Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Space Policy 26 (2010) 9e14www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

Viewpoint

Creating a European internal security strategy involving space applications

Nina-Louisa Remuss

European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), Schwarzenbergplatz 6, A-1030 Vienna, Austria

Available online 24 December 2009

Abstract

Space applications are used for countering a wide variety of external security threats but their use for the provision of internal security (fornon-military threats like terrorism, organised crime or illegal immigration) is still largely neglected. Several steps have recently been taken toconsider space applications for counter-terrorism and other internal security threats. In the context of the general call for a specific Europeansecurity research programme, the European Union’s Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP 7) is conductingseveral projects using space applications for fighting internal security threats. However, current attempts remain scattered across national andEuropean initiatives, policy fields and pillars, institutional actors and actors involved in various projects. There is thus a strong need for a moreintegrated approach at the EU-level through a European Internal Security Strategy complementing the existing European Security Strategy. TheUS has been looking at the provision of homeland security for some time. A revision of existing structures in Europe should thus not neglect thedimension of transatlantic cooperation in this policy area.� 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. The changing security landscape in the post-cold warera

In the post-cold war era Europe’s security environment haschanged. Large-scale military aggression against EU territoryhas become unlikely, while new threats such as terrorism, illegalmigration and organised crime have become the main sources ofanxiety for both citizens and policy makers.1 With the fall of theIron Curtain as well as events such as 9/11, the Madrid bombingsand the tsunami disaster, a re-thinking of the traditionalperception of ‘‘threats’’ and ‘‘security’’ occurred.2 While earlierthe so-called classical security perception identified threats asactor-focused and the classical threat was an armed territorialattack by another state, threats today come from non-state actorseven within their own state’s boundaries.3 As economic

E-mail address: Nina-Louisa.Remuss@espi.or.at1 Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research. ‘‘Research for

a Secure Europe: Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security

Research.’’ Luxembourg: Group of Personalities, 2004. 9.2 Varwick, Johannes and Woyke, Wichard. Die Zukunft der NATO. Trans-

atlantische Sicherheit im Wandel. 2nd Edition. Augsburg: Leskeþ Budrich,

2000. 127.3 Sundelius, Bengt. ‘‘Disruption e Functional Security for the EU.’’

Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: A new D-drive for the EU. Chaillot Paper

No. 83. Ed. Antonio Missiroli. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005. 68.

0265-9646/$ - see front matter � 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.11.011

integration and military rationality proceeded, the purely terri-torial perception was overtaken and security became part of anenlarged concept in which defence played only a minor role.4

One can thus identify a shift in the nature of threats, threatperceptions and eventually security provision in the post-coldwar environment. New threats are mainly structural threats thatare not ‘‘actor/agency-focused and the greatest threat in today’sworld is instability’’. Thus ‘‘security’’ has to be redefined and itsprovision and the instruments involved have to be adapted to thenew threat scenarios (see Fig. 1).

Counter-terrorism debates frequently draw on the idea ofa spectrum, with security and freedom at each end.5 Anincrease in one happens at the expense of the other.6 TheEUe Member States’ willingness to sacrifice one for the other

4 Varwick, Johannes and Woyke, Wichard. NATO 2000. Transatlantische

Sicherheit im Wandel. Augsburg: LeskeþBudrich, 1999. 30e1. This is in line

with Emerson’s definition of security, claiming that: ‘‘The security nexus

involves an interconnected sets of rules’’: democracy, human rights, economic

and political stability and multidimensional crisis management. cf. Emerson,

Michael. Redrawing the Map of Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998. 28.5 Donohue, L. ‘‘Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum’’. Terrorism and

Political Violence 17 (2005): 69e87. 69.6 Donohue, L. ‘‘Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum’’. Terrorism and

Political Violence 17 (2005): 69e87. Ibid. 70.

New threats/changing threat scenarios

Changing threat perceptions

Re-definition of „security“

Need for new instruments for

security provision

Fig. 1. The changing definition of the term ‘security’ in the post-cold war era.

10 N.-L. Remuss / Space Policy 26 (2010) 9e14

differs: Spain, the UK, France and Germany would be placedon one end of the evolving continuum e as countries havingexperienced domestic terrorism even before 9/11 and thereforeconsidering it a major threat e and Finland could be placed atthe other end of the spectrum e with a terrorism experience‘‘classified as negligible’’7 and therefore considering terrorisma minor threat.8 While specific instruments in the fight againstterrorism or other internal security might thus vary dependingon diverging threat perceptions, given the interconnectivity ofEuropean countries and the transnational character of threatstoday, EU involvement is becoming inevitable. With thechanged concept of security the line between defence andsecurity is becoming thinner and thinner.

