Friday cases digest

1. Arceo vs People

Facts:

Petitioner obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal in the total

amount of P150,000.00.

Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because Arceo promised that he would

replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When

his patience ran out, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment. The

check bounced because of insufficient funds. As a consequence, Cenizal executed his

affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for estafa and violation

of BP 22 against petitioner. After due investigation, this case for violation of BP 22 was

filed against petitioner. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by

Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on. Cenizal executed an

Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. Arceo

was found guilty in the trial and on appeal.

He claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure

of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial.

Issue: Whether or not the best evidence rule applies in the instant case and that the

presentation of the check in evidence is necessary as a condition sine qua non for

conviction under BP 22

Ruling:

The best evidence rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject

of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the

circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and

testimonial evidence is admissible.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless

check.6Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the

check, not its content.

Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established.

Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other

pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he

executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City

Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed

the corresponding information based on the documents.

2. FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES ANTONIO and EVELYN P. BERAÑA, IGNACIO EBREO and

ELEUTERIA CUETO, Petitioners, vs.GIL EBREO, represented by His Attorney-in-Fact,

FELIXBERTO EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and HOMOBONO CUETO, Respondents.

Facts:

Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926 leaving behind as heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano,

Felino, Ignacio, and Felipa.1 Subsequently, Felipa died leaving behind her heirs,

Genoveva, Homobono and Eleuteria all surnamed Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991

without any issue. Defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña are the son

and daughter-in-law, respectively, of defendant Felino, one of the five children of

Felipe Ebreo.

As agreed upon by these heirs, subject lot, shall remain under the co-ownership of Gil,

Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However, plaintiffs were surprised

to discover that subject lot was declared for taxation purposes in the name of

defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs’ recitals, they alleged that they never

sold, ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-ownership over subject

lot.

Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of the

Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by and among the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo,

subject was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the corresponding

Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the name of Santiago Puyo as owner.

However, the deed of sale evidencing this transaction was never presented.

Defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of the lot by the heirs of

Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was executed and ratified sometime in 1968 before

Attorney Doroteo M. Chavez of Batangas City. Then it was sold by Santiago Puyo by

way of Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio Ebreo was duly executed and ratified

before one Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.

The deed of Sale Annotated in the Tax declaration of the Puyo could no longer be

found in the Office of the Municipal Assessor for the building was burned.

Felino alleged that his copy of the deed was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto

who is the daughter of one of the heirs, Felipa Ebreo.According to Felino, Eleuteria

refused to return the document and even got angry when he tried to demand its

return.From Felino’s account,there are three copies of the missing deed of sale.

Lamentably, petitioners failed to present any one of them.

Issue: Is the secondary evidence admissible considering that the primary evidence

cannot be found?

Held:

The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by the heirs of

Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo. However, defendant-appellants failed to

produce the alleged Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.

The best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates as a rule of

exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary) evidence cannot inceptively be

introduced as the original writing itself must be produced in court, except in the four

instances mentioned in Section 3. Defendant-appellants miserably failed to prove that

their case is included among the exceptions to the Rule.

The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the Deed of Sale cannot be

given credence. Defendant-appellants did not even look for a copy of the deed of

sale on the notarial registry of Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly notarized

the deed of sale. Neither did they look for a copy in the archives of the Court where it

should have been submitted as required by the notarial law. In the words of the trial

court, "the decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and

conspicuously unproven." The controversial deed of sale not having been produced as

required by the rules of evidence, Santiago Puyo acquired no rights whatsoever to Lot

subject lot.

3. SSS v AGUAS

Facts:

Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna

Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that

Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13,

1997.

In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosanna’s claim,

saying that Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she

was living with another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any

children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela

Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the pension and conducted an investigation. The

investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that

Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel

Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile.

It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume payment and

ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to

her and Jeylnn.

When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also

claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As

proof, the petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janet’s certificates of live birth.

SSS denied their claims but decided to conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC

found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while

still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still

married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court for

Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of Rosanna

Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)

The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support

from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablo’s legitimate child,

even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records

that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person. Janet on the other hand was

only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal papers.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of Janet and

Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the

deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits due to the

presentation of their birth certificates.

Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature

of Pablo as her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991.

Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 which

continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the death of Pablo on December

8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of Rosanna and

Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is

considered legitimate.

Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who

is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be “dependent

from support” upon the husband

Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to

prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary.

4. Vallarta vs. CA

Facts: Accused, Vallarta, was appointed as a warehouseman-cashier in the National

Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC), as the agent-in-charge and disbursing officer of

the NARIC and accountable for property and funds of the corporation, he was

charged with the crime of malversation after the NARIC auditor found shortage in cash

and items under his custody. He was later found guilty.

A motion for new trial was filed by the accused, alleging that errors of law or

irregularities were committed during the trial prejudicial to his substantial rights but the

trial court denied the motion. The accused elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate affirmed the trial court's decision. Accused-appellant filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which was also denied by the respondent appellate court hence it

appeal to the Supreme Court.

Vallarta`s motion for new trial before the trial court, he sought to present, as additional

evidence, the testimonies (affidavits) of Messrs. Pedro Esquivel and Pedro Perez, to

rebut the claim of Missing 6,000 empty sacks.

