JUDICIARY – CONSTI LAW 1 CASE DIGEST

Atty. Lozano, et al vs Nograles, et al,

Facts

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned

citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled

“A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of

Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote

of All the Members of Congress.†Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable�

controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1,

Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.

The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the

prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the

Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution

and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.” �

Issue

Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.

Held

No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and

adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would

forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible

promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a

Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or

hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the

House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing

amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired

and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and

hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House

Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future

event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has

not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.

The petitions were dismissed.

Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority

Facts

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake

reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the

DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34

hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of

submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

Issue

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

Held/Ruling

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to

PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the

Freedom Islands, now covered bycertificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable

lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas ofManila Bay

remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA

seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the

Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the

1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of

alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to

transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila

Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution which prohibits thealienation of natural resources other than agricultural

lands of the public domain.

Dante Liban vs Gordon

FACTS

Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J.

Gordon as “having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The petitioners were officers of the

Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is

Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was

elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC

Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility,

Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI

of the Constitution:

Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other

office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality

thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,

during his term without forfeiting his seat….

Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional provision had no

basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus,

prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did not apply to his case.

Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to which is neither an

office nor an employment.

Issue

Whether or not Gordon forfeited his Senate seat by accepting the PNRC Chair.

Held/Ruling

No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public

functions. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation

from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from

private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns

organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must

also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its

activities in accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality,

independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13

could not apply to Gordon’s case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition

was deemed to have no merit.

Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In

March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE

Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

Held/Ruling

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records

The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers.

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress.

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

Daza vs. Singson

Facts

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political

realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission

on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it

to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives

in the CoA which consisted of the original . Daza was chosen to be part of the

Commission of Appointments and was listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP

was reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of

this, the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the seat

given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace

Daza, in accordance to proportional representation.

ISSUE

Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the

composition of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD

As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments

consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives

elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the

political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of

Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take

appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also

subsequently thereto NOT the court.

De la Llana vs. Alba

Facts

In 1981, BP 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds

Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity

because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of

the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional

provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. De La Llana, et.

al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the

Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of

Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and

judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the

Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by

such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their

incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that

thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and

disregarded.

Issue

Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such

statute (BP 129).

Held

The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline

judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.”

Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was

the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be

distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no

tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of

removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in

that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of

security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts

abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between

removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He

ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed

legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional

construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be

consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be

entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court

does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the

case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the

two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where

the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be

appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the

hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore

from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved

by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the

exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal

of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The

challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily

discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a

construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of

alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a

statute, the former is to be preferred.”

Demetria vs. Alba G.R. NO. 71977, Feb. 27, 1987

Facts

Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit

Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree

1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of

Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that “The President shall have the

authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,

offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General

Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or

office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

Issue

Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

Held/Ruling

Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,

the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,

and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any

item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other

items of their respective appropriations.

Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said

Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one

department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program,

project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General

Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not

the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to

be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to

which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards

set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative

powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional

infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of

savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed

by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one

department to another here.

Dumlao vs. COMELEC

Facts

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and

he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same

office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof)

providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it

is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and

Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and

Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52

regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the

provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the

filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already

disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of

the law.

ISSUE

Whether or not the there is cause of action.

HELD

The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have

been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues.

Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial

review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of

judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest

personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that

the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the

constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only

the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons

charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against

them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null

and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is

neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject

to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real

differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.

For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified

differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to

compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates

should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to

everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor

General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of

younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that

persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification

for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government

service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged

65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is

not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a

provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the

same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.NO. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of

Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively

fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the

constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law

that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"

standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes

already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the

fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.

Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the

petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law

using the facial challenge.

Ruling

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness.

The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of

what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine

is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can

understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that

specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving

clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case

since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a

reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or

mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not

be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area

of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed

to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling

effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot

take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the

most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that

no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for

facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the

established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be

heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as

applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be

unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely

on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities

are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder

Law is more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’

decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to

death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for

lacking merit.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.NO. 148560 Nov. 19, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of

Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively

fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the

constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law

that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"

standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes

already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the

fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.

Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the

petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law

using the facial challenge.

