consti1 case matrix art. 10, sec. 8-21

8/11/2019 Consti1 Case Matrix Art. 10, Sec. 8-21

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CASE FACTS ISSUE HELD KEY TAKE-

AWAY

SECTION 8: Term of Office of Local Officials

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years, and no such official shall

serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

BORJA, JR.VS COMELEC - Respondent Jose Capco, Jr. was electedvice-mayor of Pateros.

- He then became mayor, by operation of

law, upon the death of incumbent mayor

Cesar Borja.

- He ran and was elected for 2 consecutive

terms as mayor. On March 1998, Cacpo filed

his COC for mayoralty again.

- Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., also a

candidate for mayor, sought the

disqualification of Capco and contendedthat Capco already served as mayor for 3

consecutive terms, including his succession

to Cesar Borjasmayoralty by operation of

law; thus, he is ineligible to serve for

another term.

W/N Capcossuccession to the office

of the mayor by

operation of law and

service of the

remaining term is

already considered as

one term in applying

the consecutive 3-term

limit for local officials,

hence, making himineligible to serve for

another term.

- No, Capco is still eligible to serve foranother term as mayor, because his

succession to Cesar Borjas mayoralty is not

considered as one term in applying the

consecutive 3-term limit to local officials.

- The fundamental principle of representative

democracy is that people should be allowed

to choose those whom they want to govern

them. To bar the election of a local official

because he has already served 3 terms,

although the 1stwas a result of succession byoperation of law and not election, would

amount to violation of this principle.

- For disqualification to apply, an individual

must:

a) have been elected for 3 consecutive terms

in an elective local office

b) have served in the same position for the

same number of consecutive and full terms

CONSECUTIVE 3-TERM

LIMIT OF

LOCAL

OFFICIALS

DAVID VSCOMELEC - Petitioner Liga ng mga Brgy. Quezon CityChapter assailed the constitutionality of RA

7160 or the Local Autonomy Code,

specifying the term of barangay officials to 3

years.

- Petitioner contended that by excluding

barangay officials whose term shall be

determined by law from the general

provision fixing the term of elective local

officials at 3 years, the Constitution

implicitly prohibits the Congress from

W/N the Constitution,by excluding the term

of barangay officials

from the general

provision of 3-year

term for elective local

officials, prohibits the

Congress from

legislating a 3-year

term for barangay

officials.

- No, the Constitution did not expresslyprohibit Congress from fixing any term of

office for barangay officials. Sec. 8, Art. 10 of

the Constitution provided that the term of all

elective local officials shall be limited to 3

yeas, except that of barangay officials, which

shall be determined by law.

- It merely left the determination of such

term of barangay officials to the Congress

without specific limitations or prohibitions.

TERM OFBARANGAY

OFFICIALS


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legislating a 3-year term for such officers.

SECTION 9: Sectoral Representation

Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.

SUPANGAN,

JR. VS

SANTOS

- Petitioners attacked the authority of the

Secretary of Local Government to designate

or appoint members/sectoral

representatives to the local legislativebodies.

- Petitioners argued the following:

a) the designations and appointments made

by the respondent Secretary was unlawful

and unconstitutional, in the light of Sec. 9,

Art. 10 of the Constitution, because there

was no enabling law yet to implement such

provision.

b) only the President has the power to

appoint and cannot be delegated to theSecretary of Local Government.

c) assuming the Secretary has the

appointing power over sectoral

representatives, the

designations/appointments were null and

void because it did not comply with the

manner prescribed by the same law.

d) the appointees are not qualified.

W/N Secretary Santos

of Local Government

has the authority to

designate or appointmembers/sectoral

representatives to the

local legislative bodies.

- Yes, because Sec. 9 of Art. 10 of the

Constitution commands that all legislative

bodies of local governments must have

sectoral representatives among its members,and the appointment or designation of

individuals thereto must be done in

accordance with provisions of law, whether

that law exists or is yet to be passed.

- In this case, that law already exists in B.P.

Blg. 337, particularly Sec. 146 & 173, and it is

neither inconsistent with the Constitution,

repealed, amended or revoked.

- Also, the Secretary of Local Government

may, by authority of the President inform thesectoral representatives of their

appointments.

- However, the designations made by

Secretary Santos were null and void, since

there was no basis for the

designations/appointments, because the

manner prescribed in BP Blg 337 was not

followed, which is the requirement that the

Sanggunian should determine first that theIndustrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in

their particular city or municipality are of

sufficient number to warrant representation.

- VALID APPOINTMENT OF SECTORAL

REPRESENTATIVES:

a) appointees must belong to the sector

which he represents

b) prior consultation and determination of

the Sanggunian that the Industrial and

Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular

APPOINTM

ENT OF

SECTORAL

REPRESENT

ATIVES


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Lupa in Camarines Norte to be composed of

several barangays, where a plebiscite would

also be held.

- In the plebiscite held throughout the

Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes

favored its creation while 3,439 votes

against it.

- The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers

declared the rejection of the creation of the

Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.

- Petitioner, as the Governor of Camarines

Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite and

prays that a new plebiscite be held,

contending that the plebiscite should have

only included 12 barangays comprising the

new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, and

excluding the remaining areas of the motherunit of Municipality of Labo, Camarines

Norte.

resolution, and

consequently, W/N the

plebiscite conducted in

the areas comprising

the proposed

Municipality of Tulay-

Na-Lupa of Camarines

Norte and the

remaining areas of the

mother Municipality of

Labo is valid.

Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.

