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Educational Administration

http://eaq.sagepub.com/content/43/5/525The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/0013161X07303276

2007 43: 525Educational Administration QuarterlyEnrique Alemn, Jr.

''Substantially Equal'' Yields Racial InequitySituating Texas School Finance Policy in a CRT Framework: How

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Educational Administration Quarterly

Vol. 43, No. 5 (December 2007) 525-558

Situating Texas School Finance Policy

in a CRT Framework: How Substantially

Equal Yields Racial Inequity

Enrique Alemn Jr.

Purpose: The purpose of this article is to conduct a critical race policy analysis of

Texas school finance policy. This empirical article examines three chapters of the Texas

education code (TEC) and identifies the racial effects that the school funding system

has on seven majority-Mexican American school districts.

Methodology: Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Latina/o Critical (LatCrit) theoretical

frameworks are employed in this article in which race and property are highlighted as

concepts central to the analysis. The methodology allows for a critical perspective on

history and the racial effects of policy to be outlined. First, a historical analysis of race

and racism, schooling, and politics in Texas contextualizes the debate over school finance

equity. Second, an analysis of the effects that the school finance system has on commu-

nities of color is completed.

Analysis and Findings:An examination of primarily 20022003 school finance data,

Texas Supreme Court opinions, and TEC indicates that majority-Mexican American

school districts are disadvantaged by Texas school finance policy. Whether it is opera-

tional, maintenance, or facilities funding, the school finance system institutes inequity.

Keywords: Critical Race Theory; policy analysis; school finance; equity

INTRODUCTION

On a recent 60 Minutes program, correspondent Leslie Stahl reported on

the Texas Top 10% Plan, the states college admissions policy that auto-

matically admits students who rank in the 10% of their high schools grad-

uating class to any of the states public institutions of higher education. The

plan has come under legislative attack recently as university enrollment has

ballooned, limiting the options of certain powerful and elite constituenciesand their children. Put plainly, as the number of automatically accepted

525

DOI: 10.1177/0013161X07303276

2007 The University Council for Educational Administration

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students has risen, the remaining available slots have dwindled, limiting

options for some. Constituents and legislators from majority White, high

socioeconomic communities are now lobbying for a legislative revision or

repeal of the policy.

In her report, Stahl portrayed the plan as an unfair policy, which pun-

ishes higher achieving students who attend more rigorous high schools

and rewards students from lesser educational backgrounds. The story cen-

tered on two students, one of whom was White, who had attended one of the

wealthiest school districts in the state, and was denied admission to a state

flagship institution because of the cap on enrollment. The other student, a

Mexican American, graduated from one of the poorest public school districts

in the state, lived in public housing with her family, and was admitted underthe admissions policy.

Stahls reporting implied that the White student was disadvantaged because

she was fortunate enough to attend a high school where Advanced Placement

courses were the norm, where fierce student competition resulted in academic

rigor, and where students expectations were to attend one of the states

premier universities. What Stahl failed to explore, however, was the long his-

torical practice of disadvantaging communities of color and the institutional-

ization of inequity within the Texas public school system.1 She provided nohistorical context for the long struggle to provide fair and equitable funding to

the states 1,037 school districts (Cardenas, 1997; Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999;

San Miguel & Valencia, 1998), and although relative change has occurred, her

report lacked an analysis of the racism institutionalized by current Texas

school finance policy.

Stahls report exemplified much of what is wrong with the practice of and

the research conducted in traditional educational policy analysis. It lacked a

contextual analysis of historically racist practices, ignored the power dynam-ics that disadvantage communities of color, and failed to insert a critical

analysis of the winners and losers of a given policy. Furthermore, the report

failed to link the funding inequities in the public school system to academic

readiness and access at the higher education level. In this article, I initiate a

discussion of how Texas public school finance policy continues to disadvan-

tage both poor communities and students of color. First, I discuss the study

of race and racism and outline the major tenets guiding Critical Race Theory

526 Educational Administration Quarterly

Authors Note: Please address all correspondence to Enrique Alemn, Jr., University of Utah,

Department of Educational Leadership and Policy, 1705 E. Campus Center Drive, Salt Lake

City, Utah 85112; phone: (801) 585-5097; e-mail: [email protected].



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can be used as a methodological tool as well as a greater ontological and

epistemological understanding of how race and racism affect education and

lives of the racially disenfranchised (pp. 78). Delgado and Stefancic (2001)

describe CRT as a movement and a collection of activists and scholars

interested in studying and transforming the relationship among race, racism,

and power (p. 2). The theoretical framework has branched out into fields of

study outside the original legal studies. It is now utilized by scholars in soci-

ology, ethnic studies, womens studies, and most recently, in education.

CRT scholars generally operate under the following central tenets

(Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001;

Lpez & Parker, 2003; Parker, 1998):

1. Racism is endemic and ingrained in U.S. society;2. The civil rights movement and subsequent laws require reinterpretation;3. Concepts of neutrality, objectivity, colorblindness and meritocracy must be

challenged;4. Providing a space for the voices of marginalized people to be heard is

vital to reform; and,5. Whiteness is constructed as the ultimate property.

Solrzano (1998) adds commitment to social justice and an interdiscipli-nary perspective to these tenets and notes that in education, CRT challenges

dominant education theory, discourse, policy, and practice.

LatCrit Theory

Made up of scholars who participated in the formation and growth of CRT,

LatCrit was designed as a project to highlight the racing of Latina/os in the

legal discourse (Trucious-Haynes, 2001; Valds, 1997). Haney-Lpez (1998)argues that LatCrit scholarship should avoid the elimination of race discourse

or the substitution of ethnicity-centered explanations as a means for under-

standing Latina/o identity and marginalization. Similar to CRT, LatCrit schol-

arship provokes liberatory research and promotes self-determination by

Latina/os, for Latina/os (Nuez, 1999). Arguing that the best way to attack

the effects of racism upon Latinos in this country is to establish a distinct

Latino Critical Race Theory (p. 3), Nuez posited that the current discourse

and analysis on race for Latina/os is inadequate, does not interrogate a pre-

dominant Anglo, racist ideology, and does not foster cooperation and collab-

oration with other marginalized groups.

Theorists also contend that LatCrit complements CRT work, never sup-

planting it or its central tenets. By complicating definitions of race and

racism, Espinoza and Harris (1998) challenged LatCrit scholars in their




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understanding of racial hierarchy and pushed those in the field to accept

Latina/o histories, cultures, perspectives as epistemologies and ontologies

worth understanding. Furthermore, Trucious-Haynes (2001) stated that

Latina/os must acknowledge and investigate the ways in which the domi-

nant culture defines our group as a Non-White, White or non-racial group

that is outside of the race discourse, in order to suit its convenience . . .

(p. 3) as has been done at different points in history. She was forthright in

her assertion that [A]t a minimum, it is critical that LatCrit scholars con-

front our communitys ambivalence about its group racial identity (p. 3).

Stefancic (1998) stated that the Latina/o critical research has been con-

ducted and written about for many years, although it has been ignored or

marked as illegitimate by the traditional and positivistic segments of main-stream academia. She pointed to Rodolfo Acua as the progenitor (p. 1509)

of LatCrit discourse and his book, Occupied America, as the first work in

LatCrit scholarship for its historical accounting of Latina/os, specifically

Chicana/os in the United States and southwest. In her annotated bibliography

of works of LatCrit scholarship, Stefancic (1998) organized the literature into

17 themes. In her listing, several corresponded generally to central tenets

noted by CRT scholars, whereas others were more specific to issues in Latina/o

communities. They included, among others, storytelling/counterstorytellingand naming ones own reality, Latina/o essentialism, black/brown tensions,

assimilationism and the colonized mind (pp. 15111515). Espinoza and

Harris (1998) argued for an expansion on the BlackWhite paradigm that

dominates racial discourse.

In the educational research community, scholars have begun to tell the sto-

ries of Latina/os in higher and public education, integrating LatCrit scholar-

ship and their research agendas while promoting social change. Researching

and examining the issues that affect Chicana/o graduate students (Solrzano& Yosso, 2001; Yosso, 2006) and proposing practical applications of CRT and

LatCrit to student services staff that serve Latina/o undergraduate students

(Villalpando, 2004) are just two examples of how educational researchers

have begun to apply LatCrit to the field. Others have studied the histories,

experiences, and cultures of Chicana/os in the colleges and universities

(Delgado Bernal, 2002), as well as how Chicana activist teachers combat

oppression in the public school setting (Revilla, 2004) in an effort to propose

critical frameworks from which to analyze research findings.

