compilation cases consti1 (part2)

7/27/2019 Compilation cases Consti1 (Part2)

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The Collector of Internal Revenue v.

Antonio Campos Rueda

Fernando, J.:

Facts:The collector of internal revenue heldAntonio Campos Rueda, administrator of

the estates of Marie Cediera, liable forcertain amount as a deficiency andinheritance taxes for the transfer ofintangible personal properties in thePhilippines, the deceased, Spanishnational having been a resident ofMorocco Tangier until her time of death.

Campos Rueda petitioned an exemptionof tax but was denied on the ground thatthe law of tangier was not reciprocal tosection 122 of National Internal RevenueCode.

Rueda requested then anotherreconsideration petition but was deniedon the grounds that Tangier is not, to anextent, a mere foreign country and not

reciprocal to the section 122 of theNational Internal Revenue code.

The court of tax of appeals ruled that thestatement foreign country used in

section 122 of the said code, refers togovernment of that foreign power,although not an international power, does

not impose transfer of death taxes uponintangible properties of our citizens notresiding therein.

Issue:Whether or not the requisite of statehood,or atleast, so much thereof, may benecessary for acquisition of aninternational personality, must besatisfied for a foreign country, to fallwithin the exemption of section 122 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, is now ripefor adjudication.

Decision:

The Supreme Court affirmed the TaxAppeals ruling.

Reason for decision:

If a foreign country is, therewith, to beidentified with a state, it is required inline with Pounds formulation.

Is is thus a sovereign person with thepeople composing it viewed as anorganized corporate societyundergovernment with the legalcompetence to exact obedience to itscommands.

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,V. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011,EN BANC(Carpio, J.)

FACTS:

The conversion of internal waters into

archipelagic waters will not riskthePhilippines because an archipelagicState has sovereign power that extendstothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic

baselines, regardless of their depth ordistance from the coast.

R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congressin March 2009 to comply with thetermsof the United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea (UNCLOS III),which thePhilippines ratified on February 27, 1984.Such compliance shortenedone baseline,

optimized the location of somebasepoints around thePhilippinearchipelago and classifiedadjacent territories such as the KalayaanIslandGround (KIG) and the ScarboroughShoal as regimes of islands whose

islandsgenerate their own applicablemaritime zones.Petitioners, in theircapacities as citizens, taxpayers or

legislators assailthe constitutionality of

R.A. 9522 with one of their argumentscontending thatthe law unconstitutionallyconverts internal waters into

archipelagic waters,thus subjecting thesewaters to the right of innocent and sealanes passageunder UNCLOS III,including overflight. Petitioners havecontended that thesepassage rights willviolate the Constitution as it shall exposePhilippine internalwaters to nuclear andmaritime pollution hazard.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 9522 isunconstitutional for converting internalwatersinto archipelagic waters

HELD:

PetitionDISMISSED.The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional

and is consistent with thePhilippines

national interest. Aside from being a vitalstep in safeguarding thecountrys

maritime zones, the law also allows aninternationally-recognizeddelimitation ofthe breadth of the Philippines maritimezones and continentalshelf. The Courtalso finds that the conversion of internal

waters intoarchipelagic waters will notrisk the Philippines as affirmed in theArticle 49 of the UNCLOS III, an

archipelagic State has sovereign powerthat extends to thewaters enclosed by thearchipelagic baselines, regardless of theirdepth ordistance from the coast. It isfurther stated that the regime ofarchipelagic sealanes passage will notaffect the status of its archipelagic watersor the exerciseof sovereignty over watersand air space, bed and subsoil and the

resources therein

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, v.COMELEC

Facts

The case hovered around the issue of theunconstitutionality of the Republic Act9189 or the Overseas Absentee VotingAct of 2003. Atty. Romulo Macalintalappealed that certain provisions of theRA 9189 suffer from constitutional

infirmity and it was appropriated of asupplemental budget for the enactment ofits provisions to which taxpayers such ashim have the right to restrain wastage of

public funds just for the enforcement ofan unconstitutional statute. According tohim, Section 5(d) of RA 9189 - whichstates that an immigrant may exercise hisright to vote as long as upon registration,he provides an affidavit declaring hisintention to resume physical permanentresidence in the Philippines not later than3 years from the date of the approval of

his registration - violates Section 1,Article V of the Constitution which

provides that a voter shall have resided inthe Philippines for at least one year and inthe place wherein they propose to votefor at least 6 months. Petitioner cites theruling of Court in Caasi vs. Court ofAppeals where the Court held that a"green card" holder immigrant to theUnited States is deemed to haveabandoned his domicile and residence inthe Philippines which automaticallydisqualifies him as a voter. Atty.

Macalintal also questioned Section 18.5of RA 9189 which states that theCommission is empowered to proclaimthe winning candidates. The provision isin contrast with Section 4, Article VII ofthe Constitution mandating that theelection returns for the Presidency andVice-Presidency be transmitted to theCongress and directed to the SenatePresident which both later will hold a

joint public session for the canvassingand proclamation. And finally, petitioneralso questioned Sections 19 and 25 of RA

9189 which under it, the JointCongressional Oversight Committee wasformed to review, revise, amend and


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approve the implementing rules andregulations promulgated by theCOMELEC whereas according to Section1, Article IX of the Constitution, theCOMELEC is an independent body andis not under the control of either theexecutive or legislative departments ofthe government.

Issuesa) Whether or not Section 5(d) of RA9189 violates the voters residency

requirement as stated in Section 1,Article V the Constitution.

b) Whether or not Section 18.5 of RA9189 violates the mandate thatCongress has the authority to proclaimthe winning candidates in thePresidency and Vice-Presidency underSection 4, Article VII of theConstitution.

c) Whether or not Sections 19 and 25 of

RA 9189 violates the independence ofthe COMELEC as mandated underSection 1, Article IX of theConstitution.

Held

The Court didnt find Section 5(d) and

Section 18.5 of RA 9189 constitutionaldefective. The petition for Sections 19and 25 of RA 9189 however was partlygranted and some of its portions weredeclared void for being unconstitutional.

Ratio Decidendia)The court didnt find Section 5(d) of

RA 9189 unconstitutional becauseSection 2, Article V of the Constitution

provides that the Congress shallprovide a system for absentee voting ofqualified Filipinos abroad and thismanifests that absentee voting is anexception to the residency requirementfor voters as stated in Section 1, ArticleV of the Constitution. For a sense of

practicality, if the Philippines willfollow the residency requirement rule,

it will be legally and constitutionallyimpossible to give franchise to vote tooverseas Filipinos who do not

physically live in the country. This willforfeit the whole point of creating theRA 9189.

Also, as per the criteria of political laws,the concepts of residence and

domicile are synonymous.

Differentiating the terms, residence

involves the intent to leave when thepurpose for which the resident has taken

up his abode ends. A person could go to aforeign country for work or pleasure buthe will still go back to his domicile

which denotes fixed permanent residenceto which, when absent, one has intentionof returning. Having become animmigrant or permanent resident of aforeign county doesnt necessarily implyan abandonment of his domicile.Therefore, the law gives a chance to thosewho wish to exercise their right ofsuffrage by submitting an affidavit.

b) The constitutionality of Section 18.5 ofRA 9189 was upheld but reiterated thatthe COMELEC has the authority to

proclaim winning candidates for theSenators and Paty-list Representatives

but not as to the power to canvass thevotes and proclaim the winningcandidates for the President and Vice-President which is solely lodged to theCongress.

c) Parts of Sections 19 and 25 of RA 9189

were declared void because theCOMELEC agrees with the petitionerthat they are an absolute independentinstitutionfree from control of eitherthe executive or legislative departmentsof the government. COMELEC agreesthat the creation in the RA 9189 of theJoint Congressional OversightCommittee which is mandated toreview, revise, amend and approve theimplementing rules and regulations

promulgated by them isunconstitutional.

Section 5(d) of RA 9189

An immigrant or a permanent residentwho is recognized as such in the hostcountry, unless he/she executes, uponregistration, an affidavit prepared for the

purpose by the Commission declaringthat he/she shall resume actual physical

permanent residence in the Philippinesnot later than three (3) years fromapproval of his/her registration under thisAct. Such affidavit shall also state that

he/she has not applied for citizenship inanother country. Failure to return shall bethe cause for the removal of the name ofthe immigrant or permanent resident fromthe National Registry of Absentee Votersand his/her permanent disqualification tovote in absentia.

Section 18.5 of RA 9189The canvass of votes shall not cause thedelay of the proclamation of a winningcandidate if the outcome of the electionwill not be affected by the results thereof.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, theCommission is empowered to order the

proclamation of winning candidates

despite the fact that the scheduledelection has not taken place in a

particular country or countries, if theholding of elections therein has beenrendered impossible by events, factorsand circumstances peculiar to suchcountry or countries, and which events,factors and circumstances are beyond thecontrol or influence of the Commission.

