consti 2 digests manila prince - filoteo

8/10/2019 Consti 2 Digests Manila Prince - Filoteo

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MANILA PRINCE v GSIS

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December

1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and

outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18

September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a

Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at

P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its

hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or

P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard asthe winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,

the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by

Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel

sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSISrefused

to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded

the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be

hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came

to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII

Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in

Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision

which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary

or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the

right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional

provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the

liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined

by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating

that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing

constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the

exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such

a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a

convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination

thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere

fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the

violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a

provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from aconstitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is

not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule

is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust

legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the

constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.

Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject

constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of

the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different

principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to

operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory

enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one

more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a

legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumptionnow is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional

provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the

legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the

fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987

Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which

needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From

its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

TAADA v ANGARA

I. THE FACTSPetitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the

concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the

international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They

argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to

develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by

Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the

preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the

WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same

footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy

of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phraseeffectively controlled by

Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide

trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global

economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine

Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in

worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a

global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to

ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,

labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business

exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity andlimits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade

practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue

an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in

the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not

encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the

country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis

of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy

does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.

It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international

community.As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,sponsor of this constitutional policy:


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Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly

aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It

does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding

mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom

from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic

industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade

without discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are

rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from

envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental lawencourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,

thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade

environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that

can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and

Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.

And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in

Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against

the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the

State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by

Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials

and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while

serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes

of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles

relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves

the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the

basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are

competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance

of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of

legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of

the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave

its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land

is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and

gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in suchexercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its

members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the

national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal

reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its

decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial

power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its

authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the

realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy

makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march

toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people

should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement

allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

PBMEO v PBMCI

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a

mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the

alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, PhilippineBlooming Mills Inc.,

called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the

planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the

demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of

the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of

speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the

normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was

backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if

they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while

the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts

should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed.

Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the

PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout

clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were

found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was

subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days

late.

Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of

human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are

"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the

"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual

application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting

government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights

can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy

of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred

position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political

institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not

permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and ofpetition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials

or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom

we shall be governed.

PEOPLE v MARTI

Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes

went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich,

Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the

packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package

making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes,

husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of

the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package,he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he


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found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect

the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious

package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre

Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed

an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was

violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as

evidence against him.

Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private

individuals?Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that

the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked

with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of

private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened

the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere

presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr.

Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely

to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

WATEROUS DRUG v NLRC

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the

normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a

total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a refund for the jacked-up

price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous

Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for

Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being

rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity ofones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts

committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged

unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens

from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse

against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an

invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled

that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from

employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code

for the termination of Employment.

YRASUEGI v PAL

Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein

respondent. Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight

standards of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed.

Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the

equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of

governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be

invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of

private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14thAmendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in

saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however

discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate

the equal protection guarantee.

In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a flight steward on

the ground of obesity. YRASUEGUI vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. ( G.R. No.

168081 October 17, 2008) an international flight steward was dismissed for his

failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. It sounds

discriminatory but the Court found that it was not.

On various dates, Petitioner was at 209 pounds, 217 pounds and 212 pounds, well

beyond the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew

Administration Manual of PAL. When found to be overweight, he was asked to go

on leave in order to address this. He was unable to comply and in one instance, he

even gained weight instead by 49 pounds beyond the limit. He was restricted to

ground duty as a result. He made a written commitment to reduce his weight.

He remained overweight despite periods given to him in order to comply. He failed

to report for weight checks and was formally warned that a repeated refusal to

report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly.

In 1992, he was finally served a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of

company standards on weight requirements and given 10 days to answer. In his

answer, he did not deny being overweight. He claimed that his violation had been

condoned by PAL and that PAL had discriminated against him considering that there

were cabin crew members who are similarly situated.

In 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain

his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which

spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were

considered terminatedeffective immediately. He filed a complaint for illegaldismissal against PAL. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor but this was overturned

by the Court of Appeals. Hence, his recourse to the Supreme Court.

He argued that (1) his dismissal does not fallunder 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2)

continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide

occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other

overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

The Court found that obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article

282(e) of the Labor Code. It found that the weight standards of PAL constitute a

continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. And an employee

may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as

prescribed by the weight standards. Hence a dismissal of the employee falls under

Article 282(e) [1] of the Labor Code. It did not give credence to Petitioners claim

that obesity is a physical abnormality and/or illness, citing Nadura v. BenguetConsolidated, Inc. The Supreme Court did not find the case applicable as it was not


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decided under the Labor Code. Moreover, there was no issue of flight safety in the

aforecited case. In Nadura the dismissal was due to illness in contrast to the instant

case where petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of

his employer. Another issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is

entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue is the propriety of the

dismissal. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here,

petitioner was accorded utmost leniency, having been given more than four (4)

years to comply with the weight standards.

