Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)- ignorance of lawAlexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts: Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960. Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883. Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00. At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him. Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines. Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.Issue: Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.Held: Yes.Ratio: Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people. In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

People Vs Oanis shoot to kill orderFacts- Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the door, simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal. Held: Both accused are guilty of murder Ratio: Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of law who are trying to capture him that killing him would be justified.U.S vs. Ah Chong- cook- killed his roomateFacts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, Who is there, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed & called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, & believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife & struck & fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Held: Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.

US vs Valdez-homicide by drowningThe case ofU.S. vs. Valdez,41 Phil. 497 (1921), isanalogous. In that case, the accused had brandished a big knife at the victim while they were on a small boat in the Pasig River. Before the accused reached the victim at the bow of the boat, the latter, believing his life in danger, threw himself into the water, disappeared beneaththe surface and was seen nomore. The accused therein was convicted of Homicide.If a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct ofself-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicideincase death results by drowning.

People v Toling- twinsComplex CrimesFACTS:AntonioToling and JoseToling both the accused, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their ownlands.Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila. Jose's three children had stayed in Manila also since 1964. Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money.To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.Leonora gave her father P50. Antonio's grandson, gave him P30. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants.After buying their tickets home, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five oclock in the afternoon. The train left atsix o'clock that evening. The twins were in coach No. 9.Each seat in the coach faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.Sitting on the thirdseat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat. On the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.The train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna, and not long after it resumed regular speed, Antonio stood up and stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him with scissors. Jose stabbed the sleeping old woman sitting in front of him with a knife.The twins ran amuck and started stabbing the people in the coach. They were finally stopped when Constabulary soldiers aboard the train heard about the incident. At that time, Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Rayel was not on duty and was simply taking his wife child to Quezon. He was at the dining car when the incident happened. Constabulary Sargeant Vicente Aldea was in the dining car as well.The dead amounted to twelve. Eight suffered from stab wounds while others died after theyjumped offthe train, apparentlytrying toescape theviolence. Sevenwereinjured, thoughone of them was reported tohave died as well.RULING:Antonio Toling and Jose Toling were found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder.Eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty ofone (1) year ofprision correccionalas minimum to six (6) yearsand one (1) day ofprision mayoras maximum for the attempted murder.Pay solidarily an indemnity of P12, 000 to each set of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C.Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96, 000,and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa.The forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code was to be observed.HELD:On defenses attempt to put up a theory of self-defenseNo evidence to corroborate the story of the twins that they were being held up and thatthey only began stabbing people as a form ofretaliationThey were caught inflagrante delictoTheir testimony, as well as that of the witnesses, confirm them as authors of the killingsInjuries they sustained could be attributed to the blows which the other passengersinflicted on them to stop their murderous rampageOn defenses contention that they should only be liable for two homicides (for the victims they admitted to killing)The heirs of the eightpersons who died because of stab wounds must be indemnifiedTo the four persons who died from traumatic, conjecture that may be made is that theyjumpedfromthetraintoavoidthewrathofthebrothers.However,theabsenceofeyewitness-testimony as to the jumping precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.On whether it was a complex crimePerpetrated by means of differentactsCannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other"."Concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hechoconstituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno deellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro(el llamado delito complejo)."According to Google Translate: Formal or ideal contest (?) takes two formsof crime: a) when a single act constitutes two or more offenses (offensescalled composite); and b) when one of them is a necessary meansto commitother (so-called complex crime)En al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion materialde las penas",is that"si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, estaconforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cadauno de los delitos -According to Google Translate: In the competition (?) of real crimes, the rule, when there is material accumulation of penalties, is that if there are several results where there are several actions that conform to the logic andjustice that the support agent load of each of the crimes (?)Twins are thus liable for eight (8) murdersand one attempted murder

