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    ACTUS REUS (CONDUCT)

    I. Voluntary/Involuntary Acts

    A. MPC

    1. Conduct must includea. a voluntary actor

    b. the o!ss!on to "#r$or an act o$ %&!c& !s "&ys!cally ca"abl#2. Involuntary acts are

    a. r#$l#' or convuls!on,b. bo!ly ov##nt ur!n unconsc!ousn#ss or sl##",c. &y"nos!s,. boy ov##nt t&at !s not a "rouct o$ t #$$ort or #t#r!nat!on o$ t actor* #!tr

    consc!ous or &ab!tual

    II. O!ss!ons

    A. MPC

    1. No liability for omissions unless

    a. o!ss!ons ar# #'"r#ssly a# su$$!c!#nt by t la%, orb. a uty to "#r$or t act !s r#+u!r# by la%

    B. Tra!t!onal Rul#, A person has no criminal law duty to act to prevent harm to another, even if the person

    imperiled may lose her life in the absence of assistance. This distinuishes between !causin" and!preventin" harm.

    -. Duty !s cr#at# $or o!ss!ons by,

    a. relationshipb. contract to provide carec. creation of ris#d. voluntary assumption of care that isolates the individual

    e. statutory dutiesf. duty to control conduct of another. bad $amaritan laws.

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    MENS REA (MENTA STATE)

    A. MPC S#ct!on .0. 1#n#ral R#+u!r##nts o$ Cul"ab!l!ty

    %Ta#es an &elemental& approach to mens rea%%Inores the common law distinction of &eneral& and &specific& intent%%% 'efault is rec#lessness

    Pur"os#ly( Conscious desire)ob*ect to enae in certain conduct or cause a certain result. +ersonacts purposefully with reard to attendant circumstances if she hopes that that they eist, or if shebelieves or is aware that they eist. Necessary for !specific intent" crimes.

    2no%!nly, Actor is aware that his actions are illeal or illeal result is !practically certain to

    follow from his conduct." Need #nowlede of eternal circumstances.

    R#c3l#ssly, Conscious disreard of a substantial and un*ustified ris# that will result from his

    conduct. $ubstantial and un*ustified involves a ross deviation from the standard of conduct that alaw-abidin person would observe in the actors situation.

    N#l!#ntly, !$hould be aware& that a substantial and un*ustified ris# eists or will result from his

    conduct. /easonable person would have been aware of the ris#. 'istinuished from the others inthat it does not involve a state of awareness. A person is nelient when he !inadvertently creates asubstantial and un*ustifiable ris# of which he ouht to be aware." 0i#e in rec#lessness, the ris#must be substantial and un*ustifiable. hether he ouht to have been aware of it depends onwhether in the circumstances a reasonable person would have eercised care in the situation ivenderee of ris#, purpose of actor3s conduct, circumstances #nown to him4.

    Cul"ab!l!ty R#+u!r# Unl#ss Otr%!s# Prov!#. hen the culpability sufficient to establish a

    material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person actspurposely, #nowinly, or rec#lessly with respect thereto.

    Pr#scr!b# Cul"ab!l!ty R#+u!r##nt A""l!#s to All Mat#r!al El##nts . hen the law definin

    an offense prescribes the #ind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense,without distinuishin amon the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all thematerial elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears

    4. T%o #an!ns o$Mens Rea,

    1. 5eneral sense( It is sufficient that he committed it in a manner that demonstrated bad character,malevolence, and immorality

    2. 6lemental sense( particular to the specific element of the crime. A person can have eneral mensrea, but not satisfy the elemental mens rea, and wont be uilty.

    C. 1#n#ral v. S"#c!$!c Int#nt

    1. 5eneral Intent( A crime that isnt &specific.& 7ost crimes are eneral.

    2. $pecific Intent( Includes an intent or purpose to do some future act, or to achieve some further

    conse8uence beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the actus reus of the offense . The actormust be aware of a statutory attendant circumstance. burlary4

    9. The 7+C proposes doin away with these distinctions

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    Conduct Circumstances /esult $tandard

    +urposely Consciousob*ective to enaein act

    :nowlede ofcircumstancesre8uired

    Conscious ob*ectiveto cause the harm

    $ub*ective

    :nowinly Aware that conduct

    is illeal

    :nowlede of

    circumstancesre8uired

    Aware that illeal

    result is !practicallycertain to follow fromconduct"

    $ub*ective

    /ec#lessnessawareness ofa ris#4

    /e8uires awarenessof a ris# andconscious disreardof it

    Consciouslydisreardssubstantial andun*ustifiable ris#

    Consciouslydisreards substantialand un*ustifiable ris#

    $ub*ective);b*ective

    Nelientlyno state ofawarenessneeded4

    hen inadvertentlycreates substantialand un*ustifiableris# of which heouht to have been

    aware

    $ame $ame ;b*ective

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    STRICT IA4IIT5

    A. D#$!n!t!on,A crime that does not conta!n a mens rear#+u!r##ntreardin one or more of the elements

    of actus reus

    4. MPC .06

    1. Rul#( There is no strict liability. 7ens rea and actus reus must be proven to be uilty of a crime.

    2. E'c#"t!on( There is strict liability for offenses raded as &violations& rather than &crimes&

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    a. Rul#, 7ista#e of fact is only a defense if the mista#e is reasonable ob*ective4. It is not adefense if the mista#e is unreasonable.

    b. E'a"l#( ' has se with

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    B. MPC(

    -. Rul#( 7ista#e of law is not a defense. E'c#"t!ons,

    a. /easonable reliance doctrine( A persons belief that he conduct is lawful is a defense if(i. $he relies on an official, but erroneous statement of the law, and

    ii. The statemt of law is found ini. a statute or other enactment

    ii. a *udicial decision, opinion, or *udmentiii. an administrative order or rant of permissioniv. an official interpretation of the public officer or body chared by law with

    responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of thelaw definin the offense, and

    iii. The reliance is otherwise reasonable

    a. @air notice doctrine( A persons belief that he conduct is lawful is a defense if(i. It is not #nown to her, and

    ii. It was not published or otherwise reasonably made available to her before she

    bro#e the law

    C. Tra!t!onal(1. 1#n#ral Rul#,7ista#e of law is not a defense. People v. arrero !Even reliance on one"s own reasonable interpretation of the law is not a

    defense. 7arrero '4, a federal corrections officer, was convicted of unlawful possession of apistol under a statute containin an eemption for !peace officers." The statutory definition of!peace officers" included !correction officers of any state correction facility or any penalcorrectional institution." 7arrero claimed that he relied on interpretations of fellow officers andteachers, as well as the lanuae of the statute itself, in formin his belief that he could carry apistol. >e was uilty anyway.

    . E'c#"t!onsa. R#asonabl# r#l!anc# octr!n#

    i. Rul#, /easonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, but laterdetermined erroneous, obtained from a person with responsibility of interpretin,enforcin, or administerin the law is a defense.

    ii. @or it to be official, it must be(1. A statute later declared invalid2. A *udicial decision of the hihest court in the *urisdiction, later determined

    to be erroneous9. An official, but erroneous, interpretation secured from a public officer

    with responsibility of interpretin, enforcin, or administerin the lawAttorney 5eneral4.

    iii. /eliance on ones own reasonable interpretation of the law is not a defense seeabove4

    #nited $tates v. Albertini( Albertini '4 had enaed in a peace demonstration on a

    >awaii naval base after bein barred from enterin the installation by itscommander. >is entry constituted a violation of ?$ Code, and he was convicted ofthe offense. ;n appeal, the Hth Circuit reversed the conviction in !Albertini I", onthe rounds that the 1st Amendment protected Albertini3s riht to demonstrate atthe base. After the reversal, Albertini demonstrated several more times. $upreme

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    Court eventually reversed Hth Circuit3s decision in Albertini I. 5overnment thenpressed its prosecution on the second roup of demonstrations and obtained aconviction.

    b. Lambert

    i. ' was a 0A resident and a felon. There was a statute re8uirin e-felons to

    reister, but she didnt, because she didnt #now the law. $upreme Court said thatshe wasnt uilty, even thouh not #nowin the law is almost never a defense. Tobe interpreted eceedinly strictly, $C loo#ed at(

    1. >er act was an omission, not an affirmative act2. >er duty to act was imposed on basis of status, not an activity9. The offense was malum in prohibitum.

    c. Collat#ral M!sta3# o$ a%,'s lac# of #nowlede of, or misunderstandin as to the

    meanin or application of, another law, usually non-penal, neates the mens reafound inthe definition of the crime.

    i. $pecific intent crimes1. %heek v. #$( ', an anti-ta activist, failed ot file ta returns, despite

    receivin waes each year. >e was chared with &wilfully& failin to filetaes. >e willfuly did this, but, after attendin seminars, he actuallybelieved that &waes& werent &income,& so he didnt report them.$upreme Court found that if he really believed that waes werent income,he couldnt be uilty.

    ii. 5eneral intent1. Rul#, There is no defense for a eneral intent collateral mista#e of law.

    d. Statutory 3no%l## r#+u!r##nt, A statute re8uires #nowlede of the law, and youdon3t have it

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    CAUSATION

    A. D#$!n!t!on, Causation assesses whether there is a sufficient relationship between the defendant3s conductand the harm that occurs. ;nly arises for a !result" crime. Cause means !leal)proimate."

