ARANETA v. DINGLASAN

84 Phil. 368 (1949)

G.R. No. L-2044: J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.

G.R. No. L-2756: J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.

G.R. No. L-3054: EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, vs. EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido (eyng?).

G.R. No. L-3055: LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-3056: ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

As the issue is of transcendental importance, technicalities or procedure, particularly petitioners’ personality or sufficiency of interest and the question whether prohibition lies, was brushed aside.

Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President issued in virtue of the Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671)o L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution

in the Manila, CFI for violation of provisions of EO No. 62 (regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings) and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal.

o L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Respondents

refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by EO No. 192 (aims to control exports from the Philippines)

o L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225 (appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes)

o L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226 (appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671 in their oral argument and memorandum (they rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect), constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted.

Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency, pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness

Issue: WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect

Held and Ratio

YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period" as used in the Constitution means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency.

It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view as the opposite would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.

Moreover, the fact that Sec. 4, CA No. 471 (which stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated

thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide") is silent regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it only means that the National Assembly believed that there was no necessity to provide for a provision regarding the repeal of the authority itself. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.

It would anomalous to have two legislative bodies (Legislative and Executive) operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.

Aside from these anomalies, Sec. 3—which provides that the President shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted—implies that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.

Moreover, Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, that CA No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. A new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.

What then was the contemplated period? Pres. Quezon said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." From that, the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet, as no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority.

HELD: Thus, the Court held that the period contemplated from the foregoing was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body. Particularly, CA No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met, not in the first special session where the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Art. VI(9), Constitution) but in regular session on May 25, 1946 where the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. The Court further held that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law (because they were issued when CA No. 671 was not in full force and effect).

Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court need not decide the question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue.

What the Court in this case did is to find out the will of legislature and, once found, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty.

No legal principle can be found to support the proposition that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war has not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it.

Another peg to the ratio decidendi (naks! Method ang dating! Haha!) Acts Nos. 600 and 620 even imparts by express provision that the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." From this the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source.

The question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered.

In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one

which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.

A Note on the System of Separation of Powers: The Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively." (Thus, the President should not retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines)

Votes:

MORAN, C. J., concurring PARAS, J., concurring MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting TORRES, J., concurring REYES, J., concurring and dissenting: PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting BENGZON, J., dissenting:

For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.

Rodriguez vs Gella

2nd Emergency Powers Cases

  Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate EO. 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EO’s were pursuant to CA 671. Note that prior to Araneta

vs Dinglasan, Congress passed HB 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

 ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.

 HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

People vs. Vera[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result

Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8

years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu

Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the

constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA166 SCRA 533 (1988)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may

be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary

to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

US v Ang Tang Ho

GR L-17122

February 27, 1922

Johns

Facts:

The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section 1, authorizing the governor-General “fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Issue:

Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?

Held:

Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General.

Ynot vs. IAC G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government interference; (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose

FACTS:

Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.ISSUE:

Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law

RULING:

Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and Hearing

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of

mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

Exceptions to Notice and Hearing

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is

found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

First Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Interests of the Public Generally Require Interference

xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process: Reasonable Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly Oppressive Upon Individuals

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missingWe do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.

However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

EO 626-A is unconstitutional

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no

reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to

the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987]En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur

Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.

Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the

supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.” The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. 

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.  It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.  This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.  Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one.  Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. 

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

G.R.No. L-114785                          08 December 1994

Tobias v Abalos

PONENTE: BIDIN, J.

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.  A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion.  The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion.  Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion.  Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.  The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment.  Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Mariano v. COMELEC

Facts:

Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati, petitioned for prohibition and declaratory relief. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as

unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Sec 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)

existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

Issue: WON judicial review is indispensible to substantiate the constitutionality of the sections 2, 51 and 52 of the R.A. No. 7854 :An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”

Held: NO

Rationale:

At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in

this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995

DOMICILE: a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,

and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent

RESIDENCE: implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.

RESIDENCE FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

ELEMENTS OF CHANGE OF DOMICILE: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing information that she is a resident of seven months in the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election. Subsequently, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency (must have been a resident for not less than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” This amendment was refused admittance for reason that it was filed out of time, so Petitioner filed her amended COC with COMELEC in division.

The COMELEC in division found the petition for disqualification meritorious and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. In ruling thus, COMELEC in division found that when petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections

HELD:

Meaning of “Residence”

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:

Residence vs. Domicile

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one

domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Did Petitioner satisfy the residency requirement?