- Both the mother Municipality of Labo

and the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of

the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-

Lupa should participate in the plebiscite,

since both of these political units would be

affected.

MUNICIAPLITY

INVOLVED IN

A PLEBISCITE

LEAGUE OF

CITIES VS

COMELEC

- RA 9009 was passed, increasing the

income requirement from P20M to P100M

for municipalities to become cities.

- But the respondent 16 LGUs who had

pending cityhood bills in Congress, prior to

the enactment of RA 9009, were exempted

from this law, as provided for in their

respective cityhood laws, because they

already met the criteria prescribed in the

former law.

- Petitioners contend that the cityhood laws

providing for the exemption of the

respondent LGUs from the income standard

provided in the amendatory RA 9009 violate

the Constitution, since the petitioners

theorizes that the criteria for creating cities

must be written only in LGC and not in other

W/N the Cityhood Laws

is unconstitutional for

violating:

a) Sec. 10 of Art. 10,

that criteria for creating

cities must be

contained only in LGC

b) equal protection

clause

a) No, because the only reason why the

Constitution used the clause in

accordance with the criteria established in

the local government code is to

emphasize that it is the Congress alone

which can impose the criteria, but it does

not mean that Congress cannot enact

statutes containing such criteria. The

exemption from RA 9009 provided for in

the cityhood laws of the respondent LGUs

is valid.

b) No, there is a valid classification that

justified the exemption of the respondent

LGUs.

CITYHOOD

LAWS


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statutes.

- Petitioners also argue that the cityhood

laws, by granting respondent LGUs

exemption from the P100M income

requirement, is a violation of the equal

protection clause of the Constitution.

SECTION 11: Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions

The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component

cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The

jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

MMDA VS

BEL-AIR

VILLAGE

ASSOC.

- Petitioner MMDA is a government agency

tasked with the delivery of basic services in

Metro Manila.

- Respondent Bel-Air Village Association Inc.,

who is the registered owner of Neptune

Street, is a non-stock, non-profit

corporation whose members arehomeowners in Bel-Air Village.

- Respondent received from MMDA a notice

requesting respondent to open Neptune St.

to public vehicular traffic starting Jan. 2,

1996 and also informing that the perimeter

wall separating the subdivision from

Kalayaan Ave. would be demolished.

- The Court of Appeals ruled that the

MMDA has no authority to order the

opening of the Neptune St. & the

demolition of the perimeter walls, because

the authority is lodged to the City Council of

Makati.

- MMDA claims that it has authority to open

Neptune St. because it is an agent of the

state endowed with police power in the

delivery of basic services in Metro Manila,

including traffic management.

W/N the MMDA has

the authority to order

Bel-Air Village Assoc.

the opening of the

Neptune St. to public

pursuant to its

regulatory and policepowers.

W/N the passage of an

ordinance is a

requirement before the

MMDA may order the

opening of the Neptune

St. to the public.

a) No, MMDA has no authority, because

there is nothing in its charter that grants it

police and legislative (ordinance-making)

powers.

- Also, although Metro Manila Commission

(MMC) is the precedent of MMDA, MMDA

is different from MMC, because MMC wasthe central government of Metro Manila,

who had police and legislative powers.

However, MMDA is not a political unit or a

special metropolitan political subdivision

of government. It is only a special

development authority, tasked to deliver

basic services in Metro Manila, such as the

following:

1) development planning

2) transport and traffic management

3) solid waste disposal

4) flood control and sewerage

5) urban renewal, zoning and land use

planning and shelter services

6) health and sanitation, urban protection

and pollution control

7) public safety

MMDA AS

SPECIAL DEVT

AUTHORITY

SECTION 12: Classification of Cities


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Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose characters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective

officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not

be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

ABELLA VS

COMELEC

- Since the petitioner failed in her

contention that Adelina Larrazabal is a

resident and registered voter of Kananga

Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative

position that her being a registered voter in

Ormoc City was no impediment to her

candidacy for the position of governor in

Leyte.

- petitioner submits that while a Component

city whose charter prohibits its voters from

participating in the elections for provincial

office, is indeed independent of the

province, such independence cannot be

equated with a highly urbanized city; ratherit is limited to the administrative supervision

aspect, and that said voters are not likewise

prohibited from running for the provincial

offices.

W/N component cities

whose charters

prohibits their voters

from participating in

the elections for

provincial office can be

equated to highly

urbanized cities.

W/N the said voters of

such component cities

can run for provincial

offices.

Yes, the component cities like Ormoc City

whose charters prohibit their voters from

voting for provincial elective officials are

treated like highly urbanized citie,s which

are outside the supervision of the province

to which they are geographically attached.

This independence from the province

carries with it the prohibition to their

voters from voting and being voted for the

provincial elective offices.

COMPONENT

CITIES THAT

PROHIBIT

THEIR VOTERS

FROM VOTING

PROVINCIAL

ELECTIVE

OFFICES

SECTION 13: Local Government Units Grouping

Local Government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to

them in accordance with law.

SECTION 14: Regional Development Councils

The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of

departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of

administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of

the units in the region.

CORDILLERA

BROAD

COALITION

VS COA

SECTION 15: Autonomous Regions

There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographic


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areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the

framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

SECTION 16: Presidents General Supervision over Autonomous Regions

The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

SECTION 17: Powers not Granted to Autonomous Regions

All powers, functions and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the national

government.

SECTION 18: Organic Act

The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission

composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic Act shall define the basic

structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and

representative of the constituent political units. The organic act shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law

jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this constition and national law.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous

region.

