conflict management and conflict resolution

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Conflict management andconflict resolutionStephen Ryan aa Teaches Political Science , University ofUlster, Magee College , Northern IrelandPublished online: 21 Dec 2007.

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Conflict Management andConflict Resolution

Stephen Ryan

In examining constructive responses to the problems caused by violent ethnicconflict a distinction is often made between the 'management' and 'resolution'approaches. Indeed, they are often defined so as to make them incompatiblewith each other. The basic assumptions upon which the differences betweenthese two approaches are based are analysed, and the weaknesses of each areexplored. Finally, the assumption of basic incompatibility is questioned, becauseit is generally unhelpful in promoting conflict resolution; and an attempt is madeto show how the two approaches can be combined by introducing the concept ofpeace-keeping (management) and peace-making and peace-building (resolution).

I

We live, the British journalist James Cameron has written, in a crazy worldof bogus absolutes. This should serve as a warning to those engaged inconflict to be aware of the way that their attitudes to each other havebecome polarized and mutual antagonism deepened unnecessarily. Butit should also serve as a warning to those who try to resolve conflictsor who theorize about conflict. For they too, in support of one or otherstrategy, may close their minds to alternative courses of action. Oneexample of this is the frequent assertion that a particular conflict caneither be managed or resolved. This division is then characterized asbeing between competing 'paradigms', which by definition are mutuallyexclusive; and thereby polarization of thinking is encouraged. This articlewill seek to identify the different assumptions on which each strategy isbased. However, it will also try to argue that they might be mutuallycompatible, rather than mutually exclusive strategies. To show this we willattempt to expand the definition of conflict resolution to show how it needsto include elements of the management approach. For as Heradsteveit hasargued:

A strict distinction is often made between what is called conflictmanagement and conflict resolution. . . . But at the same time it isclear that once there is obtained conflict management there is also

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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 55

obtained some elements of conflict resolution. And it is difficult toimagine a process towards conflict resolution that does not at somestage start with management of conflict.1

To explain this another way we might take the following description ofconflict management given by a New York police officer. He states that'What I've got to do is come up with a temporary solution for a long-termproblem. The problems we encounter in policing, somebody else startsand somebody else has to ultimately finish. We get the little pieces inbetween.'2 What we will argue here is that dealing successfully with thelittle pieces in between may be vital if progress is to be made in dealingwith the longer-term problem. However, one may only be able to dealsuccessfully with these little pieces if there is some hope that the long-termproblems can be solved.

Whilst this may be true of all types of violent conflict, we are onlyinterested here in violent and protracted ethnic conflict. This is conflictbetween different groups who define themselves as being distinct from eachother because of cultural factors which have given rise in each communityto a unique set of beliefs, values and ways of living. Ethnic conflict is usuallyrelated either to a fear that this cultural distinctiveness may be destroyedor to a claim that this cultural distinctiveness entitles the group to controlover a specific territory - perhaps a right to autonomy or even a right tonational self-determination. There is no one generally accepted theory toexplain why ethnic identification has survived, and even flourished, inan increasingly interdependent world, and this is not the concern of thisarticle. Instead we will explore what can be done to counter the threatthat such violent conflicts pose to the life and well-being of the peoplecaught up in them and to the peace and security of the wider inter-statesystem within which such conflicts arise. For recent experience has shownhow such problems that are internal to a single sovereign state can spillover into international relations either by dragging in outside states (Israelin Lebanon, Turkey in Cyprus) or through the spread of internationalterrorism (IRA, PLO, Islamic Jihad, etc.).

It is important to emphasize that we are concerned with the managementand resolution of violent ethnic conflict and not ethnic conflict as a whole.Of course one cannot resolve ethnic conflict once and for all so thatthe ethnic factor stops becoming important in multi-ethnic societies. Aconflict-free multi-ethnic society is as much an Utopian idea as is theidea of a conflict-free unitary society. But the idea of a multi-ethnic societywhich is free of severe and protracted violence is not Utopian. Indeedseveral such societies exist. What is important therefore is whether ethnicconflict expresses itself in destructive or constructive ways. Restraints ofspace mean that we cannot deal with how ethnic conflict can be channelled

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56 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

constructively. Instead we will concentrate on what can be done to reversethe destructive channelling of ethnic conflict when it results in violence.

Two general strategies are usually considered in response to the problemof violent and protracted ethnic conflict, and these can be labelled theresolution approach and the management approach. It should be pointedout that there is no necessary reason why managers or resolvers shouldwant to reduce violence or reject destructive actions. As the conflict theoristJandt has written, 'no-one ever accused Joseph Stalin or Francesco Francoof not knowing how to deal with conflict.'3 Michael Howard makes a similarpoint when stating that the KGB and the South African Bureau of StateSecurity will often claim to be keeping the peace.4 Indeed, there are manyethnic conflicts in which destructive actions have been taken in an attemptto 'solve' ethnic problems. Such actions include expulsion (UgandanAsians), forced assimilation (Bulgarian Turks), repression (Kurds) andeven genocide (Hutus in Burundi). So the search for 'solutions' will notalways be either constructive or non-violent.

