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The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule inBangladeshAuthor(s): Talukder ManiruzzamanSource: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 1992), pp. 203-224Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British ColumbiaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2760169 .

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The Fall of the MilitaryDictator:1991 Elections and the ProspectofCivilian Rule in BangladeshTalukder Maniruzzaman

T HEdetractors fthedemocratic xperimentnBangladeshusually alkof heexistence f large numberofpoliticalparties.They arguethatthe existence fsomany partieswillprevent hecrystalizationfpoliticalopinions ntoreasonable ptions ndthusposea threat odemocratic evel-opment.The results fparliamentarylectionsheld on February27, 1991disprove his hesis.The numberofparties fficiallyontestingheelectionwas 76. The voters ejected lmost llof heseparties, avouring ourmajorparties. This suggeststhatiffree and fairelectionsare held at regularintervals, he naturaltendency fpolitics o exhibit ual characteristicssemphasized byMaurice Duverger,I might ake place, and effectiveartygovernment ouldwellemerge n Bangladesh.However, free nd fair lections ould beheld nBangladeshonly fterthe overthrowftheregimeofLieutenant-GeneralHussain MuhammadErshad Ershad) whoseized power n March 1982 through military oupd'dtatnd who ruledup to November 1990.How could Ershad rule for lmostnine yearswhen severe nstabilitiesmarked hepolitics fBangladesh nthefirst ecade? How was theErshadregimeoverthrown?What were the main themesof the campaign by theleadingparties? id the lection f 1990representny socialchange nBang-ladesh? What were skills xhibited y the eaders ofthe new government?What s theprospect f he ivilian ule nBangladesh? n this aperweshallbe concernedwith ll of thesequestions.STABILITY OF THE MILITARY RULE

The stabilityf heErshadregime anbe interpretedrimarilyntermsofthedevelopmentswithin heBangladesh army.The Bangladesh armyin 1972 to 1975 was riven by acute factionalism.The first leavage was

I Maurice Duverger writes: "None the less the two party systemseems to correspond to thenature of things, that is, to say that political choice usually takes the formofa choice betweentwoalternatives. Maurice Duverger, Political arties.Their rganizationndActivityn theModern tatetrans-lated by Barbara and Robert North) (London: Methuen & Co., 1955), p. 215.

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PacificAffairsbetweenthe "freedomfighters" those whofought war of iberation n1971) and the "repatriates" (who had been in West Pakistan duringtheperiodofthe iberationwar andwho returned oBangladesh n 1973 74).There was anothercleavage between thosewho wanted a "productivearmy" based on the pattern f Red China's armed forces nd thosewhowanted strictlyrofessionalrmy ased on theWestern attern. he armybecamevertically ividedwhenthe unior officerstaged swift ndbloodycoup d'etat againstSheikhMujibur Rahman (SheikhMujib), thefound-ing eaderof ndependent angladesh.These internal leavages n the rmedforces, ombinedwith ystemicweaknessesofBangladesh politics, ausedabout a dozen successful nd unsuccessful oups d'etat in the first ecadeofBangladesh.2By 1982, the developments in the Bangladesh army reached awatershed. Each of theunsuccessful oups duringthe rule ofPresidentGeneral ZiaurRahman (Zia) had been followed yseverereprisals esult-ing nthedeath nd dismissal f uspected issidents. s the"freedom ight-ers" and the eftistoldiers onstitutedmostof hosewhowere nvolved nthecoup attempts, heir trengthnthearmysteadily ecreased.Officersrecruited nthepost-liberation eriodresented hemonopoly fpatriotismclaimedbythe "freedomfighters" nd had alreadymade commoncausewith heir repatriate ounterparts. Ershad,a repatriated fficer, hohadbeen appointedchiefofstaff f theBangladesh army byZiaur Rahman(Zia), killed nMay 31, 1981bya groupofdissident fficers, obilized henowclosely-knitepatriatedfficerorps ndforced resident bdusSattar,elected nNovember 1982,tohand overpowerto him.Like all othermilitary ictators rshad'sfirsttrategy as to nursehisconstituency,.e., tokeepthe armed forces atisfied.The strengthf thearmed forceswas increasedfrom 0,000 in 1975-76to 101,500 n 1988-89.The defence udget ncreased naverageby18percent ver heperiodwhiletotalyearly udget ncreasedby14percent. ndeed,the alary ndperqui-sites f rmy ersonnelwere ncreased o muchthat ealwagesof heofficersand privateswerenearlydouble the real ncome ofcorresponding ivilianpositions, nd a numberofcivilianpostswere taken overbythemilitary.Of 22 large corporations, 4 wereheadedbyserving rretiredmembers fthe rmedforces,nd of48 heads ofmissions broad,one-third eredrawnfrom he defence orces.3

2 For a full ccount of the polarization of Bangladesh politics and frequentforaysby the factionsof the armed forces on the incumbent governments see chapters 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 in Marcus F.Franda, Bangladesh The FirstDecade New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982).3 For the figuresof the growthof police, armed forces and defence expenditure and for meas-ures taken by Ershad to keep the armed forces atisfied ee "Politics: Bangladesh" in TheCambridgeEncyclopediaf ndia, Pakistan,Bangladesh, ri Lanka, Nepal,Bhutan ndtheMaldives1989), pp. 219-22.

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Bangladesh.The Fall oftheMilitary ictatorMILITARY REGIME VERSUS THE CIVIL SOCIETY

While Ershad managed to securethe supportof the armed forceshefailedto establishhishegemony nd dominationover the civil society fBangladesh.As a matter ffact henearlynine year regimeofErshad canbe describedas Ershad's attempts oconquer thecivilsocietywhichulti-mately nded in thedestruction fhis authoritarian egime.Soon after akingoverpower,Ershad's government ame intosharpconflictwith the studentsof Dhaka University. n late 1981, Ershad'sgovernmentnnounced a neweducationpolicywhichrecommended herestriction f higher education to only talented students.4 he studentsinterpretedhenew education olicy s a long-term lan bythegovernmentto createa smallruling lass. The students iolently gitatedfor he with-drawalof heneweducation olicy.This agitation esultednseveralDhakaUniversitytudents eingkilled.Ershadsuspended he mplementationfthe educationpolicy.5 The student pposition o Ershad's rule continuedunabated.Ershad's governmentame into harp ollisionwith nother oliticiallycritical ector f hecivil ociety the awyers fDhaka's SupremeCourt.OnJune 8, 1982Ershad,as martial aw administrator,stablished erma-nentbenchesfor heHigh CourtDivisionof heSupreme Court at Dhaka,Comilla, Rangpur, Jessore,Patuakhali, Barisal, Chittagong nd Sylhet.The purpose,as statedby Ershad,was tobring usticecloserto the homeofevery itizen.The lawyers ouldeasily eethat hemove was an attemptto disperse the lawyers ll over thecountry nd so reduce theirpoliticalinfluence. he lawyers rotested yboycottinghe essions ftheSupremeCourtfor ome time.Laterthe awyers imited heirboycott otheCourtof theChiefJustice .M.M.A. Munim because ofhiscollaborationwiththepresidentnestablishinghepermanent enchesoftheHighCourtout-side Dhaka. The boycott ontinued ntilJusticeMunim retirednthemid-dle of1989and theBarCouncilof heSupremeCourt continued o demandtheresignation f Ershad through eminars, onferences nd meetings.6Ershad's government lso alienated the major federation f tradeunions, ramikarmachariikkayarishadUnitedFront fWorkersnd Em-ployees).The governmentccepted nd then aterwentback on itspromisetoacceptdemands oftheworkers nd employeeswhich ncluded demandfor minimum nationalwage, amendmentsofrepressive aws on trade

