clear air force station, ballistic missile early warning haer no. ak-30-a system … · 2017. 2....

CLEAR AIR FORCE STATION, BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SITE II One mile west of mile marker 293.5 on Parks Highway, 5 miles southwest of Anderson Anderson vicinity Yukon-Koyukuk District Alaska

PHOTOGRAPHS

WRITTEN HISTORICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA

REDUCED COPIES OF MEASURED DRAWINGS

HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEERING RECORD National Park Service

U.S. Department cf the Interior 1849 C St. NW

Washington, DC 20240

HAER No. AK-30-A

HISTORIC AMERICAN ENGINEERING RECORD

CLEAR AIR FORCE STATION, BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SITE II

HABS No. AK-30-A

Location: Clear Air Force Station, Alaska

Quad/UTM: Faribanks/6.393744.7131097 (North American Datum 1983)

Construction Date: 1958-61

Present Owner: United States Air Force

Present Use: Inactive

Significance: The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

Historian:

(BMEWS) was constructed in 1958-61 in response to the threat of a potential Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack from the Soviet Union (demonstrated by the October 1957 launch of Sputnik) . BMEWS Site II at Clear AFS in Alaska was one of three radar sites (the others were located in Greenland and Britain) that covered the polar regions. Although BMEWS was an expansion of existing radar technology rather than a significant innovation, it represented a major engineering achievement. BMEWS was an important part of the deterrence strategy (Mutual Assured Destruction) developed by both sides in the Cold War. It provided a minimum of fifteen minutes advance warning for a nuclear counterstrike, but not a missile defense. BMEWS remained in operation throughout the remainder of the Cold War, although the technology became increasingly antiquated and difficult to maintain in later years.

John F. Hoffecker

CLEAR AIR FORCE STATION BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SITE II

HAER No. AK-30-A (page 2)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Acronyms

Executive Summary

Chapter I. Cold War Origins and the Development of the Soviet ICBM Threat

Origins and Early History of the Cold War (1945-53) Development of the Soviet ICBM Threat (1954-57)

History of Rocketry (1903-45) Ballistic Missile Development in the Soviet Union (1945-57)

Chapter II. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System at Clear AFS, Alaska

3

4

5

6 12 12

15

22

Origins and Development of BMEWS 23 Radar and Early Warning Systems (1922-59) 24 Origins of BMEWS (1954-57) 30 Construction of BMEWS (1958-63) 38

BMEWS Site II at Clear AFS, Alaska 45 Construction of Clear AFS and BMEWS Site II (1958-61) 46 Description of Facilities; Clear AFS and BMEWS Site II 48 Clear AFS and BMEWS 54

Chapter III. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska and the Cold War 60

BMEWS Site II History of Operations (1961-89) 61 BMEWS and the Cold War: An Assessment 72

Bibliography 76

13MWS AAC AB ABM AC&W ADC AFB AFS AL CAN ARDC BMEWS BOSS CSMR DEW DSP ECM FD GE GOR IBM IOC ICBM IRBM km kW MAD MIDAS MIP MIT MW MWOC MWS NATO NORAD NSC PAR PAVE PAWS

RCA RF RNII SAC SAGE SDI SEWS SLBM SPO TOR TsAGI WACS


HAER No. AK-30-A {page 3)

List of Acronyms

13th Missile Warning Squadron Alaskan Air Command Air Base Anti-Ballistic Missile Aircraft Control and Warning Air Defense Command Air Force Base Air Force Station Alaska-Canada Air Research and Development Command Ballistic Missile Early Warning System BMEWS Operational Simulation System Central System Monitoring Room Distant Early Warning Defense Support Program Electronic Countermeasures Frequency Diversity General Electric General Operational Requirement International Business Machines Initial Operating Capacity Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile kilometers kilowatts Mutual Assured Destruction Missile Defense Alarm System Missile Impact Prediction Massachusetts Institute of Technology Megawatts Missile Warning Operations Center Missile Warning Squadron North American Treaty Organization North American Air Defense Command National Security Council Perimeter Acquisition Radar Perimeter Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phase

Array Warning System Radio Corporation of America Radio Frequency Jet Scientific Research Institute Strategic Air Command Semi-Automatic Ground Environment Strategic Defense Initiative Satellite Early Warning System Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Special Project Office Tactical Operations Room Central Aerodynamics Institute White Alice Communications System



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was

constructed in 1958-61 in response to the threat of a potential

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack from the Soviet

Union (demonstrated by the October 1957 launch of Sputnik) .

BMEWS Site II at Clear Air Force Station in Alaska was one of

three radar sites (the others were located in Greenland and

Britain) that covered the polar regions. Although BMEWS was an

expansion of existing radar technology rather than a significant

innovation, it represented a major engineering achievement.

BMEWS was an important part of. the deterrence strategy (Mutual

Assured Destruction) developed by both sides in the Cold War. It

provided a minimum of fifteen minutes advance warning for a

nuclear counterstrike, but not a missile defense. BMEWS remained

in operation throughout the remainder of the Cold War, although

the technology became increasingly antiquated and difficult to

maintain in later years.



Chapter :r

COLD WAR ORIGINS AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE SOVIET :ICBM THREAT

The creation of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

(BMEWS), which was constructed by the U.S. Air Force during 1958-

61 to provide advance warning of an Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile (ICBM) attack from the Soviet Union, was a consequence of

geopolitical and technological developments of the preceding two

decades. Although these developments have deep historical roots,

they may be traced with particular clarity to the final year of

World War II. Between the summers of 1944 and 1945, it became

increasingly apparent that the United States and the Soviet Union

held conflicting objectives for postwar Europe-a disagreement

that ultimately gave rise to the Cold War.

During the same period, two technologies that acquired

fundamental strategic importance in the Cold War reached critical

milestones. In September 1944, the first ballistic missiles were

launched by Germany against enemy targets, and in July-August

1945, the United States tested and dropped the first nuclear

weapons. By the early 1950s, both the United States and the

Soviet Union were developing ICBMs that could deliver

thermonuclear warheads. In 1957, the Soviet Union demonstrated

its apparent lead in this technology by launching the first

satellites into Earth orbit. In the wake of this event, which



generated a political uproar in the United States, the Air Force

was authorized to construct BMEWS.

Origins and Early History of the Cold War (1945-53)

The Cold War was a direct outgrowth of World War II, which

began as an effort by Britain and France to prevent German

domination of Eastern Europe. When diplomatic pressure failed to

halt the invasion of Poland in September 1939, Britain and France

declared war on Germany. Ironically, the war ended in 1945 with

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, which provided the original

basis for the conflict between the United States and the Soviet

Union that lasted for more than four decades. The Cold War

ended-appropriately-with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from

Eastern Europe in 1989. 1

President Roosevelt supported the efforts of Britain and

France to contain German expansion in the 1930s, but had to

contend with strong isolationist sentiment in the United States

After his re-election in 1940, Roosevelt provided military aid to

Britain through the Lend-Lease program. In June 1941, Germany

invaded the Soviet Union, which then became an ally of Britain.

Following the Pearl Harbor attack in December, Germany joined

Japan in its declaration of war on the United States. Roosevelt

then began to provide military aid to the Soviet Union as an

ally. 2

The Soviet Union played a critical role in the defeat of

Germany, and the United States continued to send military aid



until the end of the war. The situation on the Eastern Front

shifted decisively in favor of the Russians after the battle of

Kursk in July 1943. Following the collapse of the German central

army group in June 1944, the Soviet Union was ready to advance

into Poland, and in August they began to move into the Balkans. 3

Concerns about a Soviet presence in Eastern Europe were

outweighed by the potential effects of Soviet losses or reversals

on American and British forces on the Western Front. By the time

that the Allied leaders met at Yalta in February 1945, Soviet

forces were less than 100 miles from Berlin and had overrun most

of Eastern Europe. At the Yalta conference, Stalin agreed to

hold democratic elections in Poland, and not to impose Communist

rule over the East European nations occupied by Soviet armies. 4

However, within a few months it became apparent to the

United States and Britain that Stalin would not honor the Yalta

agreements. Pro-Soviet regimes were installed in many nations

occupied by Soviet troops, and no democratic elections were held

in Poland. In a March 1946 speech that many identify as the

starting point of the Cold War (a term apparently introduced by

the author George Orwell in late 1945) , 5 Churchill declared that

an "iron curtain" had descended across Eastern Europe. Stalin

characterized the speech as a "call to war" against the Soviet

Union. Some historians argue that the Soviet government, which

sought to neutralize Germany and create a protective wall of East

European buffer states, was motivated in part by legitimate

security concerns. 6 Others believe that Stalin made the same



miscalculation with the United States in 1945-bellicose bluffing

that he had made with Hitler in 1940. 7

American policy was influenced by the "Long Telegram"

(authored by American diplomat George Kennan in early 1946),

which offered an informed analysis of the historical basis of

Soviet hostility to the Western nations. Kennan's message was

read by President Truman, and it became required reading in the

U.S. Department of State. 8 During 1947, the Soviet Union

continued to consolidate and even expand its control of Eastern

Europe. In August, elections were rigged and anti-Communist

elements purged in Hungary, while the Soviets supported a

guerrilla insurgency in Greece. The United States responded with

the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan-economic aid to Western

Europe and military aid to Greece designed to help resist Soviet

influence and expansion. 9

In 1946-47, Soviet superiority in European ground forces was

more than counter-balanced by American possession of nuclear

weapons and long-range bombers. Despite the long-standing

emphasis of the Communist regime on science and technology, the

Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in most technical

fields. Impressed by the development of atomic bombs and

ballistic missiles by foreign powers, Stalin ordered intensified

research and development in these and other areas of advanced

military technology in 1945. Progress was accelerated by Soviet

espionage and the capture of foreign scientists and materials

during and after World War II. American B-29s forced to land on



Soviet territory in late 1944 were seized and used as a prototype

for a long-range bomber, while German scientists were brought to

Russia in 1946 to help ballistic missile research. Atomic

secrets obtained by Soviet agents in America sped development of

nuclear weapons. By October 1947, the Soviet Union had tested a

long-range bomber (Tu-4) with a maximum range of 3,000 miles

(5,000 km) and a short-range ballistic missile (R-lA) based on

the German v- 2 . 10

The Cold War took shape during 1948-50, as the disagreement

between the United States and the Soviet Union over Europe

rapidly grew into a nuclear confrontation on a global scale. In

February 1948, the Soviets staged a coup against the elected

government of Czechoslovakia. The Czech foreign minister was

assassinated and a pro-Soviet regime was established. In the

wake of this shocking development, the U.S. Army commander in

Berlin warned of a possible Soviet military attack. In June,

after the Western powers announced formation of a West German

government, the Russians blockaded Berlin. The United States

countered with an airlift and deployed B-29s (widely associated

with the atomic bombing of Japan) in Britain. 11

In April 1949, the United States entered its first peacetime

military alliance with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) . 12 At the end of August, the United States

was stunned by the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb, which had

not been expected until 1952. During the same year, the Tu-4

bomber went into service. 13 In October, China fell to Communist



revolutionaries, and the world's most populous nation became an

ally of the Soviet Union. Several months later, the Truman

administration proposed a major expansion of U.S. military

forces, which was articulated in a National Security Council

memorandum (NSC 68). In June 1950, North Korean Communist forces

invaded South Korea, and Truman ordered American troops to the

Asian mainland. 14

Following the attack on South Korea, air defenses in the

continental United States and Alaska were placed on around-the

clock alert in case of a general war with the Soviet Union. 15

Truman received broad support for implementing NSC 68 and began

an unprecedented peacetime American military build-up. Following

General MacArthur's advance into North Korea during the autumn of

1950, Chinese Communist forces intervened and drove the U.S. Army

southward. The war finished in a stalemate, and an armistice was

signed in July 1953. 16

During the Korean War, the Soviet Union continued to develop

long-range bomber aircraft, and worked on the design of a

hydrogen bomb (initially started in 1946) . 11 An intercontinental

bomber (Tu-95) with a range of 7,500 miles (12,500 km) was test-

flown in November 1952. In January 1953, a faster jet-propelled

bomber (M-4) with a range of about 5,000 miles (8,000 km) was

successfully tested. In August of that year, the Soviet Union

exploded its first thermonuclear device (once again ahead of

American expectations), and the new bombers later went into

service armed with hydrogen bombs. 18



Despite the advances in Soviet bombers and nuclear weapons,

the United States maintained strategic military superiority in

this phase of the Cold War. Continental air defenses were

significantly expanded and improved during and after the Korean

conflict with the development of new radars, fast interceptor

aircraft, and both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.