He also assail as erroneous is the respondent court's appreciation of exhibit 2, the

charge order of one Flavio Vasquez for 353 cavans and 50 kilos of rice worth P 8,171.68.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals was correct in not

appreciating the affidavits of Mr Esquivel and Perez

2. Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals was correct

Ruling:

1. Yes. The use of affidavits should be regulated by the hearsay rule to safeguard

every opportunity to cross examine the affiants with regard to their contents and

due execution. The statement of Pedro Esquivel submitted to the court is not signed;

consequently, the same could not be considered by it, because upon the face of

the instrument, the due execution thereof has not been established. More than this,

the two affidavits could not be relied upon by this court for the same are hearsay.

Unless and until the two supposed affiants of said instruments are presented in this

court, their testimonies as to the contents of their sworn statements are inadmissible

in evidence. Furthermore, the affidavits of Perez and Esquivel attached to the

motion for new trial of the accused does (sic) not show that they borrowed a total

of 6,161 empty sacks.

2. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Exhibit 2 was not signed and

duly authenticated; it is a mere carbon copy and no explanation was given why

Flavio Vasquez was not presented as a witness. A signed carbon copy or duplicate

of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate

original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-

production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting

to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public

officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy. The accused did not request for a

copy and exhibit the same before the trial court. The non-production by the

accused of the original document, unless justified under the exceptions in Section 2,

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of

evidence" adverse to him.

5. Trans Pacific v CA

Facts: In a case for collection of a sum of money, the defendant put up then defense

that his obligation has been fully discharged by presenting in evidence duplicates of

the promissory notes which were stamped “PAID”. The Court of Appeals, however,

disregard the evidence on the theory that Art. 271 (1st paragraph) of the civil code

which reads:

“Art. 271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit made

voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor implies the renunciation of the action which the

former had against the latter.”

applies to the original copy, not its duplicate.

Issue: Is the appallate court correct?

Held:

NO. In relation to Rule 130 Sec 4(b) of the Rules of Court, it was held in People v. Tan,

105 Phil 1242 that:

“When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper

so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheets, including the signature of the

party to be charged thereby, producing a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such

signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or

exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals

and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the

non-production of the others.”

A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in

the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to

produce it after reasonable notice (SEC. 2b, rule 130), as in the case of respondent

bank. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge

the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by the petitioner.

6. Ramos v CA

Facts:

In a prosecution for several counts of estafa filed by a bank against its Acting Branch

Manager arising from her act of allowing the drawing against uncleared check

deposits (DAUD), the bank auditor testified based on the worksheets he prepared in the

process of his investigations. The worksheets were presented together with account

ledgers of the other co-accused, including inter office correspondence between

accused and her superiors as well as the uncleared checks.

The accused contends that such evidences which constitute of audit worksheets and

xerox copies of the dishonored checks and check return slip are inadmissible because

they do not constitute the best evidence.

Issue:

Are the entries in the account ledgers of the depositors admissible in evidence?

Held:

Yes. The entries in the account ledgers of the depositors which are on file on the bank

may be regarded as originals under paragraph c, Sec. 4 Rule 130 of the rules of Court.

“Section 4(c). When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one

being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are

likewise equally regarded as originals.”

SC sees no error on the part of the trial judge in admitting the testimony of the bank

auditor based on the worksheets he prepared in the process of his investigation

regarding the unauthorized DAUD extended by the petitioner to her accused. These

worksheets, are organized data culled from the pertinent bank documents which are

not intended to supplant the probative value of said documents. But together with the

other evidence presented such as the account ledgers of petitioner's co-accused, a

number of interoffice correspondence between the petitioner and her superiors as well

as the xerox copies of the uncleared checks deposited to the FSB and the checks

issued by the latter corresponding to the withdrawals against said uncleared checks,

they present indubitable proof that DAUD was allowed by petitioner even after that

practice was prohibited.

7. People vs. Tandoy

Facts: Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation where one officer posed as a

buyer and waited for a pusher near a store. Tandoy approached him and right away

asked him if wanted to some drugs. The officer paid a P10 bill and two P5 bills (marked

money) for two rolls of marijuana. Then the other officers arrested Tandoy. They made a

body search and found 8 more rolls. They brought him to the police station to be

investigated. Tandoy remained silent after being read his rights.

Accused was charged for the illegal sale of marijuana in the amount of Php 20.00. The

prosecution, however, marked only a photocopy of the Php 10.00 which was used by

the police in the buy-bust operation.

However, Tandoy contends that he was playing “cara y cruz” with 15 other people

when somebody suddenly said that the police were making arrests. The people

grabbed the bet money and scattered. He was arrested and the money they found on

him was from the game. He and a fellow player were taken to the police station and

mauled to induce them to give up the identity of other pushers. The trial court believed

the police officers’ story over the defendant’s. Applying the presumption that they had

performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated

allegation that he had been manhandled and framed.

Issue: Did the trial court violate the best evidence rule when it admitted the photocopy

of the money?

Ruling: No, the marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 3, Rule

130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary

evidence except in the five instances mentioned therein. The best evidence rule

applies only when the contents of the document are subject of inquiry. Where the issue

is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the

circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence is admissible.

Since the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of

establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitute evidence, like a

photocopy thereof. It is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the

original.

8. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA, petitioner, vs.HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of

First Instance of Pampanga, and ANDRES GUEVARRA, respondents.