ABBAS VS

COMELEC

- A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and

nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,

was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in

implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An

Act Providing for an Organic Act for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"

(Organic Act).

- These consolidated petitions pray that the

Court:

(1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting

the plebiscite

(2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,

unconstitutional.

- The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by

petitioners may generally be categorized

into either of the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates

W/N RA 6734 is

unconstitutional and if

it violates the Tripoli

Agreement.

The petition has no merit and the law is

constitutional.

1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a

provision in the Organic Act makes the

creation of an autonomous region

absolute, such that even if only two

provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an

autonomous region would still be created

composed of the two provinces where the

favorable votes were obtained. there is a

specific provision in the Transitory

Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act,

which incorporates substantially the same

requirements embodied in the

Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take


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the Constitution

(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734

conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

effect when approved by a majority of the

votes cast by the constituent units

provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of

Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which

shall be held not earlier than ninety (90)

days or later than one hundred twenty

(120) days after the approval of this Act:

Provided, That only the provinces and

cities voting favorably in such plebiscite

shall be included in the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao. The

provinces and cities which in the plebiscite

do not vote for inclusion in the

Autonomous Region shall remain the

existing administrative determination,

merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No6734, the creation of the autonomous

region shall take effect only when

approved by a majority of the votes cast

by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and

only those provinces and cities where a

majority vote in favor of the Organic Act

shall be included in the autonomous

region. The provinces and cities wherein

such a majority is not attained shall not be

included in the autonomous region. It may

be that even if an autonomous region is

created, not all of the thirteen (13)

provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in

Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734

shall be included therein. The single

plebiscite contemplated by the

Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will

therefore be determinative of (1) whether

there shall be an autonomous region in


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Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces

and cities, among those enumerated in

R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

2. The question has been raised as to what

this majority means. Does it refer to a

majority of the total votes cast in the

plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a

majority in each of the constituent units,

or both?

The 1987 Constitution provides: The

creation of the autonomous region shall

be effective when approved by majority of

the votes cast by the constituent units in a

plebiscite called for the purpose, provided

that only provinces, cities and geographic

areas voting favorably in such plebisciteshall be included in the autonomous

region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will

readily be seen that the creation of the

autonomous region is made to depend,

not on the total majority vote in the

plebiscite, but on the will of the majority

in each of the constituent units and the

proviso underscores this.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the

thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities

included in the Organic Act, possess such

concurrence in historical and cultural

heritage and other relevant

characteristics. By including areas, which

do not strictly share the same

characteristic as the others, petitioner

claims that Congress has expanded the

scope of the autonomous region which the


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constitution itself has prescribed to be

limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The

Constitution lays down the standards by

which Congress shall determine which

areas should constitute the autonomous

region. Guided by these constitutional

criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of

the areas that share common attributes is

within the exclusive realm of the

legislature's discretion. Any review of this

ascertainment would have to go into the

wisdom of the law.

4. Both petitions also question the validity

of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it

violates the constitutional guarantee onfree exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5].

The objection centers on a provision in the

Organic Act which mandates that should

there be any conflict between the Muslim

Code and the Tribal Code on the one had,

and the national law on the other hand,

the Shari'ah courts created under the

same Act should apply national law.

Petitioners maintain that the islamic law

(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which

makes it part of divine law. Thus it may

not be subjected to any "man-made"

national law. Petitioner Abbas supports

this objection by enumerating possible

instances of conflict between provisions of

the Muslim Code and national law,

wherein an application of national law

might be offensive to a Muslim's religious

convictions.


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In the present case, no actual controversy

between real litigants exists. There are no

conflicting claims involving the application

of national law resulting in an alleged

violation of religious freedom. This being

so, the Court in this case may not be called

upon to resolve what is merely a perceived

potential conflict between the provisions

the Muslim Code and national law.

5. According to petitioners, said provision

grants the President the power to merge

regions, a power which is not conferred by

the Constitution upon the President.

While the power to merge administrative

regions is not expressly provided for in the

Constitution, it is a power which hastraditionally been lodged with the

President to facilitate the exercise of the

power of general supervision over local

governments. There is no conflict between

the power of the President to merge

administrative regions with the

constitutional provision requiring a

plebiscite in the merger of local

government units because the

requirement of a plebiscite in a merger

expressly applies only to provinces, cities,

municipalities or barangays, not to

administrative regions.

6. Every law has in its favor the

presumption of constitutionality. Based on

the grounds raised by petitioners to

challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No.

6734, the Court finds that petitioners have


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failed to overcome the presumption. The

dismissal of these two petitions is,

therefore, inevitable.

CORDILLERA

REGIONAL

ASSEMBLY

VS COMELEC

- Petitioners prayed that the Court declare

the COMELEC resolution, memorandum of

Sec. of Justice, Exe. Sec., RA 6861 null and

void and prohibit and restrain the

respondents from implementing the same.

- Petitioners maintain that there can be no

Cordillera Autonomous Region in only 1

province as the Constitution and RA 6766

require that said Region be composed of

more than 1 constituent unit.

W/N the province of

Ifugao, being the only

province which voted

favorably for the

creation of the

Cordillera Autonomous

Region can, alone,

legally and validly

constitute such Region.

- No, the sole province of Ifugao cannot

validly constitute the Cordillera

Autonomous Region, because the term

region, used in its ordinary sense means

2 or more provinces.