    4. MPC

    -. Actual Caus#

    a. Applies the but for,sine &ua nonrule.b. &Cause& is defined as an antecedent but for which the result in 8uestion would not have

    occurred.c. ith concurrent sufficient causes, the &result& crime should be characteri=ed as if both

    were necessary death by two unshot wounds4. Therefore, both will be uilty. ;therwise,both would be able to et off, because neither was the but for cause.

    . Pro'!at# Caus#

    a. ' is not the cause if his act was &too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a *ustbearin on the actors liability or on the ravity of his offense&

    b. If there is an offense with no culpability re8uirement, causation is not established unlessthe actual result is a probably conse8uence of the actors conduct.

    c. 'oes not apply traditional law &proimate cause& approach

    C. Tra!t!onal

    1. But for test sina &ua non( actual cause4a. But for 's voluntary acts, would the social harm have occurred when it didb. Actual cause

    2. $ufficiently closely connected to the result proimate cause4

    a. If the death is a &direct& outcome of 's act, then proimate cause is not an issueb. If the death is not a direct outcome, a factor test is applied. This test includes

    foreseeability, but its not the whole test.c. The two tests provided below are the two etremes( there are a whole rane of possibilities

    in between.

    !. 7ors##ab!l!ty o$ ult!at# &ar

    1. D#$!n!t!on( Fou must only foresee the ultimate harm that can result fromyour action, whether its caused by your action or not

    Ar'on( '. set fire to a couch. hen the firemen arrived, they were trapped

    between the flames of that fire and an independent arson fire on the floorbelow, and one died. Althouh fire2 was independent from fire1, fire1 stillcontributed to the death. 5uilty. It doesnt say the &manner& in whichsomeone dies has to be foreseeable. Just that someone dies. The other fireis irrelevant.

    2. Probl#( If the fireman is in the burnin house and lihtnin comesthrouh the window(

    a. But for( yesb. Closely related( its irrelevant that the lihtnin #illed him,

    because death was foreseeable from the act. But the act wascompletely unrelated.

    !!. 7ors##ab!l!ty o$ !#!at# tr!#r!n caus#

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    1. D#$!n!t!on( Fou must foresee the eact way in which the harm comesabout

    (arner)*ambert( ' corporation allows flammable substances to

    accumulate, despite warnins. $omethin spar#s the fire, and many peopleare #illed. They arent sure what started the fire. Not uilty. No proimate

    cause( ;pposite result ofAr'on hy wasnt it foreseeable They dont#now what the trier was. This is a different test. They dont care whatstarted the second fire. >ere, the test is that &the eact way in which thatharm comes about is foreseeable.& They care about #nowin who startedthe fire.

    9. Intervenin Causes

    a. D#$!n!t!on, An indepenedent force that produces social harm, but which comes about after's voluntary act has been committed.

    b. hen there is human intervention, it may or may not cut off liabilityc. 7actors

    i. Is the human action a response to what the ' did

    $tephenson v. $tate( ' sub*ected woman to seual perversion. hen sheleft to buy a hat, she bouht mercury. $he then #illed herself. ' uilty ofmurder, because his actions were causally related to her death. ope is not the mensrea for murder.

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    4URDENS O7 PROO7

    A. MPC

    1. Burden of production!The prosecution has it reardin all elements of an offense. The prosecutionis not re8uired to disproveany affirmative defenses unless there is evidence supportin suchdefense.

    2. Burden of persuasion! The prosecution must prove every element of an offense beyond a

    reasonable doubt. The term !element" also includes conduct that !neatives an ecuse or*ustification" for the action. The prosecution must disprove defenses, assumin that the defense hassatisfied its burden of production this doesn3t apply to defenses that the 7+C re8uires thedefendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence4.

    4. Tra!t!onal

    -. 4ur#n o$ Prouct!on

    a. D#$!n!t!on( Identifies the party on who is placed the initial obliation to introduce evidenceat trial to support the particular leal claim in 8uestion.

    i. ho carries the burden

    1. The prosecution normally has this burden reardin all !elements" of thecrime. The defense usually has this burden reardin all affirmativedefenses

    i. >ow reat is the burden1. +rosecution( beyond a reasonable doubt. 'efense( varies by *urisdiction.

    Could be !a scintilla of evidence" or !a reasonable doubt"

    . 4ur#n o$ P#rsuas!on

    a. D#$!n!t!on( 'etermines who is obliated to convince the *ury of the accuracy of theparticular factual claim in 8uestion. The prosecution must prove every element of anoffense beyond a reasonable doubt, and ecept in certain limited circumstances, aleislature may allocate to the defendant the burden of persuasion reardin !facts not

    formally identified as elements of the offense chared." +roblem( The courts havedifficulty definin whether a fact relates to an element of an offense or a defense

    i. ho carries the burden1. +rosecution Gth and 1Dth Amendments42. (inship +octrine( A person is presumed innocent, so a prosecution must

    persuade the *ury beyond a reasonable doubt of !every fact necessary toconstitute the crime chared." Althouh this increases the ris# that a uiltyperson will o free, this is better than an innocent person bein convicted.$upreme Court said that burden of proof is a constitutional re8uirement,because the social disutility of incorrect convictions is worse than thesocial disutility of an incorrect ac8uittal

    ullaney v. (ilbur( he burden of proving all elements of the crime rests on the prosecution.Aperson was convicted of murder in 7aine. The 7aine statute says that for murder, you have toprove malice aforethouht but if the ovt. proves intent, malice aforethouht is presumed. The '.appealed on the rounds that the 7aine statute shifts the burden of disprovingmalice aforethouhtto the '., which violates the due process clause of the Constitution. The $upreme Court areedwith the '., because !malice aforethouht" is an element, not an affirmative defense.

    Patterson v. -ew ork(A state can shift the burden of proof for an affirmative defense to the

    defense. A man #illed his e-wife3s boyfriend. >e claimed that it was an !etreme emotional

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    disturbance." New For#3s laws do not re8uire !malice aforethouht" for a crime. $o it does notshift the burden of disprovin that to the '. /ather, the New For# law classifies !etremeemotional disturbance" as an affirmative defense, mitiatin murder to manslauhter. >oldin( Astate leislature can re8uire the defense to prove all affirmative defenses if it wants to, as lon asthe affirmative defense doesn3t !neative" an element of the crime. $o this is not in conflict withullaney, because inullaney, the defense was forced to !neative" an element of the crime

    malice aforethouht4

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    9OMICIDE

    I. MPC

    A. Ov#rv!#%, Cr!!nal 9o!c!#.

    1. A person is uilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, #nowinly, rec#lessly or neliently causes

    the death of another human bein.

    2. Criminal homicide is murder, manslauhter or nelient homicide.

    4. Mur#r

    1. Rul#, A person commits a murder when the homicide is committed

    a. purposely or #nowinly or

    b. rec#lessly under circumstances manifestin etreme indifference to the value of human life

    depraved heart4

    i. +resumed if the actor is enaed, an accomplice, or attemptin to commit robbery,rape, deviate seual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burlary,#idnappin or felonious escape.

    2. Abandons malice aforethouht

    9. 7#lony Mur#r( ta#es care of this by includin enumerated felonies. It is not re8uired that a *uryfind this is true, only that it mayinfer it.