Facts:

The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres

Guevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published

on page 9 of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid in its issue of July 13, 1930, a squib in

verse, of which a translation into Spanish was included therein, intended to impeach

the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano

Nepomuceno.

The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution, the copies of the Ing

Magumasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the

vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. However the

judge refused to accept the newspapers as evidence.

Issue:Is the copies of the newspaper admissible?

Ruling:

Yes. The rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is

applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the

libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the

libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it.

9. Heirs v. Comorposa

Facts:

In 1965, when Francisco Comorposa was terminated in his job which affects the

relocation of his house, he asks for Adolfo Saez’s help for him and his family to occupy

the land of Adolfo’s father Marco Saez. Out of pity, they were allowed.

Later, Francisco left for Hawaii, thus he was succeeded in his possession by his heirs who

likewise stayed to the said land without rent and through the Saez’s tolerance.

On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the

premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the

legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. They

alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid

and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to

the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of

the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of

the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question when

it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore,

entitled to the issuance of a title.

Among the evidence presented by the defendant in an unlawful detainer case was a

CENR Certification bearing a facsimile signature of the CENR officer.

On appeal, the petitioners contend that that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits

of their witnesses. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position

paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

Issue: 1. Is the evidence Admissible being the signature merely in facsimile?

2. Does CA erred in disregarding affidavit of petitioner’s witnesses?

Held:

1. Yes. While pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and

are not considered admissible in evidence, the certification bearing a

facsimile of a signature of the CENR office is admissible. The one referred to

here is a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by

mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial and business

transactions. Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the certification.

In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as

reference in one of his orders.

2. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.

Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are

to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of

whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of

evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial

evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

Furthermore, while in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the

witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply

does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.

10. Hernaez vs. McGrath

Facts: Rafael Alunan and Pedro Hernaez formerly were registered owners in equal

share of a land subject of the dispute. In Feb. 1943, a deed of sale, on which Alunan's

and Hernaez names were signed as sellers and the Hakodate Dock Co., Ltd., a

Japanese commercial firm, as buyer, in consideration of P170,000, was presented for

registration in the office of register of deeds, and new TCT`s in the name of the

purchaser were issued in lieu of the old TCTs, which were totally cancelled. On the

strength of this registration, the lots and all improvements still existing thereon were

vested as property of an enemy national by the Philippine Alien Property Administration,

a US Government instrumentality.

The issue was complicated by the theft after liberation from the office of the register of

deeds, of the deed of sale, the transfer certificates of title by virtue thereof, and other

papers pertaining to the last registration. only one unsigned copy of the aforesaid

deed, which had been secured from the file of the Hakodate home office in Hokaido,

Japan, was introduced. Hakodate's signed copy is said to have been lost or destroyed

in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945 along with the company's office in that city. And the

copy or the copies which had been kept by the notary public before whom the

document was acknowledged had also been burned with his other papers during the

fight for liberation of Manila. As a result, defendant's proofs on the controverted

execution of the lost deed are only the entries thereof in the registrar's office, collateral

documents, and parol testimony, some direct, some circumstantial, but none precise or

unequivocal in term. The principal witness for the defendant on the dispute sale were

Satoru Watanabe, Napoleon Garcia and Jose Ma. Recto.

Watanabe testifies that he was in the Philippines in the early part of the war as acting

manager of the Manila Branch of the Hakodate Dock. Co., Ltd. He recalls the

transaction between the Hackodate Dock Co., Ltd., on the one hand and Messrs.

Pedro C. Hernaez and Rafael R. Alunan on the other.

Napoleon Garcia, an assistant in the office of Attorney Jose Ma. Recto, declares that

he was a notary public and recall that, as such, he ratified a document in which Alunan

and Hernaez and the Hakodate Dock. Ltd., were the parties.

Jose Ma. Recto testifies that during the Japanese occupation he recalls a transaction

between Alunan and hernaez on the one hand and the Hakodate Dock. Ltd., on the

other. He thinks that he drew a deed of sale and that the document was signed in his

office; that he was in the same room.

On the other hand Hernaez was the lone witness on his behalf and for his co-plaintiff.

The gist of Hernaez' testimony is that if any document was presented the register of

deeds' office purporting to have been executed by him and his co-owner, that

document was a forgery.

Issue: WON the signatures of Alunan and Hernaez on the deed of sale are authentic,

thus rendering the sale as binding

Ruling: Yes. It is the contents, which in this case are not in dispute, which may not be

proved by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the

execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and

as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to

be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

The Rules of Court states that, ``There can be no evidence of a writing other than the

writing itself the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, except in the following

cases:x x x x x xWhen the original writing has been lost or destroyed upon proof of its

execution and loss or destruction, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital

of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or

primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the

document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined

from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to

produce the document, when available to establish its execution may affect the

weight of the evidence presented out not the admissibility of such evidence. In spite of

the defects which the trial court noted in Garcia's and Recto's testimony, the same and

Watanabe's leave little or no room for doubt that Alunan and her Hernaez did affix their

signatures to the deed of sale. The evasive answers Hernaez in his cross-examination

cast serious reflection on the truth of the protestations that the stolen document was

forged. Hernaez did not have to be shown the deed to be able to tell that he had not

signed it if that had been the case.

The probabilities of forgery are very remote and the direct evidence for the defendant

has abundantly and convincingly established that the property was sold by its former

owners for valuable consideration. The loss of the pertinent records in the office of the

register of deeds cannot be availed of to bolster the plaintiffs' case or weaken the

defense.