However there are many managers and resolvers who would be appalledby such actions and who want to discover techniques by which the sufferingassociated with violence and injustice can be reduced or even ended. Thefirst part of this article will look at the differences between these twoapproaches as they are commonly defined. Then problems associatedwith each will be identified. Finally, an approach will be suggested whichinvolves a mixture of both strategies.

II

The main differences between the management and resolution approachescan now be analysed. The first major disagreement is about the desirabilityof raising the fundamental issues which divide the parties to a conflict.Resolvers are optimists who argue that fundamental issues should beraised and can be resolved. According to Mitchell a basic assumption ofthe resolvers is that

not merely will disruptive conflict behaviour cease and hostile atti-tudes and perceptions at least be ameliorated, but that the ultimatesource of conflict (that is, the situation of goal incompatibility) willalso be removed so that no unsatisfied goals remain to plague thefuture.5

Conflict managers, on the other hand, are pessimists who believe thatattempts to resolve conflicts are unrealistic. So rather than deal with basicissues attention should be concentrated on ameliorating the symptoms ofthe conflict, and in this way reduce suffering. Interestingly though, theoverall pessimism is tempered by the belief that some people will have

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the foresight and wisdom to manage the conflict, and because of thepossibility of such management damage limitation exercises are possible,when attempts to resolve conflicts are a waste of time. Managers thereforewarn us about the best becoming the enemy of the good.

This sort of argument is quite a common theme in writings about specificconflicts. A specialist on the Sri Lankan conflict, for example, has writtenthat recent approaches to this ethnic conflict are 'wiser' because they nolonger talk of solutions, but of the management of tensions and rivalries.The diminished ambitions that have resulted from this have lead to more'realistic' policies that are more likely to bring long term improvements.6

It is not always clear what is at the heart of this fundamental disagreementbetween managers and resolvers, but one possible explanation would beto examine the assumption about whether the parties are in a zero-sumor non zero-sum situation. Zero-sum conflicts are those where what oneside gains, the other loses. So if it were possible to quantify these gainsand losses, if A gains 10, B loses 10; and if you add these two upthe total comes to zero. In such conflicts there is no community ofinterest on which to base a settlement. Or in other words, the conflict isunsolvable.

In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, this might give rise to thefollowing sort of argument. The heart of the problem between Loyalistsand Republicans is what Anthony Alcock has called the 'territorial destiny'of Ulster. Loyalists want it to be part of the sovereign territory of the UnitedKingdom; Republicans want it to be part of the sovereign territory of anIrish republic. Both sides feel so strongly about this that a compromisesolution (for example, joint sovereignty) is not acceptable to either.Therefore there is no hope of conflict resolution and all we can hopefor is effective management of the problem.

The resolvers would adopt a very different perspective. They might arguethat the 'unresolvable' nature of a particular conflict is more apparent thanreal. For it may be incorrect to see it in zero-sum (win-lose) terms, forpositive sum (or win/win) outcomes may be possible if we base ourexamination on different assumptions. John Burton has recently proposedthis, and in calling for the adoption of a human needs approach hasargued for a 'paradigm shift' in how we analyse conflicts.7 The adoptionof such an approach might lead us to very different conclusions aboutethnic conflicts such as those in Northern Ireland. Most conflicts, Burtonwould argue, arise because one or more groups are denied their basichuman needs. These needs have been listed by psychologists such asMaslow and Sites and include both physical needs (food, clean water,shelter, etc.) and psychological needs (identity, security, participation,etc.). Now managers are probably correct to point out that conflictsover sovereignty are zero sum games and can be viewed in either/or

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terms. Should the Palestinians have their own state? Should the GreekCypriots be allowed to regain effective control over the Turkish Cypriotcontrolled Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? Should Northern Irelandbe British or Irish? However, perhaps this dispute over ownership of apiece of territory is not the real cause of the conflict, but just the focusof conflict. Burton would argue that the real cause is the attempt to denyat least one party their basic human needs for security, participation andidentity. Such an approach is optimistic because need fulfilments, unlikebattles for territory, are not zero-sum conflicts. Granting me the right toidentity and security does not stop you exercising your similar needs inthe way that granting sovereignty to one country denies it to another.Indeed, the more my basic needs are satisfied, the more content I willbe, and you will be able to feel more secure as a consequence. Burtonhas put it this way:

We are faced, therefore, with the proposition that conflict at alllevels may not be over scarce resources, such as territory, but oversocial goods that are not in short supply . . . it is this paradigm shiftthat is the explanation of the win-win concept inherent in conflictproblem-solving.8

The second difference between the resolvers and the managers followson from the first difference. It has to do with the chances of obtaining aself-sustaining settlement. Margot Light, for example, has claimed that

. . . conflict resolution offers a more viable outcome to conflict,because it converts the conflict into a shared problem, settingup a process in which both sides participate equally in findingsolutions which are acceptable to both and which, therefore, areself-sustaining.9

For the manager, however, given his basic assumption about the lack ofa community of interest, such a solution is not on the agenda. The mostthat can be hoped for is the suppression, perhaps even the elimination, ofovert physical violence. This leads us on to the third, and final, source ofdisagreement between managers and resolvers.