    D. 1ra!n( 7urder is a felony of the first deree

    C. Manslau&t#r

    1. Rul#, Criminal homicide constitutes manslauhter when

    a. it is committed rec#lessly or

    b. a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of e/treme

    mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable e/planation or e/cuse. Thereasonableness of such eplanation or ecuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of aperson in the actors situation under the circumstances as he believes them to becompletely sub*ective4

    i. $ub*ective component( &etreme emotional disturbance&

    ii. ;b*ective component( &for which there is a reasonable eplanation or ecuse&

    1. Its not whether the &homicide& is reasonable, but whether the &etreme

    emotional disturbance& is reasonable2. This is partially sub*ective, because it is considered from the &viewpoint of

    a person in the actors situation under the circumstances as he believesthem to be&

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    9. This includes personal handicaps but the idiosyncratic moral values mustnot be included.

    a. >omophobia does not count for 676' if you #ill a ay personwho solicits se

    !!!. Co"ar!son %!t& 9OP (uc& broa#r)

    1. All that must be proven is that there was a reasonable 676'. Fou neednot prove that there was an eplicit provocation

    2. If there is a provocation, you need not prove that there was in*ury.9. If there is provocation, it doesnt need to fall within cateories. Also,

    words alone can constitute 676'.D. No coolin off rule

    People v. %assassa( ' had dated victim, who re*ected him. >e obsessed, stal#ed,

    and #iller her. >is defense was that he was actin under 676'. Court(reasonableness will not etend to people withpeculiarities

    . Tr# !s no n#l!#nt anslau&t#r

    a. There is no liability for manslauhter committed with criminal nelience. Theremust be a consciousdisreard of a substantial and un*ustifiable ris#

    :. D!st!nct!on b#t%##n Mur#r an Manslau&t#r %!t& r#c3l#ssn#ss

    a. @or murder, rec#lessness must manifest etreme indifference to value of human lifeb. @or rec#less manslauhter, it needs to merely be rec#less

    D. 1ra!n( 7anslauhter is a felony of the second deree.

    D. N#l!#nt 9o!c!# (Involuntary Manslau&t#r)

    1. Rul#, Criminal homicide constitutes nelient homicide when it is committed neliently.

    2. 1ra!n( Nelient homicide is a felony of the third deree

    II. Tra!t!onal

    A. Ov#rv!#%

    1. A criminal homicide is a #illin without *ustification or ecuse

    2. Criminal homicide is @irst 'eree 7urder, $econd 'eree 7urder, 'epraved >eart 7urder,

    @elony 7urder,

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    iii. 'epraved >eart( /ec#lessness K indifference to an un*ustifiably hih ris# to humanlife(

    iv. Intent to commit a felony

    . 1ra!n

    a. @irst 'eree 7urderi. 7urders that are committed in a statutorily specified manner lyin in wait,

    poison4ii. illful, deliberate, and premeditated #illins

    iii. 7urders committed in attempt or commission of a felony

    b. $econd 'eree 7urder

    i. All murders that aren3t first deree murder

    :. Analys!s o$ Pr##!tat!on

    a. T#sts

    i. -o time is too short for premeditation

    %ommonwealthv. %arroll ! >usband and wife lyin in bed, havin an arument.

    ife was sayin mean thins, had abused children. @ive minutes later husbandpic#ed up un and shot her. Court ruled that no t!# !s too s&ortto establishpremeditation. Trier of fact decides whether there was premeditation so meaninbehind distinction is irrelevant4. Time doesn3t matter if it was intentional. Also '3spsychiatric evidence is wea#Lthis is for the trier of fact to decide.

    ii. here must be reflection on intent, and there must be time after formation of theintent in order to reflect for premeditation re&uirement to be met

    $tate v. 1uthrie( There must be reflection on intent, and there must be time after

    formation of the intent in order to reflect.or#er snapped in nose by co-wor#er,and stabs man in nec#. Court says pre-meditation must mean somethin, so ointhey put it bac# into law. 7ust involve some amount of time. hat definition ofpre-meditation is now 'ifference between standard in Carrol and 5uthrie 7ustelapse some amount of time. At what point does cloc# start clic#in +roof ofpremeditation in three cateories(

    iii. To find pre-meditation and deliberation, must have evidence of

    1. defendants actions prior to the #illin2. a motive or reason from which the *ury could reasonably infer defendant3s

    intent to #ill, or9. a manner of #illin from which the *ury could reasonably infer was

    deliberately calculated to cause death.

    Anderson( Boyfriend was home with irlfriend3s ten year old dauhter he stabbed

    her M times, blood everywhere, so he chased her. $upreme court of Californiareduced punishment on rounds that no pre-meditation fact stabbed her all overshowed that he did it in a rae if premeditated he would have stabbed in the heart

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    raise the 8uestion of pre-meditation,. Is Andersen less culpable Time bomb personE is that person any less culpable then the one who thin#s about it

    b. Probl#( hat about premeditated #illins that are morally less culpable

    ercy killing case( '. premeditates for wee#s sobbin with emotion and shoots father. This

    meets every re8uirement of premeditation, but is also less culpable. 'oes it ma#e sensethat premeditation is the symbol of worst crime 'epends on other circumstances. 7+Cre*ects it all toether and *ust has intentional crime worst unless mitiated by etremeemotional disturbance, and then it is manslauhter.

    c. S"#c!al Rul#s

    i. 'eadly eapon /ule( If you #ill someone with a deadly weapon, intent is imputed

    ii. Natural and +robable Conse8uences /ule( If you beat someone with a pipe, thenthe natural and probable conse8uence is that they will die. Foure uilty.

    C. D#"rav# 9#art Mur#r

    1. D#$!n!t!on( An etremely rec#less #illin that shows etreme indifference to the value of human

    life

    2. Rul#, The *ury must consider(

    i. The actors awareness of the ris#

    ii. 7anitude of the ris#iii. Justification

    :. M#asur# by ob;#ct!v# an sub;#ct!v# stanar,i. ;b*ective( /easonable man( >ow much of a departure of what the reasonable person

    would do was the conduct

    ii. $ub*ective( /e8uirement that '. actually be aware of the ris#. Test( Jury considers 's mensreato aue awareness.

    iii. 6ception(

    1. 2nto/ication. /eplace sub*ective standard with ob*ective standard. The ' need notbe aware of the ris#.

    #$ v. 3leming( Actual awareness isnt re8uired if its voluntary drun#enness that prevents

    him from bein aware. 'run# drive drove into oncomin traffic many times. >ih dereeof ris# and no ood reason for ta#in the ris#. as he rec#less L As lon as the *ury caninfer that he was aware. They will infer he was aware because it is such a ross deviationand because they can3t consider the fact that he was drun#.

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    %ommonwealth v. alone( Two #ids playin /ussian /oulette. ;ne #id put un to other3s

    head and pulled trier. >e did not epect un to o off. 5uilty of depraved heart murder.Court finds !malice" needed to distinuish murder from manslauhter what rec#less#illin usually is4. 7alice( a eneral evil desin of a wic#ed heart. !7alice" is met whensomeone commits an act of ross nelience for which he must reasonably anticipate that

    death to another is li#ely to result . . ." >ere Court says the death was !li#ely" to resultbecause the un had a M chance of oin off. $o a ross form of rec#lessness with adepraved and wic#ed heart. Indifference to human life. T botto l!n# !s %tr r#%as %!ll!nn#ss to cr#at# a r!s3 o$ #at& $or a r#ally ba r#ason.

    !!. O!ss!ons can count as %#ll

    $tate v. +avidson ! 's rottweiler dos escape, as they had many times before and #ill the

    +s child. Court held her uilty of rec#less second deree murder

    People v. Burden! ' lets his child starve to death. Court held him uilty of second deree

    murder, because &an omission of a duty is in law the e8uivalent of an act and when death

    results, the standard for determination of the deree of homicide is identical.&

    D. 7#lony Mur#r

    -. At Coon a%,

    a. A person was uilty of murder if a homicide occurred durin the commission of a felony,reardless of mental state. This has since been abolished in 6nland

    . Tra!t!onal

    a. 1ra!n

    i. @irst deree murder( If a death results from an enumerated felony typically arson,

    rape, burlary, or robbery4

    People v. $tamp1HH4( ' burlari=ed < and < died of a heart attac# had

    a heart condition4. ' is uilty of murder 1st deree4. Fou ta#e your victimas you find him. 0imitation( The death must be a direct causal result of thefelony. But it need not be foreseeable result

    ii. $econd deree murder( A death that results from an unspecified felony

    iii. Note( These are considered !strict liability," because malice doesn3t have to be

    proven. Intent to commit the felony constitutes the implied malice re8uired formurder

    b. !!tat!ons on t rul#

    i. Inherently 'anerous @elony /ule

    1. Rul#, The felony must be inherently danerous to be convicted of felonymurder

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    /eina v. $erne ( 5uy set fire to his house and his sons burned to death.

    Not uilty. Because the felony was not in itself inherently danerous tolife Not an accurate depiction of law.

    People v. $atchell( ' is an e felon who shoots and #ills man in fiht with

    shotun. Is possession of a weapon by e felon inherently danerousCourt held not uilty offelony murder, because an e felon possessin aweapon is not inherently danerous.