Despite American fears of a "bomber gap" in 1954-56, the Soviet

bomber fleet still comprised a relatively limited number of slow-

moving aircraft confined to bases in the Soviet Union. While

U.S. bombers-deployed at forward bases around the Soviet Union-

could deliver a swift and devastating nuclear strike, it appeared

unlikely that many Soviet planes would reach their targets. 19

In addition to the Korean Armistice and the Soviet hydrogen

bomb, other important events occurred during 1953, which marked

the end of the early Cold War. President Truman left office in

January, and Stalin died in March. New American and Soviet

leaders would pursue new policies. Because of their continuing

failure to match the strategic nuclear power of the United

States, the Soviet Union began to shift attention away from long-

range bombers and towards the development of ballistic missiles.

By 1953, it was recognized that thermonuclear warheads could be

miniaturized and deployed on ballistic missiles, and both the

United States and Soviet Union embarked on ICBM programs during

the following year. 20



Development of the Soviet ICBM Threat {1954-57)

The decision of the Soviet Union to develop an ICBM had

important consequences for the Cold War. Because neither the

United States nor the Soviet Union ever designed an effective

defense against full-scale ballistic missile attack, the

deployment of ICBMs (along with submarine-launched ballistic

missiles [SLBMs]) in the late 1950s and 1960s altered the

strategic military balance between the superpowers. The Soviet

Union finally achieved strategic parity with the United States,

and the Cold War evolved into a more stable relationship based on

mutual deterrence (or "mutual assured destruction" [MAD]).

Moreover, the ICBM provided a rocket with sufficient thrust to

place objects into Earth orbit, and thus gave birth to the Space

Age, which also had enormous impact on the Cold War.

The ICBM has a lengthy history of development reflecting the

many complex technical challenges that it posed for scientists

and engineers. These challenges-which included problems of

materials, fuels, engine design, and guidance systems-required

years of research and testing, and substantial government

resources, to overcome. 21 In fact, the technical problems of ICBM

design were so formidable that some American military leaders and

scientists-notably Vannevar Bush-regarded its development as

"impossible" after World War II. 22

History of Rocketry (1903-45). The pioneers of rocketry

were inspired by dreams of space travel and the writings of Jules

Verne, H.G. Wells, and other science fiction authors. In Russia,



early theoretical work w published in 1903 by Konstantin

Tsiolkovskii (1857-1935), who addressed concepts of combustion,

lift, and orbital mechanics. Although Tsiolkovskii was not an

engineer and never tackled the more practical problems of rocket

design, he created a tradition of research in the Soviet Union

that later produced concrete results. The American engineer

Robert Goddard (1882-1945) designed and launched the world's

first liquid-fuel rocket in 1926. However, Goddard was highly

secretive about his research, and his achievements were not

widely known for many years. In Germany, initial research was

encouraged by Hermann Oberth (1894-1989), who published a book on

space travel in 1923 and helped test a small liquid-fuel rocket

in 1930 with young Wernher von Braun (1912-77). 23

The early rocket enthusiasts apparently failed to appreciate

the scale of the resources required for substantive research and

development and the need for government sponsorship. 24 During the

1930s, rocketry found state sponsorship in both the Soviet Union

and Germany, but not in the United States. In the Soviet Union,

F.A. Tsander (student of Tsiolkovskii) worked at the Central

Aerodynamics Institute (TsAGI), where he tested the first Soviet

liquid-fuel rocket in March 1933. During the same year, the

Soviet army consolidated rocket development at the newly

established the Jet Scientific Research Institute (RNII), and

Sergei Korolev (1907-66)-who eventually built the first ICBM-was

appointed deputy director. However, further Soviet progress in

rocketry was limited by the effects of Stalin's purges in 1937-


HAER No. AK-3 0-A (page 14)

38. Korolev and other leading rocket scientists were arrested

and either executed or imprisoned. 25

Germany became the first nation to develop a ballistic

missile, although the effort was costly and the short-range V-2

missile-armed with conventional warhead-had little strategic

value during World War II. The German army began to support

rocket development in 1930 and awarded a small contract to von

Braun in late 1932. Although the first design (A-1) was a

failure, von Braun successfully launched a liquid-fuel 300-kg

thrust rocket (A-2) in December 1934. With expanded funding

support from the German military, a large research and

development complex was established at Peenemunde in 1936-37 and

work began on the first ballistic missile (A-4). As Michael

Neufeld has observed, to build the A-4, breakthroughs were

required in three crucial technologies: (1) large liquid-fuel

engines, (2) supersonic aerodynamics, and (3) guidance systems. 26

In October 1942, the Germans successfully test-launched the

A-4 (later renamed V-2), which was powered by a 56,000-lb (25-

metric ton) thrust engine, and achieved an altitude of roughly 50

miles (80 km) and downrange distance of 120 miles (190 km). With

direct support from Hitler, production of the V-2 became a

priority. Between September 1944 and March 1945, over 3,000 of

these short-range ballistic missiles were launched at London and

other Allied targets with a 2, 200-lb explosive warhead. 27

Although once viewed by Hitler as a "weapon that can decide the

war, " 28 the V-2 campaign had no significant effect on its outcome.



During 1941, von Braun's team also developed preliminary plans

for a multi-stage ICBM (A-9/A-10) for use against the United

States, but this project would have required a new set of major

technological breakthroughs and was never pursued. 29

Ballistic Missile Development in the Soviet Union (1945-57).

Despite the lack of its strategic value, both the Soviet Union

and the United States sought to acquire V-2 missile technology

from the Germans at the end of World War II. Most leading German

rocket specialists, including von Braun, continued ballistic

missile research in America. However, a number of German

scientists were forcibly brought to Russia in 1946 to help begin

a Soviet program of missile development. This program was put

under the direction of Korolev, who had been released from prison

during the war. Like Hitler, Stalin provided personal support

for ballistic missile development. During 1947, the Soviets

test-launched reassembled V-2 rockets (designated R-lA), and

Korolev began work on a new missile (R-2) with a thrust of 35

metric tons and range of 360 miles (600 km). The R-2 was

successfully test-launched in October 1950. 30

In 1950, Korolev also began work on two larger missiles,

which included the R-5 with a projected range of 720 miles

(1,200 km) and the R-3 with a range of 1,800 miles (3,000 km).

The R-5 had an engine thrust of 40 metric tons and could be

modified to carry an atomic warhead. This missile was test-

launched in April 1954, and the nuclear variant (R-5M) was tested

in 1955-56. The R-3 would represent the first Soviet strategic



missile intended to reach targets in Britain and U.S. forward

bases in Europe, one that presented new challenges, especially

with respect to engine design. 31

After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Soviet military

began a reassessment of strategic weapons programs. Korolev

recormnended abandoning the R-3 project (with a range of 1, 800

miles [3,000 km]) and proceeding directly with the development of

an ICBM with a range of 4,200-4,800 miles (7,000-8,000 km) on the

grounds that both projects would require roughly the same amount

of time to complete. In May 1954, Korolev was authorized to

begin work on the ICBM (R-7) . 32

The decision of the Soviet government to cormnit resources to

the design and construction of an ICBM, despite the high cost and

technical challenges of the project, seems to have been

influenced by several factors. The failure to deploy a strategic

bomber force with sufficient striking power in the face of

increasingly effective American continental air defense must have

been a central consideration. At the same time, the successful

development of a thermonuclear warhead that could be delivered by

a rocket provided Soviet ballistic missiles with the potential

strategic value that the V-2 had lacked. The past successes of

Korolev and the supporting analyses of other leading Soviet

scientists, encouraged confidence in the ICBM project. 33

The most formidable technical problem was the engine, which

had a 400-metric ton thrust requirement (i.e., ten times greater

than the R-5). This problem was solved by attaching four engines



("packets") around a central core engine. Another major

challenge was guidance and control, because existing systems did

not provide sufficient accuracy for the distances involved in

ICBM flight. The Soviet government had to construct a costly new

ICBM infrastructure that included launch pads, fueling

facilities, missile assembly facilities, and tracking stations.

The R-7 engines were tested in February 1956, but the first test

launches during March-June 1957 were failures, and the program

was threatened with cancellation. 34

The world's first ICBM was finally launched successfully by

the Soviet Union in August 1957, and traveled 3,800 miles (6,400

km) downrange to a target area in the Pacific Ocean. A second

test launch was performed in September, and on 4 October 1957, an

R-7 was used to boost the first artificial satellite (Sputnik I)

into orbit around the Earth. In November, the Soviet Union

launched a second larger satellite (Sputnik II) weighing over

1, 000 lbs. and containing a dog. 35

The launch of the two Soviet satellites in October-November

1957 had an enormous impact on the United States and the rest of

the world. In addition to their value in international prestige,

the space launches effectively demonstrated the ICBM capabilities

of the Soviet Union, which altered the strategic military balance

of the Cold War. Not only did the United States lack a ballistic

missile defense, but existing radar systems were not adequate to

provide advance warning of a Soviet ICBM attack. Furthermore,

the United States did not test an ICBM (which could at least



deter such an attack with sufficient warning time) until December

1957, and its first satellite launch during the same month was a

failure.

A period of intense recrimination followed, and the

Eisenhower administration, as well as American institutions of

education and science, were subject to wide criticism. 36 The

failure to anticipate a Soviet ICBM was probably due in part to

the delayed effort to develop an ICBM in the United States,

which, in turn, reflected its advantage in strategic air power at

the beginning of the Cold War, as well as the high costs and

technical difficulties of building a long-range ballistic

missile. Sputnik acted as a catalyst for increased federal

funding in defense and other areas, which included the first

missile early warning system. The U.S. Congress authorized

initial funding for BMEWS in January 1958. 37

In fact, the Soviet ICBM threat did not become real for some

years following the Sputnik launch. The R-7 had major

shortcomings as a weapons system, which included the 20 hours

required for launch preparation. As late as 1962, the Soviet

Union possessed only four ICBM launch complexes. In an effort to

improve his strategic position, Khrushchev installed intermediate

range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Cuba during October of that

year, but was forced to withdraw them in the ensuing Cuban

Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union began to deploy new ICBMs in

1962, including the R-9 and the R-16. During 1966-69, deployment

increased by approximately 300 annually, and by November of 1969,



the Soviet Union had 1,140 ICBMs and 185 submarine-launched

ballistic missiles (SLBMs)-but only 145 long-range bombers. 38

Chapter 1 Notes

1Kissinger, Henry A., Diplomacy. (New York, Simon and Schuster 1994) .

2Ambrose, Stephen E., Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. Seventh Edition. (New York, Penguin Books 1993).

3Moynihan, Brian, Claws of the Bear: The History of the Red Army from the Revolution to the Present. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1989) t pp. 150-193.

