COMD PRE STAFF COURSE - 2016

MIL HISTORY

MOSHE DAYAN

PUBLISHED BY THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF MILITARY TRAINING (MT-2)

INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS OF MoD (ARMY)

The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to press or to any person not holding an official position in

service of the Government of India/ State Governments in Union of India

MOSHE DAYAN (1915 – 1981)

CONTENTS

S. No Chapter Contents Page No

From To

1. Chapter - 1 Intro 01 03

2. Chapter - 2 Early Life 04

06

3. Chapter - 3 Mil Career Till Acre Prison 07

11

4. Chapter - 4 Syria (Jun 1941) 12

14

5. Chapter - 5 Off Course (1941 – 1947) 15

17

6. Chapter - 6 Degania Again ( Nov 1947 – May 1948) 18

19

7. Chapter - 7 In Comd of 89th Bn 20

25

8. Chapter - 8 A Soldier-Statesman 26

27

9. Chapter - 9 The Sinai Campaign (Oct-Nov 1956) 28 33

10. Chapter - 10 The Six-Day War (05-10 Jun 1967 34 38

11. Chapter - 11 Minister of Def (1967 and After) 39 42

1

CHAPTER – 1

INTRO

1. Moshe Dayan was an Israeli mil leader and a politician who led Israel to dramatic victories over its Arab neighbours. He later became a crusader for peace and a symbol of security to his countrymen. Moshe played a key role in four wars and helped negotiate the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. 2. Dayan was the second child born on the kibbutz, a collective community in Israel that was

traditionally based on agriculture, (the first Kibbutz est was Degania), after Gideon Baratz . He was

named Moshe after Moshe Barsky, the first member of the kibbutz to be killed in an Arab attack,

who died getting medication for his father. Soon afterwards, Dayan's parents mov to Nahalal, the

first moshav, est based on cooperative agriculture communal settlement. Dayan attended the

Agriculture School there.

3. When he was only 14 yr old, Dayan joined the Haganah, an underground org that def

Jewish settlements from Arab attacks. In the Haganah, Dayan learned guerrilla warfare from

British Capt Charles Orde Wingate, who was a ldr of ni ptl org to fight Arab rebel bands. During

the riots of 1936-1939, he served with the special police force in the Jezreel Valley and Galilee.

When the British outlawed the Haganah in 1939, Dayan was arrested and imprisoned for two yr.

4. Upon his rel in 1941, Dayan joined the British Army, where he served with the forces that

liberated Lebanon and Syria from Vichy France during World War II. Dayan was wounded in the

battle in Lebanon and lost his left eye. He began to wear the black eye patch that later became his

trademark. He coop with British int to set up a broadcasting network for clandestine op behind en

lines in the event that Palestine should fall to the Germans. He remained active in

the Haganah until 1948.

5. Dayan's activities in the 1948 War of Independence began when he commanded the def of

Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley. He later commanded the Bn that attacked the city of

Lydda and helped halt Egyptian forces on the Southern front. In Aug 1948, he was appointed Cdr

on the Jerusalem front. In 1949, he participated in Armistice Talks with Jordanian officials at

Rhodes. Dayan's mil prowess allowed him to rise to the rk of Chief of Ops at Gen HQ in 1952,

and, in 1953, he was elected Chief of Staff of the armed forces.

6. Dayan became Chief of Staff during a time of severe Arab belligerence. Despite the mil

armistice of 1949, the surrounding Arab nations remained hostile, maint a maritime blockade,

reinforcing an economic boycott, promoting political and propaganda warfare and supporting

terrorism in Israel. The Israeli Govt was unable to contain the trt violence. Dayan insisted on

strong retaliation op. His view was that the Arabs saw terrorism as a stg of war; and the longer the

trt attacks continued, the longer the Arabs had to build up their mil str. He wanted to force the

Arabs into open battle before they gained full mil power. Under Dayan's comd, the Israeli mil

launched raids in Gaza and other retaliatory msn, causing hy cas to the Egyptians, Syrians, and

other Arab populations. On Oct 29, 1956, Dayan led Israel's Suez campaign, an invasion of the

Sinai Peninsula after Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed a pact stating as their goal, ―The destr

of Israel.‖

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7. Dayan left the mil in 1958 and entered his sec career — politics. He joined Israel's Labour

Party, ―Mapai‖, and was elected to the Knesset (the name of Israel‘s Parliament) in 1959. He

served as Minister of Agriculture in the Govt of David Ben-Gurion from 1959 until 1964. In 1964,

Dayan resigned as Minister of Agriculture after an argument with new Prime Minister Levi

Eshkol and joined Ben-Gurion in forming a new party called ―Rafi‖ (Alliance of Israel's Workers).

Dayan did not stay out of the Govt for long, however. One yr later, Dayan was re-elected to

the Knesset representing Rafi, which later rejoined the Labour Party.

8. Dayan's reputation as an eff ldr grew when he was appointed Minister of Def under Levi

Eshkol just in time for the Six-Day War in 1967 against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. When the Syrians

were shelling Israeli vill in Upper Galilee, Dayan was the one who made the decision to launch a

full-scale attack against the Syrians. It was also Dayan who ended the fighting by arranging a

cease-fire with Syria through Chief of Staff of the UN Observer Corps, Gen Odd Bull. Dayan was

seen as ‗a solo performer, partly admired, partly feared for his political stunts‘. After the war,

Dayan cont the territories occupied by the Israeli Army. He opened the borders for Arab residents

of the territories to travel to Arab countries, while at the same time maint order and security in

Israeli-held areas.

9. Dayan kept his posn as Def Minister when Golda Meir of the Labour Party succeeded

Eshkol as Prime Minister in 1969. Ambassador Gideon Rafael wrote about Dayan, "Rocking the

boat is his favourite tac, not to overturn it, but to sway it sufficiently for the helmsman to lose his

grip or for some of its unwanted passengers to fall overboard." One of his most controversial

demands, made in 1973, was for the constr of Yamit, a new Israeli port city in Egyptian territory.

Fearful of Dayan's defection from the Labour Party, Meir sp the plan.

10. Before the Yamit plan could adv, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat launched

a surprise attack against Israel. On Yom Kippur, 06 Oct 1973, Egyptian armies crossed the Suez

Canal, mov AA msl into the canal area, and waged war on Israel. Israeli losses were high and

Israel had too short a sup of eqpt to conduct a prolonged war. On 22 Oct, a cease-fire was

declared, but the Israeli public's confidence had been severely shaken. Israel had been

unprepared for the surprise attack and unable to repulse it quickly. The nation‘s lack of prep was

blamed on Def Minister Dayan and an outraged public demanded his resignation. The president of

the Supreme Court set up a commission to investigate the performance of the Gen during the war.

The commission recommended the resignation of the Chief of Staff, but reserved judgement on

Dayan. The press and the public, however, condemned Dayan. After attending a mil funeral at

which bereaved parents had called him a murderer of their sons, Dayan submitted his resignation

to Meir in 1974.

11. Dayan was ―loath to close his life story marked by the events of the Yom Kippur War," and

in 1977, newly elected Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin gave him a sec chance by offering

him the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although Dayan was from the Opposition Labour Party,

he accepted the appt because he strongly believed: "I could significantly influence Israel's mov

towards achieving a peace arng with our neighbouring Arab States and with the Palestinian

inhabitants of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip."

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12. In May 1977, Dayan began negotiating with the Egyptians. As lead negotiator, Dayan began with the premise of receiving an Arab acceptance of Israeli rule over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in exch for a return of Sinai to Egypt. He negotiated for 18 months, and held secret mtg with officials in India, Iran, England and Morocco. His style is described as acting "alternately with dash and deliberation, adv and stalling, vacillating between surprising compromises and inexplicable intransigence."With help from U.S. president and mediator Jimmy Carter, Dayan met with the Egyptians first at Leeds Castle and later at Camp David. Eventually, a peace agreement, the Camp David Accords, was drawn up and signed at 2300 hr on Sun, 17 Sep 1978. 13. In 1979, Dayan resigned as Foreign Minister. Dayan and Begin disagreed about the bldg of

settlements in the territories and Dayan was frustrated by the fact that he was not leading the

autonomy talks with the Palestinians. Dayan also felt that he was increasingly being bypassed on

foreign policy issues. In 1981, he formed the Telem Party, which advocated unilateral

disengagement from the territories occupied in 1967. The party recd only two mandates in the

subsequent elections. On 14 May 1979, Dayan was diagnosed with colon cancer. He died on 16

Oct 1981, in Tel Aviv and was buried in Nahalal, the Moshav where he was raised.

4

CHAPTER – 2

EARLY LIFE

14. Moshe Dayan was born on 04 May 1915 in Kibbutz in Degania near Lake Kinneret, to

parents Shmuel and Dvorah. Moshe Dayan started his journey of life on a tough note and though

his mother wanted to devote all her time to him alone, but the ‗Kvutza‘, a Hebrew word meaning

‗gp‘ opposed it for it meant a waste of working potential. Moshe Dayan was regarded as a difficult

infant because of his incessant crying that his mother would often take him down to the Jordan at

ni so that his crying would not wake the weary settlers.

15. One day in the summer of 1918, Moshe got high fever which compelled Shmuel and

Dvorah to take him to Dr. Pokhovsky in Tiberias, who diagnosed him with Pneumonia but due to

non-availability of hosp, they took a room in Weingart Hotel and stayed by his bedside in shifts.

With no ice to cool the stifling room, they waved wet towels over his bed, but Moshe remained

motionless for nine days. Due to excessive heat of summer at Degania, Dr. Pokhovsky suggested

that Moshe be taken to a cooler place for convalescence. Dvorah took Moshe Dayan to Metulla in

Upper Galilee where he recovered and laughed and played again. When it was time for them to

return to Degania, a cart was sent from the kvutza at ni so that they might leave Metulla early in

the morning and avoid the midday heat. On their way to the Huleh Valley, the horses suddenly

reared up violently, breaking the harness shaft. As the repair was to take longer than expected,

Dvorah decided to head for Rosh Pinna, 20 km to the south, on foot. The image of Dvorah

carrying her child across the trackless field characterised the first five years of Moshe‘s life.

16. Since his early childhood, Moshe continued to suffer from Trachoma and was subjected to

incessant but inadequate treatment. He could not be cured in Degania or Tiberias, proper

treatment was available only in Jaffa or Jerusalem, but these two cities were completely cut off

from the Galilee. In Dec 1917, the British and Turkish armies faced each other across a front that

extended from Jerusalem to Jaffa which resulted in the defeat of the Turks, which in turn, paved

the way for the Dayan family to have an access towards Jaffa or Jerusalem. Shmuel and Dvorah

decided to get their son treated in Jerusalem as the treatment would be much less expensive as

compared to Jaffa. Moshe was admitted to Dr. Aryeh Feigenbaum‘s hosp where the doctor told

Dvorah that Moshe‘s case was severe and it would take some time to cure. However, a word of

consolation was offered by him that op would not be necessary and the contracted eye would

return to its normal size once the trachoma was cured. Dvorah and Moshe returned to Degania in

the summer of 1919, though Moshe‘s eyes still reqd treatment. Apart from the warmth and love

bestowed upon him, Moshe was constantly close with his mother, she told him many fascinating

and instructive stories and even taught him the Hebrew alphabet while she learned it herself. By

the age of four he could already read and write to some extent and had earned his father‘s praise

for his handwriting.

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17. In the summer of 1920, the Dayans mov to Tel Aviv. Dvorah found work in Hapoel Hatzair‘s

Bureau for locating and tracing the whereabouts of the relatives of new immigrants. Shmuel took a

number of posn but worked mainly on the Agriculture Committee of the Moshav. It was on the day

of Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) in 1921 that the Dayan‘s family began their life in Nahalal,

after a short stint at Tel Aviv. It was also at Nahalal that the family‘s wanderings finally came to an

end.

18. Moshe‘s first year of formal edn began in Nazareth. He displayed a flair for drawing, and

while his friends were still learning the alphabet, he could read and write with ease. His adjustment

to life within a social framework, however, was ambivalent. He tried and wished to be a part of the

gp, but at the same time he tended to be withdrawn and self-enclosed. However, he would always

be a part of the gp even in matters not suiting his liking and he never backed out. Moshe often

proposed picking a fight with the Arab children who taunted the Nahalal children as they walked

about the town in pairs. ‗Moshe was never afraid to start fights with Arab children, even those

older than him‘, recalled his cousin Shulamit.

19. The arr of Meshulam Halevi, a teacher of liberal edn, at Nahalal in the autumn of 1922

proved to be a turning pt for recognition of Moshe‘s talent in writing poems and essays. Meshulam

once remarked, ―By developing his writing ability, Moshe could excel among his classmates‖.