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a

certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.

Did Petitioner abandon her domicile of origin (Tacloban, Leyte)?

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between

(actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).

How Domicile is Lost/Acquired

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks

the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC(248 SCRA 400)

Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the

election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Co v. HRET: Can the spring soar higher than its source?

In the case of Co vs. Electoral Tribunal [1] the major issue was whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI

in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

Records show that Ong Te, the grandfather of Jose Ong, Jr., arrived in the Philippines in 1895. He established his residence in Laoang, Samar. As such, he was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the Spanish colonial administration.

Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr.’s father, was born in China in 1905. In 1915, he was brought by Ong Te to Samar where he grew up. He was baptized into Christianity. He married a natural-born Filipina, Agripina Lao. He also established his residence in Laoang, Samar. In 15 February 1954, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization. He was declared a Filipino citizen on 28 April 1955; the declaration was made final and executory on 15 May 1957. He took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a corresponding certificate of Naturalization.

Jose Ong, Jr. was then a minor, nine years of age, and still finishing his elementary education in Samar when his father took his oath. After completing his elementary education, he went to Manila to complete his higher education and eventually found employment there. He, however, frequently went home to Samar where he grew up.

In 1971, his elder brother was elected a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Emil’s status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. The Convention, however, declared Emil as a natural-born Filipino.

In 1984 and 1986, Jose Jr. registered and voted in Samar. He ran and won in the 1987 elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar. His opponents protested his election to the post on the grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The Court affirmed the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal declaring Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines natural-born citizens as “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship,” [2] as well as “those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.” [3]

Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was interpreted by the Court as applying to those who elected Filipino citizenship not only after 2 February 1987 but also to those who elected citizenship before that date. It was intended to correct the anomalous situation where one born

of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of natural-born citizen while one born of Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship, whereby under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born citizen. [4]

The Court’s based its resolution of the issue by tracing Jose Ong, Jr. citizenship to his mother who was a natural-born Filipina. What is material to the case is whether he elected Filipino citizenship when he reached the age of majority as provided for by Section 1 (4) Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which was the operative law when he was born. Under the 1987 Constitution, natural-born status can only be accorded to individuals who elected citizenship upon reaching majority. In the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for Ong, Jr. to formally or in writing elect citizenship when he came of age as he was already a citizen since he was nine by virtue of his mother being a natural-born citizen and his father a naturalized Filipino. [5]

Furthermore, election can be both formal and informal. In In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) it was held that the exercise of the right of suffrage when one comes of age constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The rule in the Mallare case was applied whereby Jose Ong’s exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises were considered positive acts of electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice. These, according to the court, cannot be less binding than the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration. [6]

Lonzanida vs. COMELECJuly 28, 1999 | Gonzaga-Reyes

Facts:Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest. In 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections. After a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and ordered petitioner to vacate the post.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again ran for mayor. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to

disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.

COMELEC: Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Issue:WON petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials – NO.

Held:The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.

In Borja vs. COMELEC, the Court sets two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify elective local officials from serving more than three consecutive terms: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, the two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May

1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. He did not fully serve three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

The delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years cannot serve as basis to bar petitioner’s right to be elected.

The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's proclamation. Proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

G.R. No. L-15905: Jimenez vs Cabangbang

Howard Chan

Site Owner

Freedom of Speech and Debate

Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.

HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place." The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was

not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.

Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144. October 28, 1960. 07/23/20101 Comment  Facts: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. 

He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for

sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . ."

Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23.  

Issue: Whether the Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; 

Whether petitioner’s words constituted actionable conduct;

Whether petitioner is protected by Rule XVII Sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate he shall not be held to answer therefore nor be subject to censure by the House. 

Held: Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered. 

Ratio: On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. 

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain.

People v. Jalosjos

324 SCRA 689

FACTS: While his appeal from a conviction of rape is pending, the accused, a Congressman was confined at the national penitentiary. Since he was reelected to his position, he argued that he should be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings, because his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in Congress.

HELD: Election to high government office does free accused from the common restraints of general law. Under Section II, Article VI of the Constitution, a member of the House of Rep is privileged from arrest only if offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundations. If allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the accused would be virtually made a free man. When he was elected into office, the voters were aware of his limitations on his freedom of action. Congress can continue to function even without all its members being present. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.