Ruling

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness.

The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of

what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine

is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can

understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that

specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving

clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case

since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a

reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or

mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not

be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area

of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed

to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling

effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot

take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the

most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that

no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for

facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the

established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be

heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as

applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be

unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely

on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities

are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder

Law is more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’

decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to

death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for

lacking merit.

Gonzales vs. Narvasa

Facts

Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the

constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform

(PCCR) and of thepositions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and

recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the

manner of implementing them.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held

In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and

taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or

threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury

is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a

favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of

sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of

the positions of presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Neither does he claim

that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he

shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged

contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly brought

only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the

creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or

spending power. The PCCR was created by thePresident by virtue of EO 43 as

amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President,

not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the

Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power totransfer funds

pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of

the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not

alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a

taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue. 

Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

Facts

The Hacienda Luisita is a 6,443 hectare parcel of land originally owned bythe Compania

General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the Spanish owners of

Tabacalera decided to sell this land and its sugar mill, CentralAzucarera de Tarlac. Jose

Cojuangco, Sr. took interest and requestedassistance from the Philippine government in

raising the necessary fundsthrough: (a) the Central Bank, to obtain a dollar loan from

the Manufacturer’sTrust Company (MTC) in New York for the purchase of the sugar

mill; and (b) the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), to obtain a peso loan

for the purchase of the Hacienda. The Central Bank used a portion of the country’sdollar

reserves as security for Cojuangco’s loan with the MTC on the condition that Cojuangco

would acquire Hacienda Luisita for distribution to farmers within10 years from its

acquisition.

Issue

Whether the PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke the HLI’s SDP that it earlier

approved.

Held/Ruling

The PARC has the power and authority to approve the SDP under Section31 of the

CARL includes, by implication, the power to revoke this approval. The PARC was

created via Executive Order (EO) No. 229.The PARC’s authority to approve the SDP is

expressed in Section 10 of EO No. 229The CARL preserved the PARC’s authority to

approve the SDP in its Section 31.As the PARC has the power and authority to approve

the SDP, it also has, by implication, the power to revoke the approval of the plan unless

this implied power is expressly, or by a contrary implication, withheld from it by law. The

petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc.’s petition is denied and AFFIRM public respondent

PARC’s Resolution No. 2005-32-01 revoking the SDP, as wellas its Resolution No.

2006-34-01 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.The decision to subject

the land to compulsory agrarian reform coverage should be AFFIRMED, with the

MODIFICATION that while the acquired lands were included by the public respondent

Department of Agrarian Reform in its Notice of Compulsory Coverage, the purchase by

the petitioners-intervenors, aswell as the portion of land acquired for the SCTEX

complex, should berecognized as valid and effective. No conclusion with respect to the

transfer of 200 hectares to Luisita Realty, Inc., but it recognize that the validity of

thetransfer can still be proven, if Luisita Realty, Inc. so desires, before the DAR.

Otherwise, the 200 hectares should be subject to compulsory CARP coverage.

SUPREME COURT EN BANC RULING

The instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22,

2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of

HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the

CARP, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs

shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule

meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and

legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to

manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing

their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.Of the 6,296 FWBs, he

or she who wishes to continue as an HLIstockholder is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares.

DAR and LBP are ordered to determine thecompensation due to HLI.DAR shall submit

a compliance report after six (6) months from finality of this judgment. It shall also

submit, after submission of the compliance report, quarterly reports on the execution of

this judgment to be submitted within the first15 days at the end of each quarter, until

fully implemented.

Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) vs. Zamora

Facts

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed apetition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marinesnull and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarilyexercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writof habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s

action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, theframers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powershighlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The presentpetition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of theMarines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of theMarines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be noappointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Joya vs PCGG

Facts

Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for

Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from

proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New

York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th Century Silverware seized from

Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the

Central Bank.

Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file

the instantpetition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and Antique Silverware are

embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" and which must be protected by

the state; (c) whether such properties are of public dominion on which can be disposed

of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress; (d) whether the PCGG

has the jurisdiction; (e) whether the PCGG has complied wit the due process clause; (f)

whether the petition has become moot and academic.

Issues

1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition.

