SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 84612 March 11, 1992PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.DIOSDADO AVILA, AGAPITO AGRABIO and AURELIO SILVOZA, accused, DIOSDADO AVILA and AGAPITO AGRABIO,accused-appellants.PADILLA,J.:This is an appeal from the decision*of the Regional Trial Court, Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch 27, dated 12 July 1988, rendered in Criminal Case No. 1326, finding the accused Diosdado Avila and Agapito Agrabio, herein appellants, guilty of the crime of murder, but acquitting accused Aurelio Silvoza. However, after the trial court had forwarded to this Court the records of the case, by reason of the appeal interposed by the appellants, said court, on 1 August 1988, amended its decision of 12 July 1988 and submitted to this Court said amended decision which found accused Avila and Agrabio guilty of rebellion, not murder. The people interposed objection to the rendition of the amended decision at a time when the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case.The records show on 23 October 1985, the victim Gregorio P. Murillo, then governor of the province of Surigao del Sur, was shot dead allegedly by Diosdado Avila, Agapito Agrabio and Aurelio Silvoza. An information for murder was filed against the above-named accused, which reads as follows:That on or about 5:30 o'clock in the morning on October 23, 1985 at the National Highway, municipality of Tandag, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Diosdado Avila, Agapito Agrabio and Aurelio Silvoza, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without provocation, with treachery, evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, armed with an unlicensed .45 Caliber Pistol and with the use thereof, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Governor Gregorio P. Murillo, Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound on his head, . . .xxx xxx xxxwhich wound or injuries caused the instantaneous death of Governor Gregorio P. Murillo, . . . .1Upon arraignment, the three (3) accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The only issue which the trial court found necessary to resolve was whether or into the shooting and resultant killing of the victim by the accused, were done in furtherance of rebellion or of their intention to overthrow or help overthrow the duly constituted government.2On 12 July 1988, after hearing the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered its decision finding, as already adverted to the two (2) accused, Diosdado Avila and Agapito Agrabio, guilty of the crime charged (murder) and sentencing them to life imprisonment, while the third accused, Aurelio Silvoza, was absolved from any criminal liability. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, finding accused Diosdado Avila and Agapito Agrabio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as principals, the court sentences both of them to life imprisonment, to be served by them at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, with costs against them.They are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the late Governor Gregorio P. Murillo the sum of P6,000.00 for the marble tomb of the deceased; P10,000.00 for the expenses in the solution of this crime; P30,000.00 for life indemnity; P50,000.00 for actual damages; P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.Accused Aurelio Silvoza is hereby absolved from any criminal liability.3Accused Avila and Agapito timely filed their appeal from said decision. On 3 August 1988, the trial court forwarded (posted) to this Court the records of the case including its decision of 12 July 1988 which were received by the Supreme Court on 26 August 1988. However, the records also show that the trial court issued another decision which is dated 1 August 1988 but forwarded (posted) to the Supreme Court on 15 August 1988 and received by the Supreme Court on 15 September 1988. Its second decisionamendedits earlier decision of 12 July 1988, ruling this time that Avila and Agrabio are guilty of rebellion, not murder. The dispositive portion of the amended decision reads:WHEREFORE, finding the accused Diosdado Avila and Agapito Agrabio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rebellion, the court sentences them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion temporalin its medium period and a fine of not to exceed P20,000.00 or an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and an additional imprisonment in case of insolvency to be served by them in the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.xxx xxx xxxAccused Aurelio Silvoza is hereby absolved from any criminal liability.4It will be observed that the "amended decision", although dated 1 August 1988, was promulgated onlyafterthe appellants had timely appealed from the earlier decision of 12 July 1988 andafterthe trial court had forwarded to the Supreme Court the records of the case.Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that a "judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected." It is thus clear that at the trial court rendered the "amended decision," said court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case, the appeal having been earlier perfected. Hence, the "amended decision" has no legal force and effect.There is no question then that it is the decision of 12 July 1988 convicting the appellants of the crime of murder and sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment, which is the subject of the present review.The main if not the sole question in the appeal at bar is whether the trial court correctly convicted appellants of the crime of murder.Upon careful consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, as well as the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the Court, in the exercise of its power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm5the appealed decision dated 12 July 1988, holds that appellants Avila and Agrabio are guilty of the crime of rebellion, not murder. Hence, we find merit in their appeal.The undisputed facts6of the case show that:At about 5:30 in the morning of 23 October 1985 along the national highway of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, while the victim was inside his car seated beside the driver, whereas Mrs. Murillo, (wife of the Governor) was seated behind, appellant Avila shot Governor Murillo at the head, using a .45 caliber pistol, resulting to the Governor's death. His only companion then was appellant Agrabio. Aurelio Silvoza (the other co-accused) was not present at the time the crime was committed as he was at the hinterland resting because he was then sick.7After the shooting, the two appellants Avila and Agrabio ran away. On 17 February 1987 Agrabio was apprehended whereas Avila and Silvoza were captured on 18 February 1987 by the members of the Philippine Constabulary.During the trial of the case, it was the contention of the defense that appellants committed rebellion, not murder, the shooting and killing of the late Governor Murillo being a means to or in furtherance of rebellion or in pursuance of the objectives of the rebels.8However, notwithstanding the aforesaid claim of the defense, the trial court in its decision, dated 12 July 1988, found appellants Avila and Agrabio guilty of the crime of murder (accused Silvoza was acquitted). It ruled that the crime committed could not be rebellion because there was no evidence presented showing that at the time Governor Murillo was fatally shot, an uprising or rebellion was on-going where the rebels and the armed forces of the government were actually fighting or locked in combat.But the evidence show that appellants Avila and Agrabio were on a mission to kill and, in fact, they killed Governor Murillo on that fateful day of 23 October 1985. The evidence also disclose that at the time they killed the Governor, they were members of the liquidating squad of the New People's Army (NPA), and that they killed the Governor upon the orders of their senior officer in the NPA, one Commander Celo. According to them, they were ordered to "liquidate" the Governor because of the latter's "corruption" in not giving on time the salaries of the employees in the provincial government, and that, instead, he gave the salaries first to the military whom he maintained as his personal bodyguards.The killing of Governor Murillo by the appellants Avila (aliasCommander Efren); and Agrabio (aliasCommander Raymund) who were atthe time admittedly and undisputably members of the liquidating squad of the NPA,9upon the orders of NPA Commander Celo, appears therefore to be politically motivated and tainted. Hence, this Court is of the view that the appellants committed the crime of simple rebellion, not murder, punishable under Article 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal code ("RPC" for brevity) consistent with the ruling inPeople vs. Manglallan,10which held that:The appellant admits that he was a member of the NPA then operating in the Cagayan Area with Ka Daniel as their leader. He asserts that the NPA is the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. There is no question likewise that the killing of Apolonio Ragual by the appellant and his companions who were also members of the NPA upon the orders of Ka Daniel was politically motivated. They suspected Ragual as an informer of the PC. In fact, after he was killed, they left a letter and a drawing on the body of Ragual as a warning to others not follow his example. . . . The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the crime he committed is not murder but the crime of rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.As regards the crime of rebellion and the penalty imposable therefor, Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code have been amended several times by a number of presidential decrees and Executive Order No. 18711and Republic Act No. 6968.12At the time the crime was committed in the case at bar (i.e., 23 October 1985), the presidential decree in force and effect was P.D. 1834 which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by imposing a penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death for those found guilty of rebellion. Felonies being generally punishable under the laws in force at the time of their commission,13the impossible penalty, therefore, in the present case is thatprovidedby P.D. 1834. Said Article 135, as amended by P.D. 1834, refers to two (2) groups of persons who may commit rebellion thefirst group(referred to in paragraph one of Article 135) are those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion, or who, while holding any public office or employment, take part therein, engaging in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated; thesecond group(referred to in paragraph two thereof) are those who merely participate in or execute the commands of others in a rebellion.In the instant appeal, while we find the appellants guilty of rebellion, we also find that their case falls under the "second group" referred to in paragraph two (2) of Article 135, the evidence having shown that they belonged to the liquidating squad of the NPA, tasked to operate in Tandag, and that they killed the victim, Governor Murillo, in compliance with the orders of their senior officer, one Commander Celo of the NPA.However, as far as the penalty imposed is concerned, it would seem immaterial whether the offender falls under the first or second group, for under Article 135, RPC as amended by P.D. 1834, a uniform penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death is imposed for the "first group" or "second group" of rebellion.But we take note that pending the present appeal, R.A. 6968 was enacted and is now in full force, which provides for the penalty ofreclusion perpetuafor offenders belonging to the "first group", andreclusion temporalonly for those falling under the "second group" of rebellion.Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code14penal laws are given retroactive effect insofar as they are favorable to the offender. Considering that a retroactive effect of RA 6968 to the present appeal would be more favorable to the appellants as said Act imposes a penalty ofreclusion temporal,notreclusion perpetuaas in P.D. 1834, for offenders belonging to the "second group" of rebels, the Court shall therefore impose the penaltyprovidedfor in Article 135 of the RPC, as amended by RA 6968, which isreclusion temporal.There being neither an aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offense, the proper penalty isreclusion temporalin its medium period, applying rule No. 1 set forth in Article 64 of the RPC.15The range of the penalty ofreclusion temporalin its medium period is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.16As to the award of damages adjudged by the trial court, this Court grants to the heirs of the late Governor an indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, but the other items for damages granted in the appealed decision are set aside for they are not proper in rebellion cases.Finally, the Court notes with deep concern the trial judge's attempt to amend his earlier decision of 12 July 1988, after the lapse of 20 days (the amended decision being dated 1 August 1988), totally disregarding the basic doctrine that courts lose jurisdiction over cases after an appeal shall have been perfected therein. This doctrine is too elementary as to have been ignored by the trial judge. Whatever may be the reasons behind the intriguing change in the respondent judge in rendering his amended decision, the Court strictly admonishes him to be more cautious, circumspect and be decisive in the exercise of his judicial functions.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch 27dated 12 July 1988rendered in Criminal Case No. 1326 is hereby MODIFIED, by convicting the accused-appellants, Diosdado Avila and Agapito Agrabio of the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 135, paragraph No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, ( and not murder), and hereby sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months ofreclusion temporal, and to indemnify, solidarily, the heirs of the deceased former Governor Gregorio P. Murillo in the amount of P50,000.00.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO,defendant-appellant.KAPUNAN,J.:Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.2On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.3As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.After trial, the courta quofound accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetuawith all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.With costs against the accused.SO ORDERED.Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,"4(said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty ofprison mayorby the lower court.Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."5Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is notprision mayoras appellant contends, butreclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic ActNo. 6968, theCoup D'etatLaw, prescribesreclusion temporalas the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.6The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.7By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined aprioriwithin predetermined bounds.8One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case ofPeople v.Hernandez,9thus:In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve apolitical purpose.The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, inPeople v.Gempes,10this court stressed that:Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.11Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case ofEnrile v.Amin,12where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13for allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14(on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged inEnrile vs.Salazar(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court inEnrile vs.Aminfurther underscored that:[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.The similarity of some of the factual circumstances ofPeople v.Ompad,Jr.,16to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad,alias"Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information.17It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. InPeople v.Pazand Ticawe held:That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's obvious interest in testifying to that effect.18Similarly, inPeople v.Buco,19the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma,alias"Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement.20People v.Dasig21has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." InDasigthe Court however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief inDasigwhich this Court favorably quoted, noted that:[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states that accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self serving23an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial enough as anindiciaof political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a certainaliasALWIN,ALIASSAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)Q Please continue.A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)Q What is your participation in the group?A Look-out sir.Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)A No more sir.25It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entireextrajudicial confessiondid appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992.27As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member.28The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while upholding the rest of it.29While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was committed.30Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding ofaliasAlwin andaliasSamuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization'sgoals.31He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization,"32without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident.33As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so general and non-specific34that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. InBaylosis v.Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.35In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.36It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.37Against appellant's claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.38Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution's case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.40Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind.41The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty ofreclusion perpetuatogether with all the accessories provided by law.WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED,in toto.SO ORDERED._________

