks were willing to consent to an announcement by Battershill thatCypriot volunteers for the Greek military were not be desirable at themoment.47 Palairet believed it would be difficult for any Greek Government toapprove such a statement, and he himself was reluctant to press the Greeks todo so.48 A few days later, after speaking with General Metaxas, Palairet informedhis superiors that the Greek Prime Minister himself had received numerousapplications from Cypriots and had proposed the acceptance of a limitednumber of recruits from Cyprus. Palairet wanted to accommodate the GreekGovernment, which clearly wished to satisfy London’s request but also wishedto honour the Greeks of Cyprus who so willingly offered themselves to theGreek military.49 This alternative was not implemented, however, and theattention of both Greece and Britain was diverted from the issue, albeittemporarily, by the sudden death of General Metaxas.

The Governor of Cyprus, however, was anxious for instructions fromLondon, since the great number of volunteers registered at the Archbishopricin the first days after the announcement – around twelve hundred men for theGreek military and two hundred women for the Greek Red Cross – created atense atmosphere in Nicosia, especially since the number of volunteers for theCyprus Regiment had dwindled proportionately.50 Battershill also feared thatCypriot volunteers who fought for Greece would return from the war full ofheightened Hellenic feeling, and so inflame Enosis sentiment in postwarCyprus. Ultimately, it was the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd,51

who decided the fate of the Cypriot volunteers. “Quite clearly the GreekGovernment should be asked to say that they do not approve of the LocumTenens’s step and that all Cypriots who wish to serve the Allied cause shouldjoin the British Army and the Cypriot section of it,” Lloyd wrote. “The F.O.should so be told. We must make the Greeks do this.”52

The Foreign Office concurred with Lloyd’s opinion. A few days later theBritish Ambassador in Athens received a telegram to the effect that the GreekGovernment should respond to any offer from Cypriot volunteers to aid theGreek cause by informing them that such aid would be much more effective if



rendered to the British Cyprus Regiment, and that the Greek Consul in Nicosiashould be urged to communicate to Leontios that his recent activities were ill-advised.53 In early February, Greece instructed its representatives in Nicosia toinform Leontios accordingly, and to ask that he abandon his efforts.54 Leontiosmade another request to meet with the Governor on the subject, but Battershilldeliberately ignored it.55

Subsequent to these events, Leontios discreetly halted the volunteermovement in Cyprus. However, this did not prevent several Greek Cypriotstraveling to Greece at their own expense to participate in the Greek war effort,nor did it impede Greek Cypriots from contributing to the various funds insupport of the Greek cause, and the Acting Archbishop himself continued toexhort Cypriots to assist the Greek cause to the best of their ability.

3.4 Church and State after 28 October 1940: In Search of ReconciliationThe Italian invasion of Greece had two immediate effects on relations betweenthe Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Colonial Government. The first wasthe end of the boycott of the Orthodox Church on the British authorities. Thesecond, as evidenced by the Cypriot volunteer movement, was the LocumTenens’s demand that he be considered by the colonial authority as the Ethnarchof his Greek Cypriot flock. This dynamic meant that even in the freshcircumstances brought about in Cyprus by the war, any efforts for honestreconciliation between these two institutions were bound to be fruitless.

The Acting Archbishop was quick to react to news of events in Greece. On29 October he spoke in Larnaca surrounded by Greek, British and Turkishflags. “Past misunderstandings must be forgotten,” he exclaimed to an ecstaticcrowd. “Long live - the King of England, the British nation, our allies Turkeyand Greece.”56 He made similar speeches in Limassol and in Paphos, givingassurances that the Church and the Government were united during such acrucial time.57 In Paphos he led cheers for the British and the Greek Kings, andfor the Turkish President.58 Upon his return to Nicosia, Leontios signed theGovernor’s visitors’ book and requested an interview – this was the first timesince he took over his duties as the Locum Tenens of the vacant throne in 1933that Leontios requested an audience with the Governor. The next day, 31October, he received the Governor’s Aide-de-Camp and the Commissioner ofNicosia in the Archbishopric.59 Before departing for Famagusta, the next stopon his tour of the island, the Bishop sent Battershill a telegram expressing hisappreciation for ‘this courtesy’.60 Leontios and Battershill finally met on 14November 1940.61 This was a purely formal meeting, but its importance wascritical, as it was the first time the leaders of the Church and the State in Cyprushad met since 1933.



