class, gender and voting in italy

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Class, gender and voting inItalyAnna Cento Bull aa Professor of Italian Studies , University ofBath ,Published online: 03 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Anna Cento Bull (1997) Class, gender and voting in Italy, WestEuropean Politics, 20:2, 73-92, DOI: 10.1080/01402389708425192

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Class, Gender and Voting in Italy

ANNA CENTO BULL

This article focuses on changing voting patterns in Italy after thedemise of the traditional parties and explores two main issues. Hasvoting become 'individualised', with a breakdown of class-based andlocally based sub-cultures? Have gender voting patterns becomehomogenised or is there a re-emergence of a gender gap in voting (asdetected in other European countries)? Having established that amarked discrepancy between male and female voters exists in Italytoday, the article assesses the nature of the discrepancy and itsconsequences in terms of the political influence of male and femalevoters and the resilience of political sub-cultures.

This article explores two main issues, one of which concerns specificallythe political behaviour of women in Italy today. It is not so much concernedwith the political behaviour of all women, as of women who live and workin specific localities, characterised until recently by a high degree of partyidentification, linked to a specific political ideology, either Communist orCatholic. Gender issues, therefore, are explored in the context of changingvoting patterns in Italy after the demise, as shown in the 1992 and 1994political elections, of many of the established parties as well as theweakening of the ex-Communist Party. These electoral and politicalchanges can be explained in part by the end of the Cold War, which hasprovided a powerful impulse to overcome traditional ideological andpolitical cleavages and has taken away the raison d'être for domination bythe Christian Democratic Party. Already in the 1980s, however, a newculture based on personal success and individual values had emerged inItaly as throughout Western Europe and had started to weaken bothCommunist and Catholic collective solidarities.

At one level the electoral results of the 1990s and the disintegration ofold political traditions can be interpreted as signifying the emergence of amore homogeneous, pragmatic and liberal society, where voting behaviourincreasingly resembles the attitude of informed consumers1 and is no longerclosely linked to party identification, family loyalties and traditionalpolitical sub-cultures.2 Voters' mobility is considered to be on the increase,

West European Politics, Vol.20, No.2 (April 1997), pp.73-92PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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74 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

and the trend seems to point in the direction of voters exercising anindividual rational choice without the constraints of family, class, ideology,or religion.

One important aspect of this process is the decline of class voting as aEuropean-wide phenomenon which, in Britain at least, has only in part beenattributed to a decline in the size of the working class.3 It has also beenaccounted for on the basis of what has been defined as 'partisandealignment', namely, a partial uncoupling between party preference andclass.4 Various studies have also found that in modern western societiesgenerational differences are now more important than socio-economic ones.Indeed for Britain, Heath et al. found that there is no longer a strongcorrelation between voting patterns and parents' party preferences.5 As forgender differences, it has been argued that, in Britain at least, they do notaffect the way people vote to any significant extent: 'gender has noinfluence upon voting in Britain today'.6 The authors argue that 'the reasonis straightforward. On matters that are salient to voting, men and womentend to share similar political values. On most major political issues menand women divide similarly - along lines of party or class, not gender.'7

This is a relatively recent phenomenon, although the trend towards ahomogenisation of gender voting patterns had been detected in the past.8

Traditionally, women had been found to participate less in politics thanmen and, in Italy at least, to be more easily influenced by their families andthe Church when casting their votes. Indeed, in 1967 Dogan argued that inItaly there was a marked discrepancy between masculine and femininevoting behaviour, for religious reasons.9 The discrepancy was particularlynoticeable, Dogan argued, in the case of peasant and working-class women,who voted in accordance with their Catholic beliefs rather than out ofidentification with a social class. However, in the large industrial cities thereligious effect upon women voters was less noticeable. Since then, theprocess of secularisation of Italian society has weakened the influence of theChurch upon voters. Already in the 1970s it was suggested that women'svoting behaviour in Italy did not differ substantially from men's. Inparticular, it was argued, it was probably no longer the case that men votedmore to the left and women more to the right.10

To return to Italy's current electoral and political changes, a differentinterpretation from the one that emphasises the trend towards greaterindividualism and rational choice voting has also been put forward.According to some analysts, the emergence in Italy of new politicaldivisions along geographical lines and new political parties with apopulistic appeal points to the persistence of 'systems of solidarity' orterritorial- or class-based sub-cultures." This is not entirely surprising,given that both Christian Democracy and communism had for long

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CLASS AND GENDER VOTING IN ITALY 75

represented political sub-cultures, based on both class and regionaldifferences. As political sub-cultures, Catholicism and socialism/communism predate the Second World War and even fascism, going back tothe 1880s, and are closely linked to specific social and economic structures,predominantly rural before the First World War, industrial after theSecond.12

In this context, the assumption that the dual process of modernisationand secularisation leads to social and cultural uniformity and politicalpluralism needs to be revised. Accordingly, it cannot be unquestionablyassumed that gender voting patterns have become undifferentiated.Following the birth of new political parties in Italy, there have been signsthat gender-based differences in voting behaviour may have re-emerged.Recent polls have suggested that the electoral success of Berlusconi's ForzaItalia in the 1994 political elections was due partly to a preponderance offemale voters, especially housewives (55 per cent female versus 45 per centmale supporters).13 Conversely, the electorate of the Northern League wasfound to be predominantly male in the early days, although the party laterattracted female voters in considerable numbers.14 This is not a developmentunique to Italy. In the USA, for example, a 'gender gap'(considerabledissimilarities between the sexes in terms of political behaviour) wasdetected throughout the 1980s.15 Indeed, according to Mueller, 'a normativemodel of gender divergence now characterises much public discussion aswell as some scholarly discussion'.16 A gender gap has also been detected inSweden, where women have voted increasingly for parties on the left, andin Canada.17 As for France, it has been pointed out that in the 1981presidential elections Mitterrand succeeded by appealing to the femaleelectorate and attracting their votes in considerable numbers.18 Even inBritain, where its demise had been recorded, the gender gap reappeared atthe 1992 general elections, with a considerably higher percentage of olderwomen voting for the Conservative Party.19

