CRITICAL D ISCUSSI ON

Critical Discussion: Virtue Epistemology and ExtendedCognition: A Reply to Kelp and Greco

Krist Vaesen

Received: 16 August 2011 / Accepted: 21 August 2012 / Published online: 8 September 2012

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract Elsewhere, I have challenged virtue epistemology and argued that it

doesn’t square with mundane cases of extended cognition. Kelp (forthcoming, this

journal) and Greco (forthcoming) have responded to my charges, the former by

questioning the force of my argument, the latter by developing a new virtue epis-

temology. Here I consider both responses. I show first that Kelp mischaracterizes

my challenge. Subsequently, I identify two new problems for Greco’s new virtue

epistemology.

1 Introduction

The main intuition driving many dominant virtue theories of knowledge is the idea

that knowledge necessarily involves the exercise of cognitive ability. Knowledge is

believing the truth not because of some form of epistemic luck (as in Gettier cases),

but because of the correct application of one’s cognitive abilities. This sort of view

is famously espoused by, among others, Greco (2007),1 Riggs (2007),2 and Sosa

(2007).3

Elsewhere, I have challenged the virtue-theoretic idea that cognitive ability is a

necessary condition for knowledge, by presenting a scenario in which knowledge

K. Vaesen (&)

Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven,

The Netherlands

e-mail: k.vaesen@tue.nl

URL: http://home.ieis.tue.nl/kvaesen/

1 Greco [p. 57]: ‘‘[…] knowledge attributions can be understood as credit attributions: when we say that

someone knows something, we credit them for getting it right.’’2 Riggs [p. 329]: ’’[…] knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing.’’3 Sosa [p. 92]: ‘‘[b]elief amounts to knowledge when apt: that is to say, when its correctness is

attributable to a competence exercised in appropriate conditions.’’

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Erkenn (2013) 78:963–970

DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9397-0

and cognitive ability dissociate. The scenario concerned a subject S who, according

to intuition, knows that p, even though her believing the truth (rather than a

falsehood) is not attributable to herself; rather, she believes truly in virtue of a

feature of her extended cognitive environment. The scenario reads as follows:

SISSICASE: Sissi is a baggage inspector at the local airport. The baggage

scanners at the airport have recently been equipped with a false positive

engine; the machine periodically superimposes images of illegal objects onto

the images actually produced by the scanner. The false positive engine was

installed because research has shown that it keeps baggage inspectors

dramatically more alert. Upon viewing a suspicious image, operators can

click on the image to find out whether it is a false positive or not. Her

supervisor Joseph, a cognitive engineer who was actually involved in the

design of the device, has informed Sissi how the machine works. Currently

Sissi is inspecting a piece of luggage which contains a bomb. Thanks to the

new device her vigilance is at peak level, so that she notices the bomb on-

screen. When she clicks on the image, she finds out she isn’t looking at a

false positive, and thus forms a true belief regarding the contents of the

suitcase. As such, the bomb is intercepted and a catastrophe prevented from

happening.

I argued that even such an uncontroversial instance of extended cognition as

SISSICASE—where human cognition is just taken to be strongly dependent on

external resources—poses a problem for the virtue epistemologist.4 The reason for

this is that Sissi deserves the title of knowledge, even though her cognitive success

is attributable to the technology (or to the person installing it), rather than to herself.

After all, without the false positive engine, Sissi would have been inattentive and

would have formed a false belief.5

Evidently, Sissi’s cognitive faculties play some role in her cognitive success. But

the same holds for Gettier cases. Think of Chisholm’s dog-looking-like-a-sheep

scenario. If Roddy forms the belief that there is a sheep in the field and his belief is

true, not because what he sees is a sheep (it’s in fact a dog), but because a sheep,

4 Whether such a weak account still qualifies as ‘‘extended cognition’’ is up for debate. Adams (2012)

thinks that it is a weak account of extended cognition indeed; Aizawa (2012) accepts but doesn’t endorse

such parlance; Menary (2012), in contrast, argues that my account is more one of cognitive outsourcing

than of cognitive extension. All (myself included) agree, however, that on a much stronger version of the

thesis of extended cognition, cognizers do not merely depend heavily on external resources, but these

external resources may literally become part of the cognizing mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Haugeland

1998; Rowlands 1999; Clark 2008). Although I am sympathetic to this stronger version of the thesis, I do

not want the force of my argument to depend on one’s willingness to accept it. That is, I want to make as

few controversial assumptions as possible and, clearly, heavy dependence on external resources (or, in my

perhaps somewhat unfortunate terminology, weak extended cognition) better fits that bill than

assumptions of strong cognitive extension (i.e. sensu Clark and others). Incidentally, at the end of the

paper I return to these stronger positions; I show that one way of saving virtue epistemology is to give

SISSICASE a strong reading, and to think of SISSI plus the machinery as one integrated cognitive

system.5 Structurally, my argument is similar to one by Lackey (2007). Still, my argument doesn’t require one to

make controversial assumptions about the existence of innate knowledge; nor about whether blindly

believing a testifier can ever yield knowledge (see Vaesen 2011, p. 516).

