Violence, peace processes and post-war reconstruction

(First draft) Please do not cite.

Christina J. Steenkamp

Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.

Email: csteenkamp@brookes.ac.uk

Abstract:

This paper addresses an urgent and recently acknowledged issue in the study of peace processes: that high levels of violence – usually framed as ‘crime’ – are largely ubiquitous in societies engaged in peace processes, even after the signing of peace accords. From South Africa to El Salvador, Guatemala to Northern Ireland, rising violent crime has come to characterise the “Peace”. This violence often takes place in the context of ambitious post-conflict reconstruction project. The paper argues that even seemingly apolitical violence after civil war is intimately linked to political violence – both in its causes and in the nature of its perpetrators. In order to conceptualise post-peace accord violence, the paper starts by presenting a framework of violence, based on the identity of the perpetrators of violence and the objectives (social, economic or political) which their use of violence servesThroughout, evidence is taken from peace processes that terminated intrastate violent conflicts after the end of the Cold War.

BISA Annual conference

14-16 December 2009

University of Leicester

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Introduction

Societies emerging from violent conflict that have signed comprehensive peace accords

generally do not expect the “crime waves” that often accompany the later stages of the peace

process. The prevalent expectations are that the peace process and accompanying accord will

deliver institutional restructuring, the transformation of political culture, the reshaping of

social relationships and stimulate economic performance. The likelihood that the transition

will also bring continued - and even increased - physical insecurity, is typically ignored. Yet,

events in places such as Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa show

that despite the promises of peacemaking, physical security does not automatically

accompany the Peace.

This post-conflict insecurity often takes place on a local level within communities – what

Scheper-Hughes (1997) has labelled “everyday” violence. The purpose is frequently

apparently apolitical, and is hence popularly and officially labelled as “criminal” violence.

This violence tends to be framed by the new political elites as politically benign and thus not

threatening to the political deal, but rather as a policing issue (Steenkamp, 2009).

The implementation of the peace accord thus take place within a context of high levels of

physical insecurity. Many of the studies on violence during peace processes have focused

particularly on the continued occurrence of politically-motivated violence, which has been

termed “spoiler violence” (Stedman, 1997; Zahar, 2003; Newman and Richmond, 2006)

Some of the focus in the work on violence and peace processes is on the incidence of

violence after a peace accord – the latter being taken as a significant moment in a peace

process (e.g. Darby, 2001). Recognition is given to the fact that post-peace accord physical

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insecurity is often not at the hand of overtly political actors, but manifest itself in the form of

a “crime wave” (Call, 1999; Call and Stanley, 2001;Du Toit,2001; MacGinty, 2006b; Moser,

2000; Moser and McIllwaine,2001; Shaw, 1995; 2002). Indeed, being mindful of the

potential of rising post-peace accord crime to destabilise the new political order, MacGinty

(2006) has labelled this ‘unintentional’ spoiler violence. However, crime is only one

manifestation of violence in the wake of peace accords. The aim of this paper is to present an

unpacking and conceptualisation of violence after peace accords. This should be a step

towards a basis for more effective policy responses to continued post-war physical insecurity.

This paper asks why post-peace accord societies typically exhibit such high levels of

violence, and what shape this violence commonly takes?

The argument is made that violence after peace accords are due to conditions created by both

the conflict and the peacemaking process. These processes also determine the nature of the

violence and its perpetrators. The paper aims to illustrate the link between politically

motivated violence and other forms of violence in post-war societies. This link manifests

itself in terms of who the perpetrators are (the perpetrators of political violence are often also

the perpetrators of other violence) and the causes of violence.

The aim is to show how even apparently apolitical violence stand in a very close symbiotic

relationship to overtly politically motivated violence – with shared causes and perpetrators.

This paper thus has an explanatory purpose insofar as it aims to establish the causes of

violence after peace accords, and a descriptive purpose insofar as it describes who perpetrates

violence. The point is that, in the end, all forms of violence in post-war societies – whether

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politically motivated or not - are linked to each other in terms of the perpetrators and the

causes of violence.

This recognition of the interconnectedness of political and criminal violence is not entirely

new. Scholars of political violence are becoming increasingly sensitive to the

interconnectedness between political violence and especially organised crime (see Kaldor,

1999; Collier, 2003, Tilly, 1986, Nordström, 2004 and Mueller, 2004). In the aftermath of the

Bosnian-Herzegovina war, the study of wartime mass rape has also established itself as a

legitimate focus in the study of violent political conflict. Increasingly, voices are being heard

in favour of a more holistic approach to the study of political violence by being sensitive to

its co-existence with violence in general (Shaw, 2009) and we see some renewed efforts to

search for a ‘general theory of violence’ (with the 2009 special edition of the International

Journal of Conflict and Violence an example).