2. Whether the instant petition involves actual case or controversy.

Held/Ruling

1. No,this is premised on Section 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides

that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-

in-interest. "Legal Standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the

case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of

the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material

interest. It must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the

constitutional right of some third and related party. Having failed to show that

they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become

publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to

question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

2. No, there is no actual case or controversy involved nor is there an assertion of

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial interpretation.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona

Facts

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the

implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine

Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also

know as lotto.

Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of

serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated

Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.

Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign

Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the

executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners�

have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

Issues

1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.

2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

Held/Ruling

As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality

in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on

locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even

association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute

actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of

various government agencies or instrumentalities.

As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in

question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor

should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the

intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself.

Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby

declared contrary to law and invalid.

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

FACTS:

This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially

the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.

Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of

PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated

the law on public bidding ofcontracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987

Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.

Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional

lawbecause some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured

by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,

taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact

show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have

present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Laurel vs. Garcia

Facts

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their

representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179

square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled

on February 21, 1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by

the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on

May 9, 1956, and is part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in

life and property and their suffering during World War II.

On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino

citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of

sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were

specifically mentioned in the first “Whereas” clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been

pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the

Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at

$225 million.

Issues

1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine

Government?; and

2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and

jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?

Held/Ruling

The petition is granted. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the

commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective

ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective

needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a

juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and

cannot be the object of appropriation. The Roppongi property is correctly classified

under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State

and intended for some public service.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy

service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. An abandonment of

the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial

property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be

inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the

government’s own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to

repair and improve the property .

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of

the Roppongi property’s original purpose.

Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an “authority to sell”, does not have a

provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from

Japan for the government sector. It merely intends to make the properties available to

foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition.

Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi

property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and

when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.

Moreover, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the investigating

committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least,

conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. It does

not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative

powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year. Assuming that the

Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale

by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court

sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner Ojeda.

Manila Electric Co. Vs Pasay Transportation Co.

Facts

The Manila Electric company filed a petition before the court requesting the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO.

MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act No. 1446, section 11 which states: “Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or

corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the SC sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a mahority of whom shall be final.”

For every franchise granted, terms as to the usage and compensation to be paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority vote is required and this is final.

Copies were sent to the affected transportation company once of which is the Pasay Transportation and to Atty. Gen which disclaimed any interest.

Frameworks of the statute: SC sitting as board of arbitrators and as an entity; Decision is final; Franchise granted to Meralco although only a contract bet parties to it is now affecting rights of persons not signatories to it.

The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdication of the matters submitted to an arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case.

HELD:

Meralco is banking on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg Co vs Commissioners’ Court where it was held that a state legislature authorizing the commissioner’s court of a certain country to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is not one whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.

Dilemma of the court:

1. SC sitting as a board of arbitrator exercising judicial functions

Case I would not fall within the jurisdiction granted the SC = if it does, it would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. If the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the SC, sitting as board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the SC, where the SC would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators.

2. Members of the SC sitting as arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions.

Case 2 would mean that the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members of theSC could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.

It is judicial power only which is exercised by the SC. Just as the SC as the guardian on constitutional rights should not sanction usurpation by any other departments of the government. Its power should be confined strictly within the granted by the Organic Act.

Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators.

North Cotabato vs Republic

Facts:

A long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF) took place before the Memorandum of Agreement on the

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) come into existence. The GRP and MILF Peace Panels

signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities and the General Framework

of Agreement of Intent in 1997 and 1998, respectively.

The parties in said MOA-AD are the GRP and the MILF. It’s “Terms of Reference”

(TOR) includes not only earlier agreements between the GRP and the MILF, but also

agreements between the GRP and the MNLF. It also identifies as TOR two local

statutes – the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and

the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). Furthermore, it includes as a final TOR the

generic category of “compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-

mua’hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace

agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device.

Moreover, the MOA-AD binds the parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe

and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact, which embodies the

“details for the effective enforcement” and “the mechanisms and modalities for the

actual implementation” of the MOA-AD. The relationship between the Central

Government and BJE is described as “associative”, characterized by shared authority

and responsibility, under the MOA-AD. The BJE under the MOA-AD is also granted the

power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service,

electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and

internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions.

