COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Once in a Blue Moon:Airmen in Theater Command

Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, andTheir Relevance to the Twenty-First

Century Air Force

HOWARD D. BELOTE

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 7

Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

July 2000

AIR UNI V ERSITY

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Belote, Howard D., 1963–Once in a blue moon : airmen in theater command : Lauris Norstad, Albrecht

Kesselring, and their relevance to the twenty-first century Air Force/Howard D. Belote.p. cm. -- (CADRE paper ; no. 7)

Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 1-58566-082-51. United States. Air Force--Officers.2. Generals--United States.3.Unified operations

(Military science) 4. Combined operations (Military science) 5. Command of troops. I.Title. II. CADRE paper ; 7.

UG793 .B45 2000358.4'133'0973--dc21 00-055881

This CADRE Paper, and others in the series, is availableelectronically at the Air University Research web sitehttp://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers”then “Special Collections.”

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those ofthe author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States AirForce, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for publicrelease: distribution unlimited.

ii

CADRE Papers

CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored bythe Airpower Research Institute of Air University’s (AU) Collegeof Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE).Dedicated to promoting understanding of air and space powertheory and application, these studies are published by the AirUniversity Press and broadly distributed to the US Air Force,the Department of Defense and other governmental organiza-tions, leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learn-ing, public policy institutes, and the media.

All military members and civilian employees assigned to AirUniversity are invited to contribute unclassified manuscripts.Manuscripts should deal with air and/or space power history,theory, doctrine or strategy, or with joint or combined servicematters bearing on the application of air and/or space power.

Authors should submit three copies of a double-spaced,typed manuscript and an electronic version of the manuscripton a 3.5-inch disk(s) along with a brief (200-word maximum)abstract. The electronic file should be compatible withMicrosoft Windows and Microsoft Word—AU Press uses Wordas its standard word-processing program.

iii

Please send inquiries or comments to:Dean of Research

Airpower Research InstituteCADRE

401 Chennault CircleMaxwell AFB AL 36112-6428

Tel: (334) 953-6875DSN 493-6875

Fax: (334) 953-6739Internet: james.titus@cadre.maxwell.af.mil

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

EARLY PERSPECTIVES ONJOINT/COALITION COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . 97

AN AIRMAN COMMANDERIN CHIEF: LAURIS NORSTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

AN AIRMAN COMMANDER INCHIEF AT WAR: ALBRECHT KESSELRING . . . 31

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . 53

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

FINAL THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

IllustrationsFigure

1 Allied Advances in Italy, 1943–44 . . . . . . . . . . . 41

2 Commanders in Chief versus USAFGenerals’ Careers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

v

PhotographsPage

Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and GenLauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Gen Lauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

General Norstad before Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Gen Charles de Gaulle and GenLauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring in 1940 . . . . . . . . . . 36

Field Marshal Kesselring in HisFocke-Wulf 189 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Field Marshals Erwin J. Rommel andAlbrecht Kesselring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

vi

Foreword

In the 53-year history of the United States Air Force (USAF),only two airmen have risen to serve as regional commandersin chief (CINC). During the same period, 74 soldiers, sailors,and Marines were selected for geographic CINC billets. In Oncein a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command, Lt Col Howard D.Belote examines the reasons for this disparity and suggestshow airmen might improve their prospects for becomingfuture regional commanders.

Colonel Belote employs historical analysis to identify thepersonal and professional qualities airmen should seek asprospective war-fighting CINCs. To establish a baseline forthat analysis, he begins by studying the careers of two earlyregional CINCs, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Jacob L.Devers. Relying heavily on primary sources in the Air ForceHistorical Research Agency, the author then offers twodetailed biographical case studies. The first is of Gen LaurisNorstad, until this year the only USAF officer to have servedas a regional CINC.* The second case study considers thecareer of German Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring, one ofonly two airmen ever to have commanded a theater inwartime.**

Belote complements his historical inquiry with findingsbased on interviews with senior Department of Defense offi-cials coupled to an analysis of the recent literature on jointcommand. These varied sources agree on one very significantpoint: to perform effectively as war-fighting CINCs, airmen—indeed, all officers—must possess comprehensive joint mili-tary proficiency, an incisive geostrategic-political-militaryvision, and strong—but nuanced and deft—skills in leadershipand interpersonal relations.

One other major finding deserves mention up front. Withoutexception, the senior officials interviewed by the author agreed

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_____________*The second USAF officer to achieve this distinction is Gen Joseph W. Ralston. General Ralston assumed

the post of supreme allied commander, Europe, on 3 May 2000.

**The other airman who served as wartime theater commander was Lt Gen Frank M. Andrews, US ArmyAir Forces. Andrews served as commanding general, European theater of operations, for barely three monthsbefore he was killed in an aircraft crash in May 1943.

that as would-be CINCs, airmen are handicapped by a dis-tinctive characteristic of Air Force culture. As members of atechnical service that places a high premium on Air Force-specific skills, most airmen fail to acquire the wide-rangingjoint and political-military experience expected of potentialregional CINCs. To help remedy that problem, the authorproposes creation of a new and intentionally broad-gauged “jointwarfighter” career track.

Originally written as a master’s thesis for Air University’sSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Once in a BlueMoon subsequently was selected by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation as the best SAAS thesis for academic year1998–99. The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research andEducation is pleased to make this timely work available to awider audience in the Air Force and beyond.

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JAMES R. W. TITUSDean of ResearchAir University

About the Author

Lt Col Howard D. “Dave” Belote (BA, University of Virginia;MBA, Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University; MAAS, School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies), a senior pilot with more than1,900 flying hours, earned his commission as a distinguishedgraduate of Officer Training School in 1985. After completingundergraduate navigator training in 1986, he served as an F-111 weapon systems officer at RAF Lakenheath, UnitedKingdom. He attended Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training atSheppard Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, in 1991 and was thenassigned to Hill AFB, Utah, as an F-16 pilot. Completing histour as an instructor pilot and flight commander, he trans-ferred to Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), LangleyAFB, Virginia, in 1995. There he served as a fighter operationsinspector in the Office of the Inspector General and earnedrecognition as Headquarters ACC Company Grade Officer ofthe Year for 1996. In July 1998 Belote (then major) entered theSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) at Maxwell AFB,Alabama. Following SAAS, he was assigned as chief of theaterair strategy and chief of the joint/combined synchronizationcell for Seventh Air Force and the Air Component Command,Osan Air Base (AB), Republic of Korea. In June 2000, he willattend F-16 requalification training en route to an operationaltour at Spangdahlem AB, Germany.

Colonel Belote is a distinguished graduate of both SquadronOfficer School and the Air Command and Staff College,Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His article, “Paralyze or Pulverize:Liddell Hart, Clausewitz, and Their Influence on Air PowerTheory,” was published in Strategic Review. Two other arti-cles—“John Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: WhatGoes Around Comes Around” and “The Weaponization ofSpace: It Doesn’t Happen in a Vacuum”—appeared inAerospace Power Journal. He is married to the former PamelaRosenow. They have three sons, Drew, Michael, and Matthew.

ix

Introduction

The first requirement for any commander is leader-ship . . . . It doesn’t matter if one is air-, land-, sea-, orspace-trained . . . It is important that one understand thestrengths, weaknesses, and doctrines of each and howto blend them in battle.

—Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner

In 1947 the National Defense Act established positions forregional commanders in chief (CINC). Nine years later, whenGen Lauris Norstad took command of allied forces in Europe,he became the first geographic CINC from the young UnitedStates Air Force (USAF). He served as supreme allied com-mander, Europe (SACEUR), and as the first head of the UnitedStates European Command (USEUCOM) for more than sixyears, designing cold war strategies and force structures tocontain the Soviet Union. News accounts from the period sug-gest General Norstad commanded joint and combined forceseffectively, blending a broad knowledge of service capabilitieswith consummate diplomatic skill and understanding of Euro-pean politics.

In January 1963 Norstad retired, and the Air Force waitedmore than 37 years to see another airman rise to the pinnacleof geographic command. To be sure, 12 Air Force officersserved as commander in chief, Alaskan Air Command, be-tween 1947 and 1974; and Gen Truman H. Landon and GenHarry Goodall filled in as CINCs for five weeks and 10 days, re-spectively—but for all intents and purposes, the USAF filledonly one theater CINC billet between World War II and May2000, when Gen Joseph Ralston assumed the SACEUR billetonce held by Norstad. In the same period of time, 36 Army of-ficers, 34 Navy officers, and four marines have headed the At-lantic, Pacific, European, Southern, and Central commands.1

Does it matter that the Air Force has produced only two the-ater CINCs in its 53-year existence? More and more, the an-swer must be yes. No matter what one believes about the“decisiveness” or “centrality” of aerospace power, one must

1

concede that over the past 53 years that element of power hasbecome an increasingly significant component of militarymight. Whether used to influence significantly the terms ofland battle as at Khafji, to transport supplies to refugees as inKurdistan or Somalia, to enforce international agreementsthrough surveillance and shows of force as in the Iraqi no-flyzone, or to punish noncompliance with international agree-ments such as the Dayton accords, airpower has tended to bethe first arrow pulled from a commander in chief’s quiver. Fur-thermore, recent history suggests that this trend of airpoweruse in a wide variety of political and military circumstanceswill continue. America and its allies responded to variouscrises in late 1998 and early 1999 with cruise missile attacksin Afghanistan and the Sudan, the Desert Fox bombing cam-paign in Iraq, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. In otherwords, control and exploitation of air and space have be-come central to both modern war fighting and coercivediplomacy.

This being the case, how does the Air Force’s failure to pro-duce theater CINCs affect the national defense? Put simply,while the dearth of Air Force CINCs has not dramatically de-graded the nation’s military security, it reflects a potentialmisuse of resources. Although it is possible for a CINC who isnot an airman to employ airpower effectively, common senseargues that when airpower is central to a campaign or opera-tion, an airman would bring greater familiarity with its capa-bilities and limitations into his command decisions. World WarII Chief of Staff George C. Marshall would have agreed. In 1941his office accepted the proposition “that the employment of airpower called for more intensive knowledge of air power’s ca-pacities . . . than was possessed by the most enlightened ofground-trained officers.”2 Currently, such knowledge shouldallow the airman to blend aerospace capabilities into a jointcampaign more effectively than a sister-service counterpart.However, as indicated by the parameters cited above, airmenhave not been afforded the opportunity to demonstrate theirjoint war-fighting abilities at the most senior level.

Why? Part of the answer may stem from parochialism andinterservice rivalries. It is only a part of the human condition

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to identify with one’s experiences and fail to understand andintegrate those of others. By tradition, Army and Navy officershave owned the geographic “CINCdoms,” see no reason tochange the status quo, and for the most part have convincedcivilian leaders to maintain things as they are. Furthermore,Graham T. Allison’s bureaucratic politics model illuminatesthe natural tendency to protect turf, and thereby suggests whysome leaders could distrust Air Force officers with commandof Army, Navy, and Marine Corps formations. Indeed, at leastone retired Army four-star general reacted sharply to GeneralRalston’s nomination, insisting “that position calls for anArmy guy. I think a lot of Joe Ralston, but it’s not an Air Forcebillet.”3 Hinting at that kind of distrust, Gen Charles A.“Chuck” Horner suggested that “you can’t be a regional CINCunless you’re a gravel cruncher. Why? Because that’s how itis.”4 Finally, echoing General Horner’s point, three retiredfour-star generals—two from the Air Force and one from theArmy—conceded that senior army officers opposed the contin-uation of an admiral as commander of NATO’s southern re-gion when ground troops were deployed to Bosnia.5 Suchcomments suggest that the Air Force can do very little di-rectly to influence the mind-sets of senior officers fromother services.

There is, however, a different perspective on the subject.Three of the nation’s most senior retired defense officials insistthat personal qualification for the position is the sole consid-eration in the choice of a CINC. Former Secretary of DefenseDick Cheney does not “think there’s any conscious effort topush the Air Force out.”6 Cheney’s selectee as chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Gen Colin L. Powell, noted that“during my tenure as Chairman, all, I repeat all, of the CINCpositions were offered to all of the Services. . . . Frankly, I wasnot going to recommend an Air Force officer to the SecDef justto make the Air Force happy. That would be reverse parochial-ism. It had to make sense.”7 Finally, General Powell’s succes-sor as CJCS, Gen John M. D. Shalikashvili, declared “the sys-tem will break unless we pick the number one officer available[to serve as a CINC]. It should not be ‘it’s our turn.’ The gamestarts all over each time.”8

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Those views—from men responsible for filling the country’smost important military positions—suggest another possibilityto explain the low number of Air Force geographic CINCs. The37-year gap between airmen in that role could indicate eitherthat airmen lack certain necessary qualities to command jointforces or that they fail to demonstrate those qualities to theproper audience. Could it be that airmen fail to groom them-selves to wield joint power? Indeed, one Air Staff officer notedthat “at a recent meeting with general officers, I was amazedat how they answered the questions affecting the way theCINCs used aerospace power. They always answered in termsof being a JFACC [joint force air component commander], nota JTF [joint task force] Commander.”9

Gen Charles G. Boyd, former deputy CINC, USEUCOM,concurred, saying “we’re obsessed by JFACC because of ourprecious airplanes and a psychology that says we’re [only]support forces.”10 Whether or not this phenomenon indicatesa failure on the part of the Air Force, it is the only part of theregional CINC equation that the Air Force can directly influ-ence. General Boyd continued “make no bones that [parochial-ism] exists and must be overcome. But don’t waste time on acause célèbre. Make political [leaders] understand the logicalarguments [for airman CINCs].”11 Before arguing that an air-man can command joint and combined forces, however, onemust investigate what joint commanders do.

Understanding the responsibilities of CINCs is relevant fortwo reasons. First, if the Air Force wants to make its greatestpossible contribution to the nation—if it wants its senior offi-cers to ascend to the pinnacle of joint war-fighting competenceas regional CINCs—it has to know what it is after and mustproduce an obviously qualified pool of candidates. Second,and more importantly, the question of CINC qualifications re-lates directly to the overall national defense, as the nation’sshrinking forces must be employed in the most effective pos-sible manner. Airpower has simply become too important tooverall military capability to be permanently relegated to asupporting role. As suggested above, America’s predispositiontoward involvement in humanitarian operations and smaller-scale contingencies brings airpower in all its forms ever closer

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to center stage. This trend could make appointment of AirForce CINCs a significant national defense issue.

To meet the national need for military readiness, therefore,the armed forces need CINCs who can employ forces as effec-tively as possible. For those political and military situationswhere airpower is central—and the late 1990s suggest thatcould be the majority of international situations—the ultimateexample of an air-minded joint force commander would be anAir Force general officer who can prove to the nation that air-men understand and can employ all facets of joint power. Be-fore that can happen regularly, however, both the leaders whoappoint CINCs and the sister-service members whose forceswould serve under such CINCs must be convinced that airmencan effectively command joint and combined forces. To thatend, this paper poses the following question: What are thequalities necessary for airmen to perform effectively as war-fighting CINCs?

Evidence and Methodology

This paper identifies those necessary qualities of knowledge,insight, and skill through three methods. First, it reviews the-oretical and historical literature on command. An examinationof the writings of Allied joint and combined force commandersfrom World War II and the military historians who studiedthem will lead inductively to a composite picture of a success-ful CINC and create a baseline for further analysis.

The study then tests this conceptually derived characteriza-tion of CINCs against the experience of the only prominent air-men with complete tours as commanders in chief, the afore-mentioned General Norstad and German Field MarshalAlbrecht Kesselring.* During a period of great internationalturbulence, Norstad focused NATO on the Soviet threat inspite of competing nationalist agendas promoted by the Amer-icans, British, French, and Germans. However, because he

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_____________

*Norstad was actually the second American airman to rise to theater command. Lt Gen Frank M. Andrews,one of the seminal figures of early US airpower history, became commander of the European theater of oper-ations in February 1943 but died barely three months into his tenure. Had Andrews left a lengthier perform-ance record as a theater commander, I would have included him in this study.

was successful in deterring war in Europe, Norstad’s caselacks a significant component of CINC performance: the con-duct of active hostilities. To assess an airman’s performanceas a CINC in war, one must turn to the German World War IIexperience. Kesselring—who started World War II as the com-mander of the air fleets that supported the invasion of Polandand played a central role in the Battle of Britain—assumedjoint command of the Mediterranean theater in September1942. Through diplomatic skill, political insight, and opera-tional expertise, he covered Field Marshal Erwin J. “DesertFox” Rommel’s escape from North Africa and conducted an ef-fective defense in the face of the Allied invasion of Italy. By ex-amining oral histories, postwar interviews, personal memoirs,and contemporary sources, this paper highlights the qualitiesthese two commanders in chief used to succeed in coalitioncommand.

The discussion that follows relates the issue of war-fightingcommand to the present through interviews with retired sen-ior leaders. By comparing the historical lessons with the expe-riences of latter-day CINCs, deputy CINCs, chairmen of theJCS, and a defense secretary, a composite of requisite quali-ties for the modern coalition commander should emerge. Thesynthesis of historical and recent evidence will answer thecentral question in this paper and describe the skills and in-sights airmen must develop in order to compete effectively forregional CINC billets.

Of course, developing such abilities is but the first step inthe journey to systematically produce worthy successors toGenerals Norstad and Ralston. To that end, this paper con-cludes with thoughts to guide future research. Working fromthe evidence developed through the interviews, the study sug-gests possible answers to follow-on questions about the insti-tutional impediments to an airman’s appointment. It describesthe CINC selection process and highlights the attributes nec-essary to overcome the inertia of tradition and culture. To ad-dress the bottom line—what the Air Force can do to producepotential CINCs—this paper offers suggestions about how toinculcate those attributes in airmen.

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Early Perspectives onJoint/Coalition Command

Generalship is, in short, much more than command ofarmies in the field.

—John Keegan

What personal qualities enable an officer to command large,complex, multinational forces effectively? The pat answer wouldprobably be “courage and soldiering skills,” and without adoubt, both are components of successful command. Such ananswer, however, only scratches the surface. Achieving unityof effort inside a multicultural force requires vision and abilityabove and beyond military decision-making skills.

Such skills have been particularly necessary in this centuryof world wars fought by coalitions of representative democra-cies.12 Indeed, coalition command was instituted in despera-tion at the end of World War I, when the Allied powers turnedto Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch to direct the offensivethat they hoped would end the war. However, Foch was asmuch a “first among equals” as he was a commander; andleaders such as Gen Douglas Haig and Gen John J. Pershingenjoyed a great deal of autonomy even after Foch’s appoint-ment as commander in chief. Therefore, to examine the rootsof supreme command as it exists today and thereby create abaseline for further analysis of coalition command, one mustlook to the theater commanders of World War II. Through thewritings of both practitioners and observers of joint commandin World War II—the birthplace of the modern joint and coali-tion command system—a picture of CINCs emerges that in-cludes broad joint professional competence, deep geostrategicunderstanding, and several key personal qualities. They includeintelligence, persuasiveness, integrity, and team-building skills.

Participants

One notably successful commander, Gen Jacob L. Devers,who commanded the North African theater, the European the-ater, and Sixth Army Group in World War II, described thefoundations for coalition command in his postwar speeches

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and writings. In a 1947 speech reprinted in Military Review,General Devers argued that a coalition commander’s problems“tax his native ability, professional skill, and patience to anunbelievable degree,” therefore requiring “unquestioned inge-nuity, professional skill, tact, good judgment, and patience.”13

The general listed several problems facing top-level joint andcombined commanders, including lack of clarity of higherheadquarters’ directives; conflicting political, economic, andmilitary problems and objectives of each of the Allied powers;and “probably the most important of all . . . the personalitiesof the senior commanders of each of the armed services of theallied powers under command.”14 He then provided solutionsto those problems.

In determining his appropriate course of action under a direc-tive received, the Theater Commander must bear in mind thathe has under command professional soldiers and experiencedcommanders of several nations other than his own, who owetheir first allegiance to their own governments. . . . It is unrea-sonable to expect that the military representatives of nationswho are serving under unified command in combined opera-tions will subordinate promptly and freely their own views tothose of a commander of another nationality, unless the com-mander, through professional skill, good judgment, tact, andpatience, has convinced them that it is to their national inter-ests individually and collectively.

Hence, the Theater Commander must first know the several na-tional problems and aspirations in detail before he can hope todeal with his commanders.15

In other words, the general suggested themes of compre-hensive professional knowledge, political/strategic under-standing, and interpersonal skills—themes that recur through-out the writings of World War II observers and participants.

Devers’s superior in Europe—the supreme commander, Al-lied Expeditionary Forces, General of the Army Dwight D.Eisenhower—cited the same factors of political insight, per-sonality, and competence. Early in his command, he had butan inkling of the importance of politics, writing in 1942 toGeneral Marshall: “The sooner I can get rid of all these ques-

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tions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be.Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at leastnine are absorbed in political and economic matters.”16 Thefuture SACEUR and president quickly worked internationalinsights into his leadership style, however. Writing after WorldWar II, he noted that “personalities of senior commanders andstaff officers are of special importance. . . . The high com-mander must . . . be calm, clear, and determined—and in allcommands, especially allied organizations, his success will bemeasured more by his ability to lead and persuade than by hisadherence to fixed notions of arbitrary command practices.”17

For Eisenhower, that persuasive ability was rooted in anability to see his subordinates’ points of view:

You must work in every way you know to develop the confidenceof your subordinates in the commander, in his common sense,straight-forward thinking, and absolute refusal to touch a prob-lem on a nationalistic ground. . . .

[Y]ou have to let the people of the opposite nationality see thatin everything you do, in every move you make, you are preserv-ing strict impartiality. Literally you had to refuse in such a posi-tion to be wholly a citizen of your own country. You were half oneand half the other. You had to recall that and keep it in the fore-front of your conscious mind every single minute of the day. . . .