Building on these arguments, this paper contributes to the study of peace processes by

investigating not only the conditions that lead to political violence, but also cause violence in

other spheres concurrently at the time of peacemaking. These inter-related networks of

violence, where violence in different spheres spill over into each other remains an under-

explored dimension in the study of political violence and peace processes. In the process, it

hopes to make a contribution to our understanding of violence in general too, by revealing the

shared dynamics and causal factors in all violence – whatever its objectives.

It will unpack the reasons for violence after peace accords, and presents a framework of

violence after peace accords, which focuses on the perpetrators of violence and the objectives

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which their violence serves. Before that happens, a brief conceptualisation and

contextualisation of post-accord violence are required.

The context of violence during peace processes

Different types of violence has famously been identified by Galtung (1969;1990) as direct,

indirect (structural) and cultural violence. Subsequent studies have built upon this distinction

(for example, Bourgois, 2001; Moser and McIllwaine, 2001) and increasingly acknowledge

the prevalence of seemingly apolitical, everyday, “criminal” violence. This paper examines

the occurrence of direct, physical violence (whether overtly political or not) in the aftermath

of a transition and expects to deal largely – but not exclusively - with what is labelled

‘violent crime’.

The term “peace process” is used to refer to sustained endeavours to bring a lasting end to

direct violence and to eradicate structural violence in order to lay the foundation for a

sustainable absence of violence. Just as democratization has experienced a global surge in the

last quarter of the 20th century, peacemaking efforts in internal wars have intensified since the

end of the Cold War. It is important not to conceptualise peace processes solely in

institutionalist terms (with the emphasis on elections; institution-building; political parties,

civil liberties and rights etc.), but also to recognize that change also takes place in the social,

economic and cultural spheres (a case convincingly made by Caldeira and Holston, 1999) –

and that all these spheres need to be investigated in order to fully understand the rise in

violent crime and its consequences.

Peace processes are often judged as relatively successful, because change on a macro level

becomes stabilised and many of the visible manifestations of the old regime or conflict have

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disappeared. The failure of peace accords to bring about real and sustained change on

grassroots level is often ignored. The old social relationships of power and dependency

survive the transition with relative ease; local communities see little in terms of economic

dividends and their political and economic marginalisation remains high or increases. In this

context, high levels of insecurity are at once symptomatic of the failings of the transition, and

also present a stumbling block to successful implementation of the peace accord. In order to

truly understand what causes peace transitions fail or succeed, there is a need to also look at

the causes, manifestations and consequences of violence at this time.

Typically, comprehensive peace processes aim at establishing new (or, at least, dramatically

altered) institutions to promote fairness and equality on the political, economic and social

levels. In addition, they aim to restructure the political, economic and social relationships

between groups and individuals in such a way that these relationships support the aims of the

accord. They typically engage in activities such as reconciliation and truth recovery, security

sector reform, the building of new political institutions and attempt to stimulate social capital.

Social and economic development is typically high on the consolidation agenda. Many

transitions are elite-driven, culminating in pacts between the new and old elites – who are

also typically the first layer of society to reap the benefits. This can create a situation where

the discrepancy between the elites’ positive experience of the transition and the lack of

dividends felt on a local, grassroots level, become alarmingly clear. The rewards of

transformation are often slow to filter down and reach local communities, thus holding the

potential to lead to mass-level frustration and discontent and possibly growing alienation

from the leadership that steered the process of change.

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Violence after peace accords takes place in this context. The peace process remains

vulnerable as the accord is implemented. Continuing physical insecurity on grassroots level

typically contradict popular expectations of the peace accord and of life after war.

Causes of post-accord violence

Political violence that characterises civil war, creates conditions for other types of violence

by giving rise to the executor of violence, as well as engendering structural change in society

which underpin violence.

New or continuing forms of violence are explicitly rooted in conditions created by the violent

political conflict, such as the presence of ex-combatants, a culture of institutional violence by

the security forces, the proliferation of weapons, severe poverty and economic inequality

(Moser and McIlwaine, 2001 and Preti, 2002:110). Many intrastate violent conflicts foster a

close-knit relationship between criminal and political actors as political protagonists on all

sides engage in criminal activity to raise funds – a point effectively illustrated by Paul

Collier’s “greed” hypothesis.

The continued existence after the war of violent groups who were protagonists during the war

also emerges as a major explanatory factors in post-accord violence. After the war, these

groups often retain their power positions in their communities which they had acquired as a

result of their use of political violence (Steenkamp, 2009) and tend to specialise in

diversifying their use of violence once the war is over. For example, in post-civil war

Guatemala, ex-paramilitary leaders are often the ringleaders in mob lynchings of suspected

criminals (Schieber, 2009).