The Court found that the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims

that obesity is a disease. He was able to reduce weight given the proper attitude,determination, and self-discipline. He even admitted during a hearing that he could

bring down his weight. The Court opined that his fluctuating weight indicates

absence of willpower rather than an illness.

The Court also did not give weight (no pun intended) to petitioners citation of

Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation

and Hospitals, decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that

case, it was held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Act cited therein and

that respondent discriminated against her based on perceived disability.

Evidence was introduced to show morbid obesity is a physiological disorder.

The Supreme Court found that petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the Cook case,

the plaintiff was 100 pounds overweight. Petitioner was only less than 50 pounds

over his ideal weight at his heaviest. One is tempted to thus ask if the Court would

have decided in his favor if he had weighed more.

The Court held that the obesity of petitioner, in the context of his work as flight

attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code

that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be intentional but

it is voluntary. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282.

Petitioner likewise argued that there should be a statute constituting a bona fide

occupational qualification (BFOQ) where an exception allows an employer to

engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination if necessary to

the normal operation of a business or enterprise. Petitioner claims that since there

was no such statute, there is no justification for his dismissal.

The court stated that there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be

applied if it has no supporting statute. The weight standards of PAL are reasonable.

PAL being a common carrier is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the

safety of the passengers it transports. The weight standards of PAL show its effort

to comply with these exacting obligations. PAL has committed itself to safelytransport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its

employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the

aircraft.

Flight safety was given primary importance by the court, stating that: It cannot be

gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire

passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something

goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common

carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially

the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their

passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly.

Cabin crew do not only serve meals or attend to passengers whims. Their most

important activity is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the

aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job ofa cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary

strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped

working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules. And the

body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case

of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit

doors. Airline companies cannot be compelled to reconfigure the aircraft just for

overweight cabin attendants.

He was also found to be in estoppel since the weight standards were made known to

him prior to his employment. He never questioned the authority of PAL when he was

asked to trim down his weight. The Court even lapsed into Latin and Filipino: Bona

fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shallbe done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.

His allegation that he was discriminated against was not given credence. Except for

pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, he failed to

indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods

they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights

assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other

relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory

treatment by PAL.

Nevertheless the Court granted him separation pay even if normally, a legally

dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. But it may be awarded as an

act social justice, or based on equity, if the dismissal is not for serious

misconduct and does not reflect on the moral character of the employee. He was

thus given separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year

of service.

It is with some irony that the scales of justice did not tip in favor of the petitioner

here. However, this did involve a special case, where the nature of an employees

duties with respect to flight safety was given emphasis by the Court. Not every job

would be the same and mere obesity should not be a ground for dismissal. But

health issues should be enough to compel an employee to lose weight not out of

fear for his job but for fear for his life.

[1] Article 282 provides: Termination by employer. An employer may terminate

an employment for any of the following just causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders

of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his

employer or(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his

employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized

representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

FILOTEO v SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District

in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of

various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance

as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting

on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of thearmed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime


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and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and

Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At

1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in

Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner

however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the

law should favour him as an accused.

Issue:

Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a

retroactive effect and petitioners extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible

evidenceHeld:

No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty

of felony who is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; DECISION AND FINAL

ORDERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN; APPEALABLE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW ON

CERTIORARI ON PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 45 OF THE

RULES OF COURT; EXCEPTIONAL CASES. - As amended by Republic Act No. 7975,

Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of

the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review

on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court." However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions

of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave

misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted

public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by

this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply because the

constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond

reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a person's life and liberty are at stake. As

a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable only where

there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED DURING

INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE; ENUMERATED. - The

relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution

are, inter alia, as follows: "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of

an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and tohave competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the

person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These

rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No

torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the

free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,

incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any

confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil

sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation

of victims of torture or similar practices and their families." (italics supplied.)

Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled

waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12,

Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above underscored)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF

COUNSEL; WHEN ADMISSIBLE. - By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the

1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel

during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not

be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made

prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to

counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the

effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be a dimissible.

Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973

Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance ofcounsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court,

through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, 554, issued the guidelines to be

observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically

ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid

unless made with the assistance of counsel."

4. ID.; JUDICIAL DECISIONS; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF "JUDGE-MADE" LAW

UPHELD BY THE COURT. - The prospective application of "judge-made" laws was

underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 444, 448-449, October 28, 1993,

where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with

Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or

interpreting the laws of the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the

Philippines," and Article 4 of the same Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no

retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of

statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in

themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.

5. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DISTINGUISHED FROM PENAL LAWS. - A bill of rights is a

declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the

Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by

individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and

a limitation upon the power of the State. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and

properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state

which the executive of the State has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal

law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the State for a crime or offense

against its law.

6. ID.; ID.; ARREST; IRREGULARITY THERETO IS DEEMED WAIVED BY

VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. - It is well-

settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the

acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made

before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this

issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal

of the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any

irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted

himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by

participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient

cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after

trial free from error.


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consti 2 digests manila prince - filoteo

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