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well-hidden behind a rock, is grazing in the field, Roddy’s perceptual faculties are

relevant, but insufficient to explain his true belief. So to rule out knowledge in these

cases, cognitive ability must be more than just one of the causal factors responsible

for success; it must be the most salient one.

My charge thus, as Greco (forthcoming, p. 4 of ms) recognizes, is best

characterized as a dilemma. The first option is to give the ability condition a strong

reading, i.e. cognitive ability is the most salient feature explaining cognitive

success. The problem with this horn of the dilemma is that knowledge is incorrectly

ruled out in SISSICASE. The second option is to relax the ability condition so that

cognitive ability is just one of the many causal factors giving rise to S’s truly

believing that p. On this horn of the dilemma, however, one fails to rule out

knowledge in Gettier cases and thus the main motivation for adopting a virtue-

theoretic account of knowledge is undermined.

2 Kelp Misses the Dilemma

Kelp (forthcoming, this journal) argues that SISSICASE poses no new problem for

virtue epistemology; that SISSICASE can be dealt with in familiar virtue-theoretic

ways. Kelp forgets to mention, however, that these familiar virtue-theoretic

responses suffer from problems that are just as familiar.

Kelp’s preferred virtue-theoretic response to SISSICASE draws on Sosa (2007).6

Kelp agrees with Sosa that

what matters to satisfaction of the ability condition is whether the agent’s

cognitive success manifests ability on his part, where an ability, according to

Sosa, ’’is a disposition […] that would in appropriately normal conditions

ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued

by it.‘‘

Applied to SISSICASE: when operating the new scanner and forming a true

belief that there is a bomb in the suitcase, Sissi manifests a disposition that would

ensure that she believes truly in appropriately normal conditions.

I think Kelp is right that Sissi’s success manifests her cognitive ability, but wrong

that manifestation of cognitive ability is sufficient for immunizing SISSICASE. This

has to do with the second horn of my dilemma: manifestation doesn’t adequately

rule out knowledge in Gettier-style arguments (a point I made in fact in Section 5 of

my paper; for the same point, see Pritchard’s (2009) response to Kelp’s earlier

endorsement of Sosa’s account).

Think of Chisholm’s dog-looking-like-a-sheep scenario again. Roddy’s percep-

tual dispositions are assumed to be reliable, and thus to ensure true beliefs in

appropriately normal conditions. These perceptual dispositions definitely play a role

in Roddy’s cognitive success. So Roddy’s cognitive success manifests his cognitive

6 In fairness to Kelp, he also imagines a response by Greco. I here ignore this imaginative response, and

instead discuss Greco’s actual response in Sect. 3.

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ability. Still, according to mainstream intuition, Roddy doesn’t deserve the title of

knowledge.

Or consider the following case, due to Turri (2011), whose argument is directed

directly at Sosa’s (rather than Kelp’s) manifestation account:

A competent, though not masterful, inspection of the crime scene would yield

the conclusion that a man with a limp murdered Miss Woodbury. Holmes saw

through it and had already deduced that Dr. Hubble poisoned the victim under

pretense of treating her.

Holmes also recognized that the scene would fool Watson, whose own

inspection of the scene was proceeding admirably competently, though not

masterfully.Watson had, after years of tutelage, achieved competence in

applying Holmes’s methods, and while Holmes was no sentimentalist, he

didn’t want Watson to be discouraged. ’’Look at him,‘‘ Holmes thought,

’’measuring the distance between footprints, noting their comparative depth,

and a half dozen other things, just as he ought to. There’s no doubt where this

will lead him—think how discouraged he will be.‘‘ Holmes then resolved,

’’Because he’s proceeding so competently, I’ll see to it he gets it right!‘‘

Holmes sprang into action. Leaving Watson, he hastily disguised himself as a

porter, strode across the street to where Hubble was, and kicked him so hard

that Hubble was thereafter permanently hobbled with a limp. Holmes then

quickly returned to find Watson wrapping up his investigation.

’’I say, Holmes,‘‘ Watson concluded triumphantly, ’’whoever committed this

brutal crime has a limp.‘‘

’’Capital, Watson!‘‘ Holmes grinned. ’’I’m sure he does.‘‘ (Turri 2011, p. 5)

Watson’s belief that the criminal has a limp is true, and markedly manifests his

cognitive powers. Yet, it doesn’t seem to amount to knowledge.