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Godoy (2002) also illustrates how the army and the civil war in Guatemala succeeded in

replacing pre-war non-violent existing community bonds and networks (social capital) with

violence by recruiting communities to use violence in defence of the state, or by wiping out

communities. This has taught civilians how to use violence and establishes a culture of

violence which often outlives the conflict (Steenkamp, 2005). Communities emerging from

prolonged periods of violent conflict tend to lack effective traditions of peaceful conflict

resolution. Old, former, non-violent ways of conflict resolution have been destroyed, become

irrelevant and ineffective. When under pressure, communities use the methods which the war

has bequeathed them. Again, in Guatemala, the method of lynching through burning which

the army and guerillas widely used against ‘criminals’ in front of large crowds during the

war, are today being used by crowds in the fight against crime (.

The war, characterised by the prevalence of polticial violence, thus creates structural

conditions and give rise to agents which become central in the occurrence of non-political

violence in the later stages of the peace process. In addition, the peacemaking process which

characterise negotiated endings to civil wars, also introduces its own dynamics which

stimulate further violence.

There is a close relationship between political change and rising crime. In South Africa, Shaw

(1995, 2002) argues that, while the rising crime figures are intimately linked to conditions

created or perpetuated under Apartheid (such as socio-economic inequality), it is also

strongly connected to the social, political and economic changes that accompanied the

transition. As change proceeds, society and the formal and informal instruments of social

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control are also reshaped and this opens up new areas for criminal activity – this echoes the

Durkheimian concept of ‘anomie’.

Increasingly, democratisation accompanies peacemaking, often at the instigation of external

third party ‘sponsors’ of the peace process. In reality, thus, many peace processes are

simultaneously an exercise in peacemaking and in democratization, as experiences in South

Africa, El Salvador, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Guatemala have shown. This pattern of

peacemaking combined with democratisation has been labelled the Liberal Democratic

Peace, and is often criticised for being culturally insensitive, promoting a one-size-fits-all

notion of peace and introducing democratic reforms such as elections prematurely, even

before physical security has been achieved (MacGinty, 2006; Richmond and MacGinty,

2009). This leads to a situation where many of these new democracies end up being poor

quality, political democracies which exhibit the basic characteristics of a liberal democracy in

terms of its institutional design, but fail to transform into ‘deep’ civil democracies. The way

in which processes of democratisation – in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, for

example – have lead to a ‘crime boom’ has been analysed (Pelser and De Kock, 2000; Moran,

2001; Lotspeich, 2003; Karstedt, 2003). It is argued that the transition from authoritarianism

to democratisation relaxes the state’s social and political control over society as civil liberties

constrain the state’s coercive power and border control relaxes. Call (2003) acknowledges the

importance of particular social factors in fostering crime in post-accord El Salvador, but

argues that the dual process of peace making and democratisation and its associated freedoms

create conditions conducive to organised crime and criminal violence. The weak states which

often result from democratisation lack legitimacy and are characterised by a breakdown in

political institutions and law and order. The lack of effective political institutions prompts

citizens towards other methods to resolve their conflicts. Inadequate law enforcement leads to

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less detection, apprehension and conviction of criminals. Security forces are subjected to

lower salaries and a lack of resources and police brutality remains common. Economic

liberalisation – which in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states accompanied democratisation –

leads to an increase in income inequality, thus propelling people towards crime. The

deregulation of economic activity and the stimulation of private enterprise take place in a

context where ethical guidelines and a culture of ethical private business are absent. Unmet

expectations from sections of society (particularly youths) about the dividends of

democratisation cause disillusionment which propels them towards crime. In addition, on a

social psychological level, the constraining social norms which had previously inhibited

criminal behaviour, change and lose legitimacy and power. Since democratisation and

peacemaking tend to go hand-in-hand, these same processes are likely to be present in war-

peace transitions, thus aiding our understanding of violent crime in post-war societies.

Inadequate or ineffective police and security sector reform after the violent conflict may

result in an illegitimate security sector, aimed at protecting the new regime, rather than

civilians (Call and Stanley, 2001 and 2002). Ineffective and incomplete disarmament,

demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants leave a combination of available small

arms and disgruntled, unemployed ex-combatants on the streets of a post-accord society - a

recipe for violence (Gamba, 2003: 126). Unmet expectations about economic dividends

amongst the population could legitimise engagement in the shadow economy in pursuit of

material gain. The perceived failure of the political institutions to respond effectively to

violence tarnishes state legitimacy and could indirectly prompt citizens to respond themselves

in the form of vigilantism.

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Increases in organised crime are often a major feature of post-war societies. Pelser and De

Kock (2000) argue that there exists an indirect and direct link between organized and violent

crime. Organised crime can add directly to violent crime when people commit violent crimes

such as carjackings; burglary and armed robbery on a large scale in pursuit of their organized

criminal activities. Indirectly, illegal firearms are circulated in the population by organised

criminal networks and these firearms are often used to settle interpersonal disputes.