1 PROVINCE

CANNOT

CONSTITUTE

AUTONOMOU

S REGION

LEONOR VS

CORDILLERABODONG

ADMINISTR

ATION

- The plebiscite for the purpose of creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and

cities of the Cordillera region, except the province of Ifugao, hence, the CAR did not push through.- So, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under EO 220, the indigenous and special courts for the

indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region and the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army, as a regional

police force or a regional command of the AFP.

- Since the CAR did not come into existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or

special court.

- So the Maeng Tribal Court existed under the customs of the indigenous cultural community, but they do not form

part of the judicial system of the Philippines, thus, have no judicial power.

- Like thepangkatsor conciliation panels in barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal

objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to settle and compromise.

INDIGENOUS

COURTS OFCORDILLERA

REGION NOT

PART OF

JUDICIAL

SYSTEM

SECTION 19: Congress shall Pass the Organic Act

The 1st

Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within 18 months from the time of organization of both houses, pass the organic acts for the

autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

SECTION 20: Legislative Powers of Autonomous Regions

Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall

provide for legislative powers over:

1) administrative organization

2) creation of sources of revenue

3)

ancestral domains and natural resources


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4) personal, family and property relations

5) regional, urban and rural planning development

6) economic, social and tourism development

7) educational policies

8) preservation and development of the cultural heritage

9) such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region

PANDI VS

COURT OF

APPEALS

- An ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides for an autonomus

region which udner the Constitution may only be created, and therefore changed, through a plebiscite called for the

purpose.

- Since the RA 9054 (Organic Act of 2001) took effect on August 14, 2001, which incorporates the Peace Agreement

entered into between the National Government and the MNLF, the Organic Act of 2201 is a completely new

autonomy act for Muslim Mindanao since it totally replaced the Organic Act of 1989. It is not an ordinary

amendment but a total substitution since the Organic Act of 2001 is as comprehensive as the Organic Act of 1989.

ORDINARY

STATUES

CANNOT

AMEND

ORGANIC

ACTS

SECTION 21: Peace & Order; Defense & Security

The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,

supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the national

government.

ARTICLE 11: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERSSECTION 2: IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, CONCOM MEMBERS & OMBUDSMAN

FRANCISCO,

ET. AL VS

HOUSE

SPEAKER,

ET. AL

- 12th

Congress of House of Representatives

(HOR) approved & adopted Rules of Procedure

in Impeachment Proceedings in 2001, replacing

the previous House Impeachment Rules of 11th

Congress.

- HOR issued a Resolution directing Committeeon Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of

legislation regarding the disbursements and

expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fund

(JDF) by SC Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

- June 2, 2003: Pres. Estrada filed an

impeachment complaint against CJ Davide and 7

Associate Justices for culpable violation of the

Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other

high crimesand submitted it to HouseCommittee on Justice (HCJ).

1) W/N the power of

judicial review

extends to

impeachment

proceedings.

2) W/N the 2nd

impeachment

complaint was filed in

accordance to Sec.

3(4), Art. 11 of the

Constitution,

regarding the 1/3 vote

of all HOR members in

filing an impeachmentcomplaint.

1) YES, because this Court has the

power and duty of judicial review over

justiciable issues in impeachment

proceedings.

2) NO, because the resolution ofimpeachment contemplated by the

Constitution is not the endorsement of

1/3 of all HOR members; it must be the

signature and verification as

complainants of at least 1/3 of all HOR

members. However, the Court still

proceeded to the case and considered

the more substantive issues.

3) not discussed in casebook


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- Oct. 13, 2003: HCJ ruled that the 1st

impeachment complaint was sufficient in form

but dismissed it on Oct. 22, 2003 for being

insufficient in substance.

- 4 mos. & 3 weeks after the filing of the 1st

impeachment complaint or on Oct. 23, 2003, the

day after the 1st

complaint was dismissed, the

2ndimpeachment complaint against Davide was

filed by Representatives Teodoro Jr. &

Fuentebella, with a Resolution of

Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least

1/3 of all the members of HOR.

- Petitionersfiled a case in Court, contending

that the filing of 2nd

impeachment complaint is

unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5 of Art. 11

that no impeachment proceedings shall beinitiated against the same official more than

once in 1 year.

- RespondentHOR argues that:

a) while at least 81 members of HOR signed a

resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the

same did not satisfy the requisites for the

application of Sec. 3(4), because the verified

complaint/resolution of impeachment was not

filed by at least 1/3 of all HOR members; and

that the verified complaint must be filed and not

merely endorsed by 1/3 of all HOR members.

b) the 1-year prohibition on the initiation of

impeachment proceedings against the same

officials was not violated as the impeachment

complaint against CJ Davide & 7 Associate

Justices were not initiated, and the HOR, as a

collective body, has yet to act on it.

3) W/N the legislative

inquiry by HCJ into the

Judicial Devt Fund is

unconstitutional for

infringing the fiscal

autonomy of the

judiciary.

4) W/N Sec. 16 & 17

of the 12th

Congress

Rules on

Impeachment are

unconstitutional for

violating Sec. 3, Art.

11 of Constitution,

regarding wheninitiation of

impeachment

proceedings occur.

5) W/N the 2nd

impeachment

complaint is barred

under Sec. 3(5), Art. 9

of Constitution.

4) YES, because under the Rules on

Impeachment of the Congress,

impeachment proceedings are deemed

initiated if:

a) HCJ finds that the verified complaint

and/or resolution is sufficient in

substance; or

b) once the House itself affirms or

overturns the finding of HCJ that the

verified complaint and/or resolution is

insufficient in substance; or

c) by the filing/endorsement before the

Sec. Gen of HOR of a verified

complaint/resolution of impeachment

by at least 1/3 of all HOR members.