People vs Ortega- killed and drowned in the wellG.R. No. 116736July 24, 1997

Lessons Applicable: Indeterminate Sentence Law

Laws Applicable: Art. 4 RPC

FACTS: October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay (courting Raquel Ortega), Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, Searfin, Boyet and Diosdado Quitlong were having a drinking spree with gin and finger foods. October 15, 1992 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were already drank joined them. October 16, 1992 midnight: Andreanswering a callof nature went to the back portion of the house and Benjamin followed him. Suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying down being stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamins father while Diosdado called Romeo to pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in the well. They dropped stones to Andres body to weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go home. But, his conscience bothered him so he told his mother, reported it to the police and accompanied them to the crime scene. NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat:o cause of death is drowning with multiple stab wounds, contributoryo 13 stab woundso stab wound on the upper left shoulder, near the upper left armpit and leftchest wall- fronto stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound on the back right portion of the body back Manuel Garciaalibio He was asked to go home by his wife to fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called tawas on his sick daughter and stayed home after Benjamin Ortega, Jr. storyo After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking through the room of his sister Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where his sister was. When he answered he didnt know, Andre punched him so he bled and fell to the ground. Andre drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came, seized the knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran towards the direction of the well. Then, he tended his wound in the lips and armpit and slept. RTC: Benjamin and Manuel through conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength committed murder

ISSUE: W/N Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.

HELD: NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of homicide. Manuel deserves acquittal If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities. If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado would stab Andre 10 times successively, completely ignoring Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that Andre was choking him while being stabbed. Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority none showno Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 54 Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.o The essential requisites1. the intended act is felonious assisting Benjamin by carrying the body to the well2. the resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery3. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts (praeter intentionem) still alive and was drowned to death a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamino Exempt by Article 20 of RPC ART. 20.Accessorieswho are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties prescribed foraccessoriesshall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives byaffinitywithin the same degrees with thesingleexception ofaccessoriesfalling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of AppellantOrtega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.

URBANO VS IAC- palay- wound- tetanoFACTS:Urbano had a dispute with Javier because the latter opened anirrigation systemthat flooded the farmer's palay storage.-Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they hadan amicable settlement later on.-22 days later Javier died due to tetanus.ISSUE:Is Urbano criminally liable for Javier's death?HELD:Javier's death wasn't directly due to the hacking. The rule isthat the victim'sdeath must be direct, natural and logical consequence of thewound inflicted upon him by the accused. The infection ofthe wound was an efficient intervening cause between the wounding and hacking which was distinct and foreign tothe crime. Since Urbano is guilty of slight physical injury though. Urbano andJavier used the facilities of barangay mediators for their compromise agreement, there was no longer a criminal liability according to P.D. 1508which allows settlement of minor offenses.

People vs Abarca- paramour of the wife got killedG.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.FRANCISCO ABARCA,accused-appellant.Facts:This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existingdeath sentences to life imprisonment, we required theaccused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by wayof an appeal. On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM, accused Francisco Abarca went home and found hiswife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peepingabove the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and runaway. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. At around 6:30 p.m. he got an M-16 rifle and went back to his house. HewasnotabletofindhiswifeandKohthere. Heproceeded tothehangout ofKingsleyKoh. The accused found Koh playing mah-jong and fired at him three times with his rifle. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying the adjacent room were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Arnold and Lina Amparado were rushed to the hospital andwere rendered timely medical assistance that prevented their deaths.Legal Issues:1.WhetherornotArticle247oftheRevisedPenalCodedefiningdeathinflictedunderexceptional circumstances can be applied in the instant case dissolving the criminal liabilityof the accused for themurder of the deceased.2.Whetherornottheaccusedisliableforfrustrated murderfortheinjuriessuffered bytheAmparados.Holding:1.Yes, Article 247 can be applied in the instant case.2.No, the accused is not liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by theAmparadoReasoning/Policy:Article247qualifiesdeathtobeunderexceptionalcircumstancewhenthefollowingelements are present: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committingsexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the actor immediately thereafter.Thereisnoquestionthattheaccusedsurprisedhiswifeandherparamourintheactofsexual intercourse. That he went out to kill one of them immediately thereafter is however vague.Thelengthoftimethatpassedbetweenthetimetheaccuseddiscoveredhiswifehavingsexualintercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot took almost an hour. It must be understood however that the shooting was the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. The killing has been motivated by the same blind impulse and was the direct by-product ofthe accuseds rage. Satisfying both provisions, Article 247 can therefore be applicable in this case. As a result, accused is not criminally liable for the death of the deceased as he was under exceptional circumstance upon employing the act of killing.As arule, onecommitting anoffense isliable forallthe consequences ofhis act.However, that rule presupposes that the actdone amounts to a felony. Ruling that Article247 can be applied in this case, accused was therefore not committing a felony when he killed the deceased. Having not committing a felony, it therefore follows that the accused is not liable for the unintended acts which followed, in this case,for the injuries suffered by theAmparados.Summary of Ruling by SC:Thecaseatbarrequiresdistinctions.Here,theaccused-appellantwasnotcommittingmurder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. It cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered bythe Amparados. For the separate injuriessuffered by the Amparado spouses,wethereforeimposeupontheaccused-appellantarrestomayor(initsmediumandmaximumperiods) in its maximum period, arresto to beingthe graver penalty (thandestierro).Thedecisionappealedfrom isherebyMODIFIED.Theaccused-appellant issentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