    . T#sts,

    a. Abstract V!#%CA4

    i. Rul#, Inore the facts of the specified case, and loo# atthe offense as defined by statute

    People v. Phillips( Chiropractor swindled money out of

    parents by convincin them to use his help instead of have

    surery for dauhter with cancer of the eye. 5irl died.5rand theft was the felony. Court says should have beenno instruction on felony murder because rand theft is nota felony inherently danerous to human life. ' is laterconvicted of depraved heart. Court decides if a felony isinherently danerous by loo#in at it in the abstract. Courtloo#s at the nature of the crime, not the way it wascommitted circumstances of the felony i.e. here it was amedical fraud so aruably more danerous4. CA doesn3tli#e felony murder so pic#s the view that is mostrestrictive. 7ost states loo# at the circumstances4.

    b. Narro% v!#%7a*ority view4

    !. Rul#( 0oo# at the facts of the particular case, not in theabstract

    ii. Rat!onal#, If the purpose of the @7/ is to ma#e felonsmore careful while committin the felony, then you shouldo in the concrete to punish those who arent careful

    People v. $tewart( ' 7other on crac# bine nelects child

    and he dies. Court held that the felony doesnt have to beinherently danerous in the abstract parental nelect4 in

    order to et conviction for felony murder.

    ii. 7erer doctrinea. Rul#( If the felony is notindependent of the homicide, then the felony

    mergeswith the homicide and cannot serve as the basis for a felony-murder conviction

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    b. Rat!onal#, If the purpose is to deter the felon from accidentally #illin,

    this can only wor# if the felon actually has a purpose other than to assaultor #ill.

    People v. (ilson( ' and boyfriend beat two year old child to death. '

    chared with felony murder. Court holds that, because the felony battery4was an interal part of the homicide, it couldnt be felony murder.

    ' enters house in order to #ill a woman, which he does. This is considered

    a burlary felony4 because he bro#e into a dwellin with intent to commita felony therein. >owever, it cant be @7, cus burlary meres.

    iii. Causation

    a. Rul#, There must be a causal relationship between the felonyand thehomicide

    People v. $tewart

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    a. Rul#, A felon is responsible for any death proimately resultin from thefelony, whether the shooter is a felon or a third party.

    b. Rat!onal#( Any events set in motion by a felon3s acts were foreseeable

    . Rat!onal#s $or 7#lony Mur#r

    i. 'eterrence of rec#less, nelient, and accidental #illins durin a felony

    1. @or( The enhanced ris# of bein convicted of murder will deter danerous

    behavior2. Aainst( Fou can3t deter an unintentional act. There is no empirical

    evidence in favor of the deterrence arument. ;nly .G of felonies resultin murder, and this doesn3t even distinuish between intentional andunintentional #illins

    ii. The rule reaffirms the sanctity of human life

    0. @or( ;ur society believes that commission of a felony resultin in death ismore serious, and therefore, deserves more punishment, than a felony thatdoesn3t result in death.

    5. Aainst( 6ven if this is true, it doesn3t mean that the felon should besub*ect to the harshestpunishments. e must consider the felon3sculpability, not *ust the result

    iii. It eases the prosecution3s burden of proof

    1. @or( Because malice is implied if the criminal is already committin a

    felony, the prosecution doesn3t have to prove malice for the actual murder.This ma#es it easier to convict felony-murder perpetrators.

    2. Aainst( 6ven when a felon doesn3t !intend" to #ill the victim, often theirmens rea will amount to a !depraved heart." Therefore, the felony-murderrule is unnecessary to convict. Fet even when the prosecution can prove!depraved heart murder," it often will choose the felony-murder ruleinstead, because it3s easier. This isn3t riht.

    E. MANSAU19TER

    1. D#$!n!t!on( An unlawful #illin of a human bein by another human bein without maliceaforethouht.

    . Voluntary Manslau&t#r

    a. D#$!n!t!on( An intentional #illin committed in !sudden heat of passion." 7itiatedbecause of provocation

    b. Rul#,

    i. The actor must have acted in the heat of passion1. $ub*ective( as he really in >;+

    ii. The passion must have been the result of ade8uate provocation

    1. ;b*ective( Ade8uate provocation must be reasonable

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    iii. The actor must not have had a reasonable opportunity to cool off

    iv. There must be a causal lin# between the provocation, the passion, and the

    homicide

    c. Analys!s o$ >a#+uat# "rovocat!on>

    i. Coon la% cat#or!#s o$ "#r!ss!bl# "rovocat!on( Assault or battery, Combat,Commission of a serious crime aainst a close relative, Illeal arrest, ;bservationby a husband of his wife committin adultery

    ii. Coon la% cat#or!#s o$ !"#r!ss!bl# "rovocat!on,Trivial battery, 0earnin

    about, but not discoverin, adultery, $eein seual unfaithfulness of someone whois not a spouse, ords are not enouh

    1irouard v. $tate( ife insulted 's seual prowess, and he stabbed her to death.

    Court held that words alone do not constitute ade8uate provocation to mitiate

    murder to manslauhter. +rovocation not enouh here to ma#e reasonable man stabwife.

    aher v. People( ' suspected his wife was cheatin on him. >e shot his wifes

    lover, and was chared with assault with intent to murder. Court held that *uriescould consider words overheard as well as conduct witnessed in determininprovocation.

    People v. %assassa( ' had dated victim, who re*ected him. >e obsessed, stal#ed,

    and #iller her. >is defense was that he was actin under 676'. Court(reasonableness will not etend to people withpeculiarities

    !!!. Stanar $or %tr %as !n 9OP, Sub;#ct!v#

    1. ?u#st!on, as the '. in the heat of passion

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    aher v. People(2f a killing, though intentional, is committed in the heat

    of passion produced by a reasonable provocation before a reasonable time

    has lapsed for the passion to cool and is the result of temporary

    e/citement rather than ones personal depravity, it is manslaughter, rather

    than murder. N;T reasonableness of #illin but of the reasonableness ofbecomin upset at the provocation not deree, but that you would become

    very upset4 >omoseual advances as provocation p. D12

    :. Involuntary Manslau&t#r

    a. D#$!n!t!on( An nelient unintentional #illin that occurs durin the commission or

    attempted commission of an unlawful act.

    %ommonwealth v. (elansky! ' failed to alleviate serious fire ha=ards in his niht club that

    eisted prior to the deadly bla=e that erupted one niht. >ad duty to provide for safety ofpatrons. Involuntary manslauhter consists of wanton or rec#less conduct. Convictedbecause found failure oes beyond mere nelience into rec#lessness. 7ens rea refers todeath of other human beins. >ow out of ordinary is your behavior /is# you ta#e

    *ustifiable

    $tate v. (illiams! +arents '4 didn3t ta#e #id to hospital because scared. >e dies. Is

    nelience ever sufficient +eople who are not even aware that runnin ris#. 'idn3t thin#ris# of death Could have ta#en baby to doctor. Could say loved child. Nelience hereused to et involuntary manslauhter.

    b. M!s##anor Manslau&t#r (Unla%$ul Act Doctr!n#)

    i. Rul#, An accidental homicide that occurs durin the commission of an unlawful

    act not amountin to a felony, constitutes involuntary manslauhter

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    ATTEMPT IA4IIT5

    A. D#$!n!t!ons,

    1. Complete, but imperfect attempt( The actor performs all of the acts that she sets out to do, but failsto attain her criminal oal.

    a. E'a"l#( ' fires a un point blan# at

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    solicitin an innocent aent to enae in conduct constitutin an elementof the crime.

    iii. This focuses on how much a person has doneas opposed to what remains to be

    done

    c. R#sult an C!rcustanc#s not r#+u!r#

    :. Not#s

    a. Attempt to aid1. A person may be convicted of a criminal attempt, although a crime was neither

    committed nor attempted by another, ifa. The purpose of her conduct is to aid another in the commission of the

    offense, andb. $uch assistance would have made her an accomplice in the commission of

    the crime under the Codes complicity statute

    2. /ationale( A person who attempts to aid a non-attempted crime is as danerous as

    someone who aids an attempted crime

    b. To analy=e an attempt under 7+C, you must(i. 'etermine whether its a complete or incomplete attempt

    1. If its a complete attempt, is the taret offense a &result& crime murder4 ora &conduct& crime drivin drun#4. ?se the &mens rea& sectionO

    2. If its an incomplete attempt, you must use the &conduct& section

    C. Coon a%/Tra!t!onal

    -. El##nts,

    a. M#ns R#a,Attempt is a specific intent offense. No liability for a rec#less attempt.

    i. The actor must intentionally commit the acts that constitute the actus reus of anattempt, and

    ii. The actor must perform these acts with the specific intention of committin the

    taret crime.1. In most *urisdictions, #nowlede is sufficient for specific intent(

    :nowlede of a practical certainty that its oin to happen. Its not#nowlede of a ris# that it will certainly will happen.

    iii. /esults( If the crime is a result crime, the actor s action in furtherance of the

    prohibited result must be committed with the specific purpose of causin the result

    !v. E'a"l#s

    1. 7ust have specific intent( /ec#lessness)Nelience do not satisfy thespecific intent necessary for attempt. 6. Blindfold myself, shoot into acrowd, #ill someone, its depraved heart murder. If I do the same, but onlyin*ure someone, it IS NOTattempted depraved heart murder, becausespecific intent purpose4 is re8uired, and only rec#lessness is the mens reahere.

