Malaluan, Alyssa Clarizze E.

ZAIDA RUBY S. ALBERTO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, EPIFANIO J. ALANO, CECILIA P. ALANO, YOLANDA P.

ALANO, and NATALIA REALTY, INC., respondents.

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 119088               June 30, 2000

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner herein, filed a Complaint for the collection of money against the

respondent- spouses when they dismiss the case filed by them on which she is their

counsel against Natalia Realty based on a retainer agreement between them. The RTC

ruled in favor of the plaintiff. However, per Sheriff’s Return,5 only P3,500.00 of personal

properties of respondent-spouses were levied because apparently, Natalia Realty, Inc.

had sold to private respondent Yolanda Alano, respondent-spouses’ daughter, 23

hectares out of the 32.4 hectares given to them as settlement of the SEC case. The

sale was executed on December 28, 1988 or six days before respondent-spouses

moved to dismiss the SEC case on January 3, 1989. This discovery prompted petitioner

to file a complaint, attaching the Deed of Sale as Annex ”C” and thereafter, a second

Amended Complaint7 to declare the deed of sale null and void ab initio on the ground

that the transfer of the subject parcels of land to Yolanda Alano was simulated. The trial

court, in an Omnibus Order, dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for insufficiency of cause

of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint stating that well -

settled is the rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a

cause of action, only the averments of the complaint, and no other, are to be consulted.

Extraneous matters are irrelevant.

ISSUE: WON annexes to the complaint may be considered in determining whether or

not complaint states a cause of action.

HELD: Yes, annexes to the complaint may be considered in determining causes of

action. The sufficiency of petitioner’s cause of action in the second Amended Complaint

is readily apparent. A right in her favor was created by virtue of the retainer agreement

executed between her and respondent-spouses. When petitioner moved for the

issuance of a writ of execution, she discovered to her dismay that respondent-spouses

had no more leviable properties except a few personal properties amounting to only

P3,500.00. In fact, by making it appear that it was Natalia Realty, Inc. which sold

respondent-spouses’ 23 hectares to respondent Yolanda P. Alano, petitioner not only

had a cause of action against respondent-spouses but likewise against Yolanda P.

Alano. Clearly, all these instances which were alleged and enumerated in the second

Amended Complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action on the part of petitioner. The

trial court and the Court of Appeals should not have been too rigid in applying the rule

that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,

only the averments in the complaint and no other are to be consulted. The rule admits of

exceptions. All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness

of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the

complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.

Attached to the second Amended Complaint is the Deed of Sale the due execution and

genuineness of which were never denied by respondents. So long as those attached

pleadings are procedurally responsive to the complaint, then they may be considered in

evaluating the sufficiency of the cause of action in the complaint. In addition, since the

dismissal of a complaint by virtue of a motion to dismiss for failure to state or for

insufficiency of cause of action would be tantamount to a summary judgment, the lower

court should at least have considered the attached documents and pleadings as a

matter of due process. It must be remembered that the complaint itself is accompanied

by documentary evidence attached as annexes. The responsive pleadings, in addition,

though not attachments to the complaint, clarify its merits since they are already part of

the records of the case and should therefore be considered.

Malaluan,Alyssa Clarizze E.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE, VICENTE

STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.

Campos, JR., J p:

FACTS: It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters

and his sister Vilma de Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when

appellant broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and

made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life

and that of his companions, he reluctantly told them where the key was kept. Just on

the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum.

When the three saw her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as

another poked a knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should make an

outcry and successively raped her. After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and

feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and switched the lights on and called to his

neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost consciousness due to shock.

The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna

convicted all three accused-appellants in its decision. The accused-appellants fault the

trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted by the Crime

Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent

fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints

were not found in the objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty

of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: WON accused are guilty in spite of the report made by the PNP Laboratory.

HELD: Yes, the accused are still guilty. Although the Court agrees with their opinion that

a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, it cannot sustain their

theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the

course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not

have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid

conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent

prints other than their not being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent

fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime

laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines

instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon

in a fingerprint examination.Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the

successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime

scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the

accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet

they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten

latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are

not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime

charged.