Section 19 of RA 9189Authority of the Commission toPromulgate Rules. The Commissionshall issue the necessary rules andregulations to effectively implement the

provisions of this Act within sixty (60)days from the effectivity of this Act. TheImplementing Rules and Regulationsshall be submitted to the JointCongressional Oversight Committeecreated by virtue of this Act for priorapproval.

In the formulation of the rules andregulations, the Commission shallcoordinate with the Department ofForeign Affairs, Department of Labor andEmployment, Philippine Overseas andEmployment Administration, OverseasWorkers Welfare Administration and the

Commission on Filipinos Overseas. Non-government organizations and accreditedFilipino organizations or associationsabroad shall be consulted.Section 25 of RA 9189

Joint Congressional OversightCommittee. A Joint CongressionalOversight Committee is hereby created,composed of the Chairman of the SenateCommittee on ConstitutionalAmendments, Revision of Codes andLaws, and seven (7) other Senatorsdesignated by the Senate President, andthe Chairman of the House Committee onSuffrage and Electoral Reforms, andseven (7) other Members of the House ofRepresentatives designated by the

Speaker of the House of Representatives:Provided, That, of the seven (7) membersto be designated by each House ofCongress, four (4) should come from themajority and the remaining three (3) fromthe minority.

The Joint Congressional OversightCommittee shall have the power tomonitor and evaluate the implementationof this Act. It shall review, revise, amendand approve the Implementing Rules andRegulations promulgated by the

Commission.


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Section 1, Article V the ConstitutionSuffrage may be exercised by all citizensof the Philippines, not otherwisedisqualified by law, who are at leasteighteen years of age, and who shall haveresided in the Philippines for at least oneyear and in the place wherein they

propose to vote, for at least six monthsimmediately preceding the election. No

literacy, property, or other substantiverequirement shall be imposed on theexercise of suffrage.

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution

The returns of every election forPresident and Vice-President, dulycertified by the board of canvassers ofeach province or city, shall be transmittedto the Congress, directed to the Presidentof the Senate. Upon receipt of thecertificates of canvass, the President of

the Senate shall, not later than thirty daysafter the day of the election, open all thecertificates in the presence of the Senateand the House of Representatives in joint

public session, and the Congress, upondetermination of the authenticity and dueexecution thereof in the manner provided

by law, canvass the votes.

Section 1, Article IX of the ConstitutionThe Constitutional Commissions, whichshall be independent, are the CivilService Commission, the Commission on

Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

NICOLAS-LEWIS VS. COMELECEN BANC,G.R. No. L-162759 August 4, 2006

FACTS:

1. Petitioners are successful applicants forrecognition of Philippine citizenshipunder R.A. 9225 which accords to suchapplicants the right of suffrage, among

others.2. Long before the May 2004 national and

local elections, petitioners soughtregistration and certification asoverseas absentee voter only to be

advised by the Philippine Embassy inthe United States that, per aCOMELEC letter to the Department ofForeign Affairs dated September 23,2003, they have yet no right to vote insuch elections owing to their lack ofthe one-year residence requirement

prescribed by the Constitution.

3. Faced with the prospect of not beingable to vote in the May 2004 electionsowing to the COMELEC's refusal to

include them in the National Registryof Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this

petition for certiorari and mandamus.4. A little over a week before the May 10,

2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004,the COMELEC filed a Comment,therein praying for the denial of the

petition. As may be expected,

petitioners were not able to register letalone vote in said elections.5. On May 20, 2004, the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) filed aManifestation (in Lieu of Comment),therein stating that "all qualifiedoverseas Filipinos, including dualcitizens who care to exercise the rightof suffrage, may do so" , observing,however, that the conclusion of the2004 elections had rendered the

petition moot and academic.6. The holding of the 2004 elections had,

as the OSG pointed out, indeedrendered the petition moot andacademic, but insofar only as

petitioners participation in suchpolitical exercise is concerned. Thebroader and transcendental issuetendered or subsumed in the petition,i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to

participate and vote as absentee voterin future elections, however, remainsunresolved.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioners and otherswho might have meanwhile retainedand/or reacquired Philippinecitizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 mayvote as absentee voter under R.A.9189.

DECISION:1. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Courtrules and so holds that those who retainor reacquire Philippine citizenshipunder Republic Act No. 9225, the

Citizenship Retention andReAcquisition Act of 2003, mayexercise the right to vote under thesystem of absentee voting in RepublicAct No. 9189, the Overseas AbsenteeVoting Act of 2003.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

1. In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1prescribes residency requirement as ageneral eligibility factor for the right tovote. On the other hand, Section 2authorizes Congress to devise a system

wherein an absentee may vote,implying that a nonresident may, asan exception to the residency

prescription in the preceding section,be allowed to vote. (Sections 1 and 2Article V of the Constitution)

2. As finally approved into law, Section5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specificallydisqualifies an immigrant or permanentresident who is "recognized as such inthe host country" because immigrationor permanent residence in another

country implies renunciation of one'sresidence in his country of origin.However, same Section allows animmigrant and permanent residentabroad to register as voter for as longas he/she executes an affidavit to showthat he/she has not abandoned hisdomicile in pursuance of theconstitutional intent expressed inSections 1 and 2 of Article V that "allcitizens of the Philippines nototherwise disqualified by law" must beentitled to exercise the right of suffrage

and, that Congress must establish asystem for absentee voting; forotherwise, if actual, physical residencein the Philippines is required, there isno sense for the framers of theConstitution to mandate Congress toestablish a system for absentee voting.

3. SEC. 3. Retention of PhilippineCitizenship. Any provision of law tothe contrary notwithstanding, natural-

born citizens of the Philippines whohave lost their Philippine citizenship byreason of their naturalization as citizens

of a foreign country are hereby deemedto have re-acquired Philippinecitizenship upon taking the followingoath of allegiance to the Republic:

Natural-born citizens of the Philippineswho, after the effectivity of this Act,

become citizens of a foreign countryshall retain their Philippine citizenshipupon taking the aforesaid oath. (Section3 R.A. 9225)

4. Those intending to exercise their rightof suffrage must meet the requirements

under Section 1, Article V of theConstitution, Republic Act No. 9189,otherwise known as "The OverseasAbsentee Voting Act of 2003" andother existing laws.

(Section 5(1) R.A. 9189)

TECSON V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 151434, 3 March 2004

VITUG, J.

FACTS: 31 December 2003respondent

Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a.k.a.Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed


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candidacy for the position of PhilippinePresident under Koalisyon ng

Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ

represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines with abirth date of 20 Aug 1939, and Manilaas birth place.

Various petitioners including

Victoriano X. Fornier sought FPJsdisqualification on the contention thathe made material misrepresentation of

being natural-born citizen when in factboth his parents were foreigners; hismother an American and his father, aSpanish national.

Petitioners motion was dismissed byComelec en banc. Fornier filed motionfor reconsideration but was againdenied. As a result, he assailed thedecision before the Supreme Courtthrough Article 7, Sec 4, Par 7 of the

1987 Constitution, which states thatonly the Supreme Court has originaland exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the

basic issue on the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ was a natural-bornFilipino citizen and was qualified to runfor the position of Philippine President.

DECISION:

Evidence does not establishconclusively FPJs citizenship but the

evidence preponderates in his favor tohold that he could not be guilty ofmisrepresentation in his certificate ofcandidacy.

Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED forfailure to show grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of theCOMELEC for dismissing the original

petition. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe

DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

RATIONALE:

1987 Constitution aimed to correctirregular situation generated by thequestionable proviso in the 1935Constitution outlined in Article 4, Sec.1 that the following are Filipinocitizens:

o Those who are citizens of the Phil.upon adoption of this Constitution

o Those whose parents are citizens of thePhilippines (Jus Sanguinis)

o Those born before January 17, 1973 ofFilipino mothers who elect Philippinecitizenship upon reaching age of

majorityo Those who are naturalized in

accordance with law.

The public documents submitted aredeemed trustworthy.

There is no jurisprudence to prove thatan illegitimate child cannot inherit hisfathers citizenship.

In the matter of the petition ofJ.GARCIA BOSQUE for admission to

the practice of law in the PhilippineIslandsG.R. No. 666, January 14, 1902Arellano, C.J.:

FACTS:

The Philippine Archipelago was cededto the new sovereign by having agreedupon by the parties to the Treaty ofParis on December 10, 1898. Thesubjects of the ceding power are placedunder a compulsory subject to the newsovereign.

With respect to these the specialagreement contained in article 9 wasestablished, by virtue of which it wasagreed to accord the subjects the rightof electing to leave the country, thusfreeing themselves of subjection to thenew sovereign, or to continue to residein the territory, in which case theexpiration of the term of eighteenmonths without their making anexpress declaration of intention toretain their Spanish nationality resulted

in the loss of the latter, such personsthereby becoming subjects of the newsovereign in the same manner as thenatives of these Islands.