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    $mallwood v. $tate( +erson with AI'$ rapes three women Chared with

    attempted murder. $tate li#ens it to assault with a deadly weapon. It saysthat if you assault someone with a deadly weapon, intent to #ill is inferredthe deadly weapon is evidence of that4. This is an appeal. The prosecutiononly has to show that there is evidence enouh that a reasonable fact findercould find specific intent. This uy put a deadly weapon to these people

    and pulled a trier. The court says that this isnt enouh. Tr# %as no#v!#nc# "rov!# t&at t !rls %#r# l!3#ly to #t 9IV. Unl!3# r#ular

    ur#r* r!s3 !s not #nou&.5ou ust &av# actual s"#c!$!c !nt#nt* andthe fact finder cant infer specific intent if there isnt any other evidence.0ow ris# behavior would be enouh to convict if there was other evidenceif he had said &Im oin to #ill these women&4 'oesnt challenetraditional rule, but shows difficulty of applyin it

    b. Actus R#us,

    i. The 68uivocality Test(1. D#$!n!t!on, Actus reus of attempt should by itself un8uestionably show

    that the actor is tryin to commit a crime. ;therwise, the defendant3s

    behavior is e8uivocal E that is, e8uivalent with either innocent or criminalpurpose.

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    D. Pun!snt o$ Att#"ts

    1. Common law( they were misdemeanors, no matter how heinous the underlyin offense.2. Traditional( they are punished less severely sometimes 1)2 the time for underlyin offense4.9. 7+C( punishes attempt *ust as severely as the crime attempted because it considers an unsuccessful

    criminal *ust as danerous as a successful one.

    E. 9o!c!# Probl#s1. Attempted @elony 7urder

    a. All but two state hold that attempted felony murder is not an offenseb. E'a"l#( ' robs a ban#, durin which, his un unintentionally oes off and someone dies.

    5uilty of murder under felony murder doctrine. But if the un unintentionally oes off,and nobody dies, then you cant be uilty of attempted felony murder. This would ma#eyou uilty of murder for the commission of any inherently dangerous felony.

    2. Attempted 7anslauhter

    a.

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    factual and leal impossibility. This seems arbitrarily drawn E in both cases it is a factualimpossibility. Court( The TC *ury found uilty of murder so they must have decided heintended to #ill

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    #.$. v. Berrigan( ' brins in and out of prison letters. +rohibition to do this

    without consent of warden. arden #nows thouh, and consents to it. Court( sincewarden did #now, the 's intent couldnt be a crime( leal impossibility. Test( ifetraneous circumstances un#nown to the actor or beyond control, he is preventedfrom consummatin the crime. BA' T6$T. The distinction between factual and

    leal impossibility is useless. They want to ma#e this distinction because theydon3t want *ust any act toward the crime to be enouh. But is the confusindistinction worth it he only situation of true legal impossibility is where +commits a crime that doesnt e/ist.

    II. Abanon#nt (r#nunc!at!on)

    1. 7+Ca. Rul#, A person is not uilty of an attempt if

    i. she abandons her effort to commit the crime or prevents it from bein committed,and

    ii. her conduct manifests a complete and voluntary renunciation of her criminalpurpose

    iii. Cannot be motivated by anythin other than absolute remorse and repentance. Ifshe abandons because somethin ets in her way or discouraes her fromcompletin the crime, it isnt a defense victim bein more resistant than shethouht, cant find condom, etc.4

    2. Traditional

    a. Rul#, abandonment is typically not a defense.b. E'a"l#, 7an who ta#es a irl home, beins to undress her to rape her, and then hears her

    sob story

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    COMPICIT5

    I. Introuct!on

    1. D#$!n!t!on( Complicity is when somebody can be accountable for a crime perpetrated by somebodyelse.

    2. Two types(

    a. Accomplice 0iabilityi. Rul#,A person may be held liable for anothers conduct if he assists the other in

    committin an offense

    b. Conspiratorial 0iabilityi. Rul#( A person may be held accountable for the conduct of a co-conspirator who

    commits a crime in furtherance of their areement

    II. Acco"l!c# !ab!l!ty

    A. Coon a%

    1. Two rades of bein a principala. @irst deree primary actor4

    b. $econd deree actually or constructively present4

    2. Two rades of bein an accessorya. Before the fact wasnt present, but encouraed, helpful, counseled4b. After the fact helped after the crime( in modern times, this is a misdemeanor4

    4. Tra!t!onal a%

    1. Rul#,$ is an accomplice of + if he intentionally assists + to enae in the conduct that constitutesthe crime.

    2. 'erivative liability( It is not a substantive crime. Its a way of bein accountable for a crimecommitted by primary actor. >owever, you are not uilty of a lesser crime either( you are uilty ofthe actual crime the primary actor commits.

    9. It is distinct from vicarious liability, where you can be held liable *ust because of your status to theactor for bein an employer4. /ather, youre accountable because of your own conduct andculpability mens rea4( so we have to analy=e it throuh the conduct, mens rea lens.

    D. 5eneral 7ens /ea /e8uired

    a. The intent purpose4 to assist the primary party, andb. The intent purpose4 that the primary party commit the offense chared

    G. 6lements

    a. M#ns R#a

    i. Conuct(1. Rul#, +urpose to aid) encourae the primary actor to enae in underlyin

    offense

    $tate v. 1ladstone( ou can"t be guilty of aiding and abetting where you have no

    connection to the principal.+olice officer went undercover to buy pot from '. 'said he didnt have any, but directed him to a seller. >e drew a map for him. +olicethen went to seller and bouht pot. Court found him not uilty of aidin andabettin sale of mari*uana by seller. All he does is ive the cop the directions anddraw the map. >e didnt have any connection with the seller, or the purpose to forthe seller to complete a sale. >e wasnt chared with aidin the purchase of pot,

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    only the sale. Court says there is no complicity, because there was no interactionbtw) ' and the perpetrator. This is bad. If someone is runnin from a murderer, andyou dont #now the murderer, and you trip the victim. Foull be uilty, even thouhyou didnt #now the perpetrator.

    9icks v. #$(A person can"t be an accomplice unless encouragement was intended

    to encourage the murder.>ic#s was *ointly indicted with /owe for murder ofColvard. itnesses didnt hear everythin, but they saw /owe raise a un towardColvard three times. >ic#s said to Colvard &ta#e off your hat and die li#e a man&/owe #illed Colvard, and they rode off toether. /owe was #illed in an attempt toarrest him. >ic#s claims that he didnt encourae him to #ill Colvard, but wasthreatenin to Colvard because he was afraid /owe would shoot >ic#s. Not uilty.Court says that he had the intent to aid and abet, and that was sufficient. >e didnthave to have intent for /owe to #ill Colvard.

    ii. R#sult(-. Rul#, +urpose for the conduct that results in result crime. E'a"l#s,

    i. cvay( >e clearly had the purpose to aid in the very conduct thatproduced result

    Russell( Not sure, because its not clear if he intended to aid in

    conduct that resulted in death

    iii. C!rcustanc#s(1. Rul#, +urpose)#nowlede 4 that the circumstances are as they end up to

    be

    ?$ v. Ravier( Clement ot a un for his brother @ran#lin, who was a felon.

    Clement didnt #now his brother was an e-felon, but it is a crime to ive a firearm

    to an e-felon. $tate could not prove he #new his brother was a felon. :nowledeis a primary part of the crime of ivin a un to a felon. Not uilty, because thiscrime is specific intent, and he has no #nowlede

    $tate v. c:ay( Boiler of steamer eplodes, #illin 9 passeners. 's are indicted

    for involuntary manslauhter captain of ship4. ;ur ' :elly4 was the boss whoordered enineer and captain to o off on trip firin up boiler in this danerouscondition. >ow can someone intend to help someone commit involuntarymanslauhter, when it is somethin that you dont intent to do Fou could create)have intent purpose)#nowlede4 for circumstances that ma#e it more li#ely. >eintended that they sail this ship in the ris#y condition this is the result4. It doesntre8uire intent with respect to death.

    b. Conuct

    i. Rul#, To have the actus reus, you must either(1. Aid or assist in the commission of the crime, or2. Influence( re8uestin, encourain, orderin, advisin, recommendin

    (ilco/ v. 6effery( ou can be guilty of aiding by being present, taking part, or

    encouraging the act.' oes to see Coleman >aw#ins, pays for a tic#et, cheers,

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    attends, etc. It is illeal for forein artists to perform. >e is uilty of aidin, eventhouh he was not the but for cause no causation re8uiredPPP4.

    c. Causat!on

    i. Rul#, Fou do not have to be the but for cause in order to be an accompliceii. E'a"l#( see ilco

    iii. hy is causation not re8uired1. Better reason( If a whole lot of people do somethin toether, none of

    them will be the but for cause.