The concept of security has thus been enlarged to includethreats to the security of the critical functions of society,giving rise to notions of ‘‘homeland security’’, ‘‘societalsecurity’’ and ‘‘internal security’’. ‘‘Homeland security’’ isa US concept largely unfamiliar to Europeans. Nordic coun-tries point to ‘‘societal security’’, an all-hazards approachincluding the entire spectrum of threats that might confrontsociety ranging from environmental threats to natural disas-ters.9 Since Nordic countries arguably feel less threatened byglobal terrorism than either the US or the rest of Europe, thisdifference in concepts can be ascribed to diverging threatperceptions. As the term ‘‘homeland’’ is perceived to resonatemost strongly at the country level, Europeans prefer to use theterm ‘‘internal security’’ when referring to intra-EU securityissues.10 Internal security is thus often used to group securitythreats such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal immi-gration. The difference in the US and EU wording also depictsthe slightly different emphasises of both: while the UShomeland security agenda is largely driven by the counter-terrorism threat, Europe follows a larger concept including

7 Hippel, Karin von. Europe Confronts Terrorism. New York: Palgrave

Macmillian, 2005. 11. Linde, E. Van de. ‘‘Quick Scan of Post 9/11 national

Counter-Terrorism Policymaking and Implementation in Selected European

Countries’’. Leiden: RAND Europe, 2002. 4.8 Grabbe, H. ‘‘Breaking New Ground in Internal Security.’’ Europe After

September 11th. Edward Bannermann (et al.) London: Centre for European

Reform, 2001. 63e75. 67.9 cf. Hamilton, Daniel S, Bengt Sundelius and Jesper Gronvall. Protecting

the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal Security e Implications for

the United States. Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005.10 Gustav, Lindstrom. ‘‘The EU’s Approach to Homeland Security: Balancing

Safety and European Ideals.‘‘ Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and

European Approaches. Ed. Esther Brimmer. Washington D.C.: Center for

Transatlantic Relations, 2006. 115.

natural disasters as well. Accordingly, responses and preven-tive measures vary on both sides of the Atlantic.

2. Internal security and space e recent policydevelopments

In the search for new instruments to deal with the changedsecurity environment, space applications play a vital role.While this has been realised for external security, the use ofspace for internal security is still not fully exploited andunderstood. The lack of a space dimension for internal securityis particularly striking, given that the European SecurityStrategy (ESS) identifies organised crime and terrorism as twoof the five key threats facing Europe; in recent years severalsteps have been taken to increase the role of space in counter-terrorism and organised crime.

For a long time the debate on security issues in Europetended to focus only on traditional external and particularlymilitary security issues. The relatively slow development ofnotions of internal security explains the relatively late devel-opment and lack of awareness of the value of space for internalsecurity. Only during the 1990s did it start to occupy anincreasingly prominent place on the EU agenda: Justice andHome Affairs (JHA) emerged as an established area of activityonly after the entry into force of the Treaty on the EuropeanUnion (TEU) in November 1993. Before that time, nationalgovernments monopolised internal security and retained it asa closely guarded issue of sovereignty.

As a first step in combining space applications with thefight against terrorism, the Space and Security Panel ofExperts (SPASEC) was given the mandate, inter alia, toreview the role of space in meeting the objectives of the fightagainst terrorism and organised crime in 2004. Its subsequentSPASEC-Report of March 2005 considered the contributionspace-based applications could make to counter-terrorismoperations. The three-year-long ‘‘Preparatory Action’’ (2004e2007) (PASR) addressed ‘‘protection against terrorism’’ as oneof five main areas. PASR’s main objective was the develop-ment of a fully fledged European civil security research pro-gramme to be implemented as part of the Seventh FrameworkProgramme for Research and Technological Development(FP7), the EU’s main research funding programme for 2007e2013. While FP7 was the first EU research programme toinclude security it did not differentiate much between internaland external security. Previously, the Sixth Research Frame-work Programme had included space as a thematic area.Additionally, the Preparatory Action, as well as FP6 and FP7,included projects related to emergency management and

11N.-L. Remuss / Space Policy 26 (2010) 9e14

maritime surveillance, which also fall under the generalheading of internal security.