'Thomas, Hugh, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945 -1946. (New York, Atheneurn 1987), p. 550.

5 Ibid, p. 550.

6Ambrose, pp. 53-57.

7Kissinger, pp. 428-429.

8Kennan, George F., Memoirs 1925 - 1950. (Boston, Little, Brown and Company 1967), pp. 292-297.

9Jones, Joseph M., The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5, 1947). (New York, Viking Press 1955).

10Zaloga, Steven J., Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945 - 1964. (Novato, CA, Presidio 1993). The technological backwardness of the Soviet Union may have had deep historical roots. As Arnold Toynbee observed, Russian cultural heritage was primarily derived from Byzantium and not Western Christendom (Toynbee, Arnold J., "Russia's Byzantine Heritage," in A. J. Toynbee Civilization on Trial (London, Oxford University Press 1953), pp. 164-183). The historian of Medieval technology Lynn White found a cultural and theological basis for the rejection of novel technology in Byzantium (e.g., ban on clocks and pipe organs in Orthodox churches) and the very different attitudes of the West (White, Lynn, "Cultural Climates and Technological Advance in the Middle Ages." Viator, Vol. 2, pp. 171-201, 1971).

11Ambrose, pp. 90-99.

uKissinger, pp. 456-457.

13 Zaloga, pp. 63-79.



14McCullough, David, Truman. (New York, Simon and Schuster 1992), pp. 775-794.

15Schaffel, Kenneth, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945 - 1960. (Washington, Office of Air Force History 1991), pp. 129-139.

16Hastings, Max, The Korean War. (New York, Simon and Schuster 1987) .

17Holloway, David, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939 - 1956. (New Haven, Yale University Press 1994), pp. 294-319; Rhodes, Richard, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. (New York, Simon and Schuster 1995).

uZaloga, pp. 79-88.

19Schaffel, pp. 169-239.

20Spires, David N., Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership. (Washington, Air Force Space Command 1998), pp. 31-35.

21Neufeld, Michael J., The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1995).

22spires, pp. 11-21.

23McDougall, Walter A., ... The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. (New York, Basic Books 1985); Neufeld, pp. 5-16.

24Ibid, p. 77; Neufeld, p. 10.

25 Zaloga, pp. 108-113.

26Neufeld, pp. 16-109.

27Ibid, pp. 135-265.

28Speer, Albert, Inside the Third Reich (New York, Avon Books 1971), pp. 469-472.

29Neufeld, pp. 138-139.

30 Zaloga, pp. 125-128; Holloway, pp. 245-248.

31 Ibid, pp. 128-139; Holloway, pp. 249-250.

CLEAR AIR FORCE STATION BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SITE II'


32Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. Second edition. (New Haven, Yale University Press 1983), pp. 31-43; Zaloga, pp. 134-141.

33Zaloga, pp. 135-140.

34Ibid, pp. 139-145.

35Ibid, pp. 143-149; McDougall, pp. 60-150.

36McDougall, pp. 141-176.

37Ray, Thomas W., History of BMEWS 1957 - 1964. ADC Historical Study No. 32, pp. 4-7.

38Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. Second edition. (New Haven, Yale University Press 1983), pp. 43-60.



Chapter II

BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

AT CLEAR AIR FORCE STATION, ALASKA

The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Clear

AFS in Alaska was part of a larger radar system established by

the U.S. Air Force in 1958-63 to provide advance warning of a

Soviet ICBM attack across the polar region. Although the U.S.

government authorized construction of BMEWS in the wake of the

October 1957 Sputnik launch, the system had been conceived

several years earlier. Most existing radar in 1957 lacked the

range necessary for adequate advance warning of an incoming

ICBM.

In addition to the radars at Clear AFS (BMEWS Site II), sites

were established in Thule, Greenland (Site I) and Fylingdales

Moor, Britain (Site III).

BMEWS was the first ballistic missile early warning radar

system (although prototypes had been constructed and tested in

Massachusetts and Trinidad during 1955-58). The deployment of

BMEWS reflected a fundamental shift in Cold War military

strategy, because in contrast to continental air defense against

nuclear bombers, it was part of a system designed to deter but

not defend against an attack from the Soviet Union. By



providing a minimum of fifteen minutes advance warning, BMEWS

ensured sufficient time for the United States to launch a

counterstrike. "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) became the

basis for a relatively stable strategic military balance between

the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold

War.

Although BMEWS was a major engineering achievement, it

represented an expansion of existing radar and computer

technology. The radars were exceptionally powerful in order to

project beams thousands of miles across the polar region, and

they included both detection and tracking radars (although the

latter was not installed at Clear until 1965-66) . Each BMEWS

site was linked to the North American Air Defense Corrnnand

(NORAD) and Strategic Air Corrnnand (SAC) in the continental

United States by redundant and secure lines of corrnnunication.

Origins and Development of BMEWS

BMEWS was based on radar technology that had been developed

irrnnediately prior to and during World War II, although it

represented an unprecedented "scaling up" of that technology to

provide advance detection and tracking of an ICBM. 1 The data

processing technology was a more recent development; the first

completely solid state computer (CG-24) had been designed for



the BMEWS prototype tracking radar in 1956. 2 Despite the shock

of the Sputnik launch in 1957, the United States had prepared

for the possibility of a Soviet ICBM threat from 1954 onward,

and had designed radars for ballistic missile tracking and

developed the basic configuration of an early warning system in

1955-56.

Radar and Early Warning Systems (1922-59). Radar is based

on the reflection of electromagnetic waves by an object, and the

reflected waves are used to deter~ine the position and motion of

the object. Electromagnetic theory was first developed by James

Maxwell (1831-79), and published in an 1873 treatise. In 1888-

89, Heinrich Hertz (1857-94) experimentally generated and

detected radio waves within the electromagnetic spectrum,

demonstrating that they possessed the same properties as visible

light. The practical applications of "Hertzian waves" were

initially pursued by Guglielmo Marconi (1874-1937), who built

the first wireless set and transmitted radio signals across the

Atlantic in 1901. 3 However, the development of effective radar

required generation of relatively short radio waves (less than

50 meters in length) in order to reflect waves of sufficient

energy back to a receiver for detection. High frequency radios

were devised during World War I. Several years later, in 1922,

a passing ship on the Potomac River disrupted a high frequency

\ \



radio beam, and revealed the potential application of shorter

wavelengths for early warning. 4

During the early 1930s, research and development of

primitive radar technology took place in many nations, including

Germany, Italy, Holland, Japan, and the Soviet Union. 5 In the

United States, the Army tested a radar device in 1936 that

provided detection of an aircraft at a distance of seven miles. 6

However, Britain constructed the first large-scale early warning

system (Chain Home network) during 1935-39 in response to the

threat of German air attacks {which had occurred during World

War I). At the beginning of World War II {September 1939), the

Chain Home system comprised twenty stations that provided

coverage of the eastern and southern coasts on wavelengths

between 10 and 13 meters. This early warning network played a

major role in the Battle of Britain. In 1939, British

scientists also invented the cavity magnetron, which produced

microwave radar {10-centimeter wavelength) and significantly

improved radar capabilities. 7

Like most other nations, the United States was less

concerned about potential enemy air attacks in the years prior

to World War II. On 7 December 1941, a mobile radar unit on

Oahu Island detected incoming Japanese planes, but the

information was misinterpreted and ignored. After the United



States entered the war, the Army established ninety-five radar

stations on the west and east coasts to provide early warning.

These stations were equipped with SCR-270 (mobile) and SCR-271

(fixed) radars with a range of about 150 miles (240 km), and

were augmented with civilian volunteer ground observers. 8

Throughout the war, radar research and development was

undertaken at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Radiation Lab, which ultimately designed roughly 150 types of

radars for the military, and estaplished a precedent that was

revived in the Cold War era. 9 In 1943-45, the threat of air

attacks on the continental United States again declined and air

defense and early warning radar became a low priority. 10

At the end of World War II, air defense systems in the

United States were dismantled. The strategic air threat to the

United States was perceived as low, despite the growing

confrontation with the Soviet Union during 1946-47 and the

development of the Soviet Tu-4 long-range bomber. The Soviet

threat to the continental United States was constrained by its

lack of forward bomber bases and atomic weapons. Furthermore,

the Truman administration sought major reductions in defense

spending at this time. The Air Force proposed a "radar fence"

plan in late 1947 that called for deployment of several hundred

stations, but it was never implemented due to cost. At the end



of 1947, Air Defense Corrunand (ADC) was operating only two radar

stations in the continental United States. 11

Sharply increased tensions with the Soviet Union during the

spring and surruner of 1948 encouraged the U.S. Air Force to

expand early warning radar in the northwest and northeast. This

network (eventually termed the "Lashup system") was equipped

with World War II vintage AN/CPS-5 and AN/TPS-lB/lD radars that

could detect bombers at altitudes of 10,000-40,000' (3,000-

12,000 m) and distances of 60-120 miles (95-190 km). Further

proposed expansion of the system to eighty-five radar stations

and eleven control centers in the continental United States and

Alaska (termed the "Permanent Network") were again shelved in

late 1948 due to cost. However, President Truman's announcement

of a Soviet atomic bomb test in September 1949 significantly

raised public concern regarding air defense, and funds were

allocated for construction of expanded network by the end of

that year. To supplement the radar stations, the U.S. Air Force

organized a ground observer corps in early 1950 that eventually

comprised over 300,000 civilian volunteers. 12

The attack on South Korea in June 1950-followed by Chinese

Communist intervention in November-further accelerated the

expansion of the U.S. early warning network. New funding was

authorized for construction of more radar stations and



acquisition of upgraded radar equipment. Reflecting increased

emphasis on new technology, the Air Force had established the

Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) in January 1950, and

supported the recommendation for a new MIT laboratory devoted to

air defense problems. The Lincoln Laboratory was constructed at

Hanscom Air Force Base (AFB) in Massachusetts, and immediately

began work on a computer to improve the highly complex command

and control functions for radar networks. 13

During 1951-53, Lincoln Laboratory developed the AN/FSQ-7

computer (also known as Whirlwind II) with a magnetic-core

memory, which was tested as part of the experimental Cape Cod

System in October 1953-August 1954. The Cape Cod System became

the model for a computerized continental air defense network

known as SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) . By the time

that SAGE became operational in 1958-59 (employing a new

generation of radars), strategic air defense had been superseded

by the Soviet ICBM threat. However, the innovations in computer

technology and command and control functions developed for the

Cape Cod System and SAGE are now viewed as having been critical

to the evolution of Cold War early warning systems, including

BMEWS .14

The Soviet test of a hydrogen bomb in August 1953 acted as

another catalyst to the expansion of early warning systems and



air defenses in North America. The latter included construction

of the Mid-Canada Line and-even further north-the Distant Early

Warning (DEW) Line, which had been recormnended by the Surmner

Study Group in 1952. The Mid-Canada Line consisted of ninety-

eight unmanned microwave radars deployed roughly along the 54th

parallel and became fully operational in 1958. The

controversial and costly DEW Line (comprising fifty-seven

stations from Alaska to Greenland) was built during 1955-57 with

new radars adapted for arctic use that included the AN/FPS-19

search radar (range of 160 miles [260 km]). The massive

construction effort above the Arctic Circle anticipated the

construction of BMEWS, which began the following year. Like

SAGE, these early warning lines did not become operational until

strategic air defense had already been overshadowed by the

Soviet ICBM threat. 15

During 1955-59, several improvements were made in U.S.

radar technology related to the evolution of early warning

systems and continental air defense. New "gap filler" radars

such as the AN/FPS-14 and AN/FPS-18 were developed for detection

of low-flying aircraft. As a result, the U.S. Air Force

disbanded the civilian Ground Observer Corps at the beginning of

1959. New "frequency-diversity" (FD) radars (e.g., AN/FPS-24)

were designed to avoid the effects of electronic counter-



measures (ECM), which had blinded ADC radars in a 1956 attack

exercise. 16

The Eisenhower administration, which came into office in

January 1953, advocated a "New Look" in defense policy that

entailed spending cuts and greater emphasis on the deterrence of

"massive retaliation" by nuclear bombers. Air Force officers

who favored increased support for offensive capabilities

attacked the DEW Line proposal as "Maginot Line mentality." The

expansion and improvement of early warning radars undertaken

after 1953 appeared inconsistent with the "New Look" approach,

but actually reflected recognition of the inseparable

relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in the

Nuclear Age. Effective early warning (measured in hours or

minutes) was necessary to ensure survival of the capacity to

retaliate. 17 The MAD concept (mutual assured destruction), which

is associated with the later ICBM threat, seems to have evolved

from this earlier understanding of the role of early warning

systems in U.S. nuclear strategy.