In contrast to the USA, however, where the gender gap has taken theshape of a constantly higher level of support for the Democratic Partyamong women than men, so much so that some commentators have spokenof a 'voting bloc',20 in Italy women voters have been judged to form a'mobile electorate', responsible to a large extent for the success of thecentre-right alliance, the Polo délie Libertà, in 1994, and of the centre-left(olive tree) alliance, the Ulivo, in 1996.21 Whereas in the USA the existenceof a gender gap was skilfully exploited by the women's movement in the1980s to increase its political influence and gains, in Italy women appear tohave been unable to make significant progress, particularly in terms ofobtaining increased representation in Parliament. Women in Italy nowaccount for only 9 per cent of all MPs, as opposed to 13 per cent in the

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76 • WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

previous legislature. The number of female members of parliament is nowroughly the same as it was 50 years ago.

The question, therefore, arises of whether voting behaviour in Italy hasbecome gender-neutral, as is generally maintained, although with increasingreservations, or whether specific gender differences are clearly visible. If amarked discrepancy exists, are women still attached to a traditional partyand sub-culture, have they moved towards rational choice voting, or havethey found a new collective political voice? Last, if voting behaviour differssubstantially by gender, what are the nature of the differences and theirconsequences in terms of the political influence of male and female voters?

To address these questions, the present article looks to the micro-level,and focuses on the political culture of industrial workers in two northernareas, both of which are in the Region of Lombardy, which until recentlywere characterised respectively by a proletarian/communist subculture andan inter-classist/Catholic one. The two areas are Sesto San Giovanni (anindustrial suburb of Milan known in the past as the 'Stalingrad of Italy' forits Communist identity, built around the local concentration of large-scaleindustry and further cemented by its role in the anti-Fascist Resistance) andErba (Como), a small town characterised by small-scale industry andlocated in a predominantly Catholic area previously dominated by theChristian Democratic Party. Both areas have seen the demise of theirtraditional dominant parties, but in different contexts.

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SESTO AND ERBA

Sesto S. Giovanni in the 1994 political elections registered a majority ofvotes for the centre-right alliance (the Polo) for the first time since 1946; yetat the administrative elections that followed in June 1994 the candidate ofthe left was elected mayor. In the 1996 political elections the centre-leftalliance (the Ulivo) won the majority of votes, and thus reversed the 1994outcome. In recent times Sesto has undergone substantial socio-economicchanges. Of the large plants set up in the area since the beginning of thecentury, only one, Falck, remains a major employer. An exodus of industrialworkers dismissed from the large factories has been accompanied by anemerging image of the town as a 'residential suburb' of Milan. In 1971, 79per cent of the local working population were employed in themanufacturing industry, by 1991 the percentage had gone down to 43 percent. These socio-economic changes, in particular the decline in the size ofthe Sesto working class, can, to a certain extent, explain the failure of theleft at the 1994 general elections, indicating a pluralistic, 'rational choice'approach on the part of an electorate which has no reasons to feel loyal to atraditional subculture. Left-wing organisations in the town, however, have

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also started to change, after a period of sterile defence of the status quo inthe 1970s and early 1980s. In particular, the Democratic Party of the Left(PDS), the main heir to the Italian Communist Party, has begun to woo theincreasingly middle-class electorate. It remains to be seen, however,whether the Sesto 'working class' itself changed allegiances andcontributed to a large extent to the success of the right in 1994, or whetherit maintained its loyalty to the left. Gender differences within this socialgroup will be explored in this context.

Erba on the other hand is representative of the northern Italian model of'diffused industrialisation', characterised by the prevalence of small andmedium-sized industrial plants diffused over the territory. The town has avariety of industries with a predominance of employers having 100-200workers. This model, unlike the one prevalent in Sesto S. Giovanni, has notundergone substantial change over the years, yet the political configurationof the town has greatly changed, just like in Sesto. Erba has recently seen anupsurge in support for the Northern League, a party which has been definedvariously as populist, sub-cultural, racist and even Fascist.22 The NorthernLeague, it has been maintained, has made inroads into all social groups, thusrecreating the inter-classism which characterised the Christian DemocraticParty, whose electorate has shifted in great numbers to the League. ChristianDemocracy (DC) commanded a comfortable majority after the SecondWorld War and even in 1976 - at a time of increasing support for the left inItaly - it polled 48 per cent in the town. In 1992 this decreased to 26 per cent,on a par with the Northern League. In 1994 the PPI (Popular Party - the mainheir to the DC) polled 11 per cent, the League 26 per cent, and Forza Italia26 per cent. In 1996 the League obtained 32 per cent of votes, the Polo 36.9per cent, the Ulivo 31.1 per cent. Christian Democracy's domination thusseems to have been replaced by electoral fluidity. Do we have to concludethat the local sub-culture has broken down?