Meshulam began taking the children on outings and often suggested that they have their lessons

out in the fd. Apart from teaching the children to speak correct Hebrew, he instilled in them a

profound love for the flora and fauna of their country.

20. Although he excelled in writing, drawing, and nature and Bible studies, Moshe was not one

of the teacher‘s pets. One of Meshulam‘s favourites was Dov Yermiyah, two yr older than Moshe,

and liked by the entire class especially the girls. Meshulam‘s fondness for Dov would certainly

provoked Moshe‘s anger and envy. Meshulam recalled one incident how in the winter of their first

school year, Dov was beaten up by Moshe until Meshulam intervened. And if his father had not arr

in time to fetch him at the end of the day, Dov would have remained at the school until Meshulam

took him home, for fear of being attacked by Moshe again. His envy for Dov was an important

element in Moshe‘s social conduct as a child that nurtured to influence his future course.

21. The Nahalal children had the feeling of being ―chosen‖ as they belonged to the first

moshav, and they felt superior to everyone else. This sense of superiority was more highly devp in

Moshe than in others, which was proved by his efforts to assume leadership over the class. One

may assume that Moshe, the bright, alert child, ‗who loved to surprise people with a beautiful word‘

and excelled in expressing himself, found it difficult to conform to the pattern exemplified by the

recognized students‘ ldr, but under the circumstances he had no choice, to be accepted as he had

to imitate the other children.

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22. Moshe was well known to have never lied and always be honest with himself, but he was

not entirely frank on many occasions and by Nahalal std this was tantamount to being dishonest

and cunning. He was capable of making plans in adv and of turning events to his own advantage

by his foresight, which made the other children accuse him of intrigue, cunningness, and

dishonesty. Another target of attack was Moshe‘s attitude towards farm wk. In a society like

Nahalal, founded on total dedication to agriculture, public opinion was severely critical of anyone

who treated this ‗sacred‘ undertaking with indifference and Moshe was not a ‗serious worker‘. As

soon as he satisfied his curiosity in a wk, he lost interest and grew impatient with its endless

repetition. Moshe invested his talents, energy, and diligence only in wk that captured his interest.

When he was fascinated by grafting, Moshe built his own grafting shed and later started his own

apple nursery. The nursery eventually won high praises and his seedlings were in great demand.

23. In 1929, the youth of the vill were permitted to share the gd duty with their parents. Moshe

carried a double burden, as his father Shmuel had left for the US. The boys guarded the

courtyards, armed with spears fashioned by the vill blacksmith, and Moshe earned a reputation for

bravery when he extended his nightly round beyond the courtyard to behind the cowsheds.

24. It was only after the riots of 1929 that Nahalal joined the Haganah (Underground National

Jewish Def Org which func until the est of the Israel Def Forces on 25 May 1945) and began

receiving arms and mil instr. The boys were first posted as sentries and charged with warning the

adults should the police apch; later they were given lessons in Judo and Pistol Shooting. The

handling of live wpn was of secy importance; belonging to the Haganah was a far more coveted

prize for the boys, Moshe was of no exception to such a notion. Most of them had handled wpn of

one sort or another from their early childhood.

25. It was during this time that Moshe‘s natural talent for comb leadership stood out. His

schoolmate Avino‘am recalled that ―It always felt good to go out to fight with Moshe. He was very

daring. He never looked twice and simply ran fwd. We all noticed that nothing seemed to frighten

him, nor did he seem to care a whit what might happen to him. And in fights he knew no mercy.‖

Moshe gradually earned respect from the boys, who never accepted his leadership in any other fd,

for his unique gift for comb leadership.

26. Moshe met a girl named Ruth Shwarz on 01 Sep 1934 when the new school yr began at

the Agriculture School for Girls. After a courtship of a little over 10 months, they were married on

21 Jul 1935. At the age of 20, Moshe was the first boy in his class to take a wife.

7

CHAPTER – 3

MIL CAREER TILL ACRE PRISON

27. In 1936 the Haganah began working in cooperation with the British Army against the Arab

trt gangs. One of the first manifestations of this cooperation was the assignment of Haganah

guides to British Army units. One of the reqmt for guides was a working knowledge of English, and

Moshe‘s stay in England made him an obvious choice. He was posted to the regt that was

guarding the Iraqi ppl. In retrospect, this assignment may be regarded as the first stg of Moshe‘s

mil career. It was during this time that Moshe became involved in the Haganah and met two of the

three people, Yitzhak Sadeh and Capt Orde Charles Wingate, who, in his estimation had the

greatest influence on his character and thinking. The third, David Ben Gurion, was to enter his life

only at a later stg.

28. The anti-British nature of the Arab Revolt temporarily linked the British authorities and the

Jewish community in a common cause, initiating a pd of cooperation between the Mandatory Govt

and the Haganah that lasted until the publication of the White Paper in May 1939. The British

Army requested for guides who were acquainted with the mtn paths around the Arab vill.

29. Moshe served as a guide working first with units of the King‘s own Scottish Borderers and

then with units of the Yorkshire Fusiliers. His duties consisted of guiding the units on reg ptl along

the ppl which was sabotaged by the Arab trts, inflicting hy losses on the oil company. Moshe

learned the limitations of an army func within a rigid routine of the Reg Army. He told his friends

that he was not very impressed by the mil proficiency and its method of op as the soldiers were

inadequately trained in fd craft and the uniforms were too cumbersome for their msn, ptl were

carried out in slipshod manner and ambushes were prepared carelessly. These obsn emphasise

the importance of proper trg in fd craft, and during those eight months in Afula the outline of a Mil-

Trg Manual began to take shape in his mind.

30. Another manifestation of the cooperation was the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP), a Jewish

militia composed of Haganah members and subject to reg that allowed the mandatory Govt to

reinforce Army or police units. The est of JPS meant official sanction for the possession of

firearms and trg in the use of small arms by the Haganah. Moshe joined the JPS in the spring of

1937, after relinquishing his post as a guide, and serve in the Nahalal Dist. According to critics,

although the opportunity for trg and consolidating the rk of JSP was accomplished, the policy had

ultimately a destructive eff on the Jewish communities in Palestine and abroad.

8

31. The official history of the Haganah described the creation of Sadeh‘s ‗Flying Squad‘ unit as

a revolution in the entire tac thinking of the Haganah‘. This unit was soon succeeded by the Mob

Gd of the JSP. In 1937, Moshe was appointed Cdr of one of the three Mob Gd (known as MG‘s) in

the Nahalal Dist, which turned out to be a testimony of his success in the early stg of his mil

career.

32. In the exec of their duties, the JSPs were forced to assume a split personality, as they were

under the dir comd of both the British authorities and the Haganah, which called upon them for spl

duties. For the Haganah, the most imp JSP func was to train other Haganah members. Like many

others, Moshe was both an MG Cdr and a Haganah instr. As an instr, though a strict discp of

dress, drill, and insp did not come to him easily. He, nonetheless, did his best to have his unit

excel in it. He took drill very seriously and would take his men out to the main rd with clean rif and

polished shoes and drill them until they excelled at it, even though he personally hated all of it.

Moshe devoted all his efforts to train the members of the Shimron Gp and the younger boys of

Nahalal. By 1937 he had his own well-formed ideas on fd craft and used the boys of Nahalal to

test them.

33. Moshe first displayed his tendency towards disobedience when, as the Cdr of an MG, he

was ordered by his CO, Lee Marshall, to gather all his constables and rush to the Nazareth mtn to

help put out a forest fire. He refused to obey the order. The only explanation he had for this

insubordination was that there was no political reason and that he found it irrational to march his

constables, who earned only Six Pounds a month, in such a hot temp. He was punished for this

act and was demoted from Sergeant to Pvt.

34. In 1938, Moshe was appointed the Cdr of an NCO course held at Kibbutz Alonim. By that

time he had already compiled a pers manual of fd craft, which later developed into the first proper

ordered manual of fd trg in the Haganah. Moshe Dayan was firmly against drill, cumbersome

uniforms, and ‗square‘ fmn. Instead, he devised rules based on obsn of men and topography, how

to gd more effectively, shoot more accurately, steal up to an obj unnoticed, find eff firing posn,

throw gren further, wear lighter clothing which facilitated faster crawling. For all his fd crafts,

Dayan always carried out live ex. 1938 was an imp yr in the wielding of the Haganah into an Army,

for it was then that the Sadeh‘s Spl Fd Companies and Orde Wingate‘s Ni Squads were formed.

Although both the units were short lived, they had a formative influence upon the character of the

Haganah.

35. The renewed outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1938 brought about the fmn of the Fd

Companies and the Ni Squads. The Fd Companies – known by their Hebrew initials as FOSH,

were an offshoot of Sadeh‘s ‗Flying Squad‘, and were composed of existing MGs which were

subordinate to other mil or police frameworks. The Wingate‘s Spl Ni Squads (SNS) had a dynamic

unified comd, elite manpower, a proper budget, and a large sup of wpn. While the SNS was emp

against the Arab gangs of the Galilee and the Jezreel Valley as the main striking force, the FOSH

was reserved for actions in the south.

9

36. The Scottish Arty Capt Orde Charles Wingate, who is said to have a far-reaching influence

on shaping the resourcefulness and fighting spirit of the Israeli soldier, arr in Palestine in Sep

1936, and two yr later undertook a survey of the methods used by the Arab trts. Wingate met

Moshe Dayan in 1938 while he was still carrying out his survey of the Arab gangs. Moshe invited

the Capt to give a lecture on his method of mob ambushes which the latter complied and carried

out the demo. After mtg with each other several times, Moshe realised that Wingate was a superb

mil man who proved that an army could be more than merely a hollow, routine framework.

37. Wingate carried out one of his better known ops with the help of Moshe and his Mob Gd in

raiding the Galilee trt gangs by surprise on the outskirts of the small vill of Lid el-Awadin. Zvi

Brenner, a close associate and confidant of Wingate, revealed that Wingate had great respect for

Moshe, because he too hated repeating the same op twice and always tried innovations.

38. In 1939, the British Govt considered seriously the possibility of the dispute in Palestine

exploited by the Axis Powers to gain sp of the Arabs in the Middle East. The end of the Arab

Revolt also marked the end of cooperation between the Zionist mov and the Great Britain. The

British Govt abandoned cooperation with Haganah and curtailed its activities and at the same time

sought the Arabs as its allies.

39. Haganah HQ moved its Pl Ldrs Course to Yavniel due to fear of the British svl over the

bases at Ju‘ara and Kfar Vitkin. Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon were among those chosen as instr

at Yavniel. A surprising incident occurred when two British offr from the Tiberias Police Force

unexpectedly visited the camp on 03 Oct 1939. While inspecting the lecture hall and the living qr,

they discovered rif hidden under the mattresses. The incident was reported to Haganah HQ at Tel

Aviv and it was decided that the camp was to be evacuated at once.

40. The course was to be transferred to Kibbutz Ein Hashofet. While making their way to the

new base, a gp of forty three men with a good number of wpn caches led by Moshe encountered a

unit of the Trans Jordanian Frontier Force. A small Arab force consisting of 12 to 15 men, riding on

three or five pickups, surrounded and captured the larger Israeli force. The men were detained

and the matter was reported to the British authorities. The Forty-Three were taken into custody in

Acre Prison.

41. In the prison the authorities tried to intimidate the Forty three. While one of the men was

being interrogated in an adjacent room, ‗a bony hand holding a club‘ was seen in a small window

that opened onto the hall. The hand waved the club up and down, left and rt, while ‗a gruff voice

could be heard through the window, muffled and breathing heavily, saying ―Death, Death‖, and

repeating the same word over and over again in a sing song cadence‘.

10

42. Four men who said they knew English, Zvi Brenner, Moshe Dayan, and two others were

interrogated first. Zvi Brenner was taken for interrogation first at one o‘clock in the morning. As he

walked in, he was placed up against a wall with a spotlight on his face. Three men dressed in civ

clothes and holding batons fired questions at him in turns. The men in the hall herd sounds of

blows, kicks, groans, questions then once again blows, kicks, groans, and a cry of pain.

Throughout the interrogation Brenner repeated only a single sentence – without a lawyer he would

not say a word, as suggested by a Haganah lawyer that if caught and questioned a Haganah man

must state only his name and then demand to see a lawyer.

43. Moshe had no hesitation to reveal his iden and insisted that the Haganah was not a trt org

and was not fighting the British. On the contrary, he said that they had op with the British Army. He

instead warned the interrogators that if they continue to beat and torture the prisoners, he would

get word of it to his Jewish friends outside, and ‗they will know how to take care of the torturers‘. It

was only after Moshe‘s warning that the torture ceased.