The preparation of both the PASR and the FP7 Securitytheme was supported by high level strategy groups: the Groupof Personalities (GoP) for Security Research and the EuropeanSecurity Research Advisory Board (ESRAB), whose strategicadvice shaped the scope and implementation of these pro-grammes. The GoP recognised space as a ‘‘force enabler’’. Itconcluded that security and civil applications forma continuum, with challenges inside and outside the EU oftenbeing similar. Across this continuum applications in one areacan often be transformed into applications in another area.Space was mentioned as a prime example for suchdevelopments.11

On the basis of ESRAB recommendations the EuropeanSecurity Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF)12 wasestablished in 2007. It was mandated to propose by the end of2009 a European agenda for research and innovation in thefield of security capable of guiding European institutions,governments and the private sector in the coming two decades.Composed of 11 working groups, ESRIF considers security ofcitizens, infrastructure, borders and the role of space in rela-tion to natural and man-made threats. One of its workinggroups looks specifically at the role of space in situationalawareness.

Moreover, the EU is developing its own operational capa-bility through the GMES initiative in the form of a series ofresearch and development projects funded by the EuropeanCommission and ESA in the domains of maritime surveil-lance, humanitarian relief, early warning and prevention ofconflict. While it seems that the EU is now finally makingseveral steps in the direction of considering space applicationsfor the provision of internal security, the most recent SixthSpace Council under the Czech Presidency (29 May 2009)touched upon the issue of mobilisation of existing innovationsupport mechanisms at European, national and regional levelsand the consideration of new instruments to ensure cross-fertilisation between the space and non-space sectors but didnot mention the field of internal security explicitly.

These European level initiatives are complemented bynational ones.

3. Some characteristics of the EU internal security policy

Defining internal security as covering critical infrastructureprotection (particularly of energy and nuclear facilities, portsand communication structures), the transportation sector(freight and passengers on land, via the waterways and by air),

11 Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research. ‘‘Research for

a Secure Europe: Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security

Research.’’ Luxembourg: Group of Personalities (2004). 12.12 European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) ‘‘European

Security Research and Innovation in Support of European Security Policies.

Intermediate Report.’’ Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the

European Communities, 2008. <http://www.esrif.eu/documents/intermediate_

report.pdf>.

border security and emergency management, the strategies andapproaches remain sectoral, covering single sectors only.While most EU official documents realise the urgency oftackling this matter, space as a distinct policy area is onlyrarely mentioned.

The EU does not currently follow a centralised approachthrough a Department for Homeland Security or any equiva-lent Directorate General (DG) within the European Commis-sion. Thus, while the European Parliament (EP) and itsrelevant committees e the Civil Liberties Committee, Justiceand Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Foreign Affairs Committee(AFET) do not cover internal security, related issues explicitly,some of the European Commission DGs are involved in theprovision and development of internal security, e.g. theDirectorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DGJLS), the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the DG for Transportand Energy (DG TREN), the DG for Enterprise and Industry(DG ENTR), the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the DGfor Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE), the CivilProtection Unit (CPU) of the DG Environment and theEuropean Commission (EC) Maritime Affairs Task Force.13

Apart from the EC DGs the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) ofthe Council Secretariat, as well as the Counter-TerrorismCoordinator and several EU agencies e the European UnionSatellite Centre (EUSC), the European Maritime SafetyAgency (EMSA), the European Agency for the Managementof Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRON-TEX), the European Defence Agency (EDA) - are involved inprojects and initiatives related to using space applications forthe provision of internal security. ESA is also pursuing severalprojects in this context but particularly those related to thedevelopment of operational GMES services.

In a related six-month research project, the European SpacePolicy Institute (ESPI) was able to identify a total of 140projects, initiatives and satellites, of which 92 were Europeanand 48 were national. Most EU-level projects were initiated aspart of FP5 to FP7. They focus on the research and demon-stration level and mostly cover only Phase 1 e the preventionphase e of the disaster cycle. Information on the projects isdifficult to access. Information dissemination particularly onthe findings and outcome of the projects is not transparent.One can identify an emphasis on natural disasters like floods,forest fires, land slides, earthquakes and tsunamis. Manyprojects seem to be very similar, with differences that cannotbe discerned from the outset.