Utilizing CRT in Educational Policy Analysis

Parker (2003) states that critical race policy analysis seeks to link a

historical analysis with educational policies racialized effects (p. 147).

Alemn / CRT ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL FINANCE POLICY 529



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He proposes a framework from which to analyze policy decisions, scrutiniz-

ing them and the conditions they create for students of color. Borrowing

Parkers framework, I seek to investigate these effects and the conditions cre-

ated by Texas school finance policy on majority-Mexican American school

districts. As exemplified by the plethora of research, Mexican Americans

have historically been disadvantaged in many areas of K-12 education

policycurriculum and instruction, bilingual education, assessment and

accountability systems, and school finance (Allsup, 1982; Cardenas, 1997;

Cortez & Montecel, 2003; Delgado Bernal, 2002; Donato, 1997; Kozol,

1991; San Miguel, 2004; Solrzano & Delgado Bernal, 2001; Valencia,

2002b; Valenzuela, 2002; Yosso, 2006). Therefore, this article further seeks to

use CRT to determine how Texas school finance policy institutes inequity byanalyzing the racialized effects of the Texas system of school funding.

Completing a critical race policy analysis such as Brady, Eatman, and Parker

(2000) and arguing for race-conscious education policy as does Moses (2002)

gives voice to marginalized communities, questions the disadvantaging of

communities of color, and problematizes the effects of equity statute. As

proffered by Parker (2003), my central argument is that race should be the

primary factor used in analyzing educational policy.

The rationale for utilizing this methodology is amplified by its potential inachieving an understanding of the intersection of politics, policy, and race and

its applicability to educational practice. Aside from some notable exceptions,

this type of scholarship is lacking in the educational administration/leadership

or educational policy fields of study (Brady, Eatman, & Parker, 2000; Ladson-

Billings, 1998; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1997; Lpez, 2003; Lpez & Parker,

2003; Parker, 1998, 2003; Parker & Lynn, 2002; Tate, 1997). As Parker (2003)

has noted, CRT has not crossed over into the field to any significant extent

and is virtually absent in the area of educational policy (p. 154).Therefore, the premise of this article is based on CRT and LatCrits cen-

tral tenets in an effort to tell the story behind the story (Lpez, 2003). It

situates the story of Texas school finance policy in a contextualized cri-

tique of a racist historical past, questions the neutrality of school funding

formulas and law, challenges the notion that school finance equity was

achieved through recent litigation, and places a racist funding structure at the

heart of inequity and discrimination. As argued by Parker (2003) and Young

(1999), it deviates from traditional educational policy analysiswhich

neglects the pervasiveness of racism embedded within policy structures and

endorses a rationalist perspective of policymakingby employing a criti-

cal race policy framework. Similar to the analysis of higher educational

finance completed by Brady, Eatman, & Parker (2000) and the critique of

human capital theory in educational finance conducted by Alemn ( 2007),




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this article specifically calls for a critique of educational finance policies

employing a CRT framework.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLITICSOF TEXAS SCHOOL FUNDING

To understand why the Texas school finance system exists in its current

form, one must first examine the molding of the United States and Texas, and

the roles that property and race played in instituting inequity. The war for

independence against England was a liberating moment for capitalism, the

free market economy, and Anglo domination. The central concern of theAmerican political and economic elite was the issue of property rights.

As stated by Takaki (2000), the war allowed enterprises to convert Native

American land into private property, open up trading opportunities, develop

business and industry, and in general, expand the market (p. 5). Kramnick

(1987) noted that the primary concern raised by newly liberated property

owners was whether the central government would have power over the

states. He stated that it was concern of states rights issues that became so

threatening to the rights of property, which evoked the most outrage (p. 25)among the White ruling elite.

Like property, race and racism played a central role in the formation of the

United States. Spring (1997) explained that the English belief in their own

cultural and racial superiority over Native Americans and, later, enslaved

Africans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Asians, was not born on

American soil (p. 39). However, these beliefs provided the underpinning for

the elimination and subjugation of non-Anglo groups of people. This belief

system, exemplified by the enactment of the Naturalization Law of 1790 bythe First U.S. Congress, required that applicants demonstrate 2 years of U.S.

residency, show good moral character, and be white (Takaki, 2000, p. 15)

in order for citizenship to be granted.

Similar to the Founding Fathers strategy to rid the land of Native

American tribes, appropriate African American labor, and instill a republican,

puritan work ethic (Spring, 1997; Takaki, 2000), Texan policymakers imple-

mented efforts to eliminate Mexicans from their land, create a dual-wage

system of labor, and inculcate a sense of Manifest Destiny (Acua, 1988;

De Len, 1998; Montejano, 1987; San Miguel, 1987; Spring, 1997). For

example, as expressed by two of Americas most notable democratic

thinkersBenjamin Franklin and Thomas JeffersonWhites were superior

and Texas would play a significant role in the Manifest Destiny plans of the

United States (Takaki, 2000). Takaki expanded on Franklins notion of the




9/35

lovely white, (p. 11), whereas Acua (1988) stated, Jefferson predicted

that the Spanish borderlands are ours the first moment war is forced upon

us (pp. 67). Although it would not be until 1836 that war would be forced

upon the United States by a struggling, poor, and resource-stripped nation,

the creation of dominant and subordinate classes was imminent once the

Texans defeated the Mexican Army with the help of American men, money

and supplies (Acua, 1988, p. 13).

Revolt! Fighting for Education

Although many recall the Remember the Alamo rallying cry as a semi-

nal moment in Texas history, education was also a rallying cry of sorts atthe onset of TexasMexican War. Texas revolutionaries in 1836 declared

that the Mexican government had failed to establish any public system of

education, although possessed of almost boundless resources (Gammel cited

in Walker & Casey, 1996, pp. 12). The revolutionaries used this purported

lack of educational opportunity as one of the major themes for inciting revolt.

In this case, the revolutionaries adroitly argued against this lack of educa-

tional opportunity, stirred up anti-Mexican sentiment among Mexican land

grantees, and enlisted the assistance of the U.S. government in freeingTexas land from dictatorial control (Acua, 1988).

However, the Mexican Constitution of 1824 did address public education

and not unlike its counterpart to the north, left the responsibility of education

to the states. The Mexican state of Coahuila y Tejas (modern day Texas) made

provisions for education through land grants and municipal funds in 1827 and

1833; however, land grantees themselves failed to put a high value on educa-

tion. Instead, the newcomers settled the land, established economic ties, and

fought with Native American tribes for control of local lands (Acua, 1988).Individual communities and families determined local educational funding, a

method soon employed by the newly formed Republic of Texas (Walker &

Casey, 1996).

With both the Republic of Texas Constitution of 1836 and the Texas state

constitution of 1845, educational funding consisted of allotting counties land

for generating revenue or space to educate a countys children. The state also

dedicated its first state funds, albeit a very small amount, to be used by coun-

ties toward the establishment and maintenance of public schools. Walker and

Casey (1996) contended that public interest in establishing and administer-

ing public schools was virtually nonexistent. However, San Miguel (1987)

demonstrated how Mexican parents struggled to educate their children,

founding their own schools, enrolling in Catholic schools, or sending

them to Mexican schools to be educated. Whichever the case, it is clear that

wealthy landowners, the vast majority of whom were White males, controlled




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the political, educational, and economic structures at Texas inception

(Acua, 1988; Johnson, 2003; San Miguel, 1987; Spring, 1997). This elite

group of White men formed the states school finance system, laying the

groundwork for the modern debate on school finance equity and local con-

trol of property taxes.

Loss of Property, Institution of Segregation

After the TexasMexican War of 1836, Mexican and Mexican American

communities continued to comprise the majority of the population but held

little or no institutional power. Mexicans were stripped of their land, enabling

White cattle ranchers and farming interests to take control of the Texas eco-nomic and political system (Acua, 1988; Johnson, 2003; Montejano, 1987).