11. MARIA MAHILUM, SALVADOR MAHILUM, ANGEL MAHILUM, EMILIO OGDIMAN,

VICTORIO SALAZAR and TOMAS SALAZAR, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and GORGONIA FLORA DE SOTES, respondents.

Facts:

Pedro Mahilum was the registered owner of a parcel of land, as evidenced by Original

Certificate of Title. Upon his the death, he was succeeded by his six children, namely,

Tomas, Juan, Clemente, Antonia, Juliana and Tomasa who executed a "deed of

definite sale" in favor of Gorgonia Flora, married to Basilio Sotes, whereby in

consideration of P2,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by them, they had

ceded and conveyed unto her.

The vendors had acknowledged the deed of sale before Notary Public Nicolas D.

Destua.

According to Tomasa, neither she nor her brothers and sisters appeared before notary

public Nicolas Destua or thumbmarked and/or signed the deed of sale Further more,

According to the plaintiff, Gorgonia Flora Vda. de Sotes, fraudulently taking advantage

of the illiteracy or incapacity of the plaintiff and their brothers and sisters, Tomas,

Clemente and Antonia who were then living, induced them to sign a certain writing,

which writing the defendant, in conspiracy with Notary Public, Nicolas D. Destua ...,

falsely and fraudulently represented to be an acknowledgment of debt of plaintiffs

father, Pedro Mahilum, but which is in fact a Definite Contract of Sale disposing of Lot

No. 2195 as aforesaid.

Issue: Is the Deed of Sale admissible in evidence and be given weight?

Held:

Yes. the lone testimony of Tomasa could not overcome the probative value of a public

instrument. The rule is well settled that clear and positive evidence is necessary to

destroy the credence of a public instrument, especially so where, like in the instant

case, the notary public who ratified the deed of sale took the witness stand and

categorically declared that the thumbarks of the vendors are genuine.

The fact that the deed of sale has not been registered since then does not destroy its

efficacy insofar as they and their own privies are concerned. They delivered possession

to said respondent and no superior rights of third persons have intervened.

12. People v Cruz

Facts:

A case of parricide and frustrated murder was filed against Remegio Cruz for killing his

wife and hacking her sister with bolo.

Cruz was married to Natividad Concepcion in 1953. During their marriage there had

been many times that Natividad left their conjugal abode alleging that the appellant

beat her up. However, the appellant always convince his wife to come back and the

two always reconcile.

In 1956, the appellant brought her wife and daughter in his parent’s house in

Pampanga. On arriving in the said place, he fetched a physician, however, when he

returned his wife and daughter had left for the latter’s parents’ house in Cabanatuan

City. He was so enraged that he slashed a jar of sugar with a bolo.

On June 9, 1956, the appellant followed his wife and daughter in Cabanatuan city to

convince her to go back to Manila with him. During his stay, from June 9-11, the

appellant helped in the household chores, and said to be polite towards his wife’s

family and attentive to their daughter.

At about midnight of June 11, Anita and Lourdes, Natividad sisters, were awakened by

the sound of the banging on then wall and shattering of the chinaware in the kitchen.

Rushing down, they saw the appellant holding a bolo knife. When Anita was about to

approach the couple, the appellant hacked his wife with it. She ran out of the house

and cried for help, the appellant chased her and hacked her in the head.

Meanwhile, Daniel Cabunta, the sisters’ uncle living nearby was awakened and saw

the appellant hacking Anita. He went down to stop the appellant, but the latter swung

his bolo at him. Daniel was able to parried the blow and wrest away the bolo. The

appellant the run towards the city hall, and when arrested by the police why he is

running, he answered that he is very aggrieved.

Defense plead insanity of the accused during the trial based on him being hospitalized

on March 19, 1948, and discharged on April 17, 1948, as unimproved; the diagnosis was

schizophrenia, paranoid type in Hawaii USA and when deported to the Philippines, he

was committed to the National Mental Hospital at Mandaluyong, Rizal, for chizophrenia

on April 20, 1948, and after about twelve days of confinement was released on May 2,

1948, as mentally improved.

Issue: WON the defense of insanity meritorious in the case at bar?

Held:

It is the policy and accepted standard of jurisprudence that the allegation of insanity or

imbecility must be clearly proved. The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary,

and it is thus improper to conclude that acts were executed unconsciously. In order

that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete

deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act that the accused acted without

the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude

imputability.

Appellant’s actions before the killing merely indicate his tendency to be violent when

he is angry. Breaking glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an

explosive temper, not clear and satisfactory proof of insanity.

13. People vs. Tan

Facts: Respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others are charged with the crime

of falsification of the public documents, in their capacities as public officials and

employees, by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise

were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or

sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or

persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in truth,

no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by

said Pacita Madrigal Gonzales in the public and official documents, had ever been

made.

In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution presented to a witness a

booklet of receipts, which was marked Exh. "D", the duplicates to the customers, so that

the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. The booklet contained the triplicate

copies, and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to Manila office of

the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in

the booklet. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons

were used between the three sheets. However, as the witness was explaining the figures

or words appearing on the triplicates, Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan, then presiding in the trial

court, interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not admissible unless it

is first proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced.