However, several petitions have been filed by different interested parties praying that

the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Issue:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialled the

MOA-AD?

2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

Held:

1. YES. Respondents violate the constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initalled the

MOA-AD.

Access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information

on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy; the public has a

legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. The MOA-AD is a

matter of public concern for it involves the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the

State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern

covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the

consummation of the contract. This negates the State policy of full transparency on

matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not

have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the

public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined

in the Bill of Rights.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it

“should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important

to all Filipinos” and “shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different

contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community

2. YES. The contents of the MOA-AD are unconstitutional.

The MOA-AD explicitly alludes the concept of association, indicating that the Parties

actually framed its provisions with it in mind. An association is formed when two states

of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the

associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining

its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between

integration and independence.

The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal

concept of association. The concept of association is not recognized under the present

Constitution for no province, city or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized

under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government.

Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the

Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the

associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state

in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a

transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral

declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents’ act of

guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the

MOA-AD fatally defective.

Therefore the MOA-AD is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

Pimentel vs Ermita

Facts

While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their

respective departments. They were appointed in acting capacities only. Pimentel

together w/ 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al.

During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-issued ad interim appointments re-

appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity. Pimentel argues that GMA

should not have appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because “in case of a

vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be

designated as Acting Secretary. Pimentel further asserts that “while Congress is in

session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position

of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtained its consent;

GMA cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while

Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power.

Issue

Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

Held

Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that GMA is allowed under Sec. 16,

Art 7 of the Constitution to make such appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the

President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the

Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective

only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Ermita

also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an appointment with the exception that such

temporary designation shall not exceed one year. Sec 17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III of EO

292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the

government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office

in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a

person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person

competent. Also, Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the

obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An

alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and

confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot

impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

Bernas says that ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in

an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim

appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting

appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim

appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or

rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.

Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they

can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments.

The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from

GMA’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the

recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

PACU vs. Sec. of Education

Facts

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act

No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.)

They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty

and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right

and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on

the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and

standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain

that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of

Education. Petitioners reason out, “this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled

discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education

is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the

Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard . .

.” Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the

government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the

power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law

or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or

which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may

deem pedagogically unsuitable.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioners have presented actual case that affected them and their

operation.

Held/Ruling

Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with

their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the

power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. No justiciable

controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on

Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to

refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or

rights for so refusing.

Salazar vs. Achacoso

Facts

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged

petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent

petitioner a telegramdirecting him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint

against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a

recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure

and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the

documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of

committing illegalrecruitment, it having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license

or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy

workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under

Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was

then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and

Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a

certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes.

Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,

because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due

process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties

were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and

intimidation.

Issue

Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of

Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of

the Labor Code

Held/Ruling

Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”.

Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure

and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court

held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue

search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.

To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional

and of no force and effect… The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for

deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to

extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain

of the courts.” Furthermore, the search andseizure order was in the nature of a general

warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify

specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to

return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure

Order No. 1205.

Tan vs. Macapagal

Facts

Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The

petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention

was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act

6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals whichseek to revise the present

Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form

nowoutlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to

propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid

down therein."

Issues

1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi

2. WON the court has jurisdiction over the case

Held

1. No, in the language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who

impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal andsubstantial interest in the

case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement .

In Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works it states that validity of a statute may be

contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its

enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement

of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose

of administering an unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds,'

which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."

2. No, at the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution

that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial

review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something

already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.

Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit.

The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out

their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. The court

may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness

Umali vs. Guingona, G.R. NO. 131124, March 21, 1999

Facts

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to

March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994,

President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged

violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as

Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and

nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President

authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and

immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on

Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of

the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his

Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), andPersonal Data

Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office.

On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on

record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie

evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6,

1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued

Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of

retirement and all benefits under the law.

Issues

Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether

the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for

reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

Held/Ruling

Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed

for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of

the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the

ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized.

After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled

correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due

process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other

pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations,

and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear

that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal

basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his

security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal

Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim

of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove

that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on

the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the

PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such

late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under

consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the

institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152

were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on

thecriminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the

ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for

overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However,

taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court,

in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the

charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable

manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is

no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor

General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and

substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.