With the end of the MexicanAmerican War in 1848 and the signing of the

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexican inferiority was further institutional-

ized within the new states political, economic, and social structures (Alonzo,

1998; Menchaca, 1993; Montejano, 1987). Although Mexican negotiators

had debated for two articles that would have granted full citizenship rights to

Mexicans living in annexed territories as well as recognized Spanish and

Mexican land grants as valid, the articles were summarily rejected by theU.S. Congress (Montejano, 1987, p. 311). Menchaca (1993) demonstrates

that the treaty stipulated the rights of inhabitants of the ceded territories

(including Indians), set the U.S.-Mexico border, and brought several bina-

tional agreements on economic relations to closure, but that the American

legislators violated the treaty and refused to extend Mexicans full political

rights (p. 584).

With the assistance of the Texas Rangersknown by Mexican American

citizens as the diablos Tejanosthe Texan devils (Johnson, 2003, p. 12)because of their savagery and brutalitya powerful ruling class of White

elites secured its place in Texas society. Establishing authority over the now

displaced Mexican citizenry, Whites began assuming ownership of the land

quickly and solidified White domination in the newly formed state. Economic

transformation from a primarily ranching to a farming industry required a

steady stream of cheap labor. Because of the states proximity to the border

and the depressed nature of the northern Mexican economy, there was endless

demand for and supply of cheap labor. Yet as Montejano (1987) noted, White

power brokers struggled with, What was to be done with the Mexican?

(p. 177). He stated:

Growers argued that the feared social costs of Mexican immigration could beregulated, small farmers and workers, on the other had, predicted the undo-ing of America. The end result . . . Mexicans were to be kept in the fields




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and out of industry. The proper place for Mexicans in modern Texas was thatof farm laborers. (p. 179)

However, in the off-season when crops were not ready to be harvested,farmers and local citizens found it necessary to get Mexican American

children off the streets (p. 193). They attended separate schools lacking

adequate resources, housed in antiquated facilities and staffed by an untrained

faculty (Montejano, 1987; San Miguel, 1987; Spring, 1997; Wilson, 2003).

Compulsory laws were either enforced or ignored based on the seasonal

needs of farmers. Many White administrators justified their racism by citing

district financial distress. San Miguel (1987) noted, They [White adminis-

trators] argued that the increase of Mexican enrollment would financiallyburden the school budget (p. 52). It was not until the state instituted funding

formulas that generated state monies based on attendance that Mexican

American and other students of color, primarily African Americans, were

wanted in schools (Cardenas, 1997).

Policy Reform Through the Courts

From the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to 1949, the state of Texas schoolfinance did not change significantly. The first major reform since the annex-

ation of the statethe Gilmer-Aiken Act of 1949provided an infusion of

state funding and consolidated inefficient school districts, but it did not fun-

damentally alter the way Texas schools were funded (Walker & Casey, 1996).

In other words, districts continued to generate school operational and main-

tenance funds primarily through local property taxes. The state system was

unequalized and the varied property values across the state resulted in wide

disparities in local school funding. The negative impact on majority-Mexican

American schools was most egregious. Even after several governor-

appointed statewide commissions recommended a massive infusion of state

funds and a restructuring of the system to include a method for equalizing2

funding, the legislature failed to act. It took a group of parents and leading

civil rights groups to initiate change through the courts (Cardenas, 1997).

In 1969, a San Antonio-based parent group from one of the poorest

districts in the state filed suit against a wealthier local school district.3 In

the landmark San Antonio Independent School District vs. Rodriguez

(1971), a U.S. District Court declared the Texas school finance systemunconstitutional. The court held that the states method of relying heavily on

local property wealth discriminated against children living in poor school

districts (Cardenas, 1997; Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999; Hobby & Walker,

1991; Walker & Casey, 1996). As noted by Valencia (2002a), the case was

unique in that it is the first, and only, case of school finance equity to be




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adjudicated before the United States Supreme Court (pp. 1920). When

heard on appeal, the court overturned the lower court decision, referred the

case back to the state, and reiterated that education was not a fundamental

right protected under the U.S. constitution (Valencia, 2002b).

The threat of litigation notwithstanding, the Texas legislature failed to

address the evident school finance inequities in legislative session from 1973

to 1983. Rather, they dealt with the issue piecemeal, allocating inadequate

additional funds and refusing to restructure the school finance system.

Lobbying efforts and civil rights protests failed to budge the legislature.

Once again, litigation tactics were employed to force legislative action (Farr

& Trachtenberg, 1999; Hobby & Walker, 1991).

The state constitutional case that provided the impetus for shiftingfrom unequalized local enrichment to an equalized system of finance was

Edgewood ISD vs. Kirby (1989).4 Although the originalEdgewoodcase went

to trial in January 1987, the state constitutional cases were adjudicated mul-

tiple times, spanning 8 years before district, appellate, and the Texas Supreme

Court (Cardenas, 1997; Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999; Walker, 1988; Walker

& Moak, 1988). Edgewood ISD leadership, attorneys from the Mexican

American Legal and Educational Fund (MALDEF),5 and directors of the

newly formed Equity Center6 provided leadership on legal and political fronts(Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999).

However, MALDEF and Equity Center leadership utilized disparate legal

strategies. Districts represented by the Equity Center consisted of majority-

White, rural, and poor school districts, yet they did not agree with the argu-

ments presented by Edgewood ISD and MALDEF. As a result, the Equity

Center school districts joined the struggle against the state system as plaintiff-

intervenors, but provided an alternate argument to the court. The original

Edgewoodplaintiffs, along with other majority-Mexican American schooldistricts, advocated a race-based argument. Equity Center supporters pre-

ferred a wealth-based discrimination legal argument.

In Farr and Trachtenbergs (1999) interviews with Craig Foster, head of

the Equity Center, and Al Kauffman, lead attorney for MALDEF, reasons

for the abandonment of the equal protection argument were provided.

Citing political concerns, Foster found that if the struggle for school finance

reform were made into a Mexican-American issue (p. 643), no one in the

legislature would support them. More specifically, Foster stated:

The reason for [bringing in the plaintiff-intervenors, i.e. the Equity Centergroup] was that MALDEF was unwilling to give up the ethnic componenteven though David Long from California [attorney in Serrano v. Priest] andeverybody that had ever done a school-finance lawsuit said that you dontreally get anything out of that if you have an inequitable system . . . It is best




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to just go with inequity for everybody and not try to make it an ethnic orracial thing. (pp. 643644)

Kauffman, however, frustrated by the Supreme Courts reluctance toaccept an equal protection claim, planned on using the equal protection

argument as was used in federal voting rights cases. In his interview with

the authors, he concurred with Fosters warning about legislative resistance

to an equal protection claim yet was cognizant of the racial reality.

Kauffman stated, To this day, I still feel there was discrimination. . . . The

main reason this [type of system] was allowed to go on was discrimination

against Mexican-Americans (Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999 p. 643).

In June 1987 the district judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding thatthe states finance system was unconstitutional and inefficient, and that edu-

cation was a fundamental right protected by the state constitution. Farr and

Trachtenberg (1999) stated, The States only victory came at the expense of

Kauffmans race-based equal protection claim. On every other point, the

plaintiffs were victorious (p. 633). After the state appealed and won in appel-

late court, the Texas Supreme Court once again declared the Texas school

finance system unconstitutional. As had the lower court, the Texas Supreme

Court focused on the wealth-based efficiency provision and ordered theTexas Legislature to create a constitutional system by May 1990 (Hobby &

Walker, 1991; Walker, 1988; Yudof, 1991).

Five more years of litigation and legislative proposals ensued, finally

resulting in the adjudication of the lastEdgewoodcase in 1995. After more

than 25 years of grassroots struggle, political action, and litigation, advocates

were able to secure additional funding for their communities and students.

Gone were the days of a blatant and overtly racist system that provided vir-

tually no state assistance to districts in poor property value areas and permit-

ted wealthy property value districts to benefit unchecked. However, Texas

school finance policy evolved into a more subtle brand of institutional racism

and inequity. Whereas the early years of Texas schooling denied Mexican and

Mexican American students the opportunities to attend integrated and better-

funded schools, a new era of school finance inequity was mandated by Texas

educational statute. What follows is an analysis of the racialized effects that

three chapters of the TEC have on majority-Mexican American schools.