It isn’t clear at all how Kelp’s manifestation account can be made immune to

Roddy’s case, or to similar Gettier-style arguments, like the one of Holmes and

Watson, without falling prey to the first horn of the dilemma. Perhaps Kelp could

ask for a quantitatively more demanding version of manifestation. For instance, he

could try the idea that S knows that p, only if S’s cognitive success most

prominently manifests S’s cognitive powers; what Roddy’s and Watson’s success

most prominently manifests is luck, not cognitive ability. Unfortunately, that

proposal pushes us back to the other horn of the dilemma, for it mis-diagnoses

SISSICASE; Sissi’s success seems a manifestation of Joseph’s cognitive powers

(his idea of equipping the baggage scanner with a false positive engine) rather than

those of Sissi.

Alternatively, Kelp may follow a (further unexamined) suggestion by Turri

(2011, p. 6), and try to put qualitative constraints on manifestation; cognitive

success must manifest cognitive ability in the right way (or so). I leave it to Kelp,

however, to work out the details of such an account.

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3 New (and not so New) Problems for Greco

John Greco (forthcoming), in contrast to Kelp, admits the force of my argument, and

proposes a new virtue epistemology in response.7 That is, Greco grants that

SISSICASE undermines the idea that a true belief’s being attributable to cognitive

ability is to be understood in causal-explanatory terms. Instead, Greco proposes, the

attributability relation should be thought of in pragmatic terms.

How is this pragmatic account spelled out? Greco conjoins ideas of Craig (1990),

Sosa (1991), Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005) into a proposal about the

function of the concept of knowledge:

[(Gfunction)] […] the concept of knowledge functions so as to flag good

information and good sources of information for use in practical reasoning.

Put differently, the concept of knowledge is used to identify actionable

information and sources of actionable information.

The corresponding content of the concept of knowledge is defined by Greco as

follows (p. 16 of ms.):

[(Gcontent)] S has knowledge only if S’s believing the truth is attributable to S’s

intellectual abilities. And that is so just in case S’s abilities contribute to S’s

believing the truth in a way that would regularly serve relevant needs for

information.

According to Greco, Gcontent provides a solution to the dilemma posed by

SISSICASE. Sissi’s cognitive ability contributes to her believing the truth in the

right way, that is, in a way ’’that would regularly serve relevant informational needs

(p. 17 of ms.).‘‘ Sissi exploits the baggage scanner in such a way that true belief is

produced in a generally regular, dependable way. In Gettier cases, Greco continues,

this doesn’t hold: a true belief is produced, and the subject in question even

contributes to that, but it is not the sort of cognitive/causal route that could be

regularly exploited for practical purposes. In light of that, the subject is denied the

title of knowledge—and virtue epistemology is saved.

Although I am sympathetic to this pragmatic move, it doesn’t work as it stands.

Greco’s new proposal faces two problems.

3.1 A Problem for Gcontent

A simple Temp-style case is sufficient for showing that Greco, in particular

Gcontent, sets the bars for knowledge too low. Consider Ferdinand. Ferdinand likes to

be up to date with respect to room temperature, and therefore regularly consults a

thermometer on the wall. Ferdinand doesn’t know that the thermometer is defective

and that it fluctuates randomly within a given range. Nonetheless, Ferdinand’s

readings are reliable, since unbeknownst to him, a benevolent demon sees to it that,

7 In fact, Greco’s new virtue epistemology is not just issued by SISSICASE, but also by a case of Lackey

(2007) concerning testimonial knowledge.

Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition 967

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whenever Ferdinand consults the thermometer, room temperature is adjusted so that

it actually corresponds to what is displayed on the device.

In this case, Ferdinand exploits the thermometer so as to produce true

temperature beliefs in a regular, dependable way. After all, Ferdinand is a good

informant with respect to temperature: he gets temperature readings right all the

time! Yet, according to mainstream intuition, Ferdinand should not be attributed

knowledge. In sum, as it stands Gcontent doesn’t rule out knowledge in simple Temp

scenarios.

3.2 A Conflict Between Gfunction and Gcontent

Greco’s point of departure, as per Gfunction, is the idea that the concept of knowledge

serves to flag informants possessing actionable information. The corresponding

content of the concept is given by Gcontent. However, it is not clear at all why Gcontent

would be a suitable characterization of the content of a concept of knowledge that is

functionally characterized along the lines of Gfunction.