The period of eighteen months beganto run from the date of the exchange ofthe ratifications of the treaty that isto say, from April 11, 1899, andexpired on the corresponding day ofOctober, 1900. The petitioner absentedhimself from these Islands on May 30,1899, and remained absent therefrom

during the whole period. It was inJanuary, 1901, that he returned to theseIslands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is eligibletoadmission to practice his profession in thePhilippine Islands

DECISION:

Under the Treaty of Paris of 1898,between the United States and Spain, aSpanish resident of the Philippine Islands,

who left there in May, 1899, withoutmaking any declaration of intention to

preserve his allegiance to Spain and

remained away until after the expirationof eighteen months after the ratificationof the treaty, continued to be a Spaniard,and did not, even though he intended toreturn, become a citizen of the islandsunder the new sovereignty, and thereforeis not eligible to admission to practice atthe bar under the rules established by themilitary and civil authorities of the

Philippine Islands.

REASON BEHIND THE DECISION:

From the conduct on the part of thepetitioner, it is evident that he electedto take the first of the two courses opento him under his right of optioncontained in Article 9 of the agreement.

Neither the Government nor the courtscan place any other construction uponthe facts above related. Having left theislands he had no occasion to make anydeclaration of his intention to preserve

his Spanish nationality, which hecarried with him on his departure. Thisnationality could be forfeited only by acontinued residence in the cededterritory and a failure to make adeclaration of intention to preserve itwithin the term fixed therefor. Theconditions which gave rise to the

presumptive change of nationality wereresidence and the lapse of eighteenmonths without express declaration tothe contrary; these two conditions not

being fulfilled there was no change of

national status. Neither by theGovernment of Spain nor by that of theUnited States could the petitioner beregarded as a Filipino subject. Byabsenting himself from the territory hecontinued to be a Spaniard.

MA V. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 183133July 26, 2010PEREZ, J.:

The Facts

Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr.,Balgamelo and Valeriano were all bornunder aegis of the 1935 PhilippineConstitution in the years 1948, 1951, and1957, respectively.[3]

They were all raised in the Philippinesand have resided in this country foralmost sixty (60) years; they spent theirwhole lives, studied and received their

primary and secondary education in the

country; they do not speak nor understandthe Chinese language, have not set foot inTaiwan, and do not know any relative of


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their father; they have not even traveledabroad; and they have already raised theirrespective families in the Philippines.[4]

During their age of minority, theysecured from the Bureau of Immigrationtheir Alien Certificates of Registration(ACRs). [5]

Immediately upon reaching the age oftwenty-one, they claimed Philippinecitizenship in accordance with Section1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,which provides that (t)hose whose

mothers are citizens of the Philippinesand, upon reaching the age of majority,elect Philippine citizenship are citizens

of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit ofelection of Philippine citizenship andtook his oath of allegiance before thenJudge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal

Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte.[6] On14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the samebefore Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, NotaryPublic, Surigao City, Surigao del

Norte.[7] In 1978, Valeriano took hisoath of allegiance before then JudgeSalvador C. Sering, City Court of SurigaoCity, the fact of which the latter attestedto in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.[8]

Having taken their oath of allegiance asPhilippine citizens, petitioners, however,failed to have the necessary documents

registered in the civil registry as requiredunder Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner inwhich the Option to Elect PhilippineCitizenship shall be Declared by a Personwhose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). Itwas only on 27 July 2005 or more thanthirty (30) years after they electedPhilippine citizenship that Balgamelo andFelix, Jr. did so.[9] On the other hand,there is no showing that Valerianocomplied with the registrationrequirement.

Individual certifications[10] all dated 3January 2005 issued by the Office of theCity Election Officer, Commission onElections, Surigao City, show that all ofthem are registered voters of BarangayWashington, Precinct No. 0015A sinceJune 1997, and that records on previousregistrations are no longer available

because of the mandatory generalregistration every ten (10) years.Moreover, aside from exercising theirright of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the

incumbent Barangay Kagawads inBarangay Washington, Surigao City.[11]

Records further reveal that Lechi Annand Arceli were born also in Surigao Cityin 1953[12] and 1959,[13] respectively.The Office of the City Civil Registrarissued a Certification to the effect that thedocuments showing that Arceli electedPhilippine citizenship on 27 January 1986were registered in its Office on 4February 1986. However, no other

supporting documents appear to showthat Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACRnor that she subsequently electedPhilippine citizenship upon reaching theage of majority. Likewise, no documentexists that will provide information on thecitizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.

ISSUE/COMPLAINT

On 16 February 2004, the Bureau ofImmigration received the Complaint-Affidavit[14] of a certain Mat G. Catral(Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao

Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children areundesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr.Catral, however, did not participate in the

proceedings, and the Ma family could notbut believe that the complaint againstthem was politically motivated becausethey strongly supported a candidate inSurigao City in the 2004 National andLocal Elections.[15]

On 9 November 2004, the LegalDepartment of the Bureau of Immigrationcharged them for violation of Sections

37(a)(7)[16] and 45(e)[17] ofCommonwealth Act No. 613, otherwiseknown as the Philippine Immigration Actof 1940, as amended. The ChargeSheet[18] docketed as BSI-D.C. No.AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416)reads, in part:

That Respondents x x x, all Chinesenationals, failed and continuously failedto present any valid document to showtheir respective status in the Philippines.They likewise failed to produce

documents to show their election ofPhilippines (sic) citizenship, hence,undocumented and overstaying foreignnationals in the country.

That respondents, being aliens,misrepresent themselves as Philippinecitizens in order to evade therequirements of the immigration laws.

DECISION:

Should children born under the 1935Constitution of a Filipino mother and an

alien father, who executed an affidavit ofelection of Philippine citizenship andtook their oath of allegiance to the

government upon reaching the age ofmajority, but who failed to immediatelyfile the documents of election with thenearest civil registry, be consideredforeign nationals subject to deportation asundocumented aliens for failure to obtainalien certificates of registration?

Positioned upon the facts of this case, the

question is translated into the inquirywhether or not the omission negates theirrights to Filipino citizenship as childrenof a Filipino mother, and erase the yearslived and spent as Filipinos.

The resolution of these questions wouldsignificantly mark a difference in thelives of herein petitioners.

Ruling of the Board of Commissioners,

Bureau of Immigration

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) childrenwere afforded the opportunity to refutethe allegations, the Board ofCommissioners (Board) of the Bureau ofImmigration (BI), composed of the publicrespondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2February 2005 finding that Felix Ma andhis children violated Commonwealth Act

No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) inrelation to BI Memorandum Order Nos.ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6and 22 August 2001, respectively.[19]

The Board ruled that since they electedPhilippine citizenship after the enactmentof Commonwealth Act No. 625, whichwas approved on 7 June 1941, they weregoverned by the following rules andregulations:

1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.625, providing that the election ofPhilippine citizenship embodied in astatement sworn before any officerauthorized to administer oaths and theoath of allegiance shall be filed with the

nearest civil registry;[20] andCommission of Immigration andDeportation (CID, now Bureau ofImmigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April1954,[21] detailing the proceduralrequirements in the registration of theelection of Philippine citizenship.

2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August1956[22] of the CID, requiring the filingof a petition for the cancellation of theiralien certificate of registration with theCID, in view of their election of

Philippine citizenship;


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3. Department of Justice (DOJ) OpinionNo. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJGuidelines, 27 March 1985, requiringthat the records of the proceedings beforwarded to the Ministry (now theDepartment) of Justice for finaldetermination and review.[23]

As regards the documentation of aliens in

the Philippines, Administrative Order No.1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration[24]requires that ACR, E-series, be issued toforeign nationals who apply for initialregistration, finger printing and issuanceof an ACR in accordance with the AlienRegistration Act of 1950.[25] Accordingto public respondents, any foreignnational found in possession of an ACRother than the E-series shall beconsidered improperly documented aliensand may be proceeded against inaccordance with the Immigration Act of

1940 or the Alien Registration Act of1950, as amended.

Supposedly for failure to comply with theprocedure to prove a valid claim toPhilippine citizenship via election

proceedings, public respondentsconcluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo,Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann areundocumented and/or improperlydocumented aliens.

Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did

not submit any document to support theirclaim that they are Philippine citizens.Neither did they present any evidence toshow that they are properly documentedaliens. For these reasons, publicrespondents likewise deemed themundocumented and/or improperlydocumented aliens.

Roa v. Collector of Customs

Series of Conflicting SC Decisions reCitizenship

Date: October 30, 1912Ponente: Justice Trent

Facts:

This is an appeal from an order of theCourt of First Instance of Ceburecommitting the appellant, TranquilinoRoa, to the custody of the Collector ofCustoms and declaring the Collector'sright to effect appellant's deportation toChina as being a subject of the ChineseEmpire and without right to enter andreside in the Philippine Islands. There is

no dispute as to the facts.Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town ofLuculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands,

on July 6, 1889. His father was BasilioRoa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, andhis mother was Basilia Rodriguez, anative of this country. His parents werelegally married in the Philippine Islandsat the time of his birth.