In the following sections I intend to assess the extent of the process ofpartisan dealignment and individualism in voting behaviour or, conversely,the degree to which voters, both male and female, still subscribe to aterritorial or class sub-culture and values. I will also explore the possibleemergence of gender-based discrepancies in voting behaviour and values,and examine their significance in terms of electoral outcomes and politicalinfluence. First, however, I shall briefly describe the survey and thecharacteristics of the samples upon which it was based.

FIELDWORK

This article is based on an analysis of 443 questionnaires distributed amongindustrial workers in Sesto's remaining large factories as well as among

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unemployed people and 445 questionnaires distributed in Erba mainlyamong employees of various medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, aswell as among artisans and small entrepreneurs. The survey was carried outby the author in February and March 1994. The questionnaire focused onmultiple social identities as well as political behaviour at a local level.Specific questions dealt with the voting behaviour of the respondents andtheir parents in the 1987 and 1992 political elections as well as the 1993administrative elections, voting intentions for the 1994 political elections,and criteria for party preferences. The role of the two most importantintegrating forces in society, the family and religion, was explored in somedepth. A third factor of social identity, class, was also prioritised in thequestions. The main object was to examine the interplay of these socialidentities, in the knowledge that the process of working-class bonding wasinserted into pre-existing structures of social relationships such as kinshipand family networks, national and local loyalties, and religious affiliation.23

Gendered attitudes were systematically explored. In addition to thequestionnaires, interviews with local politicians, administrators, tradeunionists, and members of various associations were carried out.

As for the characteristics of the samples, roughly two-thirds of therespondents in both localities were men, and one-third was made up ofwomen. In terms of age, the Sesto sample contains a smaller percentage ofyoung people. Although this could be due to a sample quirk, it moreprobably reflects the fact that large employers in Italy have stoppedrecruiting in any significant numbers and indeed have been shedding labour.Small and medium-sized enterprises in Erba appear to have been better ableto sustain employment, in line with Italy's successful model of small-scaleindustry.

The age composition of respondents influences their marital status, withonly a fourth claiming single status in Sesto but two-fifths in Erba. Beingsingle and between 18 and 30 years of age does not, however, mean livingaway from one's own family of origin. The nearly 40 per cent of singlepeople in Erba translates into only 7 per cent of people living on their ownor outside the family circle. This is in line with recent findings on the Italianfamily, which show that children continue to stay at home until they getmarried.24 The average family size of the samples in both Sesto and Erba is3.2, above both the local averages as recorded in the 1991 population censusand the national average.

The data related to gender, age and family composition indicate arelative stability in terms of personal circumstances in both localities. Thedivorce rate is very low, young people enjoy the security of their familieseven in their twenties, and partly thanks to them nearly two members perfamily are in full-time employment, which indicates relative prosperity as

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well as stability. In Sesto the stable conditions of the respondents contrastwith the general instability of recent demographic and socio-economicchanges. Thus, respondents in Erba seem to be a stable cohort living in astable environment, whereas the Sesto respondents represent a stable cohortliving in a very unstable - and above all greatly changed - environment.

MAIN FINDINGS: SESTO SAN GIOVANNI

In Sesto the parties of the left experienced a dramatic decline between 1987and 1994. The Communist Party polled 34.9 per cent of the votes in 1987,but this went down to only 20.9 per cent in 1992 and 21.9 per cent in 1994,the latter figure rising to 29.7 per cent if the votes for the Democratic Partyof the Left (PDS) and those for Rifondazione Comunista are put together.Votes for the Socialist Party (PSI) amounted to 18.6 per cent in 1987, but amere 1.3 per cent in 1994. The full picture shows that, whereas in 1987 theparties of the left (including the Greens) obtained almost two-thirds of thevotes, they managed only about a third in 1994.

Did the votes for these parties decrease in a similar pattern amongindustrial workers? The answer, on the basis of the present survey, is no,although there are distinct gender patterns. (Table 1).

The above data suggest the persistence of Communist allegiancesamong male workers, and the failure on the part of both the NorthernLeague and Forza Italia to make any considerable inroads among thisgroup. A majority of male respondents voted for the Communist andSocialist parties in both 1987 and 1992, and expressed their intention ofdoing so at the 1994 political elections. There were, however, signs that theCommunist sub-culture was weakening even among factory workers,although this trend differed considerably in terms of gender. It was womenwhose voting behaviour showed greater discontinuity and who in 1992 hadtended to 'betray' the ex-Communist Party. Whereas in 1987 a majority ofwomen had voted for the Communist and Socialist parties (53.4 per cent),in 1992 this percentage decreased to 40.5 per cent (including RifondazioneComunista - Communist Refoundation). Women seemed to cast their votesin favour of new and/or smaller parties. In 1992 these types of parties(League, Greens, Communist Refoundation, and a variety of 'other' parties)attracted 56 per cent of women's votes, as opposed to 30.7 per cent of men'svotes.

Even more interestingly perhaps, a significant number of Sesto femalerespondents declared their intention of returning/starting to vote for the PDSin 1994, although on the basis of a pragmatic choice rather than on the basisof party loyalty/party identification. Thus men remained loyal to the partythroughout the period, while women's voting behaviour appears more

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TABLE 1PERCENTAGE OF VOTES TO THE MAIN PARTIES IN SESTO S. GIOVANNI AND AMONG SAMPLE

OF RESPONDENTS

1992 199420.9 21.9

8.0 7.815.1 1.34.4 2.9

15.3 6.715.7 12.73.7 5.9

27.016.9 13.8

43.0 49.76.0 2.47.94.97.7 5.0

12.6 7.33.3 3.4

9.714.6 1.9

20.6

(365) (382)

50.0 54.56.6 1.68.63.77.0 5.4

10.7 5.83.7 5.5

5.19.7 0.3

21.8

(244) (257)

29.7 39.55.4 4.45.47.29.0 3.5

17.1 10.50.9 3.5

21.126.3 4.3

13.2

(111) (114)

N.B.: MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) and AN (Alleanza Nazionale) are both on the right.Sources: Comune di Sesto San Giovanni and 1994 survey. Please note that the number of all respondents is

higher than the total number of male and female respondents, due to the fact that some respondentsdid not specify their sex.