Some of these institutional actors are thereby limited to oneparticular pillar or policy field, like the EUSC which, throughits mission, is bound to support ‘‘the decision-making of theEuropean Union in the field of the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy and in particular the European Security andDefence Policy, including European Union crisis management

13 For a more detailed description of the involvement of these institutions

refer to Remuss, Nina-Louisa. ‘‘Space and Internal Security e Developing

a Concept for the Use of Space Assets to Assure a Secure Europe.’’ ESPI

Report 20. Vienna: ESPI, 2009. <http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/

dokumente/studies/espi%20report%2020_final.pdf>.

12 N.-L. Remuss / Space Policy 26 (2010) 9e14

operations’’. The EU’s approach to internal security is thusdivided by its pillar structure.

4. Transatlantic cooperation e issues and perspectives

While Europe is following a decentralised approach tointernal security, the US is relying on the Department ofHomeland Security, driven by the counter-terrorism agenda.The EU and US’ diverging positions on the freedomesecuritycontinuum can be seen, for example, in discussions on thePassenger Name Record (PNR).14 Shortly after 9/11, the USpassed legislation providing that air carriers operating flightsto, from or through US’ territory must provide the US’customs authorities with electronic access to the PNR.15 TheAviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, adopted on19 November 2001, gave the Bureau of Customs and BorderProtection (CBP), within what is now the Department ofHomeland Security, and the Transportation Security Admin-istration (TSA) authority to require access to PNR data forborder screening and passenger pre-screening.16 In thesubsequent transatlantic discussions one could identify anemphasis on data protection, i.e. freedom, over securityconsiderations as put forward by the US.17 Thus one could saythat, while Europe slightly favours freedom considerationsover security ones, the US positions itself at the opposite endof the continuum. Diverging approaches can also be identifiedwhen looking at the way both actors counter terrorism: whileEurope involves the judiciary in the investigations of terroristcrimes in order to bring individuals involved to justice, the USuses a military model.

Globalisation has given the effective provision of internal/homeland security an international dimension. Greater USeEuropean cooperation in this field is necessary to better

14 Donohue, L. op. cit. 69.15 For detailed discussions refer to: Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04 of

2006; European Parliament v. Council of the European Union and European

Parliament v. Commission of the European Communities. Opinion of the

Advocate General Leger delivered on 22 Nov. 2005; Commission of the

European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the Council

and the Parliament: Transfer of Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A

Global EU Approach. of 2003. Statewatch 19 Jan. 2007 <http://www.

statewatch.org/news/2003/dec/apis_en.pdf>.16 House of Lords’ European Union Committee. The EU/US Passenger Name

record (PNR) Agreement. Report with Evidence. UK Parliament 11 July 2007

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/108/

10802.htm>. 9.17 The European Parliament (EP) called upon both the Commission and the

Council to safeguard the EU’s data protection standards and referred to the

principle of proportionality. In EU jargon the principle of proportionality

refers to: the idea of a balanced relationship between means and ends.

Accordingly, ‘‘the collection and retention of data for security purposes must

be no more invasive of individual privacy than is necessary to achieve the

objective for which they are collected. That objective must be narrowly and

clearly defined.‘‘ House of Lords’ European Union Committee. The EU/US

Passenger Name record (PNR) Agreement. Report with Evidence. UK

Parliament 11 July 2007 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/

ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/108/10802.htm>. 7e8. The Commission was

finally able to reach some concessions from the U.S. side on the number of

single data to be provided.

guarantee security on both sides of the Atlantic. Withoutsystematic pan-European and transatlantic coordination, eachside of the Atlantic will be at greater risk. Cooperation andcoordination is often confused with adopting the other side’sapproach to the subject. It should rather be understood asconvergence, confidence building and understanding of eachother’s policies, values and practical approaches. A dialogueshould therefore take place at the transatlantic level.

Neither Europe nor the US are yet well organised enough toadvance the provision of internal/homeland security. Thedifferent mechanisms set in place have complicated transatlanticcooperation. Scattered efforts must now be incorporated intosystematic, high-profile efforts to ‘‘transform’’ internal/home-land security in all its many dimensions. The US’ administrationunder Barack Obama provides a window of opportunities fora convergence of both actors in this field. While completetransatlantic agreement is utopian, the EU and US should aim atpresenting a unified message about their commitment and thefundamental values they espouse. In order to do so, both need tointernally assess their core values and principles in the provisionof internal/homeland security.