[Finally], you must be prepared . . . to accept minor inefficien-cies as long as that is promoting the great and common pur-pose. You should not try to change ideas and concepts on thepart of some subordinate of a different nationality because youdisagree with him. If you can achieve the great overall unity ofpurpose that inspires loyalty, inspires teamwork, never botheryour heads about seeking perfection.18

Eisenhower also relied on broad professional development,noting “that in the higher positions of a modern Army, Navy,and Air Force, rich organizational experience and an orderly,logical mind are absolutely essential to success,” as was “aninexhaustible fund of nervous energy. [The commander] iscalled upon night and day to absorb the disappointments, thediscouragements and the doubts of his subordinates and to

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force them on to accomplishments, which they regard as im-possible.”19 The supreme allied commander fired that nervousenergy with a driving but not-too-obvious personal ambitionthat he subsumed in a deep commitment to the ideals of themilitary profession and sense of purpose, and he demandedthe same of those close to him. “Combat commanders,” he in-sisted, “must be selected from among those who preferred abattle-line position to any other, regardless of lesser consider-ations.”20 Eisenhower, like Devers, credited his success tobroad military skills, an understanding of international reali-ties, and the personal ability to communicate them to a di-verse audience.

Observers

In the intervening years, historical analysis has confirmedthe impressions and recollections of the World War II com-manders. In 1986 Col Richard W. Anderschat analyzed theatercommand requirements in a monograph for the US Army WarCollege titled “Factors Affecting Success in Coalition Com-mand.” Colonel Anderschat used studies of General Deversand his contemporaries, Gen Mark W. Clark and Gen JosephW. Stilwell, “to determine those factors which contributed totheir success or failure in combined command in various the-aters” of World War II.21 The colonel concluded that a suc-cessful coalition commander must “be a consummate profes-sional. He must be experienced and knowledgeable on the artof war and must understand the capabilities” of all the com-ponent forces at his command.22 Anderschat continued thatthe commander “has to be able to think on the political andstrategic levels,” understanding his country’s policy, alliancepolicy, and the national policies of each coalition member, andthen be sensitive to each.23 He finished with the observationthat “the most important factor” in his study of Devers, Clark,and Stilwell was “personality.” “Strong interpersonal skills areabsolutely essential to the success of a coalition com-mander.”24

To frame his analysis of command success, Anderschat re-lied on an in-depth, sophisticated study by professors MartinBlumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of

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Command. While most of their chapters dealt with individualmilitary leaders, Blumenson and Stokesbury also assessed thepeculiarities of coalition warfare. They described the broad in-sights and abilities demanded of theater commanders.

In a coalition effort, the commanders at the top of the scale arein a never-never land between the political and military reali-ties. Below them military forces are usually organized in sepa-rate national armies. Above them are the civilian politicianswho have their own domestic interests and their own interpre-tations of foreign policy. The military high command is the pointof contact between political and military aspirations and activi-ties; because of this, the coalition commanders must functionas superb artists.

The soldier who can run a coalition is a rare figure. To reachthat stratospheric position and remain there, he must be ag-gressive, bold, ruthless, and enterprising—in short, he has topossess all the traditional military virtues. He is then told to doa job that requires tact, tolerance, forbearance, and patience—qualities that had little to do with his previous advancement.

The coalition soldier . . . who can do so successfully is one whohas indeed proved his versatility. Defeating one’s enemies whileplacating one’s allies calls for the remarkable characteristics ofthe soldier-statesman.25

The two historians followed those observations with de-scriptions of various coalition commanders and situations,then finished the section with a discussion of Eisenhower—intheir mind, the prototypical supreme commander. “Quick andbright, Eisenhower had a capacity for learning, an ability forassessing complicated situations, a facility for striking to theheart of a problem. . . . Add an ability to get along with peopleand you have a rare person—sharp, smart, and persuasive,one fitted by intelligence and temperament for high com-mand.”26 Eisenhower, they argued, “made the coalition work”by having “precisely the qualities—of character, selflessness,and good sense—to knit the staff officers of two nations intoan integrated organization in which national differences andjealousies were forgotten.”27 Furthermore, Eisenhower had an

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“intimate knowledge of politico-military problems on the high-est level and a breadth of outlook unusual in a regular soldier.. . . nobody else revealed Eisenhower’s remarkable capacity forintegrating the efforts of different allies and rival services andfor creating harmony between individuals with varied back-grounds and temperaments.”28

Blumenson and Stokesbury praised Eisenhower for thesame qualities the general himself had highlighted: deep pro-fessional competence, political-strategic insight, and the intel-lect and personal skills to lead a disparate team.

Summary

This snapshot of World War II experience highlights certainqualities that prominent coalition commanders and subse-quent analysts found vital to success and, thereby, provides aframework for further examination of the attributes of effectiveCINCs. Devers and Eisenhower alluded to, but did not dwellon, basic military proficiency. Perhaps they took such profi-ciency for granted—it was, after all, what got them promotedin the first place—and the success of the combined campaignsthey led is ample testimony to their broad joint expertise. In-stead, they and later observers insisted that two additional ca-pabilities had to join with comprehensive knowledge to ensurecoalition success: understanding of international political-mil-itary realities and the personal skills to blend multiple servicesand nationalities into a coherent whole. Does the experience ofother CINCs—specifically airmen—lend weight to these asser-tions about command?

An Airman Commander in Chief:Lauris Norstad

Everything Norstad does in NATO he equates to the po-litical atmosphere. His job is more diplomatic than any-thing else. Like a doctor, he is rushing around to fix thiscrisis here, iron out that difficulty there. It’s a helluvajob, but the guy’s got what it takes to do it.

—Gen Nathan Twining

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The USAF experience provides but one test case for thequalities of coalition command outlined in the preceding sec-tion: General Norstad, supreme allied commander, Europe,and commander in chief, USEUCOM, from 20 November 1956to 2 January 1963.29 Praised as the “most brilliant air strate-gist . . . in any air force” by Newsweek, Norstad rose from amediocre finish in the West Point class of 1930 to become afull general in 1952.30 Along the way, Norstad used his con-siderable intellect; a foundation of airpower competence; andan interest in history, economics, and politics to develop abroad understanding of the role of military power in interna-tional relations. A study of General Norstad’s exceptional ca-reer and performance as SACEUR reveals the command qual-ities of comprehensive professional expertise, broad strategicvision, and personal leadership ability suggested by Norstad’smentor, General Eisenhower.

Background

After graduation from West Point and commissioning as acavalry officer, Norstad transferred to the fledgling Air Corps in1931. He spent a decade in a variety of flying, staff, andschools assignments, and, in the words of historian Phillip S.Meilinger, “quickly impressed his superiors with his meticu-lous staff work and incisive intellect.”31 Noticed at the AirCorps Tactical School (ACTS)—Norstad believed that ACTScommandant Gen Millard F. “Mif” Harmon Jr., personally toldGen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold about his performance there32—Norstad moved through staff jobs at Langley Air Force Base,Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Shortly after the United Statesentered World War II, General Arnold put Norstad (then major)on his special advisory council, telling him simply “your job isto do my thinking for me.”33 Arnold put his young protégé inpositions to earn the regard of General Marshall and orches-trated Norstad’s rapid rise through the ranks, at one point di-recting a personnel officer to “see he’s a full colonel by sun-down.”34

Both to take advantage of and to further develop thecolonel’s war-fighting abilities, Arnold sent Norstad to Londonas an air planner in early 1942. Norstad worked on cross-

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channel invasion plans, then became the lead air planner forOperation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa—andthere gained the confidence of General Eisenhower. As assis-tant chief of staff for operations of Twelfth Air Force, then asdirector of operations of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces(MAAF), Norstad (then brigadier general) directed air opera-tions over North Africa and Italy and planned the air portionof Operation Anvil, the Allied landing in southern France.Norstad returned to Washington in 1944 to oversee strategicair operations in the Pacific as chief of staff of Twentieth AirForce, General Arnold’s strategic force controlled from Wash-ington, D.C.

After the war, Norstad helped organize the new Departmentof Defense (DOD) and Air Force, first as the War Department’sdirector of plans and operations, then as Air Force deputychief of staff for operations and acting vice chief of staff. Fromthese positions, Norstad helped to write the 1947 National Se-curity Act and the Key West agreement on service roles andmissions, and he developed the force structure for the postwarAir Force. In October 1950, Norstad (then lieutenant general)became the commander in chief, United States Air Forces inEurope (CINCUSAFE), then a specified command billet. He fol-lowed his mentor Eisenhower to the North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganization (NATO) headquarters in April 1951. There, he woredual hats as CINCUSAFE and commander, Allied Air ForcesCentral Europe, until July 1953, when he took over as airdeputy to SACEUR. After three years as Gen Alfred M. Gruen-ther’s deputy, Norstad rose to NATO’s top military job—turn-ing down more than one offer to become chief of staff of the AirForce (CSAF) to do so.35

As SACEUR, Norstad fulfilled his military and political re-sponsibilities with equal adroitness. He created the cold warstrategy of forward defense backed by a US/United Kingdomnuclear deterrent—a doctrine known as “Shield and Sword”—and personally negotiated with European leaders for basingrights and national force structure contributions. He handleddifficult issues of troop reductions, nuclear control, and WestGerman rearmament as an international spokesman, earningthe respect of figures throughout the NATO alliance. News ac-

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counts of the early 1960s credited Norstad with great success.Gen Thomas D. White, who followed a turn as CSAF with astint as a contributing editor for Newsweek, cited Europeanand American praises such as “shrewd and understandingfriend” to all the Allies and “one of the most remarkable pub-lic servants of his time,” and concluded that “Norstad had thebrilliance and intimate grasp of the situation to representNATO and America, together with the moral stamina andnerve to stand up to both.”36 General White’s comment echoesthe requirements for coalition command outlined by Eisen-hower and others. Did Norstad rely on a similar foundation ofskills; and, if so, what does that suggest about joint/coalitioncommanders in general?

Comprehensive Professional Knowledge

As argued above, Norstad developed a reputation for airpowerknowledge early in his career, and Hap Arnold put that ability touse in the European theater of operations. In 1942 Norstad

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Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Lauris Norstad

Source: Newsweek, 1 October 1951. AP photo. Courtesy of the Associated Press.

went to London to be a planner. At that time, of course, both theBritish and we were thinking of every possibility of getting intothe action because we were on the receiving end and had notbeen able to take the initiative at all. . . . people even then werethinking in terms of a possible cross-channel landing. Then theAfrican landing was also actively considered.37

[When] Torch was accepted . . . I was Plans and Operations forthe Twelfth Air Force so I did most of the planning for the airpart—essentially all of the air part of the Torch landing.38

Because he “had written the plans and was in charge of op-erations anyway,” Norstad was the first American airmanashore in North Africa.39 He established the first forward airbase at Tafaraoui, set up Twelfth Air Force’s forward head-quarters, and caught the eye of the man who would ultimatelyappoint him as SACEUR:

When I transferred headquarters from Gibraltar to Algiers onNovember 23, I took advantage of the journey to begin inspec-tions of our troops and facilities. At the Oran airfield I camesquarely up against conditions that were to plague us through-out that bitter winter. . . . Tactical operations were at a stand-still so I spent the morning inquiring into problems of supply,housing, and food. It was on that occasion that I first met Lieu-tenant Colonel Lauris Norstad, a young air officer who so im-pressed me by his alertness, grasp of problems, and personal-ity that I never thereafter lost sight of him. He was and is oneof those rare men whose capacity knows no limit.40

Over the next two years, Norstad planned and executedmany significant air operations in the Mediterranean; there-after, he focused his abilities on the Pacific air war. In his ownwords, he “really developed and directed the tactical air oper-ations in North Africa and all the way up Italy. OperationStrangle, for instance [the air interdiction campaign to weakenGerman defenders of Rome, Anzio, and the Gustav Linethrough Cassino], was my baby.”41 Dr. Eduard Mark of theCenter for Air Force History has supported Norstad’s claims ofresponsibility, citing several memos from the MAAF director ofoperations to Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker and Air Marshal Sir JohnSlessor, the commander and deputy commander, that outline

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Norstad’s influence on targeting decisions in Italy.42 After lay-ing the groundwork for air operations in southern France,Norstad helped set the stage for airpower success in the Pa-cific. Perceiving that Arnold had lost faith in Maj Gen HaywoodS. “Possum” Hansell Jr.’s handling of Pacific strategic opera-tions, Norstad personally orchestrated Maj Gen Curtis E.LeMay’s assumption of command in the theater.43 Norstadwas also part of the small circle of Air Corps leaders involvedwith the Manhattan Project.

After the war, Norstad immediately funneled his operationalairpower expertise and wartime experience into a broad un-derstanding of joint matters. After Eisenhower took over asArmy chief of staff in 1946, he made his former air planner thechief of War Department plans and operations. Air Corps com-manding general Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz called the appoint-ment a breakthrough and marveled that Eisenhower wantedan airman in the key policy job at the center of the War De-partment’s General Staff.44 From that position, Norstadworked the “great reorganization efforts [of] the Defense Act of’47, which [he] helped draft and negotiated up on [Capitol] Hill,[with] the President and with the Navy.”45 Norstad developed aclose personal relationship with Adm Forrest P. Sherman andused those ties to overcome turbulent interservice squabbles;together, the two officers facilitated the Key West and Newportagreements and set the course for early DOD budgetary pol-icy.46 While Norstad’s careful tilling of joint middle ground didnot win universal applause—the retired Hap Arnold chargedNorstad with having “sold [the Air Force] down the river” in theaforementioned agreements—it did garner him widespread re-spect for his military competence. Deadlocked over Gen Dou-glas MacArthur’s proposal for the Inchon landing in the sum-mer of 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) dispatched Norstad(who asked Gen Matthew B. Ridgway and Ambassador W.Averell Harriman to accompany him) on a fact-finding missionto Korea. After personally reviewing the ground situation andinterviewing General MacArthur and Gen Walton H. Walker,commander of the forces holding the Pusan perimeter, Norstadrecommended approval of the Inchon plan.47 Norstad’s en-dorsement helped convince a skeptical JCS of the feasibility of

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MacArthur’s audacious plan, notwithstanding the consider-able risks it entailed.

Shortly thereafter, General Norstad put his understandingof American joint roles and missions, as well as his bureau-cratic savvy, to work for the new NATO. While Norstad’s titlessuggested an emphasis on air, his wide-ranging efforts en-compassed a much broader focus. Norstad had written apaper for the joint chiefs in 1949 arguing “that there shouldbe some meat on the bones of NATO,” something tangible forthe Europeans who believed that “a treaty and a statement ofgood intentions are fine, but we have been overrun so manytimes that words aren’t good enough. We have to have some-thing that we can see and something we can feel.”48 Norstaddelegated the running of United States Air Forces in Europe(USAFE) to his chief of staff, General Landon, and focused on“building this Allied organization [from a] grassroots basis” forhis supreme commander, Eisenhower.49 As he built the NATOorganizational structure, he also took over as the alliance’spremier joint strategist, especially after rising to the air deputyposition. Norstad—never one for false humility—rememberedthat “if you asked anybody who was working at SHAPE[Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe] in my timewho made the NATO strategy for Western Europe, they wouldsay I did. And they would be right.”50 Air Force generalRichard H. Ellis, a SHAPE planner in the mid-1950s, remem-bered that “Norstad was the heart of [cold war planning]. Gru-enther, the SACEUR, turned all of the strategy and nuclearplanning over to Norstad, . . . [who], in my opinion, was the fa-ther of the flexible response.”51

Significantly, Norstad rejected the seemingly “easy” solutionof “let Strategic Air Command [SAC] handle it” and insteadworked for a true combined-arms strategy. In fact, he clashedwith the commander in chief, SAC (CINCSAC) Gen LeMay toprevent SAC from encroaching on the SACEUR’s turf52 and fo-cused on building effective conventional and nuclear groundforces to serve as the “shield” in his shield-and-sword strategy.For Norstad, the ground forces could not simply be a trip-wire—they had to prevent accidental incursions and be capa-ble of halting a deliberate attack long enough to force the So-

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viets to commit their operational reserve. This would allow theAllies to discern Soviet intent while affording the enemy achance to back off prior to a nuclear exchange. Norstad ex-plained the strategy to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-tee on 7 June 1957.

The shield was developed for the purpose of defending NATOterritory for the limited period between the outbreak of hostili-ties and . . . our retaliatory attack. . . . If this line were lightlydefended, or not defended at all, it would not be impossible forthe Soviets or satellites by accident to cross that line. . . . Onthe other hand, if this line were held with some substantialforce, and if there were an incident where someone moved in byaccident through ignorance and error, he would be stopped.

Then there would be at least a momentary pause, and by “mo-mentary” I mean minutes, hours, maybe days. Someone wouldhave to think about the problem of bringing up more force, andhe would have to weigh the consequences of doing that. I wouldlike to suggest that, during this time, the persons who have tomake this decision would have to consider the consequences ofthe full employment of our retaliatory forces. They would haveto consider the probability of starting their own destruction.53

[The Soviet planner] must always face the decision: “If I deliber-ately start a war, I will be destroyed.”54

To ensure NATO’s shield capability, the SACEUR concen-trated on building international ground forces. Immediatelyafter assuming command, Norstad publicly opposed a Britishplan to withdraw one-third of the Army of the Rhine from thecontinent. According to political scientist Robert S. Jordan,“Norstad took a leading role in the discussions among the Al-lies. . . . In speeches on both sides of the Atlantic, in press re-leases, . . . and in his formal report to the Council of the West-ern European Union, Norstad sought to forestall the Britishmove.” Norstad emerged from this “thorny policy thicket” witha compromise that left the “adequate minimum” of 30 divi-sions on the continent.55 To strengthen that minimum force,he strongly advocated nuclear-equipped armies. Norstad over-saw the deployment of Thor, Jupiter, Matador, and Nike mis-

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siles, favored the army’s atomic cannon, and suggested a land-based, mobile short-range nuclear force 20 years before themobile (but long-range) MX missile was developed.56 The gen-eral understood the threat, recognized Allied capabilities, andconstructed a broad-based coalition solution to meet NATO’s re-

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Gen Lauris Norstad

USAF Photo

quirements. Clearly, Norstad possessed a deep understanding ofthe employment of joint force to achieve political objectives.

Strategic Vision/Political-Military Understanding

Such understanding, while necessary, was not in itself suf-ficient for the SACEUR to create NATO force structure and op-erational plans. An intricate concept such as the shield-and-sword doctrine also requires geostrategic insight—anawareness of international political realities, a feel for the cul-tures of friend and foe alike—to come to fruition. Examinationof Norstad’s career and education shows that he developedthat strategic vision early. He came to understand political-military interconnections, then honed the ability to manipu-late those linkages masterfully—and therein lay much of hissuccess as a coalition commander.

Norstad cited his interests in the political-military field asbeing the “decisive factor” in his career and credited a WestPoint professor of economics and history for the foundation ofhis success: “Colonel [Beukema] got more young guys think-ing than anybody I’ve ever known . . . this was really the firsteffort, I think, to teach people to think in terms of real politi-cal-military objectives and means. . . . History became moreimportant to us because of [him] and added a tremendous in-fluence [on my ability as a decision maker].”57

Prevented by circumstances from attending graduate or pro-fessional military education (PME)—six years after attendingACTS as a first lieutenant, he was a major general—Norstadcontinued his study of history and politics on his own time.Evidently, his self-education was broad and effective. As Timemagazine reported, “in a profession not noted for breadth ofreading, Norstad quickly became conspicuous as one airmanwho read voraciously, ranging from The Federalist to the mem-oirs of the Aga Khan. In later Washington days, he liked toargue law with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, whowas so impressed that he offered to recommend him for a pro-fessorship at Harvard Law School.”58

Norstad’s personal reading program produced an under-standing of international politics and culture that guided hisactions as SACEUR—he noted that “grand strategy involves

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everything political, military, economic, and social. To be aSupreme Commander . . . has almost the same brea[d]th.”59

This philosophy also guided his instruction of other officers. Ina 1947 speech written for the Air War College, Norstad cata-logued many historical instances of “great gaps between for-eign policy and military policy” and declared it “imperative . . .that we should maintain strategic plans reflecting completelyintegrated political, economic, and psychological factors alongwith our military potentialities.”60 Norstad reached that con-clusion because

in the late war we failed to realize the extent to which chaoticconditions would be created in Europe and the Far East by thedefeat of our enemies. Soviet Russia recognized and quicklytook advantage of our early demobilization and . . . spread herinfluence throughout war-weary Europe, the Balkans, the mid-dle, and Far East. The Anglo-American members of the Alliedteam lacked truly integrated political guidance. . . . Without thispolitical guidance they unquestionably lost hard-earned oppor-tunities to supplant the Nazi-created system by one based onWestern democratic ideas of constitutional government.

Our broad strategy was defective in that it was incomplete. Weentered the war and fought valiantly without establishing ourlong-range objectives, political and economic. The military vic-tory was achieved, but today we find that the combined nationalaims for which we fought are jeopardized by the very conditionsof victory. We liberated most of Europe from one totalitariansystem only to let it be threatened by another.61

Interestingly, Norstad had been one of the few American of-ficers who spoke out during the war against the Stalinistthreat to eastern Europe. He remembered “catching hell” foropposing the Anvil plan to invade southern France, preferringinstead (with the British) to “go up the northeast of Italy, upthrough the Ljubljana Gap, up to Vienna, and cut off the Rus-sians. . . . so [they] wouldn’t have [eastern Europe] all to them-selves.”62 Norstad may have let his geostrategic beliefs over-ride his military judgment, for there were strong logisticalarguments against the eastern plan and in favor of Anvil. Still,backed by General Clark, he argued his case all the way up to

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presidential advisor Harry Hopkins. However, he declinedHopkins’s invitation to brief the president after the Americanmilitary leaders came out in favor of Anvil, telling Hopkins“there is some merit in the British thinking here. Other thanthat, I do not wish to interject myself between the AmericanChiefs of Staff and the President of the United States. Thatwould be wrong and terribly unproductive.”63 Ever the goodsoldier, Norstad wrote the air plan for Anvil—then Arnoldbrought him back to Washington and turned his attention tothe Pacific.