The father of the appellant went to Chinaabout the year 1895, and died there about

1900. Subsequent to the death of hisfather, in May, 1901, the appellant wassent to China by his mother for the sole

purpose of studying (and always with theintention of returning) and returned to thePhilippine Islands on the steamshipKaifong, arriving at the port of CebuOctober 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, andsought admission to the PhilippineIslands. At this time the appellant was afew days under 21 years and 3 months ofage.

After hearing the evidence the board ofspecial inquiry found that the appellantwas a Chinese person and a subject of theEmperor of China and not entitled toland.

In view of the fact that the applicant foradmission was born in lawful wedlockOn appeal to the Insular Collector ofCustoms this decision was affirmed, andthe Court of First Instance of Cebu inthese habeas corpus proceedingsremanded the appellant to the Collector

of Customs Under the laws of thePhilippine Islands, children, while theyremain under parental authority, have thenationality of their parents. Therefore, thelegitimate children born in the PhilippineIslands of a subject of the Emperor ofChina are Chinese subjects and the samerule obtained during Spanish sovereigntyIssue: WON Roa is a citizen of thePhilippines

Held:

YES, The nationality of the appellant

having followed that of his mother, hewas therefore a citizen of the PhilippineIslands on July 1, 1902, and never havingexpatriated himself, he still remains acitizen of this country.

We therefore conclude that the appellantis a citizen of the Philippine Islands andentitled to land. The judgment appealedfrom is reversed and the appellant isordered released from custody, with costsde oficio.

Ratio:His mother, before her marriage, was, aswe have said, a Spanish subject.

Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:That all inhabitants of the PhilippineIslands continuing to reside therein whowere Spanish subjects on the eleventhday of April, eighteen hundred andninety-nine, and then resided in saidIslands, and their children bornsubsequent thereto, shall be deemed andheld to be citizens of the Philippine

Islands and as such entitled to theprotection of the United States, exceptsuch as shall have elected to preservetheir allegiance to the Crown of Spain inaccordance with the provisions of thetreaty of peace between the United Statesand Spain signed at Paris Decembertenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.On the death of her husband she ipsofacto reacquired the nationality of thecountry of her birth, as she was thenliving in that country and had never leftit. She was then the natural guardian of

Tranquilino. Upon the dissolution of amarriage between a female citizen of theUnited States and a foreigner, she ipsofacto reacquires American citizenship, ifat that time she is residing in the UnitedStates.

There is no statutory declaration on thequestion as to whether or not her minorchildren would follow that of theirwidowed mother. If the children were

born in the United States, they would becitizens of that country. If they were born

in the country of which their father (andtheir mother during coverture) was acitizen, then they would be a citizens ofthat country until the death of their father.But after his death, they being minors andtheir nationality would, as a logicalconsequence, follow that of their mother,she having changed their domicile andnationality by placing them within the

jurisdiction of the United States.

But, of course, such minor children, onreaching their majority, could elect, under

the principle that expatriation is aninherent right of all people, thenationality of the country of "no principlehas been more repeatedly announced bythe judicial tribunals of the country, andmore constantly acted upon, than that theleaning, in questions of citizenship,should always be in favor of the claimantof it." Quoted with approval in the case ofBoyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135)

G.R. No. L-46593RAMON TORRES V.TAN CHIM.

Laurel, J.:


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Tan Chim, the petitioner here, arrived atthe port of Cebu on January 18, 1937, andsought admission as a minor son ofAlejandro Tan Bangco. After hearing, theBoard of Special Inquiry decided to denyhim entry on the ground that the status ofhis father had not been passed upon bythe Secretary of Labor. A petition forhabeas corpus was filed with the Court of

First Instance of Cebu (civil case No.308), which ruled that Alejandro TanBangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli,having been born in Manila on February27, 1893. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals, by decision of February 27,1893, upheld the conclusion of the lowercourt and declined to overrule thedoctrine in Roa vs. Collector of Customs,23 Phil. 315, in the followingcommendable language:

It is urged upon us by the Solicitor-

General that we reexamine and reversethe doctrine laid down in Roa vs.Collector of Customs, supra, because thelaw, we are now informed, had beenmisconstrued and misapplied by thiscourt in that case. A suggestion of thiskind should be sympathetically received

but for the fact that the principle ofterritoriality or jus soli adopted in Roa vs.Collector of Customs, supra, does nothave to be set aside by this Court for thereason that the principle is no longer pre-dominating in this jurisdiction after

taking effect of the Constitution of thePhilippines, which has mainly adoptedthe contrary principle of jus sanguinis. If,however, what is suggested is that thecase at bar because of the embodiment ofa new policy on citizenship in theConstitution, we are of the opinion thatthis cannot be done unless we give aretroactive effect to the Constitution. Wehold that the present case is still governed

by, and should be decided on theauthority of Roa vs. Collector ofCustoms, supra, for the following

reasons:

1. As already observed, the present caseis similar to Roa vs. Collector ofCustoms, supra, in that the factsdeterminative of citizenship in both relateto events which had taken place beforethe advent of American sovereignty. Wecannot reverse the doctrine in Roa vs.Collector of Custom, supra, and convertRoa into an alien, after our final

pronouncement in 1912 that he was aFilipino. If we depart from the rule there

established notwithstanding the almost-exact analogy between the two cases,

nothing short of legal anachronism wouldfollow, and we should avoid this result.

2. While we profess no idolatrous

reverence for precedents (PhilippineTrust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30), weshould not overlook the fact that the rulelaid down in the Roa case had beenadhered to and accepted for more than 20

years before the adoption of ourConstitution; not only this Court but alsoinferior courts had consistently andinvariably followed it; the executive andadministrative agencies of theGovernment had theretofore abided by it;and the general public had acquiesced init. Withal, our decisions should not be, asto a given period of time, upon the sameor similar facts and under the same orsimilar circumstances, as fluctuating as toengender the phenomenon described byMr. Justice Thompson, of the Supreme

Court of Virginia as ignis fatuus. (Perkinsv. Clemente et al. 1 Pat and (Va.) 153.)

3. When in Roa vs. Collector of Customswe declared the applicant therein to be acitizen of the Philippines, that declarationwas a statement of a general principleapplicable not only to Tranquilino Roaindividually but to all those who were inthe same situation, that is to say, to all

persons born in the Philippines before theratification of the treaty of peace betweenthe United States and Spain, of Chinese

father and Filipino mother; residents ofthe Philippines at the time mentioned inthe treaty of peace, although in theirminority; thereafter, going to China forthe purpose of studying, and returning tothe Philippines to live here. This was therule at the time of the adoption of ourConstitution. With it, the bench and the

bar were familiar. The members of theConstitutional Convention were alsoaware of this rule, and in abrogating thedoctrine laid down in the Roa case, bymaking the jus sanguinis the

predominating principle in thedetermination of Philippine citizenship,they did not intend to exclude those who,in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, werecitizens of the Philippines by judicialdeclaration at the time of the adoption ofthe constitution.

4. In the case of Commonwealth of thePhilippines vs. Gloria Baldello, G. R. No.L-45375, promulgated April 12, 1939, weheld that a Filipino woman, abandoned

by her husband who was a native of

Mexico but who was neither a Mexicannot American citizen, retained herFilipino citizenship, and in arriving at this

conclusion, we said that, our opinion

finds corroboration in the rule indicatedin Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil.315, 324-325), which is now a legal

provision embodied in paragraph 7,Article 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 63,to the effect that a Filipino woman doesnot lose her citizenship by marrying aforeigner belonging to a nation the laws

of which do not allow her to acquire thehusbands nationality. It should be notedthat in this Baldello case we reliedhowever indirectly on Roa vs. Collectorof Customs, supra and citedCommonwealth Act No. 63, which Act is

but a partial expression of the moderntendency in the United States to accorddistinct personality to married woman

providing that the marriage of anAmerican woman to a foreigner does notoperate loss of American citizenship.(Vide Act of Congress of September 22,

1922, 42 U. S. St.-at-L. p. 1022, ch. 411,sec. 3, 8 U.S. C. A. sec. 9; Act ofCongress of March, 1931, 46 U.S. St.-at-L. p. 1511, ch. 442, sec. 4.)

In Yu Ching Po vs. Gallofin, G.R. No.46795, promulgated on October 6, 1939,we held that a person born in thePhilippines of a Filipino-mestizo fatherand a mestiza-Chinese mother,notwithstanding vagueness in point of

paternity and maternity, becauseaccording to our decision, no dicen si es

hijo de padre filipino y de madre china, osi lo es de padre chino y de madrefilipina, is a Filipino citizen, for thereason that under Article 17, paragraph 1of the Civil Code, which was in force inthat year, he was a Spanish subject,which nationality he conserved.