4 For the main recommendations of the new education policy ofErshad's governmentsee TheDaily Ittefaq Dhaka), September 20, 1982.I TheDaily Ittefaq, ebruary 15, 1983.6 For details of some of the anti-Ershad activities see TheBangladeshObserverDhaka), June 7,1987; November 16, 1987; December 21, 1987; April 18, 1988; April 12, 1989.

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PacificAffairsunions, stoppageofprivatization fpublic ndustries nd thereopening fclosed industries.7

Ershadcame into conflictwithpoliticalparties oo. AlthoughErshadformed heJatiya National) Party by recruiting eserters romvariousopposition arties, he womajorpolitical arties theAwami League (AL)headed by SheikhHasina, daughter fSheikhMujibur Rahman, and theBangladesh NationalistParty BNP) led by Khaleda Zia, widow of ZiaurRahman - still ccupieda large partofthepolitical tage nBangladesh.Khaleda Zia and SheikhHasina followed wodifferenttrategiesor ringingaboutthe fallofErshad's government.Khaleda Zia wanted ajoint move-ment of all oppositionpoliticalparties includingAL) to forceErshad toresign. Sheikh Hasina wanted the mass movement against the Ershadregimeto be organized byAL under her sole leadership o that he couldseize powerfrom rshad as the eaderof theopposition. n late 1987 andearly1988therewas a popularupsurgefollowinghegovernment's ttemptto inductarmyofficersntothe district ouncil. The oppositionpoliticalalliances an eight-partyllianceof ecularpolitical arties edbySheikhHasina; a seven-party lliance of some of the anti-IndianpoliticalpartiesledbyKhaleda Zia; and a five-partyllianceconsisting ffive ro-Beijingleftists jointly ponsored number f uccessful artalsstrikes) emand-ingtheresignationfErshad and theholding ffree nd fair lections ndera neutral, aretaker overnment.8 hirty-eight eoplewere killedby gov-ernmentforces n Dhaka and Chittagong duringtheHartalperiod.9AsSheikhHasina failed okeepthe eadershipofthemovement n herhandssheabruptlywithdrew rom hemovement, tating hatherpartydidnotwantanymorebloodshed nd wouldcapturepoweronly hroughheballotbox. 101990 MASS UPHEAVALAND FALL OF THE ERSHAD REGIME

Sheikh Hasina's "go it alone" policy could not dislodge Ershad.However, the opposition againstErshad's regime deepened among theintellectuals, articularly mongthestudents.The watershed nthe anti-Ershad movement ame inJune-October 990whentheJatoyatabadihattraDal (Nationalist tudent arty) ffiliated ithBNP wonthe tudents' nionelectionsn Dhaka Universitynd in270 out of350 colleges nup-country7 For the details of the activitiesof SramikKarmachari ikkay arishad ee Holiday Dhaka), May25, 1984; October 12, 1987;July5, 1989; October 19, 1989; October24, 1990; November 15, 1990;Decerrsber3, 1991.I For the use of Hartal as the primary means of political communication by the oppositionpoliticalforces ee, Robert S. Anderson, "Stop Everythingn Bangladesh: Communication, MartialLaw and National Strikes," CanadianJournal f CommunicationDecember 1988), pp. 67-86.9 The figuresare culled from reports in The BangladeshObserverDhaka) and The Daily Ittefaq

(Dhaka).10See The Daily Ittefaq, ebruary 4, 1987.206

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Bangladesh:The Fall of theMilitary ictatortowns. I The Jatiyatabadi hattra al UCD) leaders of Dhaka UniversityCentralStudentsUnion (DUCSU) conveneda meeting felectedcollegestudentsnOctober1, 1990 nDhaka. The assembly f2731 eadersofJCDfrom ll over thecountry esolved to force heresignation f the Ershadgovernmentothat free ndfair lection nder neutral aretaker overn-ment could takeplace.Duringa demonstrationgainstthe governmentnOctober 10,1990several eoplewerekilled y governmentorces, hile nOctober 12 eadersofthe DUCSU werewoundedwhileprotestinghekillings fOctober 10.These events cted as the accelerators f a mass upheaval whichhad beenfomentingince 1987. Alltwenty-twotudents' rganizationsincluding hestudentwing ofAL) spontaneously ormed heAll PartyStudents'Unity(APSU) to ead themeetings nd processions hichhad becomedaily ffairsbynow. The spontaneousunityofthe students orced r "shamed" thepoliticalparties ocooperate nd on November19,1990thethree lliancesissuedajoint statement. he declaration tated hatErshadwouldbe forcedtoappoint underArticle 1 of he onstitution)newvice-presidentccept-able to the hree lliances nd that rshadhimselfmust esign nd hand overpowertothevice-presidentunderArticle 5 oftheconstitution)othat hevice-presidentould act as the cting resident. he actingpresidentwouldthen form neutralgovernment o hold free and fairelections.12Evenbefore he oint declaration fthethree lliances,thepoliticalparties nthedistrictownshad formedll-partyommitteesndwereorganizing roces-sions and strikes. he decisive tageofthemovement eganwithkilling fDr. ShamsulAlamMilon, Assistant ecretary, angladesh Medical Asso-ciation by gunmen of the regimein the Dhaka University ampus onNovember27, 1990. Soon after he killing f Dr. Milon the governmentdeclared a nationalemergency nd imposeda curfewnDhaka.