However, under the Constitution,

initiation of impeachment proceedings

takes place by the act of filing a verified

complaint and referral to the HCJ for

action. Therefore, Sec. 16 & 17 of Rules

on Impeachment are unconstitutional.

Impeachment case is the legal

controversy that must be decided by

the Senate.

Impeachment proceeding takes place

in several steps:

1) filing of a verified complaint

(initiation of impeachment proceeding)

2) processing of the complaint by HCJ

3) resolution must be forwarded to the

House for further processing

4) HOR either affirms or overrides the

resolution of the HCJ by a vote of 1/3 of


15/25

c) only HOR has the power to make and

interpret its rules governing impeachment.

all members

If at least 1/3 of HOR members upholds

the complaint, Articles of Impeachment

are prepared and transmitted to the

Senate, and it is at this point that an

impeachment caseis initiated (as

opposed to initiation of impeachment

proceeding).

Also, as regards the argument of

respondent HOR that only HOR has the

power to make its rules on

impeachment, its rules must still not

contravene the Constitution.

5) YES. Since the 1st

impeachmentcomplaint by the former Pres. Estrada

against the CJ Davide and 7 Associate

Justices was filed on June 2, 2003,

referred to HCJ on Aug. 5, 2003, and

that the 2nd

impeachment complaint of

Representatives Teodoro Jr. &

Fuenteballa was filed on Oct. 23, 2003,

then the 2nd

impeachment complaint

violated the constitutional prohibition

against the initiation of impeachment

proceedings against same officer within

1 year.


16/25

Case Facts Issue Held Key take away

Section 1: The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be

autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

Section 2: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

San Juan v. CivilService

Commission

By executive order 112, theauthority to appoint a provincial

budget officer (PBO) had been

given to the secretary of DBM

upon recommendation of thelocal executive concerned

The person recommended by the

provincial governor of Rizal did

not possess the necessary

qualifications

Budget secretary then appointed

somebody else of his own choice

W/N the appointmentdone by the DBM

secretary without the

recommendation of the

governor is valid

NO, if the recommendee of thelocal executive is not qualified,

the secretary must ask for new

recommendees with the

necessary eligibility.

There are factors about life in a

local community about which

central government is NOT the

best judge (provincial budgets

are prepared at a local level)

When the CSC interpreted the

recommending power of the

provincial governor as purely

directory, it went against the

letter and spirit of the

constitutional provisions on

local autonomy

Recommendation of local executiveconcernedlynot purely directory

but mandatory.

NOTE: autonomy and

decentralization are NOT the same.

Autonomyeither

decentralization of administration

or decentralization of power

1) decentralization of

administration centralgovernment delegates

administrative powers to political

subdivisions

2) decentralization of power-

abdication of political power in

favor of LGUs declared to be

autonomous

Laguna Lake

Development

Authority v. Court

of Appeals

Tons of garbage are dumped

everyday in Taal Estate, Caloocan

city

Laguna Lake Development

Authority (LLDA) filed a case

against the Caloocan city for

appropriate dispositionCA

rules LLDA has no authority to

issue a cease and desist order

enjoining the dumping of

garbage in Caloocan

City govt of Caloocan: as a localgovernment, it is within theirpower to determine the effects of

the operation of the dumpsite

(territorial jurisdiction)

W/N the LLDA has

jurisdiction over a city

govt authorizeddumpsite in Camarin,

Caloocan

YES

General rule: adjudication of

pollution cases pertains to the

Pollution Adjufication Board,

except when special law

provides for another forum.

LLDA is a specialized

administrative agency

authorized by special laws to

protect Rizal Laguna, San Pablo,

Manila, Pasay, QC and Caloocan

with regard to provisions for

environmental control.

LLDA, by virtue of its specialcharacter, is mandated to pass

upon and approve or

Specific power of LLDA prevails

over general power of Local

governments


17/25

1

LLDA is required to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continueimplementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de bay region without previous clearance from the authority.

LLDA: as an administrative

agency which was granted

regulatory and adjudicatory

powers by RA 48501, PD 813,

and EO 297, it is invested with

the power to issue a cease and

desist order.

disapprove all plans/projects

proposed by the local

governments.

Dumpsite project was

undertaken without clearance

from LLDA

Magtajas v. Pryce

Properties

PAGCOR decided to expand its

operations to Cagayan de Oro

city and leased and leased a

portion of the building of Pryce

Properties.

The government of CDO

contended that under its

authority to prohibit gambling,

the city could prevent PAGCOR

form operating a casino in the

city. It enacted ordinancesnumber 3353 (prohibiting the

issuance of business permit for

the operation of casino) and

3375-93 (prohibiting the

operation of casino)

PAGCOR however, had authority

under PD1869 to centralize and

regulate ALL games of chance

under the territorial jurisdiction

of the Philippines.

W/N the city government

of Cagayan de oro could

curtail PAGCORsauthority to operate a

Casino in the city

NO

The ordinance prohibiting the

issuance of a business permit to,

and cancelling any business

permit of any establishment

allowing its premises to be used

as a casino, and the ordinance

prohibiting the operation of a

casino, were declared invalid for

being contrary to PD 1869(Charter of PAGCOR) which has

the character and force of a

statute. Ordinances should not

contravene a statute.

Municipal governments are only

agents of the national

government and local councils

exercise delegated legislative

powers conferred on them by

Congress. The delegate cannotbe superior than the principal.