    2. orse reason( +ractical( If you order someone else to do somethin, thereis a sense in which you arent the cause. hen human action intervenes, ina sense, youre not the cause. Fou cant cause human beins to dosomethin if theyre mentally sane.

    . Natural an Probabl# Cons#+u#nc#s Doctr!n#

    a. D#$!n!t!on( A person encourain or facilitatin the commission of a crime may be heldliable not only for that crime, but for any other offense that was a &natural and probable

    conse8uence& of the crime aided and abetted.

    People v. *uparello(A person is liable for the unplanned and unintended acts of co)

    conspirators.' wanted to locate an e-lover who then remarried deceased. >e enlistedfriends to find out for him, and told them to use whatever means necessary. They waitedoutside her husbands house, and shot and #illed him. ' was convicted of murder. Courtholds that only the perpetrator must have the mens rea for the crime. The 's mens rea onlyneed to be encourain or assistin or influencin the act. ' should be responsible forharms that are naturally probable and forseeably put in motion by his act.'issent( +roblem with this foreseeability doctrine is that it assesses 's culpability basedon mental state of perpetrator. ith 's same actions, he could be convicted of numerousderees of homicide all dependin on whether the perpetrator lied in wait, was drun#,

    unintentionally #illed, etc.

    Roy v #nited $tates(2f ;in the ordinary course of things, the crime might reasonably ensue

    from planned events.; 7iller wanted to buy a un, and as#ed ' where to buy one. >edirected 7iller to /oy. /oy and 7iller echaned money and un, but then /oy chanedhis mind and robbed 7iller. ' was convicted of bein an accomplice to the robbery. TCheld that it was within forseeability doctrine. This court reversed. It said that this doesntsatisfy the &in the ordinary course of thins& clause in the natural and probableconse8uences doctrine. Basically, althouh this was conceivable, it wasnt predictable, sohes not uilty of robbery.

    B. Att#"t# acco"l!c#

    a. Rul#, Fou cannot be an attempted accomplice. Fou must actually aid or influence.

    C. MPC

    -. M#ns R#a

    a. Conuct( If he assists with thepurpose of promoting or facilitatingaid)encourae4 thecommission of the offense. Not only encourain, but thepurposeto encourae.

    b. R#sult( hen causin a result is an element of the crime, a person is an accomplice if

    i. >e was an accomplice in the conduct that caused the result, and

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    ii. >e acted with the culpability reardin the result that issufficient for commissionof the offense.

    c. C!rcustanc#s( Not addressed in the 7+C.

    . Conuct

    a. Aid, aree to aid, or att#"t to a!you no loner have to actually help Sattempt toaidand the underlyin crime doesnt have to be committed4

    b. $olicit primary to commit( command, encourae, re8uest very similar to common law4

    :. Natural an Probabl# Cons#+u#nc#s,

    a. The 7+C re*ects this.

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    CONSPIRAC5

    A. Introuct!on

    1. Tra!t!onal D#$!n!t!on( Areement by two or more people to commit one or more unlawful acts, orto accomplish a leal act by unlawful means.

    a. +urpose to form an areement to commit a crimeb. Aree to commit a crime

    c. +urpose to commit a crimed. In some *urisdictions, you have to commit an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy this

    can be completely innocent in and of itself and committed by only one of the co-conspirators4

    2. 6tremely often used easy for prosecutors9. /ationale

    a. 'aners of roup criminalityb. +reventive law enforcement Inchoate crime4

    4. MPC

    -. El##nts

    a. M#ns R#a,i. Conduct( +urpose of promotin or facilitatin the substantive offense

    1. @or*auria, he wouldnt be uilty, because he doesnt have purpose for theoffense of prostitution.

    ii. /esult( +urpose

    1. '1 and '2 plan on burnin down buildin for insurance, but someoneinside dies, they dont have purpose for this result. They have purpose thatthe buildin burn down.

    iii. Circumstances( left to interpretation best left to *udicial resolution4

    b. Conuct, T Ar###nti. Rul#( A person conspires if with the "ur"os#of promotin or facilitatin its

    commission he(1. Commits an offense2. Attempts to commit an offense9. $olicits another to commit an offense, orD. Aids another person in plannin or commission of offense

    !!. Ob;#ct o$ cons"!rator!al ar###nt

    1. Rul#( The ob*ect of the conspiratorial areement must be a criminaloffense unli#e Common 0aw4

    !!!. Ov#rt Act R#+u!r##nt1. Rul#,Conspirator must perform an overt act in pursuance of the

    conspiracy with misdemeanors and 9rd deree felonies. No overt actre8uired for 2nd or 1st felonies

    . M#r#r

    a. Rul#( ' cant be convicted and punished for both conspiracy and the ob*ect of theconspiracy or an attempt to commit the taret offense, unless prosecution proves theconspiracy involved commission of additional offenses not yet committed or attempted. It

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    does not mere if you are convicted of a different crime of that which you were convictedof conspirin

    b. E'a"l#( If '1 and '2 conspire to rob a ban#, they cant be convicted for robbery and

    conspiracy. But if they conspires to rob ban# 1 and 2, and are arrested after robbin onlyban# 1, the conspiracy does notmere with the completed robbery of ban# 1.

    C. Tra!t!onal

    -. El##nts

    a. M#ns R#a

    i. /e8uirements1. Intend to aree purpose4, and2. Intend that the ob*ect of their areement be achieved purpose)#nowlede4

    ii. Intent( purpose or #nowlede

    1. +urpose may be proved from #nowlede if(a. ' furnishes oods to + at rossly inflated price

    b. +romotes the venture and has a sta#e in its outcomec. A rossly disproportionate share of 's business is with Rd. ' provides R with oods for which there is no lawful use

    *auria( ' #new that he was furtherin)helpin prostitution by providin the

    answerin service. ?nder what circumstances does the supplier become part of theconspiracy +urpose or #nowlede Also, intent to aree& re8uirement has beenreplaced by the &intent to commit the underlyin offense areement&

    b. Conuct, T Ar###nt !ts#l$

    i. Rul#, @or ' to be convicted of conspiracy, there must be an areement betweenhim and one or more other persons.

    1. Areement may be inferred from circumstantial evidence( almost never in

    writin, and sometimes not even oral, and sometimes people dont have toeven meet, communicate, or even #now who the other parties are.

    a. Behavior of parties where one each does a part of whats needed,

    where it is implausible that one would have done his part w)outrelyin on the other to do his part

    b. 6treme implausibility of people enain in this conduct is

    enouh evidence that there is a tacit areement

    c. E'a"l#,Alley oop analoy

    2nterstate %ircuit v. #$(2f by their actions it was obvious that they were

    cooperating, they don"t need an e/press agreement. as there anareement amon all eiht suppliers which is illeal4 +roof ofareement( letter ccd all eiht distributors, so they #new who the otherconspirators were. They are charin hiher prices, so if one of themdoesnt aree, it screws the other Q. If they all &play ball& its reat for all ofthem. It would be bi=arre to thin# that each independently decided to raise

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    prices w)out #nowin everyone else was oin to, or they would hurt theirprofits. Court says that &they dont need an areement.& It was enouh thatthey #new about it. If by their actions it was obvious that they werecooperatin, they dont need an epress areement.

    !!. Ob;#ct o$ t ar###nt

    1. Rul#, The ob*ect of a conspiracy must be to do either an unlawful act or alawful act by criminal means. It need not be a crime. It is enouh if theacts are corrupt, dishonest, fraudulent, or immoral.

    2. 7any states have avoided this rule, and use the 7+Cs approach

    !!!. Ov#rt act

    1. Rul#( 7any states re8uire proof of an overt act. This act need not becriminal. Any act in furtherance of the conspiracy buyin toilet paper4 isallowed.

    . M#r#r ()

    D. P!n3#rton Doctr!n#1. Rul#, Allows a conspirator to be held liable for crimes committed by co-conspirators without

    overnment havin to satisfy what is needed for accomplice liability.2. /e8uirements of liability under +in#erton

    a. There must be a conspiracyb. Acts must be committed in furtherance of conspiracy, andc. ;ther acts may have to be foreseeable.