44. It was typical of Moshe to try and find a way out of his predicament through initiative and

resourcefulness before putting his will power and physical stamina to the test. This strategy devp

into a pattern of behaviour, acting tough when given no choice, but being flexible if there was any

chance of emerging victorious without a clash. To a great extent his actions constituted direct

assumption of leadership and resp for the gp. Dayan quite naturally became the chief and

spokesman of the Jewish detainees without any one having elected or appointed him to the post.

He earned the reputation of being a cool headed ldr, respected because of the way he consulted

his companions, his forceful attitude towards the hostile prison authorities and his decisiveness in

dealing with the belligerence of the Arab prisoners with whom the Jews shared qr. He gained the

hearts of his companions mainly by his pungent and sardonic sense of humor and by his

resourcefulness in saving himself and others from tight corners.

45. The trial was held at a British Army base, two km north of Acre, and lasted for three days.

The verdicts were read on 30 Oct, and the sentences shocked the Yishuv. All forty-three were

found guilty, one was sentenced to life imprisonment and the others to ten years each. Imdtly after

the trial, an intensive campaign was initiated to repeal, or at least reduce, the sentence.

46. Moshe sat in prison Acre perfecting his English. He also learnt various Arabic dialects and

even adopted certain Arab habits and mannerisms. He spent much of his time writing poetry. His

favorite reading in prison was the wks of Natan Alterman, a Hebrew poet and political writer,

whose writings gave forceful expression to the emotional revulsion of the Jews in Palestine at the

dest of European Jewry, and to their feelings of bitter disappointment at the frustration of their

aspirations towards an independent Jewish State. The young men remained in prison, plg the

struggle they knew they would face in the future.

11

47. A suitable opportunity presented itself early in 1941. At this time a threat to Britain in

Palestine arose from the fact that Syria and Lebanon were occupied by French forces which were

collaborating with Nazi Germany. British HQs were worried at the existence of hostile tps

concentrated along Palestine‘s frontiers and realized the necessity for the speedy conquest of the

two neighboring countries before they could be used by a German Army attacking Southwards

while Rommel‘s forces put pressure on British def in the Western Desert. The Jewish community

in Palestine became a Maj factor in British mil plg because of its natural anxiety at the terrible

threat posed by the existence of Nazi collaborators only a few miles to the North.

48. When release seemed more remote than ever before, sit in Palestine suddenly changed

radically due to devp in the war in the Middle East, the British Army reqd the help of the Haganah

and agreed to conscript a large number of Jewish youth in Palestine. On 16 Feb 1941, the forty

three prisoners in Acre were informed that they were to be released the fwg day. At dawn, they

were given their civ clothes, had their palms stamped with the official prison symbol, and were set

free.

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CHAPTER – 4

SYRIA (JUN 1941)

49. When Moshe left the Acre Prison, the Middle East seemed to be in imminent danger of

conquest by the Nazis. This sit led to the renewal of the coop between the British and the Yishuv.

The Jewish Agency urged Jews to volunteer for the Palestinian units of the British Army.

50. Sit in the Middle East also brought about changes within the Haganah itself. In May 1941, it

was decided to set up a country-wide Haganah force to def the Jewish settlements against Arab

attacks and to serve as a res force for the British Army. Yitzhak Sadeh was appointed Spl Offr in

charge of org this force. Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan were singled out to comd the first two coys.

Initially, these two coys were intended to form a nucleus of the spl force, but they were given

entirely new obj – to join the British invasion of Syria.

51. Moshe had only a few days to recruit, train, and org his men. He was eager for action and

not disheartened by the fact that his unit was totally unprep to go into action. Of the thirty men

Moshe gathered in Hanita, only one could speak Arabic well, while the msn reqd that the entire

unit should not only be fluent in Arabic, but they should be able to pass as Arabs. Moshe however

felt that the most imp aspect that they lacked to execute the msn was presence of any man who

knew his way around in Syria. Moshe therefore decided that he would have to find a guide. After a

prolonged search, they finally found an Arab who had at one time been the ldr of a trt gang in that

region and was well acquainted with SW Syria and the Syrian – Palestinian border. They hesitated

to apch him for obvious reasons. Once the border was crossed, he could turn them over to the

French tps for a reward and then return inventing any tale he chose. Indeed, anything might

happen across the border, but since they had no one else, they contacted him. As security, his

wife and children were brought to Haifa and held in a hotel, and he was warned that if anything

untoward happened, his family would face the consequences.

52. Since Moshe divided his force into small units of two or three men, subsequently, addl Arab

guides were hired. Moshe and his men made a No of recce ptls across the border with the help of

these hired Arab guides during the first week of Jun. On returning from the ptls, the men drew up

reports and handed them in to Gen Wilson‘s HQ.

53. Moshe‘s action in this incident forecasted his typical behaviour as a Commander in Zahal.

Moshe was less concerned about his personal safety, as a commander can be replaced, but there

was no substitute for good work done. Logic, curiosity, and a spirit of adventure blended in

Moshe‘s character and made him always lead from the front. His desire for daring exploits also

proved his worth as a ldr.

13

54. On 07 Jun 1941, Moshe was introduced to the two young Commanding Officers of the

Australian tps. They showed him a printed plan which he recognised with pride as a copy of a

plan drawn by one of his ptls. Moshe‘s men were given seven assignments, the principal one

being to capture the sentries on the br north of Iskanderun. It was actually a pair of brs on the

coast rd, ten km north of the Palestinian border. The Australians numbered three offrs – Kippin,

Allen, and Cowdrey - and seven soldiers. To these Moshe added a gp of five, incl himself and the

Arab guide, Rashid Taher. All together there were sixteen men.

55. The ni of 08 Jun was clear and bright. In the kibbutz‘s dining room Australian tps ate

together with Dayan‘s men. Few hrs later, the Jews were on the other side of the border. They

continued on their way, skirting vills so as not to arouse their sleeping inhabitants. It was tough

going through the mtns. The invading force with which Dayan op was commanded by Capt Henry

Gowling. They were split into two sec, one set for the Beirut Haifa highway and the other for the

Iskanderun Br. Dayan accompanied the latter. The br was loc about twelve miles from the frontier

and when they came within sight of it, the Australian Capt decided that he, the Arab guide and

Dayan would get near it and see whether there were any French tps on gd. The Australian was an

expert on explosives and sabotage ops. He warned Dayan not to remove his finger from the

trigger as he followed the guide for fear that the Arab guide might betray them. When they reached

they found the br was unguarded, the French had blown up the rd further south, closer to the

Palestine border, and the br was therefore left intact. Dayan‘s men decided to cut the French tele

lines. They saw no signs of the main invading force, so they decided to make for the police stn not

far from the Iskanderun br. Dayan suggested to Gowling that they capture the bldg from the

French and leave a gd behind to secure the br. The Capt agreed and the men mov fwd towards

their obj, unaware of the fact that inside the police stn a large French force was awaiting them. It

was only when they were within about two hundred yards from their obj that they noticed there

was a considerable mov of khaki clad men inside. Their suspicions were aroused but it was too

late. The French opened fire and Dayan‘s men took cover in the nearby grove.

56. A machine gun was trained directly upon them which was firing from the open balcony of

the bldg, a dist of almost twenty yards. Dayan pulled the pin from one of his hand gren and lobbed

it straight at the machine gun and silenced it. Ten men rushed fwd to the attack. The attack was so

fast that it overwhelmed the French defenders. Complete surrender came within minutes. The

Haganah party disarmed their prisoners and locked them in a room, while Moshe Dayan took

charge of the machine gun. They decided to hold on to the police stn until the Australian invasion

force arr. In the adjacent grove they discovered more French armt and sup. From the roof of the

bldg they could see other large gp of French tps dug in over the surrounding countryside. The

French began to snipe at the men on the roof, and Dayan found that there was no more amn left

for his machine gun. Bullets were removed from rif mag and the amn belt was thus filled. Dayan

was able to return the French fire, but there was no way for taking cover on the roof and he stood

fully exposed to the snipers. Moshe took a fd glass from a dead French offr and as he raised his fd

glasses to his eyes in search of the en snipers, a bullet hit the left lens, shattering the casing and

sending fragments of glass and metal into his eye and one of his hands, severing the finger

muscles. Despite all his pain and discomfort, Dayan appeared to be unmoved.

14

57. When the main Australian force arr from Palestine, the French realised their sit was

hopeless and abandoned the fight. Only then were Dayan and a dead Australian soldiers loaded

on a truck carrying the war booty and taken back to Haifa. They reached there about eighteen hr

after Dayan had been wounded. Moshe neither ate nor drank during the time, nor did he bother

any of his men or ask for aid or comfort. On arr at Hadassah Hosp in Haifa, Moshe was imdtly

wheeled into the operating theatre. It was found that his left eye was a total loss, and the only

course open to them was to remove all the metal and glass fragments and to close up the empty

socket. For further treatment to his wound, it was decided that Moshe was to be sent to Hadassah

Hosp in Jerusalem.

58. According to Zalman Mart, it was Moshe who took the initiative, and the Australian offr,

Kippin, merely followed his lead, while the Australian version of the attack completely omitted the

part played by Moshe and Mart. According to the Australians, the heroes of the day were Kippin

and Henderson, while the Jews claimed that the credit was due to Moshe and Mart.

15

CHAPTER – 5

OFF COURSE (1941 – 1947)

59. The disabled often fail to grasp quickly how drastic a change their injury brings to their lives.

Moshe was no exception in this respect and at first believed that he would still take an active part

in the war. The loss of an eye is a serious handicap for a pl or a coy ldr. Moshe was relieved of the

comd of his coy although he was a comb hero and decorated by the British Army. He did not

return to comb duty, either in the British Army or in the Haganah for seven years. He was

compelled to remain in Jerusalem for protracted med treatment.

60. When he recovered from his injury, Moshe was assailed by fits and depression, He

considered himself no more fit for mil activities and finished physically. He started experiencing

constant mental pain, and the hardest blow of all was to get accustomed to his new image with its

unmistakeable badge - the black eye patch (which was to become the trademark of his image). He

became conscious of his ‗pirate appearance‘ and dreaded children‘s fear of him. Moshe

experienced constant pain, and although he learnt to bear it silently, it deepened his

initial despondency.

61. Moshe‘s dark moods were aggravated by the thought of his contemporaries‘ advancement

in the Haganah. Yigal Allon with whom he had been running neck to neck in their race was now

leaving him far behind. Moshe who ever since his childhood wanted to ‗do something great‘ was

now out of the race altogether. For a time all seemed lost, and it looked as though he would be

just another member of Nahalal.

62. Reuven Shiloah, who had been the Jewish agency rep in the affairs of the Forty-Three was

then the head of the Dept for Special Affairs, a br of the Political Dept of the Jewish Agency, he

offered Moshe a post in the dept. The new post enabled Moshe to get exposure to an entirely new

dirn for his life – politics.

63. The German invasion of the USSR on 22 Jun 1941 and subsequent devp on the Eastern

front aroused concern in the Yishuv about the possibility of a Nazi invasion of Palestine. These

fear prompted the Haganah to discuss what actions the Yishuv would take in such an event. In the

summer of 1941, the British authorities began prep Palestine and Syria for a retreat. It was in this

context that British Army Int requested Reuven Shiloah‘s dept to set up several small transmitting

stn that would coord the espionage rings in the event of Syria and Palestine being overrun by the

Germans. Shiloah handed the matter over to Moshe and by Aug 15 1941 he submitted the

detailed plan suggesting the est of transmitting stns in the South at Samaria, Haifa and the Beisan

areas, which was approved by the British Int. On 26 Sep, a spl three month course was opened for

twenty of Moshe‘s men in wireless txn and rxn and theories of radio and electricity.

16

64. To carry out his new duties, Moshe made his home in Jerusalem and rented a large four

room flat in the suburb of Katamon. What became known as ‗Moshe Dayan‘s Pvt Network‘ proved

narrow grnd for Moshe‘s energy and imagination. He soon began proposing much broader fd of

activity for the eventuality of conquest. On 20 Oct 1941, he suggested the creation of two spl units

whose men would be disguised as Arabs and Germans. At first the British rejected this proposal,

but in Jul 1942, when the circumstances of the war changed, it was accepted. The result was the

est of the Arabic Pl and the German Pl within the Palmach. The proj began when the British asked

the Dept for Spl Affairs to find a man willing to parachute into Yugoslavia and serve as a wireless

opr with the first British msn to Tito. Since activities behind en lines were Moshe‘s dept, Shiloah

transferred the British request to him. Moshe chose a Nahalal boy, Peretz Rosenberg, who was

dropped into Yugoslavia in May 1942. The idea appealed to Moshe, and he began asking himself

‗why only one‘ he wondered why an entire cdo unit could not be dropped behind the en lines in

Europe. It would serve two purposes, fighting the Germans and creating live contacts with the

persecuted Jewish communities of Europe. The Political Dept of the Jewish Agency submitted a

detailed proposal to the British authorities, and it was accepted. Eventually, thirty three Jewish

parachutists from Palestine, most of them Palmach members, were dropped into Rumania,

Bulgaria, Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia on guerrilla msns.