THE RACIALIZED POLICY EFFECTS

OF TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE

Even after intense political action and mandated court remedies brought

about substantial changes to the Texas school finance system, the state funding




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structure continued to utilize the property value of a local district as the pri-

mary factor in generating state fundsa variable that disproportionately dis-

advantaged poor, majority-Mexican school districts (Clark, 2001; Walker &

Casey, 1996). Provisions outlined in the Texas School Law Bulletin7 delin-

eate how funding formulas consider property value, student counts, and tax

effort in determining state aid. The most vulnerable districts maximized

local tax rates and awaited legislative appropriations to fund their academic

programs. As stated in TEC, 42.251 (b) (4), the legislature required that a

districts academic program be financed in an amount sufficient to finance

the cost of the districts basic academic program (Texas Education Agency,

2001). This provision, potentially most damaging to school districts over

reliant on state funding for operational expenses, forced property-poor,majority-Mexican American school districts to trust the historically reluctant

legislature to provide sufficient funding.

In this section of the article, I analyze three chapters of the TEC and inter-

rogate their racial effects on seven majority-Mexican American school dis-

tricts, most of which are among the poorest of the poor school districts

in Texas. These data are from a larger study of Mexican American school

district leadership and their political discourse of school finance equity.

Therefore, the seven majority-Mexican American districts analyzed in thisarticle were specifically chosen because they were led by the participants of

the larger study at the time of their participation. The superintendents and

districts were selected because of their majority-Mexican American student

enrollments, because they were among the poorest of the poor school dis-

tricts in the state, and because the superintendents were politically active in

the struggle for school finance equity.

The educational statute, specifically chapters 42, 41, and 46, provide the

broad structure for school district revenue generation, distribution, and statefunding (Texas Education Agency, 2001). Although statewide and regional

data provide an overview of the enormity of the Texas school finance system,

the majority of these analyses focus on how these three chapters affected the

seven participant school districts. Because the districts were also members of

the South Texas Association of Schools (STAS),8 some of the analyses were

conducted from a regional perspective that encompassed members of this

organization. Historical data up to the 20022003 school year gathered from

the Texas Education Agencys Public Education Information Management

System (PEIMS) were analyzed. To begin, I provide an illustration of statewide

and regional data before outlining district-level student enrollment and total

revenue data.

In 20022003, approximately 4.2 million schoolchildren attended

Texas public schools in which the majority were Latina/o.9 White students




15/35

comprised the next largest racial group and African Americans were the

third largest group of students. Total revenue generated for district opera-

tions, maintenance, and debt service was approximately $29.4 billion. The

majority of revenue for schoolsalmost 52%was generated at the local

level, whereas state appropriations provided the next largest portion

approximately 40%of local district budgets. Regionally, the 59 members

of the STAS served over 403,000 Texas schoolchildren or approximately

9.7% of the states student population. The STAS schools were over-

whelmingly Latina/o and economically disadvantaged, 91% and 79%,

respectively. Only 7.6% of STAS student populations were White and an

infinitesimal 0.99% were African American. Furthermore, Latina/o student

population in STAS districts accounted for one fifth or 21% of the statestotal Latina/o student population. Finally, the STAS member districts gen-

erated total revenue of $2.7 billion, representing approximately 10% of

total revenue statewide.

The seven participating school districts educated a combined 112,300

students, 73.6% of which were economically disadvantaged and 30.8% of

which were classified as Limited-English Proficient (LEP) in school year

20022003 (see Table 1). The student demographics were more pronounced

when factoring in the skewing effect that the Karankawa ISD10 had on thetotal percentage of Latina/o and economically disadvantaged. The only dis-

trict not located on the border, it consisted of a more diverse student popu-

lation and was the largest district in the study.

The seven districts generated $750.7 million in total revenue in

20022003, 76.9% of which was provided by state aid. Only 28.9% of all

funds were raised locally. This stark illustration of the fragility in which

most and specifically these STAS districts operate highlights the vital

nature of state appropriations for the funding of their schools.

A Continued Reliance on Property

Combined with historically limited state appropriations for equalized

funding, an examination of TEC Chapter 42 indicates how a reliance on

property value severely disadvantaged these seven STAS school districts.

As outlined in educational statute, districts account for total operating

costs from a combination of local taxes and state aid. TEC chapter 42 pro-

vides equalized funding for a basic academic program through Tier I

state aid formulas and for an enrichment program funded by Tier II state

aid formulas. Tier I state and local allotments are determined by a districts

property value and tax effort, meaning, for example, that higher property

wealth requires local funding to generate more funding than state resources




16/35

(Texas Education Agency, 2001). The inverse effect occurs for property-

poor school districts.

Tier II finance formulas generate funds beyond the cost of the regular

academic program in a similar manner to Tier I funding formulas. Althoughstudent enrollment and characteristics account for weighted adjustments to

funding levels, they are not the primary variables in determining revenue.

State aid, based on a guaranteed yield of a districts weighted average daily

attendance (WADA), property value and tax effort, is consistent with Tier I.

A districts property value plays a prominent role in state aid generation

(Walker & Casey, 1996).

Prior to investigating how the policys overreliance on property value is

more disadvantageous for those districts dependent on state funding for themajority of their operational and maintenance expenses, the following data

demonstrate majority-Mexican American school district property wealth.

Table 2 shows, by calculating the property wealth per average daily atten-

dance (ADA) for each of the states school districts, that 76% or 38 of the

50 poorest school districts were majority Latina/o, whereas 48% or 24 of the

50 poorest districts were at least 95% Latina/o. The data further amplify how

the seven participant districts, as well as all STAS member districts, fare under

the school finance system. Forty-two percent or 21of the 50 poorest school dis-

tricts were located in the Rio Grande Valley region and were STAS members.

Of the seven participant districts, four were among the states 50 poorest

(see Appendix A, Table A1 for a complete list of the 50 poorest districts).

Of the 50 wealthiest school districts, 76% of them were majority-White

and 35% of them were at least 75% White.11 Three majority-Mexican


TABLE 1

Student Demographic Data for Study Participants

% Limited% Economically English

District Students Disadvantaged % Latino Proficient % White

Algodn 2,102 82.7 95.1 12.1 4.9

Snowbird 10,934 91.1 98.7 51.3 1.1

Oso 25,186 90 98.6 37.4 1.2

Azcar 2,691 93.2 99.9 52.5 0.1

Cuatro 30,655 72.9 97 47 2.3

Nopalito 1,503 82.2 96.1 18.5 3.5

Karankawa 39,268 56.7 71.9 8.1 20.8

NOTE: Data for this table was compiled from the 20022003 Texas Education Agency PublicEducation Information Management System database.



17/35

American school districts were on the 50 wealthiest school district list; how-

ever, this resulted from their sparse populations, low student counts, and high

property values because of oil, gas, and mineral-rich land and/or portions of

oceanfront property not enjoyed by their predominantly-Mexican American

communities. Despite their apparent property wealth and majority Latina/o

student enrollment, their district leadership participated in STAS organiza-

tional and political efforts (see Appendix A, Table A2 for a detailed list of the50 wealthiest districts).12

The seven participants and a majority of the STAS school districts were

further disadvantaged by their overreliance on state funding as their primary

source of revenue. As shown in Table 3, for the 59 STAS member districts,

only 5.5% of their total revenue was provided by the federal government,

whereas 28.8% was generated at the local level. The majority of their total

funding, almost 64%, came from state appropriations. Analyzing the partic-

ipant districts, the reliance on state aid is even more striking.All generated the majority of their funding from state coffers. Cuatro

and Karankawa ISDs skewed the data because of their ability to raise a

higher percentage of total revenue from local sources despite their signifi-

cant numbers of economically disadvantaged and LEP students. Contrary

to other districts that generated the majority of their total revenue from state

resources, both are located in economically developing areas of southern

Texas with growing tax bases.