    %% 7any *urisdictions have re*ected +in#erton, includin 7+C

    Pinkerton( Two bros. convicted of conspirin to evade the revenue code. Both were also convicted

    of the substantive crimes of avoidin the revenue code. But 'aniel was in prison at the time, so hecouldnt have committed the substantive crime. Jury instruction( 14 must be committed in

    furtherance of the conspiracy, and 24 must be a party to RRR. The court says that the rule thatholds youre responsible if you command)counsel another to do a crime is based on the sameprinciple as accomplice liability. But under accomplice liability, you must have the purpose tocommit the underlyin)further crime. 'id he have the purpose to commit this specific ta crime, orthe purpose to commit the eneral ta crime The facts say that he only had the purpose to committhe eneral crime of ta evasion, but that isnt enouh under accomplice liability you must havepurpose specific to a crime4. ?nder 0uparella, he would be liable thouh because it only re8uireseneral crime if its the natural and probable conse8uences4. At the end of the opinion, the courtsays that this wouldnt apply if it hadnt been foreseeable.

    Bridges( Ev#n !$ !ts not !n t sco"#* but !ts !n $urtranc#* your# st!ll u!lty un#r

    P!n3#rton. ' ot in arument with A. >e left and brouht his friends bac# with uns. hile he

    was fihtin with A, B hit his friend, who shot and #illed B. ' was uilty of murderin B.a. @oreseeable( yesb. In furtherance( maybe this is clearly not what they intended to do not within scope4, but it

    may have been in furtherance of the planc. 7ental state w) respect2 death( rec#lessness

    Alvare'( Sa# as 4r!#s. 'ru conspiracy in motel resulted in death of federal aent durin bust.

    >otel manaer part of the conspiracy to let dru dealers use hotel. >e even translates. 5uilty of 2ndderee murder in addition to conspiracy, as is everyone else involved.

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    a. @oreseeable( probably people often et shot in dru dealsb. In furtherance( maybe it wasnt the purpose of the conspiracy, but if theyre oin to be

    able to et away to sell another day, maybe its somehow in furtherance of conspiracy.c. 7ental state( rec#lessness aware of the ris#4

    E. 9#arsay

    1. D#$!n!t!on( somethin someone says outside of court cant be introduced into court to prove thetruth of what they said.

    2. /ationale(a. Its unreliableb. Fou cant cross-eamine them

    9. E'c#"t!ons(a. Fou can use it when its a statement made by one of the co-conspirators in furtherance of

    the conspiracyi. /ationale( Four co-conspirators are li#e your aents. Its li#e you doin it. Its

    similar to statements aainst your own interest, because if they implicate a co-conspirator, they are implicatin themselves

    b. Thins that people say that o aainst their own interestc. Thins people say on their death bed. +eople li#e to &free their conscience& before they die,

    so its more reliable.

    4rulewitch v. #$( Turns on hearsay. The witness was tal#in to another co-conspirator, and the co-

    conspirator says that they shouldnt name the '. This implies that the ' was involved in the crime.5ovt. says that the discussion was in furtherance of the conspiracy. Court says its not. >earsayeception wasnt available because all three had been arrested. This was part of the conspiracy tocover up the conspiracy, not part of the actual conspiracy itself. +rosecution arued that part of theconspiracy was to cover it up in the future. Court says that the ovt. didnt chare the conspiracy tocover up in the indictment, so you cant brin it up in court if you didnt chare it.

    7. Collat#ral cons#+u#nc#s o$ cons"!racy

    1.

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    i. Conspiracy comes into play a lot earlier than attempt. @or attempt there must be asubstantial step toward committin the crime. In conspiracy, it is complete at initialareement, or at time first overt act is completed.

    ii. Attempt meres with completed offense. Conspiracy doesnt- you can be convictedand punished for both. see 7+C4

    iii. Conspiracy doesnt re8uire nearly as much conduct.

    iv. Fou can use conspiracy as a way of holdin someone liable for substantiveoffenses that he didnt commit

    v. There is only one purpose of punishin for attempt( inchoate crime to deter themfrom completin the crime. But conspiracy has an additional purpose( there is aspecial daner in roup criminality.

    2. Accomplice 0iability v. Conspiracy 0aw

    a. S!!lar!ty( Both are aimed at preventin roup criminality

    b. D!st!nct!on( Conspiracy is a substantive crime, but accomplice liability isnt

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    DE7ENSES

    I. OVERVIE8

    A. @ust!$!cat!ons

    1. D#$!n!t!on( An act that the law does not condemn, or even welcomes. Conduct that under ordinarycircumstances is criminal, but under special circumstances is not wronful and maybe even

    desirable.. e accept responsibility but deny that it was bad.

    2. E'a"l#,$elf-defense

    4. E'cus#s

    1. D#$!n!t!on( Althouh the actor has harmed society, she shouldnt be blamed or punished for causinthat harm. e admit that it was bad but dont accept full, or even any, responsibility

    2. E'a"l#( Insanity

    C. At Coon a%

    1. If you were ac8uitted for *ustification, nothin happened to you

    2. If you were ac8uitted for ecuse, you were ac8uitted, but you forfeited all your property

    II. SE7 DE7ENSE

    A. D#$!n!t!on( A person is privileed to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend herself

    aainst an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another.

    4. Ty"#s o$ S#l$ D#$#ns#

    1. +erfect self-defense

    a. D#$!n!t!on( 6vidence from which a reasonably *ury could find that she reasonably believed

    that she was imminently in daner

    2. Imperfect self-defensea. D#$!n!t!on( 6vidence from which a reasonable *ury could find that she actually, but not

    reasonably believed, that she was imminently in danerb. /educes murder to voluntary manslauhterc. 0i#e provocationd. ;nly for homicide cases

    C. Tra!t!onal a%

    1. El##nts, A person is *ustified in usin self defense if

    a. >e r#asonably b#l!#v#s

    b. $uch force is n#c#ssary to defend aainst

    c. I#!at#/!!n#ntuse of unlawful force at ' by assailant

    i. Arument for relain this re8uirement(0. Imminence is too strict in certain situations5. E'a"l#(-orman

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    ii. Arument aainst relain this re8uirement(

    0. It cant really be *ustified to #ill an attac#er anytime that you reasonablythin# some force will be used aainst you in the future.

    5. E'a"l#( $chroeder

    . and us# o$ $orc# !s not #'c#ss!v#i. $pecial limits on deadly force

    . T M#an!n o$ R#asonabl#

    a. Applies to elements b and c

    b. Tra!t!onal Rul#,

    i. ;b*ective( a reasonable person in your situation would believe it, andii. $ub*ective( you actually believe it

    c. 1o#t Rul#( Justifiable self-defense must be ob*ectively reasonable under the

    circumstances, but the circumstances may include perceptions of the attac#ers3 intentions

    whether he believes that its reasonable4 People v. 1oet'( @our blac# youths were ridin a subway train. hen 5oet= '4 boarded

    the train, two of the youths approached him and as#ed for UG dollars. ', fearin robbery,drew an illeal pistol and shot the boys, woundin them. ' stated that he feared that theboys were oin to hurt and rob him from their epressions. Court( not uilty. 5oet= triedto chane the law of self-defense by aruin that the standard of reasonability should beheld to a sub*ective rather than an &ob*ective& test. 'efense convinced intermediateappellate court to accept this arument, based on statute 9G.1G which is based on 7+C(&he believes&4 0ower court accepted fully sub*ective test, but appellate court said it waspartly ob*ective.

    d. MPC( If you believe its reasonable, but if it turns out it wasnt reasonable, you can be

    convicted of a rec#less)nelience crime

    D. MPC

    1. El##nts( A person is *ustified in usin force upon another person if

    a. >e b#l!#v#s that such forcei. No &reasonableness re8uirement&

    ii. !!tat!on(1. If the actor is rec#less of nelient in in havin such belief, self-defense is

    not available for crimes that have rec#less or nelience as the re8uiredmens rea.

    b. Is !#!at#ly n#c#ssaryto protect himselfi. No &imminence& re8uired. Authori=es force sooner than allowed under traditional

    c. Aainst the eercise of unlawful force by the other on the present occasion

    E. S"#c!al C!rcustanc#s, 4att#r# 8oans Synro#

    1. Ov#rv!#%, Assertion of self-defense arisin from a lon history of abuse creates problems

    involvin the issues of imminence and unreasonableness. $ome courts have held that

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    reasonableness of a defendant3s actions must be evaluated in liht of her physical andpsycholoical characteristics, her specific eperiences, and perhaps the disadvantaed position ofwomen in society sub*ective reasonability4

    2. Rul#, hen battered woman #ill their batterers and claim self-defense, epert testimony on

    battered woman3s syndrome is admissible to prove they faced imminent ris# of in*ury, but

    inadmissible to prove their belief in that ris# was ob*ectively reasonable.