Our attention has been called to the caseof Paz Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R.

No. 46451, promulgated September 30,1939, where we affirmed the decision ofthe Court of First Instance of Manila

denying the writ of habeas corpus andholding that the applicants therein werenot entitled to enter and reside in thePhilippines on the basis of Philippinecitizenship.

With due respect to my brethren in themajority, I would say that when thisCourt continues to uphold a ruling knownto be erroneous, with no plausible excusetherefor but public acquiescence therein,it may soon find itself compelled to makemore mistakes in an effort to justify the

previous ones. We may thus be buildingone error upon another until, by theiraccumulation, we shall come to a point


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when going further would be perilous andturning backward impossible.

I therefore vow to reverse the Roadoctrine and the decision of the Court ofAppeals based thereon.

Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor

G.R. No. 47616

Facts:

On 15 October 1941, a decision waspromulgated in the case of Tan Chong vs.Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.47616,whereby this Court affirmed the

judgment of the Court of First Instance ofManila, which had granted the writ ofhabeas corpus applied for by Tan Chong,on the ground that he, being a native ofthe Philippines, of a Chinese father and a

Filipino mother, is a citizen of thePhilippines.On the same date, in the case of LamSwee Sang vs. Commonwealth of thePhilippines (G.R. No. 47623), this Courtrendered a decision dismissing the

petition of the applicant for naturalizationfiled in the Court of First Instance ofZamboanga, on the ground that theapplicant, having been born in Sulu,Philippines, of a Chinese father andFilipino mother, is a citizen of thePhilippines. The dismissal of the petition

implies and means that there was no needof naturalization for the applicant who isa Filipino citizen.On 21 October 1941, a motion forreconsideration was filed in both cases bythe Solicitor General. The latter contendsthat even if the petitioner in the first caseand the applicant in the second were bornin the Philippines, of a Chinese father anda Filipino mother, lawfully married, stillthey are not citizens of the Philippinesunder and pursuant to the laws in force atthe time of their birth, and prays that both

decisions be set aside and the judgmentsappealed from be reversed.

Issue: 1.) What is the law in force duringthe petitioners birth?

2.) Is Tan Chong a citizen of thePhilippines?

Held:Accordingly, the decision of this Court inthe first case confirming the lower court's

judgment is set aside; the judgment of theCourt of First Instance of Manila

appealed from is reversed; the petitioneris recommitted to the custody of the

Commissioner of Immigration to be dealtwith in accordance with law.

Considering that the common lawprinciple or rule of jus soli obtained inEngland and in the United States, asembodied in the Fourteenth Amendmentto the Constitution of the United Stateswhich provides that "All persons born or

naturalized in the United States, andsubject to the jurisdiction thereof, arecitizens of the United States and of thestate wherein they reside.", has never

been extended to this jurisdiction (section1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Actof 29August 1916); considering that the law inforce and applicable to the petitioner andthe applicant in the two cases at the timeof their birth is sec. 4 of the PhilippineBill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended byAct of 23 March 1912, the Court is of theopinion that the petitioner in the first case

and the applicant in the second case, whowere born of alien parentage, were notand are not, under Sec. 4 of the PhilippineBill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended byAct of 23 March 1912 , citizens of thePhilippine Islands.

Sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1July 1902), as amended by Act of 23March 1912, which provides that onlythose "inhabitants of the PhilippineIslands continuing to reside therein whowere Spanish subjects on the 11th day of

April, 1899, and then resided in saidIslands, and their children bornsubsequent thereto, shall be deemed andheld to be citizens of the PhilippineIslands.

The petitioner in the first case was bornin San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915, of aChinese father and a Filipino mother,lawfully married, left for China in 1925,and returned to the Philippines on 25January1940 ( 15 years ).

*Jus Soli - The principle that nationalityis determined by the place of birth.

Valles v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino fatherand an Australian mother. In 1949, at theage of fifteen, she left Australia and cameto settle in the Philippines, where she

later married a Filipino and has since thenparticipated in the electoral process notonly as a voter but as a candidate, as well.

In the May 1998 elections, she ran forgovernor but Valles filed a petition forher disqualification as candidate on theground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is anAustralian or a Filipino.

HELD:

YES.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheresto the principle of jus sanguinis.Thereunder, a child follows thenationality or citizenship of the parentsregardless of the place of his/her birth, asopposed to the doctrine of jus soli whichdetermines nationality or citizenship on

the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a yearbefore the 1935 Constitution took intoeffect and at that time, what served as theConstitution of the Philippines were the

principal organic acts by which theUnited States governed the country.These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act ofAug. 29, 1916, also known as the JonesLaw.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants ofthe Philippines who were Spanishsubjects on April 11, 1899 and residedtherein including their children aredeemed to be Philippine citizens. Privaterespondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet,Camarines Norte.... Thus, under thePhilippine Bill of 1902 and the JonesLaw, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to bea Philippine citizen. By virtue of the samelaws, which were the laws in force at thetime of her birth, Telesforos daughter,

herein private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of thePhilippines.

The signing into law of the 1935Philippine Constitution has establishedthe principle of jus sanguinis as basis forthe acquisition of Philippine citizenship,xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis,which confers citizenship by virtue of

blood relationship, was subsequently

retained under the 1973 and 1987Constitutions. Thus, the herein privaterespondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a


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Filipino citizen, having been born to aFilipino father. The fact of her being bornin Australia is not tantamount to herlosing her Philippine citizenship. IfAustralia follows the principle of jus soli,then at most, private respondent can alsoclaim Australian citizenship resulting toher possession of dual citizenship.

The Republic of the Philippines v.

Nora Fe Sagun

G.R. No. 187567

FACTS: Respondent is the legitimatechild of Albert S. Chan, a Chinesenational, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipinocitizen. She was born on August 8, 1959in Baguio City and did not electPhilippine citizenship upon reaching theage of majority. In 1992, at the age of

33 and after getting married to AlexSagun, she executed an Oath ofAllegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines. Said document wasnotarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung onDecember 17, 1992, but was not recordedand registered with the Local CivilRegistrar of Baguio City.

Due to the denial of her passportapplication, since there was annotationthat she had elected Philippinecitizenship, she sought a judicial

declaration of her election of Philippinecitizenship and prayed that the LocalCivil Registrar of Baguio City be orderedto annotate the same on her birthcertificate. After conducting a hearing,the trial court rendered the assailedDecision on April 3, 2009 granting the

petition and declaring respondent aFilipino citizen.

However, a petition for review oncertiorari filed by the Solicitor General;the latter arguing that respondents

petition before the RTC was improper ontwo counts: for [one], law and

jurisprudence clearly contemplate nojudicial action or proceeding for thedeclaration of Philippine citizenship; andfor [another], the pleaded registration ofthe oath of allegiance with the local civilregistry and its annotation onrespondents birth certificate are theministerial duties of the registrar; hence,they require no court order.

ISSUES:

[1] Whether or not an action orproceeding for judicial declaration of

Philippine citizenship is procedurally andjurisdictionally permissible?

No. Under our laws, there can be noaction or proceeding for the judicialdeclaration of the citizenship of anindividual. Courts of justice exist onlyfor settlement of justiciable controversies.Such judicial declaration of Philippine

citizenship is beyond the judicial powerof the court. Hence, such power is limitedonly to what the Constitution, itself,

prescribes.

[2] Whether or not respondent haseffectively elected Philippine citizenshipin accordance with the procedure

prescribed by law?

No. Respondent failed to comply with thelegal requirements for a valid election.Specifically, respondent had not executed

a sworn statement of her election ofPhilippine citizenship. The onlydocumentary evidence submitted byrespondent in support of her claim ofalleged election was her oath ofallegiance, executed 12 years after shereached the age of majority, which wasunregistered.

The mere exercise of suffrage, continuousand uninterrupted stay in the Philippines,and other similar acts showing exercise ofPhilippine citizenship cannot take the

place of election of Philippinecitizenship.

COURT DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated April 3,2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No.17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The petition for judicial declaration ofelection of Philippine citizenship filed byrespondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.No costs.

Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto

Aguinaldo Lim and Lau Yuen Yeung

versus

The Commissioner of Immigration(G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971)

Facts

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a temporary

visitor's visa to enter the Philippines as anon-immigrant for a period of one month.She was permitted to come into the

Philippines on 13 March 1961, and waspermitted to stay for a period of onemonth which would expire on 13 April1961. On the date of her arrival, herfriend filed a bond of P1,000.00 toundertake, among other things, that Ms.Yeung would actually depart from thePhilippines on or before the expiration ofher authorized period of stay in this

country or within the period as in hisdiscretion the Commissioner ofImmigration or his authorizedrepresentative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, petitioner wasallowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13February 1962., She contracted marriagewith Moy Ya Lim Yao alias EdilbertoAguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizenon 25 January 1962.