The district data on property wealth and their reliance on state funding indi-

cate the tenuous predicament in which the seven majority-Mexican American

school districts must operate. Prior to the Edgewood victories, tremendous

inequity existed between districts with high property value and those with low

property value. Under a so-called unequalized system of finance, districts

capable of taxing themselves minimally were able to raise more funds than

those taxing themselves to their limit. With theEdgewoodcourt victories and


TABLE 2

Fifty Poorest School Districts as Measured by

the Texas School Finance System

% Latina/o Number of Districts % of 50 Poorest Districts

50% or more 38 76

70% or more 35 70

77% or more 29 58

95% or more 24 48

NOTE: Data compiled from 20022003, Average Daily Attendance (ADA) and ComptrollerProperty Tax Division (CPTD) data, Texas Education Agency School Finance and FiscalAnalysis Division.



18/35

subsequent legislative enactments, additional state monies became available,

eradicating issues of blatant inequity (Cortez & Montecel, 2003).

Yet, a continued reliance on property value as a primary driver in state

funding formulas bore racialized effects. Whereas with TEC chapter 42,

property-poor districts would be equalized up to the $271,400 wealth perWADA threshold, TEC, 42.001 (a), would codify inequity (Texas Education

Agency, 2001). It states the following:

It is the policy of this state that the provision of public education is a stateresponsibility and that a thorough and efficient system be provided and sub-stantially financed through state revenue sources so that each student enrolledin the public school system shall have access to programs and services thatare appropriate to the students educational needs and that are substantially

equal [emphasis added] to those available to any similar student, notwith-standing varying local economic factors.

The substantially equal level for property-poor school districts was set

by the legislature. In 20022003, the equalized amount was set at $271,400

per WADA. As is shown in the next section, although TEC chapter 41 forced

property-wealthy school districts to share their wealth, it allowed them to

operate with more funding than property-poor school districts. The substan-

tially equal provision of the TEC amounts to legalized inequity (Texas

Education Agency, 2001).

The Robin Hood Provisions

The main feature of the Texas school finance system is the recapture

provisions in TEC chapter 41. These provisions require property-wealthy


TABLE 3

Participant District Total Revenue, 20022003

IndependentSchool District % Federal % Local % Other % State

Algodn 7.3 11.8 2.3 78.6

Azcar 9.7 10.7 0.5 79.1

Cuatro 5.5 34.7 2.3 57.5

Karankawa 4.1 41.7 3 51.2

Nopalito 6 14.9 2.2 76.9

Oso 6.7 16.1 1.2 76.1

Snowbird 5.8 10.4 1 82.8

NOTE: Data was compiled from 20022003, Texas Education Agency Public EducationInformation Management System database.



19/35

school districtsthose with a property value per WADA that exceeds

$305,000to share their wealth with the state or with other school districts

(Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999).13 According to 20022003 school year data,

only 105 school districts, or 10.13% of districts, were required to share their

wealth. Twenty-seven school districts were considered gap schools, mean-ing they did not generate Tier II funds nor were their local funds recaptured.

Because they generated between the guaranteed level of $271,400 wealth per

WADA and the recaptured wealth level of $305,000, the districts remained

unaffected by either TEC chapters 41 or 42. Districts capable of generat-

ing above $271,400 wealth per WADA were legally able to have more fund-

ing per student. The recapture provisions hardly instituted an equitable

system as professed by many in the school finance debate; rather, the TEC

Chapter 41 legitimized and codified state-sanctioned inequity (TexasEducation Agency, 2001).

The 105 recapture districts provided $962.1 million to the state and

property-poor school districts in school year 20022003. The majority of

these costs were borne by only seven districts. These seven districts com-

bined for 52.4%, or approximately $504 million of the total recapture cost

(see Table 4). Students attending these seven districts totaled 214,000 or

5.1% of the student count for the entire state.

Twenty school districts accounted for 75.4% of the total recaptured costsand educated only 7% of the statewide student population. White students

were most affected by the recapture provisions. Of the total student popula-

tion attending recaptured schools, 55% were White, 28% Mexican American

and 11% African American.


TABLE 4

Districts With the Majority of the 20022003 Recapture Cost

Independent School Cumulative % of Rank District Recapture Cost Total Recapture Cumulative Total

1 Austin $139,238,091 14.47 $139,238,091

2 Plano $117,983,118 26.74 $257,221,209

3 Highland Park $57,788,110 32.74 $315,009,319

4 Carrollton-Farmers Branch $52,590,091 38.21 $367,599,410

5 Eanes $51,121,251 43.52 $418,720,661

6 Richardson $48,389,624 48.55 $467,110,285

7 Deer Park $36,862,339 52.38 $503,972,624

NOTE: 20022003 Chapter 41 district and cost data was collected from the Texas EducationAgency School Finance and Fiscal Analysis Division.



20/35

The substantially equal language in TEC chapter 42, along with chapter

41 Robin Hood provisions advantaged wealthy, majority-White school dis-

tricts, in that they were legally entitled to more funding per student than poorer,

majority-Mexican American school districts. Of the participant districts, six of

the seven generated less funding per student than did the seven recaptured dis-

tricts reviewed earlier. Austin and Nopalito ISDs were the lone anomalies

because of their high concentration of low socioeconomic-status students(Texas Education Agency, 2001; see Table 5).

Of these 14 districts, chapter 41 districts generated an average of $859

more per student in state and local funding than did participant school dis-

tricts. The largest discrepancy was exhibited by Cuatro ISD, which has

$2,500 less per student in local and state funding than did Eanes ISD. If

Cuatro ISD were provided with the $2,500 difference in funding per student

for each of its 30,600 students, the district would have generated an addi-

tional $78.5 million for its budget. The additional funding generated forKarankawa, Azcar, Oso, Snowbird, and Algodn ISDs would have been

$83.5 million, $2.3 million, $48.4 million, $18.4 million, and $2.7 million,

respectively. The total additional funding for the seven participant districts

would have amounted to $234.2 million in 20022003.


TABLE 5

Comparison of Funding per Student in Seven Wealthiest Participant Districts

Independent School District Total State/Local per Student Total Funding per Student

Eanes $8,298 $8,984

Nopalito $7,929 $8,637

Carrollton-Farmers Branch $7,538 $8,114

Plano $7,379 $7,981

Highland Park $7,250 $7,792

Richardson $7,073 $7,544

Deer Park $7,026 $7,473

Algodn $6,997 $7,738

Austin $6,697 $7,147Snowbird $6,609 $7,093

Oso $6,379 $6,922

Azcar $6,232 $6,940

Karankawa $6,159 $6,631

Cuatro $5,730 $6,212

NOTE: Data was compiled from 20022003 Texas Education Agency Public EducationInformation Management System database. The bolded districts are those that had superin-tendents that participated in this study. Total State/Local is state aid, whereas Total Fundingincludes state and federal funding.



21/35

TEC chapter 41 has traditionally contained the school finance systems

most controversial provisions. The media and public have named it Robin

Hood because of the perception that the state requires districts to give back

their money, a form of stealing from the rich and giving to the poor (Texas

Education Agency, 2001). Many Texans falsely believe that property-poor

school districts generate more total revenue than do the property-wealthy

school districts. As demonstrated by these data, Robin Hood has not stolen

as much money from the rich as is publicly perceived.

Utilizing Debt to Re-Enforce Inequity

The original Edgewood plaintiffs presented evidence of disparate expen-ditures in school facilities funding. By the January 1995Edgewood IVdeci-

sion, the Supreme Court admonished the state to consider additional or

equalized state funding for facilities. As a result, the state legislature finally

appropriated funding for a limited facilities grant program in 1995. It was

the precursor to the better-funded and more-inclusive Instructional Facilities

Allotment (IFA)14 program that was instituted in September 1997 (Clark,

2001; Farr & Trachtenberg, 1999; Walker & Casey, 1996). Two years later,

the Existing Debt Allotment (EDA)15 program was created to assist schooldistricts with eligible existing general obligation debt (Clark, 2001).

Both the IFA and EDA programs, often referred to as Tier III, coexisted

since 1999, yet they served different types of districts. Districts in need of

state funding for facilities construction projects were once again at the mercy

of the biennial appropriation process as was the case with Tier II funding. If

Tier III was unavailable or insufficient to meet the demands of rising school

enrollment or deteriorating existing facilities, property-poor districts were not

able to initiate construction projects. Majority-Mexican American school dis-tricts were subsequently at a disadvantage to attain facilities funding.