Norstad returned to Europe six years later, convinced of thenecessity to shape and strengthen the North Atlantic alliance.In the interim, the time he spent in Washington prepared himwell for multinational diplomacy. He developed a close rela-tionship with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and spent somuch time in political-military consultation with State De-partment leaders that Secretary of Defense Louis A. John-son—perhaps jealous of Norstad’s influence—ordered him tostop.64 The time he spent negotiating with the Army and Navyand shepherding bills and budgets through Congress alsohelped prepare the future SACEUR to navigate NATO’s politi-cal maze. As he told historian Edgar F. Puryear Jr., “I studiedthe countries . . . I knew the governments, but I also knew theopposition people and I spent almost as much time with theopposition people as I did with the government. . . . I felt thatwas my forte. . . . I’d become an expert in . . . the field of rela-tionships between countries as well and I knew I had theirsupport.”65

Norstad demonstrated that expertise throughout his tenureas supreme commander. As previously mentioned, the firsttest he faced as SACEUR was in limiting planned British troopwithdrawals; Time magazine marveled that Norstad respondednot with acquiescence, but was able to call “for a buildup ofNATO ground forces in the central sector of Western Europealone (‘the most sensitive and critical line in the world’) fromthe present 18 divisions to about 30.”66 Most important toNATO cohesion, however, was Norstad’s deft handling of WestGerman rearmament and integration into the NATO commandstructure. Believing that American interests were best served

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by helping create a politically, economically, and militarily sta-ble Western Europe to balance the Soviet Union, Norstad iden-tified West Germany as a geostrategic center of gravity andworked to facilitate its reentry into the European politico-mil-itary structure. He recognized that German chancellor KonradAdenauer, a “wise and courageous man” who “understood theapprehension of all Europe to Germany,” needed to answerGerman concerns over having the largest troop contribution toNATO while being denied any command positions. To satisfyboth Adenauer’s domestic needs and other European coun-tries’ uneasiness, Norstad personally chose the German officerhe thought most acceptable to the whole coalition, Lt GenHans Speidel. He then orchestrated Speidel’s appointment ascommander of Allied ground forces in the central region—acommand held by Germans to this day.67

Norstad’s feel for international politics helped him avoid be-coming a mere mouthpiece for American policy in the eyes ofEuropean statesmen, and this favorable perception greatly in-creased his effectiveness. In fact, he opposed US policy pro-posals that he thought might weaken NATO. When Sen.Homer E. Capehart of Indiana suggested withdrawing fromEuropean bases and relying on US-based strategic airpower,Norstad was adamant: “Such action by the United Stateswould destroy the confidence of all European countries in theUnited States, and it would destroy the NATO alliance. . . . thiswould undermine . . . everything that has been built up in 10years’ time.”68 Over his years at SHAPE, Norstad moved far-thest away from American nuclear policy, opposing Americanreluctance to give alliance members a voice—not necessarily aveto, however—in their own nuclear defense. With his prede-cessor Gruenther, he at first lobbied for a NATO atomic stock-pile with US control of warheads but NATO control of deliverysystems. In 1959, fearing that American intransigence mightweaken the alliance and play into Soviet hands, he “proposedmaking NATO the ‘fourth nuclear power’ through the creationof a multinational atomic authority.”69 His development of thisidea, along with the NATO-controlled mobile missile force dis-cussed above, created a rift between himself and Kennedy ad-ministration leaders—notably Secretary of Defense Robert S.

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McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk—and ultimatelyprecipitated Norstad’s retirement.

Although Norstad never toed a strictly American line, nei-ther was he an apologist for European concerns. Always at-tuned to alliance interrelationships, he recognized clearlywhere national policies could fracture the coalition, and op-posed a number of national demands, both nuclear and con-ventional. Early in his tenure, he publicly rejected German de-fense minister Franz-Josef Strauss’s calls for a Germannuclear role because NATO could not yet accept it; he also pre-vented a proposed German-Spanish military exchange be-cause it recalled for alliance members the prewar Nazi-Francorelationship.70 His most serious policy disagreement occurredwhen French president Charles de Gaulle vetoed (through theNATO budget) an American plan to build intermediate-rangemissile bases, withdrew French ships from NATO Mediter-ranean forces, then, in December 1959, demanded controlover American warheads in France. In response Norstad with-drew eight fighter-bomber squadrons from France and reposi-tioned them—with their nuclear capability—in West Germany,while still maintaining NATO headquarters in France.71 Aboveall, Norstad thought of himself as an international com-mander. Believing that he best served America by servingNATO, he always sought an evenhanded, international solu-tion to alliance problems.72

Nowhere was Norstad’s international insight more evidentthan in his handling of European tensions in a time of contin-ual East-West confrontation. Writing for Newsweek, GeneralWhite commented that “in consideration of [conflicting US andNATO guidance] particularly, . . . the changes in governments,. . . the revolution in weapon technology, and the recurringcrises affecting NATO such as Hungary, Suez, Algeria, and theCongo it is high tribute indeed that Norstad survived themall.”73 To be sure, White soft-pedaled his praise, for he omittedthe most tense confrontations of Norstad’s time: Nikita S.Khrushchev’s pressure on Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis.The SACEUR was peripherally involved in the Cuban tensionbecause of the missiles stationed in Turkey, and Norstad post-poned his retirement in October 1962 to avoid fanning those

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flames; however, the SACEUR’s major concern was Berlin. So-viet demands for the city precipitated Norstad’s redeploymentof fighter-bombers from France, providing NATO a quick nu-clear response capability free of French control—because theNATO council had approved three different resolutions to go towar for the city. Norstad was clear: “we would have fought overBerlin. The Russians always knew that.”74

Part of the credit for not going to war over Berlin has to goto the NATO commander’s comprehension of East/West rela-tions. He knew that even America’s allies were “damn wary,”telling an Air War College audience that “our best friends feelwe are a little headstrong at times.”75 Therefore, feeling that“there was one thing that always frightened me a great deal,the chip-on-the-shoulder attitude that governments had,” andthat “you can’t maintain the peace by having a mad-dog ap-proach,” Norstad chose to “pray three times a day, ‘God giveme the strength to be weak. God, give me strength not to justjump and be tough.’ Because toughness is a dangerous thing,every American, and if a commander wants to be applauded bythe American public, all he has to do is be tough, but he’llprobably get you into war in the meantime.”76

At the same time, he wanted the Russians “to know that Ihave patience, that I can outlast them . . . I will never blow up.If I decide to do something I am going to do it, it will succeed.I am not just going to huff and puff.”77 Norstad eschewed blus-ter and saber rattling—anything designed for the Americanpublic that might cloud the issues: “There was periodic pres-sure from the US government to make those demonstrationtrips to Berlin, which I always resisted. But I would movetroops to their battle stations, because battle stations were ob-vious.”78 Being cautious, Norstad made sure his troops knewthe rules of engagement—“governments think they make greatdecisions, but sometimes it’s the private leading a convoy whomakes the decision. So they were well briefed”79—and he wasconvinced that his careful handling of relations with the Rus-sians set the stage for success. “I think if you get into the his-tory of the confrontations, we damned well impressed the So-viets because our moves were deliberate and were always to

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put ourselves in a better position. We did that, indicating thepressure was on, that if they pushed, we would fight.”80

The SACEUR used his knowledge of political-military inter-connections; his relationships in Congress and the NATOCouncil; and his feel for American, European, and Soviet his-tory, economics, culture, and politics to inform his decisionmaking under pressure. That the cold war never boiled overinto hot conflict in Europe during the tense 1950s and 1960sis perhaps the best indicator of Norstad’s strategic acumen.

Leadership and Personal Diplomacy

Norstad’s extensive joint competence and broad interna-tional vision would have had little impact, however, had theynot been joined with an impressive set of personal attributes.His performance during crises like Berlin in 1961—holding afractious alliance together while facing down a powerful foe—

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U.S. Information Agency

General Norstad before Congress

demonstrated self-control and an ability to convince a large,diverse coalition to follow his lead. Like his mentor, Eisen-hower, and a handful of other successful commanders, Gen-eral Norstad had the blend of disciplined intellect, charm, ar-ticulate persuasive ability, and selflessness that inspired trustin friends and foes alike. Through the words of the popularpress and contemporary international leaders, and in the finalact of Norstad’s military career, a portrait emerges of an ex-ceptional leader.

While the American and European press never hesitated todisagree with Norstad’s positions—the SACEUR once boastedthat he was the most criticized man in Europe—news clip-pings of the day are almost uniformly in favor of Norstad, theman. A Newsweek column from 5 September 1960 reportedBritish frustrations with Norstad’s 30-division plan—the Lon-don Daily Telegraph called his shield-and-sword doctrine “acollection of unplausible assumptions about the behavior ofan enemy”—but juxtaposed the criticism with praise fromBritain’s Economist: “[Norstad’s] ‘remarkable combination ofmilitary and political talent’ would be difficult to replace and‘was ever more needful.’ A highly ranked general said, ‘If Lau-ris Norstad were running for President of the US, the wholeBritish defense staff would—if they could—vote for him.’”81

Often, Norstad’s press coverage was far less balanced. Timecalled him a “philosopher in uniform,” and after describingNATO’s somewhat convoluted organization, opined that “onereason it [works] is Norstad himself.”82 Newsweek gushedeven more: “Most associates consider . . . Norstad a highlycomplex individual whose main characteristics are brains,vast curiosity, tremendous will power, uncanny memory, andbrains again. One SHAPE officer said, ‘You seldom meet AirForce generals who are such experts, and yet so uncompro-misingly intellectual.’ One astonished Frenchman said, ‘I did-n’t know they made such Americans.’”83

More significant than the impressions of contemporary pun-dits, however, is the high regard in which political and militaryleaders held him; the esteem he enjoyed despite his open op-position to various leaders’ nationalistic fervor clearly demon-strates Norstad’s personal abilities. Geostrategic vision would

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count for little were it not joined to a capacity for engenderingtrust, and Norstad consistently demonstrated skill in interna-tional teambuilding. Despite intra-alliance tensions over theSuez crisis, Cyprus, and French conflict in Algeria, “Norstadbuilt up a tremendously loyal following . . . The French respecthis behind-the-scenes efforts to encourage a better under-standing of French problems in North Africa. Turks, Britons,and Greeks, for example, function smoothly at SHAPE. Most ofall, the NATO nations implicitly trust the skill and judgment ofNorstad and his staff.”84 That trust—in Norstad’s intellect,motivations, and discipline—was probably most importantduring crises such as those involving Berlin. Norstad thoughtit “important to realize that crises and crisis management takeon the characteristics of the individual who’s doing it. If he hasa tendency to flap and get semihysterical, it is going to be awild and hysterical, potentially dangerous situation. If he isstrong, confident, and calm, the crisis will be handled in thatway, and it will remain contained.”85 As described above, theSACEUR calmly reacted on behalf of the alliance in times ofheightened tension and kept NATO members focused on acommon goal. Additionally, respect for the CINC permeatedthe coalition’s everyday operations. German chancellor Ade-nauer was so close to Norstad that he called to warn the gen-eral about Defense Secretary McNamara’s machinations tooust him.86 Despite Norstad’s displeasure with British defensepolicy, Adm Lord Louis Mountbatten, the senior Briton in theNATO military apparatus, believed that “Norstad did an almostimpossible job with exemplary skill.”87 Finally, de Gaulle,whose demands for nuclear autonomy and French prestigemay have been Norstad’s heaviest burden, paid the outgoingSACEUR the following compliment: “The fact remains that, insix years, you have done everything that could and should bedone on behalf of the Atlantic Alliance. I wish to render you myvery sincere recognition of this.”88

The ultimate example of Norstad’s leadership—his subordi-nation of his personal position to what he believed was right—happened, paradoxically, when he was unable to persuade po-litical leaders to follow his recommendations. Norstad’srelations with the key members of the Kennedy administration

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were strained from the outset; between disagreements overnuclear policy proposals and the handling of Soviet confronta-tions described above, Norstad found himself increasinglyalienated from McNamara and Rusk. When the secretaries ofdefense and state pressed the general to toe their line, he re-fused to roll over, saying “I’m quite aware of the role a majorcommander, particularly a supreme commander, is given byhistory. He can’t just be a mouthpiece . . . he is to follow hisown judgment in the light of what he knows at the time.”89

When McNamara and Rusk questioned his loyalty for not un-critically following their policy lead, he responded that heserved his “country best by serving [the alliance]” and re-signed.90 Dedicated to a cohesive North Atlantic alliance to theend, Norstad’s final act was to convince de Gaulle not to blockhis successor’s confirmation; the French president detestedthe administration’s arrogant refusal to consult with NATOleaders prior to the appointment, which “convey[ed] great in-sensitivity of your government to anything European.”91 Bysetting up a last minute courtesy call for Gen Lyman L.Lemnitzer, Norstad assuaged French irritation and helpedLemnitzer start his own lengthy tenure as SACEUR on apositive note.

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SHAPE photo.

Gen Charles de Gaulle and Gen Lauris Norstad

Summary

By no means can one suggest that General Norstad was thesole architect or executor of Western containment policy. Bythe same token, no one can deny that Norstad was an in-sightful, effective leader who exerted great influence on worldevents. In the words of Dutch political scientist Frans A. M.Alting von Geusau and Robert S. Jordan,

“With respect to the need to maintain allied cohesion, nationalgovernments have failed in at least two areas. They have failedin many instances in the task to inform their electorates ade-quately about the reality of the international situation and thedilemmas of allied security. They have equally failed in their un-derstanding of the psychology of mutual confidence in allied re-lations.” Without a doubt, Norstad attempted to make up forthese two failures, which made him one of the most influentialas well as one of the most controversial of the distinguished oc-cupants of this vitally important—and unique—position[SACEUR].92

Clearly, Norstad brought an impressive list of personal qual-ities to bear on his command tasks. His success in all aspectsof military planning, his understanding of the internationalsituation, and his ability to influence the leaders of the worldpowers—seen in the esteem in which Eisenhower, Adenauer,de Gaulle, and others held him—highlight the same qualitieshis successful predecessors brought to coalition command:comprehensive professional competence; broad strategic, po-litical-military vision; and genuine personal leadership ability.Airmen—and all soldiers, sailors, and marines—would do wellto emulate General Norstad’s example.

An Airman Commander inChief at War: Albrecht Kesselring

Results will demonstrate an officer’s fitness to be aField-Marshal, and no one will then ask about his ori-gins, whether he came from the army or the Luftwaffe.But one piece of advice I give to all Air Field-Marshals:

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do not become a one-sided technician, but learn to thinkand lead in terms of all three services.

—Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring––––––––––––––––––––––––Soldat bis zum letzten Tag [Memoirs]

Despite his cold war success and impressive personal abili-ties, General Norstad’s experience lacked one aspect vital tothis exploration of airmen as commanders in chief: he neverled joint or combined forces during active conflict. Indeed, itappears that only one airman has ever commanded a theaterof operations during war—German Field Marshal Kesselring,who as CINC South (later South-West) directed German andItalian air, land, and naval forces in the Mediterraneanthroughout 1942, 1943, and 1944. Originally tasked only toprotect the supply lines to Rommel’s Afrikakorps, Kesselringwas soon orchestrating the overextended Desert Fox’s retreat.Thereafter, according to his biographer, “he fought a virtuallyincessant delaying action against desperate odds, managed toimpose his will upon strong-minded and sceptical [sic ] subor-dinates, and yet emerged unscathed by serious rout, leadinghis men in fighting to the last gasp.”93 Kesselring’s success leda prominent German chief of staff to rate him, along withRommel and Gen Heinz Guderian, as one of the top three Ger-man officers “with a hold on the troops.”94

Before using Kesselring as the lone example of the airmanCINC at war, one must concede the field marshal is a specialcase: he was an army officer for 29 years before becoming anairman as a colonel in 1933 (due to Versailles restrictions, hewas officially a civilian in the Air Ministry). Kesselring wasbrave and decisive under fire in World War I, was intimately in-volved as a staff officer in rebuilding the post-VersaillesWehrmacht, and understood land warfare well enough to com-mand an artillery regiment. After 1933, however, he immersedhimself completely in air matters; significantly, all his war-fighting commands prior to CINC South were air related. It isprobably most accurate to say Kesselring cultivated the jointmiddle ground, always placing “the welfare of State andWehrmacht above sectional considerations [and] thus receiv-ing more than his share of disapproval from ex-Army and ex-

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Luftwaffe colleagues whenever they felt he had betrayed theirinterest.”95 Perhaps the Americans most like Kesselring wereLt Gen Frank M. Andrews and Rear Adm William A. Moffett—officers who understood both surface and air warfare wellenough to succeed at either, but who were regarded with someskepticism by their fellow airmen. In any case, an examinationof Field Marshal Kesselring’s career reveals an airpower expertwho, despite an unfortunate loyalty to the charismatic AdolfHitler, clearly demonstrated the command attributes of broadprofessional competence, political-strategic insight, and per-sonal leadership ability.

Background

Born to a Bavarian schoolmaster in 1885, Kesselring joinedthe 2d Foot Artillery Regiment as a Fahnenjunker, or volunteerpotential officer, and attended the military academy in1905–6. His earliest performance reports described an ener-getic, tactful, and skilled officer—the 1909 report concluded“Kesselring is by far the best of my officers”—and by 1914 rec-ommended the lieutenant for duty as the regimental adju-tant.96 Service in the First World War proved his mettle; atArras in April 1917, his commander credited him with haltingan Allied breakthrough “with quick comprehension and greatpower of decision” and “by his indefatigable industry whilecompiling clear and concise orders.”97 In 1918 Kesselring wasappointed to the General Staff despite never having taken theGeneralstab course and saw action on both fronts as a Gen-eral Staff officer attached to the 1st Bavarian Landwehr Divi-sion and to the II and III Bavarian Army Corps.98

After postwar service as a battery commander, Kesselringhelped to guide the reconstruction of the German armedforces, first as senior staff officer in the Army Training De-partment (T4) of the Reichswehr Ministry in Berlin. There,Kesselring “was busily occupied with questions of economyand administration, national and international law, [and] theproblems of the Interallied Military Control Commission.”99

Kenneth Macksey notes that “across his desk came every miteof essential information and through him passed the Chief’s

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instructions to the rest of the army as well [about both landand air warfare].”100 After directing a reorganization of theReichswehr staff and releasing “thousands” of soldiers for fieldduty, Kesselring ended his army service with command of the4th Artillery Regiment in Dresden.101

In October 1933 Kesselring became the head of administra-tion in the Luftfahrt Commissariat, the forerunner of the Luft-waffe. Realizing that “a man who is not an airman cannotbuild an air force, any more than a man who is not a horse-man can form and command a cavalry division,” Kesselringand contemporaries such as Walther Wever and EhrhardMilch took flying lessons, then set to work designing an airforce.102 After Wever’s death in June 1936, Kesselring becamechief of staff of the Luftwaffe, where he made the decisionsthat shaped the force with which Germany went to war. Fol-lowing disagreements with State Secretary Milch, Kesselringleft the staff to command Luftflotte (Air Fleet) I. By then a fullgeneral, Kesselring commanded air fleets in action overPoland, over the low countries, during the Battle of Britain,and during the initial attack into Russia in the summer andfall of 1941.

In November 1941 Kesselring (now field marshal) was or-dered to Italy to assume command of the Mediterranean the-ater. At first he was a CINC in name only because Hitler gavehim command of only German air forces, and the Italiansbalked at any explicit subordination to a German.103 In Sep-tember 1942 because of concerns over an Allied landing some-where in the Mediterranean, Kesselring “was entrusted withthe command of all German forces (Army, Navy, and Luft-waffe)” in the theater, except for Rommel’s Afrikakorps.104 TheOperation Torch landings two months later “plunged [Kessel-ring] into a cauldron of political intrigue, strategic dilemma,and tactical improvisation”; the CINC fought a bitter two-frontwar against the Allies and Rommel, who wanted to be CINC inKesselring’s place.105 After a year of watching the CINC or-chestrate a fighting withdrawal through Tunis, Sicily, andsouthern Italy—despite overwhelming odds (and the fact thatKesselring’s order of battle and plans were known to the Alliesthrough Ultra intercepts)106—Hitler broke the stalemate and

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moved Rommel to France. With complete authority in his the-ater, the renamed CINC South-West and commander of ArmyGroup C forced the Allies to take another year to fight theirway past Rome to the Alps. Kesselring’s final service to theReich was to take over from Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedtas CINC West following the Allied capture of the Remagenbridgehead. Likening himself to “a concert pianist, who isasked to play a Beethoven sonata before a large audience onan ancient, rickety, and out-of-tune instrument,”107 Kessel-ring could do little to stem the Allied advance, but refused tobetray his oath to Führer and Fatherland. After Hitler’s death,however, Kesselring moved quickly as the German plenipoten-tiary in the south (Adm Karl Dönitz, Hitler’s legal successor,filled the same role in Berlin) to surrender all forces in south-ern and western Europe.108

Friend and foe alike praised Field Marshal Kesselring for hiswartime accomplishments. Gen Heinrich von Vietinghoff,commander of the Tenth Army under Kesselring and his suc-cessor as CINC South-West, called his former superior “highlygifted, versatile, a great organizer in varied fields, extremelyskillful in dealing with people, [and] a commanding, brilliantpersonality.”109 He further noted that under Kesselring’s com-mand, “the fighting men acquired an [sic] unity unachieved onany other front.”110 General Clark, who faced him in Italy, saidKesselring was “one of the ablest officers in the Hitler armies. . . Kesselring was well qualified, both as a commander andan administrator, and he conducted the Axis operations inItaly with great skill for two years . . . I was glad to see himgo.”111

Reflecting intelligence assessments of the period, the BritishOfficial History called Kesselring “a formidable commander”with “a strong mind in assessing tactical facts, a deep under-standing of tactical detail, an unfaltering spirit and a sternhold on his troops.”112 Such words certainly suggest broadand deep military competence; further analysis will show thatlike his fellow airman Norstad, Kesselring relied on that com-petence plus strategic, political-military vision and personalleadership.

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Comprehensive Professional Knowledge

This section cannot begin to recount all the ways in whichKesselring demonstrated his expansive military competence; afew significant examples will have to suffice to describe hiswell-rounded military genius. He displayed exceptional ad-ministrative talents in the Truppenamt—the shadow GeneralStaff—in Berlin in the 1920s. The simple fact of Kesselring’spresence—in an elite of about 60 cream-of-the-crop officershandpicked by Gen Hans von Seeckt to rejuvenate the Ger-

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Photo courtesy of Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited, London.

Source: Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War (London, Bats-ford, 1978. Reprinted London, Greenhill Books and Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1996).

Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring in 1940

man military—argues that the then captain’s military skill waswell known.113 Most importantly, Kesselring blended his mili-tary vision and organizational talents to build the German airforce from scratch. As chief of staff, Kesselring created the“tactical” Luftwaffe that facilitated the blitzkrieg operationsearly in the war. After pragmatically comparing German in-dustrial conditions, war game results, and Hitler’s political de-mands for fast action, Kesselring canceled plans for a heavybomber and concentrated the Luftwaffe on smaller aircraftand combined-arms tactics—although he would later lamentthe lack of a heavy bomber.114 In Macksey’s words, “the Luft-waffe reflected Kesselring’s image to a truer extent than thoseof his principal collaborators, for although Wever and Milchwere pre-eminent in its initial creation, it was Kesselring,through the decisions forced on him as Chief of Staff by a rap-idly changing political situation of 1936 and 1937, who fixedupon the actual nature of the instrument that went to war in1939 and enabled the Wehrmacht to win so many outstandingvictories.”115

Kesselring had much more than a creator’s or forceprovider’s share of those early victories, however—having al-ready left the staff, he commanded Luftflotte I over Poland in1939. Kesselring divided his time between personal flights toreconnoiter the front lines and visit the troops, and face-to-face coordination with Gen Fedor von Bock, the army groupcommander. In his memoirs, Kesselring noted that “I under-stood the needs and worries of the army too well not to reachcomplete agreement with [von Bock] in brief talks. I was notsubordinate to von Bock, but . . . even in cases where air con-siderations had priority I sought ways and means to satisfythe army. Bock and I both knew we could rely on eachother.”116

After the victory in Poland, Kesselring took over Luftflotte IIfrom Lt Gen Hellmuth Felmy, who was sacked after a securitybreach, and found himself again collaborating with von Bockfor the invasion of Holland. Again adamant about close col-laboration, Kesselring orchestrated both Maj Gen Kurt Stu-dent’s airborne troop insertions and the air support thathelped capture Rotterdam. The Dutch campaign was, how-

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ever, “the last complete victory Kesselring was to win outright,the high water mark of his success.”117 Misled by false intelli-gence and his own optimism, Kesselring would concur in shift-ing the emphasis of the Battle of Britain from Royal Air Forceairfields to London, and thereby lose a battle he might havewon. Subsequently deploying with Luftflotte II to Russia,Kesselring designed a dawn knockout blow on 22 June 1941that “within 24 hours, had demolished the Russian Air Forceon almost every airfield within a 185-mile radius of thefront,”118 but ultimately could not overcome the logisticalproblems that bedeviled Operation Barbarossa. Then, in lightof Rommel’s difficulties supplying his tank corps in Africa,Kesselring was sent to the Mediterranean to consolidate andprotect Axis sea lines of communication.119

In Macksey’s words, the man who assumed the mantle oftheater command in the Mediterranean was already “the epit-ome of the ideal modern commander, who shrewdly and un-selfishly balances the demands of co-operation between theservices and forswears service prejudices”;120 over the nextthree years, he would prove time and again that he meldedthat joint mindset to deep military understanding. Kesselringstarted by focusing his air effort on reducing Malta, a Britishair and naval bastion just south of Sicily, ordering construc-tion of over 1,000 small barges and ferries, and persuading“the Duce to employ the carefully preserved Italian battle fleetfor securing convoys. On 17 December [1941] the first convoyin several months reached the North African coast, and thevessels were unloaded in Tripoli and Benghasi.”121 Embold-ened by his reestablished supply lines, Rommel began toclamor for another offensive; Kesselring proved for the first ofmany times his superior comprehension of the entire theaterby demanding—from Hitler and the German High Command(OKW)—a takeover of Malta first to ensure logistic success.When Rommel declared in June 1942 his armies could be inCairo in 10 days, Kesselring warned he could furnish neitherlogistical nor air support:

I agree, of course, that the beaten enemy should be pursued tothe limits of possibility . . . But if the advance is continued, even

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with a minimum of fighting . . . replacements to the requisiteamount cannot be expected for a long time.

[Speaking for the Luftwaffe], my airmen will land near the Nilecompletely exhausted . . . yet with totally inadequate supplies.. . . As an airman, I consider it madness to attack [the intactBritish air forces]. In view of the decisive importance of air co-operation, from this standpoint alone I must reject the proposalto continue our advance with the objective Cairo.122

Events proved Kesselring right; after Hitler decided in favorof Rommel’s plan, “only twenty per cent of the supplies re-quired reached North Africa and the British Air Force, virtuallyunopposed by an exhausted Luftwaffe, tore the Axis lines ofcommunication to pieces.”123

Thereafter, Kesselring—now, by Hitler’s decree, a joint forcecommander in fact as well as name—turned his attention torepulsing an expected Allied landing in the western Mediter-ranean,124 and began to display impressive feats of general-ship. Gen Paul Deichmann, then the chief of staff to Kessel-ring’s air commander, recalled the manner in which the CINCsynthesized early reports of blacked-out ships sailing thestraits of Gibraltar into a picture of Allied landings and di-rected U-boats to intercept the convoys before receiving con-firmation of the Torch operations.125 “Lacking both a plan andthe forces to support strong intervention,” Macksey has ar-gued “the manner in which Kesselring improvised to stabilisethe situation and create a strong German bridgehead inTunisia is all the more impressive.”126 According to the biog-rapher, Kesselring discerned British Gen Bernard L. Mont-gomery’s methodical nature in the east, stiffened German re-solve by ordering retreating forces to counterattack whenAmerican tanks threatened Tunis on 25 November, stole theinitiative from Eisenhower in the west, and personally “pro-duced the master plan which was to lead to the infamousAmerican debacle at Kasserine.”127 Kesselring made mistakes,such as nearly ordering a disastrous counterattack on 24March 1942,128 but on the whole performed well under pres-sure. Unable to convince Hitler to permit a withdrawal, how-

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ever, the CINC watched from Sicily as the Allies capturedTunisia on 12 May.

From that point on, Kesselring proved himself a master ofdefensive warfare. In Sicily Kesselring overturned existingWehrmacht doctrine by stripping the Luftwaffe of all its flakguns; ringed the straits of Messina with torpedo boats, sub-marines, and 500 antiaircraft and coastal artillery pieces; andordered the evacuation of the island without waiting for OKWapproval—thereby saving 60,000 Germans, 75,000 Italians,and nearly all their tanks and guns.129 After containing the Al-lied landings at Salerno, Kesselring gave up the toe and heelof Italy, consolidated his forces, and began constructing fall-back defensive positions up the Italian boot. As the US Fifthand British Eighth Armies slowly advanced, Kesselring devel-oped five contingency plans for possible Allied landings inItaly, and “because a commander without reserves is unableto exert any influence over the course of a battle” pulled divi-sions from the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies to create an armygroup reserve in Rome.130 On 18 January 1944, Kesselringcommitted those reserve divisions to prevent a British break-through in central Italy, then had to implement contingencyplan “Richard” (for Rome) without reserves as the US VI Corpslanded at Anzio on 22 January.131 Reacting quickly despitebeing caught off guard, Kesselring ignored the Tenth Army’srequest to withdraw in central Italy and shifted forces to con-tain the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead.132 Kesselring and GenEberhard von Mackensen, the Fourteenth Army commander,planned a counterattack that failed to eject the Allies due tolack of supplies and Hitler’s insistence on using a training reg-iment (the Infantry Lehr, or demonstration, regiment) thatbroke and ran under fire.133 Despite the failure, Kesselring’sforces prevented the British and Americans from linking upand created “a strategic stalemate which was actually a victoryfor the Germans.”134 It would take another four months beforethe Allies, who knew the Germans’ weak spots and seamsthrough Ultra, would threaten Rome—and Clark’s successwas in large part because von Mackensen erred in the deploy-ment of his troops and refused to release the reserves Kessel-ring directed into western and central Italy.135 Then, even

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after the loss of Rome, Kesselring’s final defensive line—theGothic Line in northern Italy—held until spring 1945.

From the foregoing, Kesselring’s comprehensive militaryability should be evident, even though many German generalsdenigrated Kesselring’s decisions both during and after thewar. Rommel spent the better part of two years insisting thatKesselring’s strategy could not work, suggested giving up all ofItaly south of the Alps in early 1943, and nearly convincedHitler to transfer the CINC to Norway; the sacked von Mack-ensen blamed Kesselring for his defeat.136 (See fig. 1) Even vonVietinghoff, who generally agreed with Kesselring, accused hisCINC of sometimes misunderstanding defensive land war-fare.137 In a detailed analysis of Kesselring’s decision making,however, Capt Teddy D. Bitner, US Army, concluded that thefield marshal’s reactions were swift, logical, and sound.138

Macksey opined that the “massacre” of the 36th American Di-vision in central Italy in January 1944 was due to Kesselring’sdecision to deploy his reserves, and Gen Siegfried Westphal,

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Source: Thomas E. Griess, ed., Atlas for the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (Wayne,N.J.: Avery Publishing Group). Adapted by Lt Col Howard D. Belote.

Figure 1. Allied Advances in Italy, 1943–44

who served as first Rommel’s, then Kesselring’s chief of staff,believed an Allied breakthrough at that time would have been“irreparable.”139 After the war, General von Vietinghoff pro-vided a worthwhile summary of Kesselring’s military skill:“Having been called in by our Italian ally to assist them, thefew German divisions in southern and central Italy were con-fronted with an apparently hopeless situation on the conclu-sion of the Italian armistice in September 1943. Contrary to allexpectations, the divisions scattered between the Strait ofMessina and northwards of Rome were successfully assem-bled in time and put up such a resistance to the Allied armies,which were superior in every respect, that it was only brokenafter twenty months of very severe fighting.”140

Strategic Vision/Political-Military Understanding

General von Vietinghoff’s allusion to the Italian armisticehints at the “situations of exacting political and diplomaticcomplexity” in which Kesselring was embroiled.141 More thanperhaps any other German, and in stark contrast to Rommel,Kesselring understood both the military and geopolitical valueof the Mediterranean theater. For almost two years, he strovediplomatically to keep the Italians in the war; he spent anotheryear cajoling the Italians into neutrality so he could focus hismeager forces against the advancing British and Americans.Armed with insight into the differing cultures, personalities,and motivations of Axis leaders—most notably Hitler, Mus-solini, and the Italian King—Kesselring walked a diplomatictightrope not unlike the one Norstad would walk in NATO adecade later.

As did Norstad, Kesselring appears to have developed hispolitical insights through self-study. The field marshalskipped the PME his contemporaries received; he movedstraight from the Western Front’s trenches into service as aGeneral Staff officer, without the requisite extensive schooling.While the available sources fail to mention what or how muchKesselring read, they do suggest he sought and received abroadbased strategic education through personal contacts. Asa General Staff officer to the II and III Bavarian Army Corps,Kesselring noted “I came into frequent personal contact with

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the C.-in-C. [sic], Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. We wereinvited to his table in turn, where the Crown Prince dominatedthe conversation. Whether the topic was politics, art, geogra-phy, history or statecraft, he had a mastery of it.”142 At Rup-precht’s table, the lieutenant learned about diplomacy and“the necessity of a civilising influence” from “a prince and sol-dier of deep and wide-ranging education whose insight intostatecraft far out-reached that of the Kaiser . . . nothing wasto be wasted in this schooling of his intellect.”143 The futureCINC continued his education during his service in Berlin. Ac-cording to Macksey, Kesselring gravitated toward the “urbane,cosmopolitan and artistic” von Seeckt, who

held Kesselring in high esteem among the bright young men hegathered around him in the inner circle of the Truppenamt. Itwas in Kesselring’s rooms that they frequently met for informaldiscussions which covered a multitude of subjects outside themilitary curriculum, and here that the Hauptmann of “good all-round knowledge” and “excellent powers of expression” sharp-ened his intellect upon the hone of his general’s vast experi-ence. . . . The liberal-minded von Seeckt relished suchsophisticated company as this and here Kesselring put a glossupon his techniques of diplomacy and organising. . . . Thesewere the tricks of a trade which he learnt to perfection in equip-ping himself for a task which, with trained foresight, he mayeven dimly have visualised.144

Whether through foresight or not, Kesselring developed an in-ternational awareness generally lacking among World War IIGerman leaders.

Throughout his memoirs and in nearly all of the postwar in-terviews he gave and studies he wrote, Kesselring complainedthat Hitler’s thoughts and the OKW’s strategies were rooted inthe Continent and that the Mediterranean theater was treatedas an afterthought.145 The German CINC, on the other hand,saw a great deal of political and military value in the theater.He told the US Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) that theGermans should have made “it a main theater of operations,knowing how important the Mediterranean was for theBritish”;146 elsewhere, he and his chief subordinates outlinedwhy North Africa and Italy were important to the Axis powers.

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General von Vietinghoff, Kesselring’s Tenth Army commander,summarized his CINC’s reasoning as having “(a) A purely mil-itary aspect: To keep the front, and also enemy airfields, as faraway from the southern frontier of Germany as possible; [and](b) A political aspect: To maintain the newly formed ItalianFascist Republic under Mussolini with Rome as capital andCity of the Holy See and thereby give it an important moralboost in the eyes of the Italian people and of world opinion.”147

To those ends, Kesselring designed all his strategies to keepGermany and Italy engaged together against the Allies—first inLibya and Tunisia, then Sicily, and finally during the fightingwithdrawal up the Italian peninsula.

In contrast with Kesselring’s comprehension of the theater’smilitary and political nuances, Rommel appears to have seenonly the military side of the theater equation—and he dis-agreed even then with Kesselring’s judgment. Once his armieshad been repulsed in Egypt, Rommel advocated an immediatewithdrawal, not only from Africa but also from all of Italy. Hewanted to retreat to the Alps, thereby consolidating Germandefenses on interior lines and denying the Allies opportunitiesto attack along the Italian coastline. General von Vietinghoffdismissed the Rommel plan, which would have meant the lossof considerable political prestige; “the very important contri-bution made by Italian war industries and agriculture to theAxis potential”; the Po valley, “where the Allied Air Force couldassemble in any strength required”; and would have caused“the complete reversal of the German overall situation in theBalkans and in France.”148 Kesselring recalled his apprecia-tion of the situation: “I condemned at the time Rommel’s hurryto get out of Tripolitania and Tunis as quickly as possible, andto give up Italy, since it would influence the conduct and out-come of the war. Rommel and Bonin [Rommel’s chief of staff]think as Army men. I recollect that I strove to keep the war aslong as possible and as far as possible away from the homearea so that effective air warfare could not be carried into Ger-many. . . . Therefore I fought for my idea by argument and ac-tion.”149

Convinced that “the state of public opinion in Italy de-manded that Tunisia be held at all costs,” otherwise “sooner or

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later Italy would withdraw from the war,”150 Kesselring workedto shore up his coalition’s will to fight. He moved his head-quarters to Frascati (near Rome) to maintain personal contactwith the Italian High Command, acted as intermediary be-tween the Italians and Vichy French to lay the politicalgroundwork for the defense of Tunisia, and personally directedthat six-month-long defense.151 After losing that battle, theCINC “accomplished a quite remarkable feat of solo diplomacyin overcoming Italian obstruction” and assembled a force of 12Italian and two mobile German divisions for the defense ofSicily.152 As Macksey has noted, “it was politics and diplomacythat governed the flow of military reinforcement,”153 andKesselring understood both well enough to acquire the forceshe needed to effect military action.

In keeping the Italians in the war, Kesselring had to rely onhis political-military understanding of both the Italians andthe Germans, for leaders on both sides were often at cross-purposes. Macksey, for one, has highlighted the “environmentof international intrigue and deceit” in which Kesselring hadto re-cement “the alliance upon which the defence of Ger-many’s southern flank depended.”154 The field marshal hadnot only to move carefully among Mussolini, the king, andGeneral Ambrosio, the anti-German chief of the ComandoSupremo; he had to execute his strategy as Rommel undercuthis position with Hitler. In fact, Hitler concocted a plan (Oper-ation Axis) to disarm the Italians and place Rommel in overallcommand.155 Kesselring merely persevered with his plans andpersuaded the Italians to accept four divisions and a panzercorps that had earlier been declined by Mussolini, frustratedHitler’s scheme to kidnap the king, and convinced the Germanhierarchy to continue the dialogue with the war-weary Ital-ians. “Crude military intervention,” he argued, “would imme-diately initiate a confrontation that would cut communicationswith the south and also overstretch the German forces.”156 Inhis biographer’s words, “It is a tribute to Kesselring’s percep-tion and dominating ability that . . . he could steer a consis-tent course through a maze of contradictions and emerge atthe centre with his integrity and aims virtually intact. . . .Eventually, ‘by seduction, not rape,’ as the US Official History

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puts it, the Brenner Pass fell peacefully into German hands.At once a flood of German troops was poured into Italy.”157 Al-most alone among German military men, Kesselring demon-strated a keen understanding of coalition psychology and ma-nipulated that understanding to his benefit.

Events would soon force the theater commander to spend asmuch effort keeping the Italians out of the war as he previ-ously had keeping them in it; as before, he would realize con-siderable diplomatic success. On 8 September 1943, Allied airforces bombed Rome, and Italian morale collapsed. “Crawlingfrom beneath the rubble” of his bombed-out headquarters,Kesselring immediately activated contingency plan “Axis” tosecure Rome and “capitalise on the Italians’ shock to preventtheir collaboration with the approaching Allied invasion.”158

Through bluff and hard bargaining—Kesselring threatened tobomb Rome and destroy the aqueducts if the Italian negotia-tors refused his terms—the Germans in southern Italy engi-neered the surrender of a large number of Italian troops andtheir weapons. The terms, however, were not draconian—Kesselring ignored a telegram from Rommel instructing him to“send all Italian soldiers to Germany as prisoners of war.”159

Instead, Rome would remain an open city, Italian troops wouldbe allowed to work for the Germans as long as they laid downtheir arms, and Italian troops would maintain order in thecity.160 Although he complained that “the work of disarmingthe Italians and storing away arms, munitions, and materialin safety occupied more time and men than I liked in view ofthe tactical developments at Salerno,” Kesselring “had won an-other truly remarkable diplomatic victory with the minimum offorce.”161 He followed that with a similar success, convincingthe Italians to assist in the extensive demolition program thataccompanied the German withdrawal from Sardinia.162

Clearly, Kesselring’s political, diplomatic, and strategic in-sights facilitated his defensive military successes.

In his memoirs, the imprisoned field marshal summarizedhis beliefs about commanders and politics. Emphasizing thathe did not refer to “the special case of the Third Reich,” Kessel-ring wrote,

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I require of every senior officer in a high position of authoritythe political discernment which will help him to obtain a deepand proper insight into events of political life within and with-out his own country. This perception should enable such an of-ficer to play his part as responsible adviser to the head of thestate with full knowledge of his responsibility, to foresee mili-tary requirements, and at the same time to accommodate themto political circumstances. This delicate but indispensable col-laboration may, of course, lead to serious conflicts of conscienceand to external disputes in which the military leader must takeinto consideration the effects of his attitude on foreign policy.

In the above I [want] to emphasise that an officer, above all ahigh-ranking officer, stands above parties, but also that everysoldier owes obedience to the legal government and the legalform of state.

One more point: there is an inner contradiction between politicsand soldiering. Only exceptional persons can combine the two.. . . A division of power seems to me the sound solution. Thefact, however, remains that troops are as good or as bad as theircommander. The age of enlightenment we live in demands an of-ficer who can grasp the interrelations of politics and explainthem to his men.163

Even if one discounts the middle paragraph as an attemptby a condemned man to mollify his captors—and Macksey, thebiographer, would not, pointing to Kesselring’s ramrod-straight, unyielding testimony at his court-martial—Kessel-ring’s own incisive “political discernment” permeates his argu-ment. Certainly, he was one of those “exceptional persons”who could combine politics and military art.

Leadership and Personal Diplomacy

As did all the successful commanders examined thus far,Kesselring joined an impressive set of personal leadershipskills to his military competence and strategic vision. In con-junction with his reading of the political situation, Kesselringhad the self-confidence and talent to subordinate himself andachieve his aims with the Italians through conciliation, notcommand. Ever present at the front lines, he used his consid-

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erable energy and charisma to buoy often demoralized soldiersand airmen. Most importantly, Kesselring passed the ultimatetest of leadership. On a number of occasions, the CINC riskedhis career by defying Hitler’s explicit instructions. In so doing,he saved many German and Italian lives and contributed pos-itively to the postwar peace.

Where Kesselring’s political-military insight helped himunderstand the Italian reluctance to have a German CINC,his personal diplomatic skills allowed him to subordinatewhatever selfish desires for command he may have had andinstall a liaison system which indirectly achieved his com-mand objectives. Immediately after arriving in theater,Kesselring

found out the difficulties of a coalition command. . . . CountCavallero, the Italian chief of staff, could not swallow the pill ofhanding over to me all the Italian military, naval, and air for-mations. . . . He protested that this arrangement was tanta-mount to giving up an independent command.

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Photo courtesy of Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited, London.

Source: Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War (London, Bats-ford, 1978. Reprinted London, Greenhill Books and Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1996).