This has to do with what role the third party should play in responding toviolence. Central to the resolution approach is the consent and contentmentof the parties to a conflict, who, after all, are the only groups able to resolvethe problems that divide them. In other words, the solution to the conflictnot only can come, but must come, from the parties themselves. It cannotbe imposed from outside. The third party plays a vital role here, but only tothe extent that he can facilitate this process. In a recent book on conflictresolution de Bono has popularized much of the recent thinking on howthis can be done. He writes:

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In a conflict situation the two parties are unable to stand outsidetheir own perceptions. In order to move from the argument to thedesign mode there is a need for a third party. The third party is not ago-between negotiator or mediator. The third party acts as a mirror,an overview, a provider of provocation and creativity and a director ofthinking. The third party also organises the mapping of the situation.This third party is an integral part of the design thinking required forconflict resolution.10

Clearly, if the third party is to play such a role his power is irrelevant to hissuccess. Creativity is not a function of physical strength. Indeed, it mightbe argued that the poweriessness of such a third party might be a factor thatfavours the creative approach to conflict resolution suggested by Bono.11

Burton suggests as much when he states

There is a difference between enforced settlement and resolution ofconflict and the latter is accomplished without support except respectfor the professional knowledge and status of the mediator. Authorityis derived from the parties and not from external institutions.12

This is not the case in the management of conflict. Even the termmanagement implies a certain amount of arm twisting, and to do thiseffectively power is required. A powerless manager seems to be a contra-diction in terms. The belief that basic issues cannot be resolved will logicallyencourage the assumption that the natural state of affairs between theparties is conflict and that a 'third force' is needed to ensure an acceptabledegree of order and stability. This will have to take the form of a coerciveintervention, sometimes by military or paramilitary forces, sometimesthrough economic measures. It is the state which is most often called onto play this role; but in responding to ethnic violence there are seriousproblems which can arise out of state intervention. This is because thestate may not be an honest broker and may be the instrument of oneethnic group. This indeed, may be the very cause of the conflict. Brass, forexample, has pointed out how certain states can play this 'differentiating'role in ethnic conflict.13 In such circumstances the state stops being partof the solution and starts becoming part of the problem. In Cyprus, forexample, the Greek Cypriots have monopolized the legitimate governmentof Cyprus since the breakdown of inter-communal relations in 1963. TheIsraeli state developed out of Zionist ideology, and this is reflected in suchbasic institutions as the Law of Return in the exclusion of Arabs fromthe armed forces and sensitive security posts. Sri Lankan governmentsmay have been able to resist some of the more extreme demands ofthe 'Sinhala only' movement in their country but they have enforcededucational laws that are regarded by the Tamils as discriminatory and

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have also disenfranchised Indian Tamil settlers. Santayana has written thatin a healthy society the public instinctively runs to help the police. By thisdefinition there are clearly many 'unhealthy' societies in the modern world.

One explanation for this is that in countries where the state is a party toethnic conflict coercive interventions such as states of emergency may justadd to the grievances of the group that feels discriminated against. Almostcertainly the authority of the traditional state mechanisms for respondingto violent conflict will be rejected, since it is the very legitimacy of theseinstitutions which will be at the heart of the conflict.

Resolvers, then, think that the best way forward is by moving fromadversarial politics to joint problem solving based on analysis and creativity- which is a non-coercive activity demanding the full co-operation of allthe parties to a conflict. Managers favour coercive interventions andare less scrupulous in seeking the consent of all of the parties. Indeedsometimes they will try to impose a solution by working behind the backsor above the heads of one or more of the main contenders. The Anglo-IrishAgreement of 1985, for example, was introduced without any input fromthe Loyalist community. Similarly, at the London Conference of 1959 thatresulted in the independence of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios was forcedby Britain and Greece to accept conditions of which he did not approve. Hissubsequent attempt to reform the Cyprus Constitution on the basis of theseoriginal objections in 1963 - the infamous 13 points - led directly to therenewal of inter-communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriotsand to a deepening spiral of violence and polarization.

These then appear to be the main differences between the resolversand the managers. Resolvers believe fundamental issues can be resolved,managers do not. Resolvers believe in self-sustaining outcomes, managersdo not. Resolvers tend not to believe in enforced settlements, managersdo.

Ill

Having set out three main differences between the management andresolution approaches, as they are often defined in the literature,some additional points can know be made about them.