Origins of BMEWS (1954-57). The Summer Study Group, which

was convened during June-August 1952 at the Lincoln Lab

(discussed above), had been asked to consider the ICBM among the

range of potential threats to the United States. Apparently

regarding this possibility as relatively remote, they focused



attention on strategic air defense issues. However, as early as

1954, intelligence reports revealed the existence of the Soviet

ICBM program (during the same year that Korolev had been

authorized to proceed with the R-7) . 18 While successful

development of an ICBM in the Soviet Union might take many

years, the U.S. Air Force recognized that it represented an

entirely new strategic threat that would render much o.f the

evolving air defense system obsolete. An ICBM presented a

problem not only with respect to defense (because it appeared

impossible to intercept and destroy), but also to detection and

tracking.

The northernmost state-of-the-art early warning radars on

the DEW Line (which became operational in 1957) could detect

Soviet turboprop and jet bombers (traveling at cruising speeds

of 425-500 miles [710-835 km] per hour) at altitudes of 65,000'

(20,000 meters) at a distance of 160 miles (250 km). This could

provide several hours' early warning of a Soviet nuclear attack

on the United States. However, an ICBM would travel at a

velocity of roughly 4 miles (7 km) per second at an altitude of

up to 600 miles (1,000 km) or higher. Even if the DEW Line

radars could detect the comparatively small ICBM target at such

a speed and altitude, they could not provide sufficiently early


HAER No. AK-30-A (page 32}

warning-given the ICBM's extreme high velocity-to protect

retaliatory forces from destruction. 19

The U.S. Air Force asked General Electric (GE) and the

Lincoln Lab to design new radars that could detect and track

ballistic missiles. Initial discussions during 1953-54

addressed the question of whether any form of radar technology

would be adequate for this task. The ballistic missile radar

design first proposed by GE lacked sufficient range resolution.

In November 1954, Lincoln Lab began to modify the GE concept,

which eventually became the AN/FPS-17 coded-pulse radar. The

AN/FPS-17 represented the first long-range radar (range of over

600 miles [1,000 km]), and provided for both detection and

tracking of missiles by generating long pulses constructed from

short pulses on a frequency of 200 megahertz. The large fixed

antenna measured 110' (34 meters) in width and 175' (53 meters)

in height. 20

An AN/FPS-17 was tested at Laredo AFB, Texas in 1956, where

it successfully tracked sounding rockets fired at White Sands

Missile Range at a range of several hundred miles. The radar

was subsequently installed at Pirinclik in Turkey to monitor

Soviet missile launches, and detected the Sputnik launch in

October 1957. An AN/FPS-17 was also installed on Shemya Island

in the Aleutians to track Soviet missile tests in the North



Pacific (eventually replaced with the Cobra Dane phased-array

radar) . 21

In June 1955, the Air Force issued General Operational

Requirement No. 96 (GOR 96) entitled "A Ballistic Missile

Detection Support System," which called for the construction of

three northern radars for detection of Soviet ICBMs over the

polar region. The system would be designed to provide a minimum

of fifteen minutes early warning of an ICBM attack. GOR 96 was \

first formal proposal of the missile early warning system that

ultimately became BMEWS. The estimated cost of the system was

$1.3 billion, and the proposal was promptly shelved as too

expensive. 22

Nevertheless, the Lincoln Lab organized a Systems Research

Group in 1955 to study the problems of designing a ballistic

missile early warning system. The ,group addressed a variety of

issues, including the radar reflection properties of ICBMs,

prediction of missile impact areas, and meteor trails (which had

generated false alarms on the AN/FPS-17 radar). The Lincoln Lab

also proceeded with the development of a more powerful missile

radar that would become the prototype for the BMEWS tracking

radars. Construction of the new radar began in the summer of

1956 at Millstone Hill, located in Westford, Massachusetts near

Hanscom AFB. 23



Building the Millstone Hill radar forced Lincoln Lab to

confront the major problems of designing an ICBM early warning

system. Such a system did not require any fundamental

innovations in radar technology (e.g., cavity magnetron), but

rather a massive "scaling up" of existing technology to provide

the needed increase in range (by a factor of 20) and sensitivity

(by a factor of almost 100,000) . 24 To provide adequate warning

time of an ICBM attack, the radar would have to detect the

incoming missile at a range of several thousand miles (i.e.,

significantly greater range than the AN/FPS-17). The data

processing equipment would have to discriminate quickly between

a hostile ICBM and other phenomena (e.g., a meteor), or risk

triggering an accidental nuclear war.

As radar historian Robert Buderi has written, at Millstone

Hill "everything seemed designed on a gigantic scale." 25 The

transmitter operated on an average power of 60 kW and peak power

of 1 MW with "monster klystron" tubes (100 times more powerful

than any existing klystrons) that generated waves at 440

megahertz. The waveguide " ... ran almost the size of a heating

duct. /1 The mobile antenna was 84' ( 2 6 meters) in diameter and

was mounted on a 90' (27-meter) tower. A separate building

adjacent to the tower housed the control and processing



equipment, including the world's first solid-state digital

computer (CG-24) for real-time data processing. 26

The Millstone Hill radar was operational by October 1957

and successfully tracked Sputnik I in earth orbit at a range of

600 miles (960 km), although its detection range was over 1,000

miles (1,800 km). The Lincoln Lab made further improvements to

the radar during the following year, and rebuilt the system in

1962 for L-band operation at 1295 megahertz. Millstone Hill was

subsequently used for space surveillance and research. In 1963,

the antenna was shipped to Pirinclik in Turkey to replace the

existing AN/FPS-17, where it was operated at higher power

(average of 150 kW) with a detection range of 3,800 miles (6,400

km) . 27

In August 1956, the Systems Research Group at Lincoln Lab

prepared two technical reports that outlined the design of an

ICBM early warning system in greater detail than had been

described in the GOR issued fourteen months earlier by the U.S>

Air Force. In Lincoln Lab Technical Report No. 127 ("A

Comparison of Selected ICBM Warning Radar Configurations"), the

authors concluded that the Millstone Hill prototype would be

suitable only for tracking missiles. Detection of the ICBM

would be achieved with massive fixed arrays (measuring 440' [134

meters] in width and 165' [50 meters] in height), which would be



less susceptible to jamming. 28 This radar would represent an

expansion of the AN/FPS-17 coded pulse radar. The 1956

technical reports from the Systems Research Group became the

basic blueprint for BMEWS.

The model for what would become the BMEWS detection radar

was assembled by GE on Trinidad in the British West Indies in

1957-58. The Trinidad radar followed Lincoln Lab specifications

and included a 400'-wide (123-meter) fixed array antenna and

scanner. A tracking radar based on the Millstone Hill prototype

was also constructed. These radars were tested on missile trial

launches from Cape Canaveral (approximately 1,500 miles [2,400

km] northwest). 29

The Soviet Union test-launched their first ICBM in August

1957, and used the R-7 as a booster for the first two satellites

during October and November. As described earlier, the Sputnik

launches generated a public furor in the United States, which

had wide-reaching and long-term consequences for federal

funding. One of the almost immediate consequences was the

allocation of funds for the construction of the first BMEWS

radar site. On 7 November 1957 (four days after the Sputnik II

launch), the U.S. Air Force issued a new general operational

requirement for BMEWS (GOR 156), which updated the original GOR



96 with the results of research and development undertaken since

June 1955.

GOR 156 (misleadingly titled "Ballistic Missile Defense

System") specifically called for construction of radar sites at

Thule, Greenland (Site I); Clear, Alaska (Site II); and

Fylingdales Moor, Britain (Site III). These radar sites were to

provide overlapping coverage of the polar region at a range of

2,600 miles (4,200 km) to ensure fifteen minutes advance warning

of an ICBM attack. They were to operate at a level of virtually

100 percent reliability with the capability to resist jamming

due to ECM and false alarms due to meteor trails and other

disturbances. Construction of Site I in Greenland was

designated as the first priority with a scheduled completion

date of 1959, while Site II in Alaska was tentatively scheduled

for completion in 1960. The estimated total cost was $750

million. In January 1958, Congress appropriated funds for

construction of Site I. 30

Despite the public furor that followed the Sputnik

launches, which included charges of negligence against the

Eisenhower administration, it was apparent that the U.S. Air

Force had prepared for the Soviet ICBM threat since 1954. Not

only had the overall configuration of BMEWS been developed, but

many of the components of the system had already been built and



tested by late 1957. Sputnik simply acted as a catalyst for

funding construction of BMEWS. Moreover, the U.S. Air Force was

close to completing the offensive side of the equation, and

successfully tested the first American ICBM (Atlas) in December

1957. Finally, many historians have emphasized the point that

by launching Sputnik, the Soviet Union implicitly accepted space

as an international zone (as opposed to sovereign "air space")

and established the right of other nations to conduct satellite

reconnaissance over its territory. In the final analysis, this

precedent was more important to the U.S. government than the

temporary loss of prestige engendered by the Soviet space

achievement. 31

Construction of BMEWS (1958-63). Between 1958 and 1963,

the U.S. Air Force constructed the three northern BMEWS sites

with support facilities and rearward communication systems. The

construction of BMEWS, which required installation of massive

high-powered radars in arctic and subarctic environments,

represented a major engineering achievement, although the DEW

Line project (1955-57) provided some precedent. The technology

of the BMEWS radars was not revolutionary, but did reflect a

significant expansion of existing technology.

Two types of radars were installed at the BMEWS sites. The

first of these was the AN/FPS-50 detection radar, comprising an



immense fixed antenna measuring 400' (122 meters) in width and

165' (50 meters) in height and a scanner building. This radar

(an expanded version of the original AN/FPS-17 missile detection

radar) was designed to operate on L-band (400 megahertz) with ~

range of over 2,500 nautical miles (4,630 km). The other radar

was the AN/FPS-49 tracker-based on the Millstone Hill prototype-

that consisted of a mobile parabolic reflector (70-80' [21-24

meters] in diameter) mounted on a pedestal. The tracker would

operate at an unprecedented average power level of 540 kW and

peak power of 10 MW. 32

The BMEWS data-processing equipment was essential to

effective operation of the early warning system because it was

designed to discriminate as quickly as possible between the

trajectory of an incoming ICBM and other phenomena in the upper

atmosphere. The radar sites were equipped with solid-state

digital computers (International Business Machines [IBM] 7090s)

using a software program (BMEWS Operational Simulation System

[BOSS]) designed by Lincoln Lab. The computer technology had

evolved rapidly from Whirlwind (associated with the Cape Cod

System and SAGE) through the CG-24 (for the Millstone Hill

radar). A dual system was operated at each site for greater

reliability. 33



The three radar sites were linked to the North American Air

Defense Command (NORAD) and Air Defense Command (ADC)

headquarters at Ent AFB in Colorado by a rearward communications

system. Dual lines of communication over land, sea, and air

were established for each site. Site I in Greenland, for

example, was connected to NORAD/ADC via submarine cable and

microwave radio-relay (route one), and also via tropospheric-

scatter radio and commercial telephone circuits (route two).