Official results

PC1/PDSRifondazione C.PSIGreensDC/PPINorthern LeagueMSI/ANForza ItaliaOthers

AH respondents

PCI/PDSRifondazione C.PSIGreensDC/PPINorthern LeagueMSI/ANForza ItaliaOthersDon't Know

Total numbers

Male respondents


Total numbers

Female respondents


Total numbers

198734.9

18.64.2

20.41.34.6

-16.0

49.5.

12.63.49.64.12.7

.18.1

-

(293)

57.4

9.72.68.24.63.1

.13.4

-

(195)

36.4

17.04.5

12.52.51.1

.26.0

-

(88)

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varied and changeable. This is confirmed by a comparison between the1987 and 1992 votes. Asked whether they had voted for a different party in1992 compared to 1987, less than a fifth of male respondents said 'yes', asopposed to a third of women. When presented with a list of motivations toaccount for their party preference in 1992, both men and women indicated'ideals' and the 'party programme' as important factors influencing theirchoice. However, men also appeared to have been influenced to a largeextent by considerations of loyalty. In fact, a third of all male respondentspointed to 'loyalty' as an important factor behind their vote. Considerationsof loyalty also weighed heavily with men when voting at the 1993administrative elections. By contrast, only a fourth of women mentioned'loyalty' as a relevant factor for the 1992 political elections and even fewerreferred to it for the 1993 administrative elections. Another substantialdifference between male and female voters concerned the importanceattributed to the level of competence of party candidates. Only 29 per centof men gave this factor any consideration, as opposed to 41 per cent ofwomen.

The phenomenon of partisan dealignment among women is neverthelesssomewhat questionable, since most women changed party preferencebetween 1987 and 1992, but remained within either the left or the rightpolitical spectrum. Interestingly though, many more women than men werecontemplating crossing the left/right boundary in 1994.

The more pluralistic attitude on the part of women workers appearsconfirmed by other responses related to political socialisation and the roleof the family and the Church. Despite the fact that many more women thanmen attended Church regularly and had formed their political ideas in thefamily, women were only slightly more likely than men to have voted forthe Christian Democratic Party in 1992 and much less likely to have votedlike their parents. Even young male voters voted largely in line with theirparents in 1992, unlike young female ones. These findings appear toindicate a real cleavage between past and present women's politicalbehaviour, since traditionally, as we saw, women were identified withpolitical conservatism which in turn was attributed in great part to theirdegree of religiosity. The findings also indicate that for men, unlike women,political loyalty extends to their families as well as their class.

Why women should have adopted a more pragmatic attitude than menand freed themselves from their class and families influence is an interestingquestion. One answer lies, in my view, in the fact that the Communistworking-class sub-culture was male-oriented, in the sense that it took forgranted that politics was mainly reserved for men and did not questiontraditional gender divisions of roles.25 Back in 1981, Weber suggested thatthe shift in women's party preferences from the DC to the PCI should not

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necessarily be seen as 'an indicator of a secularisation process amongstItalian women. It could easily indicate a lack of information, emotionalelectoral behaviour and a preference for reassuring ideologies rather thancultural pragmatism.'26 In retrospect, it would seem that women wereopening up to cultural pragmatism to a higher degree than it was judgedpossible at the time.

The recent collapse in Italy of the traditional ideologies may, therefore,have had, as one of its major consequences, the effect of freeing womenfrom the old constraints and making it easier for them to become detachedfrom a sub-culture that has never really represented them directly. On thecontrary, for male workers this collapse has marked the end of a dream andhas resulted in great disappointment. These two contrasting sentiments —freedom and new illusions on the one hand, disappointment anddisillusionment on the other - emerge very clearly from other parts of thesurvey, which also bring to light the continuing attachment to the old sub-culture on the part of men but not of women workers.

When asked whether they discussed politics with family and friends amajority of both men and women stated that they did so 'quite frequently'or 'very frequently'. Asked whether they discussed politics more or lessoften than five to ten years ago, more women than men indicated that theydiscussed it more often (Tables 2 and 3).

TABLE 2FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS (SESTO SAN GIOVANNI)

(PERCENTAGES)

Men Women

Never 16 11Occasionally 30 29Quite frequently 39 45Very frequently 15 15

Total numbers (271) (122)

TABLE 3FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS NOW COMPARED TO 5/10 YEARS AGO

(SESTO SAN GIOVANNI) (PERCENTAGES)

Men Women

More frequently 37 46The same 49 44Less frequently 14 10


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Table 3 is an indicator of women's increased interest in politics after thedemise of the traditional ideologies. The findings contrast sharply withthose of a national survey carried out among Italian women in the 1970s (adecade of great political participation and turmoil), when 54 per cent ofrespondents stated that they never discussed politics.27

Women in Sesto have also retained faith in social and politicalinstitutions, such as industry, banks, political parties, regional government,and Parliament, whereas men expressed predominantly negative judgments,while portraying a much rosier picture of the past. Indeed, unlike men,women do not feel that the past was a 'golden age' compared to the present.It is probably for this reason that they do not appear to be tempted to retreatinto their family network to the same extent as men (Tables 4 and 5).