(a) First, the two positions are incompatible to the extent that one cannotat the same time be both a manager and a resolver. Either you believe thatthe basic issues can be resolved and a self-sustaining settlement reached, oryou do not. This is not to say, however, that the same person at differenttimes cannot change positions on this issue. This is a perfectly acceptableposition given that all conflicts are dynamic, and situations, people andissues are constantly evolving and changing. A dogmatic approach to

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the management/resolution question is therefore unwise as it will implya lack of sensitivity to changing circumstances. Similarly, one should notcarry over assumptions about one conflict when analysing another. It isquite possible to argue that conflict A cannot be resolved, only managed;whereas conflict B is solvable and conflict C is a lost cause. In this context,Zartman is surely correct to argue that there will exist during the course ofa violent conflict a 'ripe moment' when resolution becomes a possibility.14

This will arise when all the parties face a hurting stalemate which they findcostly to live with; when there is ah impending disaster; when a way outcan be identified; and when there is an effective mediator able to pushthe resolution process along. Attempting to work for a resolution beforethis ripe moment develops will not be a wise strategy, Zartman suggests.He mentions, as an example, the attempts by the Organization of AfricanUnity to intervene in the Ogaden conflict between Somalia and Ethiopiabefore the ripe moment existed.15

(b) Second, it can tentatively be suggested that because of their basicassumptions managers will favour dissociation strategies (keeping the sidesapart), whereas resolvers will favour association strategies (bringing thesides together). Managers, we have argued, tend to believe the conflictis unresolvable and the status quo is therefore inherently conflict prone.Given these assumptions it seems to make sense to prescribe strategiesthat involve keeping the sides apart so as to reduce the opportunities forviolence. Such strategies include partition (or if this has not worked well -re-partition), segregation, and the creation of physical barriers such as the'peace' line in Belfast and the Green Lines in Nicosia and Lebanon.

John Stuart Mill, for example, followed the logic of the incompatibilityapproach in Chapter 16 of Considerations On Representative Government.Here he argues that multi-national states cannot be stable and democraticat the same time, or in his own words 'free institutions are next to impossiblein a country made up of different nationalities'.16 Therefore, he goes on 'itis in general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundariesof governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities'.17

This analysis was modified in the case of 'backward nations', where it wasbetter for peoples such as the Bretons and the Basques to be brought into'the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivatedpeople . . . than to sulk on [their] own rocks, the half savage relic of pasttimes, revolving in [their] own little mental orbit, without participation orinterest in the general movement of the world'.18 In the supposed culturalegalitarianism of the twentieth century, it has become less acceptable todenigrate other cultures in such a way and calls for the separation of ethnicgroups often remain unqualified.

Mill, in fact, goes beyond the management approach and despite his

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pessimism about the democratic nature of multi-national societies is ableto propose a way of resolving ethnic conflicts. Indeed his solution, whichis to separate the parties, is based on his pessimism. This is an importantreminder that pessimism does not have to lead to a management rather thana resolution approach. Unfortunately this solution based on separation isunrealistic in many ethnic conflicts for often it is difficult to achieve aclean break either because disputed territories will remain (for example,Kashmir in the case of the partition of India) or one or both groups willclaim the whole of the previous territory and be unhappy with obtainingonly a portion of it (the Republicans in Ireland). Furthermore, in thepresent inter-state system no state will accept the loss of part of itsterritory without resistance. So secessionist attempts invariably lead toincreased violence and not conflict resolution. This was the case duringthe Nigerian Civil War, the war in Bangladesh and the war betweenKatanga and the central government of the newly independent Congo. Itremains the case in Ethiopia (Tigre and Eritrea), Iraq and Turkey (Kurds),India (Sikhs) and Sri Lanka (Tamils). The resolution through separationapproach does not therefore appear a viable option in the present worldsystem, except in very exceptional circumstances. So pessimists may onlybe able to rely on management.

(c) The third point to be made is that choosing between the managementand resolution approaches may involve unwittingly taking sides in an ethnicconflict even though the decision may be based on an impartial analysis. Toillustrate this point we can turn to the Cyprus conflict. There are two generalapproaches to this ethnic conflict that are suggested by the communitiesthemselves. Greek Cypriots claim that the natural harmony between thetwo communities has been broken by external interventions that includeBritish colonial policy of divide and rule followed by divide and quit; thesupposed expansionist aims of the Turkish state sometimes referred to as a'neo-Ottoman' mentality; and a supposed NATO plot to partition the islandwhich was led by the USA. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, argue thatthere was no natural harmony between the two communities because theGreeks wanted ENOSIS - or union with Greece, whereas the Turks did not.From this perspective Turkish intervention, and particularly the invasionof 1974, did not cause the conflict but saved the Turkish Cypriots fromdomination and discrimination within a Greek state. This is not the placeto go into a detailed examination of these claims. Both perspectives are toosimplistic. The example is used here to show how any proposal which eithersupports or rejects the idea of a natural harmony between the communitieswill involve siding with one or other of these views and will be judgedaccordingly. This is what decided the fate of the UN appointed mediatorin Cyprus, Galo Plaza. In 1965 he submitted a report on the situation in

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Cyprus in which he argued that the issues dividing the sides were resolvableand Cyprus should return to being a unified state.19 This clearly did not fitin with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interpretations and so Ankara pressedfor, and obtained, Plaza's resignation, after which his report was shelved.

(d) Fourth, I am not sure one can talk about just one type of managementapproach, for managers will have to face at least two distinct types ofsituation. The first will be periods of relative calm, the other periods ofcrisis. In responding to the latter, conflict management may not be enoughand crisis management may be needed. We can illustrate the differencebetween the two by adopting Oakeshott's description of politics in termsof a boat analogy. Politics, he argued, was not about heading for a definitedestination but about staying afloat. But staying afloat in calm seas andstaying afloat in a storm may require different actions and skills. Forexample, in Northern Ireland, the period between 1969 and 1976 mightbe described as a time of crisis management during which the British Armyplayed the leading role in containing IRA violence. The period since 1976,which has seen an increased role for the RUC, might be an example of moretraditional conflict management.