Field Marshal Kesselring in His Focke-Wulf 189

Half-measures would get us nowhere; so, ignoring Hitler’s in-structions, I waived my claims to an over-all command, but in-sisted in return on an even closer and more confidential co-operation on the Italian side than had originally beencontemplated. Cavallero gave me his word that no operationalorders should be issued for the Italy-Africa war zone by the Co-mando Supremo without my oral or written agreement—apromise that was kept.164

Kesselring safeguarded his concession and ultimately dom-inated the Italian command by placing a German operationssection within the Comando Supremo and then “staffing it withso many men that the original Italian establishment was out-numbered.”165 Still, it was the field marshal’s personal diplo-macy that kept the coalition operating for nearly two years.After the war, Kesselring opined “that this concession, affect-ing the national prestige and highly cultivated pride of the Ital-ians, was the prime factor in the success of our collaboration.I have always preferred a voluntary collaboration based onmutual trust to a constrained submission.”166

To illustrate Kesselring’s broad personal abilities, the con-trast with Rommel is again instructive. Not only did the panzercommander fail to see the strategic value of the theater, he wasunable to overcome his own ego and the German army had topay the price. Kesselring noted that “Rommel was unwilling tobudge an inch to avoid treading on the corns of the suscepti-ble Italians”; his intransigence, along with secretive, distrust-ful behavior added to “the difficulties of the coalition com-mand—Rommel was, after all, subordinate to . . . the ComandoSupremo.”167 Macksey has described the penalty the Germanspaid for the hard line Rommel adopted in northern Italy as theItalians withdrew from the war:

Forsaking any pretence at negotiation with the Italians, heruthlessly took prisoner and transported to Germany those whowould not at once join with the Germans, and thereby incitedan antagonism which was to reverberate into the future. ThoseItalians who were not captured cached their arms or fled withthem into the hills. When the partisan war later broke out on alarge scale it was in the north that it was most severe, whereRommel had failed to collect arms, rather than in the centre

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and south, where Kesselring and Westphal had persuaded theItalians to hand them in.168

With characteristic understatement, Kesselring remarkedsimply “Rommel, too, would have been better advised if he haddemobilised the Italians in the north, instead of letting themdesert en masse to form the nucleus of the partisan guerillabands.”169

In addition to a “constructive negotiating ability dextrouslymixed with firmness and humanity,”170 Kesselring possessednearly limitless reserves of optimism, and he strove constantlyto spread that optimism to his men. “Hope was about the onlyluxury remaining to the Axis and nobody attempted to inject itmore than Kesselring”; the CINC steadied his coalition part-ners and flew his personal aircraft on frequent frontline visitsuntil uncontestable Allied air supremacy—Kesselring was shotdown five times—made him stop.171 Much as his opponentEisenhower had to absorb his subordinates’ disappointmentsand doubts “to force them on to accomplishments, which theyregard as impossible,” Kesselring encouraged “the command-ers in the field with acts of undiluted optimism in which he didnot entirely believe [but had to] constantly play [to] do hisduty.”172 Kesselring’s operations chief, Col Dietrich Beelitz, re-ported that “at least three days a week, and sometimes more,the Field-Marshal went to visit units at the front . . . atdawn.”173 Macksey elaborated further: 70 percent of theCINC’s time was spent visiting division headquarters in turn,“encouraging the men under training, assessing their fightingspirit and endeavouring to make his command self-sufficientby harmonising consumption with the limited resources to beobtained from Germany.”174 One of Kesselring’s inspectiontrips nearly cost him his life. On 25 October 1944, Kesselring’scar collided with a long-barreled gun; his convalescence for asevere concussion put him out of action for three months.175

Kesselring consistently placed moral considerations at theforefront of his decision making and was frequently able tocounter Mussolini’s and Hitler’s immoral excesses—for exam-ple, Hitler’s plan to kidnap the Italian king.176 Significantly,the CINC blocked nearly all of the Führer’s orders for troops tostand and die. General von Vietinghoff characterized Hitler’s

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“strategic theory” as “wherever the German soldier has set foothe will remain”;177 Kesselring first opposed one of Hitler’s die-in-place orders during Rommel’s retreat from El Alamein.General Westphal, then Rommel’s chief of staff, recalled thatKesselring appeared “as the rescuing angel” and assumed fullresponsibility for recommencing the retreat before cablingHitler for a change of orders, allowing the Afrikakorps to “[es-cape] destruction in the nick of time.”178 Blaming himself forwaiting too long to evacuate Tunisia (again in the face of astand-and-fight order), Kesselring ordered the Sicilian with-drawal without informing Hitler or the OKW.179 In June 1944,as the Allies advanced on Rome, Kesselring met Hitler person-ally to press for a free hand in conducting his mobile defense;after guaranteeing “to delay the Allied advance appreciably, tohalt it at latest in the Apennines” and thereby prolong the warinto 1945, Kesselring earned Hitler’s acquiescence.180 Accord-ing to Macksey, “to no other commander, not even tofavourites such as Göring, Guderian, or Rommel, did Hitlermake such concessions at this stage of the war.”181 At thesame time, Kesselring issued orders to protect Rome andItaly’s ancient works of art––forbidding, for example, Germansoldiers from entering the Monte Cassino monastery.182 Fi-nally, Kesselring defied the most despicable orders from theNazi regime. Because it would have caused widespread star-vation, Kesselring refused a Schutzstaffeln (SS) proposal toevacuate the population of Rome. And despite being told “youwait until after the war. Then we will deal with the GeneralStaff,” the commander in chief prevented SS chief Reichs-führer-SS Heinrich Himmler’s order to arrest 800 Jews by sim-ple inertia. At his trial, Kesselring remarked “we did not detailany troops for the order . . . and therefore this order was notcarried out and he could not arrest these people.”183 Kessel-ring’s leadership example is tainted by his association with theNazi regime, for he remained loyal enough to Hitler to call hima genius in an interview immediately following the Germansurrender.184 However, he performed far more admirably thanmost of his contemporaries, and “came as near as did anybodyto solving the dilemma of survival in resistance to Hitler with-out fatally sacrificing integrity.”185

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Summary

In his memoirs, Kesselring declared himself “both an armyand an air-force officer.” Having held both air and army groupcommands, he believed himself “in a position to appreciate thetasks of individual commanders in both services” and de-manded of all commanders “a high degree of knowledge andunderstanding of the rudiments of all three arms.”186 In apostwar interrogation on 17 September 1945, Field MarshalKesselring recapitulated all the skills required of theater com-manders in chief. Alluding to comprehensive military knowl-edge, Kesselring recommended “General Staff officers whohave if possible had experience in administering and control-ling all three branches.” Of strategic acumen, the former CINCsuggested “the Supreme Commander would not have to be anairman, although airmen in [my] opinion most often have theglobal view of strategy which is necessary for modern war.” Ofleadership, he stated simply “more important requisites for the

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Photo courtesy of Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited, London.

Source: Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War (London, Bats-ford, 1978. Reprinted London, Greenhill Books and Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1996).

Field Marshals Erwin J. Rommel and Albrecht Kesselring

Supreme Commander would be character, humbleness, andintegrity.”187 Kesselring’s experience suggests that an airmancan excel in theater command and highlights the qualities anyofficer—soldier, sailor, airman, or marine—must have to suc-ceed as a CINC. Although he fought on the wrong side in WorldWar II, Kesselring is, along with his contemporaries Eisen-hower, Devers, and Norstad, worthy of further study and em-ulation by the American military professional.

Contemporary PerspectivesIf you constrain yourself to military thinking and mili-tary learning, you’re going to be fairly narrow. More andmore, senior officers have to be a blend of diplomat,statesman, humanitarian.

—Gen Anthony Zinni

The World War II and cold war experiences discussed thusfar are consistent in their definitions of CINC qualities. But arethose qualities relevant to the present? Late twentieth-centuryexperience provides a number of perspectives on the require-ments for theater CINCs; significantly, those perspectives mir-ror the ones from 40 to 50 years ago. Almost unanimously,more recent holders of high command, as well as many ana-lysts who have studied CINC performance, underscore thequalities of competence, strategic insight, and leadership de-scribed thus far. If anything, they give greater emphasis to theunderstanding of political-military interrelations. According toone student of the subject,

the nature of the international economic system has undergonea radical transformation, creating new forms of interdepend-ence and rivalries. . . . International institutions have, as a con-sequence, undergone both rapid proliferation and diversifica-tion in the military and nonmilitary realms alike, and thedistinction between the two, in terms of conceptions of nationalsecurity and national interest as such, is diminishing. The[CINCs], in other words, have had to adapt in their respectiveleadership roles to larger political, technological, and economiccircumstances over which they have had, to a greater or lesserdegree, little or no direct control.188

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How, then, have recent leaders and their observers depictedthe attributes they relied on to adapt to modern circum-stances?

Command Perspectives

One richly experienced officer, former joint task force com-mander, SACEUR, and CJCS, General Shalikashvili, usedwords that could have been spoken by his predecessors Eisen-hower and Norstad to describe the requirements for joint andcoalition command. When asked what a geographic CINCdoes, General Shalikashvili responded

I think we principally select CINCs to be able to function in war. . . the principal reason [is] his ability to conduct strategic/op-erational level war in his theater. In reality, he does relativelylittle of that. Most of what he does is in the political-militaryfield. . . . but the first thing that [the CJCS and SecDef] askedwas “if war broke out in [a given theater], who would be the bestguy of those available to conduct combat operations.”

[To be effective], he needs an ability to conduct combat ops, tounderstand joint operations. Close on the heels of that, heneeds an ability to swim in political-military waters. He has tohave personality and understand strategic issues.189

While the general touched on political savvy and personalskills, he emphasized broad professional expertise, noting thateven though a CINC’s outlook is strategic, he has to be wellgrounded operationally. Referring to his NATO experience,Shalikashvili described a command structure wherein hismajor subordinate commands were each joint, and asked “Sowhere does the CINC get his air, naval, [or ground] componentadvice? The staff? He doesn’t call the four-stars in and say‘what do we do.’ That says the CINC has to be competent onhis own . . . that’s where the benefit of [having held] seniorcomponent command is vital.”190

Finally, Shalikashvili insisted that comprehensive knowl-edge of one’s own service had to be accompanied by broadknowledge of sister-service capabilities. He cautioned airmento remember the Army’s “cultural perception that you must be

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really grounded in doctrine to lead.”191 To command jointforces, one must be able to communicate effectively with mem-bers of each component. Effective communication requires abroad understanding of each component’s doctrine and tacti-cal/operational outlook.

It is ironic that Shalikashvili, a former NATO supreme com-mander, hammered home the theme of joint expertise, formost commentators see SACEUR as being a primarily politicalposition. From Norstad’s time on, dual-hatted SACEUR/UScommanders in chief, Europe (CINCEUR) have delegated day-to-day supervision of their American forces to their deputies.General Powell, for example, argued “that [deputy commanderin chief, Europe] DCINCEUR, a four-star officer, is a CINC forall practical purposes even though subordinate toSACEUR.”192 Three former DCINCEURs identified the sameCINC attributes as Shalikashvili, but two of them reversedtheir former boss’s order and stressed the political elements ofthe position. General Boyd highlighted political-military un-derstanding and personal qualities, saying “most CINCs haverisen through [strategic] vision, great intellect, and under-standing of how to meld resources to political-military objec-tives.”193 Similarly, Gen James L. Jamerson, Boyd’s successor,believed that “a CINC is mostly a political animal. . . . Hetracks US interests, and works with allies and ambassa-dors.”194

Boyd’s predecessor, Gen James P. McCarthy, gave a bal-anced assessment of a commander’s need of strategic insightand joint competence in an article for the Naval War CollegeReview, “Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations.” Mc-Carthy, who outlined requirements for both theater-levelcoalition commanders and their subordinates, demandedbroad joint knowledge to ensure optimal use of military re-sources: “the major impediment to a commander using thebest forces available is the absence of knowledge about the ca-pabilities offered by sister-services and special operatingforces. Therefore, it is essential to educate those leaders on thecapabilities offered by the full spectrum of forces to enablethem to . . . combine unique capabilities in a complementaryfashion.”195

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The deputy commander in chief (DCINC) then turned to na-tional and international political understanding. In Clause-witzian fashion, he observed that “there is no military opera-tion of any significance that does not have politicalconsequences. . . . commanders must be constantly aware ofthe political impact of the actions in the United States andaround the world.”196 He also echoed Eisenhower’s ideas oncoalition command. Multinational operations, argued Mc-Carthy, represent both the toughest and most essential mili-tary endeavors; therefore, commanders must emphasize “in-ternational political support, occasionally at some expense tooperational efficiency.”197 Finally, he focused on American pol-icy and noted that a commander “must be sensitive to the per-spectives and concerns of [his superiors] and where the con-sensus is going in Washington on strategic policy issues.”198

The general suggested constant communication with Pentagonleaders, from joint staff directors through the secretary of de-fense, to maintain a feel for “the Pentagon’s perspective,” be-cause “as operations unfold, circumstances change, and polit-ical objectives shift, neither the mission nor the tasks arelikely to remain constant.”199 In McCarthy’s view, the CINCmust combine his knowledge of world and Washington politicsto be able to discern his mission.

General Horner, who experienced the national and interna-tional interplay of coalition operations firsthand during thePersian Gulf War, agreed with McCarthy’s take on political in-sight. The Desert Storm air commander and later CINC, SpaceCommand (SPACECOM) phrased it thusly:

I think it is vital for a CINC to understand the role of the uni-fied command vis-à-vis his boss, the SecDef, and his compo-nent commanders. Here is [a quote] to keep, from GeneralGeorge Crist: “The role of the unified command is to create theenvironment needed for the components to prosecute the war.”Of course, the war may be nothing more than humanitarian re-lief, it may be getting other nations to work with the US in se-curity policy matters, or it may be a coalition in wartime.

[To create that environment, the CINC] must trust and promoteharmony among his components, . . . [and] know how to work

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Washington, e.g., the pitfalls in the Joint and Service staffs andmore importantly with the SecDef and Chairman . . . He will [go]before the President—and you don’t get two chances to screwthat up so he must be deliberate and thoughtful—but at theend of the day he better have the strength of character to say“no” when appropriate. Yes-men are of little value to anyone.200

In other words, the CINC has the responsibility not only tocarry out Washington’s policy directives but also to use hisknowledge of the US and theater political situations to helpguide American policy decisions.

Gen Fred F. Woerner, CINC of the US Southern Command(SOUTHCOM) in the late 1980s, reiterated the foregoing eval-uation of high command, observing that “area [strategic] com-petence, professional competence, and diplomacy in its broad-est context—call it leadership, call it personnel skills”201—arethe core requirements for successful CINCs. He considered the“duality of [his] career central to effectiveness as a CINC,” andachieved that “by balancing two careers: one pol/mil, onestraight military.”202 Starting as a captain, the general “fol-lowed politics, economics, culture, and religion” to develop abroad-based expertise but stayed “d--n proficient in the coreelements of the military profession. I tried not to be a [regionalpolitics] scholar who dabbles in the military, but a great sol-dier who’s also a profound student of [regional politics].”203

General Woerner combined that blend of skills with personaldiplomatic ability, noting the importance and difficulty of com-municating with a CINC’s counterparts, both foreign andAmerican: “When you get down to it, [the CINC must alwaysask] ‘how do I advance US foreign policy?’ Diplomacy and tact-fulness play [a big role] in dealing with . . . ambassadors, allof whom are cognizant they’re the senior American in country.Without a rapport, you cannot implement policy, and you putall military members of the country team in jeopardy. So, youtalk to the Chairman, to the other CINCs, and the servicechiefs. . . . You’re in constant communication with the StateDepartment and Congress, and you write a little. [What reallycounts] is the personal relations you develop.”204

General Woerner explained in detail the problems of am-biguous top-level guidance at which Generals Devers and Mc-

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Carthy had hinted, noting that “the CINC is not just at thestrategic level of policy—he’s at an ephemeral, philosophicallevel . . . He must understand the amorphous nature of policy.It doesn’t come from the top down, really; it comes from the in-teraction of the ambassadors, and from requests for direction. . . No one ever handed me a Presidential paper from which Igot my mission . . . I got direction when I asked [national lead-ers] ‘please order me to do this.’”205

CINC credibility and effectiveness in the often-hazy worldpolitical arena, then, demand a robust combination of skills inthe three broad categories of military proficiency, strategic vi-sion, and personality.

Observer Perspectives

Scholarly analysis of the problems faced by top-level com-manders has, on the whole, concurred with the precedingviewpoints; if anything, outside analysts have emphasizedeven more strongly the political-military aspects of high com-mand. For example, in Beyond the Battlefield, a 1981 study ofboth military leadership and civil-military relations, Sam C.Sarkesian rejected Samuel P. Huntington’s contention thatmilitary leaders should strive to be apolitical. Instead, heagreed with sociologist Morris Janowitz—and leaders like Gen-eral Woerner—that the military professional must “develop po-litical-social insights to deal with political-military issues andthe ambiguous nature of the security environment.”206 Sarke-sian acknowledged “that battlefield skills and technology re-main important ingredients of military professionalism” butdemanded that military leaders “develop the intellectual toolsand insights to appreciate the interdependence between warand politics.”207 Furthermore, he argued, military leadersmust understand “the nature of the environment in which theleadership role must be performed,”208 and realize that “tolead, therefore, means the art of influencing people, both mil-itary and civilian, to accomplish a particular goal in a [partic-ular] political-cultural setting. . . . [This requires] political as-tuteness, imagination, [and] a mind sensitive to and experiencedin the essentials of human behavior and human motiva-tion.”209

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Even though Sarkesian was more concerned with domesticthan international political insights—he wrote as much to de-scribe the military’s role in society as to advise future lead-ers—he nevertheless described precisely the qualities pre-scribed by and for multinational commanders.

Analysis of some recent multiservice and multinational op-erations has focused on joint and combined task forces(J/CTF)––one level below CINCs––but the lessons foundtherein correspond almost directly with the experiences oftheater commanders. US Atlantic Command (USACOM) after-action report from Operation Uphold Democracy, the effort torestore the popularly elected government of Jean BertrandAristide to Haiti, sounded once again the themes of jointnessand strategic acumen. It recommended revamped training andservice school education for JTF commanders and staffs, who“lacked sufficient knowledge of . . . interoperability” and cau-tioned that “the MNF [multinational force] commander has ex-tensive political military responsibilities.”210 Those responsi-bilities included maintaining the “fragile” MNF cohesion,which “varied with changes in the political and economic fac-tors affecting [the participants’] motivations.”211 Maj JohnMetz, who studied the humanitarian relief Operations ProvideComfort and Restore Hope, agreed, saying “consensus is themost critical element for sustaining multilateral action.”212 “Tobetter prepare himself and his organization,” Metz declared“the commander must understand both the military and civil-ian factors influencing operations within his region of theworld” and must communicate effectively with civilian andmilitary superiors and a range of governmental and civilian or-ganizations.213 Examining Operation Provide Comfort, StateDepartment employee Robert E. Sorenson acknowledged theproblem of synchronizing “many agencies’ activities at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels,” and wrote of thecommander’s need “to shape the ‘political’ area of opera-tions.”214 He stressed that “the skills demanded of the militarycommander were uniquely ‘political’ in nature and requiredsubstantial courage . . . [because] field initiatives often super-seded Washington instructions as to the best course of action”and highlighted consensus building, coordination, and flexi-

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bility.215 Navy Capt Terry J. Pudas summed it up simply: “Un-derstanding the complexities of coalitions and successfully ex-ecuting coalition warfare requires a unique combination of po-litical and military prowess.”216

Lt Gen John H. Cushman, US Army, has provided a suc-cinct yet comprehensive analysis of command at JTF level andabove. Cushman, who retired in 1978 after serving as com-mandant of the Army Command and General Staff College andcommanding a combined corps group in Korea, explored thecategories of military, interpersonal, and political talent in hishandbook Thoughts for Joint Commanders. Joint commanders,the general suggested, require “objectivity reflecting broadmultiservice professional competence” to reach correct deci-sions and develop fingerspitzengefühl, a German term denot-ing acute awareness of the entire battle space.217 To achievethat competence, he recommended starting “early in life tostudy other-Service forces, their ways of operating, and theircultures.”218 He also discussed the personal skills necessaryto meld joint and multinational forces into cohesive teams,calling for “genuine empathy for national sensitivities andpride, leading by understanding persuasion, sound thinking,and . . . a steady hand, robust liaison, and adept use of team-building techniques.”219 Cushman acknowledged the need forstrategic vision capable of discerning, when necessary, devel-oping, and accomplishing the mission:

Political and strategic direction to the multinational force willlikely be the ambiguous product of negotiation and compro-mise, augmented for its US commander by guidance from hisUS-only chain of command and perhaps by policy input from alocal American ambassador of other US authority. Authoritiesat each nation’s seat of government will be giving their own in-structions to their national forces, thereby complicating opera-tional and tactical direction by the field commander, who mustwork out, probably on his own, ways to weave together the myr-iad and diverse national contributions in a common effort.

Agreement on the multinational force’s basic objectives is thebedrock requirement; this may not, however, produce a clearstatement of the desired operational end-conditions. In that

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case, the commander considers his guidance, makes his ownassessment of the situation, and formulates the desired end-conditions in the necessary detail. He communicates these tohis superiors and to his colleagues . . . directs operations ac-cordingly, and revises them as the situation and his instruc-tions change. (Emphasis added)220

Summary

Clearly, modern commanders in chief must rely on attrib-utes consistent with those of their predecessors. According toa variety of military leaders and scholars, CINCs still dependupon abilities in three major categories: military prowess,strategic-political-military vision, and leadership skills. Verylittle seems to have changed in 50 years: with the exception ofa minor emphasis on interagency coordination, modern lead-ers describe command problems and solutions almost exactlyas commanders did after World War II. For the last word on thesubject, consider the views of the current CJCS, Gen Henry H.Shelton. Penned in February 1999, they represent but an up-to-date version of Eisenhower’s thoughts from the mid-1940s:

Based on the position under consideration and the individualsnominated, the selection for each CINC is different; however,there are some general characteristics that joint force com-manders must possess. First, the individual must be capable ofleading complex organizations and be widely recognized as agood leader. There are different leadership styles and hundredsof books have been written on the subject, but a short defini-tion of a good leader is an ethically grounded individual whocan empower people and create a team capable of getting thejob done no matter how difficult the circumstances. In additionto being highly successful leaders, prospective CINCs must bean expert within their own Service. Airmen, for example, mustthoroughly understand airpower and employ those capabilitiesin different environments.

Being an accomplished leader and a Service expert is only partof the equation. CINCs must be truly “joint” and possess aworking knowledge of the capabilities of all the Services andhow they can be used both individually and in concert to han-

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dle any mission, from high intensity combat to peacekeepingoperations. To be effective in applying military force, CINCsmust also understand the challenges our Nation faces in thecurrent strategic environment and appreciate how all instru-ments of power—economic, political, and military—can be usedto achieve national objectives. In today’s complex, intercon-nected world, CINCs must also possess the ability to think atthe strategic, operational, and tactical levels nearly simultane-ously. Every CINC must also understand the inter-agency pol-icy process and their role in that process.221

Conclusions[A young officer should] take General de Gaulle’s advice. . . the education of a general should be directed to anysubject except the military, because by the time he’s con-sidered for high leadership position it should be as-sumed he’s professionally qualified—but in this world ageneral can’t make a decision unless he’s aware of thepolitical, economic, and social factors which also influ-ence his decision. So he should broaden the field thathe’s studying.