Issue: Whether or not the duplicates and the triplicates are admissible

Ruling: Carbon copies when made at the same time and on the same machine as the

original, are duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary

evidence as the originals.

14. TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of

Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE

REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher

of "Balalong," respondents.

Facts:

Thomasa claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was

appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a

reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.

Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In

support of his claim, he presented an Order granting the petition for adoption filed by

deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of

the estate of the deceased Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the

deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro

questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive

father Alfredo.

Issue:

Is the reconstructed Marriage Contract admissible?

Held:

The primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage

contract.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established

by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and

subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is

the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the

foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such

document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of

the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence

of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently

establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.

15. Citibank v Teodoro

Doctrine: Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of

original documents, the offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss

or unavailability of the original.

Facts:

Teodoro was issued a credit card by Citibank, N.A. Mastercard. When his purchases

reached P191, 693.00 and he was billed by Citibank, he refused to pay claiming that

the amount did not correspond to his actual obligation. During trial, Citibank presented

photocopies of sales invoices bearing Teodoro’s signatures in the amount of P24, 388.

36 as proof of his purchases.

Issue: Considering that all the invoices or charge slips were only photocopies of the

originals, are they admissible as evidence?

Held:

No. Under Rule 130, Sec 5 of the rules of court, before a party is allowed to adduce

secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the

following:

1. The existence or due execution of the original

2. The loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non- production in

court; and

3. On the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of

the original can be attributed.

Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original

documents, the offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or

unavailability of the original.

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the

photocopies and the testimonies of the witnesses. Citibank, however, failed to prove

that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable

diligence and good faith in searching for them. While a witness testified that he had

requested the originals from Equitable, he failed to show that he had subsequently

followed up the request. It was established that triplicates were produced, although the

cardholder signed the sales invoice only once. When more than one original copy

exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced

in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one of them.

16. Rodelas vs. Aranza

Facts: appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate

of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in

her favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees, contending that alleged

hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it

would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509. the court set aside its

order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of

Ricardo B. Bonilla.

Issue: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by

means of a photostatic copy

Ruling: Yes, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed

because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. A

photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because

comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam

vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or

destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who

have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall

produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of

authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved

by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by

other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the

deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court"

17. EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO, RUFINO L.

SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN, petitioners,

vs.BF CORPORATION, respondent.

Facts: ESHRI contracted with BF Corporation. However, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14

to 19, they did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment

Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF

claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which

gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.

Despite several attempts to collect ESHRI did not pay. In their suit for a sum of money

and damages, BF used the photocopy of Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs as

evidence.

Issue: is the photocopy of Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs admissible?

Held:

Respondent BF, have complied with the laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the

action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the

documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of the

documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over

to BF despite requests.

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party

against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The

offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by

giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the

form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the

presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party

in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has

the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to

produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

18. Gabatan v People

Facts:

An action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession over a 1.1062

hectare parcel of land was filed by Lourdes Pacana against the heirs of Teofilo

Gabatan. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. Pacana

alleged that she is the sole heir of Juan being the only daughter of her deceased

mother Hermogena Gabatan, who, according to her is the only child of Juan Gabatan

and his wife. Respondent, further alleges that upon Juan’s death the land was merely

entrusted to Teofilo, Juan’s brother, and his wife for administration, and before

Hermogena’s death she demanded the return of such land but to no avail. Upon the

death of Teofilo and his wife, their heirs took possession of the property despite the

demands for them to vacate the same.

On trial, RTC and CA relied to the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by

Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan,

wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.

Also presented as evidence are the two conflicting birth certificate Pacana, one

typewritten presented by Pacana, wherein her mother name is “Hermogena

Clarito Gabatan”, the other handwritten, presented by the heirs where Pacana’s

mother name is "Hermogena Calarito”.

Issue: 1. Which of the birth certificate admissible as evidence?

2. Is the photocopy of the deed of absolute sale admissible?

Held:

1. Both are admissible. SC states that it doesn’t mean that if a document is typewritten,

it is more genuine than the handwritten one. Handwritten document doesn’t mean it

has a dubious credibility. However, both birth certificates only proved the filiation of

Pacana to Hermogena and not to Juan Gabatan. Respondent’s mother’s

(Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of

Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.

Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment

categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

2. No. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a

document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.

Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where

the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is

lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary

evidence must still be established. A party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the

best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first

present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of

the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac

Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that

she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or

whether it was recorded in any public office.

19. Cruz vs. CA

Facts: Salonga filed complaint for collection and damages against Cruz alleging that

Cruz borrowed from him P35,000 evidenced by a receipt. Cruz claimed that only

P20,000 was paid, leaving balance of P15,000. He said that he and Salonga agreed

that Salonga would grant him exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain

fishponds leased by him in exchange for certain loan accommodations. Salonga

delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250 evidenced by 4 receipts and P4,000

receipt of which was lost. Cruz failed to comply by refusing to deliver the alleged

harvest of fishpond and his indebtedness. Cruz denied contracting any loan; he alleged

that he was a lessee of fishponds owned by Yabut and that he agreed w/ Salonga that

Salonga would purchase fish from the fishpond. Salonga would also sublease the same

fishpond.

Cruz admitted having received P35,000 but said these were received not as loans, but

as consideration for the pakyaw agreement and payment for the sublease.