It may be possible to be optimistic about the chances of managing conflictin periods of calm, but the emergence of crises would be likely to reduce thisoptimism considerably. For crises by their very nature demand decisionsof vital importance under conditions of stress and anxiety on the basisof uncertain and incomplete information in unfamiliar and unexpectedcircumstances.20 Such circumstances tend to lead to shipping tragedies andto political disasters. For as Dixon has pointed out in a recent stimulatingstudy, the stress, fatigue, emotional arousal and the existence of false orinsufficient information during a crisis can have a profound effect on thedecision-making process. This will be especially true when these factorsare filtered through the minds of leaders with personality problems whoare pursuing irrelevant motives such as the need to boost self-esteem. Inhis important study of crisis management, which concentrates on inter-stateviolence, Williams has noted that

. . . the success of the rules or conventions of crisis managementhas depended on the exercise of prudent self-restraint by the twosuperpowers. It has also involved a large element of luck . . . Thefundamental problem is that the only rules likely to have any validityor effectiveness in crises are those based on common consent. By thesame token, if that consent is withdrawn the rules are rendered whollydevoid of meaning.22

It is precisely because common interests cannot always be assumed, becauseself-restraint may give in to pressures for escalation and because luck has a

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habit of running out that the long-term prospects of crisis management donot offer grounds for optimism.

There is also another cause for concern. The Chinese characters for crisis(wei-ji) mean both danger and opportunity. This warns us that it is by nomeans certain that during a crisis the protagonists will try to avoid thedangers rather than trying to exploit the opportunities presented to them.The Cyprus case can again provide us with a good example of the latterwinning out over the former. Under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960,Britain, Greece and Turkey were all made Guarantors of the status quoin Cyprus. This gave them the right to 'take action' to make sure that thestatus quo was not overturned. Yet in 1974 we find the Greek government inAthens trying to overthrow by force the legitimate government of the islandand the Turkish government intervening to seize and keep about a third ofthe island for the Turkish Cypriot community in a way that caused a lot ofmisery and suffering. Britain, on the other hand, seemed to abandon anyattempt to influence events after the breakdown of the Geneva Conferencein August 1974. As someone once pointed out the Treaty of Guarantee waslike appointing two wolves and a sheep to guard the sheep fold. There waslittle effort to manage the conflict, for the Guarantor Powers were too busypursuing their own narrowly defined national interests.

(e) Finally, from all that has been said so far it is clear that neitherthe management nor resolution approaches are without their problems.The optimistic approach of the resolvers may be based on an unrealisticanalysis of the readiness of the parties to negotiate. Rather the partiesmay hold to a belief in the utility of violence and will not see the pointof sitting around the conference table with their enemies. Or the partiesmay have an existing framework of rules and norms within which aresolution would be acceptable but are not prepared to abandon theseto search for creative solutions. No government, for example, is likelyto entertain a solution to a conflict that will involve the loss of part ofits sovereign territory to a secessionist ethnic movement. On the otherhand secessionists may not be prepared to accept anything less thanfull national self-determination. So the unwillingness of the parties toabandon deeply held beliefs and attitudes may destroy any resolutioninitiative.

However, there are also problems with the management approach whichshould not be overlooked. Here a tragedy of possibility may be wronglydiagnosed as a tragedy of necessity. A conflict which has arisen fromavoidable factors that could be changed will be seen as unavoidable. Inaddition, if a violent conflict is labelled unsolvable the will of the managerto persist in his task may well be undermined. What, then, will be thereward for bearing the cost in lives and resources and time if no end

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to the violence is in sight? Limits to commitment have to be assumed,and once passed a policy of management may give way to neglect,disinterest or withdrawl. Here the warnings of a British ex-diplomat arevalid. Reddaway has written:

Palestine, Cyprus and the chronic crises in the Middle East, SouthAfrica and Ulster are grim reminders that sometimes to labelproblems as unsolvable and then to fall back on a policy of 'waitand see' and doing nothing meanwhile may in the end lead toa worse disaster.23

In 1987 we had a very good example of how the will of a governmentto continue a management role was undermined. Sweden, arguing thatit could not bear the financial burden of troop contributions to the UNforce in Cyprus given that no end to the problem was in sight, withdrew itscontingent as of 1 January 1988. After 27 years of active involvement in thisforce we can perhaps understand the fatigue of the Swedish government.Cyprus has also experienced another backlash due to the frustrationscreated by conflict management not leading to conflict resolution. Aworrying development recently has been clashes between UN forces andGreek Cypriot protesters who 'invade' the UN-controlled buffer zone toprotest against a claimed Turkish intransigence. In a clash in November1988, for example, nine UN soldiers and 12 students were hurt during aviolent confrontation.