65. Moshe remained in Jerusalem from June 1941 to Sep 1942. During this pd, he devoted

much of his time to his family. He specially liked to play with his three yr old Yael. He would sit her

down on his knees and very patiently teach her how to read. However, he devoted the bulk of his

time to affairs of the state. Certain changes occurred in him. Moshe, who was always sociable and

jovial, became more distant, and never smiled or seemed to need anyone. Another change which

occurred in him was his interest in people concerned with politics, people who studied and

contemplated the destiny of the Yishuv.

66. During his stay in Jerusalem, Moshe achieved with ease the one thing that always eluded

him in Nahalal, to be well liked. He now discovered that many sought his coy and his confidence

and to be his friend was considered an honour, but fame did not affect him in any profound way.

His easy going manner, sense of humour, wit, nimble mind, indefinable charm and love of dir

contact with things, of learning from imdt experience remained unchanged.

67. When the danger of German invasion had passed, the ‗Pvt Network‘ was no longer needed

and his presence in Jerusalem could no more be justified. He returned with his family to Nahalal

in Sep 1942.

68. Moshe undertook an adventurous msn to Iraq before he returned to Nahalal. The Haganah

entrusted him with smuggling three suitcases of arms to its cell in Baghdad, which Moshe

completed with ease by removing his eye patch and looking like the local inhabitant. Filthy as he

was, he entered the lobby of the elegant Omayyad Hotel to look for the Jewish Agency rep, Enzo

Sereni, and completed his msn.

17

69. Returning to Nahalal, he mov his family into a hut on his parents‘ farm. Moshe began bldg

up a promising farm based on dairy produce, but he was unable to undo completely his ties with

the Haganah and issues of National Policy, and thus, he returned to wk for the org on a part

time basis.

70. In Dec 1946, Moshe attended the Twenty Second Zionist Congress in Basle, where he

delivered a speech as a rep of the younger generation and called for an intensification of the

scope and depth of resistance to British Mandatory Rule. When Ya‘akov Dori was appointed Chief

of Staff of the Haganah, Moshe received the appt of Staff Offr for Arab Affairs.

18

CHAPTER – 6

DEGANIA AGAIN (NOV 1947 – MAY 1948)

71. Moshe Dayan‘s return to fd comd came about entirely by chance, for he was considered

suitable as Offr for Arab Affairs. He resumed his comb duty on being appointed as a Sect Cdr,

followed by a Bn Cdr in the rk of a Maj.

72. Moshe‘s posn as Offr for Arab Affairs was advantageous as it afforded him dir access to

CoS Dori and his superiors: Israel Galili C-in-C of the Haganah National Comd, and David Ben

Gurion, who held the Def Portfolio in the Zionist Executive. At the same time, his wk was

hampered by a plethora of interested parties, all of whom dealt with Arab Affairs viz Arab Dept of

the Jewish Agency, the Int Service of the Haganah etc. As an Offr for Special Affairs, he was

permitted to give advice, but Mil action was taken by units not under his dir comd.

73. Moshe‘s main tasks were to recruit agents and to limit the activities of the Arab gangs in

Palestine and neighbouring countries, particularly Syria. These gangs expanded very fast and

became very violent and in fact, they were the only adversary in the War of Independence. When

the State of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 1948, they joined forces with the reg armies of

Egypt, Jordon, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, which proceeded to invade Palestine.

74. Moshe recruited agents whom he called ‗advisers‘ to work as watchmen for settlements in

the Nahalal region. In selecting the Arab agents, Moshe followed the same rule that had served

him before the invasion of Syria, choose men who are good mtrl for trts. The agents played an imp

role in the successive victories against the Arabs.

75. Moshe recd his first non-advisory post after the Carmeli Bde secured the city of Haifa on 22

Apr 1948 during the famous Battle of Ramat Yohanan. On Ben Gurion‘s initiative, Haganah HQ

sent Moshe to Haifa with a spl assignment to administer abandoned Arab property. It was here

that he gained his first experience in mil Govt.

76. Although he repeatedly expressed his desire to be given a fd comd, he was not offered one

and spent much time wandering the corridors of Haganah HQ with nothing to do. The change in

Moshe‘s mil prospects came suddenly when the 8th Bde, the last one raised prior to the est of the

state turned out to be the only Armd Bde during the War of Independence, with Yitzhak Sadeh as

its Cdr, was to be raised in May 1948. There was a shortage of Offrs for a cadre of Commanding

Offr as everyone worthy of it had been recruited to other units. Sadeh was undoubtedly pleased to

discover that Moshe was still available. He proposed that Moshe be given the 89th Bn, which he

called a ‗Cdo‘ Bn. Moshe was no less pleased.

77. On 17 May 1948, Moshe Dayan was given the charge to org a Cdo Bn for the Central

Front. A new order was however released the fwg morning by Ben Gurion appointing Moshe

Dayan as Cdr of the front in Jordan Valley due to radical change for the worse in the ongoing war

which was known as ‗the Battle of Deganias.‘

19

78. Moshe arr at his sector just before sunset on 18 May. The massive Syrian attack, fwg the

proclamation of the State of Israel on 14 May, began two days later at 0415 hr. The ‗Battle for the

Deganias‘ lasted approx nine hours, from 0415 hr to 1300 hr. The Syrian attacking force

comprising of an Inf Bde supported by arty, tks, armd cars, and two bombers was humiliated by

the Israeli tps. The Syrians began to flee the battlefield and retreated to Zemakh. A few days later,

Moshe returned to Tel Aviv to assume comd of the 89th Bn.

20

CHAPTER – 7

IN COMD OF 89th BN

79. After the ‗Battle of Deganiah‘, there was no doubt about the ability of Moshe Dayan to comd

the 89th Bn. While he was a Sect Cdr, Moshe Dayan had told the Nahalal and Yavniel boys about

his tfr to a new Bn, which would be a cdo unit and proved very appealing for the young and

enthusiastic soldiers.

80. The first Coy of the 89th, later known as C Coy, was built around the nucleus of men Moshe

had spirited away from the Golani Bde; the sec (B Coy) was lured away from the 43rd Bn of the

Kiriyati Bde and the third (A Coy) came from the rks of the disbanded Lehi.

81. Moshe had an able 2IC in Yohanan Pelz who, on 21 May 1948, was offered the posn of 2IC

89th Bn by the GHQ. Pelz was of double service to the new unit. First, he told Moshe about his

former Coy and Akiva Sa‘ar, 2IC of his unit. Secondly, he explained to Moshe that it was the prac

all over the world to man cdo units with volunteers.

82. Moshe began exploiting his connections in GHQ to obtain authorities to recruit volunteers

and Pelz began organizing the Bn HQ and barracks at Tel Hashomer Army base. Their separate

areas of resp in the new unit were also determined at their very first mtg. Moshe was not

interested in adm and lgs and had no intention to understand them. As soon as Pelz proved his

worth as an organiser, Moshe gave him complete autonomy.

83. On 28 May, GHQ issued an order to all Bde Cdrs stating that the 89th Bn reqd select

volunteers and every Bde was obliged to provide ‗a quota of 40 men, incl one Pl Leader and four

Sec Ldrs to be approved by the 89th. The OC of the 43rd Bn of Kiryati Bde was unwilling to part

with his best men. At the same time neither Moshe nor Pelz had the patience to resolve the matter

through regular GHQ channels. Pelz met secretly with AkivaSa‘ar and his men. The next day

morning, the entire coy left the 43rd in a bus brought by Pelz.

84. On finding out the fact about the disappearance of the entire coy to join Moshe‘s 89th Bn,

Amos Ben Gurion, OC 43rd and son of the Def Minister, was so annoyed and appealed to his

father. The outcome was that Moshe was ordered to return Akiva Sa‘ar and his men to 43rd. They

were all confined to prison.

85. However, Moshe did not give up and finally succeeded in getting Sa‘ar and his men. Sa‘ar

also set out to find volunteers in other Bdes, armed with a copy of GHQ order. The response he

got from various fmns was way below satisfactory. Some Bdes even refused to relinquish their

prisoners. Thus, many of the volunteers joined the 89th without official tfr and some were declared

deserters by their original units. As far as Moshe was concerned, anyone who disobeyed orders in

order to join a comb unit was most welcome.

21

86. The 89th justified its reputation as a colourful and undisciplined bunch in many ways. During

the formative period, they often stole civ jeeps and drove them to the base, where they were

hastily painted khaki and provided with Army Licence plates. It is likely that the rapid equipping of

the Bn would have been discovered only much later, if at all, had the boys of the 89th not laid

hands on a brand new jeep parked outside the Ritz Hotel in Tel Aviv, which housed the Govt

Press Office. After the jeep was painted khaki, had a black Army license plate affixed to it, and

was fitted out with two machine guns, fore and aft, it transpired that the veh belonged to Arthur

Koestler, who was covering the war as a foreign corres.

87. Moshe‘s behaviour lent a spirit of ‗devil may care‘ audacity to his Bn. Whenever he left the

base in his jeep, for example, he would say to his companions, ‗Just watch this‘, and would floor

the accelerator as they apch the main gate. The jeep would shoot past the startled sentry, who

would shout for them to halt. Moshe would bring the jeep to a stop some 30 meters from the gate

and arng his papers for the M.P, who would then have to lve his post and run over to him. His

escapades endeared him to his men, and he soon became their hero.

88. Another prominent fig in the 89th was Theodor ‗Teddy‘ Eytan. A French gentile (anyone not

Jewish) whose birth name was Thadee Diffre. He was sent by GHQ to 89th as an expert on Armd

Warfare, a man of great ability who proved to be an excellent fighter. The final touch was added by

Akiva Sa‘ar‘s dvr, an Irish deserter from the British Mandatory Police. The Bn was fully org and

ready for action, and the morale was high.

89. Apart from minor actions in the vill of Yehudiya, the first comb action of the 89th was not

against the Arabs, but their fellow Jews, the Irgun. The Irguns planned to ship wpns and fighters in

a ship named ‗Aleftalena‘. As the import of arms by an indep mil org was regarded as a serious

violation of the laws of the State of Israel, the Govt tried to prevent the unloading of the Irgun wpns

and the Army was tasked to execute the same.

90. Moshe spread his men out and surrounded the Irgun forces on the beach. They were

cautioned to try and avoid a clash with the Irgun but at the same time, they were instructed to

return fire if fired upon. Although Moshe did not accept the task with enthusiasm, the men under

his comd testified that he was energetic, aggressive, and forceful in carrying it out.

91. While the fighting was still on, Moshe was directed to escort the dead body of Col David

Marcus to the US, who was accidentally killed by a Zahal sentry. During his weeklong stay in New

York, Moshe was fortunate enough to get a chance to meet with a man named Abraham J. Baum,

who was emp on a voluntary basis by the Haganah msn in the United States. During the

preliminary small talk, Moshe learnt that Baum was one of the most daring, decorated and scarred

veterans of the US Army in the Sec World War. What Baum had to say was exactly what the Cdr

of 89th Bn wanted to hear. In a Bar of Hotel 14, Moshe thirstily absorbed Baum‘s stories and

committed to memory the essence of his theories on mech warfare, which are enlisted as under:-

(a) If there is a rd, make use of it.

22

(b) Attack with a man‘s force to do a boy‘s job and make every effort to have it appear

much larger than it is.

(c) Penetrate in narrow fmns, preferably in single line coln.

(d) Use your fire power more as a psy factor than a wpn of death.

(e) Keep mov because once you stop, your advantage as an armd force is lost.

(f) Forget about res tps, use them all and let the en think there are more.

(g) Bring in Inf to occupy.

(h) Keep your armr mob for CA.

92. On his return from New York, Moshe went directly to his Bn, which was in the midst of prep

for ‗Op DANNY‘. The obj of the op were to push the Arab Legion back from its posn near Tel Aviv,

liberate the rd leading to Jerusalem and the city itself from the pressure of the Arab Legion and

irregulars, afford Zahal a new, more tenable line of def, and capture the two imp centres of tn, the

airport and the railroad stn of Lydda.

93. At the break of dawn on Sat, 10 Jul, after swiftly taking Muzira and a few other vills, the

entire Bn mov in a single coln with Moshe in the lead and Pelz with the mor pl on two armd cars in

the rear. The aslt on Kula began, but the battle did not devp as Moshe had anticipated. It was not

enough merely to ‗bang once on a tin‘ for the Arabs to flee the town. Moshe was forced to call in

Pelz who had judged correctly that mor would be needed before the aslt for a softening up of tgts,

He instr him to set up the mor and begin covering fire so that Akiva Sa‘ar‘s B Coy could break into

Kulla. Without detailed battle plans Pelz did not know exactly where the men of the Bn were

positioned and was afraid the mor fire might hit his own men. Nevertheless, with great presence of

mind and not inconsiderable courage, he managed to set up the mor and bombard the town.