To appreciate the conflict between Gfunction and Gcontent, consider a simple

TrueTemp case. Suppose that I as an attributor know that Franz’s temperature

beliefs are true because a benevolent demon implanted a TrueTemp device in

Franz’s brain. Suppose, moreover, that my decision to air Franz’s room is dependent

on the room’s temperature—if temperature exceeds X degrees, I open the windows,

else, I keep them closed. When I ask Franz about the room’s temperature, it doesn’t

really matter whether Franz’s temperature beliefs are true thanks to himself, or

thanks to a benevolent demon; as long as I know that there is a suitable causal path

ensuring the truth of Franz’s temperature beliefs, his true beliefs will properly

inform my decision. In the scenario just described Franz thus possesses actionable

information, even though his believing the truth is not attributable to the dependable

contribution of his cognitive abilities.

Likewise, S’s merely having a true belief that p may be sufficient for S to possess

actionable information regarding p, however un-dependably S’s true belief was

produced. Adapting an example of Hawthorne (2002), Marie-Antoinette may

retrieve the information that Vienna is the capital of Austria from a book full of

mistakes—with the information regarding the capital of Austria being a rare

exception. Marie-Antoinette’s believing the truth is not attributable to a dependable

way of information-gathering, yet her belief definitely qualifies as actionable. If she

were to decide to travel to the capital of Austria, the information she possesses

certainly is of use.

What these scenarios show is that Gcontent is too demanding to mirror the

functional specifications given by Gfunction. If, per Gfunction, actionable information

is what the concept of knowledge picks out, referring to intellectual abilities in

Gcontent seems unnecessary and, without further argument, out of place.

This conflict between the supposed function and content of the concept of

knowledge presents a new dilemma for Greco. Either Greco retains Gcontent, and

gives up Gfunction; or he retains Gfunction, and gives up Gcontent. Let’s examine the

implications of either option.

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First, giving up or modifying Gfunction so that it fits better with Gcontent is like

putting the cart before the horse. Gfunction was invoked to restrict, clarify and justify

the content of the concept of knowledge (not the reverse). As Greco rightly puts it:

the purpose should explain the content (not the reverse).

On the second horn of the dilemma, Greco saves Gfunction, which means he

should be willing to attribute knowledge to Franz and Marie-Antoinette. That would

make for a remarkable, but not entirely unpalatable position. After all, there is a

sense in which the concept of knowledge seems admissible in the scenarios alluded

to, namely when ‘knowing that p’ is construed as ‘being cognizant of p’. Returning

to Hawthorne’s adapted example, suppose Marie-Antoinette is sitting in a room with

several other people, and I ask you to count how many people in the room know that

Vienna is the capital of Austria. Most likely, you would count Marie-Antoinette in,

and this in virtue of her being cognizant of the fact that Vienna is the capital of

Austria. While this weak sense of knowing may be inconsistent with the eventual

semantics of the concept of knowledge, it certainly is consistent with Gfunction.

The main problem with the second horn of the dilemma is rather that Gcontent

needs to be altered. If knowledge picks out actionable information, perhaps Gcontent

must be defined just in terms of true belief. But however we fill in the details of

Gcontent, it is not sure at all that one can change it so that it both better corresponds

to Gfunction and at the same do what it was supposed to, namely to save virtue

theoretic approaches to knowledge in the face of extended cognition. At first blush,

the challenge seems substantial.

4 Conclusion

Extended cognition poses a problem for certain formulations of virtue epistemology,

I argued before. Apparently, that claim remains valid today. To suitably deal with

my challenge, Kelp needs to make his response Gettier-proof; and Greco needs to

make his response both Temp-proof and internally more consistent. Alternatively,

Kelp and Greco may abandon their robust virtue epistemology, and embrace a

weaker version, according to which knowledge involves a significant amount of

cognitive ability, as opposed to being primarily creditable to cognitive ability. On

such a weaker virtue epistemolgy (see also Pritchard 2010; Vaesen 2011, p. 527),

Sissi’s success attests to her cognitive ability, even though primary credit would go

to the machinery/Joseph. Finally, there is also a third alternative (see Vaesen 2011,

p. 526): virtue theorists may interpret SISSICASE as an example of the strong

variant of extended cognition I alluded to (see footnote 4). On this construal, the

processes going on in the machinery are considered genuinely cognitive, as

belonging to ’’Sissi the extended cognitive agent‘‘. On this condition, Sissi’s (now

extended) faculties would remain the most salient feature explaining her true belief,

and Kelp’s and Greco’s robust virtue epistemologies would be saved. Note,

however, that such a strong reading of SISSICASE is quite radical; I suspect that

even radical extended cognition theorists (such as Clark) would resist so

characterizing SISSICASE.

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Acknowledgments Research by Krist Vaesen was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for

Scientific Research (NWO).

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