She brought this action for injunction

with preliminary injunction, because ofthe contemplated action of respondent toconfiscate her bond and order her arrestand immediate deportation, after theexpiration of her authorized stay.

Issue

1. Can Ms. Yeung, having been admittedas a temporary alien visitor based on herdeliberate and voluntary representationthat she will enter and stay only for a

period of one month, and thereby secured

a visa, go back on her representation tostay permanently without first departingfrom the Philippines (under Section 9 ofthe Immigration Act) as she had

promised?

2. Can Ms. Yeung's marriage to Mr. Yaoalias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipinocitizenship is not denied, have an effectof making her a Filipino, since it has not

been shown that she "might herself belawfully naturalized", it appearing clearlyin the record that she does not possess all

the qualifications required of applicantsfor naturalization by the Revised

Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act473)?

Held

1. No. Section 9 of the Immigration Actdoes not apply to aliens who after cominginto the Philippines as temporary visitors,legitimately become Filipino citizens oracquire Filipino citizenship. Such changeof nationality naturally bestows upon

them the right to stay in the Philippinespermanently or not.


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2. Yes. For an alien woman who marriesa Filipino to become herself a Filipinocitizen, there is no need for anynaturalization proceeding because she

becomes a Filipina ipso facto from thetime of such marriage: Provided, that shedoes not suffer any of thedisqualifications enumerated in Section 4of Commonwealth Act 473.

The Constitution itself recognizes asPhilippine citizens "Those who arenaturalized in accordance with law"(Section 1[5], Article IV, PhilippineConstitution). Citizens by naturalization,under this provision, include not onlythose who are naturalized in accordancewith legal proceedings for the acquisitionof citizenship, but also those who acquirecitizenship by "derivative naturalization"or by operation of law, as, for example,the "naturalization" of an alien wife

through the naturalization of her husband,or by marriage of an alien woman to acitizen.

In all instances where citizenship isconferred by operation of law, the timewhen citizenship is conferred should not

be confused with the time whencitizenship status is established as a

proven fact. Thus, even a natural-borncitizen of the Philippines, whosecitizenship status is put in issue in any

proceeding would be required to prove,

for instance, that his father is a citizen ofthe Philippines in order to factuallyestablish his claim to citizenship. Hiscitizenship status commences from thetime of birth, although his claim thereto isestablished as a fact only at a subsequenttime. Likewise, an alien woman whomight herself be lawfully naturalized

becomes a Philippine citizen at the timeof her marriage to a Filipino husband, notat the time she is able to establish thatstatus as a proven fact by showing thatshe might herself be lawfully naturalized.

Indeed, there is no difference between astatutory declaration that a person isdeemed a citizen of the Philippines:Provided, that his father is such citizenfrom a declaration that an alien womanmarried to a Filipino citizen of thePhilippines provided she might herself belawfully naturalized. Both becomecitizens by operation of law; the former

becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth;the later ipso facto upon marriage.

ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner andappellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, oppositor and

appellant.

FACTS:

On petition to declare Zita Ngo alsoknown as Zita Ngo Burca "as

possessing all qualifications and none ofthe qualifications for naturalization under

Commonwealth Act 473 for the purposeof cancelling her Alien Registry with theBureau of Immigration".1 She avers thatshe is of legal age, married to FlorencioBurca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident ofReal St., Ormoc City; that before hermarriage, she was a Chinese citizen,subject of Nationalist China; that she was

born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit,Surigao.By constitutional and legal precepts, analien woman who marries a Filipinocitizen, does not by the mere fact of

marriage - automatically become aFilipino citizen.Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution,citizenship is limited to:(1) Those who are citizens of thePhilippine Islands at the time of theadoption of this Constitution.(2) Those born in the Philippine Islandsof foreign parents who, before theadoption of this Constitution, had beenelected to public office in the PhilippineIslands.(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of

the Philippines.(4) Those whose mothers are citizens ofthe Philippines and, upon reaching theage of majority, elect Philippinecitizenship.(5) Those who are naturalized inaccordance with law.And, on the specific legal status of analien woman married to a citizen of thePhilippines, Congress in paragraph 1,Section 15 of the Revised NaturalizationLaw legislated the following:Any woman who is now or may hereafter

be married to a citizen of the Philippines,and who might herself be lawfullynaturalized shall be deemed a citizen ofthe Philippines.

Issue:

Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed aFilipino citizen in accordance to the

provisions in the Revised NaturalizationLaw vis--vis the Constitution of thePhilippines.

HELD:

No. Petitioner did not meet therequirements specified in the Revised

Naturalization Law. The petition is fatallydefective for failure to contain or mentionthe essential allegations required under

Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, suchas, among others, petitioner's formerplaces of residence, and the absence ofthe affidavits of at least two supportingwitnesses.

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alienwoman married to a Filipino who desiresto be a citizen of this country must applytherefor by filing a petition for citizenshipreciting that she possesses all thequalifications set forth in Section 2, andnone of the disqualifications under

Section 4, both of the RevisedNaturalization Law; (2) Said petitionmust be filed in the Court of FirstInstance where petitioner has resided atleast one year immediately preceding thefiling of the petition; and (3) Any action

by any other office, agency, board orofficial, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competentcourt of justice certifying or declaringthat an alien wife of the Filipino citizen isalso a Filipino citizen, is hereby declarednull and void.

We note that the petition avers thatpetitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigaothat her former residence was Surigao,Surigao, and that presently she is residingat Regal St., Ormoc City. In court,however, she testified that she alsoresided in Junquera St., Cebu, where shetook up a course in home economics, forone year. Section 7 of the NaturalizationLaw requires that a petition fornaturalization should state petitioner's"present and former places of residence".

Residence encompasses all places wherepetitioner actually and physically resided.13 Cebu, where she studied for one year,

perforce comes within the term residence.The reason for exacting recital in the

petition of present and former places ofresidence is that "information regarding

petitioner and objection to his applicationare apt to be provided by people in hisactual, physical surrounding". And theState is deprived of full opportunity tomake inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to

become a citizen, if all the places of

residence do not appear in the petition. Soit is, that failure to allege a former placeof residence is fatal.


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We find one other flaw in petitioner'spetition. Said petition is not supported bythe affidavit of at least two credible

persons, "stating that they are citizens ofthe Philippines and personally know the

petitioner to be a resident of thePhilippines for the period of timerequired by this Act and a person of goodrepute and morally irreproachable, and

that said petitioner has in their opinion allthe qualifications necessary to become acitizen of the Philippines and is not in anyway disqualified under the provisions ofthis Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "setforth the names and post-office addressesof such witnesses as the petitioner maydesire to introduce at the hearing of thecase". 16The necessity for the affidavit of twowitnesses cannot be overlooked. It isimportant to know who those witnessesare. The State should not be denied the

opportunity to check on their backgroundto ascertain whether they are of goodstanding in the community, whose wordmay be taken on its face value, and whocould serve as "good warranty of theworthiness of the petitioner". Thesewitnesses should indeed prove in courtthat they are reliable insurers of thecharacter of petitioner. Short of this, the

petition must fail.

YUNG UAN CHU vs. REPUBLIC

GR L-34973, April 14, 1988SECOND DIVISION, PARAS (J): 4concur

Facts: This is an appeal by theGovernment seeking the reversal of theDecision of the then Court of FirstInstance of South Cotabato, GeneralSantos City dated December 7, 1971granting the petition for naturalization ofYung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung Yu HuiTin.

After trial, a decision wasrendered on December 7, 1971 finding

petitioner Yung Uan Chu baptized asLina Yung, known in school in herregistered name as LinaUan Chu and nowas Mrs. Lina Y. Cupang, as possessed ofall the qualifications and none of thedisqualifications of a Filipino citizen andtherefore authorized to take her oath ofallegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines and to register the same in the

proper civil registrar. The sole issue raised by

appellant is whether or not the lowercourt erred in concluding that it has

jurisdiction to declare petitioner a

Filipino citizen based on its conclusionthat if administrative bodies are

possessed with such power (to determinethe absence of disqualifications on thestatus of citizenship), there is strongerreason for the court to have jurisdictionover the case." The Government thru theSolicitor General submitted that in the

case of Moy Yu Lim Yao vs.Commissioner of Immigration, thisCourt, while holding that an alien womanwho marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto

becomes a Filipino provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of thePhilippines under Section 4,Commonwealth Act No. 473, reiteratedthe rule that "a judicial declaration thatthe person is a Filipino citizen cannot bemade in a petition for naturalization andthat, in this jurisdiction there can be noindependent action for the judicial

declaration of citizenship of anindividual."