The peoplewere oenraged hat hey iolated he urfew n masse: our-nalists toppedpublication fnewspaperswhileothers uch as entertainersand writers,rrespective f deologicalaffiliations,oined themovement.The doctors fDhaka Medical College, teachers fDhaka UniversityndBangladeshUniversity fEngineeringndTechnology esigned rom heirjobs. The senior ivil ervants ow oined themovement.The businessmeninDhaka brought ut a processiondenouncingErshad's government.In contrastwiththemass upsurgeof1987,thepressure f thepeoplewas now so great hatSheikh Hasina did not dareto go againstthe move-ment.Besides twas reported y VOA and BBC during hemovement hatJapanandGreat Britainmade itclearto Ershadthat heywould stop ll aidifthe emergencywhichhe had declared was continued. 3II The figures are from a report n Holiday, November 23, 1990.12 For the full text of the oint declaration see Holiday,November 23, 1990.'< See "The Fall ofErshad Regime: The Last Episode," Holiday,December 7, 1990.

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Bangladesh.The Fall of theMilitary ictatorHowever, themostcritical actorwas the attitude fthe officers fthearmed forces. n 1987 Lieutenant-GeneralAtiqurRahman, the chief f

army taff, as an elderly nd sicksoldier oyal to Ershad and atthat imetherewas notmuch opposition mong theofficers. y 1990 theofficers adcome tothinkhat he rmy s an institution asgreaterhan ny ndividualorpoliticalparty ut thenErshad, formany officers, as seen to be debas-ing the nstitution hilehisJatiya artywas viewed as being a liability orthe rmy.The senior enerals ouldwellunderstand hemood of heofficers.According o reliable ources,whenthousandswere n the treets fDhakademanding resignation f Ershad on December 4, 1990,theseniorarmyofficersedby LieutenantGeneralNoor Uddin Khan, who succeededLieu-tenantGeneral AtiqurRahman inAugust 1990, decided n a meeting hatthe rmy ould not support rshad as president ny more. The decisionwascommunicated o Ershad onthat erydayand Ershad announcedhisresig-nation. Even after he announcement of resignation,however, Ershadmanoeuvred to bring bout a freshmartial aw regime. While the opposi-tion eaders werebusy selecting heirnominee for ice-president owhomErshad would hand over power, Ershad called a meeting of his Vice-PresidentMoudud Ahmed, Lieutenant-General Rtd.) AtiqurRahmanand Lieutenant-GeneralNoorUddinKhan at hishouse n Dhaka Canton-ment oconsider heproposalof stablishing newmartial awregime.Thestrategem ailed, s Lieutenant-General oorUddin failed oappearat themeeting.4Ershad thushad no other lternative utto hand overpowertothe chiefustice oftheSupreme Court,JusticeShahabuddin Ahmed (aconsensus-candidateof all opposition political parties)on December 5,1990.15 usticeAhmed was given a mandate by all opposition parties toholdfree nd fair lections ftheJatiyaangsadNational Assembly)withinthreemonths f hisassumingoffice. hus the civilsocietyprevailedoverthe armedsectorof thestate. 6

14See "The Special Report: Lies of Moudud Ahmed," Saptahic KhaborerKagoz (WeeklyNewspaper) (Dhaka), January8, 1991; "What Happened in Last Hour in the Cantonment, SaptahikPrio-ProjanmoWeekly of the New Generation) (Dhaka), December 8, 1991. Two generals headingNational Security ntelligenceand Defence Forces Intelligencewere reportedly gainst the decisionof other generals. They were later transferred o otherposts.

15 General Nuruddin Khan later stated: "The armed forceshave earned the confidence of thepeople by followingthecourse desired by them in recentpolitical and social evolution," Messageto Special Supplement on "Armed Forces Day 1991," The Daily Ittefaq,November 11, 1991.16 The similarity between the mass upheaval of 1969 in former East Pakistan and the massupheaval of 1990 is striking.For a discussion on the mass upheaval of 1969 see Talukder Maniruz-zaman, The BangladeshRevolutionnd Its AftermathDhaka: University Press, 1988), pp. 62-67

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Bangladesh.The Fall of theMilitary ictatorCAMPAIGN THEMES IN THE ELECTION ON FEBRUARY 27, 1991

Justice hahabuddinAhmedheldthe lection fJatiyaangsadnFebru-ary 27, 1991.The electionwas described s "free and fair"by nongovern-ment ocal and foreign bservers.7What werethe ssues, ideas and themes n theelection ampaignsin1991?During thePakistan ra when hemedia wascontrolled ythegovern-ment, he eadersofwhatwasformerlyast Pakistandevelopedmass meet-ings as themain channel of communicationwiththepeople. During theperiod after ndependencethe news media had been farfrom ree nd sonow, notsurprisingly,hehabit ofattending ublicmeetings nd discus-sing he ssuesraisedbecame an integral artof hepolitical ulturenBang-ladesh. Khaleda Zia and SheikhHasina, both ntheirmid-forties, rovedto be indefatigable ampaignersand covered all district nd subdistricttowns.Theyaddressed everalmeetings lmost very aybetweenDecem-ber 15, 1990 to February 25, 1991.A content nalysisofthespeechesofKhaleda Zia and SheikhHasina would helpus tounderstand hemessagesthatBNP andAL had for hevoters.Consequentlywe haveanalaysedfortyspeechesofKhaleda Zia and SheikhHasina each as thesewerereportednTheDaily ttefaqtheBengali newspaperwith argestdaily circulation) ndTheBangladesh bserverthe largest circulationEnglish daily). The mainthemes nthespeechesof Khaleda Zia and SheikhHasina revolved boutdiscussionson the mplementation fZia's nineteen-point rogram,thenegative spectsofAL rulebetween1972 and 1975,thenegative spectsofErshad's rule,safeguarding he ndependenceofBangladesh, thewaivingofcertain griculturaloans,rent xemptions,mprovingheeconomic it-uation,thebuildingof powerful rmy, mprovingaw and order, nsur-ing the rightsofwomen, stopping smuggling nd corruption, nd theimprovement fgovernment n general.Khaleda Zia invoked henameofZiaur Rahmanand thenineteen-pointprogram,Gram arkervillagegovernment), ith ts ims of ncreasing oodproduction,ndertaking mass iteracy rive, opulation ontrol, nd canaldigging osupplywater to farmersn87 percent fher speeches. Follow-ing Ziaur Rahman, Khaleda Zia began everyspeech withBismillah-Ar-Pahman-Ar-Rahiminthename ofAllah, theBeneficent nd theMerciful).In most ofherspeeches Khaleda Zia upheld the slamic provisions ncor-porated n theconstitution uringthe ruleof Ziaur Rahman, namely bythe nsertion fBismillah-Ar-Rahman-Ar-Rahim;ispensingwith ecularismand substitutingnstead absolute trust nd faithnAlmighty llah"; and