Additional backup facilities were available for use if both

primary communication routes failed. Data from the BMEWS sites

was instantly relayed from Ent AFB to SAC headquarters in Omaha,

Nebraska. 34

Each of the BMEWS sites had a unique configuration of

radars and support facilities. Site I at Thule Air Base in

northern Greenland was originally designed with four AN/FPS-50

detection radars and three AN/FPS-49 tracking radars. Site II

at Clear, Alaska would receive three detection and two tracking

radars, and Site III in the United Kingdom would operate with

three detection and three tracking radars. However, funding

constraints soon forced the Air Force to scale back the original

plans. Sites I and II received only one modified tracking radar

each-in addition to the detection radars-while the AN/FPS-50



detection radars were never installed at Site III, which

received only the three tracking radars. 35

When completed, the BMEWS sites provided broad radar

coverage of the polar region, and were capable of detecting anq

tracking most (although not all) potential Soviet ballistic

missile trajectories. Because of their irrnnense range and

sensitivity, they could detect an ICBM at sufficient distance to

ensure a minimum of fifteen minutes advance warning (estimated

maximum of thirty-seven minutes) to NORAD/ADC and SAC. The

giant AN/FPS-50 detection radars projected two line-of-site

beams at 3.5° and 7° above the horizon, respectively. An ICBM

passing through the lower beam within a range of at least 2,500

nautical miles would trigger an alarm. As the missile

intercepted the upper beam, the computer would determine if the

trajectory matched the characteristics of an ICBM or some other

phenomenon. The AN/FPS-49 radar would be used to track the

missile to its target (and provide further confirmation of ICBM

detection) . BMEWS Site III also offered four minutes advance

warning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)

targeted at the United Kingdom. 36

On 9 May 1958, the Secretary of Defense authorized the U.S.

Air Force to proceed with the construction of BMEWS Sites I and

II. The entire system was to be constructed within a total



funding ceiling of $822.7 million. Air Materiel Cormnand was

assigned responsibility for systems development and funding,

while Air Defense Cormnand was to assume control of the system

when it reached operational readiness. A Special Project Office

(SPO) for BMEWS was established at Hanscom AFB (where the MIT

Lincoln Lab was located) under Electronic Systems Division (Air

Force Systems Cormnand) . The SPO was designed to function as a

liaison with the various Air Force organizations, contractors,

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 37

The prime contract for the construction of BMEWS was

awarded to Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which

subcontracted more than half the work to other firms. Over

3,000 companies were involved in the project. The detection

radars were built by General Electric (GE) and D. S. Kennedy and

Co., while the tracking radar was built by Goodyear Aircraft

Company. Support facilities were constructed by the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers (Eastern Ocean District) . The data

processing equipment was designed by Sylvania Electric, and the

solid-state digital computers were manufactured by IBM. Western

Electric was the prime contractor for construction of the

rearward cormnunications system. 38

Construction of Site I in Greenland began in May 1958, and

placement of the four 1,500-ton detection radar antennae began



in April 1959. The antennae had to be installed on permafrost

but capable of withstanding a 6-inch coating of ice and winds of

up to 185 miles (300 km) per hour. The U.S. Air Force delayed

installation of the tracking radar, and Site I reached initial

operating capacity (IOC) with the four AN/FPS-50 radars on 1

October 1960. A single tracking radar (AN/FPS-49A) was

constructed during October 1960 - July 1961. The total cost for

Site I was approximately $425 million (i.e., more than half of

the established ceiling for BMEWS as a whole) . 39

Site II construction at Clear, Alaska (described below in

detail) began in July 1958. Unlike Thule, there was no pre-

existing military installation at Clear, and a complete Air

Force station was established to support the BMEWS facilities.

The construction schedule was delayed by labor strikes and a

major fire in one of the transmitter buildings. The three

detection radars and transmitter buildings were not completed

until March 1961, and Site II achieved IOC on 30 September 1961.

The total cost for Site II was approximately $350 million. In

1965-66, one tracking radar (AN/FPS-92) was installed at Clear

AFS. 40

Construction of Site III in the United Kingdom (eventually

placed at Fylingdales Moor in Yorkshire, England) was also

delayed by several factors. After protracted negotiations with



the British government, construction commenced in late 1960.

More than fifty labor strikes occurred, slowing completion of

the facilities. Three AN/FPS-49 tracking radars were ultimately

installed, and Site III reached IOC in September 1963 at a total

cost of $120 million. Fylingdales Moor was connected to

NORAD/ADC by four transatlantic lines of communication, three of

them via submarine cables. 41

The construction of BMEWS between 1958 and 1963 marked a

fundamental turning point in the military and political balance

of the Cold War. While all previously built early warning radar

systems-from the Chain Home network to the DEW Line-were part of

a strategic air defense designed to help destroy as much of the

attacking force as possible, BMEWS was established only to

provide advance warning. It ensured survival of the U.S.

ground-based ICBM force (deployment of which began during this

period) and nuclear bombers for a counterstrike. Although both

the United States and the Soviet Union developed model anti-

ballistic missile (ABM) systems after 1963, neither side

deployed large-scale ABM defense during the Cold War (addressed

in the 1972 ABM Treaty) . BMEWS marked the beginning of a

relatively stable balance of military power based on the mutual

deterrence of ICBMs (supplemented with SLBMs and bombers) or the

MAD concept. As noted earlier, the latter was not an entirely



novel concept-it was implicit in President Eisenhower's support

for the DEW Line and other early warning systems prior to BMEWS

to ensure "massive retaliation" by SAC.

BMEWS Site II at Clear AFS, Alaska

Site II at Clear AFS in Alaska was the only BMEWS radar

site within the United States. Located in south-central Alaska

roughly 85 miles (135 km) southwest of Fairbanks, Site II

represented the western BMEWS radar site and provided coverage

of ICBM launches from Northeast Asia at a range of 2,600 miles

(4,000 km) on a 170° azimuth. Constructed during 1958-61, the

BMEWS site at Clear AFS remained operational throughout the rest

of the Cold War (1961-89) and beyond. Site II was initially

equipped with three AN/FPS-50 detection radars, but one tracking

radar (AN/FPS~49) was also installed in 1965-66. A coal-fired

power plant was constructed at Clear AFS to provide the enormous

power needed to operate the radars.

At the time that the U.S. Air Force began construction of

BMEWS, several early warning systems were already operating in

Alaska for strategic air defense. They included the Aircraft

Control and Warning (AC&W) network, comprising twelve coastal

and interior radar stations constructed during 1950-54 (six

additional stations were completed by 1958). The AC&W stations



were equipped with AN/CPS-5 and AN/FPS-3 long-range search

radars, which were also deployed at Ladd AFB and Elmendorf AFB.

Along the northern coast were sixteen recently constructed DEW

Line stations equipped with newer AN/FPS-19 search radars. The

Alaskan radar stations were linked to NORAD via a tropospheric

scatter and microwave relay system (White Alice Communications

System) initially constructed during 1955-57. 42

Construction of Clear AFS and BMEWS Site II (1958-61).

Clear was selected for BMEWS Site II in January 1958. The

location (approximately 65° North 149° West) was chosen for the

Alaskan BMEWS site among eleven candidates on the basis of

relatively easy access, suitable substratum for construction,

open horizons, and lack of electronic interference. 43 The land

(34,642 acres) had been withdrawn by the U.S. Air Force in 1947,

and used during 1948 for an AC&W radar site. The radar

equipment was subsequently moved to Ladd AFB, and the site was

renamed Clear Air Force Auxiliary Field and used by Alaskan Air

Command (AAC) for a gunnery range. In 1949, the land was

transferred to the Department of Interior; a 1956 fire destroyed

the three structures built for the AC&W site. 44

After the Air Force reacquired the Clear site in early

1958, a temporary camp was established to house 800 workers for

construction of the new facilities. During the winter of 1958-



59, the area was cleared of trees, and construction of the

support facilities began under the direction of the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers (Alaska District) . The support facilities

included dormitories, dining facilities, workshops, garages, and

other structures. Construction was delayed by a plumbers and

carpenters strike in June-July 1959, and by the national steel

strike during August 1959-January 1960. 45

Construction of the radars and other components of the

BMEWS site began in early 1960. In addition to the three

antennae for the AN/FPS-50 detection radars (Structures 735,

736, and 737), scanner buildings (Buildings 104, 105, and 106)

were erected opposite the reflectors. Larger transmitter

buildings (Buildings 101 and 102) were constructed in between

the scanner buildings. On 4 May 1960, a major fire occurred in

Building 102, causing extensive damage to the floors, walls, and

roof of the structure. This further delayed completion of Clear

AFS and BMEWS Site II. 46

To meet the high power requirements of the radars, a large

power plant (Building 111) was constructed as part of the BMEWS

facilities at Clear AFS. The seven-story plant was designed to

produce 22,500 kW with three steam-driven turbine-generator

units. The fuel source was sub-bituminous coal, mined near

Healy (located approximately 30 miles [50 km] south of Clear)



and shipped to the BMEWS site on a specially built Alaska

Railroad spur line. The power plant was completed in 1961. 47

In addition to the major subcontractors such as GE and

Sylvania Electric (discussed above), many smaller local firms

were contracted for various components of Clear AFS and the

BMEWS facilities. The transmitter buildings were constructed by

Baker Ford (Contract No. DA-95-507-ENG-1282), and the scanner

buildings were erected by Patti-MacDonald (Contract No. DA-95-

507-ENG-1317). Empire Gas and Engineering was contracted to

build the power plant (Contract No. DA-95-507-ENG-1333), and

Miller Brothers was contracted for the fire station. 48

Because of the construction delays caused by the labor

strikes and fire in Building 102, the BMEWS Site II radars and

support facilities were not completed until March 1961.

Communication links with NORAD/ADC at Ent AFB in Colorado were

established between 30 June and 31 August 1961. BMEWS Site II

achieved Initial Operating Capacity (IOC) on 30 September, and

full operational status on 31 December 1961 (i.e., more than

year after its originally scheduled completion date) . 49

Description of Facilities: Clear AFB and BMEWS Site II.

Clear AFS comprises three areas: (1) Technical Site (BMEWS

facilities); (2) Composite Site (administrative and support

facilities); and (3) Camp Site (original work camp). The



following description of facilities is focused primarily on the

BMEWS Site II radars and associated structures at the Technical

Site.