—Gen Lauris Norstad

In the end, the evidence about the qualities of successfulCINCs appears overwhelming. Throughout the 50-year periodstudied herein, commander after commander and observerafter observer have repeated the same conclusions about jointand multinational command. Eisenhower and Devers dis-cussed problems of coalition cohesion and unclear top-levelguidance and outlined the skills and mindset they used tocope with those problems; historians have confirmed the gen-erals’ ingredients of command success. Norstad, a savvy air-man, used skill, grace, and a sure hand to help build the al-liance during six turbulent years of East-West confrontation.According to the Washington Post, “this required a NATO com-mander with a sophisticated understanding of European poli-tics and a deft diplomatic hand as well as the military skill todirect the defense of Western Europe along a 4,000-milefront.”222 Another remarkable airman, Kesselring, used simi-

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lar insights and skills to conduct a two-year-long fightingwithdrawal from Tunisia to the Alps as his coalition collapsedaround him. In the 30 years between Norstad’s tenure asSACEUR and that of General Shalikashvili, little of conse-quence seemed to change. Commanders and their observers inthe 1980s and 1990s described the same problems of supremecommand and called for similar CINC qualities. Every sourceconsulted in this study concurred: to perform effectively aswar-fighting CINCs, airmen—indeed, all officers—need com-prehensive military proficiency, an incisive geostrategic-politi-cal-military vision, and strong, but nuanced and deft skills inleadership and interpersonal relations.

The categories of leadership and military competenceshould come as no surprise to any student of military affairs.Professional libraries contain countless volumes about thegreat military leaders of the past; most of those leaders reliedon exceptional personal skills—charm, intellect, integrity, andpersuasiveness—to reach the pinnacle of success. Addition-ally, no top commander would have achieved greatness with-out a well-recognized ability to employ his service’s forces. AsGeneral Woerner remarked, “you only get there as a competentmilitary man”; General McCarthy argued that airmen “mustunderstand the JFACC business—it’s the logical prerequisitefor CINCdoms.”223 Furthermore, in the last half-century, fewleaders would have succeeded without a great facility for em-ploying joint forces; and in this day and age, the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates it. Presumably, all recent leaders havealso had the ability to direct large, complex organizations—butthey appear to take this talent for granted. Only General Shel-ton, backed by a few civilian analysts, explicitly described aneed for organizational expertise.

While leadership and military ability may have been consid-ered as “givens,” military thinkers have occasionally over-looked the CINCs’ demand for extensive political-military acu-men. Most likely everyone realizes the requirement is there;professional military colleges include generous helpings ofClausewitz and the interrelationships of the national instru-ments of power in their curricula, and Air Force Basic Doctrinestarts with a discussion of strategy and policy.224 To use Gen-

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eral Shalikashvili’s metaphor, however, few seem to realize justhow deep the political waters run. Former CSAF Ronald R.Fogleman believes a cultural bias exists against service inWashington, and many military officers seem to identify withEisenhower’s early wish to “get rid of all these questions thatare outside the military scope.”225 Unfortunately, such a nar-row military focus contradicts the experience of theater com-manders. Eisenhower’s postwar speeches reflect clear politicalunderstanding, and senior leaders from Devers to McCarthyand Woerner imply that CINCs may never fail to include polit-ical considerations in their advice. In fact, CINC experiencesuggests strongly that theater CINCs are not just executors ofpolicy but policy makers in their own right. Circumstanceshave often forced on-scene CINCs to craft American foreignpolicy with ambiguous guidance at best, and observers suchas General Cushman suggest that trend will continue. The re-sponsibility to formulate policy and strategy demands exten-sive domestic and international political-military understanding.

There are, to be sure, viewpoints that oppose “political” gen-erals. As described above, Harvard political scientist Hunting-ton’s 1957 work The Soldier and the State advocated an apo-litical mentality, arguing that an officer corps “immune topolitics and respected for its military character would be asteadying balance wheel in the conduct of policy.”226 Signifi-cantly, some of the politically savvy CINCs described abovehave risked overstepping their political bounds. General Wo-erner conceded that his critics considered him “an apologistfor the area.”227 Furthermore, some of Norstad’s contempo-raries viewed the SACEUR as overly political. Indeed,Norstad’s deputy at USAFE, Landon (then major general)mixed admiration and disdain:

I am a close personal friend, and I have a great deal of admira-tion and respect for Larry, but I don’t think much of Larry as anAir Force officer, I mean as an Air Force general. . . . Larry is too“global.” . . . He was very fond of saying, “I am not a nuts-and-bolts general.” Well, I am a nuts-and-bolts general, and a lot ofthe generals in the Air Force are.

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[However], as an Air Force general officer, he did a very beauti-ful job of at least fronting for USAFE and for running the AlliedAir Forces. He did a good job of setting them up because he hadan appreciation of the other air forces that some of the rest ofus wouldn’t have had at the time. And then as SACEUR, he wasreally magnifico.228

Landon’s criticism wisely counsels caution to the officerswho might overplay their political hand—but Huntington’smust be discounted, given the balance of evidence. As a polit-ical scientist, Huntington was concerned with the theory ofcivil-military relations; the experiences of the CINCs citedherein suggest, however, that Huntington’s desire for apoliti-cal generals at best represents wishful thinking and at worstignores political realities. Indeed, one general universallyrenowned for battlefield prowess lasted only a year asSACEUR because he lacked a deft political touch. As GenOmar Bradley, the CJCS, explained, “[General Matthew] Ridg-way was not proving to be the ideal choice for NATO. Matt wasa field commander without peer but not a diplomat. . . . in hiszeal, Ridgway had antagonized many politicians among our al-lies.”229 Norstad thought simply that Ridgway “just did notgrasp the length and breadth of the problem.”230 General offi-cers who would be CINCs must acknowledge the danger ofbeing too political, but must also develop considerable inter-national and domestic political expertise to complement theirmilitary competence and leadership skills.

To recapitulate, threads of broad professional knowledge,political-military insight, and leadership are woven through-out the histories of successful regional CINCs. In World War II,Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower and his subordinateDevers, among others, set the stage for their successors by fig-uring out why and how to put together militarily viable, polit-ically cohesive international forces. Norstad had the militaryskill to plan the air portions of the Mediterranean theater jointcampaigns for two years, and to help construct the unified De-partment of Defense. At the height of the cold war, he meldedthat expertise to a deep understanding of international politicsand cultures, developed the combined-arms sword-and-shieldcontainment strategy, and handled crises and Soviet threats

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with aplomb. Similarly, Kesselring served with valor in WorldWar I, was instrumental in organizing both the Wehrmacht andthe Luftwaffe, and commanded air forces in all of Germany’searly World War II victories. He then deftly walked a politicaland military tightrope as he cajoled both Italian and Germanleaders during a slow, effective withdrawal up the Italian boot.Finally, recent CINCs and DCINCs all described their jobs asrequiring extensive military, political, and interpersonal skills.The evidence suggests that success as a geographic CINCrests on joint competence, geostrategic vision, and leadershipability—and the cases of Norstad and Kesselring demonstratethat airmen who possess these qualities can excel in theatercommand.

Implications

The truth of the matter is that it is not as routine for [air-men] to develop broad-gauged military thinkers, but theones we develop are as effective as any. The climate justdoesn’t produce many. That absence hurts the wholecountry’s military power . . . and affects the Air Forcepsyche down to the lowest levels. We must overcomethat or airpower cannot develop in its most grand andeffective form.

—Gen Charles G. Boyd

Even if Norstad and Kesselring have proved that airmen canbe exceptionally effective CINCs, significant questions remainunanswered. Put most bluntly, the first is, so what? Does thenation really need airman CINCs? If so, as General Boyd ar-gued previously, airmen must articulate the reasons to the na-tional political leadership—and, to have meaning for a wideAmerican audience, the reasons must relate to American se-curity, not just Air Force institutional prerogatives. Second, ifthe nation would benefit from airmen in theater command,can the Air Force overcome the cultural and traditional im-pediments that led to a four-decade gap between GeneralsNorstad and Ralston? Third, has the Air Force adequately pre-pared its officers for major theater command, and has it demon-

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strated that preparation to civilian leaders? Fourth, what canthe USAF do to develop potential regional CINCs?

National Defense Perspective

Ultimately, the arguments for or against airman CINCs turnon the role of airpower in future conflicts. Describing the biasthat has worked against airmen since Norstad’s day, GeneralShalikashvili highlighted a prevalent belief “that someone whohas spent 30 years living ground operations is the right guy fora theater with a preponderance of ground forces,” althoughthe general personally discounted that argument. He thenworked “all the way around to the primary issue” and asked“is the Air Force a primary arm or a supporting arm?” As anartillery officer, the former CJCS appeared at ease with a viewof airpower as support, as suggested by the following admoni-tion: “Be careful. We have the best Air Force in the world.When you begin to change your emphasis, understand thecost of that. Ask first what a change in focus will do—it’s kindof like surgeons complaining ‘we’re not hospital administrators.’I wouldn’t turn the Air Force around [just] to grow moreCINCs.” (Emphasis added)231

Recent history seems to counter the general’s inference thatthe Air Force will remain a supporting arm, however. Instead,as a number of analysts have noted, airpower may often as-sume a central role in military action. Air Vice Marshal R. A.Mason has described “a new era of optional warfare” in which“air power is the instrument of least commitment,” able to“reach into a conflict zone from outside, either for direct air at-tack independently of ground forces, or in support of them.”232

Highlighting airpower’s versatility, he opined that “air power islikely to become a favourite instrument in optional warfare,minimising friendly casualties, providing a wide range of of-fensive options, capitalising on technological superiority, sus-ceptible to the fine tuning of volume and duration, and able tobe started, interrupted, and halted without concern for ‘in-country’ logistic support or protection.”233

In contrast, Edward N. Luttwak, Senior Fellow at the Centerfor Strategic and International Studies, has suggested thatground forces, although versatile “across the entire spectrum

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of conflict,” face “political restraints [that] greatly restrict theiravailability.”234 He argued that “the prospect of high casual-ties, which can rapidly undermine domestic support for anymilitary operation,” is the key restraint, and in “a first ap-proximation of what might be called a casualty exposureindex,” ranked Army and Marine ground forces as the “leastusable” components of military policy.235 Indeed, 1999 wit-nessed an American president explicitly ruling out groundpower at the beginning of a military campaign.

If airpower may be the first or only politically acceptable pol-icy option in a conflict, it stands to reason that an air-mindedtheater commander would be the most effective officer to em-ploy it. Along those lines, General Boyd eloquently providedcounterpoints to General Shalikashvili’s concerns, and high-lighted reasons why airmen CINCs are, in fact, important tonational security. He dismissed the idea that a wider focuswould reduce Air Force effectiveness, saying “look at the Navy.They’re the greatest Navy and TACAIR piece the world has everseen . . . [and] their aviators can compete well for CINCslots.”236 He also spoke forcefully about the issue of primaryversus supporting roles for airpower, and that debate’s influ-ence on national power:

The reason it is important for airmen to be routinely consideredfor regional CINC positions [is that, if they aren’t], that makesthe Air Force—in people’s subconscious—inferior to those serv-ices that do provide leadership to regions. . . . That relegates theAir Force to slightly diminished status, which works all the waydown to company grade officers.

If the Air Force never sees its role models as number one incommand, that hurts its self-perception. An Air Force CINCwould alter the self-perception that airpower is just for support.Airpower [must be seen as] co-equal, and sometimes primary.The attitude of subordination of air has truncated its develop-ment in its fullest horizons as an element of military power. Ifyou only think of it as support, its flourishing as a form of mil-itary power can never be complete.237

By inference, if airpower is to be at its most effective in themyriad crises and contingencies in which it is employed today,

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airmen must more often be the theater commanders who in-tegrate it into joint, multinational military power.

Few would deny that a bias still exists against calling air-power a coequal component of military power—despite the factthat the July 1943 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20,Command and Employment of Air Power, declared that land-power and airpower were independent and coequal. Manyofficers—soldiers and airmen alike—accept the superficial ar-gument that “if there are ground troops involved, commandmust go to the ground component.” General Boyd demon-strated that the argument does not stand on logic: “I’ve neverknown an Army officer who didn’t think he could command aforce including airmen and never met one who thought airmencould command soldiers. The pure psychology defies logic, butit’s pervasive.”238 Instead of logic, the argument reflects whatHarvard professor Yuen Foong Khong calls schema theory.Human beings, according to behavioral and cognitive scien-tists, truly understand only what they have lived and tend todiscount everything else.239 Therefore, ground-trained officersidentify with their ground experience and generally reject thenotion that any other perspective could be equally valid. Morethan simply parochialism, therefore, it is a lack of a commonframe of reference that separates the soldiers and airmen whomust meld the forces of the future.

Unfortunately, that lack of a common framework can havedisastrous consequences—consequences that a joint-mindedairman CINC might avoid. General McCarthy, formerDCINCEUR, argued that lack of appreciation of sister-servicecapabilities was the greatest impediment to effective combinedoperations.240 General Fogleman, former CSAF and CINC ofUS Transportation Command, emphasized the high costs of alack of airpower understanding:

The entire nation loses out. As chief of staff and CINCTRANS, Isaw gross misapplications of force—CINCs who briefed contin-gencies using only what they knew. The deaths in Mogadishu[on 3 October 1993] were senseless. AC-130s [gunships] wereaccessible in theater, but not used because a green-suiterwanted to use green-suit assets.

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We lose lives because we don’t make full use of airpower—com-manders don’t fully understand it. Everybody thinks they’regreat [air] campaign planners, that it’s easy somehow. But if it’san airshow, it’s easier for an airman to visualize and explain.241

Certainly, airmen must explain the limitations of airpoweras well; arguably, an airman CINC would understand and ex-press both capabilities and limitations to political leaders bet-ter than a surface-trained CINC. In Air Vice Marshal Mason’swords, “the application of air power is now a profession of con-siderable complexity, demanding technological mastery, asense of command, structure, speed, time, distance and im-pact in proportions quite different from those applicable onland or sea. Not greater, nor lesser, but different.”242 In view ofairpower’s likely role in future conflict, and the potential costsof misuse of airpower, national security would indeed benefitfrom the “not greater, nor lesser, but different” abilities andworldviews of airman CINCs.

Cultural Obstacles

If the Air Force is to produce officers able to contribute tothe national defense as CINCs, it must first understand thehurdles such officers must face and overcome. Secretary Che-ney highlighted the domestic cultural obstacles facing AirForce regional CINCs by averring “there’s something about theculture that identifies the Air Force with specific positionsrather than joint command” despite insisting he had workedwith “some very talented [airmen] . . . superb officers whocould have done it.”243 That cultural obstacle stems from theground-centric mindset to which General Shalikashvili al-luded, and can be seen vividly in the command changeoverthat occurred between Generals Jamerson (then major gen-eral) and Shalikashvili (then lieutenant general) at the begin-ning of Operation Provide Comfort. This exercise started as anaerial operation under Jamerson’s command; but when themission grew to include on-ground protection of humanitarianconvoys and refugee camps, the SACEUR, Gen John R.Galvin, installed Shalikashvili as task force commander. To aman, Generals Jamerson, Shalikashvili, and McCarthy—ac-tively involved as DCINCEUR—insisted there was nothing

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“sinister” or overtly parochial about the replacement; Jamer-son said “don’t read too much into it—General Galvin had tobe comfortable, and ‘Shali’ made him more comfortable.”244 Atthe same time, Shalikashvili characterized the commandchange as “just one of those knee-jerk reactions,” and admit-ted that his own contributions to Operation Provide Comfortsuccess lay not in operational ground expertise. Rather, theyinvolved political and strategic issues like negotiations withcoalition partners and, most importantly, with Iraqi militaryleaders—activities in which an airman, specifically GeneralJamerson, could have succeeded if given the chance.245 Be-cause it was a joint task force, the Provide Comfort examplerepresents the step below theater CINC concerns—but the ex-perience is indicative of the ground-centric bias airman com-manders must overcome by demonstrating joint proficiencyand strategic insight.

Would-be airman CINCs face similar—perhaps even larger—cultural hurdles in the international arena as well. In 1954then SHAPE air deputy Norstad expressed “the major regretthat d--n few countries have the Air Force as their first serv-ice” because such a lack complicated military-to-military rela-tions with US forces,246 and the more recently retired CINCscharacterized the US Air Force’s unique position as a similardetriment in the present. General McCarthy repeatedNorstad’s lament: “the interface in Europe has always beenbetween ground force commanders . . . talking the language ofthe Army,”247 and General Woerner’s SOUTHCOM experienceprovided similar evidence. “Militaries outside of our own,” hebelieved, “ have a single-Service orientation that is, by far,ground-based. . . . There is a greater facility for soldier-to-sol-dier war stories than [soldier-to-airman]. I don’t talk with myhands, I do foxholes.”248

Along those lines, General Shalikashvili provided two tellingexamples of international military bias. For the first, henoted “when we proposed [USMC General John] Sheehan asCINCUSACOM [commander in chief, US Atlantic Command], Ihad to make countless trips to London to placate the British,who said ‘over our dead bodies will we have a Marine in com-mand of UK naval forces.’”249 For the second, he described his

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attempts to install an airman as commander, US ForcesKorea, and commander, Combined Forces Command, thatfailed because the Koreans could not accept the appointment.“Because the preponderance of forces are Korean—the num-ber of US forces are insignificant—you cannot be cavalier withhow the Koreans feel,” and the large number of Korean fullgenerals subordinate to the combined commander objected toserving under an airman.250 Political acceptability derailed theairman’s chance to command multinational forces.

In spite of these cultural obstacles, however, this study’scorrespondents concluded that the time was nearly ripe for anAir Force regional CINC—roughly six months before GeneralRalston was nominated as SACEUR. General Jamerson cited“many barriers to break down” but said “it’s not inconceivable.[Secretary William S.] Cohen could decide [to appoint an air-man].”251 General Woerner insisted that “in principle, anyCINCdom could be non-Service specific” and that servicebackground was “not a disqualifier. Soldier stories [lose value]after the initial icebreaking and don’t outweigh other skills—as evidenced by the current CINCSOUTH [Marine General Wil-helm].”252 General Boyd noted that other services “have usedthe ‘influential service in the country’ argument to justify de-fense attaché billets for years. In truth, the host nation dealswith the appointee. Success depends on his skills, not hisservice background.”253 General Horner put it perhaps mostcolorfully, declaring “an Air Force officer can drink tea withArabs as well as a grunt. An airman can brief Congress as wellas a grunt. An airman can do [everything] CINCs do . . . so whynot an airman?”254

Most significantly, the three leaders most closely involvedwith CINC selection suggest the obstacles can soon be morefrequently overcome. Regarding interservice misunderstand-ings, General Shalikashvili noted that the Army’s internalprejudice against “supporting” arms is fading, citing three ar-tillery officers—himself, Gen J. H. Binford Peay, and Gen Den-nis J. Reimer—who had risen to serve as CJCS, CINC, USCentral Command (CENTCOM) and Army chief of staff, andsuggested one could extrapolate that to the Army/Air Force re-lationship. Since Desert Storm, he argued, “ground com-

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manders understand better how to maximize air’s role, andthat will put future Air Force officers in better position to com-mand.”255 He also pointed out that the situation has changedin Korea, where, despite the ground forces’ predominance, aKorean airman has become chairman of Korea’s JCS. GeneralPowell went through the list of geographic commands one byone and declared an airman could command any one of them.Given the prestige and air of impartiality Powell enjoys in thiscountry, one doubts he could have said anything else, but hesaid it bluntly enough to predict accurately that Norstadwould see a successor. An airman, he suggested, could haveSOUTHCOM or USACOM (redesignated US Joint Forces Com-mand, 1 October 1999) “tomorrow,” and

CENTCOM could be air or ground. We’ll be fighting an AirLandbattle. I would accept an airman who has a clear record ofknowing and understanding ground maneuver warfare.

PACOM could be an airman, but PACOM is really a naval the-ater. . . . For an airman to get this job, he has to have strongjoint qualifications.

[Finally], in the current environment, I would have no reserva-tions about an airman as SACEUR. . . . Norstad returns!256

Secretary Cheney summed everything up simply for hiserstwhile CJCS and the other defense officials, unwittinglyforecasting General Ralston’s nomination: “I don’t think anairman’s appointment as a CINC would break any china.”257

Air Force Institutional Perspective

A changing domestic and international climate is not suffi-cient to institutionalize such a radical change as Air Force the-ater CINCs, however. For airmen to compete on a level playingfield for regional command, their service has to make that aninstitutional priority; it is not at all clear that senior Air Forceleaders are so motivated. General Shalikashvili counseled cau-tion to those who might change the Air Force’s focus, and afew retired Air Force general officers agreed with him. GeneralMcCarthy, for one, professed little concern over the dearth of

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Air Force regional CINCs.258 A senior visitor to Air Universityshared McCarthy’s view and explained why: “The fact thatthere are no USAF geographic CINCs doesn’t bother me verymuch. There is no entitlement here. . . . Four star counts [notspecific billets] are [the] indices of power to the services. . . .For the most part, we do pretty well.”259 General Woerner sec-onded that view, noting how any service chief would seek tomaximize his cohorts’ opportunities rather than give up four-star billets.260 Secretary Cheney stressed that “the number offour-stars per service is jealously guarded” as he described a“cumulative, iterative” process of assigning four-star officersin consultation with the CJCS: “I thought in terms of a wholeuniverse of four-star billets . . . of a puzzle with multiplechoices and solutions. I might postpone [a promotion] if Ithought a more appropriate slot was opening later. It doesn’tmean I downgraded [airmen] because I didn’t assign [them] togeographic CINC positions.”261

For those who accept box scores as indicators of service in-fluence and prestige, the USAF is in good shape and probablyshould not change its focus. Indeed, counting all CINC ap-pointments since 1947—including SAC when it was a speci-fied command and a number of now-obscure commands—theAir Force leads all services.262

In the end, however, each of the officials cited above rejectedbean counting and provided additional arguments for the AirForce to seek regional command opportunities. General Mc-Carthy opined that “as a Service, [the Air Force has] more togain from improved joint opportunities.”263 The Air Universityguest predicted that regional commands “are going to get in-creasingly important over time. . . . we are eventually going togrant CINCs resource allocation authority, if not all, at least asignificant fraction. When that happens, we had better beready.”264 Finally, General Shalikashvili echoed part of Gen-eral Boyd’s argument in favor of airman CINCs, noting “theissue is worthwhile—it’s important for morale.”265

If the institutional Air Force accepts any of the foregoing ar-guments—about USAF self-perception, about a seat at the re-source allocation table, about morale in the officer corps, ormost importantly, about airpower’s fullest development and its

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impact on national security—then it should make gaining ge-ographic CINCdoms a service priority. In that case, SecretaryCheney’s description of the four-star officer assignmentprocess suggests the Air Force must give up a valuable generalofficer position to gain more opportunities for CINC posi-tions—and that may prove difficult. (It remains to be seen howGeneral Ralston’s appointment will affect the process.) Onepossibility would have been DCINCEUR; another, US StrategicCommand—but admirals currently fill both positions. Thatleaves US SPACECOM and US Transportation Command(TRANSCOM) as possibilities, but many senior leaders believethose should stay in Air Force hands. General Powell, for ex-ample, wrote that “airmen should continue to commandTRANSCOM and SPACECOM because you get a two-fer . . . theincumbent is also a major service command commander.”266

General Horner, a former CINCSPACECOM, disagreedstrongly, however, calling the Air Force’s hold on those posi-tions “a Pyrrhic victory.”267 By inference, Horner supportedthe contention that failure to place airmen in regional com-mand billets hurts airpower and American security and thatgeographic CINCdoms should be a service priority.