In addition to speeches throughout the island, Leontios also organizedservices in the Orthodox Churches in honour of the Allied cause.62 TheGovernor was invited to take part in the celebration at Phaneromeni Churchin Nicosia, which was conducted by Leontios, but the Commissioner ofNicosia attended in the Governor’s place.63

The Church led the collection of funds for the Greek war effort. Under theBishop’s guidance, committees were formed in all major towns to coordinatefundraising, and Leontios personally appealed to Cypriots for generalcontributions. Leontios issued further encyclicals calling upon churches to donateat least one-fourth of their annual revenue before Christmas64 while continuingto advance the cause of Cypriot volunteers. Meanwhile, Bishop Makarios ofKyrenia and the rest of the exiles in Athens followed events in Cyprus65 andacted as mediators between the Acting Archbishop and the Greek government.

Government House regarded Leontios’s actions as highly ambiguous.Battershill believed Leontios’s efforts were dictated by his desire to takeadvantage of the situation and consolidate his position as the Ethnarch of GreekCypriots.66 Leontios’s persistent efforts to aid Greece, especially through Cypriotvolunteerism, posed potential difficulties for the colonial authority in Cyprusand for the British Government, and the Bishop’s efforts to combine ferventsupport for the defeat of the Axis powers with the expectation of Enosis irritatedBattershill. During his sermons, Leontios repeatedly told worshippers, “themoment is near when we, the Greeks of Cyprus, will be liberated and unitedwith our Mother Greece.”67 In his messages to the Greek Prime Minister and theKing of Greece on the occasion of the New Year of 1941, Leontios underlinedthe desire of the Greeks of Cyprus for Enosis; He also sent similar telegrams tothe Governor and to King George VI on the same occasion, which the ColonialOffice read with suspicion.68 Inevitably, the occasion of that year’s celebrationof Greek Independence on 25 March was more intense than ever. Leontiosmade a speech in which he once again aligned the fate of Cyprus with that ofGreece, tempting Battershill to impose Emergency regulations against him.69

The Colonial Office’s increasing impatience and indignation were emphaticallysummed up in one official’s minute, when he flatly wrote that he wished “itwere possible to devise some means of getting rid of this turbulent priest.”70

Against this background, when everything in Cyprus was overshadowed byevents in Greece, the problematic issue of the archiepiscopal vacancy remained.Given the complexity of the problem, the British considered approaching theGreek Government and the Phanar in Constantinople to participate in aneffort to end the deadlock.71 Winston Churchill himself felt that the time wasfavourable to reach a solution, and he urged his officials to do everythingpossible to end a problem which had gone on too long.72 However, events in



Greece during spring 1941 put a halt to any possible resolution of the vacancy. Greece was overrun by the German military in April and May of 1941. The

Germans occupied Athens, and in the confusion created by the occupation,contact with the exiled Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, was lost.73 Makarios wasstill alive in Athens, but he was now in enemy territory, which prevented himfrom participating in Synodical affairs via correspondence as he had previouslydone. Under these circumstances, Leontios founded the ‘Popular AdvisoryCommittee of the Church of Cyprus’, an advisory body under his leadershipthat assumed full administrative responsibility for the Orthodox Church ofCyprus.74 The majority of Cypriots saw this maneuver, which no one expected,as rather clumsy, and most newspapers criticized the move.75 Only Νέος ΚυπριακόςΦύλακας, a loyal supporter of the Bishop’s policies, stood in favour of it.76

Despite forces in support of wartime unity, the Orthodox Church and theGovernment of Cyprus did not manage to reach a mutual understanding andfind a path to cooperation. Leontios continued to stress his Ethnarchic roleeven more than he had prior to the war, and he increasingly clashed with Britishcolonial officialdom, whose attitude toward him was still frozen by the eventsof the 1930s. It was also during this period that the Church itself faced internalconflicts, as Leontios’s popularity waned after public condemnation of thePopular Advisory Committee of the Church of Cyprus. Meanwhile, the labourmovement continued to increase its power and its stature on the island, furthercomplicating the internal politics of Cyprus as the war continued across Europeand the Pacific.

3.5 The Labour Movement and the Foundation of A.K.E.LBeginning in the late 1930s, the Colonial Government was concerned aboutthe rising power of the labour movement and its influence on Greek Cypriotsociety. The British were convinced that the Trade Unions were led bycommunist agitators and were devoted to political rather than industrialpurposes, and the Secretary of State himself was worried about the possiblesway the Trade Unions might gain on the island. Thus, in addition to the postof Labour Adviser, the Colonial Government considered further measures todiminish the influence of external political elements on workers.