As noted earlier, BMEWS Site II contains a unique

configuration of radars and support facilities that are not

fully duplicated at the other two BMEWS sites. All of the BMEWS

facilities at Site II are located within the fenced boundaries

of the Technical Site at Clear AFS. These facilities include

the three AN/FPS-50 detection radars (antennae and scanner

buildings), two transmitter buildings, and one AN/FPS-92

tracking radar (located on the roof of the larger transmitter

building). The scanner and transmitter buildings are joined by

a protected passageway (or "utilidor") for all-weather access

from the Composite Area. A supply warehouse was constructed

adjacent to the larger transmitter building in 1966 (i.e.,

concurrently with the installation of the tracking radar). The

other facilities at the Technical Site include the power plant

and associated structures (including the fire station and

locomotive shelter), which are located northeast of the radar

complex in a separate enclosure. 50

Each of the antennae for the three detection radars

(Structures 735, 736, and 737) measures 400' (122 meters) in

width and 165' (50 meters) in height, and weighs approximately



900 tons. Each antenna is composed of 2,000 steel frames

(special steel alloy designed to withstand extreme low

temperatures and high wind conditions), and is supported by

concrete footings and lattice backstays. The twenty concrete

footings at the base of each antenna are spaced 21' (6 meters)

apart; each footing measures 16' x 22' (5 x 7 meters) and rests

on 30' (9 meters) of compacted fill. The solid tubular

backstays at BMEWS Site II were modified to withstand potential

earthquakes (which did not present a hazard at the other BMEWS

sites). s1

Each antenna faces a scanner building (Buildings 104, 105,

and 106), which functions to project electromagnetic waves onto

the reflecting antenna to produce the two radar beams for target

detection. Each two-story scanner building measures 80' (24

meters) in width, 144' (44 meters) in length, and 58' (18

meters) in height. Although basically rectangular in plan, the

side facing the antenna exhibits a curvature that mirrors the

parabolic form of the latter. Each building is constructed with

a steel frame and corrugated metal exterior siding covered with

an asbestos/asphalt coating. The frame rests on a poured

concrete foundation and pilings to ensure maximum stability and

cushion the structure from the effects of permafrost and

vibration.



Two rows of feedhorns that project electromagnetic waves

onto the antenna through the scanner "windows" are located on

the curved side (or plenum) of each scanner building (visible as

white horizontal bands on the building exterior). The feedhorns

are connected by waveguides to a central "pipe-organ scanner" in

each building (so named because of its resemblance to a church

organ). The pipe-organ scanner, which was designed by the

Lincoln Lab, is one of the most famous engineering features of

BMEWS. 52

The larger transmitter building (Building 102) is

rectangular in plan, and measures 376' (115 meters) in length

and 155' (47 meters) in width. Like the scanner buildings, it

is constructed with a steel frame and metal siding (coated with

asbestos/asphalt paint) over a poured concrete foundation. This

structure houses the banks of "monster klystron" amplifiers,

which generate the waves (at an average power of 150 kW each)

guided to the scanner buildings and projected onto the antennae.

Each klystron tube measures 9'-8" (3 meters) in length.

Building 102 also houses the control centers and data-

processing equipment for the radars. The Missile Warning

Operations Center (MWOC) is located on the lower floor, and

contains consoles that display the computer output. The

original computers (also located on the lower floor) were two



solid-state IBM 7090 digital computers loaded with specially

designed software programs for missile impact prediction (MIP) .

Each computer would process the radar data and compare results

with the other IBM 7090. They were replaced in 1982-1983 with

Control Data Cyber 170/720 computers. The Central System

Monitoring Room (CSMR) is located adjacent to the MWOC and

contains equipment used to monitor the component subsystems. 53

The AN/FPS-92 tracking radar is mounted on the reinforced

concrete roof of Building 102. This radar was installed during

1965-66, and represents a modified version of the AN/FPS-49

trackers deployed at the other BMEWS sites (the AN/FPS-92

antenna is rotated with hydrostatic rather than ball bearings).

The antenna measures 84' (26 meters) in diameter with a central

hub and 24 radial sectors (each 31' [9 meters] in length) that

are bolted to each other as well as the hub. It is supported by

a four-section steel axle with aluminum frames. The radar is

enclosed within a 104' (32-meter) radome for protection from

wind and low temperatures. The radome was originally composed

of cardboard honeycomb between fiberglass sheets, covered with

polyethylene film. In 1981, it was replaced with a new radome

composed of tedlar panels set in an aluminum frame. 54

The smaller transmitter building (Building 101) measures

only 255' (78 meters) in length and 150' (46 meters) in width.



Its design is otherwise similar to Building 102. Although

Building 101 was also constructed with a reinforced concrete

roof to support a tracking radar (up to 110 tons), no radar was

ever installed on this structure. Both transmitter buildings

and the three scanner buildings are interconnected by a covered

passageway or "utilidor" that provides protected access

(personnel and vehicles) from the Composite Area. The

waveguides between each transmitter and scanner building also

are contained in the utilidor, which is composed of a steel

frame covered with steel siding that rests on a concrete grade

and is up to 19' ( 6 meters) in width. 55

The power plant (Building 111) and associated facilities

are also located within the Technical Site. Building 111 is a

seven-story steel-frame structure covered with steel insulated

panels on a concrete foundation. It contains three 7,500-kW

steam turbine generators and three 100,000-lb per hour boilers

heated by coal. Approximately three carloads of coal, shipped

by rail from the Usibelli coal mine near Healy, are required

each day to provide sufficient fuel for the boilers. Associated

facilities include a locomotive shelter (Building 118), thaw

shed (Building 110), coal transfer crush house (Building 115),

and ash silo (Building 114) . 56



The Composite Area contains administrative and support

facilities for the BMEWS site. These include dormitories,

dining facility, recreation facilities, gymnasium, vehicle

maintenance, warehouses, and other structures. The Camp Site

represents the original work camp and staging area established

in 1959, and contains Quonset huts, dormitories, warehouses, and

other structures used for base civil engineering and functions

not associated directly with the BMEWS site. 57

Clear AFS and BMEWS. Clear AFS was one of three northern

sites that were part of BMEWS to provide advance warning of a

Soviet ICBM attack over the polar region. As the western site,

BMEWS Site II at Clear covered potential missile launches from

Northeast Asia at a range of 2,600 miles (4,000 km) on an

azimuth of 170°. One of the three detection radars at Site II

was operated to provide low angle coverage with radar beams at 2°

and 5° respectively within a 10° segment of the azimuth. This

would allow detection of ICBMs that could be launched at low

angles from one area in Northeast Asia and otherwise avoid the

BMEWS radars . 58

Like the other two BMEWS sites, Site II in Alaska was

connected to NORAD and ADC at Ent AFB in Colorado via redundant

lines of communication. One route was based a series of

microwave radio-relay stations that followed the Alaska-Canada



(ALCAN) Highway through western Canada into Montana to Colorado.

The other route was based on a combination of systems. A

microwave radio-relay was used from Clear AFS to Boswell Bay,

where a tropospheric scatter system (part of the White Alice

network) transmitted to Annette Island. From the latter,

signals were sent by another microwave radio-relay station to

Ketchikan, where they were transmitted via commercial submarine

cable to Port Angeles (Washington), and then through commercial

telephone circuits to Ent AFB. 59 Clear AFS was not connected to

the other BMEWS sites in Greenland and the United Kingdom.

BMEWS was the first early warning system constructed and

operated for detection of ICBMs, although it was increasingly

supplemented with other sensors and radars. During the summer

of 1960, while Site II was still under construction, the United

States began launching its first reconnaissance satellites.

These included MIDAS (Missile Defense Alarm System), which

provided infrared detection (but not tracking) of missile

launches in the Soviet Union. 60 The deployment of SLBMs by the

Soviet Union also forced the United States to develop early

warning systems to cover its ocean flanks (Atlantic, Pacific,

and Caribbean) during the 1970s. Thus, BMEWS eventually

functioned within a larger network of ballistic missile early

warning systems.

Chapter II Notes



1Buderi, Robert, The Invention that Changed the World: How a Small Group of Radar Pioneers Won the Second World War and Launched a Technological Revolution. (New York, Simon and Schuster 1996), p. 413.

2Freeman, Eva C. (editor), MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in the National Interest. (Lexington, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1995), p. 48.

3Cardwell, Donald, The Norton History of Technology. (New Co. 1995York, W.W. Norton and Co.), pp. 325-379.

4Buderi, pp. 62-63.

5Buderi, pp. 63-64.

6Winkler, David F., Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program. (United States Air Force 1997) / p. 9.

7Buderi, pp. 82-89.

8Winkler, pp. 9-11.

9Buderi, pp. 98-245.

10schaffel, Kenneth, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945 - 1960. (Washington, Office of Air Force History 1991), pp. 42-45.

11Schaffel, pp. 47-76; Winkler, pp. 14-16.

12Ibid, pp. 76-160.

13Winkler, pp. 22-26; Freeman, pp. 1-13.

14Schaffel, pp. 197-209; Buderi, pp. 380-406; Hughes, Thomas P., Rescuing Prometheus. (New York, Pantheon Books 1998), pp. 15-67.

15Schaf fel, p. 197-27 5.

16Winkler, pp. 33-36.

17Ibid, pp. 27-29.



18Freeman, p. 45; Buderi, p. 405.

19Toomay, John C., "Warning and Assessment Sensors," in A.B. Carter, J.D. Steinbruner, and C.A. Zraket (editors) Managing Nuclear Operations. (Washington, The Brookings Institution 1987), pp. 293-294; Buderi, p. 405.

2°Freeman, pp. 45-47; Winkler, pp. 84-85.

21Freeman, pp. 46-47; Winkler, p. 85.

22Ray, Thomas W., History of BMEWS 1957 - 1964. (ADC Historical Study No. 32), pp. 1~4.

23Freeman, pp. 47-49.

24Buderi, pp. 407-409.

27Freeman, pp. 48-111.

28Pettengill, G. H. and Dustin, D. E., "A Comparison of Selected ICBM Warning Radar Configurations." Lincoln Laboratory Technical Report No. 127. (Lexington, Mass., MIT Lincoln Laboratory 13 August 1956); Buderi, pp. 412-413.

29Freeman, p. 48; Buderi, p. 413.

30 Ray, pp. 4-6.

31McDougall, Walter A., ... the Heavens and the Earth. (New York, Basic Books 1985), pp. 112-230; Spires, David N., Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership. (Washington, Air Force Space Command 1998), pp. 50-53.

32 Ray, pp. 8-10; Toomay, pp. 294-297.

33Klass, Philip J. , "BMEWS Uses Discrimination Techniques." Aviation Week, 6 March 1961, pp. 70-74; Freeman, p. 49.

34 1 Kass, 1961, pp. 72-73; Ray, pp. 15-24.

35 Ray, pp. 11-24.


HAER No. AK-30-A (page SB)

36Klass, Philip J., "First BMEWS Nears Operational Status. /1

Aviation Week, 30 May 1960, pp. 76-85; Toomay, pp. 294-296.

37Fusca, James A., "Army Reveals BMEWS Radar Site Details. /1

Aviation Week, 28 July 1958, pp. 19-20; Ray, p. 7.

38Fusca, pp. 19-20; Ray, pp. 6-8.

39 1 Kass, 1960, pp. 76-85; Ray, pp. 11-18.

40Ray, pp. 18-2 0

41 Ray, pp. 21-24.

42Denfeld, D. Colt, The Cold War in Alaska: A Management Plan for Cultural Resources. (Anchorage, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1994); Reynolds, Georgeanne L., Historical Overview and Inventory: White Alice Communications System. (Anchorage, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1988).

43Alaskan Air Command, Visitor's Briefing. (Clear, Alaska: BMEWS Site II, 2 November 1960).

44Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, Keeping Track for Twenty-Five Years 1961-1986. 13 September 1986.

45Alaskan Air Command, 1960; Ray, p. 18.

46Alaskan Air Command, 1960; Ray, pp. 18-19.

47Clear Air Force Station, 1986.

48Whorton, Mandy and Hoffecker, John, Historic Properties of the Cold War Era: Clear Air Station, Alaska. (Report prepared for 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colorado 1997); Nielson, J.M., Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier: The Military in Alaska's History. New York, Greenwood Press 1988), p. 195.

49 Ray, pp. 19-20.

50Whorton and Hoffecker, pp. 28-35.

51Ibid, p. 35 ·

52 Ibid, pp. 36-38.



53Klass, 1961, pp. 72-73; Whorton and Hoffecker, pp. 39-40.

54Clear Air Force Station, 1986.

55Whorton and Hoffecker, p. 39-43.