1 See Bangladesh arliamentarylections, ebruary 27, 1991, byNational Democratic InstituteforInternationalAffairs,n d.

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PacificAffairsby defining 'socialism" as "'meaningeconomic and social ustice" in thepreamble of the constitution.In 67 percentof her speeches,Khaleda Zia criticized heAL-rule in1972-1975as the "years ofdarkness." Khaleda Zia pointedtothe failureofAL government o prevent amine n 1974, theone-party ystemntro-duced by Sheikh Mujib, the enactment f repressive egislation nd thebuilding f heJatiyaakkiiBahiniNational DefenceForce) whichwas oyalto SheikhMujib.Khaleda Zia accused Ershad of trying o destroy ll democratic nsti-tutions, heelectoral ystem, olitical arties, tudent rganizations, radeunions ndthe udiciary. he alsotookpridefor er teadfast, ncompromis-ing opposition gainst Ershad.Possibly the most crucialtheme n Khaleda's speeches was the safe-guardingof ndependenceof Bangladesh vis-a'-vis ndia. Although ndiahelped Bangladesh nthe iberationwar, some Bangladeshiswereparticu-larlyresentful f ndia's denialoftheright fBangladesh over theGangesWater. Khaleda Zia deprecatedthe ndian withdrawal f Ganges waterduring he ean seasonwhichwas turning hewhole northwesternone ofBangladesh into deserts.With regardto what formofgovernmentwould be most desirable,Khaleda repeated n several speechesthat hisquestion wouldbe decidedbythosewho werenewly lected.The realization fthedreamofbuildingSonar angla Golden Bengal)by SheikhMujib became themain themeof Sheikh Hasina's electionspeeches.She depicted heruleofSheikhMujib (1972-1975) as thegoldenera and vowed topunishthekillers fthe "Father ofthe Nation, SheikhMujibur Rahman, thesekillers avingbeen rehabilitateduccessively ythegovernmentsf Zia and Ershad. Both theHasina Zia and theErshadregimeshad their rigins n themilitarynd they ould ruleas longas thearmedforcesupportedhem.BothZia andErshadhadrigged lections ndused Islam to increase their ppeal to thepeople. SheikhHasina, in con-trast,promiseda living, eculardemocracy.In hercampaign,SheikhHasina repeatedly eclared, The election nFebruary 27 will be a referendum n thefuture orm fgovernmentwhether twill be parliamentary rpresidential. She urgedthevoters ogivehertwo-thirds'majorityntheJatiyaangsad o that he couldamendthepresent onstitution, hichprovidedfor presidential orm fgovern-ment,and introduce parliamentary orm fgovernment.Given the bysmal overtyf heBangladesh eopletherewas notmuchdiscussion n the trategyf conomicdevelopment ythe woparties.Boththepartiespromised mixedeconomy.To gainthesupport fruralvotersboth he eaderspromised hat fvoted ntopower heywouldwaiveagricul-tural loans up to Taka 5,000 and exempt and revenueup to 25 bighas(8.5 acres).210

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Bangladesh.The Fall of theMilitary ictatorWith regardsto otherparties,Jamaat-i-Islami alone presentedanuntainted deological program.The partypromised obuildup an Islam-

ic state trictlyn thebasisof heQurannd Sunnah.ts stancewas anti-Indianand itsattackwas againstAL for he atter's ecularism.18Three other slamic parties the BangladeshZaker"9 arty, slamicOikkayJote United IslamicFront)and theBangladeshKhilafatAndolon(Bangladesh Caliphate Movement) each presented n orthodoxslamicplatform. he significance f theZaker partywas that twas foundedbythePir religious evine)ofAtroshia placeinthedistrict fFaridpur).TheFir had thousandsof disciplesdrawnfrom ll partsof the country.Manyimportant olitical eaders and generals, ncludingErshad, visited he PirofAtroshi orhisblessings.20he platformsfthe slamic OikkayJote ndBangladesh KhilafatAndolon partiesweremarkedby theUlema (scholarsin traditional slam).As far s theformal deologicalposition s concerned, heJatiya arty(National party)headed by deposedPresident rshad, upheld slam as anessential lement fBangladeshnationalism nd amended theconstitutiondeclaring slam as thestate religion.Politicallymauled duringthemassupheaval against the Ershad regime,the candidates of theJatiya partyresorted o the strategy fpersonalappeal to thevoters ftheir onstituen-cies as "sons ofthe soil. TheJatiyaparty andidates also reliedon nurs-ingtheir onstituency hile npower.Withregards o the eftists,ll four roups fformer ro-Moscow eftistsmade an electoral lliancewith heAL andcontestedhe lection singAL'selection symbol a boat) in thirty-sixonstituencies.All the former ro-Peking leftist roups, excepting that headed by a formerprofessor fRajshahi University, orgotheMaoistdictum hat power comes from hebarrelof gun" and fielded andidates ntheelection.The secularists ndleftists,owever,werebadlydefeated y partieswho espousedvarious evelsof slamic orientation.THE VERDICT

The effectivenessf he ampaignwas shownby thefact hat n the lec-tionsheld on February 27, 1991,2155.35 percentof the total voters casttheirballots.This percentage ompareswell with he threepreviouselec-tionsheld npostliberation angladesh theJatiyaangsad lectionsn1973

"I The paragraph is based on the speeches of Abbas Ali Khan, ActingAmeer (Leader) ofJamaatpublished in TheDaily Sangram, hemouth-piece ofJamaat, inJanuary and February, 1991."I Zakermeans meditation on and remembrance of the attributes of Allah.20 See "The Generals' Holy Man," Far Eastern conomicReview, April 17, 1983, pp. 16-1721 Bangladesh Election Commission.

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PacificAffairs(55 percent), residential lections n 1978 53.59 percent) nd thepresiden-tial electionsin 1981 (56.55 per cent).22Table 1 showshow voters re-spondedto the deas and issuespropagated by theparties n the electioncampaignof 1991 nd closely eflectshe womain streams fpolitical rien-tation nBangladesh.The BNP secured 139 seatsagainst88 seatswon bytheAL. However,thepercentage fvotes securedby thetwo major partieswas almostequal(about 31 percent). fthe ballotsforJP and Jamaat are added to thoseofBNP, the Islamic orientationeuphemistically ubbed as "Bangladeshnationalism") was shared by54.13 percent fvoters. fthe votes forpro-Moscow andpro-Peking eftists, hosubscribed osecularism, readdedto thevotes forAL we see that hosecandidateswith securlarist rienta-tion usuallydescribed s "Bengali nationalism") shared34.81 percent fthevotes.