94. On Sun, 11 Jul 1948, Moshe appeared at Dir Tarif in a jeep and discovered a Jordanian

armd car that had overturned in the battle fd. Moshe desperately wanted the veh and initially tried

to extricate it personally, despite hy Jordanian machine gun fire. Sa‘ar pleaded with him not to

endanger his life and agreed that his men would free the car with cables. The Jordanians

however, began bombarding the area with mor to prevent them from salvaging it. Moshe felt that

with an armd car, his tps would be kings, so with his eagerness to gain possession of the veh, he

himself climbed into the half track Sa‘ar‘s men had been using, asked one of the mechanics to

accompany him, and ignoring the Jordanian fire pulled the armd car out of the ditch. Within an hr it

was ready for action. The men dubbed it ‗The Terrible Tiger‘. As soon as one of the soldiers had

learned how to fire its cannon, it was jubilantly welcomed into the Bn as the most modern and eff

wpn at their disposal. By then 89th had already taken Dir Tariff, which was to have been captured

by the 82nd, and was now on its way to Lydda.

23

95. Before the 89th left Dir Tarif, Moshe gathered his offrs and described the plan of action they

were to emp. His orders were that there is to be no stopping. If anyone came up against an obst,

hy fire was to be brought down and before they knew what was happening the scouting jeeps

were to mov aside and the armd car and half tracks were to break through. If one of own veh was

hit, no one was to stop to repair it or hold up those behind. ―Pass it and continue advancing. No

one except myself is allowed to hold up the coln. Keep mov at all costs. Shoot, run over, and keep

mov.‖ Thus without having recd orders or notifying 8th Bde HQ, most of the Bn drove to ‗Op

DANNY‘ HQ in Ben Shemen.

96. Dayan decided that this was the best moment for an attack on Lydda, particularly while its

NE flank was exposed. The defenders would not expect an attack from that dirn. He did not wait

for orders from op HQ but got his Bn ready for a quick and powerful drive. Moshe was in the first

coy of half tracks that led the way behind the ‗Terrible Tiger‘. This was one of the rare instances

that a Bn Cdr headed his unit in an aslt. The Bn deployed in a single coln and mov out along the

rd. It was met by hy fire and halted at an anti tk ditch. Moshe left his scout car and mov from one

half track to another, ordering their dvrs personally and not relying on the wireless to spur on the

adv. At the entrance to Lydda the Israelis encountered a large en force and powerful fire raked

them from all sides. He ordered the coln to fan out, leaving the ‗Terrible Tiger‘ to overwhelm the

first line of def. The coln continued its aslt and reached the centre of town. Despite the hy fire

pouring on them, the Israelis attacked the police fortress. Dayan arr in front of the bldg in his armd

car. He ordered his main force to make for Ramleh, leaving only a squad of tps to keep the

Legionnaires pinned down inside their fortress. When he reached the centre of Ramleh, which

straddles the highway from the coast to Jerusalem, Dayan ordered an about turn and roared back

to his base camp. On the way back through the towns he again ordered his men to sweep the

streets with concentrated bursts of gunfire. As he neared the camp next to the Jewish vill of Ben

Shemen, he was met by a murderous rain of fire coming from the dirn of Lydda. The Arab tps

there had managed to recover and reorg after their initial rout. Dayan‘s Bn suffered cas but

overwhelmed the remaining def in both Lydda and Ramleh, this time aided by other Israeli units

which had set out to capture the towns. The Arab Legion disappeared in the dirn of the Jordan,

and the Arab irregular forces withdrew from the area. Dayan informed the Israeli Inf units now

attacking the outskirts of Lydda that there was nothing to stop them walking straight into the town.

Two Inf Bdes entered Lydda and mopped up the remnants of the stunned and routed Arab forces.

97. On 13 Jul, Dayan recd new instr from the High Comd. Brig Gen Yigal Yadin, Chief of Ops,

wanted the Bn reorg imdt for an urgent msn on the Southern front as part of ‗Op DEATH TO THE

INVADER‘. The obj of the op was to break the Egyptian stranglehold on the Negev. Dayan begged

for a respite for his exhausted tps but, despite the cogency of his arguments, the issue was

decided by the personal intervention of Ben Gurion as the op was urgent. Dayan returned to his

base at Tel Litvinsky. There was no time to spare. Five days had passed since the end of the truce

and a new resolution for the imposition of another truce was being considered by the UN. Several

mil victories gained during these first five days had given the Israelis encouragement and it was

imp to improve their posn before they were forced to accept the new cease fire.

24

98. The Egyptians had built fortified posn along the East-West rd leading from Beit Guerin via

Faluja to Ashelon. To break the Egyptian blockade it was essential to capture the Arab vill of

Caratia and this, therefore, was the most imp obj of ‗Op DEATH TO THE INVADER‘. The task was

given to the 89th (Cdo) Bn, which was henceforth attached to the Givati Bde operating on the

southern front. At the Tel Litvinsky HQ, Dayan inspected his tps and eqpt. Those of his vehs which

were not out of action needed a thorough overhaul. Manpower was seriously depleted; several of

the Bn‘s offrs and NCOs had been killed. Ben Gurion agreed to give six more half tracks to the Bn,

which now had twelve jeeps, eight half tracks, four tracked open armd cars, two primitive

homemade armd vehs and the ‗Terrible Tiger‘.

99. On 14 Jul the Bn set out for South. It made its camp in an orange grove near the Masmiya

crossroads, thirty miles South of Tel Aviv and less than thirteen miles North of the battle area.

Dayan was given the battle plan which provided for a ni penetration by his Bn into Caratia. He was

to capture the vill but would be given a pl of inf to help in holding it. Dayan was not in favour of a ni

attack because of the difficulty of negotiating the area with armd vehs in the dark, but ‗Op DEATH

TO THE INVADER‘ had already been set for the night of 17/18 Jul and Dayan had to fit himself

into the overall plan. The two fwg ni, recce ptls were sent out to learn the lay of the land. On the

third ni, at 2200 hrs, the 89th (Cdo) Bn went into action. It had hardly started off when the leading

armd car was put out of action by a mine but the coln kept going. Fwg the tac used at Lydda, the

vehs adv in single file ready to fan out. Led by the ‗Terrible Tiger‘ they adv to within 170 yards of

the Egyptian fortified posn, mov in silence broken only by the quiet purring of the engines. As soon

as the force was close enough to make full use of its fire power, Dayan gave the order to fire.

Every wpn was fired, sending a withering fusillade in the dirn of the Egyptian posn, several of

which were evac imdt. The Israelis were soon within rg of en arty which opened up a fierce

barrage on the en. But when the force reached the wadi (dry river bed) it was found to be the

biggest obst to its adv on the vill. Recce ptls were sent out and came back with Egyptian prisoners

and Arab villagers. Other ptls tried to find a pt at which it would be easy to cross the wadi.

100. Meanwhile, most of the men were busy shoring up its banks in prep for the xg. The men

had managed to mov most of the eqpt across the wadi. At 0400 hrs Dayan gave the sig for the

attack on the vill to begin. Scouts were sent ahead, and after them went the ‗Terrible Tiger‘. The

Inf pl which was to occupy the vill stood by to await results. By early morning, Dayan and his men

were inside Caratia. The rd to the Negev was not yet open, but capture of Caratia created crucial

breach in the Egyptian posn. Dayan‘s successes at Lydda and Caratia were no more spectacular

than those of other Cdrs, but in the opinion of the High comd, and particularly that of Ben Gurion,

Dayan had proved himself outstanding by reason of his daring, initiative, decisiveness and tenacity

in the face of all obst. Nevertheless, his cold blooded order to adv regardless of cas was

considered unacceptable in the Israeli Def Forces in those days.

101. The raid on Lydda was considered a brilliant mil victory. For the Zahal, it was an innovation

and a preview of the future. In his book, ‗Battles of the Palmach‘, Yigal Allon wrote that the 89th

‗charged with great daring into Lydda‘. Ben Gurion claimed, ‗I became acquainted with Moshe

from Lydda Ramle, which was the greatest of our conquest‘.

25

102. Despite the fact that Moshe wanted to remain in the comb unit, Ben Gurion insisted that he

was the rt person for Jerusalem, as he was determined to return the Old City of Jerusalem to Jews

and looked for an aggressive offr.

THE 89TH BN’S ATTACK ON LYDDA

26

CHAPTER – 8

A SOLDIER-STATESMAN

103. Moshe‘s appt as OC Jerusalem based Etzioni Bde was the threshold of his career in Zahal.

Had he remained a fd Cdr, Moshe‘s political faculty might not have been noticed. In Jerusalem, he

became involved in negotiating the Armistice Agreements, had contact with UN truce keeping

apparatus, and became known to the public as a soldier-statesman. His rise in status and change

of image made him to be referred to by his surname.

104. Dayan took up his new duties in Jerusalem on 01 Aug 1948 and it turned out to be the last

time Dayan was seen in a coy of entourage. From then on, he always mov alone to each new

posting. A time even came when his capacity for teamwork was doubted. Dayan brought with him

a No of men from 89th to instil fighting spirit in the Etzioni Bde as Jerusalem had experienced

many failures and disappointment and the threat of Jordanian conquest still hovered over several

suburbs.

105. A little before Dayan took over the Jerusalem sect, ceasefire was declared. Two imp places

of Jewish Jerusalem, Mt Scopus and Govt House were demilitarised. The Govt House was made

HQ of the UN Truce Supervision Org. When the Arab Legion violated the neutrality of Govt House

Hill, Dayan wanted to take the opportunity to attack at ni to gain control of the area. The GHQ

approved his proposal for an action that was to take place on 17 Aug. The op was not successful

as Dayan stuck to the political limitations of not touching the Govt House while the Arabs paid no

heed to political limitations.

106. Failure at Govt House Hill turned out to be the turning pt of Dayan‘s diplomatic political

activities. Dayan soon became a reg participant in all the top level discussions concerning the

formulation of ceasefire policies and to some extent subsequent state policies. Dayan brought to

his political activities great charm, intelligence, a rapid grasp of essentials, and a frank and open

personality that inspired confidence.

107. When it was time for Dayan to lve his post in Jerusalem, the fd Cdr within him again gained

over the diplomat. In his letter to Ben Gurion dated 22 Sep 1949, he no longer suggested

negotiating with Jordan to implement the clauses of the Armistice Agreement as he was

concerned about the possibility of the armistice lines being accepted as the est borders without

peace settlement. He now proposed the planning of a mil op to take Mt Scopus by force.

108. The War of Independence which came to an end on 20 Jul 1949 with the signing of the last

Armistice Agreement with Syria had various repercussions. Among other things, it is worth

mentioning that the two parties agreed not to emp force as means to solve the Palestine problem.

Speculations arose on antimilitarism going to take place. Zahal was degraded to a small Army

composed of conscripted soldiers who were mainly Jewish migrant from Arab-speaking countries

undereducated and ignorant of Hebrew. Even the outstanding young offrs of the War of

Independence had no intention to choose a mil career.

27

109. Dayan was quoted as confiding to his friend, Ahiya Ben-Ami, who vis him in Jerusalem in

the autumn of 1949, that he wanted to lve the Army as he (Dayan) could not envision his future

and wanted to engage in politics. Dayan also felt that he lacked mil edn necessary for a career as

a soldier.

110. Prime Minister Ben Gurion offered Dayan the appt of OC Southern Comd which the latter

was a little hesitant to accept as he felt that his mil knowledge was ltd. Ben Gurion, however,

insisted on it, promising Dayan would be given the opportunity to complete his mil edn. Dayan was

appointed OC Southern Comd on 25 Oct 1949, four days after he had been promoted to the rk of

a Maj Gen.

111. On 09 Nov 1949, Yigael Yadin took over the baton of CoS from Lt Gen Dori. Yadin‘s Maj

goal was to create a reg, well disciplined Army out of the partisan and popular Army of 1948.

Thus, Zahal had started enforcing strict stds of mil discp and etiquette, which could not go very

well with Dayan. For example, Dayan never deprived himself of plucking the fruit from the tree just

because he was OC Southern Comd. Even as the OC Southern Comd, his pleasures were small.

His sociable, straightforward, and egalitarian apch made a deep impression on his subordinates.