One of these measures was the suggestion that a prominent Trade Unionistfrom Great Britain should visit the island, with the purpose of explaining toworkers how Trade Unions functioned in the UK under demanding wartimeconditions. The colonial authority hoped that Cypriot labourers would seethat the British Trade Unions were prepared to surrender some of theirprivileges for the sake of victory, and that the Cypriot Trade Unions might dothe same. Battershill, however, opposed the idea, believing that the attitude of



the Cypriot workforce toward the war had changed since the Italian declarationof war against Greece, and that it would now be more cooperative. Under thesecircumstances, the intrusion of an outside ‘expert’, which was something thelocal colonial bureaucracy had always resisted, was considered unnecessary.77

The Trade Unions followed a somewhat pacific path when it came to war,and their members refrained from enlistment in the Cyprus Regiment.However, the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 created an importanttesting ground for the island’s labour movement, and the Trade Unions werecalled to respond to a challenge that would be critical for their future in Cyprus.Battershill’s hope that the Trade Unions would adopt a fresh attitude to thewar once Greece entered hostilities was dashed. Indeed, the Trade Unions,whilst sympathizing with Greece’s war effort, did not fully identify with thegeneral upheaval affecting their compatriots, and their reticence createdtensions within and around them. In early November the Locum Tenens invitedrepresentatives from clubs, the press, Trade Unions and other Greek Cypriotinstitutions to a meeting, in order to coordinate the collection of contributionsfor the Hellenic war effort.78 The Trade Unions declared their hatred forfascism and wholly condemned the Italian invasion of Greece.79 Yet, despitethe presence of their representative at the meeting, the Trade Unions wereadamant that they were unable to contribute to the Greek war fund due to ascarcity of funds, and that they could not take a leading part in the collections,since all their members were full-time workers.80 This position would ultimatelydraw negative criticism of the Trade Unions from the press and the public.

It soon became apparent that there was no solidarity amongst Trade Unionmembers themselves on the matter. Upon hearing the announcement that theTrade Unions were not able to contribute to the Greek war cause, ninetymembers of the Private Employees Trade Unions sent a letter to Leontiosexpressing their willingness to donate funds to the war effort and reaffirmingtheir patriotic Hellenic feelings.81 The leaders of the Private Employees Uniondenied there was a large number of dissidents within the union, but thatindividual members were free to contribute to war funds if they so wished.82

Still, one of the immediate effects of the Unions’ decision was the creation ofdivision within their own ranks, with moderates prepared to pledge theirloyalty to the national cause on the one hand and hard-core members whoinsisted on maintaining an anti-war position on the other, making any coherentTrade Union policy impossible.

Further solicitations from Leontios to the Trade Unions of Limassol for adonation of one shilling from each member83 were again rejected on thegrounds that ‘this is contrary to our Unions’ statutes as it would define theUnions as political organizations’.84 In addition to their internal problems, the



Trade Unions were also forced to confront negative public opinion. At a timewhen Cyprus was mobilized for the Greek cause, any refusal to take part wascriticized as ‘anti-national’ and even vilified. Local newspapers became theforums for such views, mostly the right wing Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ and thelabour Ανεξάρτητος.

In response to criticism in the press of the Limassol Trade Unions, theLarnaca Unions clarified that they supported the victims of Italian fascism, butthat they did not want to mix war politics with labour affairs.85 In Limassol,the ‘Limassol Committee for War Funds in Favour of the Greek Cause’ pleadedwith workers to contribute to the general effort, as did most Greek Cypriots.86

To these pleas the Limassol Unions again listed rules and regulations thatprohibited them from contributing to the collections.87

Nevertheless, perhaps in an effort to vindicate their position, the TradeUnions decided to host theatrical performances in all the major towns, withall profits to be donated to the civilian victims of the Italian bombing of Greece.In Nicosia, however, the Trade Union met with opposition from the committeeresponsible for the organization of the collections, which was led by theChurch. The committee informed the Union, in response to its petition to theLocum Tenens, that no theatrical shows were acceptable for raising funds unlessit was declared that the profits would be donated in favour of the Greeknational cause itself.88 The unions met with a similar reaction in Larnaca, wherethe local ‘national’ committee refused to permit any performances unless it wasclearly stated that the occasion would be under the aegis of the committeeresponsible for the national collections.89 There were cases to the contrary,however, particularly in Famagusta, where a play was performed and supportedby the public.90 Ανεξάρτητος took the lead in supporting the Unions’ policy andcriticized anyone who opposed them, including the Locum Tenens.91

Well-known local figures participated in the debate - including GeorgeVassiliades, who defended the position of the Trade Unions. 92 This augmentedthe intensity of the debate and introduced a flavour of confrontation into thediscussion that would feature prominently in the future municipal elections.An apparent antithesis soon arose between the Church and the Right, on theone hand, and the labour movement on the other.