56 Ibid, pp. 41-42.

57 Ibid, p. 43.

58 Ray, p. 19; Toomay, pp. 294-296.

59 Ray, pp. 19-20.

60Burrow, William E., Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security. (New York, Random House 1986).



Chapter III

BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

AT CLEAR AIR FORCE STATION, ALASKA

AND THE COLD WAR

BMEWS Site II at Clear AFS, Alaska became operational in

1961, and continued to operate throughout the remainder of the

Cold War, which ended in November 1989 with the dismantling of

the Berlin Wall. As part of the larger BMEWS, it provided

advance warning of ICBM attack over the polar region, and-in

conjunction with satellite early warning systems (SEWS)-it

remained the primary North American missile early warning system

for more than a decade. By ensuring sufficient warning for a

retaliatory strike, BMEWS was a critical component of U.S.

nuclear strategy (mutual assured destruction [MAD]) of the post-

Sputnik era. During the 1960s, it also provided a significant

proportion of space-tracking data to the U.S. government.

Although initially plagued with false alarms and some

software problems, BMEWS soon attained efficient operating

capacity. In 1965-66, a tracking radar (AN/FPS-92) was finally

added to Site II. By the late 1960s, when the Soviet Union was

developing a capability to deploy submarine launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs), the United States began to expand early warning

coverage beyond the polar region. This eventually included

construction of Perimeter Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phase Array

Warning System (PAVE PAW)S in the 1970s and 1980s, which provided



early warning for SLBMs (as well as air-launched cruise missiles)

in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and Caribbean Sea. Unlike

BMEWS, the new early warning systems incorporated major advances

in radar technology (phased array radar) . 1 After 1970, BMEWS

provided a less significant proportion of the space-tracking

data.

By the early 1980s, the BMEWS technology had become rather

antiquated (especially the computer hardware and software) and

various upgrades were necessary. During the final decade of the

Cold War, the Air Force seems to have found it increasingly

difficult to maintain the system because of the older technology.

Nevertheless, BMEWS continued to function through 1989 and

beyond. During the early 1990s, phased array units were

installed at Site I and Site III, but not at Clear AFS. A phased

array upgrade at Site II finally took place in December 2000, and

the AN/FPS-92 radar was shut down during the following month.

BMEWS Site II History of Operations (1961-89)

Site II at Clear AFS in Alaska was the second of the three

BMEWS sites to achieve initial operational capacity (30 September

1961). Site I at Thule Air Base (AB) in Greenland had reached

IOC on 1 October 1960, and was first to confront some of the

unanticipated problems of operating radars of such unprecedented

range and sensitivity. Four days after becoming operational, the

rising moon triggered the highest alarm level ("Level 5") as it

passed through the lower and upper fans of the Site I detection

CLEAR AI:R. FORCE STATION BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM SITE II

~R No. AK-30-~ (page 62}

radars. Because the system did not generate any missile impact

predictions, NORAD recognized this as a false alarm, and the

system was modified to ignore return signals from th€ moon. The

growing number of orbiting satellites and debris also generated

false alarms, and required additional adjustments to the system

(installed in July 1961). Less serious problems were created by

vehicular traffic and radio frequency (RF) signal generators,

which caused "single-fan" alarms. 2 Given its potential for

triggering an accidental nuclear war, the false-alarrn problem

remained a major concern that was alleviated to some extent by

deployment of early warning satellites, which provided some

redundancy (and added to the early warning time) . 3 The addition

of the tracking radars at Site I (installed by July 1961) and

Site II provided additional redundancy to the system.

Another problem that had become apparent in 1961 as Site II

prepared to become operational was the high potential of BMEWS

for jamming by the Soviet Union. This was partly a function of

the forward location of the BMEWS sites. 4 Accordingly, the Air

Force requested $160,000 for installation of electronic

countermeasures (ECM) at Sites I and II by May 1962 that included

a noise monitor, target test generator, and ECM simulator. In

1964, both RCA and GE were awarded contracts for more permanent

ECM improvements. 5

BMEWS Site II achieved full operational capacity on 31

December 1961, and on 5 January, Air Force Systems Command turned

Sites I and II over to Air Defense Command (ADC). Operations and

\



maintenance of BMEWS were supervised by the 71st Missile Warning

Wing, which was part of ADC's 9th Air Defense Division. BMEWS

Site II was placed under the command of Detachment 2 of the 71•t

Missile Warning Wing. During 1962, the commander of Clear AFS

was Col. Edward H. Ellington. Although the first months of

operation were plagued by a number of technical problems,

Detachment 2 achieved 1,000 hours of uninterrupted operation

("green time") between 12 June and 30 July 1962. On July 4, a

bear ransacked Col. Ellington's office, underscoring the remote

northern location of the BMEWS sites. 6

BMEWS became part of a wider organizational problem in the

Air Force that reflected the impact of advanced technology on the

U.S. military during the Cold War. In the wake of the 1957

Sputnik launch, the Air Force had initiated development of a

variety of new electronic weapons systems. In addition to SAGE

(see Chapter II), these included the NORAD combat operations

center (425L), strategic air command and control system (465L),

electromagnetic intelligence system (466L), space track (496L),

and BMEWS (474L), and they were known collectively as the "L-

Systems." Unsure of how to fit the L-Systems into its

organizational structure, the Air Force established the "Winter

Study Group" to address the problem. In a report issued in March

1961, the Winter Study Group recommended that the L-Systems be

treated as "automated command and control systems," and not

simply weapons systems. 7



In August 1962, the Soviet Union began installation of

intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba in an effort to

redress the strategic nuclear advantage held by the United States

at that time. This provoked the Cuban Missile Crisis in October,

which was resolved when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the

missiles in an exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.

The crisis exposed North America to the threat of missiles based

outside the Soviet Union for the first time, revealing the limits

of BMEWS and the "polar concept." In fact, ADC had been asked to

consider early warning systems for forward-based missiles on

Soviet submarines in late 1961. By 1965, the U.S. Air Force had

begun to deploy missile early warning radars outside BMEWS,

beginning with the installation of the AN/FPS-85 phased array

unit at Eglin AFB in Florida. 8

In the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cold

War rapidly evolved into a relatively stable nuclear strategic

balance based on opposing missile forces. This balance was

achieved as the Soviet Union finally began to develop a serious

long-range ballistic missile capability with the deployment of

new ICBMs (e.g., SS-7 and SS-8) and forward-based SLBMs during

1962-65. 9 Deterrence for both sides rested on the concept of

mutual assured destruction (MAD), which was formally recognized

in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. In the ABM

Treaty, both the Soviet Union and United States agreed to limit

development of anti-ballistic missile systems in order to

preserve the "balance of terror. " 10 By ensuring adequate warning



for a retaliatory nuclear strike, BMEWS was a cornerstone of this

balance and continued in this role for the remainder of the Cold

War (although gradually supplemented with other early warning

systems) . In fact, despite the post-Sputnik panic that had

engendered its construction in 1958-60, BMEWS anticipated a

Soviet missile threat that did not become a reality until after

1962.

During 1963-65, Detachment 2 of the 71st Missile Warning Wing

continued to improve the performance of BMEWS Site II. During 9-

28 January and 28 January-5 March 1963, Site II logged 448 and

844 hours of green time, respectively. On 27 March 1964, the

tubular backstays installed on the antennae of the AN/FPS-50

detection radars (see Chapter II) were put to a severe test by

the "Good Friday" earthquake (measuring 8.4 on the Richter

scale). The operation of Site II was interrupted for six

minutes, but no lasting damage to the radars occurred. In 1965,

the site exceeded 2,000 hours of green time. 11

In August 1965, the Air Force finally began construction of

a tracking radar at BMEWS Site II. Although the original plans

had called for deployment of two AN/FPS-49 tracking radars at

Clear AFS, the Air Force had been forced to scale back these

plans due to cost, and no trackers were built at Site II during

1958-61 (see Chapter II). By 1965, some improvements had been

made in the tracker (now designated AN/FPS-92). The new radar

was installed on the concrete-reinforced roof of Building 102 and

enclosed within a 104' (32-meter) wide fiberglass radome. It



reached initial operating capacity in June 1966. The AN/FPS-92

radar added some redundancy to Site II by providing further

confirmation of ICBM detection, although it was capable of

tracking only one target at any given time. Ultimately, the Site

II tracker was used primarily to provide space-tracking data. 12

On 1 January 1967, Detachment 2 was disbanded, and BMEWS

Site II was assigned to the 13th Missile Warning Squadron (13 MWS)

of the 71st Missile Warning Wing. The 13 MWS would remain in

charge of Clear AFS and the Alaskan BMEWS site until the end of

the Cold War and beyond (although it was reassigned to other Air

Force commands in later years). On 22 May of that year, 13 MWS

received an "outstanding" rating from the 9th Air Defense Division

in ADC, which was the first such rating received at a BMEWS site.

By November 1970, 13 MWS had achieved more than 6,500 hours of

uninterrupted green time, and received the Air Force Outstanding

Unit Award for the period 1 July 1968-31 May 1970 . 13

In December 1969, an automated tracking system was installed

at BMEWS Site II to improve the tracking of both missiles and

satellites. Earlier that year'· the U.S. Air Force began to

explore techniques for countering the interference to the radars

caused by the aurora borealis (or "northern lights"). This

involved a series of experiments in which clouds of ionized

barium were injected into the aurora in order to observe the

effects on the radar. In April 1970, new experiments were

performed with the University of Alaska in which clouds of sulfur



hexaf louride were dispersed into the upper atmosphere to measure

their potential for reducing the interference of the aurora. 14

By 1969, the Soviet Union had begun to deploy submarines

("Yankee Class") armed with SLBMs (SS-N-6) off of the east coast

of North America. The deployment of SLBMs, which increased

significantly during 1971-74, represented the first serious

threat of ballistic missiles based outside the territory of the

Soviet Union since the Cuban crisis of 1962. The U.S. Air Force

therefore began to expand missile early warning coverage beyond

the polar region at this time. In 1971, seven new radars

(AN/FSS-7) located at various stations along the west, east, and

south coasts were activated for SLBM early warning. In addition

to the AN/FSS-7 units, the phased-array radar installed at Eglin

AFB in Florida (partially destroyed by fire in 1965 and rebuilt

by 1969) provided early warning of SLBMs from the Caribbean Sea. 15

By the beginning of the 1970s, BMEWS had become part of a larger

missile early warning radar network that covered most of the

North American perimeter. In the late 1970s, the Air Force began

to replace the AN/FSS-7 radars with more powerful phased-array

units (PAVE PAWS) to cope with later advances in Soviet SLBM

technology. 16

The 1970s became the most stable decade of the Cold War, and

the Soviet Union and the United States negotiated a series of

treaties that recognized the balance of strategic nuclear weapons

(primarily ICBMs and SLBMs) . The tense confrontations over

Berlin, Cuba, and other crisis points that had marked the period



between 1948 and 1962 ceased, and, after the U.S. moon landing in

July 1969, the space race that had begun in 1957 also ended. The

Nixon and Ford administrations pursued an active policy of

detente, which was continued under President Carter during 1977-

79. BMEWS and the other early warning systems functioned quietly

throughout the decade in their supporting role as part of the

nuclear strategic balance. 11 At the end of the decade, Site II

had set a BMEWS record for more than 19,500 hours of

. d . . 18 uninterrupte green time.