IV

We have tried to argue so far that there are clear differences between themanagement and resolution approaches to violent ethnic conflict and thatneither is without its problems. But even though the two approaches ascommonly defined are based on such different assumptions that one cannotbe at the same time both a manager and a resolver, this should not betaken to imply that they are mutually exclusive and antagonistic. Indeed,in order to move ethnic groups from what Curie has called 'unpeaceful' topeaceful relations24 a combination of the two approaches may be required.For the rest of this article we will try to develop this argument by exploringwhat one prominent peace researcher and one prominent conflict analysthave to say about how the problem of violent conflict can be tackled. Thiswill involve expanding the concept of conflict resolution to incorporateelements of conflict usually ignored by resolvers, who tend to concentrateon elite interaction.

When there is a violent conflict we can subdivide each side into threedistinct groups - even if in practice the boundaries between them maybe blurred. When faced with trying to move these groups towards

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peace different strategies are required because we are trying to changedifferent things. These strategies have been suggested by Galtung, whoreferred to them as peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building.25 Thedimensions of the conflict to be addressed have been described by Mitchellas behaviour, attitudes and interests.26 By combining these strategies anddimensions we can identify three distinct target groups.

The first of these is the people who actually undertake the physicalviolence. That is they is the main instruments of violent behaviour, thewarriors who fight the enemy and often take it on themselves to instilldiscipline on their own side. Such groups clearly have an important roleto play in the search for a negotiated resolution, if only because theymay have the capacity to raise the level of violence to oppose movestowards peace. Sometimes they may be able to wreck the peace process.Such wrecking attempts can be found in several parts of the world atpresent. The paramilitaries in Northern Ireland are trying to bring downthe Anglo-Irish agreement, and the Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese JVCare both attempting to use violence to oppose the Sri Lankan-Indianagreement of July 1987, which brought Indian peace-keeping forces ontothe island. Because of their rejectionist stance towards negotiations it maynot be possible to include such groups, or at least the most committedmembers of such groups, in the negotiating process. So all that mightbe hoped for is that their wrecking role may be limited by effectiveconflict management. The strategy that tries to stop violent behaviouris peace-keeping, and this tries to separate the warring factions as muchas possible through the interposition of a military or police units. Peace-keepers tend to believe that good fences do make good neighbours.Sometimes this task is undertaken by local security forces using speciallegislation - as has been the case in ethnic conflicts in Sudan, Turkey,Fiji, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nicaragua and Bangladesh. Although, as wepointed out earlier, this activity may add to the violence if the state isseen as a party to the conflict and its legitimacy is one of the issuesin the conflict. Sometimes when such attempts fail peace-keeping willbe undertaken by other states either through the UN (in Cyprus andLebanon), regional organizations (OAU in Chad) or states acting outsidean institutional framework either jointly (MNF in Beirut) or alone (Indiain Sri Lanka).

The second target group is the decision-makers in the respective com-munities. It is part of their role to represent their community and topromote the interests of their side, and if possible to reconcile these withthe interests of the other parties. It should also be noted that leaders willhave their own self-interest to promote as well, which might not always becompatible with the group interest. But this is a matter which cannot bedealt with here, and we shall regard decision-makers as representatives of

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their groups' interests. The strategy of trying to reconcile these conflictinginterests has been called peace-making and this can take the form eitherof traditional mediation methods such as good offices or conciliation or ofnewer techniques suggested by some contemporary conflict analysts.27

The third group are the ordinary people whose support is vital to thewarriors and the decision makers. Their attitudes are therefore crucialand can determine the success or failure of attempts either to escalateor reduce violence. The strategy which tries to change these attitudes canbe termed peace-building. This always seems to involve trying to increasecontacts between the parties to a conflict - a policy of association. Eventhough this might seem at odds with the dissociative strategy of thepeace-keepers this will only be the case if no distinction is made betweenthe men of violence and the ordinary people. There is no reason whyyou cannot build barriers between the former whilst building bridgesbetween the latter.

If we now return to the discussion on the management and resolutionapproaches an attempt can be made to locate both within this broaderframework. The management approach seems to coincide very closelywith the strategy we have called peace-keeping. It does not try to buildanything new, but rather attempts to alleviate the symptoms of conflict.In the words of a writer on UN peace-keeping: 'The goal of peace-keepingunits is not the creation of peace, but rather the containment of war so thatothers can search for peace in stable conditions.'28

The attempt to build something more positive through peace-makingand peace-building coincides with the resolution approach which does tryto change attitudes and reconcile conflicting interests. So through thisbroader framework I hope it is becoming clearer how the management andresolution approaches may not be antagonistic and may be complementary.To develop this argument let us consider what might happen if one of thesetwo approaches is attempted without the other.