Against the background of the first visible confrontation within GreekCypriot society, labour unrest continued to surge during this period. Labourersengaged in the relief works in Famagusta marched in protest to the office ofthe District Commissioner, resulting in the arrest of around eleven persons.93

In April, another incident took place, in Larnaca, where a hundred and fortyworkers were dismissed on account of a shortage of jobs in the buildingconstruction sector; the dismissals were followed by public protests, which



resulted in numerous arrests, although those arrested were later released afterpaying their fines.94 In May, 300 Public Works Department workers went onstrike over wages. The strike continued until the end of the month, when theworkers reached a compromise with the Government.95

The most important political evolution of this period was undoubtedly thefoundation of A.K.E.L. (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού - ProgressiveParty of Working People). A.K.E.L. was destined to play a vital role in Cypriotpolitics in the future, but this was hard to predict at the party’s outset. On 14April 1941, George Vassiliades convened a meeting of thirty-two people inSkarinou – many of them communists, the rest from a wide ideologicalspectrum – to discuss the formation of a new political party.96 It is significantthat many attendees were members of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie, includingLefkios Zinon, Fidias Kyriakides, Saveras Saveriades and Zinon Rossides.Kyriakides presided over the meeting but stated at the beginning that he wouldnot participate in the organization for personal reasons.97 The participantsagreed on the formation of a Central Committee and on the formation of localcommittees in the major towns.

The new party asserted its democratic and anti-fascist character, andpresented a coherent program of social and labour policy. However, contrary topress speculation,98 the Central Committee decided that A.K.E.L. would notparticipate in the forthcoming municipal elections.99 It is interesting that atthis point A.K.E.L. didn’t clarify its position with regard to the nationalquestion of the island.100 Indeed, it would be some months later when the partyofficially declared its political orientation towards Enosis.

Parallel to A.K.E.L, K.K.K. survived underground for a few more yearsbefore its final dissolution. The simultaneous existence of both parties, a freshleftist entity including ‘moderate’ elements and an older formation retainingits radical ideological character, was bound to create some confusion.Considering how critical A.K.E.L was to become in the political life of Cyprus,it is quite remarkable that its emergence passed almost unnoticed in the localpress, but the middle of April 1941 also saw the final defeat of the Greek andBritish armies on the mainland. Most Cyprus newspapers mentioned thefoundation of A.K.E.L., but only Ανεξάρτητος presented the party’s statutes andprinciples in detail. Three weeks later, on 9 May, A.K.E.L. announced it wouldcall its first Pan-Cyprian Conference for October 1941. By that time, it wouldbe clear that the young party’s growing power would be impossible to ignore.

3.6 The Question of the Greek Government’s Move to CyprusTowards the end of 1940, as Greece, bolstered by Cypriot volunteers, continuedto prevail against Italy, the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet,



tentatively suggested to his colleagues that London might promise the postwarcession of Cyprus to Greece in exchange for a permanent base.101 Palairet’ssuggestion was in part inspired by an article published in a Greek newspaper,Εστία (Hestia), which referred in detail to the stirring contribution of Cypriotsto the Greek war effort. The Ambassador’s suggestion initiated a debate withinWhitehall about postwar Cyprus.

Edward Warner, counsellor on Middle Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office,favoured this suggestion, although he had originally preferred the acquisitionof a valuable base at Suda Bay in Crete, instead of keeping an island with apopulation regarded as ‘hostile’ towards colonial rule.102 Other officials, suchas Pierson Dixon and Philip Nichols, were concerned that both Turkey and theTurkish minority on the island might respond to this decision by demandingthe cession of the island to Turkey.103 The recognition of the strategic importanceof Cyprus to the Empire was fundamental to these officials, and the postwarretention of Cyprus by Britain assumed the colony’s further development as amilitary bastion. It was decided that Professor Arnold Toynbee104 at the RoyalInstitute of International Affairs in London would prepare a memorandumregarding the postwar alternatives for Cyprus, one that would take intoconsideration all interested key players and factors.