Salonga claimed that aside from the P35,000, etc., he also delivered P28,000 which is

the consideration for the pakyaw agreement, evidenced by receipt; 2.) Cruz testified

that out of the P35,000 he received, P28,000 covered full payment of the pakyaw

agreement while P7,000 is advance payment for sublease.

The trial court ruled in favor of Cruz but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered Cruz

to pay Salonga. CA also found that the amounts were not payments for pakyaw and

sublease, but for loans extended by Salonga to Cruz.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Exhibit D is covered by the parol evidence rule

2. Whether or not Exhibit I is covered by the parol evidence rule

Ruling:

1. No. The reason for the rule is the presumption that when parties have reduced their

agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of

the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing is deemed waived or abandoned.

The rule is not applicable because it is predicated on existence of document

embodying terms of agreement. Exhibit D doesn’t contain an agreement. It is only a

receipt, not the sole memorial of the agreement. At most, it is a casual memorandum.

A receipt will, in general, fall outside the line of the rule. Usually a receipt is merely a

written admission of a transaction, independently existing.

2.No. The exhibit I does not make categorical declaration that the P28,000 was

received by Cruz on the same date. The date then can’t be conclusive. A distinction

should be made between statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms

of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol evidence, not the latter. The

statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner’s receipt of P28,000 is just a statement of fact, not

a part of the agreement. Thus, parol evidence may be introduced to explain Exhibit I.

The Court is satisfied that P35,000 was received by Cruz as payment for pakyaw and

sublease agreements.

20. Inciong Jr. V CA

Facts:

A promissory note was issued by petitioner together with 2 others jointly and severally,

to make them liable to PBC. Thereafter was a default on the payment of the note. PBC

proceeded against Inciong and in the action filed by the bank.

The petitioner alleged that he was only a co-maker to the loan.

Petitioner further alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to

him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he

indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by

trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of

P50,000.00.

Issue: Does Parol evidence rule apply where the document whose terms are supposed

to be modified or altered is a private, not a public document?

Held:

Yes. Sec 9. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does not specify that the written agreement

be a public document.

What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on

long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that

which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have

expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control

and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from

that expressed in the writing signed by them. Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply,

a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a

general rule, bills, notes, and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be

varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

21.VICTORIA LECHUGAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Facts:

Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from Leoncia Lasangue, as

evidenced by a public “Deed of Absolute Sale” which was registered with the Register

of Deeds. Lechugas claimed that the Lozas, by means of fraud, intimidation, strategy

and stealth, unlawfully entered said properties and appropriated the produce thereof

for themselves, refusing to surrender the same despite demands. The Lozas, however,

deny that the properties which Lechugas bought from Lasangue in 1950 was the same

subject land. They claimed that their predecessor, Hugo Loza, had bought a parcel of

land from one Victorina Limor, and another adjoining land from one Emeterio

Lasangue. The remaining portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one

bought by Lechugas. This was corroborated by Lasangue in her testimony, who,

although illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to Lechugas. Such

testimony, however, was contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed

between Lasangue and Lechugas.

Issue: Should parole evidence have been admitted to determine the land bought by

Lechugas?

Held:

Yes. The Parole Evidence Rule does not apply where the controversy is between one of

the parties to the document and third persons. While the deed of sale was executed

between Lasangue and Lechugas, the dispute over what was actually sold was

between Lechugas and the Lozas. Lasangue, therefore, is a stranger to the dispute and

is not bound by the rule.

The Parole Evidence Rule applies only as between parties to the written agreement or

their privies, and not to strangers. It does not apply where either one of the parties

between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement and does not

claim under or through one who is party to it.

Doctrine: The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by

either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the

suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not

base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the

relation established thereby.

22. Remalate vs. Tibe

Facts: In a complaint filed before the trial court, private respondent Cornelia Tibe, as

plaintiff, sought the annulment of certain contracts and other documents which

became the bases for the transfer of six (6) parcels of land from private respondent to

petitioner Paciano Remalante, the defendant below. Private respondent claimed that

petitioner, through fraud, deceit, abuse of confidence and misrepresentation, induced

her to sign three (3) affidavits of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M), purported to be bail

bonds, that transferred three (3) parcels of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 20280,

20273 and 20274 to petitioner. Petitioner thereafter presented the affidavits to the

Provincial Assessor and caused the three (3) parcels of land to be declared under Tax

Declaration Nos. 20323, 20324 and 20325.

Private respondent also claimed that petitioner forged her signature in a deed of

absolute sale (Exhibit 22) whereby her other three parcels of land described under Tax

Declaration Nos. 13959, 17388 and 16999 were transferred to petitioner's name.

Petitioner in his answer denied the allegations of private respondent and claimed that

he is the absolute owner of the six (6) parcels of land described in the complaint. He

further claimed that the first three (3) parcels of land mentioned were bought by him

from Silvino Alminario and that it was private respondent, who, by means of fraud and

misrepresentation caused the transfer of the three (3) parcels of land to her name, and

declared them under Tax Declaration Nos. 20280, 20273 and 20274, purportedly so that

she can use the land as collateral to secure a loan from a bank in Leyte. Petitioner also

claimed that he bought the three (3) parcels of land described under Tax Declaration

Nos. 13959,17388 and 16999 from private respondent, as evidenced by a deed of

absolute sale (Exhibit 22) executed by her in his favor.