112. Dayan‘s greatest pleasure during his first few months at Southern Comd was to go on ptls-

cum-excursions into the desert while familiarising himself with the territory under his comd. The

soldiers of the Southern Comd remembered their Commander as frank, friendly, full of jokes and

anecdotes.

113. Yadin admitted that he was drawn to Dayan by his (Dayan‘s) charm and sense of humour.

The relationship between the two, despite the above, became severely strained. Yadin felt that

Dayan was immature, and he had little patience for his constant insubordination. His main flaw, as

per Yadin, was his disregard for staff wk.

114. Dayan was sent to British Army‘s Sr Offrs‘ School in Devizes, England, by the end of 1951.

Though sceptical about the ex-British Army offrs serving in Zahal, Dayan found the course at

Devizes valuable. His craving for Mil instrs had grown and he requested permission from Yadin to

take addl courses, even at a lower level, which the latter denied. Yadin had noted that Dayan was

among those men who were self-taught. After his return from England, Dayan was appointed OC

Northern Comd, which, later on, was regarded as the starting pt of Dayan‘s leadership in Zahal.

His leadership in comb began to crystallise in Northern Comd.

115. After the resignation of Lt Gen Yadin in 1952, Mordechai Maklef became CoS and Dayan

was appointed Chief of G Br, in GHQ and would be acting CoS in Maklef‘s absence. The

relationship between Maklef and Dayan may best be described as a classic example of a lack of

comn. Maklef even demanded that Dayan be removed from his post, which Ben Gurion did not

consider. On the contrary, Gurion wanted Dayan as CoS.

116. Consequently, on 06 Dec 1952, a day before Ben Gurion tendered his resignation to the

President, Maklef carried out one of the conditions he had stipulated upon taking office and

handed in his resignation. Thus, on the 06 Dec 1952, before leaving from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem to

hand in his resignation, Ben Gurion appointed Dayan as CoS, eff from 1600 hr.

28

CHAPTER -9

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN (OCT – NOV 1956)

117. The yr 1953-56 provided many incidents that incensed both Ben Gurion and Dayan. These

were the result of three principal devp in the area, namely acts of terror and sabotage perpetrated

by Arabs against Israeli settlements and citizens, the Egyptian blockage of Israeli shipping in the

Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran and Egyptian prep for an all – out war against Israel. Israel‘s

reactions devp accordingly from retaliatory actions to a pre-emptive war in Oct 1956. As far back

as 1951, Arab terror was the main cause of unrest along the borders. In that year Arab infiltrators

carried out 1,665 acts of plunder, sabotage, and armed attack on civ. In 1952 the No of incidents

rose to 1,751. The terror, at first carried out by indls, was encouraged by the Arab Govt‘s refusal to

implement the Armistice Agreements (that is, to replace them with peace settlements) and by

incessant declarations of their intention to attack and destroy Israel.

118. At first Israel displayed forbearance and appealed to the Arab Govt to abide by the

Armistice Agreements. When these measures had no effect, the first retaliatory actions were

carried out, on the principle of ‗an eye for an eye‘. If Arab citizens took the law into their own hands

and crossed the border to kill and destroy, Israeli citizens would do likewise. Small det of two or

three soldiers would cross the border at ni, carry out an attack and return.

119. Israeli Govt appealed to the Egyptian Govt to take preventive steps to avoid a mil

confrontation. The Govt held the view that the terror and the retaliation should not be allowed to go

beyond what could be interpreted as a dispute between civ. It was only after the Kibya action that

the Israeli Govt began ascribing the execution of retaliatory actions directly to Zahal.

120. Dayan‘s attitude toward reprisal passed through two stgs. Until the Egyptian blockade of the

Straits of Tiran in Sep 1955, he believed that even if hard hitting attacks on mil obj would not

completely end the infilt, murder, and plunder, they would at least drastically reduce them. In an

address to Zahal offrs published in Sep 1955, he stated, ―We cannot safeguard every water pipe

and every tree, we cannot prevent the murder of workers in orchards or families asleep in their

beds, but we can put a high price on our blood. Too hy a price for an Arab settlement, an Arab

Army, or an Arab Govt to pay. The Arab Army will be able to fight infilt and explain its actions to

the people only if it knows that stealing a cow from the city of Kalkilya and the murder of a Jew on

a moshav endangered the population of Gaza‖.

121. The month of Sep 1955 saw the blockading of the Straits of Tiran and the signing of the

Egyptian – Czech arms deal. All shipping from the Red Sea Eilat was halted, and flts to South

Africa, which traversed Egyptian air space, were suspended. The arms deal simultaneously

accelerated the build up of Soviet wpns in the Egyptian Army. Furthermore, in Apr 1955, Egyptian

GHQ concluding that terror and sabotage provided an eff way of waging war against Israel, est a

spl unit called Fedayeen or ‗ self sacrificers‘, who carried out raids against Israel from Egyptian,

Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian territory. In Sep Egyptian HQ stepped up fedayeen activities,

29

and Dayan expressed the opinion then that ‗now more than ever before, Israel must confront the

Arabs with an ultimatum to preserve the peace or slide into war.‘ Dayan feared that if Israel did not

strike first, she would be attacked by Egypt, and have less of a chance of victory, and suffer

greater damage. His fears were well founded. On 29 Sep, word leaked out that ships bearing hy

wpns (tks, cannons, and planes) as well as Soviet submarines, were entering Egyptian harbours,

and Radio Cairo declared, ‗The day of Israel‘s defeat is at hand. There will be no peace on the

borders, for we demand revenge, and revenge means death to Israel. As soon as the Egyptians

closed the Straits of Tiran, Dayan suggested to Ben Gurion that Zahal reopen them by force, Ben

Gurion (still Minister of def in Sharett‘s Cabinet) did not however, consent.

122. The mil sit in 1956 deteriorated steadily. Egyptian spokesmen declared with incr freq their

country‘s intention and ability to destroy Israel. The details of the Czech arms deal began to leak

out to the public.The intensification of the Fedayeen raids was regarded as only part of the prep

for an all out Egyptian attack. To complete the picture, Egypt set up jt mil comd, first in Sep 1956

with Syria and then in Oct with Jordan. On 24 Oct, a tripartite mil agreement was signed between

Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, tightening the noose around Israel.

123. Dayan was confident in the ability of the Israeli Def Forces to deal a knockout blow to the Egyptian Army in Sinai and to break the blockade of Eilat. While Dayan busied himself with his plans and got his forces into fighting shape, Shimon Peres was strengthening his ties with French statesmen, mil ldrs and arms manufactures. The French, who were then fighting in Algeria, considered Nasser the driving force behind the revolt of the FLN. French Army wished to see Nasser‘s influence diminish. Israeli thus became a virtual ally of the French in their plans to counter Nasser‘s intervention in Algeria and his seizure of the Suez Canal. 124. In place of sup from surplus mil stock, Israel began to receive the latest eqpt produced by the French manufacturers. This was made possible by the recommendation of the French High Comd and deliveries were often made from the latter‘s own stocks. Dayan was still waiting for the order from Ben Gurion to use mil force to open the sea way to Eilat when on 26 Jul 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was a serious blow to Britain, France and the other maritime nations which were the Maj shareholders in the Canal. They greatly feared that Nasser‘s mov would mean an end to freedom of passage through this international waterway. 125. Secret discussions were held in Paris and Israel. The talks were soon joined by the two Foreign Ministers, Pineau and Mrs Golda Meir, who had by now taken Sharett‘s place in the Israeli Govt. By the end of the summer, General Dayan came into the picture after several of his staff offrs had already held discussions with their colleagues of the French High Comd. While talks were proceeding in Paris regarding the arms sup, Israel learnt of the Anglo-French plan to occupy the Canal Zone. A telegram from Israeli mil rep in Paris reported that the Anglo-French ‗Op MUSKETEER‘ was due to be launched in a matter of weeks and would be commanded by the British Gen Sir Charles Keightly and the French Admiral Barjot. Dayan realized that his opportunity had come and placed the Def Forces on the alert. 126. In the days fwg, Dayan vis AF and armd units and gave orders to speed up the trg of the crews to man the new tks Israel was receiving and to prep the new French planes for action. The Gen Staff was instructed to examine a No of Op plans, rg from full conquest of the Sinai Peninsula to occupation of the Straits of Tiran or the Gaza Strip only. Dayan then accompanied Shimon Peres to Paris, travelling via Tunis, in order to complete negotiations regarding the supplies of

30 French arms. The two men met with the top brass of the French Army, headed by the French Chief of Staff, Gen Ely in secrecy. The French offrs had come back from holding talks with their British colleagues in prep of Op ‗MUSKETEER‘. They were unhappy when they returned from London as indecision and doubt had characterised the talks on the British side. The French drew courage from Dayan‘s self-confidence, yet he frightened them with his daring apch and his conviction as to his Army‘s chances of defeating the Egyptians. Dayan presented the list of eqpt he needed. This including tks, tk-carriers, armd vehs, ac and other items. When Gen Ely heard what the composn of the Israeli units was, and the enormous task they were taking upon themselves, his eyebrows shot up and a look of sheer astonishment came into his eyes. Dayan and Peres left the mtg with a written assurance that they would have the eqpt needed with which to begin the campaign. 127. The fwg evening Dayan called a mtg of the Gen Staff at his office in Tel Aviv, at which he gave orders to begin mob for war against Egypt. He explained that, as a result of the Anglo-French decision to attack the Suez Canal Zone, Israel now had a good opportunity to capture Sinai and break the Egyptian blockade of Eilat. Due to the tension which built up on the Jordan border, Israeli tp mov were interpreted by foreign int services as preliminaries to an attack on Jordan. The str of the Israeli Army and Air Force was almost doubled during the final days preceding the Sinai campaign. While the Israelis were ready to act, the British and French went on squabbling amongst themselves over ‗Op MUSKETEER‘. The British wanted to have nothing to do with any possible link up with the Israelis. It was the French who wanted it on the assumption that an Israeli op would bring about the downfall of Nasser. Dayan stood fast in his belief that the Israeli forces could manage very well by themselves. 128. On 29 Oct, the Sinai campaign was launched and the first wave of Israeli paratroops had already captured their obj in the Sinai desert. This first Para drop took place at the Eastern entrance of Mitla Pass, in the mtns between Eastern Sinai and the Suez Canal. So preoccupied at that time were Middle East watchers with the tense sit on the Israel-Jordan border that the Egyptian High Comd at first judged the Mitla attack to be a mere reprisal raid. Only when armoured colns and inf thrust into Sinai did the Egyptians and the rest of the world wake up to what was really going on. The timing of the Israeli attack was based on the assumption that the Anglo-French Op MUSKETEER, aimed at seizing the Canal Zone, would begin two days later, that is on 31 Oct. The coord of the Sinai invasion with the Anglo-French plan appeared in Dayan‘s tac of creating an Israeli threat to the Canal. In his own original plan the emphasis had been on Capturing Sharm-el-Sheikh and opening the straits of Tiran. He did not disclose the full truth about the combined Anglo-French-Israeli Op even to his colleagues on the Gen Staff but contented himself with dropping a few hints. 129. Dayan had set a time-limit of seven to ten days for the completion of the Sinai campaign. This was based on his assessment of his forces, capability of dealing with the Egyptians and if necessary any other Arab Army which might join the battle against Israel. On the Anglo-French side, however, things did not go quite as had been hoped. 130. On 30 Oct, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to stop fighting and withdraw to a dist of ten miles from the Canal on either side. Israel, naturally, agreed to the ultimatum but Nasser rejected it. In the UN Security Council, an American resolution calling for cease fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai was vetoed by Britain and France. The next day British and French planes began attacking Egyptian air bases. A further cease fire resolution, adopted by an emergency mtg of the Gen Assy, was defied by the two powers, but it was only on 05 Nov that ‗Op MUSKETEER‘ began in earnest with the dropping of the first British