The continuing flux of events in Greece and the Balkans, however,profoundly influenced Britain’s considerations. By the end of 1940, Hitler hadplanned the ‘Barbarossa’ invasion against Russia, a massive offensive thatrequired Germany to safeguard its control over the Balkans. To this end, theGermans forced Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact of Berlin,Rome and Tokyo.105 The subsequent overturning of the pro-Nazi governmentin Yugoslavia was the trigger for a long feared German onslaught. On 6 April1941, the German army attacked Greece and Yugoslavia simultaneously,defeating and occupying both nations. The Greek premier, Alexandros Korizis,committed suicide on 18 April 1941, and the legitimate Government of Greecehad to consider where outside the occupied mainland it might establish a baseof operations. Crete was clearly preferable, as it was part of Greece itself, but theisland was vulnerable to air raids, so King George II asked Palairet if the BritishGovernment would consider the temporary concession of a small part ofCyprus where the Greek Government could reestablish itself. This was not thefirst time Cyprus had figured in the considerations of the Greek Government.A few months earlier, Korizis had raised the subject of a future cession ofCyprus to Greece with Anthony Eden during one of the British ForeignSecretary’s secret visits to Athens.

“As the Greek people will be required to offer the greatest of sacrifices, theywill need, in order to maintain the excellence of their morale, an immediate



satisfaction of their demands,” Korizis told Eden. “I cannot tell you howimpressive, in these hours of crisis, would a British gesture be whereby Cypruswould be ceded to Greece. I am simply putting forth a thought which willrequire further study and am not demanding an answer.”106 The British Ministerreplied that this was an important issue but was beyond his jurisdiction andthat this precluded him from immediately addressing it. Near the end of March,Korizis spoke with Eden again, this time more urgently, and requested at leasta part of Cyprus in which the exiled Government of Greece could exercise itslegitimate authority. This second request also met with British hesitancy.107

On 11 April King George II again requested permission from the Britishfor the establishment of an interim Greek capital in Cyprus.108 At first, Britishofficials considered sequestering the Greek Government in Cyprus in a mannersimilar to arrangements made with other Allied governments then enjoyingtemporary refuge in London. However, and especially after receiving urgentwarnings from Battershill,109 the British decided it would be impossible to cedea part of Cyprus, even a village, to the Greeks. Battershill was stridentlyopposed, explaining to his superiors in London that Cyprus lacked any airdefence, and that its heretofore immunity from invasion would be endangeredshould the Greek Government establish itself in exile in Cyprus. Battershillalso emphasized that ceding any portion of Cyprus to the Greek Governmentwould provide an insurmountable boost to the Enosis movement. TheGovernor was adamant that no matter what guarantees were made as to thetemporary character of the cession, Cypriots would look upon George II andhis entourage as their own, which would antagonize both the Turkish Cypriotcommunity and Turkey itself.110 On 12 April 1941 the British Foreign Ministeroutlined the difficulties surrounding the implementation of the King George’srequest to his Greek counterpart, Charalambos Simopoulos. The GreekMinister did not hide his disappointment and once again stressed the need forthe Greek Government to continue to exercise its sovereignty, preferably fromCyprus.111 The British ultimately decided it would be best for the GreekGovernment-in-exile to rule from Crete, and defence measures were organizedon the island,112 with the subject of Cyprus postponed until a later date.113

This date arrived suddenly at the end of May 1941, when Crete surrenderedafter fierce resistance to German forces. By this time, Toynbee, on behalf of theRoyal Institute of International Affairs, had submitted his memorandumregarding the strategic and political value of Cyprus.114 Toynbee’s paperdiscussed all possible solutions to the question of Cyprus, listing the advantagesand disadvantages of each solution, but clearly supported the cession of Cyprusto Greece. Toynbee remarked in the paper that it was ‘contrary to the traditionsand in general to the interests of the British Empire to maintain in political



subjection a people whose social and cultural level justifies the claims to self-determination’.115 However, given the prospect of Cyprus uniting with Greece,the reactions of Turkish Cypriots and the strategic considerations of Turkeywould have to be taken into account. E. Warner in the Foreign Office continuedto support this prospect, as he had earlier that year when Palairet first suggestedceding Cyprus to Greece.116 Warner’s colleague, R. Bowker, agreed that thecession of Cyprus to Greece would be most profitable for Britain, but that itshould not be immediate.117 On the other hand, other members of the ForeignOffice, including the Under Secretary of State, Orme Sargent, maintained theposition that the question of Cyprus should be put off until the end of the war.118

As always, the future of Cyprus had the capacity to divide British officialdom.In its meeting of 2 June 1941, the War Cabinet concluded that the Foreign