TABLE 1:RESULTS OF ELECTIONS OFJATIYA SANGSAD HELD ON FEBRUARY 2 7, 1991

Number of Percentage ofName of the Candidates Total VotesParty Elected Cast

Bangladesh Nationalist Party BNP) 139 30.81Bangladesh Awami League (AL) 88 30.08JatiyaParty JP) 35 11.92Jamaat-i-Islami (Jamaat) 18 12.13Pro-Moscow Leftists 11 3.50Pro-Chinese Leftists 1 1.23Orthodox Islamic Parties 1 2.28Independent and others 6 8.05Totals: 299* 100

* Theelectionnone onstituencyaspostponedueto he eath f neof he andidates.tshouldbementioned ere hat ome f he andidates ere lectednmore han neconstituency.haledaZia and Ershad achwon nfive onstituencies.woAL leaders,AbdurRazzak andTofael-Ahmed,were achelectedntwo onstituencies.s one member ouldholdonly ne seat nthe atiyaang-sad,by-electionsadto be held nten onstituencies.ogether ith he onstituencyhere candi-datehaddied,by-electionsereheld neleven onstituencies.nthese y-electionsheBNP, JPandAL won5, 4, and2 seats espectively.nmy nalysisf hemembersfJatiyaangsadhave onsideredthewholeHouse of 00members,ncludinghemembersf he y-elections.hirty omenmemberselected ymembersf atiyaSangsad avenotbeen ncluded nmy nalysis.Source:Bangladesh lection ommission.

22 See Talukder Maniruzzaman and U.A.B. Razia AkterBanu, "Civilian Succession and 1981Presidential Election in Bangladesh," in Peter Lyon andJames Manor (eds.), TransferndTransfor-mation.Political nstitutionsn CommonwealthLeicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), p. 129.

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Bangladesh.The Fall of theMilitary ictatorHow does one explain the results fthe elections f1991?As we haveseen, one category otally bsent in SheikhHasina's electionspeeches s

the issue of"safeguarding ndependenceofBangladeshvis-A-visndianexpansionism.By 1975 the Islamic, anti-Indian nationalism n Bangladesh gainedpreponderance over the secularist,ethnic nationalismwhich the ALpropagatedduringEast Pakistan's strugglewithWest Pakistan. By keep-ing silence n the ndo-Bangladesh elationsnherelection peeches, heikhHasina gave the nationalist tandardto Khaleda Zia.23However, the Islamic orientation f thepeople of Bangladeshneedsfurthernalysis.While theBNP andJP wanted slam as one ofthe ngre-dients nBangladeshnationalismnd received totalvoteof41.94percent,Jaamaat,wanting o Islamize the wholesociety trictlyn accordance withthe iteral ranslation ftheQuran and theSunnah, ecured12.13 percentof hevote. This findingorroborateshefindingsf seminalwork ntitledIslam nContemporaryangladesh. Socio-Politicaltudy,y U.A.B. Razia AkterBanu. Banu used sample survey ata for hewhole ofBangladeshtounder-stand therelationship etween slamic beliefs nd thepoliticalculture nBangladesh. Her findingwas thatwhile53.5 percent fruralrespondentswantedto elect"English-educatedbuttosome extent eligious eople" astheir epresentatives,9.3 percent frespondentswantedtovote for rtho-doxreligiouseaders s their epresentatives.n thecase of nurbansampleonly7 percent ftherespondentsndicated referenceor eligious eaders,while 78 percent eported heirwillingness o elect "English educated butto someextent eligious eople" as their epresentatives.24t is thisprefer-ence for"modern educated,butto some extent eligiouspeople" by thevoterswhich xplains hevery oorperformanceforthodoxslamicparties.As to the systemof government,Hasina's appeal for a two-thirdsmajority n theJat'yaSangsadforeffecting onstitutional mendment nfavour fparliamentaryystemwas argely nheededby the lectorate. os-sibly hevoters esponded oKhaleda Zia's appeal that heform fgovern-mentwould be better ettled y their epresentativesn thenew assembly.ELECTION AS INDICATOR OF SOCIAL CHANGE

It isusually said that n electiongenerally eflects heconfiguration fsocialforcesnthecountry.What social forces o themembers f henewlyelected egislatorsnBangladesh represent? able 2 helpsus answerthis.

23 For the resurgence of Islam in Bangladesh see Ahmed Shaffiqul Huque and MohammadYeahia Akter, "The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs,vol. 60, no. 2 (1987), pp. 200-25.24 See U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, IslaminContemporaryangladesh: Socio-Politicaltudy, npub-lished doctoral diss., Universityof London, 1988, p. 316.

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PacificAffairsTABLE 2:

OCCUPATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THEJATIYA SANGSAD ELECTED IN 1991Percentage ofOccupation Number Total

Lawyers 56 19Businessmen and industrialists 160 53Former army officers 17 6Landholders 12 4Doctors 8 3Teaching in school and Madrassa 12 4University nd college teachers 16 5Studentleaders 1 1Journalists 6 2Former governmentofficers 6 2Full-time politicians 6 2Totals: 300 101*

a Of160members 43werebusinessmennd 17were ndustrialists.b Now all businessmennd industrialists.c Under ategoryFull Time Politician" included heikhHasina,KhaledaZia and fourmem-bers elongingoBangladeshommunistartyPro-Moscow) howere aidby he artyor evotingfull ime o politics.* Total percentage xceeds100becauseofrounding.Ifwe ookclosely tTable 2wefind hat hebusiness nd industriallass-es are thedominant ocialclassesamongthemembers ftheJatiyaangsad,constituting3 percent fthe total.As formerrmyofficerslectedto thenational assemblyare now all businessmen, theycan be categorizedasbusinessgroupstoo so that henumberofmembersbelonging obusinessand industrial lassrises,constituting9 percent fthe total.The profes-sional classes - lawyers,doctors, choolteachers, ollegeand universityprofessors,ournalists, tudenteaders nd former overnmentfficers holed themassupsurge fOctober-December1990against heErshadregime- constitute nly36 percentof thenewlyelectedmembers of theJatzjyaSangsad.25The figuresnTable 2,however, ecomemore nterpretativehenwecompareourdata withpreviousworks n Bangladesh egislators. irst et

25 Throughout February, 1991 five Bengali dailies - Dainik Ittefaq, ainik Sangram, ainik Desh,Dainik Bangla and DainikMillat - published sketches of the nominees of different arties for elec-tion toJat'ya angsad. The election overtookthepublication of the sketches n the DailyIttefaq hichdid not publish some of the sketchesof the nominees sent to it by its upcountry correspondents.TheIttefaq ffice llowed me to consult these sketches. I collectedthe bio-data ofthemembers who wonby-elections directlyfrom heir secretariat. thus collectedthebio-data of all three hundred mem-bers ofJatiya angsad. The information n each nominee was first ecorded, collated thencoded formanual tabulation. I am grateful o Mahboob Hossain, a student of an M.A. class in theDepart-ment of Political Science, Dhaka University, for helpingme in the tabulation of the data.