Many school districts typically issue bonds or borrow money to pay for

major facilities construction or renovation projects, which is why the state

created and implemented the IFA program as a method of assisting districts

in their repayment of school construction bonds. As stipulated in TEC,

46.003 (a), the IFA program provides funding for districts to repay bonds

used to construct, acquire, renovate, or improve an instructional facility

(Texas Education Agency, 2001). The IFA program distributed state funding

based on property wealththe wealthier a district, the less state funding it

received and more local funds it was required to raise. The inverse was

required for poorer school districts. The EDA program assisted districts sim-

ilarly; however, the funding eligibility criteria were set by the definition




22/35

of eligible debt. In 20022003, eligible EDA debt was defined in TEC,

46.033 (1) as tax-supported debt that [t]he district made payments on the

bonds during the 20002001 school year or taxes levied to pay the principalof and interest on the bonds were included in the districts audited debt

service tax collections for that school year (Texas Education Agency, 2001).

This cutoff date of 20002001 forced districts to issue their debt prior to

and without the assurance that the state would assist in the repayment of it.

Higher-wealth districts were typically able to take the calculated risk that the

state would appropriate EDA funding to meet their obligations. Property-

poor districts delayed construction projects or maintained their deteriorating

facilities, choosing to wait for IFA funding opportunities rather than risk issu-ing debt without the states assurance of assistance.

The STAS member districts exhibited this phenomenon in that they were

more likely to benefit from the IFA program than the EDA program. In

20022003, STAS member districts generated a total of $115.9 million in

facilities funding, accounting for approximately 26% of the total IFA funding

and only 9% of the total EDA funding. Since 19992000, the first year of EDA

funding, the STAS districts garnered no more than 10% of the total EDA

funding. They benefited more from the IFA program, and in 20002001,

reached their highest percentage at almost 28% (see Table 6).

District-level facilities funding analysis of the seven participating dis-

tricts demonstrates how they typically did not benefit from the EDA, or

relied more significantly on IFA awards for facilities funding. For example,


TABLE 6

Comparison of Instructional Facilities Allotment (IFA) and

Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) Funding for 59 South Texas Association

of Schools Districts from 19971998 to 20022003

Year IFA Total % Total IFA EDA Total % Total EDA

20022003 $74,111,275 25.62% $41,792,385 9.24

20012002 $68,371,821 27.02% $46,416,447 8.61

20002001 $60,530,175 27.70% $44,081,235 9.18

19992000 $35,069,647 20.01% $44,851,335 10.09

19981999 $22,640,360 19.01%

19971998 $7,973,722 12.36%

NOTE: Data compiled is from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) School Finance and FiscalAnalysis Division as well as the TEA IFA Web site, www.tea.state.tx.us/school.finance/facilities/ifa.html. The data includes all state aid data since the inception of both the IFA in 19971998and the Existing Debt Allotment in 19992000.



23/35

three of the seven districts did not generate any EDA funds in 20022003

(see Table 7). Because they did not issue eligible bonds or were already

benefiting from the IFA program for the bonds they did have, the districtswere not able to capitalize on the states funding of EDA. Karankawa and

Cuatro ISDs both earned substantial EDA monies, skewing the average per-

centage of the group of districts. Their generally higher wealth per ADA

status combined with the fact they exist in fast-growth, relatively econom-

ically stable communities helped to qualify them for this funding. Azcar,

Nopalito, and Snowbird ISDs were excluded from the EDA program

because of the stipulation that they issue debt prior to receiving assurance

from the state of assistance. Algodn and Oso ISDs received minimalEDA funding.

In the debt servicing or repayment process, property-wealthy school dis-

tricts are not forced to share their interest and sinking (I & S) fund tax col-

lections as is required in the maintenance and operations (M & O) or Tier II

funding formulas.16 As was stated in the previous subsection, Chapter 42

provisions equalize up to a $271,400 wealth per WADA formula, whereas

chapter 41 provisions require districts with property value per WADA in

excess of $305,000 to select one or more of the five options to bring the dis-

trict down to an equalized level as required by the state. This equalizes tax

collections generated from the districts M & O tax rate. However, TEC

chapter 46, subchapters A and B do not require that the districts I & S fund

tax collections be equalized (Clark, 2001). Therefore, property-wealthy

districts are able to issue as much debt and build as many facilities as their


TABLE 7

Comparison of Instructional Facilities Allotment (IFA)

and Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) Funding

for Participant Districts, 20022003

Independent School District IFA 2003 % EDA 2003 %

Algodn 62.04 37.96

Azcar 100.00

Cuatro 24.94 75.06

Karankawa 24.22 75.78

Nopalito 100.00

Oso 80.11 19.89

Snowbird 100.00Average % 54.88 45.12

NOTE: Data compiled is from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) School Finance andFiscal Analysis Division as well as the TEA IFA Web site, www.tea.state.tx.us/school.finance/facilities/ifa.html.



24/35

communities are willing to build, and property-poor school district must rely

on legislative appropriation for facilities funding.

Finally, state appropriations for new IFA funding must be approved everybiennium as does a change in criteria for eligible existing debt. EDA fund-

ing is permanently fixed in the state funding formulas, but IFA funding is

not. Districts must compete for scarce funding every funding cycle. In the

first six cycles of IFA funding, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) has run

out of money every year but the first two (see Table 8).17 The bulk of facili-

ties funding has been appropriated in the EDA program. For example, since

the programs existence the state legislature has appropriated more funding

for districts qualifying for EDA funding ($1.9 billion in 4 years) rather thanin the IFA program ($1.9 billion in 6 years).

In the 4 years that the programs have coexisted, the IFA has never had a

higher funding-per-district level than districts in the EDA. The largest dis-

parity occurred in 20012002 when districts awarded in the EDA program

earned $262,251 more per district than if they were awarded in the IFA. The

states two allotment programs are designed to assist school districts with

repayment of district-approved debt; however, those issuing debt without the

assurance of state assistance are more likely to generate more funding from

the state. Districts not able to afford debt repayment solely on local tax col-

lections remain disadvantaged. The states facilities programs reinstitute

inequity because wealthy school districts generate more funding and have

ability to collect I & S tax collections without the requirement of recapture.

This affects majority-Mexican school districts disproportionately.


TABLE 8

Comparison of Per District Funding for Instructional Facilities Allotment (IFA)

and Existing Debt Allotment (EDA) since 19971998

Number Per Number Per

IFA Total of District EDA Total of District

School Year Funding Districts Funding Funding Districts Funding

20022003 $289.20 400 $723,040 $452.1 532 $849,745

20012002 $253.00 370 $683,841 $539.3 570 $946,092

20002001 $218.50 308 $709,548 $480.0 570 $842,071

19992000 $175.39 264 $664,028 $444.7 623 $713,731

19981999 $119.10 220 $541,266

19971998 $64.570 115 $561,120

NOTE: Data compiled is from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) School Finance and FiscalAnalysis Division as well as the TEA IFA Web site, www.tea.state.tx.us/school.finance/facilities/ifa.html. The totals in the IFA Total Funding and Existing Debt Allotment Total Funding arein millions.



25/35

DISCUSSION

By situating this policy analysis in a CRT framework and understanding

the history of Texas school finance from a LatCrit perspective, structural and

institutional racism are evident. A system based historically on property

rights, Texas school finance policy continues to disadvantage, discriminate,

and oppress communities and students of color in much the same way that

Menchaca (1993), Montejano (1987), and San Miguel and Valencia (1998)

found that the invalidation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo aided racist

institutional and social practices. Although substantial progress was made in

rectifying a more overt system of inequity (via the Edgewood state court

cases), property-poor, majority-Mexican American school districts continueto endure a racist school finance system. The neutral language of substan-

tially equal only seeks to mask codified inequity. As shown in these analy-

ses, property-wealthy school districts generate more funding, and facilities

programs continue to advantage wealthier school districts.