31

and French Paratroops at Port Said. By now, all fighting between Egyptians and Israelis had stopped. On 06 Nov, Anglo-French sea-borne forces took Port Said, but the action had been delayed too long, the game was already up. Under enormous political and economic pressure, particularly from the United States, Eden threw in the towel. The French were clearly disgusted at this dismal failure, which contrasted so strikingly with the brilliant victory achieved by Dayan. 131. On the sec day of the campaign, Dayan left Brig-Gen Meir Amit, Dy Chief of staff, in charge at HQ and took over personal comd of the ops in the fd. Arriving at one of the first obj which had been taken, Kuseima, midway along the Sinai border, Dayan was furious to discover that the offr commanding the area had sent an armd Bde into action earlier than the plan called for. Fearing a too early involvement of his armd with the Egyptians, Dayan raced after the Bde. He found it had fanned out across the sand dunes some twenty five miles inside Sinai, when it should have been some twenty five miles inside Israel. From the pt of view of mil discp, he should have ordered the Bde to withdraw, but comb circumstances dictated otherwise and he allowed the tks to make contact with the en. 132. Dayan did not miss being in a single critical area throughout that campaign. He arr at EI Arish in the midst of fierce fighting and followed the armd coln as it stormed into the town. Fwg the advancing Israeli tps, crashing their way through the Egyptian lines, Dayan reached Ali Muntar, a fortified ht overlooking the Eastern apchs to the town of Gaza. He carefully examined the str and layout of the fortifications which had just been captured. The battle did not end with the fall of Gaza and the capture of Northern Sinai. The main obj, the occupation of Sharm-el-Sheikh, had still to be accomplished. Dayan had to fight against time, for the hr was rapidly approaching when a vote would be taken at the UN asking for an imdt cease fire. Dayan had to complete the capture of the Tiran Straits before the UN resolution, which was tantamount to an order, came into eff. 133. The 9th Inf Bde, a unit composed entirely of mob res under the comd of Brig Gen Avraham Yaffe, left Eilat for the 250 mile journey through the mtnous desert to Sharm-el-Sheikh. On the way they fought minor skirmishes against Egyptian forces stationed along the precipitous route, but their main opponent was the trn itself, which at times was nearly impassable. Dayan was worried and impatient at the slow rate of prog, and flew to Tor, a small oil-town on the west coast of the Sinai Peninsula opp the Suez Canal. Israeli paratroopers who had landed at Tor were to mov from the town in a SE dirn towards Sharm-el-Sheikh, a dist of approx sixty miles, in order to link up with the 9th Bde. Dayan‘s plane landed at Tor in the early morning only to find that the paratroops had already mov out on their way to Sharm-el-Sheikh. Never one to be left without something to do, he collected several civ vehs abandoned by the Egyptians at Tor, collected a few soldiers escort and set off in hot pursuit of the advancing paratroops. The area through which he travelled was teeming with thousands of Egyptian tps withdrawing northward towards Suez. Dayan‘s small cvy passed the frightened Egyptian soldiers, all fully armed, and not one of them attempted to level his gun at the vehs speeding by. Dayan, who was sitting next to the dvr in a small truck, decided to climb on to the open rear of the veh in order to have a better view of the surroundings. In full view of the en, and at the mercy of the scorching, mid-day desert sun, Dayan stood up in the truck but ordered his men not to open fire on the Egyptian stragglers so as not to provoke them into a skirmish. 134. That afternoon, on 05 Nov Dayan followed the paratroops into Sharm-el-Sheikh. The places were already in the hands of the combined forces that had adv upon it from the NE and NW. The Israeli flag was flying from the Egyptian gun emplacement which had prevented Israeli shipping passing through the Straits of Tiran.

32

135. The political battle at the UN, American pressure, Soviet threats of mil action and the failure of ‗Op MUSKETEER‘ all made it obvious that Israel would not be able to hold on to the territory she had occupied. When the Israeli Govt decided to withdraw from Sinai, Dayan handed his resignations as Chief of Staff, but Ben-Gurion refused it. Dayan withdrew his resignation and represented it again only nine months later. 136. The seven day campaign of 1956, and the subsequent dply of UN force along the Egyptian frontier rid Israel of the fedayeen raids and opened the route through Eilat to Africa and Asia. Israel was thus enabled to devp trade and other relations with No of emerging nations. This at least was a partial substitute for the lack of such relations with her next-door neighbours. 137. Israel‘s statesmen believed that the UN Emergency Force would act as an eff buffer between Israel and Egypt and would prevent a recurrence of the acts of murder and sabotage inside Israeli territory. Dayan did not share their optimism. As early as Aug 1957, he warned against complacency in this respect. The UN Emergency Force, he said, would fulfil its func along the borders only as long as Egypt wished to remain passive. He pointed out that the presence of the force depended on the will of Cairo and warned against having any illusions on the subject. He did not content himself merely with issuing warnings but put the Army through its paces with a thorough trg pgme and stepped up its arms procurement and preparedness. He placed particular emphasis upon strengthening the AF. By virtue of the contacts he made with French during plg the Sinai campaign, Dayan saw the chance of strengthening the country‘s def potential and was in favour of the initiative taken by Shimon Peres to extend Franco-Israeli co-op to scientific and tech research. This was also to include nuclear research for peaceful purposes. 138. When Dayan returned to Israel at the end of the yr, he asked to be relieved of his post. Ben Gurion wanted him to remain a little longer, and Dayan agreed to continue serving in the Army but not as Chief of Staff. In Jan 1958 he relinquished his post to Maj Gen Chaim Laskov and took leave to study at the Tel Aviv School of Law Economics. From Tel Aviv he went to Jerusalem to attend the Hebrew University, where his daughter, Yael, was also studying. While still in uniform, Dayan began expressing his opinions on national affairs. This aroused protests from professional politicians of all parties. Ben-Gurion ordered him to stop his public appearances, and Dayan decided the time had come to bid adieu his uniform. On 01 Nov 1958, he resigned from the Army.

33

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN

34

CHAPTER –10

THE SIX-DAY WAR (05-10 JUN 1967)

139. At the age of fifty, Moshe Dayan found himself off course for the sec time in his life. His

party was being pushed further and further off the rd to power, and he hardly got involved in the

party affairs. His appearances at top-level Rafi mtg were equally rare and brief. A big question

arose as to whether he could lead his party to power and even if he could, would he then be an

able Prime Minister.

140. The main obst to Dayan becoming a party leader was his inherent inability, or

unwillingness, to wk as part of the team. He was assumed to be a man unto himself. He was

called ‗lone wolf‘ by his colleagues in the Rafi. At the same time, Dayan continued to display

natural leadership and aroused in many the desire to wk with him. His charisma alone was enough

to capture the minds of people. With his inherent realism, clear sightedness, and ability to analyse

devp correctly, Dayan was his own chief asset. His character was no less imp than his views, and

his personality no less relevant than his ideas. Always controversial, Dayan‘s personality was

equally a source of envy and admiration.

141. In the spring of 1967, the storm clouds gathered once again over Israel. In Apr, a long

series of Syrian attacks culminated in an air battle in which Israeli jets shot down six Syrian MiG

fighters. The fwg month Egypt began concentrating tps and armd forces in Sinai. Within a matter

of days Israel was faced with the most serious crisis. On May 23rd Nasser announced the closing

of the Straits of Tiran and his readiness for war with Israel. The Israeli Govt suddenly woke up to

the gravity of the sit, mob the res and sent Abbr Eban, Foreign Minister, on an intensive, though

unavailing, round of talks in Western capitals. The Eshkol cabinet‘s failure to take firmer measures

against the Egyptian menace was interpreted by the public as a sign of weakness and resolution.

The Israelis felt that Nasser had carefully studied their leader‘s shortcomings in timing his action.

142. Dayan was surprised by the devp. He believed that war with Egypt was still a long way off,

he however, was quick to mod his posn. While Eshkol‘s Govt was still explaining the flow of

Egyptian tps and arms into Sinai as mere display, he recognized the inevitability or war. He asked

Eshkol for permission to vis Zahal units in the south, ‗to see things at first hand‘. In a uniform

bearing the rk of Lt Gen, he toured Army units stationed along Israel‘s southern borders. He

wanted to learn about Zahal as Ten years had passed since he left the Army and during this time,

many innovations and improvements had been intro. His reading of the sit led him to advocate

imdt mil measures before the Egyptian Army managed to complete its dply in Sinai.

143. Meanwhile, large advertisements began to appear throughout the politically indep press

calling for the imdt fmn of a National Govt. Most of these advertisements urged that the War

cabinet should incl the ‗1956 Sinai campaign Team‘ meaning Ben Gurion and Dayan. A Majority of

leading personalities took a similar line. Almost all of them emphasized that Dayan must be given

responsibility of def. At the same time, women whose husbands had already spent a fortnight in

the Army demonstrated spontaneously in the streets of the main towns and asked passers-by to

35

sign a petition addsd to president Shazar in favour of the est of an Emergency Cabinet. They

demanded the return of Ben-Gurion to the Govt, the inclusion of Professor Yigal Yadin, and in

particular, the appt of Moshe Dayan as Def Minister.Irgun Menagham Begi called upon Ben

Gurion at his home in Tel Aviv and asked him to return to the leadership of the Govt. From there

he proceeded to the Prime Minister‘s Office in Tel Aviv and asked Eshkol to step down and hand

over the reins to another opposition ldr, Yosef Saphir. The mov to broaden the cabinet was given

an imp boost with the inclusion of Moshe Chaim Shapira, Minister of the Interior and ldr of the

National Religious Party. While the haggling between the parties dragged on, Nasser was piling

up political gains. King Hussein, his bitter en, flew to Cairo and signed a mil pact which placed the

Jordanian Army under the dir comd of an Egyptian Gen. The stronger Nasser grew the greater

became the public clamour in Israel for incisive action. Israelis could no longer contain their

disgust at the antics of their politicians at so grave a time. The demand for Dayan‘s appt as Def

Minister had by now devp spontaneously into a national mov.

144. Eshkol and his friends, in particular Golda Meir, who was now secy of Mapai, remained utterly opposed to handing over the resp for def of Israel to Dayan. Eshkol proposed instead, that Yigal Allon Minister of Labour, should take over def. The opposition ldrs however rejected this compromise out of hand. The issue was finally decided at a mtg of the Mapai Secretariat on the Morning of 01 Jun. Out of 25 members present, 19 voted for Dayan. Mohse Dayan was appointed Minister of Def in Eshkol‘s Cabinet. When news of his appt reached the units, there were spontaneous outbreaks of exuberant and even hysterical celebration. Everyone was now certain that Dayan would take decisive, correct, and wise steps that would lead Zahal to victory. 145. On 04 Jun 1967, in a cabinet mtg which was devoted entirely to reports given by CoS Rabin the Chief of Int br, Maj Gen Aron Yariv and the Cdr of the AF, Maj Gen Mordechai Hod. It was decided to declare war on the fwg morning on Mon, Jun 5. 146. A new facet of Dayan came to lt before the outbreak of the war. This time he feared greater international pressure should Zahal dig in on the Eastern bank of the Canal, and he wished to obviate this possibility before the outbreak of hostilities. He had other, equally imp, reasons for his choice of limit. Dayan believed that the Egyptians would not admit their defeat and would continue fighting. He thought that the war would never end and explained that the Suez Canal was vital to Nasser‘s prestige, economy, and power, not to mention the fact that it was an imp factor in the Soviet build up of naval forces in the Mediterranean and their contacts with Yemen and Vietnam. Dayan therefore told his colleagues in the Cabinet ‗anyone with an ounce of sense should keep away from the Canal. If we reach the Canal, Nasser will never agree to cease fire and the war will go on for yrs‘. 147. The war that began in Jun turned out quite differently from all the forecasts. It lasted only four days, not two or three weeks as Dayan had estimated. The outcome was decided in the first half of the first day, when the greater part of the Egyptian AF was destroyed by the Israeli AF in three hr and Maj Gen Tal‘s Armd Div penetrated the fortified def network of Rafah- E1 – Arish. Zahal‘s adv was so swift that on the third day GHQ was under the mistaken impression that the northern Army of Tal‘s Div had reached the Suez Canal opp the city of Kantara. Dayan issued an order that the unit be mov back to the stopping line near Romani.