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Bangladesh.TheFall of theMilitary ictatorus lookat Table 3 belowwhich givesa comparisonofoccupationsfor helegislators lected n 1954, 1973 and 1991.26 In Table 3, the percentageoflawyershas continuously eclinedfrom 5 percentn 1954to26 percentn1973and toonly19percent n 1991. On theotherhand, thepercentage fbusinessmen nd industrialistsas increasedfrom percent n 1954 to 24percent n 1973 and 59 percent n 1991.Table 4 allowsus to seehow the egislators f 1991 elections omparein terms f occupation.

TABLE 3:COMPARISONS OF OCCUPATIONS FOR LEGISLATORS ELECTED IN 1954, 1973AND 1991

1954 1973 1991OccupationsPercen- Percen- Percen-No. tage No. tage No. tage

Lawyers 116 55 75 26 56 19Businessmen andIndustrialists 1 1 4 67 24 160 53Formerarmyofficers 59now businessmen/industrialists - 17 6Landholders 56 19 50 18 12 4Retired civil servants - 2 1 6 2Doctors 12 4 15 5 8 3Teachers 16 5 28 10 28 9Religious leaders 21 7Journalists 1 1 4 - 6 2Whole time politicians - 35 12 6 2Miscellaneous 7 2 11 4 1 1Totals: 250 100 283 100 300 101*

* Totalpercentagexceeds100becauseofrounding.

26 The data for egislators of formerEast Pakistan are taken fromTable 1, Talukder Maniruz-zaman, "Crises in Political Development and the Collapse of theAyub Regime in Pakistan," TheJournal fDeveloping reas,vol. 5, no. 2 January 1971), p. 227; data for egislators elected in 1973are takenfromTable 1, "Bangladesh: ConstitutionalExperimentation in the Aftermath f Libera-tion, in Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh olitics. Problemsnd Issues Dhaka: University Press, 1980),p. 99. For the sources of data for 1991 legislatorssee footnote 25 above.

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PacificAffairsTABLE 4:

COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONS OF LEGISLATORS OF FOUR MAJORPOLITICAL PARTIES ELECTED IN 1991

BNP AL JP JamaatDemographicCharacteristics Percen- Percen- Percen- Percen-No. tage No. tage No. tage No. tageLawyers 25 18 21 24 7 20 1 6Businessmen andindustrialists 81 57 44 50 20 57 5 28Formerarmyofficers ow allbusinessmen/industrialists 13 9 1 1 2 6Landholders 3 2 5 6 3 9 1 6Teaching inschool andMadrassa 3 2 2 2 - 7 39University ndcollegeteachers 6 4 7 8 2 5 1 6Journalists - 3 4 1 3 1 6Former govt.officers 4 3 1 1 - 1 6Doctors 4 3 3 4 - 1 6Student leaders 1 1 - -Full-timepoliticians 1 1 1 1 -Totals: 141 100 88 101* 35 100 18 103*

* Totalpercentagexceeds 00 because frounding.Source:Footnotes25.As Table 4 shows, hebusinessmen nd industrialistsincluding ormerarmy fficersow nbusiness nd industry) omprise 6, 51 and 63percentsof egislators espectivelyn theBNP, AL andJP. The businessmen ndindustrialistslso comprise he second argestgroup amongthe egislatorsof theJamaat.The data inTables 2, 3, 4 clearly howthatbusinessmen nd indus-trialistsmergedas the dominantforce n theJat'ya angsad.As shown nTable 5 below,thebusinessmen nd industrialistslso formed 8 percentoftheministers f Khaleda Zia's ministryormed n September 19, 1991after hechangefrom presidentialoparliamentaryorm fgovernment.

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PacificAffairsaided projects nd local consultantsworkingunder various aid-financedprogramsof technical ssistanceand the ike.29

These intermediarieseed the upport f hebureaucratsnthegovern-mentwho are involved nnegotiationwith heaid donors and often harecommissionswith thesebureaucrats. Thus, foreign id also helped theemergingbureaucraticbourgeoisie. This new wealth was not generallyinvested roductivelynBangladesh, nd thenouveauichelass did nothavea highrateofsaving.30 heirhighrate ofconspicuous consumptioned toan import oom so that nmanycasesthe ntermediariesfforeign id alsodominated he mport rade, nd thus njoyeddouble benefits.31heyalsoexported apital,particularlyo theMiddleEast where nvestmentsremorelucrative.Domestically,manyofthem nvestedmoney nluxuryhousingwhichwas rented utto theforeign ommunitythighly rofitableates.32The agents ndonor ountries ho supplied he id-financed oodsand serv-ices to Bangladesh also developeda stake n thecontinuousflow f aid toBangladesh nd did thenecessary obbyingndonorcountries.Not surpris-ingly fficialsndonorcountries rininstitutionsuch as theWorld Bankand/ornternationalMonetaryFund(IMF) develop tendencyocontinueaid tothecountries hey eal with. ndeed,a viciouscircle evelopedwhereBangladesh commission gents,Bangladesh bureaucracy, nd officialsnthe donor countries raid organizationskept heflow fforeign id goingtoBangladesh,suchaid sustaining herentier lass whichforeign id itselfhelped to grow n the first lace.PATRIMONIALISM

This new affluent lass was not the productof foreign id alone,however,for heemergenceof thisclass was also facilitated ythepolicyofpatrimonialismollowedysuccessive overnmentsnBangladesh.Underthis ystem hegovernmenteaders used nationalwealth nd resources oenrichthemselves, reating n affluent lass made subservient o themthrough he massivetransfer fpublicwealth toprivatehands.33 uringSheikhMujib's rule,for xample,SheikhMujib allowedhispartymentotake thehouses and industrieseftbehindbythenon-Bengalisand West

29 Rehman Sobhan, National overeignty,xternal ependencendGovernmentfBangladeshNationalProfessor Atwar Hossain Memorial Lecture, 1991, Dhaka, October 26, 1991), p. 27.30 Domestic savings as a percentage of GDP in Bangladesh had fallen from3.4 percent in1980-81 to 0.8 percent in 1989-90. See Sobhan, National Sovereignty,. 5.31 As Bangladesh became floodedwith imported goods, some industries such as textiles, sugarand dairy farms began to sufferheavy losses.32 See "Bangladesh Aid: The New Ruling Class," South,The Third WorldMagazine (March1982), pp. 46-47.31 For discussions of patrimonialism see Gunther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism,and the Empire-Building in the New States," World olitics,vol. 20, no. 2 (1968), pp. 194-206.