In practice this means that both need to establish formalisedpoints of contact which regularly update each other on opinionsrelated to specific topics under discussion with the objective ofcorrectly conveying the partner’s understanding, opinions andobjectives. The Spanish EU Presidency of the first half of 2010could provide a good opportunity for such a development. Itshould be aimed at formulating a public declaration on funda-mental principles for confronting terrorism, organised crime andillegal migration, thereby providing a guiding strategy forcooperation, underlining the principles and values both share inthe fight against terrorism.18

5. Formulating an internal security strategy for Europe

The urgent need to take action in the field of internalsecurity is clear. The current and upcoming EU presidenciesshould actively promote this matter and finally move toestablish an all-encompassing EU approach to internal secu-rity. The Commission as the ‘‘initiator’’ has to provide thepolicy background for an integrated approach in the singleareas, but future EU presidencies should engage in discussionsrelated to the introduction of an EU Internal Security Strategy.The European Parliament should act as a forum to bringtogether expertise and become involved through recommen-dations to the Council regarding the formulation of a strategy.

6. Coordinating the European approach to create greatercoherence

Apart from persisting technological challenges, severalstructural and strategic challenges in the provision of internal

18 For a similar line of reasoning consider Dworkin, Anthony. ‘‘Beyond the

War on Terror: Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for Counter-

terrorism.’’ ECFR Policy Brief. ECFR/13 (May 2009): 4. <http://ecfr.3cdn.

net/1e18727eafdddcceb7_81m6ibwez.pdf>.

13N.-L. Remuss / Space Policy 26 (2010) 9e14

security persist. There is a strong need for further coordination1) between EU and national approaches and activities; 2)within the different single mission areas; and 3) in the over-arching area of internal security at the Community level. Acommon European approach has to be adopted.

The artificial division of the EU’s provision of internalsecurity into national and European policies, previously EUpillars and specific policy areas has to be overcome and internalsecurity needs to be established as an integrated policy field. By2003 the ESS was explicitly stating that greater coherence wasneeded to improve effectiveness in the EU’s crisis manage-ment. Thus, strategic guidance should be provided through theformulation of an internal security strategy complementing theexisting European Security Strategy.

Based on such a strategy the different instruments andcapacities created at different times, within different institu-tional structures, different policy fields and with differentrationales, should be brought together. Greater coherencerequires complementarities in the use of EU instruments(civilian and military) and better coordination between them.It should particularly clarify areas of authority in the Europeaninstitutions and establish the provision of internal security asa matter which cuts across institutions. With so many insti-tutions, actors and stakeholders active in the provision ofinternal security through space applications, a more coherentapproach is needed.

One single actor should thus pool resources and projectsand provide the oversight needed. If such a body is not created,Europe risks delays and difficulties comparable to those in theUSA, which is experiencing a variety of problems because offragmented responsibilities among agencies. Such a bodyshould coordinate European efforts, ensure post 9/11 measuresare thoughtfully applied (‘halfway’ measures could bringabout more attacks, while too drastic counter-measures caneasily be just as harmful as the attacks themselves), setEuropean security criteria (for ports, etc.) and monitor thedegree to which these are complied with so as to establishEuropean standards.19

7. Involving users, meeting their demands and setting-upoperational services

A systematic and large-scale approach is needed to furtherpromote the use of space and to identify, understand, federateand structure the demand for space-based services in Europe.An internal security strategy should also call for increased userinvolvement, with the final objective of establishing a for-malised user-exchange mechanism. Users are central to thedevelopment of new operational services but many potentialusers are unaware of the contribution of space-based services.They are thus often unable to demand space-based services.

19 Voort, van de Maarten, Kevin A. O’Brien, Adnan Rahman and Lorenzo

Valeri. ‘‘Security: Improving the Security of the Global Sea-Container Ship-

ping System.’’ Homeland Security and Terrorism e Readings and Interpre-

tations. Eds. Russel D. Howard, James J. F. Forest & Joanne C. Moore.

McGraw-Hill: New York, 2005. 192e3.