36 148. It was only on Wed, 07 Jun, that Dayan authorised an adv all the way to the Canal, apparently because the fwd momentum of the Army was difficult to stop. This new caution also led Dayan to postpone by one day the attack on the Gaza Strip. And even when it transpired on the morning of the 5th that Zahal had complete superiority in Sinai, he maint his moderate stance and forbade Central Comd to mov from the def to an offn, despite the fact that Jordan had already opened fire in the Jerusalem area. Dayan ordered GHQ to send the Harel Armd Bde as a res force for the battle along the mtn ridges leading to Jerusalem. This turned out to be one of his most imp decisions in the Six day war. Only after it was clear that the battle in Sinai was virtually over (on Tue, 6 Jun) did Dayan order Central Comd to mt its offn. 149. Dayan was under very hy pressure as most of the Cabinet ministers favoured an imdt attack on the Golan Hts, and now representatives of the Galilee settlements added their voices, even hinting that should the Syrians continued harassing them from the posn on the Golan Hts, they would be forced to abandon their settlements. Dayan, however, did not bow to the pressure and told the settlers that he would not budge from his stated policy, even if some settlements along the Syrian border would have to be mov. Dayan had several reasons for refraining from attacking the Golan Hts. First, he wanted to avoid involving Zahal on a third front. After the defeat of Egypt and Jordan, he claimed, the Soviet Union would not sit idle while the Syrian regime, so dear to its heart, was attacked. He feared that Israel, exhilarated by its successes, might go too far. 150. Another imp consideration was that assaulting the Golan Hts, which loomed over Israel like a rock fortress, would cost man lives. Dayan claimed that the AF, by now worn out would not be able to give the land forces the full close sp they would need to keep their losses down. The ministers left the mtg on Thu ni with the understanding that another mtg would be called should there be any change in the sit or in the posn of the Minister of Def. 151. Within a few hr the sit changed radically. At 0300 hr on 09 Jun, Dayan was info that the Egyptians were prep to ask the Security Council for a cease fire and that they had advised Jordan and Syria to follow suit. This mov ran completely counter to his predictions and he had to rethink his posn. Egyptian agreement to a cease fire meant the Southern front would be quiet and Zahal would be able to tfr tps to other fronts. The prospect of simultaneous involvement on three fronts would therefore disappear. The Egyptian mov thus allayed Dayan‘s earlier fears of Soviet intervention and the inability of the IAF to give adequate sp. He thus decided to attack. Dayan called OC Northern Comd, Maj Gen David Eleazar, at 0700 hr and ordered him to launch Northern Comd‘s attack on Syria and to destroy the fortified emplacements on Golan Hts. On the morning of Fri, 09 Jun, Israeli forces stormed the Golan Hts, from which for so long the Syrian Army had harassed the Israeli settlements. The original plans had envisaged penetrating only five miles into Syrian territory. Acting on his instr, Israeli forces drove the Syrians beyond the line from Kuneitra to Butniye, making sure that all Israel‘s territory would be safe from Syrian long rg Arty. 152. The emotional climax of the Six-Day War was undoubtedly the capture by Israeli paratroops of the Wailing Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem. While the tps were standing there, their guns leaning against the wall, their needs pressed against the age-old stones, Dayan appeared on the scene together with the Chief of Staff and Cdrs of the central front, all wearing steel helmets. While bullets still whined along the narrow streets of the Old City, Dayan became the first national ldr to declare from the Wailing Wall, ‗We have returned to the holiest of our holy places, never again to part from it‘.

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ISRAEL BEFORE SIX DAY WAR

38

ISRAEL AFTER SIX DAY WAR

39

CHAPTER –11

MINISTER OF DEF (1967 AND AFTER)

153. Imdt after the war, Moshe Dayan was criticised for the restraining influence he ex and for his fear of the Soviet Union. As time went by, it was realised that he had foreseen more clearly than others the outcome of the war and the devp that would follow. His fear of Soviet intervention proved accurate, for the Six-Day War was not to be the last war, as most Israelis had hoped, it was only the beginning. During the ‗War of Attrition‘ that followed, Soviet intervention was so high that Dayan called it the ‗Sovietisation of the Egyptians‘ war against Israel. On several occasions, he termed Zahal‘s occupation of East Bank of the Suez Canal ‗keeping a foot on Egypt‘s neck‘ and believed it to be a sit Egypt would find untenable. 154. The events fwg the war made Dayan, as Minister of Def, the Cabinet Minister in charge of the ‗Occupied Territories‘. He became the Supreme Mil Governor, a task at which he excelled. Arabs, who for years had been taught to hate Israel accepted his terms for coop without losing face or being subjected to any form of oppression. His task was unique in its complexity and seemingly impossible, for he was charged with establishing a mil Govt not in a country whose Army had been defeated and whose people had surrendered, but in a territory whose inhabitants – the Palestinians – were part of a greater Arab nation which outnumbered Israel by many millions and still possessed large armies. Furthermore, in a summit mtg held at Khartoum in Aug 1967, the Arab ldrs declared their firm resolve to continue the war against Israel. Maint mil rule over a million and a half Arabs while virtually 80 million of their brethren continued the war and trt org for the liberation of Palestine incited them to rise against Israeli rule was like trying to hold on to and cont the thrashing tail of an agitated whale. 155. As mil Governor, from the very outset, Dayan‘s aim was to est good neighbourly relations between Israel and the Arabs of the ‗Administered Territories‘, whom he considered potential allies. To do so he strove for a liberal mil rule that was strict only on matters of security. His basic idea was that the mil Govt should interfere as little as possible in the daily affairs of the populace or, as he put it in English, ‗would not boss them‘. He strived to let them manage their own affairs and allowed them a great measure of freedom in contacting with their relatives and friends on the other side of the cease fire lines. These were the cornerstones of his apch to mil governance even before the initiation of his ‗Open Brs Policy‘. 156. Dayan first order was normalisation. In other words, doing everything possible to return life to normal throughout the administered territories. The Army took the order at face value and understood it to mean renewing public services and the supply of foodstuffs without altering the mil sit that had emerged in the Administered Territories. Thus, the first orders were the conventional post war precautions strict curfews, restn on travel, and roadblocks. In the West bank, for eg, the Army Spokesman announced on 08 Jun that a 50 meter wide strip of land along the former armistice line was closed, and anyone found crossing it would be doing so at the risk of his life. Later, the same order was applied to all the Administered Territories. In addition, each mil governor set up his own sys of curfews, roadblocks, and controls as he saw fit. This was caused partly by the fact that the mil Govt was still in the process of setting up, and it was feared that allowing Arabs from the Administered Territories free entry in Israel after their prolonged exposure to violent anti Israel propaganda would result in riots and outbreaks of violence.

40 157. Moshe soon felt the need to relax the restn, thus his first mov in the dirn of removing roadblocks was in Jerusalem, when he demanded Maj Gen Narkiss to open the gates of the Old city. He had always believed that once the physical barriers fell, the two nations would meet, feel each other out, struggle, and ultimately find a way to peaceful coexistence. In this rapid series Dayan also decided to restore the cont of the Waqf (the High Moslem Council) over the Temple Mt and its two mosques the Dome of the Rock and Aksa thereby removing the possibility of religious overtones in any future clashes and cutting the grnd from under any possible call for a holy war. Only two weeks after the war, he decided to allow all the Arabs in Israel and the Administered Territories to pray in the two mosques on the temple Mt. This was to be the first time the Arabs of Israel would be allowed to pray in one of the holiest places of the Moslem religion. 158. Characteristically, Dayan carried out all these steps independently, bypassing reg channels. On a vis to the cities of the West Bank on Jun 17 and 20, he told Bde and Bn Cdrs to remove the roadblocks they had set up, return vehs they had confiscated, allow farmers out to their fd, and restrict the curfew to the hr of darkness. Likewise, he ordered that the refugees from Kalkila be allowed to return home and instructed that the city be rebuilt. When he revisited on 28 Jun, he was received by the inhabitants with enthusiastic cries of Ya‘ish Dayan (Long Live Dayan). 159. Comn between the West Bank and Jordanian territories had begun spontaneously in terms of marketing of West Bank agricultural produce across the Jordan and bldg brs and new apch rds to replace those destroyed during the war. Restoring the brs over the Jordan came to be known as the ‗Open Brs Policy‘. In some ways this move seemed to be a practical step toward his vision for the future. Dayan also tried to op as though a peace settlement did in fact exist and tfr most of the adm resp to the municipal authorities. This policy gave birth to the idea of creating two indp adm dist in the West Bank, one cantered around Nablus and the other around Hebron. 160. Dayan also initiated a five Year Agricultural Plan drawn up for the West bank, dovetailed with a corresponding Israeli plan, thus reducing the West bank‘s dependence on markets East of the Jordan. The citrus groves of the Gaza Strip were incorporated into the Israeli Citrus Marketing Bds, and local packing houses were built with Israeli capital. He called for an integration of the labour forces and increased Israeli investment in the Administered Territories, labelling this phase of his policy as ‗Economic Integration‘. 161. In 1967 Dayan opposed Israeli-Arab partnership proposed by Pinhas Sapir, the Minister of Finance and demanded that the Arabs manage their own affairs and provide the public services they were accustomed to, even if these were on a much lower level than those provided in Israel. He maint that Israel was obliged to devp the public services in the administered territories to raise the std of living as much as possible and demanded that the Govt double the amount spent on services in the administered territories. 162. While Dayan was considered liberal in economic, social, and cultural matters, he was equally as intransigent in matters of security. Attacks perpetrated against Israel and her inhabitants by the trt org brought swift and harsh Israeli reactions. Dayan authorized the exile of provocateurs and adm detention for anyone suspected of trt activity. He did not shrink from demolishing the houses of those accused of trt activities in Israel, even if they were officially the property of innocent relatives. He announced the rules of his game to the inhabitants of the territories on several occasions.

41

163. The clarity of his rules and his unwillingness to back down one inch on the civ, cultural, and economic liberties he demanded for the Territories or on the swift punishment he meted out for hostile activities helped Dayan realize his policy successfully, as seen by the fact that the Arabs of the Administered Territories opted for normal civilian life. 164. Dayan‘s posn as Minister of Def gained him a spl status. On several occasions, both in Eshkol‘s Cabinet and Golda Meir‘s, he alone held the fate of the Govt in his hands. His opinion was so highly regarded that at times he carried the Cabinet even though he was in the minority. Dayan had become a sort of Minister of Survival. His self confidence and belief in the future and his spiritual str to withstand the difficult, complex struggle had to serve an entire country. The task that circumstances had forced upon him was not at all the one he had prep himself for. He had neither the prophetic vision with which Ben Gurion had sustained the nation in the forties, nor the religious faith upon which the Jews of the Diaspora had drawn throughout the centuries of exile. In fact, his personality was restricted by his efforts not to overreach his own narrow area of pers resp. 165. What Dayan had feared as fallout of the Six Day war did come true when, on 06 Oct 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat launched a surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur. Israel was caught totally unprepared for the sit and had to suffer its consequences. Although Israel prevailed over Egypt and Syria in the end of the war, her cas were immense. On 22 Oct, a cease fire was declared through UN initiative but the tribulations of the Yom Kippur war ignited Israeli mass public unrest. Def Minister Dayan was blamed for the nation‘s lack of prep and demanded his resignation. Dayan resigned from office on 3 Jun 1974. 166. In 1977, Dayan was re-elected to the Knesset and was offered the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs by the newly elected Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin although Dayan belonged to the opposition Labor Party of the Alignment. He accepted the appt because he believed that he could significantly influence Israel‘s mov towards achieving a peaceful arng with her neighbouring Arab States. As Foreign Minister in the Begin‘s Govt, Dayan was instrumental in drawing up the Camp David Accords a peace agreement with Egypt. In 1977, Dayan began negotiating with the Egyptians as lead negotiator with the premise of receiving an Arab acceptance of Israeli rule over Judea, Samaria and Gaza in exch for a return of Sinai to Egypt. In 1979, disagreement devp between Dayan and Begin over whether the Palestinian territories were an integral part of Israeli matter. Begin, who did not like the idea of incl Palestine in the peace accord, did not put Dayan in charge of the negotiating team. As displeasure, Dayan resigned from his post in Oct. In 1981, Dayan formed the Telem party, which advocated unilateral disengagement from the territories occupied in 1967. The party recd only two mandates in the subsequent elections. 167. In 1971, his first wife Ruth divorced him after 36 yr of marriage due to his numerous extra marital affairs. And after two yr in 1973, Dayan married Rachel Korem, whom he met during his vis to the US. On 14 May 1979, Dayan was diagnosed with colon cancer. He died on 16 Oct 1981, in Tel Aviv and was buried in Nahalal, the Moshav where he was raised.

42

MAJ EVENTS IN MOSHE DAYAN’S LIFE

S. no Date Event

1. 04 May 1915 Born in Kibbutz, Degania

2. 1922 Mov to Nahalal

3. 1929 Joined Haganah

4. 12 Jul 1935 Marries Ruth Shwarz

5. 05 Nov 1939 Arrested and later sentenced to five yr imprisonment in the Acre Fortress

6. 16 Feb, 1941 Rel from the Acre Fortress

7. 07Jun 1941 Lost his left eye during action in Syria

8. 18 May 1948 Appointed Cdr of the Jordan Valley sect and returned to active mil service

9. 25 May 1948 Comd of the 89th Bn in the rk of Maj

10. 01 Aug 1948 Cdr of the Jerusalem Bde in the rk of Lt Col

11. 21 Nov 1949 Promoted to the rk of Maj Gen

12. 25 Nov 1949 Appointed OC Southern Comd

13. 26 May 1952 Appointed OC Northern Comd

14. 07 Dec 1952 Appointed Chief of G Br in the Gen Staff

15. 06 Dec 1953 Appointed Chief-of-Staff

16. 16 Dec 1959 Appointed Minister of Agriculture

17. 04 Nov 1964 Resigned as Minister of Agriculture

18. 02 Jun 1967 Appointed as Minister of Def

20. 28 Dec 1971 Divorced Ruth Dayan

21. 16 Oct 1981 Died in Tel Aviv and buried at Nahal