In any event, if airmen are regularly to take places as co-equal integrators of joint force, the Air Force has to argue itscase effectively to the proper leaders—which it apparently hasnot done. General Woerner, for example, was quite surprisedto discover that the Air Force had produced only one regionalCINC in its first 50 years—and, significantly, so was SecretaryCheney. Cheney said bluntly: “If the Air Force ever made anargument for a regional CINC slot, I didn’t hear it.”268 Thatmust change if the nation is to find more successors toNorstad and help airpower achieve its fullest potential as asource of international security.

To make that argument effectively, the USAF must changethe perception—one shared by high-ranking airmen and non-airmen alike—that it has not prepared its officers as well aspossible to be regional CINCs and produce indisputably well-qualified potential CINCs. General Shalikashvili spoke formost interviewees when he observed that “few [top-notch] AirForce officers have served on [joint or regional] staffs; the ‘hot-

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shots’ all went to Air Force Headquarters”;269 indeed, Air Forceculture seems to rank air staff experience above similar jointexperience. Shalikashvili continued, “it becomes incumbenton the Service to have a longer-range view [and ask] ‘Whatmust I do to create an officer more qualified than anyone?’ . . .Don’t ask if Air Force officers are qualified to be regionalCINCs—they are. The question should be—on the day the de-cision is made—is [the airman] . . . the best of the nominees?The Air Force must make joint war fighters—seek positions forits frontrunners to grow them as joint war fighters. Later on,it must start thinking about area-specific expertise.”270

According to those interviewed, it appears that the Air Forcehas not given its officers a political-military grounding suffi-cient to create a pool of qualified CINC candidates. GeneralJamerson remarked that “we don’t raise people like the Army,with a growth pattern of global political-military jobs. We’re aspecialist service—we fly—and don’t get out of our boxenough.”271 General Boyd concurred and credited formerCSAF Gen Michael Dugan with the observation that “the AirForce attracts technologically oriented young men and women,gives them the niftiest gadgets in the world, and says ‘go to it.’Then at a certain point—major or lieutenant colonel—we say‘put away those gadgets. We want you to be a sophisticatedgeostrategic thinker, planner, articulate with Congress.’ . . .The question is, how do we provide the necessary technicalcompetence and skill, but at the same time broaden thinkingabout the connections of military force and diplomacy? It’s achallenge for the whole institution.”272

General McCarthy lamented that “the issue, primarily, is wehaven’t prepared. There’s no organized plan, no group of peo-ple to put through the [joint preparation] program”; anotherretired general said simply, “we don’t even want many of thepreparatory jobs that would prepare someone to compete forCINC. . . . That is what has to change before we can expect tomerit a better shot at [CINCdoms].”273 General Foglemanagreed, noting that “world-class guys tend to pick their ownservice” and “part of the problem is to convince airmen to goto D.C. The Air Force must understand there is value in thepeople who gain exposure [to the Washington political

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process]. If the goal is regional CINC billets, joint staff or OSD[Office of the Secretary of Defense] service is more important.Ultimately the NSC [National Security Council] crowd shapesthe [appointment] decisions.”274 His observation fits neatlywith this study’s conclusion that CINCs need an in-depth un-derstanding of both national and international politics.

The interviewees were unanimous in their perception thatthe Air Force’s best and brightest migrate to Air Force jobs andtend to avoid the joint staff, unified commands, and servicewithin civilian agencies. Such anecdotal evidence begs an im-portant question. Do available data support their observationsof how the Air Force may be failing to groom its officers forhigh-level joint and international command? A cursory com-parison of 10 CINCs’ careers with 10 Air Force generals’ ca-reers helps answer the question. Figure 2 depicts the averagenumber of years each group spent in these job categories:PME/education (as student or teacher); service-specific oper-ations; service-specific staff; D.C. civilian agency job (WhiteHouse Fellow, aide to civilian secretary, legislative liaison,OSD, or NSC); command above brigade-, ship-, or wing-level;unified or combined command staff; or Pentagon joint staff.The comparison suggests that the interviewees’ impressionsare, in fact, valid.

Specifically, figure 2 reflects the careers (as of May 1999) ofUS Army generals John M. D. Shalikashvili, George A. Joul-wan, Wesley K. Clark, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, US MarineCorps Gen Anthony C. Zinni, and US Navy admirals Dennis C.Blair, Joseph W. Prueher, Richard C. Macke, Paul D. Miller,and Harold W. Gehman. The US Air Force generals are JosephW. Ashy, Charles G. Boyd, Ralph E. Eberhart, Howell M. EstesIII, Ronald R. Fogleman, Patrick K. Gamble, Eugene E.Habiger, Richard E. Hawley, James L. Jamerson, and John P.Jumper. This sample, taken from official biographies availableon-line or through service and command public affairs offices,indicates that the airmen spent more than twice the amountof career time in service-specific staff jobs than did their Army,Navy, and Marine counterparts, whose résumés included sig-nificant time on unified/combined command staffs and in gov-ernment agency jobs in Washington.

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Arguably, such breadth helped provide the CINCs with thejoint competence and political/military awareness demandedby the position. The experience with civilians is most notewor-thy; General Fogleman alluded to the need for airmen to over-come their cultural reluctance and gain exposure to govern-ment officials—but only one of the Air Force generals served insuch a position (General Jumper was senior military assistantto two secretaries of defense). Interestingly, General Ralston’scareer followed the same lines as those of his fellow airmen—his first joint job (commander, Alaskan Command) was 27years into his career—until he became the vice chairman ofthe JCS. Perhaps a combination of political understandingand networking, derived in part from interagency experience,

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Source: Lt Col Howard D. Belote.

Figure 2. Commanders in Chief versusUSAF Generals’ Careers

gave the CINCs—General Ralston included—the edge whenthe defense secretary selected them.

Quite simply, airmen appear to have a narrower upbringingand less exposure to the political process than other servicemembers. Because civilian players in that process appoint theCINCs, airmen may be cheating themselves out of vital oppor-tunities by spending minimum time in joint or civilian agencybillets.

Recommendations

Make the bias ‘‘who is the best, most qualified officer”—the uniform ought to be secondary. Still, young Air Forceofficers should ask, “how can I maximize my chances[for joint command]?”

—Gen John M. D. Shalikashvili

How, then, should the Air Force improve its preparation ofpotential theater commanders? General Boyd suggested tak-ing the “tool kit” of a commander in chief—in other words, thegeostrategic, military, and leadership related capabilities nec-essary for CINC success—and figuring out how to develop thoseskills; he also recommended “finding out who the really goodCINCs were, and what made them so.”275 General Jamersonsuggested a similar “look at where CINCs came from.”276 An in-depth analysis of some (especially post-Goldwater/Nichols) CINCcareers through interviews and comparisons of job progressioncould use the data from figure 2 as a starting point and couldprovide valuable insights for those who would develop theirjoint and international command capabilities. Airmen inter-ested in the CINC issue might conduct or commission such re-search.

More practically, airmen should focus their development intwo broad areas: professional education and career progres-sion that blend airpower expertise with broad joint compe-tence. Education is vital because CINC billets demand expan-sive knowledge and understanding of domestic andinternational politics, economics, and culture; Norstad andKesselring both grew through extensive self-study. General

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Boyd—formerly the Air University (AU) commander—sug-gested that major geostrategic issues “must be part of the ed-ucation process at every level,”277 and AU is currently provid-ing airmen a firm educational foundation. General Powellcommented “the Air Force has an excellent education process.I attended National War College with Chuck Horner, H. T.Johnson, and a number of other great airmen, and theirjoint/combined education was equivalent to mine.”278 AUmust ensure that Air Force PME retains its quality—but thecurrent attempt to make PME more egalitarian unwittinglyrisks undermining a good resident program and may inhibitthe grooming of future leaders. The 22 March 1999 issue of AirForce Times reported that AU officials want to “change a cul-ture that equates attendance in residence with career success”and instill equity for correspondence students.279 Unlessthose officials believe that a 10-month resident program whereeducation is an officer’s sole professional focus is equivalent toa program that crams compact discs and “dirty purples” in be-tween 12-hour to 14-hour work days, they must continue toemphasize the educational depth possible only in a residentprogram, and continue to reward those officers most likely tobenefit from attendance. If the Air Force wants to make surethe admission process is fair, it can base attendance on pro-motion board ranking and an entrance exam—which wouldemphasize to every officer the importance of continuing self-study.280 In any case, Air University cannot risk “dumbingdown” its product. As General de Gaulle suggested to Norstad,future generals must demand a broad education in all facetsof national power. Furthermore, the CINCs depicted in figure2 averaged four years of PME over their careers, highlightingthe beneficial—though not necessarily causal—relationship ofeducation to success.

In addition to emphasizing education, the Air Force shouldcreate General Shalikashvili’s “joint war fighter” career trackand reward the officers who excel in joint and multinationalplanning and command. Joint experience, specifically the typeof experience gained on unified command (and to some extent,component) staffs, is vital to earn credibility with sister-serv-ice members. In General Cushman’s words, if air and land

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commanders “are ever to harmonize and reconcile . . . the air-man must adopt the land commander’s way of looking at thedynamics of the battle—and the land commander must un-derstand how the airman must operate in his own medium,the air.”281 Because the ground perspective has dominatedmilitary thought for so long, the airmen who would commandtheater forces must master that perspective as well as theirown and demonstrate their mastery to sister-service audi-ences. General McCarthy concurred with the need for a greatdeal of joint experience, and cautioned “it takes years to de-velop that experience. [A prospective CINC] would need to bejoint as a lieutenant colonel and probably come back as a one-or two-star to be able to return as CINC.”282

Would-be CINCs must seek broad international experienceas well. Political scientist and coalition researcher Jordan hasargued that coalition commanders “should have extensive pro-fessional exposure to international political conditions, in-cluding serving on international staffs and, if possible, com-manding multinational military forces. They should also beproven planners because . . . in peacetime, planning for warmust never cease, and good planners are not easy to find. Themember-states, especially the United States, should makeevery effort to reward generously those officers willing to de-vote a significant portion of their careers outside the normalnational military career channels in order to serve on interna-tional planning staffs or commands.”283

In the same vein, General Jamerson noted that “we ought tobroaden our skill base” and highlighted the nascent ForeignArea Officer program as a worthwhile beginning for companygrade officers; General Woerner credited his personal successto his involvement in the Army’s similar Foreign Area Special-ist program.284 Secretary Cheney underscored the need forarea expertise, noting that the Army and Navy usually have“people coming along who’ve worked their way up” in a giventheater. Along those lines, General Jamerson contrasted anAir Force tendency to move around the globe with the biogra-phy of his former boss, General Joulwan—who held commandand staff jobs at almost every level in Europe, from companycommander to SACEUR.285

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Finally, a CINC must work in Washington to gain bothbreadth and exposure. General Shelton wrote of the need tounderstand the interagency process. General Fogleman re-gretted the Air Force’s institutional bias against working in theOSD or NSC and believed those jobs should carry equal weightwith wing command for promotion consideration, suggesting“maybe we can break the mold and say being an O-6 (colonel)on the NSC is as or more important than command of a wingat promotion time.”286 Similarly, Secretary Cheney called serv-ice on the Pentagon joint staff “crucial. That’s clearly what wasintended by Goldwater-Nichols, and I would have been hardput to hire or appoint anyone without extensive Joint Staff ex-perience. Civilian leaders need officers who understand howthe system works, and the Joint Staff is their major contactwith those officers. That’s also where I got my military assis-tants—I overlooked the guys nominated by the services andpicked them off the staff.”287

The Air Force’s first CINC, Norstad, used his Washington ex-perience to develop close contacts throughout the Defense andState Departments; presumably, General Ralston did thesame as VCJCS. Evidently, future airman CINCs must dothe same.

Combining the aforementioned factors, a representative jobprogression for an airman might entail early experience as anumbered air force (NAF) planner, a later J-3 or J-5 assign-ment on a unified command staff, a tour on the joint staff ora civilian agency, and experience as a J-3 or J-5 director—allinterspersed with operational (air or space focused) and com-mand tours from squadron level to NAF. To develop areaknowledge, the potential CINC could specialize in a theaterafter making O-6 or O-7 (brigadier general). Creating this newcareer emphasis could require a significant change in AirForce culture, which would demand public backing from cur-rent Air Force general officers.288 For example, one high-rank-ing Air Staff officer recruited members of 1999’s School of Ad-vanced Airpower Studies class with the advice “to get ahead,you’ve got to do your duty at corporate headquarters.” Whynot deemphasize “corporateness,” promote airpower expertise,jointness, and war-fighting knowledge, and put at least a sig-

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nificant fraction of the Air Force’s best and brightest on com-ponent and joint command staffs? The necessary inside-the-beltway experience can come later, after the officer has built afirm foundation of operational war-fighting knowledge. Fi-nally, in the near term, the Air Force should identify those of-ficers who have already achieved a degree of joint and inter-national political-military expertise, and place those officers inpositions that strengthen that expertise while highlightingtheir abilities to the joint establishment and the national lead-ership. If effectively executed airpower is indeed vital to inter-national security, airmen should direct its execution as the-ater commanders regularly.

Final Thoughts

So, let the best person get the job. The Air Force, as do allthe Services, has to make sure it is raising officers notjust in the model of Douhet, but in the model of Douhet,Mahan, Clausewitz, Marshall, Arnold, and Eisenhower. Ifit produces 10 Air Force CINCs, fine. If it produces none,so what. The only thing that counts is what’s best for thenation, the mission, and the troops.

—Gen Colin L. Powell

So the question remains: Can airmen effectively commandjoint and multinational forces? An impressive cross section ofretired senior officials thinks so. Will airmen more frequentlycommand such forces? Only if the Air Force makes such com-mand an institutional priority, argues its case to the nation,and ensures it produces a corps of candidates with impecca-ble joint and multinational war-fighting pedigrees. Every sen-ior official consulted for this study—civilian or military, AirForce or Army—described significant cultural impediments tothe appointment of Air Force regional commanders in chief;backed by career data, every one of them suggested the AirForce could do a better job of preparing its general officers forCINC billets. At the same time, every one insisted that airmenare up to the task now. The following quote from General Pow-ell encapsulates the lingering cultural barriers airmen face

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along with the demands CINCs face, but at the same time sug-gests that airmen can overcome them: “The integration of al-lied ground forces and the ground battle plan [for DesertStorm] was, in my view, a more demanding political, diplo-matic, and military task than the air war. I’m not shorting thecomplexity and demands of the air war. Far from it, I give it thegame ball. But I think it was more appropriate having an ArmyCINC organizing the effort with allies in this case than had itbeen an airman. But could a Chuck Horner have done it? Sure.”(Emphasis added)289

In conclusion, the former chairman’s words suggest themost important reason why airman CINCs may prove vital tointernational security in the future. Few observers anywherein the world—General Powell included—expect to see the deci-sive, Clausewitzian, mass-on-mass ground battle. Rather,many of those who foresee a conventional battle project fast-moving, maneuver-based operations wherein airpower may becentral. Regarding current threats in the Pacific, General Sha-likashvili called air “crucial,” and General Powell declared em-phatically that airpower “will defeat the North Koreans.”290 Al-ternatively, airpower may be used as a tool of coercivediplomacy, either synergistically with other components, or forpolitical reasons alone, as has been the case in the Balkans.If, as General Powell indicated, airpower is to have the gameball, should not someone who has devoted a career to airpowerquarterback some of the games—especially the games whereinairpower is central? More importantly, should not the AirForce aggressively and systematically prepare its leaders tocarry the ball?

Notes

1. Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense1947–1997: Organization and Leaders (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office,Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), appendix 2; Truman R. Strobridge,Strength in the North: The Alaskan Command 1947–1967, Elmendorf AirForce Base (AFB), Alaska, 1966; and Maj Henry J. Bishop, “A Study in theFeasibility of Inactivating the Alaskan Command,” Research Report 0245-73(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College [ACSC] 1973). I am in-debted to Lt Col Tom Ehrhard for this count. I have ignored the air-defense-

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oriented Alaskan Command in this study. Although a unified commander,the commander in chief, Alaskan Air Command had no operational controlof his components until 1958, and then only over air defense forces as adeputy to the commander in chief, North American Air Defense Command.Not until 1965 did a commander in chief, Alaskan Air Command direct anexercise with all three components.

2. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations(Washington, D.C.: Army Historical Division, 1950), 282.

3. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban MissileCrisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971); and William Matthews andSean D. Naylor, “Ralston to Replace Clark at NATO Helm,” Air Force Times60, no. 1 (9 August 1999): 9. Allison describes the interpersonal and orga-nizational interplay that shapes the decision making of senior political andmilitary leaders.

4. Charles A. Horner, E-mail to author, 3 February 1999.5. Remarks given by guest speakers at the School of Advanced Airpower

Studies (SAAS) and ACSC, Maxwell AFB, Ala., during 1998–1999. Seniorleaders speak at Air University under a policy of nonattribution.

6. Dick Cheney, interviewed by author, 23 February 1999.7. Colin L. Powell, E-mail to author, 20 February 1999.8. John M. D. Shalikashvili, interviewed by author, 22 February 1999.9. Jim Callard, Headquarters AF/XPXS, E-mail to author, 24 January

1999.10. Charles G. Boyd, interviewed by author, 26 February 1999.11. Ibid.12. For this study, even the Axis coalition counts as a “democratic” coali-

tion, as military failure led to collapse of the Italian government and with-drawal from the alliance.

13. Jacob L. Devers, “Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commanderin Combined Operations,” Military Review 27, no. 7 (October 1947): 3.

14. Ibid.15. Ibid., 5.16. Robert S. Jordan, Generals in International Politics: NATO’s Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987),175; and quoted in William R. Swarm, “Impact of the Proconsular Experi-ence on Civil Affairs Organization and Doctrine,” in Americans and Procon-suls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952,ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984),400.

17. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (1948; reprint, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 75.

18. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Problems of Combined Command,” addressto the National War College, Washington, D.C., 18 June 1948. Available on-line from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.,http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu; E-mail: Library@eisenhower.nara.gov.

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19. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Harry Cecil Butcher, letter, 10 December1942, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 2, The War Years, Al-fred D. Chandler, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970),824.

20. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 41.21. Richard W. Anderschat, “Factors Affecting Success in Coalition Com-

mand,” Military Studies Program, Research Report AD-A-170431 (CarlisleBarracks, Pa.: Army War College, 31 March 1986), ii.

22. Ibid., 34.23. Ibid., 35.24. Ibid., 37.25. Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of

Command (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 243–45.26. Ibid., 294.27. Ibid., 299; and Arthur Bryant and Alan Alanbrooke, The Turn of the

Tide: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal LordAlanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-day, 1957), n.p.

28. Ibid., 302; and Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York:Harper, 1952).

29. Norstad relinquished command of the European Command to GenLyman L. Lemnitzer on 1 November 1962. At Secretary Robert S. McNa-mara’s request, he extended his tour as SACEUR two months to lessen in-ternational tensions resulting from the Cuban missile crisis.

30. “General Norstad: Guardian of Western Europe’s Air,” Newsweek 38,no. 14 (1 October 1951): 26. The article reports that Norstad, who finished139th in a class of 241, “was a first lieutenant when the Nazis overranPoland. By the end of the war, he was a major general [and permanent]brigadier.”

31. Phillip S. Meilinger, “US Air Force Leaders: A Biographical Tour,”Journal of Military History 62, no. 4 (October 1998): 860.

32. Lauris Norstad, transcript of oral history interview by Dr. Edgar F.Puryear Jr., 22 August 1977, file K239.0512-1473, tape 2, 5, Air Force His-torical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala. Accordingto Norstad, Harmon knew that “older [officers] would arrange to see me thenight before a test to find out my solution and talk about it”—an early indi-cation of the then first lieutenant’s abilities.

33. Ibid., tape 3, side 2, 7 (hereinafter 3-2, 7).34. Ibid.; Lauris Norstad, transcript of oral history interview by Hugh N.

Ahmann, 13–16 February and 22–25 October 1979, AFHRA file K239.0512-1116; Meilinger; and “An Airman Boss for NATO,” Time 67, no. 17 (23 April1956): 29.

35. Both the Puryear and Ahmann oral histories contain similar ac-counts. Norstad felt the NATO position was more important to national se-curity and more suited to his own abilities and desires.

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36. Thomas D. White, “New Era in NATO,” Newsweek, 29 October 1962,27. General White’s draft of the column, found in his personal papers inAFHRA file168.7004-49, cites the Washington Post, 12 August 1962, E1, andthe Manchester Guardian Weekly, 26 July 1962, 2A, as sources.

37. Norstad/Ahmann, 499.38. Ibid., 280.39. Ibid., 500, 506–15. Norstad’s account of his MacArthur-style landing

and battles with the Vichy French forces that opposed the American inva-sion.

40. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 118–19.41. Norstad/Ahmann, 267.42. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in

Three American Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994),143–78. See especially notes 15, 16, 18, 25, and 39. Mark also cites a “can-did” postwar report on Strangle’s deficiencies that was written by Norstad,192.