The space sector in turn has limited knowledge and under-standing of the demand for space-based services and does nottake user requirements as a basis for new satellite missions.20

Communication with the public must be improved to achievegreater understanding of the added value of space. Initiativeslike the Global Integrated Architecture for iNnovative Uti-lisation of space for Security (GIANUS) and programmes likethe Integrated Applications Promotion (IAP), which waslaunched by the last ESA Council at ministerial level, arepromising means to provide frameworks for interactions withusers in order to establish user requirements as a basis for newsatellite missions. The user-exchange mechanism proposed inthis report would provide for formalisation of such a process.

Further, a European internal security strategy needs toemphasize the importance of the use of dual-use technology ein particular space applications e for the provision of internalsecurity. In this context it should provide for the integration ofcivil and military capabilities. The current security scenario isdominated by a combination of asymmetric threats, suggestingthe need for a comprehensive approach rather than the tradi-tional separation of civil and military capabilities.

A security strategy can be built on the current state-of-the-art by drawing on the results of the FP projects. Manydemonstrations have already provided for user feedback andrequirements and have proven the added value of spaceapplications for internal security. It is now time to moveforward from research and development programmes withdemonstrations towards fully fledged operational applicationsfor the provision of internal security, particularly with regardto GMES Fast Track Services on Marine, Land Cover andEmergency Response.

Future projects covering space and internal security shouldavoid focusing on the prevention phase as previous ones have,and take a holistic approach to counter fragmentation. Other-wise, Europe’s ability to act in the international arena may bediminished. ESA and the EC thus have to ensure that the actorsinvolved deal properly with the transition from demonstrationto operation. They should also ensure that all critical missionareas in the provision of internal security are equally coveredand that the agenda does not get ‘‘hijacked’’ by events like thepiracy attacks off the coast of Somalia which moved maritimesecurity up on the agenda, while fluvial security and efforts inland border security were lowered. Existing projects must bere-evaluated to include current trends like the increased inte-gration of energy and information in the area of criticalinfrastructure. Current projects are too similar in nature.Future projects have to be distinctly different, with clear andeasily identifiable added value. Interaction among projectsshould be increased so as to add value and to formulate anintegrated approach.

20 Matthieu, Charlotte. ‘‘Space-Based Services in Europe e Addressing the

Transition between Demonstration and Operation.‘‘ Report 17. Vienna:

European Space Policy Institute. 6. <http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/

dokumente/studies/espi%20report%2017_corr.pdf>.

14 N.-L. Remuss / Space Policy 26 (2010) 9e14

8. Important next steps

With many satellite missions needing decisions on exten-sion or replacement, Europe must take a decision now in orderto avoid national approaches leading to further fragmentationand duplication. The community must bring together the needsfor internal security and apply for funds e the sooner thebetter. With the next Framework Programme starting in 2013,and thus the new financial perspective decided upon by the endof 2012, action before that date is urgent in order for internalsecurity to be included in the next framework programme(FP8).

As identified by the GoP in the field of security research,the technology base for defence, security and civil applicationsincreasingly forms a continuum, with challenges inside andoutside the EU often similar. Across this continuum, appli-cations in one area can often be transformed into applicationsin another area. Space is a prime example for such a devel-opment.21 Current divisions in research programmes along thetwo key dimensions (internal versus external security andcivilian versus military means)22 must be overcome.

21 Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research. op. cit. 12.22 Antonenko Oksana, Bastian Giegerich Nigel Inkster, Raffaello Pantucci,

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury. ‘‘FORESEC-Europe’s Envolving Security: Drivers,

Trends and Scenarios Deliverable D 2.2 Synthesis Report.’’ FP 7 FORESEC,

2008. 13e5.

Strategies have to be found to convince the economic andfinance ministers of the need for investment. Thinking outsidethe box and introducing space as a solution in non-traditionalfora will increase funding. If general funding through researchand development budgets is insufficient it should be soughtfrom potential users. An example here is Galileo, which wasfunded by the Directorate General for Transportation, whichwill be its main user.

To summarise, Europe should take three main steps.First, it should formulate an internal security strategycomplementing existing EU strategic documents to provideoverall guidance. Second, Europe should move from purelyR&D projects to putting services in practice, therebyinvolving their users and, where possible, broader usercommunities. Third, Europe should internally assess its corevalues and principles it wants to pursue in the provision ofinternal security and work together with the US onadvancing these, thereby particularly aiming at greaterinstitutional dialogue not only at high level put also atagency-level and wherever else possible in order to advanceconvergence.