Malaluan, Alyssa Clarizze E.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

SAMUEL ULZORON, accused-appellant.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 121979 March 2, 1998

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: On 31 March 1987, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Emily Gabo, private

complainant, was watering her plants near a well in Brgy. Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan,

when Samuel suddenly appeared. He was armed with a 2-foot long bolo hanging in its

scabbard around his waist with a long-sleeved work shirt slung over his shoulder. After

Emily finished watering her plants and before she could start washing clothes, Samuel

grabbed her wrists and locked them with one hand behind her back with the other hand

drawing his bolo and pointing it at her neck. She struggled to free herself from his hold

but was so intimidated with the bolo that she could not shout for help; she lost her

strength eventually. After she weakened, he dragged her some forty (40) meters away

to the bushes and tall grasses. He forced her to lie down; then he mounted her. He laid

his bolo beside him, pinned her arms with one hand, and with the other, loosened the

buttons of her dress. Emily could only struggle in vain until he ripped off her dress and

panties. After which, Samuel had a carnal knowledge of Emily that lasted for about 15

minutes. Emily told her husband Roberto what unfortunately happened to her. The

following afternoon, Emily went to Dr. Feliciano M. Velasco Jr. for physical examination.

The doctor noted the discharge mixed with semen in her private part. The next day

Emily lodged a complaint for rape against Samuel Ulzoron as she turned over his

belongings to the police authorities as her evidence in support thereof. Appellant faults

the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his defense. He argues that the

undisputed facts and circumstances made it more likely that Emily was involved in an

adulterous relationship with him.  He claims, for instance, that there was absolutely

nothing to support the victim's claim of struggle, and that while he allegedly dragged her

forty (40) meters away before assaulting her sexually, the examining physician could

not conclude that physical force was actually inflicted since she did not sustain any

physical injuries. 

ISSUE: WON Ulzoron is correct on claiming his innocence because of the absence of

marks of physical violence of rape

HELD: No, Ulzoron is not correct. The arguments of appellant are unpersuasive; they

fail to convince the Court. The term "dragged" should not indeed be taken in the

meaning understood by appellant as "dragged along on the ground." When asked on

cross-examination by the defense counsel to "describe how she and appellant traveled

at (sic) forty (40) meters distance,"  she said, "He was holding my hands and at the

same time he is (sic) pushing me forward." This testimony adequately explains the

absence of injuries in her body. At any rate, it is not necessary for the commission of

rape that there be marks of physical violence on the victim's body. While Emily

repeatedly mentioned her struggles to be released from his grasp, such efforts need not

always result in physical injuries.  Besides, they did not refer to the circumstances when

she was being dragged by the accused, but to the circumstances when he initially

grabbed her hands, when he was on top of her, when he was undressing her,  and when

she was exerting efforts to disengage herself from the sexual anchorage. The

circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were manifested

clearly not only in the victim's testimony but also in the physical evidence presented

during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the medico-legal

report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred

witnesses.  The fact of carnal knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established

through the offended party's own testimony and corroborated by that of her examining

physician.

Malaluan, Alyssa Clarizze E.

TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner, vs.

The COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANK, respondents.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994

BIDIN, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations

amounting to P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were

evidenced and secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering

three parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and inventories.

Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by

respondent bank, a restructuring of the remaining indebtedness which then amounted to

P1,057,500.00, as all the previous payments made were applied to penalties and

interests. To secure the re-structured loan of P1,213,400.00, three new promissory

notes were executed. The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another

mortgage covering two other parcels of land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's

stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and the proceeds

amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned over to the bank and

applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned

the duplicate original copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the word

"PAID" stamped thereon. Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985,

Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00

representing accrued interest on PN No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the

promissory notes were erroneously released.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Trans-Pacific. Respondent

bank elevated the case to the appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed the decision

of the trial court. Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code,

the trial court ruled that petitioner has fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its

possession of the documents (stamped "PAID") evidencing its indebtedness.

Respondent court disagreed and held, among others, that the documents found in

possession of Trans-Pacific are mere duplicates and cannot be the basis of petitioner's

claim that its obligation has been fully paid. Accordingly, since the promissory notes

submitted by petitioner were duplicates and not the originals, the delivery thereof by

respondent bank to the petitioner does not merit the application of Article 1271 (1st par.)

of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON the appellate court is correct on holding that those promissory notes

which are copies executed at the same time with the alleged original are not considered

original documents.

HELD: No, the appellate court is not correct. The above pronouncement of respondent

court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented were

duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. A duplicate copy of the

original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the possession of the party

against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable

notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent bank. Where several originals

are made out of a private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to refer to

the delivery only of the original original rather than to the original duplicate of which the

debtor would normally retain a copy. Hence, the appellate court isn’t correct.