The trial court awarded three (3) parcels to petitioner and the other three (3) to private

respondent, but the Court of Appeals, on appeal, awarded all six (6) to private

respondent. Hence the instant petition by Remalate.

Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may be invoked by the petitioner to prove that he

is the absolute owner of the disputed land.

Ruling: No. Petitioner cannot invoke the parol evidence rule to argue that the affidavits

of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M) constitute conclusive evidence that petitioner is the

absolute owner of the three parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 20323,

20324 and 20325 and that the fact that Silvino Alminario testified that he did not sell said

parcels of land to petitioner will not vary the terms of said affidavits. As stated in Rule

130 of the Revised Rules of Court: “Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When

the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as

containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their

successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the

contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, of its failure to express the true intent

and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the

pleadings; (b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"

includes wills. “

In the case at bar, the parol evidence rule finds no application because, precisely, the

validity of the affidavits of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M) is the very fact in dispute, the

action instituted in the trial court being one for the annulment of the documents of

transfer. To adopt petitioner's theory would render nugatory the remedy founded on

the basic rule in the law on contracts that "a contract where consent is given through

mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable" (Art. 1330, Civil

Code).

23. Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. V. CA

Facts:

Philippine Remnants Co., Inc. constituted the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) as its

trustee to manage,administer, and sell its real estate property. On 23 June 1988,

PedroRevilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given formal authority by BPI to sell

the lot for P1,000.00 per sq.m. This arrangement was concurred in by the owners of the

Philippine Remnants. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of Limketkai Sons Milling (LSM)

who agreed to buy the land and BPI was informed of this sale. The parties agreed that

the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 per sq.m. to be paid in cash. Notwithstanding the

final agreement to pay P1,000.00 per sq.m. on a cash basis, Alfonso Lim asked if it was

possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to

ask for payment on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been

allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term payment be

disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash. It was Albano who dictated the terms

under which the installment payment may be approved, and acting thereon, Alfonso

Lim, on the same date, 11 July 1988, wrote BPI through Merlin Albano embodying the

payment initially of 10% and the remaining 90% within a period of 90 days. 2 or 3 days

later, LSM learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI

on 18 July 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 but it was refused. BPI

sold the subject lot to NBS but the sale was declared null and void.

Issue: Where a party invokes Statute of Frauds as a defense but cross-examines the

witnesses of the adverse party on the alleged oral contract, what is the effect of said

cross- examination?

Held: In the instant case, counsel for respondents, cross-examined petitioner’s witnesses

at length on the contract itself, the purchase price, the tender of cash payment, the

authority of the representatives and other details of the litigated contract. Under the

Abrenica rule, even assuming that parol evidence was initially inadmissible, the same

became competent and admissible because of the cross examination, which elicited

evidence proving the existence of a perfected contract.

The cross- examination on the contract is deemed a waiver of the defense of the

Statute of Frauds. The reason for the rule is that as pointed out in Abrenica, if the

answers of those witnesses were stricken out, the cross- examination could have no

object whatsoever and if the questions were put to the witnesses and answered by

them, they could only be taken into account by connecting them with the answers

given by those witnesses on direct examination.

24. Bonilla v Aranza

Facts:

On January 11, 1977, Marcela Rodelas petition for the probate of the holographic will of

Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The appellees

opposed such petition on the ground that what only is presented is a photostatic copy

or Xerox copy of the said holographic will and not the original one. Furthermore, they

contend that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary

evidence unlike ordinary wills.

Issue: May Photostatic holographic will be admissible for probate proceedings?

Held: Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the

allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate

may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required

and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three

identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or

destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the

best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that

there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and

the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may

be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the

testator.

Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be

admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be

determined by the probate court.

25. BPI vs. Fidelity

Facts: The purpose of this action is through the reformation of a written instrument of

guaranty upon the ground of mistake — the alleged mistake consisting of the

substitution of the words "Laguna Coconut Oil Co." for "Bank of the Philippine Islands" —

to obtain for the Bank of the Philippine Islands a judgment for P55,000, with interest,

against the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands.

Laguna Coconut Oil Co. executed a promissory wherein it promised to pay the

Philippine Vegetable Company, Inc., or order, P50,000. Fidelity and Surety Company of

the Philippine Island made a notation on the note as follows: “For value, received, we

hereby obligate ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for

having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated therein.” Philippine

Vegetable Oil Company endorsed the note in blank and delivered it to BPI. After

maturity of the note, demand for its payment was made on the Laguna Coconut Oil

Co., the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, and the Fidelity and Surety Company of

the Philippine Islands, all of whom refused to pay, the first being admittedly insolvent.

The correspondence of the bank with the Fidelity and Surety Company is in the record,

and is emphasized by the plaintiff as indicative of responsibility assumed by the

defendant, but is objected to by the defendant as for minor importance.

BPI filed a case against the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and the Fidelity and Surety

Company. The Fidelity and Surety Company interposed a demurrer to the plaintiff's

complaint twice and was sustained twice. BPI appealed to the SC where the ruling was

reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Back in the trial court, Laguna Coconut Oil Co. made no defense, and judgment by

default was obtained against it. The case as to Fidelity and Surety Company was

submitted to the court upon a stipulation of facts. The trial court rendered judgment

against the Fidelity and Surety Company for the full amount of the note, with interest.