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Bangladesh.TheFall of theMilitary ictatorPakistanowners,34nd so began creating nouveauiche lass.Under Ziaand Ershadthisclass expanded and flourished.

In theory ia and Ershad followed heorthodox trategy fdevelop-ment.Under this strategyhegovernment ffered arious incentives oprospectivendustrialists.heseincentivesncluded uchpracticess lendingcapitalfromDevelopmentFinancing nstitutionsDFIs) whichprovidedland to prospectivendustrialiststprices elowmarket ates nd subsidizedthe mport f ndustrialmachinery urchasedwith nundervaluedforeignexchange.However,the o-called entrepreneurs" id notfollow herulesofthegame. Withmoney nhand the borrowers oughtfancy ars,con-structed uxuryhouses and became involvedwithprofitablemport radeand other asymethods f arningmoney.Mostof hemdefaultedn repay-ing oans and interests.Accordingto thepresentfinanceminister, npaid loans fromDFIsamountedto 11000millionTaka. The Bangladesh ndustrialCreditCor-poration lone had a defaulters' istof761persons,and The AgriculturalBankfailed o recoveroansamounting o3150 millionTaka.35The largestof the defaulting reditors re those of Bangladesh IndustrialBank. Thenumber nd namesofthese reditorswere not published,but according oanotherminister, bout 80 percent fthe"projects" fundedbyDFIs donotexist.36 efaulterson loans could evade legal actionby payingkick-backs to government unctionariesncluding he"highestauthority" nBangladesh.37rshadaltered he relevant ules,enablinghimself,s presi-dent,to sanction ny projectwithoutthavingto be reviewedbythePlan-ningCommission, the financeministrynd theconcernedministries.38This created the opportunityfor Ershad to enrich himselfand hiscohorts.39

'34 Maniruzzaman, TheBangladeshRevolution, p. 158-60.$; See the statement fthefinance minister nJatiya angsad,reported n TheDaily Sangram, uly15, 199136 See the statement of stateministerfor relief, The BangladeshTimes Dhaka), December 19,1991. It is the failure of the "state to enforcediscipline and to ensure that actual and potentialentrepreneursobey the rules of the game" thataccounts for ack of sustained industrial growth nBangladesh despite Bangladesh's receiptof massive foreign id. It is the observance of financialrules

that ed to sustained industrialgrowth n South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan. See Azizur RahmanKhan and Mahboob Hossain, TheStrategyfDevelopmentn BangladeshLondon: The Macmillan Press,1989), p. 90.37 Sobhan, National Sovereignty,. 10. For an early reporton Ershad's graft ee The Observer(London), August 31, 1986.38 Sobhan, NationalSovereignty,. 11.39 Ershad wanted to create a rich rural clienteleby introducing he Upazila system.While a largefundwas allocated forUpazila development,Upazila chairmencould not be as rich as the business-men and industrialistsof major cities and towns, who vied with each other to get the nominationof the major parties - BNP and AL. Only eightUpazila chairmen were elected toJatiya angsad.

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PacificAffairsThe nouveauichelass, wellunderstanding owtheyhad been createdbypolitical ower,now wanted ohave political owerfor hemselves. his

explainswhybusinessmen nd industrialistsorm hemajorityntheJatiyaSangsad s well as in the ministry.LEARNING THROUGH DOING"

While theoccupational backgrounds f themembersof the assemblyelected n 1990do seem to be a disadvantagefor hegrowth fthe ssemblyas an effectivenstitution,o the egislators ave other killswhichmightoffset hisweakness and what are the skillsneededbythemembersofthehouse tomake it an effectiveegislature?Modern education san assetrequiredformembershipnanymoderninstitutionor twidenstheworldview and increases he analytical bilityofthemembers, nablingthem o ook at a problemfrom ifferingointsofview.Education also enables themembers ounderstandndplay bytherules n the egislaturehoning the arts ofnegotiation nd representation.I would also argue that age is anotherfactor n theeffectivenessf amember f heHouse. A young egislatoranbe a firebrand ut themiddle-agedlegislatorouldbe moremature nd thoughtfulnmuchthe amewayas an elderly egislator anbringhis accumulated xperience o bearonthelegislature'sproceedings.Let us look at Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 tounderstand heeduca-tion, ge andexperience f egislatorslected n 1991 s comparedwith hoseof1973.

TABLE 6:COMPARISON OF EDUCATION FOR LEGISLATORS OF 1973AND 1991

Legislators LegislatorsLevel of 1973 1991Education No. Percentage No. PercentagePost-graduate 78 28 : 114 38:73 :84Graduate 128 45 139 46Below graduate 75 27 47 16Total: 281 100 300 100

Source: Table 2.MembersfParliament"nRounaqJahan, angladesholitics.roblemsndssues(Dhaka: UniversityressLimited, 980),p. 147;andsourcesmentionednfootnote 5.

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Bangladesh:The Fall of theMilitary ictatorTABLE 7:

COMPARISON OF AGE FOR LEGISLATORS ELECTED IN 1973AND 19911973 1991Age No. Percentage No. Percentage

56 and above 13 5 62 21 146 - 55 61 2 101 345636 - 45 112 40 113 38:31 -35 63 23 74 20 7 4520 - 30 31 11i 4 1Totals: 280 100 300 100Source: Table2. MembersfParliament"nRounaqJahan, angladesholitics.roblemsnd ssues(Dhaka: UniversityressLimited, 980),p. 146;and sourcesmentionedn footnote5.

TABLE 8:LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE OF MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLIES OF1973AND 1991 IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MEMBERS

Experience 1973 1991No experience 33 68Experience of one Assembly 57 17Experience of two Assemblies 10 7Experience ofthreeAssemblies 4Experience offourAssemblies 4Totals: 100 100

a Constituentssemblyonsistedfmembers lected n 1970 oNationalAssemblyfPakistanandProvincial ssemblyf ormerastPakistan. onstituentssemblyatfor neyear ndenactedtheConstitutionfBangladesh, 972.Source:U.A.B. Razia Akter anu, "The Fall ofSheikhMujib Regime:AnAnalysis," ndianPoliticalcience eview, ol. 15,no. 1 January 981),p. 7; and sourcesmentionedn footnote5.