Chicana/o and Latina/o scholars have, for many years, studied the plight of

Chicana/o and Latina/o students and communities (see, i.e., Acua, 1988;

Darder, Torres, & Gutirrez, 1997; Delgado Bernal, Elenes, Godinez, &

Villenas, 2006; Elenes, Gonzales, Delgado Bernal, & Villenas, 2001; Pizarro,1998; Solrzano, 1998; Valencia, 2002b; Valenzuela, 1999; Vigil, 1999;

Villalpando, 2003). However, promoting CRT and LatCrit understandings of

educational policy are essential if a new form of educational leadership and

study of educational politics and policy within the educational administration

field of study are to take root. This approach argues that educational policy

analysis should attempt to explain and describe policy effects in a similar

methodological manner. More specifically, applying CRT and LatCrit tenets to

policy analysis would provide an alternative to traditional methods of evaluat-ing policy in unbiased, scientific, or objective ways (Boyd, Crowson, &

Geel, 1994; Cibulka, 1994; Fowler, 2004; Guthrie & Rothstein, 2001), as has

often been the case in this field.

The analysis of Texas school finance policy in this article is one example

how CRT and LatCrit may be applied. Texas school finance policy was chal-

lenged and problematized as the hallmark civil rights achievement in attempt-

ing to achieve equity for the states public school children. Despite the fact

that many continue to hail theEdgewoodstate court cases and other legisla-

tive reforms as moving toward equity, CRT provides a sound framework

from which to question its ability to accomplish this. Given that property is

disadvantaging in nature (Harris, 1993) and that funding has historically been

based on property value, CRT provides an ample critical framework that asks

the viability of this occurring (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1997). Scholars, such




26/35

as Bell (1992a, 1992b, 2004) and Delgado (2002, 2006) have also provided

analytical concepts capable of evaluating the racist nature of reform. Their

interest convergence principle maintains that reform will not occur unless

Whites are benefited. Having the ability to understand racial realism

grounds this research on the pervasiveness of racism in this country while

stressing that policies have maintained inequity and racial hierarchy.

The discussion of school finance history exemplified the utilization of

LatCrit as a method for providing alternative explanations of inequity and dis-

crimination. Scholars, such as Padilla (1999, 2001), have called for Latina/os to

consider the way by which dominant practices and policies infect the other.

She describes how Latina/o communities have been mislead by members of

their own community, overtaken by a colonized mind. Because this canaffect social critique while perpetuating self-hate, it is critical that Latina/

o-centered understandings of history be made central to combating the often

crippling nature of self-hate and self-doubt in Latina/o communities. Finally,

LatCrit inserts an analysis of majority-Mexican American school districts in a

state that is now majority Mexican American. As the nation moves toward hav-

ing majority Latina/o minority populations, problematizing the Black-White

binary that has often overshadowed conversations of racism and other com-

munities of color will result in more productive analysis and coalition-building efforts across communities of color (Stefancic, 1998).

CONCLUSION

Like the Leslie Stahl story, educational policy is commonly examined

from a traditional perspective, ignoring racism and calling for a rational view

of the facts (Boyd, Crowson, & Geel, 1994; Cibulka, 1994; Fowler, 2004).Similar to many educational leaders and policy makers, Stahl neglected what

Lpez (2003) has described as the story behind the story. This story behind

the Texas school finance story deviates from convention and refutes tradi-

tional analysis. It employs a CRT framework to center race and racism and

provides a LatCrit view of the history of domination and loss of land in

Texas formative years and in its codification in current policy. Above all, this

critical race policy analysis interrogates the racial effects of educational pol-

icy (Brady, Eatman, & Parker, 2000; Parker, 2003) and questions how sub-

stantially equal equity perpetuates racism.

It is a utilization of CRT policy analysis of school finance policy, as well

as other educational policies, that will begin to foster change in areas such as

student achievement and university access and success. This article makes an

argument for understanding race and racism from a systemic and institutional




27/35

level. Like other work in educational research (Anyon, 1997; Kozol, 1991),

it serves to emphasize the linkages between race, social class, and inequity

while also providing a critical framework from which to conduct social jus-

tice analysis in school finance (Alemn, 2007; Brady, Eatman, & Parker,

2000; Rodriguez & Rolle, 2007). A need to discuss, research, advocate, teach,

and lead from alternative perspectives is necessary if social justice goals are

ever to be attained. This article calls for such action, exemplifying the need

to deconstruct and contend with the policy assumptions and traditional

American values that dominate the majoritarian view of the world

demanding that language like substantially equal be turned on its head.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A1

Fifty Poorest School Districts as Measured by the Texas School Finance System

Wealth per Independent

Rank ADA School District % White % Black % Hispanic

1 $15,353 Boles 88.3 1.4 5.92 $17,628 South Texas 18.6 0.5 75.1

3 $22,977 San Elizario 0.8 0.3 98.9

4 $27,471 Edcouch-Elsa 0.5 0.1 99.3

5 $27,738 Progreso 0.2 99.8

6 $33,347 Tornillo 0.9 0.7 98.4

7 $36,664 Santa Rosa 2.5 0.1 97.4

8 $36,868 Mercedes 1 0.3 98.8

9 $36,930 Santa Maria 99.6

10 $39,112 Fabens 2.1 0.1 97.6

11 $40,958 McLeod 94.5 3.2 1.512 $44,637 Edgewood 1.2 1.6 97

13 $47,187 Donna 1.2 0.1 98.6

14 $47,834 Presidio 1.7 0.1 98.2

15 $49,420 Robstown 1.4 0.6 97.8

16 $50,841 Somerset 19.8 0.8 79

17 $51,103 Rio Hondo 4.6 95.4

18 $52,777 Clint 4.5 0.5 94.8

19 $53,752 San Benito Cons 2.5 0.1 97.4

20 $54,054 Southwest 11.4 4.2 83.9

21 $55,284 Orange Grove 41.5 0.7 57.622 $55,928 Valley View 0.1 99.8

23 $56,711 Poteet 16.3 0.4 83

24 $57,594 Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco 7.7 0.2 92.1




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25 $57,729 Crystal City 1.3 0.7 98

26 $57,836 Southside 16.7 1.5 80.6

27 $57,850 Harlandale 5.2 0.6 94.1

28 $58,513 Ector 98.3 1.329 $59,470 La Feria 10 0.2 89.8

30 $60,164 Olfen 41.7 3.6 54.8

31 $61,085 Rio Grande City CISD 0.2 99.7

32 $62,302 Mission Cons 2.5 0.1 97.4

33 $62,615 Axtell 87.5 4.9 7.1

34 $62,783 Martinsville 83.9 5.4 10.8

35 $64,027 Laredo 0.8 0.1 99.1

36 $64,167 Rice 72.1 6.5 21.4

37 $64,495 Splendora 88.5 0.5 10.5

38 $64,945 Roma 0.2 99.339 $65,742 Natalia 24.5 1 74.2

40 $66,808 Grape Creek 75.2 0.7 23.9

41 $67,582 Weslaco 2.5 0.1 97.1

42 $67,605 Hubbard 71.1 23.9 4.2

43 $68,069 La Pryor 5.2 0.5 94.3

44 $68,366 Eagle Pass 1.3 0.1 97.1

45 $68,439 Maud 92.3 7.1 0.2

46 $68,567 Hawley 93.7 0.5 5.1

47 $69,242 Central Heights 86.8 7.4 5.5

48 $69,521 Pharr-San Juan-Alamo 1.3 0.2 98.449 $69,682 La Villa 0.3 99.7

50 $69,720 South San Antonio 3 1.7 94.9

NOTE: Data is 20022003 school year data compiled from the Texas Education Agency, SchoolFinance and Fiscal Analysis Division. The bolded rows indicate those districts that are located inRegion One and Region Two and are members of the South Texas Association of Schools.