Secretary should not initiate discussions about Cyprus with the GreekGovernment, but instead, if asked, should declare that Cyprus would be includedin postwar peace settlement discussions.119 Anthony Eden anticipated thiseventuality in a memorandum of his own, and advocated that the cession ofCyprus to Greece did not contravene imperial interests. He also speculated thatGermany might occupy Cyprus, ultimately handing it over to the quislinggovernment of Athens, in which case the British might as well act first. Accordingto Eden, if the Germans did offer Cyprus to any such Greek Government, thebest tactic would be to ensure that the Greek Government-in-exile refused torecognize such an illegitimate Enosis. The lawful Greek Government could thenstate publicly that it had agreed with His Majesty’s Government to discuss theissue of Cypriot cession to Greece after the war.120 For his part, the ColonialSecretary merely emphasized certain points regarding the defence of the island.121

The Prime Minister himself made the final decision. Winston Churchilldeclared to his staff that it would be much better to leave all territorialsettlements until after the war ended. He was strongly against relinquishingany British territory before the end of the war. He concluded his remarks byreferring to a consideration that had long been a stumbling point for the Britishwhenever the issue of union between Greece and Cyprus came up fordiscussion: “I have followed very closely all that has happened in Cyprus sinceI visited the island in 1907. I suppose you are aware there is a substantialMoslem population in Cyprus, who have (sic) been very loyal to us, and whowould much resent being handed over to the Greeks”.122 Churchill’sintervention clinched the critical decision on the fate of Cyprus during thecrucial hour of Greece’s surrender to the Axis. Meanwhile, in Cyprus, GreekCypriots held steadfast to their hope for Union with Greece. They were to beprofoundly shocked at the end of 1941 when a formal announcement was madethat the question of the future of their island had been set aside.



3.7 Effects of the German Occupation of Greece in CyprusThe German occupation of Greece naturally had repercussions in Cyprus. Thepeople of Cyprus had closely followed the military events of the previousmonths and universally condemned the German onslaught.123 Many Cypriotswere grief-stricken at the news of the occupation of Athens, but they continuedto hope for a final Greek redemption. Although previous victories by theGreek Army at the Albanian front had inspired the hope that Cyprus wouldbe amongst Greek gains in the postwar settlement, any such hope wasnow dimmed.

In early 1941, political activity on the island expanded at the prospect ofthe restoration of municipal elections later that year – an announcement inJanuary confirming these elections would indeed take place increasedanticipation on the local political scene.124 A proposition in Ελευθερία that allcandidates be listed on one ‘national’ slate representing all classes raisedobjections from other papers, but also gave rise to fruitful debate.125 However,the Cyprus Government announced in May that the elections would bepostponed sine die126 because of the crisis in Greece and the danger now facingthe island, and the press and the public supported the delay. Indeed, thepostponement of the elections was advocated earlier that year by Πάφος, whichstressed that the occupation of Greece required the complete and undistractedattention of all Cypriots.127

Following the German conquest and occupation of Crete in the final daysof May 1941, the people of Cyprus were gripped by a profound fear that theirisland would be the Nazis’ next target. As early as 2 May, the ColonialGovernment announced the gradual relocation of people from the major townsto the countryside, in order to minimize potential losses in an air raid, an eventthat heightened the anxiety of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.128 After Crete fellto the Germans, Australian reinforcements arrived in Cyprus, and the CyprusVolunteer Force was mobilized.129 Amongst the guidance provided to thepublic, Cypriots were told to ‘stay where you are’ in the case of any invasion, andthis exhortation emphasized the need for people to move as little as possible insuch a crucial event.130 On 15 May, the island experienced another air raid,which resulted in the death of one person.131 The Governor consulted hissuperiors regarding the evacuation of foreign subjects from the island, mainlyPoles, Jews and Britons, which heightened concern that a German attack onCyprus was imminent.132 However, after the Allies occupied Syria and Germanybegan its disastrous invasion of Russia, on 22 June 1941, the possibility thatthe Germans might attack Cyprus swiftly faded.

The entry of Greece into the Second World War had profound effects onCypriot political life, particularly as it sparked a rebirth of the Enosis movement,



60 CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II

nursed to increased strength by Leontios, which was bound to pose potentialdifficulties for the colonial administration. Greece’s entry into the war alsoresulted in a partial disengagement from the post-1931 regime, which in turnencouraged new political developments within Cyprus, especially the foundationof A.K.E.L. By May 1941, Cyprus was ripe for the remaking of its politics.


cyprus in world war ii

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