Fidelity and Surety Company appealed alleging that the action involved a reformation

of the contract of guaranty, which was not put in issue by the pleadings. Judgment was

reversed and the action dismissed, without prejudice to the bringing of another action

upon the same cause.

BPI filed a new case wherein it attempted to connect the promissory note with an

existing obligation of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company in the form of another

promissory note. The evidence was also intended to demonstrate that a clear error had

been committed when reference was made to the “Laguna Coconut Oil Co.”, instead

of “Bank of the Philippine Islands” in the notation on the note.

The trial court finally rendered judgment, holding the note could not have been

discounted by the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and this must logically have been done by

BPI. Thus, judgment was rendred in favor of the BPI for P50,000 plus interest, attorney's

fees, and costs. Thus, Fidelity appealed before this court.

Issue: WON reformation of the note, and thereafter, its enforcement, is justified.

Ruling: No. To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the ground of mistake,

the concurrence of three things are necessary, the misake: (1) should be of a fact; (2)

should be proved by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) should be common to

both parties to the instrument.

According to section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is

presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. The Civil Code has articles to the

same effect. However, the Code of Civil Procedure permits evidence of the terms of

the agreement other than the contents of the writing in the following case: Where a

mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and

agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings.

The correspondence between the parties fails to disclose either an express or implied

admission that the defendant had executed the guaranty in question in favor of the

plaintiff bank. There is nothing in these exhibits from which any such admission can be

inferred. An attempt to interpret the correspondence merely leads open further into the

field of speculation. Yet the rule is that an admission or declaration to be competent

must have been expressed in definite, certain, and unequivocal language. Here the

exhibits are couched in language which is neither definite, certain, nor unequivocal for

nowhere do they contain an admission of a guaranty made by the defendant

company for the protection of the BPI.

There may have been a mistake here. It would, however, seem to be straining the

natural course of events to hold the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine

Islands a party to that mistake.

Our local decisions have applied the rule that the amount of evidence necessary to

sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is always

more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. In this case, BPI was not successful

in meeting the required quantum of evidence

26. MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 9, CEBU CITY, MELBA LIMBACO, LINDA C.

LOGARTA and RAMON C. LOGARTA, respondents.

Facts of the case:

National Airport Corporation informed the owners of the various lots surrounding the

Lahug Airport that the government will purchase their lands for the expansion of the

airport. The landowners were convinced to sell their properties, otherwise, the

government will be forced to institute expropriation proceedings in courts. They were

also assured that their properties will be turned to them when these are no longer being

used by the airport. Inez Ouano sold the property and bare in mind the condition in

such sale. Nonetheless, during her lifetime, Inez used to remind her granddaughter

Melba Limbaco, who was living with her, about the assurance by the NAC officials that

the properties will be returned. Inez also made Melba understand that the latter can

recover the land herself should Inez die before the proper time arises. Upon learning

that other landowners were able to recover their properties and that the then Pres.

Aquino had ordered that the airport be transferred to Mactan, the appellees tried to

repurchase the properties originally owned by their grandmother. They were denied

because the deed of sale covering the properties does not contain any condition

relating to the right to repurchase.

As one of the evidence presented, Eufemio Vercide, one of the affected landowners,

testified that he had signed the Deed of sale only after the rider which would indicate

that the land will be returned to him should it not be used by the airport.

Issue: was the rider in the sale of land of Eufemio Vercide applicable to sale of Inez and

shall be admissible in evidence?

Held:

An agreement allowing the right of repurchase, was established after admitting the

parol evidence presented by private respondents.

The fact which private respondents seek to establish by parol evidence consists of the

agreement or representation made by the NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute

the deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase

should the government no longer need the property. Where a parol contemporaneous

agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol

agreement forms part of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that

the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation,

such evidence is admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral

parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract though it

may relate to the same subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or

contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of existing

evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the

parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written

agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the

action is at law or in equity.

27. Borillo v. CA

Facts:

Plaintiff filed an action for recovery of several parcels of land. Defendants, on the other

hand, claimed that the parcels were sold to them by the husband of the plaintiff. As

evidence, defendants presented, among others, a document showing receipts of the

purchase price for P40.00 but it contains no reference as to what property was being

sold. The other document appears to be undated and unsigned deed of sale in lead

pencil and grade paper making reference to some tax declarations over certain

parcels.

Issues:

Can the ambiguities in the documents be cured by parol evidence?

Held:

No. Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define, the

subject matter of a writing, it must first be shown that the writing itself already contains a

description sufficient to serve as a foundation for the admission of such parol evidence;

the evidence should also be consistent with the writing. Otherwise stated, in order to

admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter of a dead or other

writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence;

the writing must at least give some data from which the description thereof is so vague

as to amount to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence, is not permitted to

supply a description, but only to apply it.

In his commentary on the rules of court, former Chief Justice of patent Moran explains

the rule in the event of patent ambiguity:

“the rule is that if the words of a document are so defective as to be unmeaning, no

evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to say. The

reason for the rule, in the language of mr. Justice story, is that “if the language is too

doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission of parol evidence you create

and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do that for the party which

he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very properly denies such authority to

courts of justice….. A case of patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein ‘a parce of

land’ without description is donated. The donation is void. The uncertainty cannot be

explained by parol evidence.