Issue:Whether a judicial declaration that a

person is a Filipino citizen can be madein a petition for naturalization

Held:The sole and only purpose of the

petitioner is to have the petitionerdeclared a Filipino citizen will be grant,this court clearly stated: Under our laws,

there can be no action or proceeding forthe judicial declaration of the citizenshipof an individual. Courts of justice existfor settlement of justiciable controversies,which imply a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act oromission violative of said right, and aremedy, granted or sanctioned by law, forsaid breach of right. As an incident onlyof the adjudication of the rights of the

parties to a controversy, the court maypass upon, and make a pronouncementrelative to their status. Otherwise, such a

pronouncement is beyond judicial power.Thus, for instance, no action or

proceeding may be instituted for adeclaration to the effect that plaintiff or

petitioner is married, or single, or alegitimate child, although a findingthereon may be made as necessary

premise to justify a given relief availableonly to one enjoying said status. At times,the law permits the acquisition of a givenstatus, such as naturalization, by judicialdecree. But, there is no similar legislationauthorizing the institution of judicial

proceeding to declare that a given personis part of our citizenry. (Tan Yu Chu v.Rep. supra)

Hence, a "judicial declarationthat a person is a Filipino citizen cannot

be made in a petition for naturalizationbecause under our laws there can be noaction or proceeding for the judicialdeclaration of the citizenship of anindividual. Such a declaration or

pronouncement is beyond the court'sjurisdiction."

In Moy Ya Lim Yao (41 SCRA292-388) the Court adverted to theadministrative procedure which up to the

present is followed in the Commission ofImmigration and Deportation. The stepsto be taken by an alien woman married toa Filipino for the cancellation of her aliencertificate of registration are embodied inOpinion No. 38, series of 1958 of thenActing Secretary of Justice Jesus G.Berrera to the effect that "The alienwoman must the a petition for thecancellation of her alien certificate of

registration alleging, among other thingsthat she is married to a Filipino citizenand that she is not disqualified fromacquiring her husband's citizenship

pursuant to section 4 of CommonwealthAct No. 473, as amended. Upon the filingof said petition, which should beaccompanied or supported by the jointaffidavit of the petitioner and her husbandto the effect and thus secure recognitionof her status as a Filipino citizen. Judicialrecourse would be available to the

petitioner in a case of adverse action by

the Immigration Commissioner. Although as already stated,administrative proceedings should have

been undertaken by the appellee, still, inthe instant case, we find no necessitytherefor because in this judicial

proceeding, it is clear she is already aFilipino citizen. The appealed decision is herebyAFFIRMED and the Commissioner ofImmigration and Deportation is herebyordered to CANCEL applicants aliencertificate of registration.

GR # 9219192 July 30, 1991Antonio Y. CoHouse of Representative ElectoralTribunal and Jose Ong, Jr.GR # 92202-03July 30, 1991Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr.Petitioner V.Electoral Tribunal of the House ofRepresentative and Jose Ong, Jr.

Facts:

Respondent Jose Ong, Jr was proclaimedwinner of the May 11, 1987congressional election for the 2nd district


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of Northern Samar. Petitioners, AntonioY. Co and Sixto T. Balanguit, Jr are bothlosers in the said election.Both filed an election protest to House ofRepresentative Electoral Tribunal(HRET) on the grounds that privaterespondent Jose Ong, Jr is not a natural

born citizen of the Philippines.HRET ruled in favour of the private

respondent on its decision datedNovember 6, 1989 and subsequentmotion for reconsideration filed by

petitioners on November 12, 1989 wasalso denied by HRET, in its resolutiondated February 22, 1990.Hence, these petition for Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not, private respondent, JoseOng, Jr is a natural born citizen of thePhilippines?

Held:Petitions were dismissed, the questioned,decision of the House of RepresentativeElectoral Tribunal is affirmed, andrespondent Jose Ong, Jr is declared anatural born citizen of the Philippines dueto the following events:1. His grandfather, Ong Te, arrivedin the Philippines from China in 1895 andestablished residence in the municipalityof Laoang, Samar, were he bought landsfrom the fruit of hard work.2. Private Respondent Father, Jose

Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905and was brought by Ong Te to Samar inthe year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent hischildhood in the province of Samar werehe establish relationship with hisneighbors, absorb Filipino cultural valuesand practices and was baptized intoChritianity.3. Jose Ong Chuan met a natural

born Filipino, Agripina Lao, the they fellin love and got married on 1931according to Catholic faith and practice.4. The couple bore eight children

and one of them is the private respondentwho was born in 1948.5. The private respondent fatherfiled an application for naturalization inthe Court of First Instance of Samar inFebruary 15, 1954. On April 28, 1957,The CFI of Samar, declared Jose OngChuan a Filipino Citizen and on May 15,1957, CFI declared its April 28, 1957decision as final and executory and thatJose Ong Chuan may already take hisOath of Allegiance. A certificate ofnaturalization was issued to Jose Ong

Chuan.6. His Elder brother, Emil waselected as a delegate to the 1971

Constitutional Convention. Emils Statusas a natural born citizen was challenged.The Constitutional convention delegateswhich in drafting the constitutionremoved the unequal treatment given toderived citizenship on the basis of themothers citizenship formally and

declared Emil Ong, (the respondent fullbrother) as a natural born citizen.

Penned by Justice Gutierrez, Jr withBidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea andDavide ,Jr. , Concur.

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

Petitioner: ANTONIO BENGSON IIIRespondent: House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal and TEODORO C.CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is atissue in this case, in view of theconstitutional requirement that no

person shall be a Member of the House ofRepresentatives unless he is a natural-

born citizen.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines. He was born in Tarlac in1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine

Corps and without the consent of theRepublic of the Philippines, took an oathof allegiance to the USA. As aConsequence, he lost his Filipinocitizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An ActProviding for the Ways in WhichPhilippine Citizenship May Be Lost orReacquired (1936)] section 1(4), aFilipino citizen may lose his citizenship

by, among other, rendering service to or

accepting commission in the armedforces of a foreign country.

Whatever doubt that remained regardinghis loss of Philippine citizenship waserased by his naturalization as a U.S.citizen in 1990, in connection with hisservice in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippinecitizenship through repatriation under RA2630 [(An Act Providing forReacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenshipby Rendering Service To, or AcceptingCommission In, the Armed Forces of the

United States (1960)]. He ran for and waselected as the Representative of the 2ndDistrict of Pangasinan in the 1998

elections. He won over petitionerBengson who was then running forreelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case forQuo Warranto Ad Cautelam withrespondent HRET claiming that Cruz wasnot qualified to become a member of theHOR since he is not a natural-born

citizen as required under Article VI,section 6 of the Constitution. HRETrendered its decision dismissing the

petition for quo warranto and declaringCruz the duly elected Representative inthe said election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cruz, a natural-bornFilipino who became an Americancitizen, can still be considered a natural-

born Filipino upon his reacquisition ofPhilippine citizenship.

HELD:

YES. Filipino citizens who have lost theircitizenship may however reacquire thesame in the manner provided by law.C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes bywhich Philippine citizenship may bereacquired by a former citizen: 1.

Naturalization, 2. Repatriation, and 3.Direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under variousstatutes by those who lost their

citizenship due to: a. desertion of thearmed forces; b. services in the armedforces of the allied forces in World WarII; c. service in the Armed Forces of theUnited States at any other time; d.marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;and e. political economic necessity.

Repatriation results in the recovery of theoriginal nationality. This means that anaturalized Filipino who lost hiscitizenship will be restored to his priorstatus as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On

the other hand, if he was originally anatural-born citizen before he lost hisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restoredto his former status as a natural-bornFilipino. R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost hisPhilippine citizenship by renderingservice to, or accepting commission in,the Armed Forces of the United States, orafter separation from the Armed Forcesof the United States, acquired UnitedStates citizenship, may reacquire

Philippine citizenship by taking an oathof allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines and registering the same with


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Local Civil Registry in the place wherehe resides or last resided in thePhilippines. The said oath of allegianceshall contain a renunciation of any othercitizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath ofallegiance to the Republic and havingregistered the same in the Civil Registry

of Magantarem, Pangasinan inaccordance with the cited provision, Cruzis deemed to have recovered his originalstatus as a natural-born citizen, a statuswhich he acquired at birth as the son of aFilipino father. It bears stressing that theact of repatriation allows him to recover,or return to, his original status before helost his Philippine citizenship.

Loss of Citizenship

Gloria Baldello for Naturalization as aPhilippine Citizen.The Commonwealth of the Philippines,appellee Vs Gloria Baldello, petitioner-Ponente: Moran, J:

Facts:

A Filipino citizen, GloriaBaldello, married a Mexican native,GabinoOrdorica, on November 12, 1921.The Mexican native was acknowledgedas to serving for the United States Army

based in the Philippines. The couple

continually been living together until theMexican native, Ordorica abandonedBaldello, consequently, the latter sued outand obtained an order from the courtdeclaring Ordorica presumptively deadfor the purpose of the law as hiswhereabouts being unknown for elevenyears. Shortly after, Baldillo, filed a

petition in the court of first instance inmanila wherein she sought to return tothe Filipino citizenship. The petition wasdenied and she appealed.