Local governments have certain

powers given by the Constitution

which may not be curtailed by the

national government, but local

governments may not pass

ordinances contrary to statute.

Phil. Petroleum

Corp v. Mun. of

Pililla

PC 26-3 suspended the effectivity

of local tax ordinances imposing

tax on business under the local

tax code with regard to

retailers/wholesalers of

petroleum products subject to

the specific tax imposed by the

W/N petitioner PPC

whose oil products are

subject to specific tax

under NIRC, is still liable

to pay (a) tax on business

and (b) storage fees

pursuant to Provincial

YES

PD 426 amended the local tax

code and is deemed to have

repealed provincial circular 26-

73 when no exemptions were

given to retailers/wholesalers

Administrative regulations must be

in harmony with the provisions of

the law


18/25

National Internal Revenue Code.

PD 426 further amended the

local tax code.

Circular 6-77; and

mayors permit andsanitary inspection fee

unto respondent

municipality of Pililla,

Rizal based on municipal

order 1.

of petroleum products.

Administrative regulations must

be in harmony with provisions

of the law. In case of

discrepancy between the basic

law and an IRR, the law prevails.

The exercise by local

governments of the power to tax

is ordained by the present

constitution and to allow the

continuous effectivity of the

prohibition in PC 26-73 will

restrict their power to tax by

administrative issuances.

Dadole et.al v.

COA

In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges

of Mandaue city started receiving

monthly allowances of P1,260each through the yearly

appropriation ordinances

enacted by the Sangguniang

Panglunsod. In 1991, Mandaue

City increased to P1500.

In 1994, DBM release Local

Budge Circular 55 stating that

allowances should not exceed

1,000 in provinces and 700 in

municipalities.COA issued a notice of

disallowance on the ground of

LBC 55

W/N local budget

circular 55 can render

inoperative the power ofthe legislative body of a

city by setting a limit to

the allowance for judges

No

DBM LBC 55 is null and void 1991 Local Government Code

does not prescribe a limit to the

allowance. By virtue of his/ her

power of supervision, the

President can only interfere in

the affairs and activities of a

local government unit if it has

acted contrary to law.

Commission on Audit may not

reduce the allowance given tojudges by local governments.

The local government code

authorizes local governments to

give allowance to judges and

decide how much this should be.

COA failed to prove that

Mandaue city use the IRA

budget for the additional

allowances of the judges

President exercise not power of

control but power of supervision

over local government units


19/25

John Hay Peoples

Alternative

Coalition v. Victor

Lim

Petitioner assails the

constitutionality of Presidential

Proclamation No. 420, Series of

1994, Creating and Designatinga Portion of the Area Covered by

the Former Camp John Hay as the

John Hay Special Economic Zone

Pursuant to Republic Act No.

7227

RA 7227: granted Subic SEZ

incentives such tax and duty-free

importations, exemption of

businesses from local and

national taxes

And gave authority to the

President to create through

executive proclamation, subject

to the concurrence of the localgovernment units directly

affected, other Special Economic

Zones (SEZ) in Clark

(Pampanga), Wallace Air Station

(La Union), and Camp John Hay

(Baguio)

Petitioners argue that the

president has no authority to

subject the John Hay SEZ to the

governance of Bases Conversionand Development Authority

(BCDA) and it diminishes the city

governments power over itsjurisdiction. Hence, it gives the

president power of control

instead of power of supervision.

W/N proclamation 420 is

constitutional by

providing for national

and local tax exemption

within and granting other

economic incentives to

the John Hay Special

Economic Zone.

W/N proclamation is

constitutional for limiting

or interfering with the

local autonomy of Baguio

City

NO

Under section 12 of RA 7227, it

is only the Subic SEZ which was

granted by congress with tax

exemption. There is no express

extension of he exemption to

other SEZs.

NO

The rights of ownership and

administration vested in BCDA

over Camp John Hay is subject

to certain limitations provided

by law. The designation of BCBA

merely emphasizes the role it

has been granted.

The delineation and declarationof a portion of the area covered

by Camp John hay as a SEZ was

well within the powers of the

president to do my means of a

proclamation. The requisite of a

prior concurrence of the city

government has been given by a

resolution of the sanggunian.

A law granting tax exemption must

have the concurrence of a majority

of all members of Congress

BCDA- merely holding and

administration

Leynes v. COA Petitioner judge Tomas Leynes

was formerly assigned to the

Municipality of Naujan, Oriental

Mindoro as presiding judge of

W/N the municipality of

Naujan, Oriental Mindoro

can validly provide RATA

to its municipal judge, in

YES

Under section 447 of the Local

government code, provincial,

Circular must conform to the law it

seeks to implement and should not

modify or amend it.


20/25

the MTC. His salary and

representation and

transportation allowance (RATA)

were drawn from the budget of

the SC and in addition, he

received a monthly allowance of

P944 from the municipality of

Naujan

COA opposed the grant of the

municipal allowance on the

ground that under section 3 of

DBMs Local Budget Circular 53,LGUs are prohibited from

granting allowances to judges

whenever such allowances are

(1) also granted by the national

government or (2) similar to the

allowances granted by thenational government

addition to that provided

by the Supreme Court

city and municipal governments

may grant allowances to judges

as long as their finances allow.

Though LBC 53 is considered as

a valid exercise of the

presidents power of general

supervision, section 3 is invalid.

DBM shall not provide a limit

when the law does not provide.

A circular must conform to the

law it seeks to implement and

should not modify or amend it.

If the local government code does

not provide a limit, the DBM should

not.

Batangas CATV v.