People vs Ulep- police-killed insane person-headshotWapili, having a high fever and insensibly talking to himself, was acting strangely in his home (nasisiraanna ng ulo).His brother in lawwas trying to calm himdown but to know avail.Wapili locked himselfin his room.Later on, he went out nakedand chasedhis brother in law(Leydan).Leydan andneighbors tried to tie him with rope but to no avail so he got loose in the village.Leydan went to a policewoman to report the incident and while this was happening, Wapili turned up in front of the policewomans house to bang her vehicle so she called for assistance.Later on, SPO1 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool (sabi naman ng relatives ni Wapiliwala siyang dalang bolo).Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shot him.Wapili fell to the ground.Ulep came closer then pumped another bullet to his head,literally blowing his brains out.Ulep: self-defense and fulfilmentof a duty.Issue: w/n Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili.SC:YES. Liable forhomicide-Before thejustifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, ofRPCmay be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.-During the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them, notwithstanding accused-appellant's previous warning shot and verbal admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he would be shot. As a police officer, it is to be expected that accused-appellant would stand his ground. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further advance was justified under the circumstances. After all, a police officer is not required to afford the victim the opportunity to fight back. Neither is he expected - when hard pressed and in the heat of such an encounter at close quarters - to pause for a long moment and reflect coolly at his peril, or to wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof.-However, Ulep cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty during the second stage of the incident - when he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after the latter slumped to the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the police officers. Sound discretion and restraint dictated that Ulep, a veteran policeman, should have ceased firing at the victim the moment he saw the latter fall to the ground. The victim at that point no longer posed a threat and was already incapable ofmounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was obviously unnecessary.-Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim ofself-defense.Thepresenceofunlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. In the present case, the records show that the victim was lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained, and possibly unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life.-The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 ofRPC"a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack ofsome of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present.-The Court likewise credited Ulep with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The police blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately after killing Wapili, accused-appellant reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily surrendered himself.

PEOPLE VS BINDOY- possession of bolo- wounded by-standerMar21G.R. NO. L-34665 August 28, 1931FACTS: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for appelant was stenced to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with the amount of P1,000. The crime charged against the accused is homicide.

In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what;s happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused and with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?HELD: Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused, Pacas and Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the chest without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent because he was only defending his possession of the bolo which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.

"In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act."

6) People vs. Bindoy:Pacas who was trying to retain the possession of the bolo of the accused who was having a quarrel with his wife when the latter refused to drink the tuba, is not liable for the death of Emigdio Omamdam when thebolo struck and pierce his breast. WHY? There is no evidence to show that the accused injured Emigdio deliberately. He was only defending his possession of the bolo. AttemptedhomicideifaccusedwantedtopiercePacasbutinsteadkilledEmigdioprovided that there is intent to kill.

7) People vs Gona- drinking spree- in the dark killed different personAccused wanted to assault Dunca but since it was dark, he inflicted mortal wound with a bolo to Mapudul instead heiscriminallyliableforthedeathofMapudul.Aberratio Ictusis mistake in the blow. It is a manner or incurring criminal liability according toParagraph 1, Article 4, Revised Penal Code. It is amistake in the identity of the victim, which may either be (a) "error in personae" (mistake of the person), or (b) "aberratio ictus" (mistake in the blow), it is neither exempting nor mitigating (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605 [1930]).

8) People vs. Mabugat- sweethearts- killed niece of gfAccused fired a gun toJuanaBuralo(hissweetheartwhorefusedtotakeawalkwithhimbecausetheaccusedvisited another womans house) but because oflack or precision, hit Perfecta (niece of Juana) accusedisguiltyoffrustratedmurderqualified by treachery (because he shot the gun while his victims did not have any chance toprotect themselves)

People vs cagoco- punch at the back of the headThat on or about the 24th day of July, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery, assault and attack one Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head, under conditions which intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon.The next question is whether the crime committed by the defendant should be classified as homicide or murder. Can the defendant be convicted of murder when he did not intend to kill the deceased?We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner. he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) isreclusion temporalin its maximum period to death, and there being present in this case one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to seventeen years, four months, and one day ofreclusion temporal. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Intod vs. CA- fired at the house without the subject Facts: Sulpicio Intod and 3 othermenwent to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4menotherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and herhomewas then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of thePhilippinesargues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, m not impossible.