TABLE 4HOW DIFFERENT ASSOCIATIONS/ENVIRONMENTS ARE VALUED TODAY COMPARED TO 5/10

YEARS AGO (SESTO SAN GIOVANNI) (PERCENTAGES)

FamilyFriendsWorkReligionUnionsPolitics/CultureLeisure

MoreImportant

671941

56

1127

Men

Same

32644266513953

LessImportant

1171729435020

(257)(181)(185)(148)(150)(142)(150)

MoreImportant

573150128

2230

Women

Same

30513457534156

LessImportant

13181631393714

(129)(100)(96)(77)(74)(76)(77)

TABLE 5WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IN LIFE? (SESTO SAN GIOVANNI)

(PERCENTAGES)

All Men Women

To succeed personallyFamily interests are

more important thanpersonal success

Family responsibilitiesare a handicap forpersonal success

Solidarity is the mostimportant human value

Total Numbers

16.0

44.2

1.7

38.1

(407)

14.1

48.7

1.4

35.8

(277)

20.0

34.6

2.3

43.1

(130)

Table 5 is particularly significant, because it suggests that men havepartially lost faith in the value of solidarity, perhaps the single mostimportant value in the 'proletarian' sub-culture. It is part of the process of

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increasing disillusionment men have undergone at Sesto. Women showmore propensity to subscribe to individual success, although they stillbelieve in solidaristic as well as family values. Despite these genderdivisions, in fact, the central role of the family does not appear in doubt,particularly when the issue of individualism is explored.

These different attitudes by men and women workers did not, however,feed into political participation, at least in terms of party politics and tradeunion activity, which remained high for men but low for women. Women'sgreater interest in politics and relatively free voting behaviour has not ledthem to engage more directly in political activity.

To conclude, male workers in Sesto are still committed to the proletariansub-culture, mainly out of loyalty, but they are also showing signs ofcontemplating 'exit' from public activity altogether, retreating to a privatenetwork of family and friends, driven by disappointment and disillusionment,according to the classic Hirschman's theory.28 As for women, they appear tohave discarded any sub-cultural allegiances and in so doing to have been'emancipated' from Church influence and partially also from the influence ofthe family. Politically, this has led them to cast their votes more widely and tochange party preferences more frequently. Loyalty to a group or a class ismuch less in evidence than among men. This does not mean that women willnot vote for the PDS. On the contrary, they may be increasingly well disposedtowards this party, now that it is striving to lose its sub-cultural connotations.When the PDS replaced the PCI, women delegates played a significant role indefining the new party, so much so that the new statute stated unequivocallythat the PDS was a 'party for men and women'.29 Since then, the PDS hasshown itself open to women's membership and representation, following atrend already started by the old PCI. In Sesto, too, the PDS impressed me withits will to attract new voters and members and to portray a new image,distancing itself from an all-too-close identification with a traditionalworking-class sub-culture. The Sesto findings seem to confirm that womenvoters have become an increasingly mobile electorate, probably swaying theelection results in the town in favour of the centre-right in 1994 and of thecentre-left in 1996. A similar trend at national level is also plausible.Nevertheless, women voters seem to be lacking a collective identity andpolitical 'clout', at least when compared to men's persisting 'bloc voting'.

MAIN FINDINGS: ERBA

In Erba votes for the Christian Democratic Party - later the PPI (PartitoPopolare) - went down from 39.2 per cent in 1987 to 27.3 per cent in 1992and 11.3 per cent in 1994. The Northern League rose from 6.5 per cent in1987 to 27 per cent in 1992, down to 26.2 per cent in 1994 (Table 6).

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TABLE 6PERCENTAGE OF VOTES TO THE MAIN PARTIES IN ERBA AND AMONG RESPONDENTS

Official results1987 1992 1994

DC/PPINorthern LeaguePCI/PDSPSIRifondazione C.GreensMSI/ANForza ItaliaOthers

All respondents

DC/PPINorthern LeaguePCI/PDSPSIRifondazione C.GreensMSI/ANForza ItaliaOthersDon't Know

Total numbers

Male respondents

DC/PPINorthern LeaguePCI/PDSPSIRifondazione C.GreensMSI/ ANForza ItaliaOthersDon't Know

Total numbers

Female respondents

DC/PPINorthern LeaguePCI/PDSPSIRifondazione C.GreensMSI/ANForza ItaliaOthersDon't Know

Total numbers

39.26.5

15.116.2

.2.55.2

_15.3

29.219.913.39.60.83.77.9

.15.6

-

(301)

26.023.712.78.71.22.97.5

.17.3

-

(173)

33.615.214.410.4

1.64.81.6

18.4-

(125)

27.327.07.4

11.83.62.63.6

16.7

20.340.510.63.91.62.63.9

16.6

(385)

18.846.010.33.11.80.56.3

13.2

(224)

21.833.311.55.11.35.80.7

20.5

(156)

11.326.27.71.14.02.57.2

25.514.5

13.334.215.6

5.414.58.28.8

(392)

13.340.014.2

8.012.96.35.3

(225)

11.826.718.0

1.917.414.99.3

(161)

Sources: Comune di Erba and 1994 survey.Please note that the number of 'Don't Knows' in Erba were considerably lower than in Sesto due almostcertainly to the fact that the Erba survey took place at a later stage, nearer the time of the 1994 elections.