Batangas City

Marcos issued PD 1512

terminating all franchises,permits or certificates for the

operation of CATV system

previously granted by local

governments

Today, pursuant to section 3 of

EO 436, only persons,

associations, partnerships,corporations or cooperatives

granted a provisional authority

or certificate of authority by the

NTC may install, operate and

maintain a cable television

system service within an area

W/N municipalities have

the power to grant CATV

franchise

NO

In the absence of constitutional

or legislative authorization,

municipalities have no power to

grant franchise.

Protection of constitutional

provisions does not extend to

franchises granted by amunicipality in excess of its

powers.

In the absence of constitutional or

legislative authorization,

municipalities have no power to

grant franchise.

NOTE: LGUs merely form part of

whole. When the drafters of the

1987 constitution enunciated the

policy of ensuring autonomy of

local governments, it was never itsintention to create intra-sovereign

political subdivisions independent

of a single sovereign state,

Section 3:The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure

instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local

government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,

powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating o the organization and operation of the local government units.

Sanchez v. BP 337 was the local government W/N Sec 3, art X of the NO, nothing in sec 3 article X of BP 337 remained in effect until the


21/25

COMELEC code existing prior to the

adoption of the 1987

constitution and the enactment

of the 1991 Local Government

Code.

Section 59, BP 337 states that:

the COMELEC shall conduct andsupervise the process of and

election on recall

constitution which calls

for an effective system of

recall repealed Sec 59 of

BP 337.

the constitution repealed BP

337. The constitution merely

provides that the local

government code to be enacted

by congress shall be more

responsive than BP 337. Until

the new local government code

is enacted, BP 337 shall take

effect.

enactment of LGC of 1991.

Garcia v.

COMELEC

Section 70 of the LCG authorizes

provinces, cities, legislative

districts and municipalities to

have a preparatory recall

assembly authorized to initiatethe recall of an elective official.

Petitioners sought to annul the

resolution of the PreparatoryRecall Assembly of Bataan

initiating recall proceedings

against their governor, Enrique

T. Garcia.

The first time the local

government officials constituted

themselves into a PRA, they

issued Resolution No. 1 as formal

initiation of the recall

proceedings. Enrique held thatthe right to recall does not

extend merely to the prerogative

of the electorate to confirm or

withdraw their confidence in the

official sought to be recalled

through special election. Such

prerogative necessarily includes

the sole and exclusive right to

decide on whether to initiate a

recall proceeding or not.

W/N the people have the

sole and exclusive right

to initiate recall

proceedings

NO

There is nothing in the

Constitution that suggests that

the power to initiate recall

proceedings is the sole and

exclusive prerogative of the

people. Congress was given the

power to choose the mechanismof recallwithout limit as to

the number of modes and with

the requisite only that the same

be effectiveand it has in itswisdom provided for one that

can be initiated by either a

preparatory recall assembly or

the people themselves. Indeed,

there is no great difference

between the two, as recall

proceedings initiated by therecall assembly is also initiation

by the people, albeit done

indirectly through their

representatives.

The constitution did not provide for

any mode of initiating recall

elections. Neither did it prohibit the

adoption of multiple modes of

initiating recall elections.

What the constitution simply

required is that the mechanisms of

recall, whether one or many, to bechosen by congress, should be

effective.

Section 4: The president of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and


22/25

municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope

of their prescribed powers and functions.

Drilon vs Mayor

Lim

Lim assails the constitutionality

of Section 187 of the Local

Government Code which

authorizes the Secretary of

Justice to review the

constitutionality of legality of a

tax ordinanceand if warranted,

to revoke it on either or both

grounds.

The Secretary of Justice on

appeal to him of four oil

companies and a taxpayer

declared Ordinance No.

7794(Manila Revenue Code) null

and void for non-compliance

with the procedure in theenactment of tax ordinances and

for containing certain provisions

contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarysresolution and sustained the

ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of

the LGC as unconstitutional

because it vests on the Secretary

the power of control over LGUs

in violation of the policy of localautonomy mandated in the

Constitution.

W/N Section 187 of the

Local Government Code

which authorizes the

Secretary of Justice to

pass judgment on the

constitutionality or

legality of tax ordinances

or revenue measures is

an exercise of power of

control and therefore,

invalid.

NO

Section 187 is VALID for it

authorizes the petitioner to

review only the

constitutionality or legality of

tax ordinance. What he found

only was that it was illegal. That

act is not control but

supervision. Even if he can set

aside a tax ordinance, he cannot

substitute his own judgment for

that of the local government

unit.

Control lays down the rules in

the doing of act and if notfollowed order the act undone

or re-done. Supervision sees to

it that the rules are followed.

Two grounds of declaring

Manila Revenue Code null and

void (1) inclusion of certain

ultra vires provisions (2) non-

compliance with prescribed

procedure in its enactment but

were followed.

Sec 187 is valid for the sec. of

justice does not dictate what the

law should be but merely ensures

that the ordinance is in accordance

with law.

Even if he can set aside a tax

ordinance, he cannot substitute his

own judgment for that of the local

government unit.

Section 5: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such

guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue

exclusively to the local governments.

Manila

Electric vs

Province of

Laguna

MERALCO was granted a franchise by

several municipal councils and the

National Electrification

Administration to operate an electric

light and power service in the Laguna.

Whether or not the

imposition of franchise

tax under the provincial

ordinance is violative of

the non-impairment

No. There is no violation of the

non-impairment clause for the

same must yield to the inherent

power of the state (taxation).