TABLE A2Fifty Wealthiest School Districts as Measured by the Texas School Finance System

Independent

Rank Wealth per ADA School District %White %Black %Hispanic

988 $913,766 Tatum 56.6 23.9 19.3

989 $917,094 Sterling City 59.6 40.4

990 $947,398 Divide 60 40

991 $958,621 Austwell-Tivoli 29.5 0.6 69.9

992 $978,938 Whiteface Cons 69.5 1.4 27.6993 $997,779 Hunt 73.2 26.3

994 $1,003,294 Plains 45.2 0.2 54.6

995 $1,009,670 Round Top-Carmine 83 8.9 6.9


(continued)



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996 $1,021,516 Beckville 75.1 14 9.4

997 $1,023,935 Matagorda 73.4 5.1 21.5

998 $1,034,170 McCamey 38 0.8 60.6

999 $1,052,076 Highland Park 96.8 0.2 1.2

1000 $1,068,477 Pringle-Morse Cons 52.8 47.2

1001 $1,090,319 Denver City 36.4 1.5 61.5

1002 $1,104,849 Crane 42.4 2.1 54.7

1003 $1,110,687 Dawson 66.1 33.9

1004 $1,119,253 San Isidro 4.1 95.91005 $1,123,704 Port Aransas 89.3 0.9 7.6

1006 $1,140,259 Seminole 55.9 2.2 41.5

1007 $1,165,711 Sudan 49.1 5.8 44.5

1008 $1,214,866 Westbrook 73.3 3.3 22

1009 $1,244,904 Evadale 99.2 0.2 0.6

1010 $1,290,402 Buena Vista 64 36

1011 $1,297,437 Loop 51.7 48.3

1012 $1,308,947 Wink-Loving 72 1.2 26.5

1013 $1,340,463 Sundown 50.6 1.3 47.6

1014 $1,365,459 Rankin 57.8 3 38.91015 $1,374,729 Glen Rose 76.9 0.4 20.9

1016 $1,412,604 Plemons-Stinnett-Phillips CISD 86.4 0.3 11

1017 $1,485,647 Glasscock County 61.9 38.1

1018 $1,515,351 Crockett County Cons CSD 33.4 0.2 66.2

1019 $1,521,917 Ezzell 97.1 2.9

1020 $1,592,147 Iraan-Sheffield 52.2 2.9 44.5

1021 $1,617,679 Terrell County 36.3 0 60.2

1022 $1,637,105 Boys Ranch 78.4 6.7 12.6

1023 $1,734,658 McMullen County 50 50

1024 $1,788,924 Palo Pinto 87 131025 $1,909,508 Borden County 73.3 24.2

1026 $2,018,144 Webb Cons 5.1 94.9

1027 $2,096,541 Grandview-Hopkins 100 0

1028 $2,105,072 Guthrie Csd 83.5 16.5

1029 $2,112,646 Darrouzett 83.1 16.9

1030 $2,168,276 Miami 93.6 5.1

1031 $2,215,169 Fort Elliott Cons 92.8 1.8

1032 $2,930,389 Kenedy County Wide CSD 28.2 71.8

1033 $3,023,232 Jayton-Girard 88.4 2.1 9.6

1034 $3,103,150 Sabine Pass 89.3 4 41035 $4,307,619 Allison 100 0

1036 $4,630,192 Kelton 64.7 5.9 29.4

1037 $5,046,781 Dew 82.5 1.3 13.8

NOTE: Data is 20022003 school year data compiled from the Texas Education Agency, SchoolFinance and Fiscal Analysis Division. The bolded rows indicate those districts that are located inRegion One and Region Two and are members of the South Texas Association of Schools.


Table A2 (continued)

Independent

Rank Wealth per ADA School District %White %Black %Hispanic



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NOTES

1. What Stahl also failed to mention were recent data indicating that top 10% students have

higher undergraduate GPAs than those non-top 10% admitted students. For the latest University

of Texas report see http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-Report7.pdf.

2. Prior to theEdgewoodcourt cases, the state had virtually operated under an unequal-

ized system of finance in which a property-wealthy school districts could tax low and continue

to generate substantial local funds. In contrast, property-poor school districts would tax their

local community very high and yield low local funds. The resulting equalized system of

finance guaranteed districts a substantially equal amount of funding for their tax effort. The

concept of substantially equal will be explored further in a subsequent section of the article.

3. The parents resided in Edgewood Independent School District (ISD), one of the poor-

est school districts in the state of Texas. Located on the west side of San Antonio, parents and

community activists from the districts spurred the initialRodriguez vs. San Antonio ISD (1971)

federal case in the late 1960s. When the federal case was dismissed, a state strategy to contest

inequitable funding was led by the same group of parents, activists, and attorneys. The state

constitutional challenges are known as the Edgewoodcases. Prior to the onset of arguments,

the plaintiffs (Mexican American parents and advocates) shifted their legal strategy, choosing

to sue the state rather than the local school district.

4.Edgewood Independent School District et al. vs. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (1989) was the

first of four iterations of state constitutional challenges. This historical background primarily

focuses on the first of theEdgewoodcases.

5. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund is a leading civil rights,advocacy, and litigation nonprofit agency serving the Latina/o communities. The organization

was founded in San Antonio in 1968. During theEdgewoodcases, they represented the majority-

Mexican American school districts.

6. The Equity Center is a nonprofit organization formed as the technical analysis arm of

the plaintiffs case, lobbied legislators and organized rural, poor school districts.

7. For purposes of the larger study and the analysis in this article, most data and all

statutes analyzed come from the 20022003 school year.

8. The South Texas Association of Schools consists of 59 school districts, mostly from

the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, the southernmost region of the state. As is the region, the dis-

tricts are among the poorest and consist of majority-Mexican American student enrollments.9. I use Latina/o interchangeably with Mexican American and Hispanic. Although most

of the students in the seven participating districts are Mexican or Mexican American, there are

some students from other Latin American nations. The state data does not categorize Latina/os

into subgroups. The state categorizes its students under the identifier Hispanic.

10. District names are pseudonyms.

11. Boles ISD is ranked the poorest school district in the state of Texas for the 20022003

school year. Although the district is majority-White, when evaluating the list of poor school

districts it is plainly evident that the majority of poor school districts, and those disadvantaged

by the state system of funding, are majority-Mexican American.

12. The ranking of the 1,037 Texas public school districts by wealth was calculated bydividing the districts assessed property value by its average daily attendance (ADA). Both

appendices list the 50 poorest school districts (ranked from 1 to 50) and 50 wealthiest school

districts (ranked from 988 to 1,037). Percentages of students may not add to 100 because only

the three largest student groups were included in the table.

13. See Texas School Law Bulletin, TEC, 41.003, which documents the options for sharing

wealth that exceeds the $305,000 per weighted average daily attendance (WADA). The five




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options include consolidation with another district, detachment of ADA credits, purchase of

ADA credits, education of nonresident students, and tax base consolidation with another district.

14. See Texas School Law Bulletin, TEC, chapters 46, subchapter A, Instructional Facilities

Allotment, as well as Texas Administrative Code (TAC), 61.1032, Commissioners Rules onInstructional Facilities Allotment.

15. See Texas School Law Bulletin, TEC, chapter 46, subchapter B, Existing Debt

Allotment, as well as Texas Administrative Code (TAC), 61.1035, Commissioners Rules on

Assistance with Payment of Existing Debt.

16. Interest and sinking (I & S) tax rate is used by school districts to tax for the specific

purpose of raising funds for general obligation or voter-approved bonds. A district is typically

able to tax up to a $.50 I & S tax rate. The maintenance and operations (M & O) tax rate is

assessed for the specific purpose of maintaining the operations of a school district. A district

is typically able to tax up to $1.50 M & O tax rate.

17. Information and data gathered from Texas Education Agency, Division of School Financeand Fiscal Analysis staff.

REFERENCES

Acua, R. (1988). Occupied America: A history of Chicanos (3rd ed.). New York: Harper

Collins.

Alemn, E. (2007). Critical race theory and human capital theory: Framing the discourse on

the nexus between social justice and education finance. In G. M. Rodriguez & R. A. Rolle(Eds.), To what ends and by what means: The social justice implications of contemporary

school finance theory and policy (pp. 35-57). New York: Routledge.

Allsup, C. (1982). The American G.I. forum: Origins and evolution. Austin, TX: The University

of Texas at Austin.

Alonzo, A. C. (1998). Tejano legacy: Rancheros and settlers in south Texas, 1734-1900.

Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.

Anyon, J. (1997). Ghetto schooling: A political economy of urban educational reform. New

York: Teachers College Press.

Bell, D. A. (1992a). Faces at the bottom of the well. New York: Basic Books.

Bell, D. A. (1992b). Racial realism. Connecticut Law Review, 24(2), 363-379.Bell, D. A. (2004). Silent covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the unfulfilled hopes

for racial reform. Oxford: O

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