    $tate v. 4elly( 7rs. :elly3s '4 husband beat her fre8uently. After one beatin, as her husband ran

    up to her, :elly fatally stabbed him, possibly by accident, with scissors. :elly was indicted formurder. At trial, she asserted self-defense, claimin that she feared her husband armed and wouldhurt her or her dauhter, and was only tryin to scare him off with the scissors.

    9. Rul#, $elf-defense, perfect or imperfect, re8uires an imminent ris# of death or serious in*ury,

    which does not include perceived threats of future harm.

    $tate v. -orman( Norman '4 was brutally abused for 2G years by her husband, who constantly

    beat her, starved her, forced her into prostitution, threatened her, etc. @inally, Norman shot her

    husband while he slept. Norman was chared with first deree murder.Court( no reasonable *ury could have found that she reasonably believed that she needed to #ill to preventher imminent death. This case is all about &imminence& and you cant have that while hes asleep. But thatpresses us to thin# about whether imminence re8uirement should really be there. Also, there is still noimperfect self-defense. >e was asleep, so a reasonable*ury couldnt find that she honestly believedshe wasimminently in daner.

    7. T&r## a""roacs %n D &on#stly b#l!#v#s t&at $orc# !s n###* but t b#l!#$ %as unr#asonabl#.

    1. Imperfect self-defense2. 7+C9. Involuntary manslauhter

    III. NECESSIT5/ C9OICE O7 A ESSER EVI

    A. D#$!n!t!on( A defendant has a defense where he reasonably believed his actions were necessary to avoid a

    reater harm than would be caused by commission of the crime. A necessity defense can arise only fromsituations created by physical force of nature if duress caused by other persons is involved, the necessitydefense is inapplicable.

    4. Tra!t!onal

    -. El##nts

    a. $ituation threatenin imminent harm unless law is bro#en, or at least reasonable so

    believes4, and

    %ommonwealth v. *eno The $tate of 7assachusetts prohibits the distribution of

    hypodermic needles without a prescription. 0eno '4 and other defendantsoperated a needle echane proram in order to combat the spread of AI'$. 0enoand the others were chared with and convicted of unauthori=ed possession ofinstruments to administer controlled substances, because the daner was notimminent

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    Borough of $outhwark v. (illiams( >omeless families '4 s8uatted in empty

    houses, and were convicted, despite the necessity for shelter. @or the sa#e of lawand order, the courts must ta#e a stand aainst this, or else property rihts will oout the window

    b. ' isnt at fault in creatin)brinin about the situation

    c. The harm avoided by law brea#in must be reater than the harm the law brea#in

    committed %ommonwealth v. 9utchins( ' uilty for usin mari*uana for medical reasons.

    Court says that leislature eplicitly considered this, but they didnt thin# it was areater harm.

    . N#c#ss!ty D#$#ns# to Pr!son Esca"#

    a. Rul#( Courts are especially reluctant to accept the necessity defense when it is offered in aprosecution for escape from prison. To limit the defense in this situation, some courtsre8uire that the defendant surrender as soon as the necessity has lost its coercive focus.

    People v. #nger Prison escapees may claim the defenses of necessity and duress. ?ner

    '4 was convicted of auto theft and imprisoned. hile imprisoned, ?ner claims he wasseually threatened and assaulted by inmates, but never reported the incidents because hefeared reprisals. hen ?ner was transferred to the minimum security !honor farm" heescaped, claimin that he had received anonymous death threats and escaped to avoidbein #illed, but planned to return when he ot help. Court says that he should be entitledto submit defense to a *ury, and if they believed that he planned on comin bac#, then hecan be ac8uitted

    C. MPC

    1. El##nts, A persons conduct is *ustified if

    a. >e believes that his conduct is necessary to avoid harm to himself or another

    b. The harm to be avoided by his conduct is reater than that souht ot be avoided by the lawprohibitin his conduct

    c. No leislative intent to eclude the conduct in such circumstances plainly eists

    . Co"ar!son %!t& Coon a%

    a. No imminence re8uirementb. ' doesnt automatically lose defense it he was at fault in brinin situation about. /ather,

    he loses it if hes prosecuted for crime of rec#lessness or nelience in brinin about thesituation

    c. Its eneral( not limited to natural forces or physical harm, and may be employed inhomicide prosecutions

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    D. Cont#"orary $orulat!ons o$ n#c#ss!ty #$#ns#

    1. >ypo( $ome friends o mountain climbin. hile they are hi#in in the mountains, anunpredictable storm comes up. It loo#s li#e they are oin to die. They brea# into a cabin and stealfood. Chared with theft and burlary. >ow would these three codes deal with this

    IL (lenient) NY (strict) MPC

    Blame

    ithout blame inbrinin about

    the occasion

    ithout blame inbrinin about the

    occasion

    No *ustification ifrec#less ornelient in

    creatin situationw)reards2 arec#less ornelience

    offenserespectively

    ImminenceRequirement

    No imminenceImminence)emerency

    re8uiredNo imminence

    Belief it wasnecessary

    /easonable beliefthat it wasnecessary

    7ust be actuallynecessary ob*ective4

    Actual belief thatit was necessary

    Greater harm

    ' has toreasonably

    believe that harmwas reater

    7ust actually be casethat harm is reater)

    must clearly outweih

    7ust actually becase that harm is

    reater

    Otherconsiderations

    $ays that *ury canconsider the

    effects on lawenforcement

    IV. INSANIT5

    A. Ov#rv!#%

    1. 1#n#ral Rul#, A defendant is entitled to ac8uittal if he was so impaired by mental illness orretardation at the time of the crime as to be !insane" within the meanin of the law. affirmativedefense or lac# of mens rea issue4

    . Con!t!ons 1!v!n R!s# to Insan!ty

    a. Althouh all insanity tests re8uire the defendant to have some sort of mental impairment,

    not all impairments ive rise to insanity.

    b. !+sychopathic +ersonality"i. $ome courts hold includin the 7+C4 that the defense does not etend to

    !psychopaths" i.e. persons whose abnormality is manifested only by repeatedcriminal or other anti-social conduct.

    c. 7ental /etardation

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    i. 7ental retardation, if it satisfied the applicable test, may render a defendant leallyinsane

    d. Intoication

    i. Involuntary intoication may be treated as a mental illnessii. e claimed he was insane. Court said that *uryinstructions must include the traditional test.

    C. MPC

    1. A person may ac8uitted as insane if he(

    a. >as a 7ental 'isease and

    b. As a result of the disease he

    i. lac#s substantial capacity to either understand the criminality wronfulness4 of theconduct ;/

    ii. lac#s the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the re8uirements of law

    . Probl#s

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    a. It is difficult to determine whether an impaired defendant could avoid his criminal actsi. E'a"l#( if ' has not acted on his impulse to molest boys for some period of

    time, then it is clear that ' has some form of control over himself.

    b. The necessary epert testimony leads to *ury confusion.

    :. Analys!sa. 7oves away from pure inorance standardb. 7ove away from a re8uirement of absolute incapacityc. If your disease comes to fruition in violent conduct, then its not a mental disease you

    could say &hey, I murder people, Im a psychopath, ive me a defenseP4

    Blake( >as etremely lon history of mental illness of many sorts. hat is his problem under the

    7Nahten test >e has ures that he shouldnt act on, and he doesnt act on them most of the time,but one day he does. +roblem for them is that they lac#ed substantial capacity 7+C4 but all thosewee#s of not actin on ures suests that they had capacity not to act on those ures.

    D. Rat!onal# $or !nsan!ty #$#ns#

    1. ?tilitariani. Incapacitate them

    ii. 'eter other people

    E. R#lat!on b#t%##n !lln#ss an cr!#

    1. Rul#, If you have a mental disease, it doesnt automatically ive you a defense if the crime isntrelated to your mental disease

    i. E'a"l#( 6hibitionist who commits ta fraud

    V. INTOFICATION

    1. In 5enerala. Involuntary intoication may be a complete defense, but voluntary intoication is not,

    althouh it sometimes neates mens rea. These rules also apply to the consumption ofdrus. ecuse not a *ustification neates mens rea4

    2. Involuntary Intoication

    a. Involuntary intoication is a complete defense only if it rendered the defendant insanewithin the meanin of the *urisdiction3s insanity test.

    b. +ermanent Insanityi. A permanent impairment brain damae4 caused by the defendant3s lon-term and

    voluntary use of intoicants can sustain and insanity defense.

    9.