The court discovered that upon

the marriage was taken part, Ordoricowas neither a Mexican nor an American,discerning that he failed to comply withthe requirements to be naturalized citizenof the United Sates, at the same timeforfeited his Mexican citizenship by hisservice to the US, and therefore appearedto be a stateless individual.Issue:

Whether or not Gloria Baldellobe deliberated as a Filipino citizenconsidering that he married a statelessindividual.

Ruling:Therefore, the court so ordered thatappellant Gloria Baldello, is a Filipino

citizen, and accordingly her petition forPhilippine citizenship is unnecessary.

Reason for the Decision:The pronouncement of the court

was evidently aided by paragraph 7,article 1, of Commonwealth Act 63, that

a Filipino woman does not lose hercitizenship by marrying a foreigner

belonging to a nation the laws of whichdo not allow her to acquire the husband'snationality. Were it not for this rule, if aFilipino woman loses her nationalitysimply by marrying a foreigner, evenwithout acquiring the foreigner'scitizenship, then she would becomedestitute of nationality. And evidently the

purpose of the said rule is to prevent suchcondition of statelessness in a Filipinowoman married to an alien, a policy thatis perfectly applicable in the present case.

G.R. No. L-83882January 24, 1989IN RE PETITION FOR HABEASCORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,vs.MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJORPABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ,BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNYREYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO,respondent.Facts:

The present controversy originated witha petition for habeas corpus filed with theCourt on 4 July 1988 seeking the releasefrom detention of herein petitioner. Aftermanifestation and motion of the SolicitorGeneral of his decision to refrain fromfiling a return of the writ on behalf of theCID, respondent Commissioner thrucounsel filed the return. An internalresolution of 7 November 1988 referredthe case to the Court en banc. In its 10

November 1988 resolution, denying thepetition for habeas corpus, the Court

disposed of the pending issues of (1)jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalizedFilipino citizen and (2) validity ofwarrantless arrest and detention of thesame person.Petitioner's own compliance reveals thathe was originally issued a Portuguese

passport in 1971, valid for five (5) yearsand renewed for the same period upon

presentment before the proper Portugueseconsular officer. Despite hisnaturalization as a Philippine citizen on10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,

petitioner applied for and was issuedPortuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N.1517410 by the Consular Section of the

Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that hisPortuguese passport expired on 20 July1986. While still a citizen of thePhilippines who had renounced, upon hisnaturalization, "absolutely and forever allallegiance and fidelity to any foreign

prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"and pledged to "maintain true faith and

allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines," he declared his nationalityas Portuguese in commercial documentshe signed, specifically, the Companiesregistry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed inHongkong sometime in April 1980.Issue:Whether or not Willie Yu still to beconsidered as a naturalized Filipinocitizen.Ruling:To Court ruled that the foregoing actsconsidered together constitute an express

renunciation of petitioner's Philippinecitizenship acquired throughnaturalization. In Board of ImmigrationCommissioners us, Go Gallano, expressrenunciation was held to mean arenunciation that is made knowndistinctly and explicitly and not left toinference or implication. Petitioner, withfull knowledge, and legal capacity, afterhaving renounced Portuguese citizenshipupon naturalization as a Philippine citizenresumed or reacquired his prior status asa Portuguese citizen, applied for a

renewal of his Portuguese passport andrepresented himself as such in officialdocuments even after he had become anaturalized Philippine citizen. Suchresumption or reacquisition of Portuguesecitizenship is grossly inconsistent withhis maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and

RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

Ponente: Justice PANGANIBAN, 1996FACTS: Petitioner Frivaldo filed hiscertificate for Candidacy for Governorabout 3 weeks before the election. PrivateRespondent Lee, another candidate forthe said position, filed a petition todisqualify Frivaldo by reason of not beinga citizen of the Philippines. A week

before the election, Second Division ofCOMELEC promulgated a resolutiongranting the petition of Lee. A motion for

Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldowhich remained unacted until after theelections. Thus, his candidacy continued


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and he was voted during the elections.Few days after the Election, COMELECEn Banc affirmed the promulgatedresolution of the SecondDivision.Frivaldo garnered the highest number ofvotes in the said election. Lee filed a

petition praying for his proclamation asGovernor. Lee was then proclaimed asGovernor. Frivaldo filed a petition for

annulment of the proclamation of Lee andfor his own proclamation alleging that hehad already taken his oath of allegianceas a citizen of the Philippines which hefiled a couple of months ago before theelection.Frivaldos motion was recognized and

was then proclaimed as Governor.Lee filed a motion for reconsiderationwhich was denied by COMELEC EnBanc.

ISSUES: Private Respondent Lee filed

this instant petition for Certiorari,Preliminary Injunction, and Annulmentof the COMELEC decision andresolution.W/N Frivaldos repatriation was valid

and legal. If it is, was it able to cure hislack of citizenship.

DECISION: The Court dismissed thepetition and affirmed the decision ofCOMELEC. Under Sec. 39 of the LocalGovernment Code, an elective localofficial must be a citizen of the

Philippines. The court held that the lawdoes not specify any particular date ortime when the candidate must possesscitizenship. At the same time, literallyspeaking, such qualification ofcitizenship should thus be possessedwhen the elected official begins togovern. In the instant case, Frivaldo whenhe took his oath of allegiance under the

provisions of P.D. No. 725, at 2:00 p.m.on June 30, 1995, he automatically re-assumed his his citizenship on that veryday which coincidentally also the day

when the term of the governor began, hewas therefore already qualified to be

proclaimed, to hold the office and todischarge the functions andresponsibilities thereof as of said date.

ANGAT V. REPUBLICG.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Angat is a natural born citizenwho lost his Philippine Citizenshipthrough naturalization in the United

States of America. He then filed apetition dated March1, 1996 before theRTC of Marikina to regain his status as aFilipino Citizen. He was then repatriatedupon the approval of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction

in deciding over repatriation cases.

HELD:

NO. RTC has no jurisdiction overrepatriation cases, thus the courts orderwas thereby not binding. Instead, theSpecial Committee on Naturalizationshould handle and decide over these casesas the said committee was revived onJune 8, 1995. In a prospective effect, thecase of Angat is under the jurisdiction ofsaid committee since the petition was

filed on March 1, 1996 and pursuant tothe LOI No, 270 PD 725 constituted bythe committee providing repatriation ofFilipino women who had lost theirPhilippine Citizenship and of natural bornFilipino who had lost their Philippinecitizenship by political and economicnecessity.

CASE TITLE: ALTAJEROSVS. COMELEC, JOSE ALMIE and

VERNON VERSOZA,G.R. NO. 163256, November 10, 2004

PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

FACTS:

On January 15, 2004, privaterespondents Jose AlmieAltiche andVernon Versoza, registered voters of SanJacinto, Masbate, filed with theCOMELEC, a petition to disqualify andto deny due course or cancel the

certificate of candidacy ofpetitionerAltajeros on the ground that heis not a Filipino citizen and that he madea false representation in his certificate ofcandidacy that "[he] was not a permanentresident of or immigrant to a foreigncountry."

On January 26, 2004, petitionerfiled an Answer stating among others,that he did not commit falserepresentation in his application forcandidacy as mayor because as early as

December 17, 1997, he was alreadyissued a Certificate of Repatriation by theSpecial Committee on Naturalization and

claimed that his Filipino Citizenship wasalready restored, and he was qualified torun as mayor in the May 10, 2004election.

On the date of hearing, theparties were required to submit theirMemorandum within 3 days. Privaterespondents filed their Memorandum,

while petitioner did not file one withinthe required period, however, he filed aReply Memorandum subsequently.

On March 22, 2004, aResolution promulgated by COMELEC,First Division adopted therecommendation of Atty.ZacariasZaragosa Jr., regional electiondirector for Region V and hearing officerof this case, disqualifying the petitionerAltajeros as candidate for mayoral

position of San Jacinto, Masabate in the

May 10, 2004 local and national election.

On March 25, 2004, petitionerfiled a Motion for Reconsideration, andattached additional documents to provethat he had completed all therequirements for repatriation which thusentitled him to run for an elective office.

On May 7, 2004, COMELEC enbanc promulgated a Resolution denyingthe petitioners Motion forReconsideration for utter lack of merit

and affirming the Resolution of theCOMELEC, First Division,hence aPetition for Certiorari was filed by the

petitioner on May 10, 2004, the electionday itself.ISSUES: Whether or not the respondentCOMELEC erred in disqualifying anddenying the

compilation cases consti1 (part2)

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