If the management approach (peace-keeping) is not matched by positivedevelopments in the areas of peace-making and peace-building, thenany progress made is likely to be short lived, a temporary palliativefor troublesome symptoms. This is because, as we have seen, conflictmanagement cannot create anything positive and can, at best, onlyestablish a 'negative' peace where the underlying causes of the conflictand the destructive attitudes remain untouched. In such circumstancesit is always likely that these unresolved issues will force the underlyingconflict back to the surface, shattering the work of the manager. This,for example, is what happened in Cyprus. Here the UN peace-keepingforce (UNFICYP) did good work between 1964 and 1974 in containingthe inter-communal conflict. But this period of relative calm was not usedto achieve a political settlement with the result that the underlying tensions

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developed into open warfare in July 1974 when a Greek sponsored coupthat installed a puppet government led by Nicos Sampson provoked aTurkish invasion of the island. UNFICYP was unable to do anythingto stop either development. The UN force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) faceda similar situation in 1982 when it was forced to watch the tanks ofthe Israeli Defence Force advance through its positions on its way tolay siege to Beirut, the capital of a country once described as theSwitzerland of the Middle East because of its record of good inter-communal relations.

The key point to be made here is that managers/peace-keepers can dono more than reduce physical violence. But this direct violence will oftenbe the symptom of deeper conflicts that have their roots in the pursuitof justice, equality, dignity and freedom. There is a very real danger,therefore, that effective management will create not a situation of peacebut of pacification. That is, a situation where an unjust, unfree society isperpetuated through the suppression of violent opposition. This can only beavoided if the management approach is accompanied by attempts to resolvethese deeper, underlying causes of the violence.

However, if there are problems associated with the management ap-proach when applied without attempts to resolve the conflict, there are alsoproblems that will arise if the resolution approach is attempted without theeffective management of violence. This is because continuing violence willfeed several destructive processes that if unchecked will destroy the work ofthe resolvers. For there is a certain logic and momentum to violent conflictthat resolvers are unable to deal with because they do not confront thisviolent behaviour directly. The processes that contribute to this momentumcan very briefly be described here.

Firstly, when groups are engaged in conflict, those people whose skillsare most in demand are the specialists in violence. Laswell noted this factwhen developing his theory of the 'garrison state' to describe what washappening in the US during the Second World War.29 He noted that as themilitary gained influence so their values, which were more dictatorial thandemocratic, seemed to spread throughout society. As a result there wasgreater intolerance of those who opposed existing policies. I do not thinkthat it is distorting such analysis too much to argue that if garrison statescan develop in response to inter-state violence so can garrison communitiesdevelop out of inter-communal violence. This intolerant atmosphere isincreased by the arousal of intense emotions during violent conflict thatcan often take the form of increased ethnocentrism. A powerful emotionalfield is created which is difficult to resist, and those who do resist it willoften find themselves vilified and ostracized. Sometimes their lives will betaken by members of their own community. Kuper has summarized verywell what happens to moderates in such circumstances. He claims:

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There can be little doubt that liberals are not viable in extreme racialconflicts. They have no mass following, they have no skill, norinclination for, violence. In consequence they are easily emasculatedby governmental repression, or liquidated by extremists on bothsides. The mediating position becomes a no-man's land. . . . Whencombat is once engaged, and the groups begin to polarise, the appealsfor conciliation, moderation and humanity become strangely insipidand meaningless.30

In other words, it may be possible to sit on the fence, but it is a lot harderto straddle a barricade. Indeed many engaged in severe and protractedviolence will sympathize with the view of Ian Paisley who once statedthat 'a traitor and a bridge are very much alike, for they both go overto the other side'.31

This volatile mixture of militarization and ethnocentrism is one causefor polarization. Another is the geographical separation of communitiesin conflict either because people retire into their 'own' areas voluntarilyfor safety or because they are forced to leave mixed areas under threatand intimidation. This is a common feature of most severe ethnic conflictsincluding those in Palestine, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. Thisgeographical separation then contributes to the psychological polarizationthat usually manifests itself as the stereotyping, scapegoating and de-humanizing of the other side. Kuper has called this the development of'uncompromising dualism'.32

The final destructive process is the entrapment of leaders and followersthrough their commitment to a favoured course of action. People, becausethey have invested their credibility in a particular course of action, orbecause they have made sacrifices in pursuit of a chosen goal then becomelocked into a conflict and are unable or unwilling to explore alternatives.In the words of a book by Teger they have 'too much invested to quit'.33

A severe form of entrapment has been labelled the 'sacrifice trap'. Thisis based on an analogy drawn from the Aztec civilization who used tosacrifice humans to ensure good harvests. If good harvests did not resultthe response was not that the sacrifices were a waste of time but that notenough people had been put to death. The point is that it is very difficultto admit that human life has been lost in vain. Indeed causes can bemade 'sacred' through loss of life and conflicts therefore become moreentrenched. Violent conflicts may even come to be justified by referenceto previous losses.

It is hoped that this brief description of the destructive processes thataccompany violence illustrates how a momentum can be built up whichmay be difficult to reverse. But these processes must be reversed if thereis to be any hope of conflict resolution. This can only happen, it can be

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argued, if the violence is stopped or reduced - which is the function ofconflict management. So therefore the management of violence is necessaryas a precondition for successful conflict resolution otherwise the 'logic ofviolence' will be too strong for resolution attempts to be successful. Suchan argument is the exact opposite of critics of effective peace-keepingoperations who claim that because they remove the incentive to negotiatethey contribute to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute. This way ofthinking would lead one to think that the peace-keeping forces should beremoved in the hope that an escalation in violence will force the leadersto search more urgently for a settlement. This seems a rather dubiousproposition. Instead attention should be focused not on how to removepeace-keeping operations, but how to use the period of relative calm andorder they provide to search more effectively for a negotiated settlement.