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As Table 6 shows, votes for the Northern League among the industrialworkers surveyed were considerably higher than the average for the townand suggest that the League may have established roots of a 'sub-cultural'nature among them, at least among male workers. Given theterritorial/localistic appeal of this party, and the fact that previous studieshave shown that support for the League increases, in the North itself, amongpeople born there, I decided to disaggregate the votes to the League in 1992on the basis of geographic origin. The results were quite striking, since therewas massive support for the League in 1992 among industrial workers bornin the North with northern parents, while there was a clear rejection of thisparty among people with southern origins (even if they themselves wereborn in the North). It is interesting, though, that this distinction appliesprimarily to men, since women appear to have voted for the Leagueirrespective of their regional origins. This suggests that the territorial,communitarian, quasi-ethnic appeal of the League was clearly perceived byand directly appealed to male voters, whereas it was not a principal factoramong women. At first value, my interpretation of these figures is that theyconfirm that the League is a new sub-cultural party,30 but also indicate thatthe League enjoys a more limited though also much more clearly focusedappeal compared to the old DC. Its appeal among industrial workers focusessharply on northern males. As in Sesto, there is little evidence of partisandealignment among male workers. The party they vote for may havechanged, however political alignments continue to be based on highlypartisan criteria (territorial and racialised rather than Catholic/solidaristic).By contrast, as other parts of the questionnaire showed, women's reasonsfor voting for the League were more pragmatic than men's.

TABLE 7HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES/OBJECTIVES? (ERBA)

(PERCENTAGES)

Wider regionalautonomy

FederalismEurope of RegionsPrivatisationHouses and work

to residents

All

51462935

39

Strongly

N. League

73733645

52

Men

: All

33223730

29

Moderately

N. League

21194331

28

All

48341825

34

Women

Strongly

N. League

77743838

52

All

32142743

37

Moderately

N. League

15133343

31

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An interesting difference emerged when the attitudes of League voterswere compared to those of voters of other parties. Whereas both male andfemale League voters subscribed to the League's flagship ideas of a federalItaly and greater regional autonomy and supported its programme ofprivatisations, the orientations of non-League voters differed considerablyby gender (Table 7).

As Table 7 shows, men were generally much more receptive to the ideasand policies put forward by the League, irrespective of their partypreference. Indeed a majority of all men subscribed to the idea of a federalItaly (including the majority of supporters of the Socialist, Green andRadical parties, as well as half of PDS and PPI voters) and of a Europe ofthe Regions (including a majority of PPI and PSI voters). By contrast,women were more clearly split, with only League voters subscribing to theidea of a federal Italy or a Europe of the Regions. This finding suggests thatthe League may in future widen its appeal among male voters, whereas itsfemale electorate is unlikely to increase. It also indicates that for mencommunitarian and localistic allegiances and shared values continue to bevery important and to cut across political party preferences. Notsurprisingly, male respondents in Erba put allegiance to their commune first,and to the nation second, unlike any other group sampled. It is alsointeresting to note that, when asked why they voted as they did at the 1993administrative elections, men respondents in Erba indicated thatconsiderations of local interests had greatly influenced their choice, whereaswomen stated that they had looked at the competence of candidates. Thegeneral impression is that in 1987 and 1992 men switched from one sub-cultural party to another, whereas women were more pluralistic in theirvoting intentions. The fact that the Northern League was a new partyprobably explains why many women voted for it and even ran as candidates,despite what has been defined as 'a party culture that favours traditionalgender roles'.31 Women's positive attitude towards the demise of the oldsub-culture was marked, as in Sesto, by their new interest for politicaldiscussion (Tables 8 and 9).

Finally, there is the issue of the role of the Church and of primaryassociations, such as networks of family and friends, in determiningpolitical socialisation. In Erba, compared to Sesto, there was a link betweenchurch attendance and voting behaviour, which appears to confirm thatthere was a direct switch from Christian Democracy to the NorthernLeague. Thus at the 1992 elections practising Catholics of both sexes votedprimarily for the league, followed at some distance by the Catholic Party,although this pattern was more marked for male voters. In Erba the role ofthe family is more in evidence and exercises a significant influence uponvoting patterns of both men and women. Thus in Erba there was evidence

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of families and even groups of friends voting en bloc. The League, inparticular, had been able to attract the votes of entire families, rather thansingle individuals.

TABLE 8FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS (ERBA)

(PERCENTAGES)

Men Women

Never 13 9Occasionally 30 27Quite frequently 43 46Very frequently 14 18


TABLE 9FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS NOW COMPARED TO 5/10 YEARS AGO (ERBA)

(PERCENTAGES)

Men Women

More frequently 46 60The same 42 32Less frequently 12 8


Nevertheless, there were also signs that for men there existed a strongcorrelation between family and group ties, and that the family was at thecentre of a communitarian view of society which found its politicalcounterpart in a sub-cultural party. By contrast, among women voters thislink between the family, society and political representation was moretenuous. Thus, when asked how many of their relatives and friends sharedtheir political preferences and ideas, nearly half of men respondentsindicated that a majority did, as opposed to less than a third of women. Also,men's lives in Erba seemed to revolve almost exclusively around family,friends and work, whereas women showed a higher propensity to cultivateother interests outside their circle of family and friends (Table 10). Men alsoindicated that they cherished the family above both individualistic andsolidaristic values, whereas women put solidarity first (Table 11). Women'sunderstanding of solidarity appeared to be linked to universalistic Catholicvalues, rather than to a class or a group.