The U.S. Air Force remained concerned about the potential

for Soviet jamming of BMEWS, and conducted several exercises

during the 1970s designed to test the ability of the system to

resist electronic countermeasures (ECM) . These included a joint

exercise that ADC held with Strategic Air Command in 1974

("Snotime 74-5"), in which four B-52 bombers subjected Site II to

live ECM. In 1977, Clear BMEWS was again tested for jamming

during an exercise ("Fencing Indian 77-5") with an EB-57

aircraft. 19

Although its primary function was early warning of ICBM

attack, tracking space objects was an important secondary role

for BMEWS, and it continued to improve its capabilities for

tracking satellites during the 1970s. At the same time, the

growing number of more advanced space tracking radars (such as

the AN/FPS-85 phased array at Eglin AFB) reduced the proportional

contribution of BMEWS space-tracking data. Although BMEWS had

provided as much as 25 percent of these data during the previous



decade, this had declined to less than 1 percent by 1985. In

early 1973, Site II successfully tracked 95 percent of the space

objects assigned to it by NORAD, and in 1974, the BMEWS site at

Clear achieved a 100 percent tracking rate for the first time.

Integration with other space tracking facilities was improved in

1975 with a computer modification that allowed automatic data

transfer to the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) in North

Dakota. 20

After 1975, BMEWS Site II was repeatedly reassigned within

the organization of the Air Force. On 1 May 1971, the 13th

Missile Warning Squadron had become independent of the 71st

Missile Warning Wing and was shifted to the 14th Aerospace Force.

In October 1976, Clear AFS was reassigned from ADC to HQ Alaskan

Air Defense Command. In December 1979, BMEWS Site II became part

of the 15th Air Force in SAC (although operational control was

retained by NORAD). And finally in May 1983, the Air Force

shifted BMEWS to the 1st Space Wing within Space Command I where it

remained until the end of the Cold War. 21

Detente began to break down in the late 1970s as the nuclear

arms race continued, and the Soviet Union installed several

hundred medium range missiles (SS-20) in Eastern Europe. The

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 inaugurated a

period of renewed Cold War tensions, which were reflected in the

strident anti-Communist rhetoric of the Reagan administration

during the early 1980s. In March 1983, President Reagan proposed

development of an anti-ballistic missile defense system



(Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]), which threatened to end the

stable balance of mutual assured destruction based on opposing

ICBM and SLBM forces. 22 This would have significantly altered the

role of BMEWS and the other early warning systems, which would

have ceased to function as part of the deterrent of massive

nuclear retaliation.

By 1980, the BMEWS technology had become outdated and in

need of substantial upgrading. During the early part of that

year, the Air Force began a major overall of the equipment in the

Tactical Operations Room (TOR) in Building 102 at Site II.

However, the TOR upgrade program was abandoned in 1981 in the

face of "insurmountable problems" with the computer software. 23

Rapid advances in computer technology had left the original BMEWS

computers at the capability level of a hand calculator by mid

19 8 0 s standards . 24 Thus, the Air Force turned to replacement of

the IBM 7090s with new computers (Control Data Cyber 170/720s),

which was completed in late 1982. Testing and evaluation of the

new computers was completed in 1983, and the antique IBM 7090s

were dismantled during the following year. 25

In 1981, the Air Force also decided to replace the tracker

radome on Building 102, because the cardboard honeycomb between

the fiberglass sheets was deteriorating and creating a potential

fire hazard. The AN/FPS-92 radar was shut down in June of that

year, and no space tracking data could be provided to NORAD for

several months until the new aluminum-frame radome was in place. 26

The Air Force seriously considered upgrading Site II with a

~


HAER No. AK-30~A (page 71)

phased array unit at this time, which would have brought the

BMEWS radar up to the level of the early warning systems that had

been deployed after 1971. However, this plan was shelved, and

Site II continued to operate with the older technology for the

remainder of the Cold War and beyond (although BMEWS Sites I and

III were upgraded with phased array units during the 1990s) . 21

Ironically, the renewal of Cold War tensions after 1979 set

the stage for the end of the conflict. The acceleration in

defense spending that began in 1980 placed increasing economic

and political strain on the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev came to

power in 1985, he began a program of internal reform that was

closely tied to reduced pressure from the United States to

compete in the new weapons buildup. This eventually led to new

arms control agreements and changes in Soviet domestic and

foreign policy. The Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern

Europe in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War, and within two

years, the Soviet Union itself was dissolved. 28

The final years of the Cold War were uneventful ones at

Clear AFS. In December 1986, the Site II power plant was

formally recognized for 134,266 hours (i.e., 15 years) of

uninterrupted operation in support of the BMEWS mission. When

the Cold War ended in November 1989, Site II was still operating

with the monster klystron tubes that had been state-of-the-art

radar technology in 1958. A phased array unit was finally

installed in 2000, and the AN/FPS-92 tracker was deactivated in

January 2001.


HAER No. AK-30-A (page 720

BMEWS and the Cold War: An Assessment

The role played by BMEWS in the Cold War was important,

although it should not be exaggerated. The strategic role of

BMEWS seems to have been critical during the years between 1963

and 1970, but thereafter it was increasingly less significant.

With the exception of a brief period during the fall of 1962

(when Soviet IRBMs in Cuba were operational), the strategic

nuclear threat to the United States prior to 1970 was confined to

the polar region. After 1962, that threat became real as the

Soviet Union finally deployed an effective ICBM force within its

borders. During this period, BMEWS was the primary early warning

system for a nuclear attack on North America and the means for

ensuring the survival (and deterrent value) of a U.S. nuclear

counterstrike. Although launch detection was provided by MIDAS

during the 1960s, the satellites lacked the capability of ICBM

tracking and impact prediction.

After 1970, changes occurred in the deployment of strategic

nuclear forces and early warning systems. The Soviet Union began

to deploy SLBMs off the coasts of North America, rendering the

"polar concept" of the early Cold War obsolete. In 1971, the

United States installed new early warning radars to provide

coverage of these areas (and during the previous year, the United

States had launched the first Defense Support Program [DSP]

satellite, which substantially improved satellite missile

detection). In 1974, the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) in

North Dakota, which was part of the Safeguard ABM system, became



operational and provided complementary radar coverage of the

polar region with the capability of tracking multiple targets.

Additional early warning radar coverage of the western polar

region was provided by the Cobra Dane phased array in the

Aleutians, which became opera,tional in 1976. By the mid 1970s,

BMEWS was part of a much larger network of missile early warning

sensors and radars. Furthermore, its role within this network

was constrained by comparatively primitive technology.

BMEWS represented a major engineering achievement, but not a

revolution in radar or computer technology. It was essentially a

scaling up of World War II era radar to meet the requirements of

detecting small high-velocity targets (ballistic missiles) at

extreme distance. The necessary advances in radars and computing

power for a missile early warning system were achieved largely

during 1951-56 with development of the AN/FPS-17 coded pulse

radar and the AN/FSQ-7 computer (Whirlwind II). Although widely

perceived in 1958 as an emergency measure against an unexpected

Soviet ICBM threat, BMEWS had actually been under development for

several years (and, in any case, Soviet ICBM capabilities

remained virtually nonexistent during the first few years of its

operation} .

v~

Chapter III Notes


HA.ER No. AK-30-A (page 74)

1Winkler, David F., Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program. (United States Air Force 1997), pp. 52-56.

2Ray, Thomas W., History of BMEWS 1957 - 1964. (ADC Historical Study No. 32), pp. 26-28.

3Toomay, John C., "Warning and Assessment Sensors," in A.B. Carter, J.D. Steinbruner, and C.A. Zraket (editors) .Managing Nuclear Operations. (Washington, The Brookings Institution 1987), pp . 3 0 5 - 3 0 6 .

4 Ibid, p. 296.

5Ra y , pp . 2 8 - 2 9 .

6 l3th Missile Warning Squadron, History 30 September 1961 to 31 May 1983; BMEWS Site II Clear Air Force Station Alaska, Keeping Track for Twenty-Five Years 1961-1986.

7Meisel, Robert C., MITRE The First Twenty Years: A History of the MITRE Corporation (1958-1978). (Bedford, Mass., The MITRE Corporation 1979), pp. 28-38; Winter Study Report: The Challenge of Command and Control. (31 March 1961).

8Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. (New York, Random House 1988), pp. 391-462; Winkler, pp. 53-54.

9Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. Second Edition. (New Haven, Yale University Press 1983), pp. 43-55.

10Bundy, pp. 549-550.

1113th Missile Warning Squadron, p. 8.

12Murakami, F. S., Operations Report II-70-03. Site II Tracker. (Clear, Alaska, ITT-Arctic Services 1970); Whorton, Mandy and Hoffecker, John, Historic Properties of the Cold War Era: Clear Air Station, Alaska. (Prepared for 21st Space Wing, Air Force Space Conunand), p. 23.

13 l3th Missile Warning Squadron, pp. 8-9.

14 Ibid, pp. 8-9.

15Winkler, pp. 49-54.

16Winkler, pp. 54-56; Whorton, Mandy, Deter and Defend: The History of the Development and Operation of the PAVE PAWS Radar



Network. (Prepared for 21st Space Wing I u. s. Air Force Space Command 2001).

17Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York, Simon and Schuster 1994) , pp. 703-761.

H13~ • 'l • S d 5 Missi e Warning qua ron, p. .

19 Ibid, p. 5 ·

20 Ibid, p. 9 ·

21Ibid, pp. 9-10.

22Arnbrose, Stephen E., Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. Seventh Revised Edition. (New York, 'Penguin Books 1993) .

23 l3th Missile Warning Squadron, p. 11; Whorton and Hoffecker, p. 27.

24Toomay, p. 296.

25BMEWS Site II Clear Air Force Station, Alaska.

26Ibid.

27Whorton ahd Hoffecker, p. 27.

2°Kissinger, pp. 762-803.


HA.ER No. AK-30-A (page 76)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The HAER historical narrative for BMEWS at Clear AFS, Alaska

is based on an array of primary and secondary sources. The

latter include various sources on the background of radar and

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Government Documents

13th Missile Warning Squadron. lfh Missile Warning Squadron

History: 30 September 1961 to 31 May 1983. Clear (AK): Clear

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Alaskan Air Command. Visitors' Briefing. Clear, Alaska: BMEWS

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BMEWS Site II Clear Air Force Station Alaska, Keeping Track for

Twenty-Five Years 1961-1986. 13 September 1986.

Cloe, J. H. Short History, U.S. Military in Alaska. Anchorage:

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U.S. Air Force BMEWS Project Office. BMEWS Rearward

Cormnunications System Equipment: A Pictorial Essay. Bedford

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Reports

Denfeld, D. C. The Cold War in Alaska: A Management Plan for

Cultural Resources. Anchorage: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

1994.

Murakami, F. S. Operations Report II-70-03. Site II Tracker.

Clear (AK): ITT-Arctic Services, 1970.



Pettengill, G. H. and Dustin, D. E. "A Comparison of Selected

ICBM Warning Radar Configurations." Lincoln Laboratory

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Laboratory 13 August 1956.

Ray, T. W. History of BMEWS 1957-1964. ADC Historical Study No.

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Reynolds, G. L. Historical Overview and Inventory: White Alice

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Engineers, 1988.

Whorton, M. Deter and Defend: The History of the Development and

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Space Wing, U.S. Air Force Space Command 2001).

Whorton, M. and J. Hoffecker. Historic Properties of the Cold War

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Winkler, David F. Searching the Skies: The Legacy of the United

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Winter Study Report: The Challenge of Command and Control. (31

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Fusca, J. A. "Army Reveals BMEWS Radar Site Details." A via ti on

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Klass, P. J. "First BMEWS Nears Operational Status." Aviation

Week 72 (May 30), pp. 76-85, 1960.



Klass, P. J. "BMEWS Uses Discrimination Techniques." Aviation

Week, 6 March 1961, pp. 70-74.

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HAER No. AK-30-A (page 80}

Spires, D. N. Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space

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