Issue:Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

Held:UnderArticle4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) thecommissionof the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in thiscategory.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latters wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to thiscategory. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And underArticle4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

People vs Domasian-kidnapping

FACTS:Ponente: Justice Cruz, 1993Petitioner:Pablito Domasianthe kidnapperDr. Samson Tanhe was a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enricos father.Respondent:People of the Philippines, Solicitor-GeneralVictim: Enrico Paulo AgraWitnesses:Enrico Agra, Tirso Ferreras, Enricos Classmate, Alexander GrateTricycle Driver where Agra and Domasian rode, hespeculated that the latter was a kidnapper and reported the incident to thetanods.Events:Enrico was walking with a classmate when a man, Domasian, approached him and asked for his assistance in getting his fathers signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed and rode with him in a tricycle.Forced by petitioner inside a mini-bus, holding him firmly all the while. They rode another tricycle and alighted from where theywalked in a market. Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed a letter address to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boys father.They then boarded the tricycle of Grate, which aroused his the latters suspicion and reported the incident to the barangay tanods, together with Grate, they went afterDomasian and Enrico. They were able to recover Enrico, Domasian escaped.Afternoon of that day, a ransom notearrived to Dr. Agra, asking for 1million pesos in exchange of his son, Enrico, who was able to return homeearlier that day, after having been recovered from Domasian.Dr. Agra identified the handwriting in the letter as Dr. Tans, and this was confirmed by an investigation made by the NBI.Filling of the Case:Regional Trial Court convicted Domasian andTan of KidnappingISSUES:Convictions of Reclusion Perpetua are subject to review by the SupremeCourt.Domasian petitions that he was forced to confess the crime inviolation of his constitutional rights.Tan petitions that his act of crime, if indeed proven, onlyconstituted an impossible crime.W/N the act committed by Dr. Tan constitutes an Impossible Crime. RULING:The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed.Article 4 Section 2 of theRevised Penal Code States: Criminal Liability shall be incurred. By a person committing an act which would be an offenseagainst persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment ofinadequate or ineffectual means.On the matter of Conspiracy: the acts done by Domasian and Tan werecomplementary to each other. Kidnapping of Enrico by Domasian, and Ransom note of Tan, with one end goal in mind, which is, the ransom of 1 million pesos from Dr. Agra.Court held that even before theransom note was received, the crime ofkidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed.The delivery of the ransom note afterthe rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.

People vs. Domasian G.R.No. 95322 March 1, 1993Facts :The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a resident physician in the hospital of the victim's parents. The victim was 8-year old Enrico Agra, who was detained by Domasian and brought to a far place. While they were boarding a tricycle, Domasian was firmly holding Enrico and the boy continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver, and brought about the recovery of the boy even before the ransom notes reached the boy's parents.Upon perusal of the note, Agra's father thought the handwriting was familiar so he compared it with some records in the hospital. It turned out that it was written by Dr. Tan. Both accused were convicted of conspiracy in kidnapping Agra.Constitutional Issues :1. Domasian contends that he was arrested without warrant, tortured and held incommunicado to extort a confession.2. Dr. Tan raised that the hospital documents which was compared to the ransom notes were seized without a search warrant.Ruling :1. Domasian never made a confession.2. The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the government and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on official action.

Gemma T. Jacinto vs.People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009, - taking of the unfunded check

the Supreme Court found an accused guilty of an impossible crime and sentenced her to six (6) months ofarrresto mayor.Here, the accused was a collector for a company called Mega Foam Intl Inc. (Mega Foam) and received a PhP10,000 check as payment from a Mega Foam customer. However, instead of turning over the check to Mega Foam, the accused took the check and had it deposited into her brother-in-laws bank account. It turns out the the check was not funded.Both the regional trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the accused was guilty of qualified theft. The Supreme Court modified the judgment and ruled that the accused was guilty of an impossible crime. According to the Supreme Court:. . . the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioners evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.