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CLASS AND GENDER VOTING IN ITALY

CONCLUSIONS

89

To conclude, in both localities there were distinct patterns of gender votingbehaviour. Male workers showed a high degree of continuity with the pastand a determination, particularly in Erba, to preserve a familistic andcommunitarian society represented politically by a sub-cultural party.Female workers continued to subscribe to family values and indeed to beinfluenced to some extent by the family in their voting allegiances(especially in Erba), but among them the link family ties-group ties-systemof solidarity-sub-cultural party is much weaker. Group ties, in particular, donot seem to exercise the same impact upon women as upon men.

TABLE 10HOW DIFFERENT ASSOCIATIONS ARE VALUED TODAY COMPARED TO 5/10 YEARS AGO

(ERBA) (PERCENTAGES)

FamilyFriendsWorkReligionUnionsPoliticsCulture/

Leisure

MoreImportant

632253168

19

10

Men

Same

355641594235

52

LessImportant

2226

255046

38

(233)(213)(213)(189)(161)(168)

(176)

TABLE

MoreImportant

622238224

23

29

11WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IN LIFE?

(PERCENTAGES)

All

Women

Same

366151584543

55

(ERBA)

Men

LessImportant

21711205134

16

(177)(153)(146)(142)(119)(128)

(136)

Women

To succeed personally 19.2Family interests are

more important thanpersonal success 38.4

Family responsibilitiesare a handicap forpersonal success 3.6

Solidarity is the mostimportant human value 38.8

Total Numbers (422)

22.2

45.7

2.1

30.0

(243)

15.1

28.5

5.6

50.8

(179)

This has two important implications, in my view. First, it indicates thatwomen are increasingly withdrawing their support from political sub-

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cultures - whether Catholic or Communist - which have traditionallyplaced them in a subordinate position vis-à-vis men. Second, it indicates thatwomen have not found a political voice of their own, nor are they likely tofind it in the foreseeable future, if by this we intend a collectiverepresentation at the political level. The findings show that, unlike men,women in areas previously dominated by sub-cultural parties are now likelyto cast their votes widely across the political spectrum, distrusting collectiverepresentation. However, I would contend that in areas such as Sesto andErba the discarding by women of a sub-cultural approach to voting does initself amount to a collective aspiration and can be seen in direct oppositionto men's collective political behaviour. In this context, it seems premature,at least for Italy, to speak of an individualistic and gender-neutral votingbehaviour. Unlike in the USA, however, the type of 'gender gap' that it hasbeen possible to detect in the areas surveyed cannot be easily translated intogreater political influence. A similar conclusion has recently been drawnfrom the outcome of the 1996 elections. Female voters may havecontributed decisively to the electoral success of the centre-left in 1996,however, to quote an editorial in La Repubblica, 'women have come out ofthe electoral campaign defeated'.32 The editorial pointed out that women hadfailed to obtain greater political representation, arguing that this could onlyemerge as the result of women achieving 'female political subjectivity'.Interestingly, only the housewives' association, the Federcasalinghe,through their leader Federica Rossi Gasparrini, openly and skilfullypublicised their conversion from the Polo to the Ulivo before the election.An electoral pact then followed, based on ten key demands put forward bythe housewives' pressure group. After the elections, Rossi Gasparriniboasted that the support of the association had been decisive for the successof the centre-left." At least one political party thus showed itself open towomen's demands but only one women's group appears to have been ableto use its members' votes as a political lever.

If women's votes are 'unpredictable' and their political orientations varyconsiderably from one election to the next, men's persistent and reliable'bloc voting' will continue to ensure that their own collective interests andaspirations are more effectively represented at the political level.

NOTES

This article contains some of the findings of a research project on social identities and politicalculture in Italy, which was funded by Bath University Research Strategy Fund in 1993. Otherfindings have appeared in Modem Italy. See A. Cento Bull, 'An End to Collective Identities?Political Culture and Voting Behaviour in Sesto S. Giovanni and Erba', Modern Italy 1/2(Autumn 1996). The author wishes to thank all industrial workers in Sesto and Erba who gave upsome of their time to fill in long and detailed questionnaires. Thanks also go to the local section

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of the PDS, as well as the Istituto per la storia della Resistenza e dell'età contemporanea, in Sesto,and the local section of the Northern League in Erba.

1. H. T. Himmelweit et al. How Voters Decide: A Longitudinal Study of Political Attitudes andVoting (Milton Keynes: Open UP 1985).

2. R. Mannheimer and G. Sani, Il mercato elettorale (Bologna: Il Mulino 1987); R.Mannheimer and G. Sani, La rivoluzione elettorale. L'Italia tra la prima e la secondarepubblica (Milano: Anabasi 1994). See also M. Revelli, 'Forza Italia: l'anomalia italiananon è finita', in P. Ginsborg (ed.) Stato dell'Italia, (Milano: Mondadori 1994).

3. M. Franklin, The Decline of Class Voting in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985). R. Roseand I. McAllister, Voters Begin to Choose (London: Sage 1986).

4. I. M. Crewe, 'The electorate: partisan dealignment ten years on', in H.B. Berrington (ed.)Change in British Politics (London: Frank Cass 1984). See also I. M. Crewe, B. Sarlvik andJ. Alt, 'Partisan dealignment in Britain 1964-74', British Journal of Political Science 7(1977) pp. 129-90.

