Pangilinan vs. CA321 SCRA 51December 17, 1999

FACTS:Mila Pangilinan was charged and convicted of the Crime of Estafa before the RTC, a crime cognizable by MTC. He brought the case to Court of Appeal for new trial but the same was denied. In her Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court, she alleged that the Decision of the trial court is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the crime charged. Relying in the land mark case of Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the appellant is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppels having already set in.

ISSUE:Whether or not Mila G. Pangilinan is barred for raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, having estoppels already set in?

HELD:No. The Office of the Solicitor General's reliance on the said ruling (Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy) is misplaced. The doctrine laid down in the Tijam case is an exception to and not the general rule. Estoppel attached to the party assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the same party who sought recourse in the said forum. In the case at bar, appellant cannot in anyway be said to have invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Santiago vs. Vasquez217 SCRA 633January 27, 1993

FACTS:An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired. 

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired. 

HELD:The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. 

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

Antiporda Jr. vs. Garchitorena321 SCRA 551December 23, 1999

FACTS:Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping, the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the place where the victim was brought.

The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman.   The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.

ISSUE No. 1:WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

HELD:No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

ISSUE No. 2:WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

HELD:No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial rights would be impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

Miranda vs. TuliaoG.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

FACTS:On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witness protection program.

2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced them 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein petitioner Miranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners appealed the resolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ. The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing the information against the petition.

Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court

HELD:Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners. It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicial relief.

Cojuangco Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan300 SCRA 367December 21, 1998

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined  personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination — independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and the special prosecutor should be examined by the court

FACTS:January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines. 

Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. 

In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information. In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992. August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat. In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted. On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question. On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan. On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed. In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court. On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information. In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996. On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.

ISSUES:

1. WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid? YES

2. WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? YES

HELD:

1. Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused:

a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and

b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution.

2. The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.

3. In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,  the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.

4. In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation. 

5. With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.   By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.

6. In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person. 

 

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;

As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner.

The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest should not be equated with "voluntary appearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his person. Truly, his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon learning of the filling of the Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable cause. It was essentially an express and continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person.

When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that such was "without prejudice” to his Opposition. 

Crespo vs. MogulG.R. No. L-53373June 30, 1987

FACTS:April 1977, Asst. Fiscal de Gala with approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Sec. of Justice for the filing of the information; which was denied. A motion for reconsideration was denied too in order but the arraignment was referred to August 18, 1997 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the CA, then CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with arraignment until further orders. 

On March 22, 1978 undersecretary of justice MAcaraig reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court attaching Macaraig's letter. On November 1978, judge denied the motion and set arraignment.= stating that the motion thrust induce the court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the undersecretary that disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes court's independence and integrity, motion denied.

Crespo then filed a petition certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition in the CA. Praying that the decision to move on with arraignment be reversed and set aside declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect and to dismiss the case and declare Crespo's obligation as purely civil.

ISSUE:Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the provincial fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:Petition denied.

(1) It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. 

(2) However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

(3) The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper

court. 

(4) Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

(5) It is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.

(6) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.