43. Norstad/Ahmann, 546.44. Ibid., 101.45. Norstad/Puryear, tape 2, 4.46. Ibid., tape 4-1, 10.47. Norstad/Ahmann, 383–89.48. Ibid., 276, 216.49. Ibid., 263.50. Ibid., 434.51. Richard H. Ellis, transcript of oral history interview by Maurice

Maryanow, 17–21 August 1987, AFHRA file K238.0512-1764, Maxwell AFB,Ala., 78–79. Ellis, chief of Air Plans and Operations at SHAPE duringNorstad’s time, served as vice chief of staff of the Air Force, CINCUSAFE, andCINCSAC before retiring.

52. Ellis, 80–82. Ellis’s account of his service (while a colonel) as a go-between for the headstrong four-stars is also noted. Norstad dispatchedEllis to Omaha to “tell Curt I said . . . ‘knock off this crap about SAC own-ing the world. We’ve got our responsibilities over here, and we are not goingto delegate them to anybody.’” Face to face with LeMay, Ellis paraphrased:“[Norstad] just asked that if you’ve got any coordination problems on any-thing, let him know,” to which LeMay replied, “tell Norstad to keep the h--lout of my business.”

53. “We Can Destroy Anything Military in Russia,” excerpted congres-sional testimony in U.S. News & World Report 43, no. 1 (5 July 1957): 58–60.

54. Ibid., 59.55. Jordan, 74–76.56. Norstad/Ahmann, 339, 400, and 406. Norstad considered himself

“father of the MX.”57. Norstad/Puryear, tape 1, 23. The transcriber could not understand

the professor’s name, giving it as “Colonel Meu-----.” A comparison of TheHowitzer 1930, The Annual of the United States Corps of Cadets, the Official

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Register of Officers and Cadets for 1930, and General Cullum’s BiographicalRegister of Officers and Graduates of the US Military Academy suggestsNorstad spoke of Herman Beukema. During Norstad’s first-class year, thenMajor Beukema was an instructor of economics and government; the fol-lowing year he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and made full professorof the Department of Economics, Government, and History.

58. “NATO: The View at the Summit,” Time 70, no. 25 (16 December1957), 19.

59. Norstad/Ahmann, 398.60. Lauris Norstad, “The Role of the Armed Forces in Implementing Na-

tional Policy,” text prepared for Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 19 May1947, n.p., AFHRA file K239.716247-62. C. E. Combs presented the lecturefor Norstad.

61. Ibid., n.p.62. Norstad/Ahmann, 533.63. Ibid., 534. See also “The Partners,” Newsweek 48, no. 25 (17 De-

cember 1958): 30. While the incident shows Norstad’s prescient feel for thepostwar world, SAAS professor James Corum argues that the eastern plancould have been an operational disaster. Because Montgomery failed to clearthe estuaries leading to Antwerp until November 1944, Allied success inFrance depended on the port of Marseilles—captured intact during Anvil.

64. Ibid., 138.65. Norstad/Puryear, tape 3-1, 8 and tape 4, 19.66. “NATO: The View at the Summit,” 20.67. Norstad/Ahmann, 270, 441–43. Adenauer wanted to keep Speidel for

a different position and offered a different general but acquiesced toNorstad’s reading of the situation.

68. “We Can Destroy Anything Military in Russia,” 63.69. Jordan, 80.70. Norstad/Ahmann, 341. Norstad describes in detail the sumptuous

lunch he set up to smooth relations with Strauss, a voracious eater whostrongly influenced German defense policy for three decades.

71. Jordan, 87–88; and Norstad/Ahmann, 298–301.72. Norstad/Ahmann, 309.73. White, 4.74. Norstad/Ahmann, 431, 297–99. Note de Gaulle’s use of the crisis as

a nuclear bargaining chip.75. Lauris Norstad, “Allied Military Tasks,” address to Air War College,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2 December 1954, transcript of question and answer pe-riod, 4. AFHRA file K239.716254-87.

76. Norstad/Ahmann, 282–83.77. Ibid., 430.78. Ibid., 282–83.79. Ibid., 428.80. Ibid., 282.

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81. “NATO: Change in the Making,” Newsweek 56, no. 10 (5 September1960): 30–31. The column’s speculation about Norstad’s impending retire-ment—and that of a simultaneous column in U.S. News & World Report 49,no. 10 (5 September 1960): 10—was more than two years premature.

82. “NATO: The View at the Summit,” 18.83. Norstad/Ahmann, 428; and “The Partners,” 29. Norstad acknowl-

edged that his press clippings were more than generous: “I got great press.. . . I deserved a good press, but I got better than I deserved.”

84. “The Partners,” 30.85. Norstad/Ahmann, 430.86. Ibid., 307, 343.87. Jordan, 92.88. Ibid., and Charles de Gaulle, transcript of luncheon address, 20 De-

cember 1962, NATO Public Information Division. 89. Norstad/Ahmann, 323.90. Ibid., 309.91. Ibid., 317.92. Jordan, 92; and Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, Allies in a Turbulent

World: Challenges to US and Western European Cooperation (Lexington,Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), 163.

93. Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Sec-ond World War (1978; reprint, Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1996),249.

94. Ibid., 11. Macksey rarely footnotes and does not identify the “promi-nent chief of staff.”

95. Albrecht Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring (1953;reprint, Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997), 10. In Kesselring,Macksey notes that certain “‘Old Eagles’ . . . denigrated Kesselring because. . . he was ignorant of the subtleties of aviation” while later, soldiers fromNorth Africa and Italy persisted “in vilifying Kesselring’s soldierly talents onthe grounds that he was only an airman,” 250. Chief among the postwar de-tractors was Gen Eberhard von Mackensen, whom Kesselring relieved asFourteenth Army commander in June 1944. See von Mackensen, Air His-torical Branch Translation VII/99, “The Campaign in Italy,” chap. 13,AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., file no. K512.621 VII/99.

96. Macksey, 19–21.97. Ibid., 24–25.98. Kesselring, 17–18.99. Ibid., 19.100. Macksey, 35.101. Kesselring, 23–25.102. Ibid., 31, 33.103. Macksey, 107.104. Ibid., 127; and Lt Gen (General der Flieger) Hellmuth Felmy, “The

German Air Force in the Mediterranean Theater of War” (Air Historical Divi-sion, 1955), AFHRA file K113.107-161, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 534. Macksey re-

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ports that Kesselring was thus the only German to control all three servicesin joint command.

105. Macksey, 130. Macksey weaves the conflict with Rommel through-out the biography—see, for example, 175–86.

106. Norstad/Ahmann, 519–21. For example, Norstad, who faced Kessel-ring for two years, reported that he “lived on Ultra” and read it several timesa day.

107. Kesselring, 259.108. Macksey, 229–30; and Kesselring, 288–90.109. Heinrich von Vietinghoff, The Campaign in Italy, British Air Ministry

Air Historical Branch Translation VII 97 (December 1947), chap. 6, AFHRAfile 512.621 VII/97, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 4 (hereinafter referred to as von Vi-etinghoff, chap. 6).

110. Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Campaign in Italy, in “High Level LuftwaffePolicy in the Mediterranean, May–June 1943” British Air Ministry Air His-torical Branch Translation VII/94, preface, AFHRA file 512.621 VII/94,Maxwell AFB, Ala., n.p.

111. Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Brothers,1950), 184. Cited in Capt Teddy D. Bitner, “Kesselring: An Analysis of theGerman Commander at Anzio” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command andGeneral Staff College, 1983), 29.

112. Cited in Macksey, 194.113. Macksey, 34. The author includes an impressive list of the person-

alities surrounding Kesselring at the time, including Joachim von Stülp-nagel, Kurt von Schleicher, Walter von Brauchitsch, Heinz Guderian, andKurt Student.

114. Ibid., 47, 52; and “US Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS] InterviewNo. 61, 28 June 1945,” AFHRA file 137.315-61, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 4. In thisinterview and at his postwar trial, the field marshal regretted canceling thebomber, the lack of which prevented the Luftwaffe from threatening the Al-lied landings in North Africa.

115. Macksey, 248.116. Kesselring, 44.117. Macksey, 73; see 68–73 for a description of the Dutch campaign.

Macksey notes this campaign “was also the last in which his communica-tions were secure,” for the British were soon to exploit Ultra.

118. Ibid., 94. Some 2,500 aircraft were destroyed against negligiblelosses.

119. Felmy, 208. General Felmy cites directive no. 38, whose “most im-portant point was that [Kesselring] obtain air and naval superiority in thearea between southern Italy and North Africa.”

120. Macksey, 89.121. Felmy, 210. See Kesselring, 109, about Malta, and 112, about his

naval program.122. Kesselring, 123; the field marshal made the same point in his 1945

USSBS interview but stressed that Rommel “was the best Army com-

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mander,” 11. Macksey notes that Gen Walther Nehring, a corps commanderfor Rommel, “has confirmed to me Kesselring’s objections—and adds theopinion that he was right,” 122.

123. Macksey, 123. Macksey points out that every convoy’s sailing wasbetrayed by Ultra.

124. Felmy, 539.125. Cited in Macksey, 133.126. Ibid., 134.127. Ibid., 148. Citing a 1943 OKW report, “Der Kampf um Tunisien [The

Struggle for Tunisia],” Felmy also describes Kesselring’s central role in or-chestrating the counterattack, 616.

128. Macksey, 155.129. Walter Fries, “The Battle for Sicily,” in The Invasion of Sicily, 1943,

ed. Albrecht Kesselring, Air Historical Branch translation VII/93 (December1947), AFHRA file 512.621 VII/93, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1. See also Macksey171–72, who notes “it was typical of the man’s ingrained modesty that heabstained from boasting about this masterpiece . . . the credit largely be-longs to him . . . It was Kesselring who had authorised the plan, which Rom-mel had declared to be impossible, and he who had thoroughly imposed hiswill on the planners, above all on von Richtofen [the Luftwaffe commanderwho resented losing his organic flak].”

130. Siegfried Westphal, “Army Group’s Comments,” The Campaign inItaly, chap. 13, AFHRA file 512.621 VII/99, 29–30. By this time, Rommelhad moved to the Western Front and Kesselring was Commander of ArmyGroup C as well as CINC South-West. About the five contingency plans, seeHeadquarters CINC South-West Order to Chief of Staff, Luftflotte II, dated 12January 1944, in AFHRA file 512.621 VII/82, “High Level Reports and Di-rectives Dealing with the Italian Campaign,” 1–2.

131. Westphal, 31–32; and Bitner, 48–53.132. Bitner, 52.133. Ibid., 58–62; Kesselring, Memoirs, 193–96; and Mark, 109–209. Bit-

ner cites artillery expenditure averages (60) that indicate the VI Corps fired25,000 rounds/day to the Fourteenth Army’s 1,500.

134. Bitner, 63. Bitner emphasizes that Kesselring fulfilled his predictionto Hitler “that he could hold the Allies south of Rome through the winter.”

135. Macksey, 207–11. In response, Kesselring shifted the inter-Armyboundary to make von Mackensen responsible for the area endangered byan Allied breakthrough and afterwards fired him.

136. Macksey, 161–63 and 185–86; von Mackensen, supplement tochap. 12, The Campaign in Italy, AFHRA file 512.621 VII/99, 27–28; von Vi-etinghoff, chap. 6, 3.

137. von Vietinghoff, chap. 6, 4; Macksey, 210.138. Bitner, 75–78.139. Macksey, 196–97; and Westphal, 30.140. von Vietinghoff, “Preface.”141. Macksey, 248.

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142. Kesselring, Memoirs, 18.143. Macksey, 26.144. Ibid., 34.145. See, for example, Kesselring’s Memoirs, 124. Kesselring argued that

the OKW “failed altogether to understand the importance of the Mediter-ranean and the inherent difficulties of the war in Africa,” and “Hitler’s per-sonal fondness for Mussolini [led to] disastrous results. The slogan was‘Mussolini in Cairo.’”

146. USSBS interview no. 61, 10.147. von Vietinghoff, chap. 6, 30.148. Ibid., 1.149. Kesselring, The Invasion of Sicily, 1943, 15; and Macksey, 162. Ar-

guing that Kesselring was not a compromiser, as some (e.g., General West-phal) have suggested, but a decisive strategist in his own right, Mackseynotes Kesselring rejected Rommel’s plan out of hand.

150. Felmy, 608; and Bitner, 18.151. Felmy, 546, 550–55.152. Macksey, 163.153. Ibid.154. Macksey, 159.155. von Vietinghoff, chap. 6, 3; Macksey, 164; and Kesselring, The In-

vasion of Sicily, 1943, 13. After the war, Kesselring realized “with a shock,how much Adolf Hitler tried, by means of certain parallel organisations andother dealings, to maintain reciprocal control. It was the same old story ofdistrust.”

156. Macksey, 169.157. Ibid., 168–69.158. Ibid., 175–76.159. Kesselring, Memoirs, 185.160. Macksey, 177. In one of his very few footnotes, Macksey says his ac-

count of the negotiations “is largely based on the version printed in the Of-ficial US History by A. Garland as amplified by Westphal’s recently pub-lished [1975] Memoirs.”

161. Kesselring, Memoirs, 186; and Macksey, 178.162. Macksey, 179.163. Kesselring, Memoirs, 292–93.164. Ibid., 104.165. Macksey, 144.166. Kesselring, Memoirs, 104.167. Ibid., 104, 120.168. Macksey, 178.169. Kesselring, Memoirs, 185–86.170. Macksey, 161.171. Ibid., 151. About the shoot downs Kesselring mentioned at his

court-martial, see 16, 62, 158, and 197. Although Macksey could only cor-roborate two of the five through outside sources, the biographer concludes

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they happened; in support, he cites congratulatory messages from Hitler fora “fortunate escape” and from Hermann Göring for his “courage in making100 operational flights over the Mediterranean.”

172. Macksey, 152.173. Ibid., 190.174. Ibid.175. Kesselring, Memoirs, 218–19.176. Macksey, 168.177. von Vietinghoff, chap. 6, 2.178. Cited in Macksey, 130; and Kesselring, Memoirs, 135–36.179. Walter Fries, 1. Fries wrote that “OKW was not informed of the evac-

uation plan. When the evacuation began, the Operations Staff asked onwhose order and with whose permission it was executed. The Chief of StaffC. in C. South answered that Field-Marshal Kesselring had given the orderand accepted all responsibility for it. Thereupon there were no furtherqueries or interference from OKW.”

180. Kesselring, Memoirs, 207.181. Macksey, 215.182. Order dated 4 June 1944, CINC South-West to G.O.C. Luftwaffe in

Central Italy, in “High Level Reports and Directives Dealing with the ItalianCampaign,” AFHRA file 512.621 VII/82, 5–8.

183. Macksey, 189.184. Interviews by Pierre Huss of the International News Service, 9 May

1945, and Richard Johnston of the New York Times, 10 May 1945, in AFHRAfile 520.056-219, n.p.

185. Macksey, 251.186. Kesselring, Memoirs, 64.187. “Notes on the Interrogation of Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring on

USAFE OKW Questionnaire of 17 September 1945, at Military IntelligenceService Center, USFET, Oberursel, Germany, 24 September 1945,” AFHRAfile 570.619-1, 5–6.

188. Jordan, x. The author wrote specifically of SACEURs; his commentsapply equally to all regional CINCs.

189. Shalikashvili interview.190. Ibid.191. Ibid.192. Powell E-mail.193. Boyd interview.194. James L. Jamerson, interviewed by author, 19 February 1999.195. James P. McCarthy, “Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations,”

Naval War College Review 46, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 15. The general reem-phasized this requirement in a telephone interview with the author on 17February 1999, calling lack of exposure to sister-services his “greatest limi-tation.”

196. McCarthy, 16.197. Ibid., 20.

93

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198. Ibid., 13.199. Ibid.200. Horner E-mail, 2 February 1999.201. Fred F. Woerner, interviewed by author, 19 February 1999. General

Woerner cautioned the author not to generalize his SOUTHCOM experiencewith that of other commands because he discounted the possibility of majorwar in his theater—then he described his job in precisely the terms used bythe CINCs from Eisenhower on who did contend with the threat of war.

202. Woerner interview.203. Ibid.204. Ibid.205. Ibid.206. Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Profes-

sionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 43; Morris Janowitz, The Pro-fessional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,1960); and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory andPolitics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Har-vard University Press, 1957). Sarkesian contrasts Janowitz’s book withHuntington’s. Huntington acknowledges that American military leaders playa political role but argues that role should not be substantive.

207. Sarkesian, 52, 132.208. Ibid., 219.209. Ibid., 228.210. “Operation Uphold Democracy Joint After Action Report” (Norfolk,

Va.: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), 61, 53.211. Ibid., 55.212. John M. Metz, “Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command

and Control Dilemma” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Army Command and Gen-eral Staff College, 2 June 1995), 1.

213. Ibid., 6, 38.214. Robert E. Sorenson, “Operational Leadership Challenges in Emer-

gency Humanitarian Assistance Operations” (Newport, R. I.: Naval War Col-lege, 19 May 1997), 2, 17.

215. Ibid., 16; Donald G. Goff, “Operation Provide Comfort” (Carlisle Bar-racks, Pa.: Army War College, May 1992), 44–46; and John P. Cavanaugh,“Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations” (FortLeavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1992),34–40.

216. Terry J. Pudas, “Preparing Future Coalition Commanders,” JointForce Quarterly no. 3 (Winter 1993–94): 43.

217. John H. Cushman, Thoughts for Joint Commanders (Annapolis: USNaval Institute Press, 1993), 52, 10. Literally translated, fingerspitzengefühlmeans “fingertip feel.”

218. Ibid., 18.219. Ibid., 53–54.220. Ibid., 52–53.

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221. Henry H. Shelton, letter to author, 24 February 1999.222. Bart Barnes, “Obituaries: Gen Lauris Norstad, 81, Military Strate-

gist, Dies,” Washington Post, 14 September 1988, B6.223. Woerner interview; and McCarthy interview.224. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 4–6.225. Ronald R. Fogleman, interviewed by author, 22 April 1999. On

Eisenhower, see chap. 2, note 5.226. Huntington, 464. On the same page, however, Huntington allows

that top American military leaders have been almost uniformly successful:“The leadership produced by the American officer corps has so far been ex-traordinary. Only a small handful of the hundreds of general and flag offi-cers have proved incapable in battle, and the top commanders in all threetwentieth-century wars have been men of exceptional ability.”

227. Woerner interview.228. Truman H. Landon, transcript of oral history interview by Hugh N.

Ahmann, 31 May–3 June 1977, AFHRA file K239.0512-949, Maxwell AFB,Ala.

229. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simonand Schuster, 1983), 659–60, cited in Jordan, 51.

230. Norstad/Ahmann, 398.231. Shalikashvili interview.232. R. A. Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’s,

1994), 242–43.233. Ibid., 244.234. Edward N. Luttwak, “A Post-Heroic Military Policy,” Foreign Affairs

75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 38.235. Ibid., 36, 41, 42.236. Boyd interview.237. Ibid.238. Ibid.239. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu,

and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1992). He provides an insightful explanation of cognitive processingtheory and how it affects military decision making.

240. Khong, chap. 5, note 8.241. Fogleman interview; Alan Vick et al., Preparing the US Air Force for

Military Operations Other than War, RAND Report MR-842-AF (Santa Mon-ica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), n.p. The authors echoed Gen Fogleman’s con-tention about AC-130s and Mogadishu: “The endurance, precision, andshock effect of fixed wing fire support might have suppressed Somali firesufficiently so that the Rangers could be extracted by helicopters. At theleast, it would have significantly increased the fire support available to USsoldiers and probably would have saved some lives in the process (61).”

242. Mason, 275.243. Cheney interview.244. Jamerson interview.

95

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245. Shalikashvili interview.246. Norstad, “Allied Military Tasks,” 13.247. McCarthy interview.248. Woerner interview.249. Shalikashvili interview. The British objected despite General Pow-

ell’s having persuaded his “colleagues on the NATO Military Committee toaccept whatever service we put in as NATO CINCLANT,” Powell E-mail.

250. Shalikashvili interview.251. Jamerson interview.252. Woerner interview.253. Boyd interview.254. Horner E-mail, 4 February 1999.255. Shalikashvili interview.256. Powell E-mail, 20 February 1999.257. Cheney interview.258. McCarthy interview.259. Remarks given under Air University’s nonattribution policy.260. Woerner interview.261. Cheney interview.262. Trask and Goldberg, appendix 2. Since 1947 the Air Force has filled

62 CINC billets; the Army, 60; the Navy, 46; and the Marine Corps, 4.263. McCarthy interview.264. Remarks given under Air University’s nonattribution policy.265. Shalikashvili interview.266. Powell E-mail, 20 February 1999.267. Horner E-mail, 3 February 1999.268. Cheney interview.269. Shalikashvili interview.270. Ibid.271. Jamerson interview.272. Boyd interview.273. McCarthy interview. Further remarks given under Air University’s

nonattribution policy.274. Fogleman interview.275. Boyd interview.276. Jamerson interview.277. Boyd interview.278. Powell E-mail, 3 March 1999.279. John Pulley, “Relaunching PME: A Whole New Approach to Educat-

ing Airmen,” Air Force Times 59, no. 33 (22 March 1999): 17.280. When questioned on this issue, General Boyd doubted that such an

exam would pass muster; “it could be too large a cultural shock to an oth-erwise anti-intellectual institution” and hurt retention.

281. Cushman, 39.282. McCarthy interview.283. Jordan, 192–93.

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284. Jamerson interview; and Woerner interview. Information on the AirForce’s new Foreign Area Officer program is available at http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao.

285. Cheney interview; and Jamerson interview.286. Shelton letter (see note 221 above); and Fogleman interview.287. Cheney interview.288. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Mod-

ern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 251. “Peacetimeinnovation has been possible when senior military officers with traditionalcredentials, reacting . . . to a structural change in the security environment,have acted to create a new promotion pathway for junior officers practicinga new way of war.” Surely these conditions pertain to the post cold war, post-Goldwater-Nichols USAF.

289. Powell E-mail, 3 March 1999.290. Shalikashvili interview; and Powell E-mail, 20 February 1999.

97

BELOTE

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107

Once in a Blue Moon:Airmen in Theater Command

Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and TheirRelevance to the Twenty-First Century Air Force

Air University Press Team

Chief EditorHattie D. Minter

Copy EditorRita B. Mathis

Book Design and Cover ArtSusan Fair

Composition andPrepress Production

Vivian D. O’Neal