5. A. Heath et al. Understanding political change: the British voter, 1964-1987 (Oxford:Pergamon Press 1991).

6. R. Rose and I. McAllister, The Loyalties of Voters (London: Sage 1990).7. Ibid. p.51. See also A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, How Britain Votes (Oxford: Pergamon

Press 1985).8. S. H. Barnes and M. Kaase (eds.) Political Action (Beverly Hills, CA, and London: Sage

1979). For Italy see G. Sani, 'The Italian Electorate in the Mid Seventies: Beyond tradition'in H. E. Penniman (ed.) Italy at the Polls (Washington DC: American Enterprise Inst. 1977).See also G. Sani, 'Italy: Continuity and Change' in G. A. Almond and S. Verba (eds.) TheCivic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown 1979).

9. M. Dogan, 'Political Cleavages and Social Stratification in France and Italy' in S. M. Lipsetand S. Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments (NY: Free Press 1967).

10. A. Parisi and G. Pasquino, Continuità e mutamento elettorale in Italia (Bologna: Il Mulino1977).

11. See esp. R. Cartocci, Elettori in Italia. Riflessioni sulle vicende elettorali degli anni ottanta(Bologna: Il Mulino 1990). Also by Cartocci, Fra Lega e Chiesa (Bologna: Il Mulino 1994).See also I. Diamanti, 'Lega Nord: un partito per le periferie', in P. Ginsborg (ed.) Statodell'Italia (Milano: Mondadori 1994). R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. CivicTraditions in Modern Italy (Princeton UP 1993).

12. A. Bull and P. Corner, From Peasant to Entrepreneur. The Survival of the Family Economyin Italy (Oxford: Berg 1993). See also C. Trigilia, Grandi partiti e piccole imprese.Comunisti e democristiani nelle regioni a economia diffusa (Bologna: Il Mulino 1986).

13. Diamanti (note 11).14. R. Mannheimer (ed.), La Lega Lombarda (Milan: Feltrinelli 1991).15. C. M. Mueller, The Politics of the Gender Gap. The Social Construction of Political

Influence (Beverly Hills, CA, and London: Sage 1988). See also B.C. Burrell, 'Party Decline,Party Transformation and Gender Politics: the USA', in J. Lovenduski and P. Norris (eds.)Gender and Party Politics (London: Sage 1993).

16. Mueller (note 15) p.12.17. D. Sainsbury, 'The Politics of Increased Representation: the Swedish Case' and L. Erickson,

'Making Her Way In: Women, Parties and Candidacies in Canada', both in Lovenduski andNorris (note 15).

18. J. Jenson and M. Sineau, Mitterrand et les Françaises. Un rendez-vous manqué (Paris: Pressede Sciences Po 1995).

19. P. Norris and J. Lovenduski, 'Gender and Party Politics in Britain' in Lovenduski and Norris(note 15).

20. Mueller (note 15) p.25.21. 'Il voto femminile mobile e scontento', L'Unità, 27 April 1996, p.6. The article is based on

analyses of electoral results conducted by Directa and Abacus.22. On the Northern League there is now a fairly vast literature. See esp. R. Mannheimer (note

14). See also I. Diamanti, La Lega. Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo soggetto

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politico (Rome: Donzelli 1993). A. Cento Bull, 'Ethnicity, Racism and the Northern League',in C. Levy (ed.) Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics (Oxford: Berg 1996).

23. R. Williams, Towards 2000 (London: Chatto & Windus 1983) pp.166-71.24. P. Ginsborg (ed.) Stato dell'Italia (Milan: Mondadori 1994).25. A recent study on women factory workers at Sesto San Giovanni during the Fascist and the

Resistance period has shown very clearly that women's participation in politics wasrestricted to traditional roles, and that these roles were sanctioned by the Communist sub-culture and organisations. P. Willson, The Clockwork Orange. Women and Work in FascistItaly (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993).

26. M. Weber, 'Italy', in J. Lovenduski and J. Hills (eds.) The Politics of the Second Electorate.Women and Public Participation (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge 1981) p.204.

27. M. Weber, 'La partecipazione politica femminile in Italia: evoluzione, determinanti,caratteristiche', Rivista italiana di scienza politica 11 (1981) pp.281-311. See also M.Weber, Il voto delie donne (Turin: Biblioteca della Libertà 1977). M. Weber, 'Le casalinghee la politica', Argomenti radicali 2 (1978) pp.45-56. For a general discussion on women(particularly Italian women) and politics see G. Zincone, Gruppi sociali e sistemi politici: ilcaso donne (Milan: Angeli 1985).

28. A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP 1970).29. M. Guadagnini, 'A "Partitocrazia" Without Women: The Case of the Italian Party System',

in Lovenduski and Norris (note 15) p.177.30. See A. Cento Bull,'The Lega Lombarda. A New Political Subculture for Lombardy's

Industrial Districts', The Italianist 12 (1992) pp.I79-83. A. Cento Bull, 'The Politics ofIndustrial Districts in Lombardy. Replacing Christian Democracy with the Northern League',The Italianist 13 (1993) pp.209-29.

31. Guadagnini (note 29) p.200.32. 'Le donne e il voto', La Repubblica, 19 April 1996, p. 10. An electoral survey conducted by

Abacus after the 1996 general elections indicated that, with the exception of Forza Italia, theelectorate of the parties of the right and centre-right was predominantly male. See Abacus,'Italia: composizione elctorato voto proporzionale 1996', 3 Oct. 1996. The survey was basedon 14,300 interviews and was directed by Paolo Natale.

33. 'Casalinghe determinanti', La Repubblica, 23 April 1996, p.6.

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class, gender and voting in italy

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