This management role - which can sometimes take the form of peace-keeping - is often ignored by those interested in conflict resolution perhapsbecause it is itself a military activity. It is, none the less, often a vitalprecondition for the resolution of violent conflict. So there is a danger,for example, in the way that resolvers like Burton call for a 'paradigmshift' in our approach to conflict analysis that this traditional activity ofpeace-keeping will be excluded from the resolution approach.

What I have attempted here is what an American academic has termeda 'plausibility probe' into the relationship between the managementand resolution approaches to serious and protracted ethnic violence.As frequently defined there are certain key differences between theseapproaches about the possibility of achieving a self-sustaining settlementand what the role of third parties should be. There are also difficultiesassociated with each approach and these have been examined. There isthe danger that the management approach may be too pessimistic and willtherefore attempt too little, whereas the resolution approach will be toooptimistic and attempt too much. The way forward, however, in developinga successful strategy for dealing with violent ethnic conflict may not be toset up these two approaches as mutually exclusive strategies which exist ina zero sum situation. Rather, one might hope that more attention will begiven to how the two strategies might complement one another in the searchfor answers posed all over the planet by multi-ethnic societies which areexperiencing the misery that accompanies violent inter-communal conflict.Setting up bogus absolutes will probably hinder not help this search.

NOTES

1. D. Heradsteveit, The Outline of a Cumulative Research Strategy for the Study of ConflictResolution in the Middle East, NUPI-Rapport (Oslo, 1974). pp. 84-5.

2. Quoted in M. Baker Cops (London: Abacus, 1985).

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3. F.E. Jandt, Win/Win Negotiating (New York: Wiley, 1985), p.153.4. M. Howard, 'Peace Studies: The Hard Questions', in E. Kaye (ed.), Peace Studies: The

Hard Questions (London: Rex Collins, 1987), p.3.5. C. Mitchell, Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role (Farnborough: Gower, 1981), p.9.6. K.M. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka

1880-1985 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), p.viii.7. See the following works by J.W. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism and War (Oxford: M.

Robertson, 1979); Dear Survivors (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); Global Conflict(Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984).

8. Burton, op. cit. (1984), p.140.9. M. Light, 'Problem-Solving Workshops: The Role of Scholarship in Conflict Resolution',

in M. Banks (ed.), Conflict in World Society (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984), p.151.10. E. de Bono, Conflicts: A Better Way to resolve Them (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1985),

p.76.11. This is an argument made in C.W. Moore, The Mediation Process (San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass, 1986), p.17. See also H. Assefa, Mediation of Civil War (Boulder, CO:Westview, 1987), p.23.

12. Burton, op. cit. (1979), p.120.13. P. Brass, 'Ethnic Groups and the State', in P. Brass (ed.), Ethnic Groups and the State

(Totowa, NJ: Barnes Noble Books, 1985). The expression of an ethnic preference bya government comes out very well from readings of reports of human rights groupsinto government abuses of human rights. See, for example, Sri Lanka: Current HumanRights Concerns and Evidence of Extra-Judicial killings by the Security Forces (London:Amnesty International, 1984); Turkey: Brutal and Systematic Abuse of Human Rights(London: Amnesty International, 1989).

14. W. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York:Oxford University Press, 1985).

15. Ibid., pp. 87-8.16. J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 3rd ed. (1865), p.297.17. Ibid., p.297.18. Ibid., p.301.19. For more details of the Plaza Report see Report of the U.N. Mediator on Cyprus to the

Secretary-General available from Cyprus government Press and Information Office.20. See, for example, R. Tanter, 'Crisis Management: A Critical Review of Academic

Literature', Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1.21. N.F. Dixon Our Own Worst Enemy (London: J. Cape, 1987). See also I.L. Janis

Groupthink (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).22. P. Williams, Crisis Management (Oxford: M. Robertson, 1976) p.201.23. J. Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p.13.24. A. Curie, 'Peace Studies', Yearbook of International Affairs (1976), 5-15.25. J. Galtung, '25 Years of Peace Research', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 2

(1985).26. C. Mitchell, op. cit., Ch.1.27. As well as the works already cited by Burton and Mitchell see J.W. Burton and E.

Azar (eds.), International Conflict Resolution (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986).28. R. Thakur, 'International Peacekeeping, UN Authority and US Power', Alternatives,

Vol. XII (1987), p.489.29. See H.D Laswell, 'The Garrison State', in L. Bramson and G.W. Goethals, War (New

York: Basic Books, 1964). See also D. McDougall, Harold D. Laswell and the Studyof International Relations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), Ch. 4.

30. L. Kuper Race, Class and Power (London: Duckworth, 1974). pp.266-7.31. L. Kuper, The Pity of It All (London: Duckworth, 1977), p.113.32. Ibid., p.111.33. T.I. Teger, Too Much Invested to Quit (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

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conflict management and conflict resolution

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