The provincial ordinance is

Tax power of local governments

must be deemed to exist although

Congress may provide statutory

limitations and guidelines.


23/25

Upon enactment of Local Government

Code, the provincial government

issued ordinance imposing franchise

tax. MERALCO paid under protest and

later claims for refund because of the

duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No.

551. This was denied by governor

Joey Lina relying on a more recentlaw (the local government code).

MERALCO filed with the RTC a

complaint for refund, but was

dismissed.

clause of the Constitution

and of P.D. 551.

valid and constitutional.

The Local Government Code of

1991 has incorporated and

adopted, by and large, the

provisions of the now repealed

Local Tax Code. The 1991 Code

explicitly authorizes provincial

governments, notwithstandingany exemption granted by anylaw or other special law, . . . (to)

impose a tax on businesses

enjoying a franchise.

The tax power must be deemed

to exist although congress may

provide statutory limits and

guidelines. This is to safeguard

the viability and self sufficiency

of local governments by directly

granting them general and

broad tax powers.

NPC vs

Cabanatuan

City

City of Cabanatuan filed a collection

suit against NAPOCOR, a government-

owned and controlled corporation

demanding that the latter pay the

assessed franchise tax due, plus

surcharge and interest. It alleged that

NAPOCORs exemption from local

taxes has already been withdrawn bythe Local Government Code.

NAPOCOR submitted that it is not

liable to pay an annual franchise

because the citys taxing power islimited to private entities that are

engaged in trade or occupation for

profit, and that the NAPOCOR Charter,

being a valid exercise of police power,

should prevail over the LGC.

Whether NAPOCOR is

liable to pay annual

franchise tax to the City

of Cabanatuan.

YES

The power to tax is no longer

vested exclusively on Congress;

local legislative bodies are now

given direct authority to levy

taxes, fees and other charges.

Although as a general rule, LGUscannot impose taxes, fees or

charges of any kind on the

National Government, its

agencies and instrumentalities,

this rule now admits of an

exception, i.e., when specific

provisions of the LGC authorize

the LGUs to impose taxes, fees

or charges on the

aforementioned entities.

Nothing prevents Congress from

Local legislative bodies are now

given direct authority to levy taxes,

fees and other charges.

LGUs can now impose taxes, fees or

charges of any kind on the National

Government, its agencies and

instrumentalities, when specificprovisions of the LGC authorize the

LGUs to impose taxes, fees or

charges on the aforementioned

entities.


24/25

decreeing that even

instrumentalities or agencies of

the government performing

governmental functions may be

subject to tax.

NAPOCOR is covered by the

franchise tax because it

exercises a franchise in thesecond sense and it is exercising

its rights or privileges under

this franchise within the

territory of the City.

Petron

Corporation

vs Mayor

Tiango

Petron maintains a depot or bulk

plant in Navotas Fishport Complex.

Through the said depot, it sells diesel

fuels to the vessels used in

commercial fishing in and around

Manila Bay.

Later, Petron received a letter from

the office of Mayor Tiangco assessing

it for business taxes in the amount of

6.2M covering 1997-2001 pursuant to

the Navotas Revenue Code.

A protest was filed by Petron arguing

that under the IRR of the NIRC, it is

exempt from local business tax. Also,

an opinion was rendered by theBureau of Local Government Finance

providing for that sales of petroleum

fuels are NOT subject to local

taxation. Letter protest was denied

and a final demand to pay was sent to

Petron.

Petron filed a complaint for

cancellation of assessment with TRO

before the RTC. RTC dismissed the

complaint.

W/N the municipality of

Navotas may impose a

business tax on Petron

NO

The language of Section 133(h)

of the LGC makes plain that the

prohibition with respect to

petroleum products extends notonly to excise taxes thereon, but

all "taxes, feesand charges."

While local government units

are authorized to burden all

such other class of goods with

"taxes, fees and charges,"

excepting excise taxes, a specific

prohibition is imposed barring

the levying of any other type of

taxes with respect to petroleum

products.

Congress has the constitutional

authority to impose limitations on

power to tax of LGUs

Example: business tax for

petroleum products

Section 6: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes, which shall be automatically released to them.


25/25

Pimintel vs

Aguirre

Then President Ramos issued AO 372

Adoption of Economy Measures in

Government for FY 1998 which

requires LGUs to reduce their

expenditures by 25% for their

authorized regular appropriations of

non-personal services. Subsequently,

succeeding President Estrada issued

AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372reducing to 5% the amount of the

internal revenues allotment (IRA) to

be withheld from the LGUs.

Contentions arises the directive to

withhold 10% of this IRA is in

contravention of Section 286 of the

Local Government Code and of

Section 6, Article X of the

Constitution, providing the automatic

release of its share in the national

income revenue.

Whether or not, the

Presidents power toexercise general

supervision over local

governments are valid

under Section 1 and 4 of

AO 372, directing LGUs to

reduce their

expenditures andwithholds 10% of their

IRA, respectively.

Yes, the Presidents power toexercise general supervision

over LGUs is valid because

Section 1 of AO 372 is merely

directive and has been issued by

the President in consistent with

his power to supervise LGUs;

Section 4 is unconstitutional forit is mandated by the

Constitution and the Local

Government Code, that it is a

basic feature of local fiscal

autonomy to automatically

release the shares of the LGUs in

the national internal revenue,

and the withholding of 10% of

the LGUs IRAcontravenes with

the law.

Local fiscal autonomy requires

automatic release of the LGUsshare in national taxes

consti1 case matrix art. 10, sec. 8-21

Documents