EN BANCG.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,plaintiff-appellee,vs.GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.MALCOLM,J.:As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of the case and of the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will be taken up in the order named.STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTSOn December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary.The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in the Barracks.During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he received the night before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen.At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the window bars of the quarters, in his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through the window with rifles and ammunition under the command of their sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real, Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in the United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a dying condition and in the face of overwhelming odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed notwithstanding that in response to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without considering that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion for, against the command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing and advanced in order that he might administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison.Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime, arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service of the city of Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the Santa Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after another returned to the Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers was, however, made.In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary officers, and later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the events of the night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at that time, numbering some one hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and when this was done, the soldiers were separated into their respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two statements.What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of Colonel Sweet: "I assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell me which ones had been out the night before and which ones had participated in the shooting, which they did, and to tell me the names of those who were with them and who were not then present, which they did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy-three) present and they named five (four) others." Again the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out on the previous night for any purpose whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward and gave them five minutes to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped forward that had gone out for any purpose whatever I asked those who took part in the shooting the night before that in justice to themselves and to the other men who had not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned, that they step forward and they did." The names of the four who took part (not five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the same day, December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in English or Spanish. The questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers, translated not their dialects. Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or three witnesses.Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in substance they are the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally transcribed:1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. Graciano I. Cabrera, 254 years of age, single, sergeant of the first company of the General Service of the Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? First Company, General Service of the Constabulary.]3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December 15,1920? In the Santa Lucia Barracks.4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? Yes, sir.5. For what reason, and where did you go? We went in search of the policemen and secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been having standing grudge against now since we have been having a standing grudge against the police of Manila. The wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by the policemen and then abused by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this woman to an American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping women of bad reputation; after this incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we have come to know that Macasinag did nothing and the policemen could have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread among us that the police department of Manila had given orders to the policemen to fire upon any Constabulary soldier they found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without foundation since we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the usual practice, were armed with carbines or shotguns. For this reason we believe that if we did not put an end to these abuses of the policemen and secret service men, they would continue abusing the constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did what we had done last night.6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? I saw that almost all the soldiers were jumping through the window and I was to be left alone in the barracks and so I followed.7. Who asked you to join it? Nobody.8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police the night before last on Calle Real? Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our comrade.9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? Indeed, yes, not only was I offended, but my companions also were.10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. I cannot tell precisely the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I fired more than once.11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the victim was a policeman or a civilian. I cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any civilian.12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. I cannot given an exact account of the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached Calle Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching the barracks.13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge did you use? I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I used; however, I placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost.14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? By the window of the quarter of the Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given? Yes, sir.16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you? Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.Witnesses:S. GALLARDO.LAURO C. MARQUEZ.The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges of first instance.All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caa, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but later, after the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventy-seven confession of the defendants, introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The prosecution further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the defendants and was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Decea, Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and was to the effect these men did not take part in the riot.The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however, distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided proportionately among the defendants.For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially the same in both cases.In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case. The rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or circumstance appears.OPINIONAn assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the assignment of error merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense raised in the lower court for these defendants and three other and which was found untenable by the trial court. Any further discussion of this question falls more appropriately under consideration of assignment of error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that the policemen were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused (assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No. 5, sedition case).1.The admission of exhibits C to C-76Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for the good of the service" in response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations were sometime taken in al language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the accused entered timely objection to the admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is worn in stating otherwise.Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received as evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the court that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of promises or offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been repeatedly announced by this and other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U. S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not voluntarily made or was obtained by undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.)What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records. The source of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the confession is not established. One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a transfer. With military orders given in English and living in the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more important, there could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their own men.It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the Insular Police force. Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical experience, these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for criminal offenses. Every man on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him, would for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire for a more exciting life, over and above the so calledesprit de corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel prudence rather than rashness; secretiveness rather than garrulity.These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been successfully impeached.We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.2. The conspiracy between the accusedThe contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between the accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession, "who asked you to join the riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and of their uniform. From both the negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence, counsel could deduce the absence of conspiracy between the accused.The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section 5 of Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for the people may be on solid ground. However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case which reaches the same result.It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is responsible for all the acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of Spain of September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training was followed.The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face of actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved. Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences therefor.We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the accused.3.The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton LawSedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.JUDGEMENTThe Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Decea, Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway, Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caa, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window through which the defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable exercise of the discretion which the law reposes in him.We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent observations found in the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey said:Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this case with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292, imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate with the enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military sciences which is worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the means furnished to them by the Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by force and violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila.Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting these same defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose penalties in this case, yet it is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one seventy-seventh of the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.________

EN BANCG.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.NARCISO UMALI, ET AL.,defendants.NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO,defendants-appellants.MONTEMAYOR,J.:Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of the principal penalty that is imposed upon them."The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not only shortly before that raid but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman. However, these friendly relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the political head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations became such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they even filed mutual accusations. According to Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this is in order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and tried to persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told him that they and their companions would not surrender except and with through the intervention of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to him from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant Umali's request further strained their relations, and thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they happened to meet at parties.On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including his bodyguard Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that the firearms taken away from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with Punzalan.Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of political strength and would determine who was who in Tiaong, Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan). After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did not even attend the sessions and that his chair in Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some experience in political campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latter's houses or headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election speeches about blood flowing and gold coffin.Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of the happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those who took part in it. According to the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to by Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may yet win the election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan.Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to the house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging to the father of Umali, and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the attacking force was deployed toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army unit but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles filled with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the election to the Governor.The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including policemen who happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said that he was guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over to the place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he was hit on the left check and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs. Punzalan who was then inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while she was resting she heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed that her house was being fired at because the glass window panes were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed by flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the children ran out of the house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.Nazario Aonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of the Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw River already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part in firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that because of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly established not only by the going of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he could well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in the evening and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived about midnight when the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give succor to the stricken residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet, instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better still, when the army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena) where before dawn, they went and contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the Army Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of having had some connection with the raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali himself, while still in Taguan that evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day he took the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have done under the circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as true, for the sake of argument, that the said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on the night in question, that would not prevent them from being in Tiaong between 8 and 9. Besides, why was it that night thehasaglamp was replaced with candles when the reinforcements passed through Taguan about midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene of the attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house of Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to pass through the provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he trying to conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also go to the house of Ona? Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have given them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and the other co-accused repaired and sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to the Army authorities, did they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from Lucena on November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion."At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem rather strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have friendly relations with this dissidents whom the Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study the evidence, it will be found that the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during the Japanese occupation, to further the resistance movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known as President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali attaining the rank