As Table 6 shows,while 3 percent f he egislatorsf 1973hadgraduateandpostgraduate ducation hefigures arger 84 percent for he egis-lators of 1991. Despite thehuge majorityof educated membersin theassemblyof 1973,themembersof the house could notplayan active roleinthe egislature. he constitutionalrovisionwhichprevented ree otingin the assembly40 nd Sheikh Mujib's insistencethatall mattersto beraised and discussed ntheassemblymusthave priorapprovalof theAL

40 Article 0oftheConstitutionf1972 tates: A person lected s a member fParliamentat an election t which e was nominated s a candidate ya political artyhallvacatehis seat fheresignsrom hepartyr vote sic] nParliament gainst hat arty. Thisarticles still nforce221

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PacificAffairsparliamentary artymade the egislature an assembly fmutes. 41 Thusthe xperience f he ssembly f 1973 ndicates hathigh ducational ualifi-cations of the vastmajority f the membersof theassemblyof 1991 couldnot alone enable the members o develop a living nd vibrant egislature.Table 7 shows he ge of hemembers f he ssemblies f 1973 nd 1991.The vast majority fthe egislators ftheassembly f 1973belonged to theage group45 and below. This generation hat aunched successivemove-ments gainst hecentral overnment fPakistanfoughtnd won the nde-pendence of Bangladesh. They thought hat permanentpolitical powerbelonged to themor, at least, to their upreme eader, Sheikh MujiburRahman. They were thus upercilious egarding heir pponents nd didnot care much fordevelopingpolitical nstitutions.42The majority f themembersof the assemblyof 1991belonged to theage group 46 and above. This generation aw the traumaticeventsinBangladesh since ts nception s an independent tate nd was, possibly,morepragmatic nd careful bout political orms nd choices han he egis-lators n 1973. The facts hat owerwastransferredeacefully romGeneralErshad to a civilian caretakergovernment howed thepragmatism ndmaturity fbothmilitary fficersnd thepolitical eaders.

However, as Table 8 shows,the egislative xperience f hemembersof theassemblyof1991was evenpoorerthanthatoftheassemblyof 1973which tself id not havemany experienced egislators.This lackofexpe-riencedmembers nthe ssembly f 1991reflectedhediscontinuitiesnthepolitical hanges nBangladesh,and every hangeofgovernment roughta newgroupofpoliticians nto the egislature.Ifwe consider he ge, education nd experience f hemembers ftheforty-memberinistryormed yKhaleda Zia onSeptember 9, 1991, fterswitch-over rom hepresidentialoparliamentaryorm fgovernment, efind hat77.5 percent fministers elongedto the46 and above age group.The people n thisgroup, s I haveargued,werepossiblymoremature hanthegroupwho were 45 and below. As far s education s concerned, ikethe egislators f1991,thevastmajority 91 percent) f theministerswerehighly ducated.43 utthe skill fthecabinet s a whole ngovernancewasprobably ow, as only5 (12.5 percent)of40 ministers ad experienceasministersn thegovernment f Ziaur Rahman (1976-1981).PROSPECTS OF CIVILIAN RULE IN BANGLADESHThe analysis bove indicates rather leakprospect or longcivilianrule nBangladesh.A rentier lass devoidofanyotherphilosophy han to

41 See U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "The Fall of Sheikh Mujib Regime - An Analysis," TheIndian Political cienceReview, vol. 15, no. 1 (January 1981), p. 6.42 Ibid., p. 8.4 See fn. 25.

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Bangladesh.TheFall of theMilitary ictatormakemoney n theeasiestwayhas takenover thepowersofthe state.Thevastmajority fthe membersof theassembly lected n 1991electionsdonot have legislative xperience.Thirty-fiveut of40members fKhaledaZia's cabinethave had no previousexperience s ministers.However, weneed notnecessarily edeterministic.ocialforces, owever trong heymaybe, always eave scope forhumanvolition.Politicianshave alreadydevelopeda nationalconsensus n theform fgovernment.While Sheikh Hasina failed ogeta mandate to introduceparliamentary orm fgovernment,hestudents nd professional roupswho took the eading part nthe mass upheaval of 1990 were insistent nhaving a parliamentary ystem f government. he majority fthemem-bersofJatiyaangsad elonging o bothAL and BNP were also infavor fa parliamentary ystem fgovernment. he supporters ftheparliamen-tary orm fgovernmentrgued hat nder he xtant onstitutionhepresi-dentwas an all-powerfulxecutivewithoutnyaccountabilityo thepeople,and that he ouncil fministers asonly o "aid and advise" thepresident.The electedpresident endedtodegenerate ntoan autocrat, nd createda crisis ituation.A supporterof the presidentialformof government,Khaleda Ziadraggedher feet n the ssue,butultimately ecided for parliamentarysystem.The Jatiya angsadvotedunanimouslyforthe introduction f aparliamentaryystemnthenight fAugust -7, 1991 nd Khaleda Zia tookoath ofoffice s primeministernderthe mendedconstitutionnSeptem-ber 19, 1991.With he ssueof heform fgovernmentettled nd withnoother urn-ing ssue nquestion twillbe difficultn thepartofAL to nitiate move-mentagainstKhaleda Zia's governmentoon after heparty'sdisastrousdefeat nthe elections.And bytheend of1990 the armed forceshad beenvirtuallyefeated ythemassupheaval ofNovember ndDecemberofthatyear.Moreover, moralhalohad been created round henewJatiyaangsadas the product of the first reeand fairelections n post-independenceBangladesh. As Khaleda Zia put it,Jatiyaangsad ad been "a symbolofour collectivewisdom. 44 Itwould require a reallyhot-headedgeneraltodrivehis tankthrough hisJatiyaangsadBuilding.The threats o Khaleda Zia's government re a stagnant conomy ndrandomviolence nsociety.Khaleda Zia willhave toprevent recurrenceofpatrimonialismnd establish inancial ectitudenDevelopmentFinanceInstitutions. he will also have to be extraordinarily trong n curbing

44 TheBangladeshObserver,ecember 16, 1991.

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PacificAffairsviolence,particularlyn theeducational institutions.Given the doggedtenacity fpurpose she has shownso far, he might ven succeed.45UniversityfDhaka, February992

45 Violence had been takinga heavy toll of lives in Bangladesh since her bloody birth n 1971.The newspapers daily reporteda number ofkillings.Violence had been partly falloutofthe iber-ation war. Bengali students nd youthsfor hefirst ime had militaryweapons in 1971. After ibera-tionmanyofthemretainedtheseweapons; weapons became a sourceofpowerand in a scarcesocietywere used to rob the rich. By now armed groups seem to have several sources ofarms, and violenceappears to be on the increase. The violence in the universities and colleges is partly political andwhile armed groups take shelterunder thestudentpolitical organizations theseorganizations haveno control over them. The armed students' groups seem to have developed a love of violence andfightach other nthestyle ffightingxhibited n movies and television.Thus, violence nBangladeshis stillmore random thanideological. Much of t could be counteractedeffectively y strong ecuritymeasures.