Clearly, post-peace accord violence takes place primarily because it is exactly that: after the

peace accord and thus following on the heels of prolonged periods of violent conflict. Yet, it

is not only the conditions created by the conflict, but also conditions that result from the

subsequent peace process that allow this violence to persist. This confirms the first part of the

argument – that even in its genesis, non-political violence after peace accords cannot be

separated from the political violence which permeated that particular society over a sustained

period of time and from the peacemaking efforts which are the direct result of this political

violence .

Framework of violence after peace accords

The literature on violence after peace accords tends to take the form of single case studies

(with Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa and Northern Ireland enjoying considerable

attention – see, for example, Moser, 2000; Moser and McIlwaine, 2001; Preti,2002; Call,

2003; Du Toit, 2001; Jarman, 2004; Neumann, 2002) but with a disproportionate emphasis on

macro level conditions and implications (Call, 2003; Call and Stanley; 2001; 2002; Darby,

2001).

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Only a few attempts have been made to comprehensively categorise manifestations of

violence in societies during the implementation period of peace accords. John Darby (2001)

considers the role of violence during peace processes and distinguishes between forms of

violence depending on who the perpetrators are (such as the state, militants (for example,

paramilitaries) or the community). While this is a useful starting point, there are some

limitations. Firstly, it focuses mainly on the use of violence as a means to influence the

negotiation process, while largely ignoring the manifestations of violence after a peace

agreement have been reached and formal negotiations have ended. Secondly, it concentrates

on violence perpetrated with a clear political motive, whether it is to influence the political

negotiations, derail the peace process or exert political control over a neighbourhood.

Violence committed for other reasons (such as social or economic) is only occasionally

mentioned in passing and Darby thus fails to acknowledge two important issues: 1) that any

form of violence committed in the public sphere might have important political consequences

for the peace process and 2) that the distinction between the motives and forms of violence is,

in reality, often blurred.

A more comprehensive typology comes from Moser and Winton (2002) when making sense

of post-conflict violence in Central America. They distinguish between political/institutional;

social and economic violence by considering the physical act used to gain power and the

motivation behind it. They categorise the different manifestations of violence in terms of the

acquisition of different types of power (political/ social/ economic), which motivates

perpetrators. They emphasise the overlap and interrelatedness of different categories of

violence.

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Moser and Winton’s emphasis on the different structural settings within which violence

occurs, is useful and the following categorisation will also distinguish between the

social/economic/political goals which perpetrators pursue with their use of violence.

Framework 1.

The perpetrators and objectives of post-accord violence

PERPETRATORS

Organisation

(Meso level)

State

(Macro

level) Militia Gang Community

Individual

(Micro

level)

So

cial

Eco

nom

ic

OB

JEC

TIV

ES

Po

litic

al

OBJECTIVES OF VIOLENCE

This categorisation stresses the functionality of violence and proceeds from the premise that

violence is never ‘senseless’ (Block, 2000). All acts of violence can thus be placed into

categories in terms of the primary aims they have, although it is possible that one act of

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violence could serve several objectives simultaneously. These broad objectives are classified

as political, social and economic.

���� Political

Political objectives are met when violence is used in pursuit of the gain of conventional

political power and aims to change political relationships on the macro level. This violence is

often directed against the state (or used by the state against its opponents) or against other

contenders for political power. These acts of violence are committed with overtly political

motives, i.e. the perpetrators want to influence the political process, obtain some political

dividend or send out a political message. It can take various forms, for example:

∗ Spoiling the peace

This is what Stedman (1997:10-11) refers to as ‘total’ spoiler violence, where groups commit

violence with the express purpose of derailing the peace process. These actors are

“irreconcilably opposed to any compromise peace; any commitment to peace…is tactical”

(Stedman, 1997:11). These perpetrators include a variety of actors, but it is not surprising that

it is often previously existing military organisations (or splinter groups thereof) that are

dissatisfied with the peace dividends, or were never on board the peace process in the first

place - such as the Real IRA in Northern Ireland or the CDR in Rwanda after the 1993

Arusha accords. It can also be newly formed groups, such as the so-called ‘Boeremag’ in

South Africa, who embarked on a short-lived bombing campaign in 2002 with the aim of ‘

destabilising the government’. Whoever the actors, the goal are the same: to overthrow the

existing negotiated peace framework and return to violence. The acts are overtly political.

∗ Obtaining political dividends but within the framework of the existing peace process.

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This is what Stedman (1997:11) refers to as ‘limited’ or ‘greedy’ spoiler violence or what

Darby (2001:49) calls ‘opportunists’. Here the perpetrators do not want to get rid of the peace

process altogether, but hope to apply pressure on the process to obtain certain benefits or

concessions which are not negotiable to them. The major difference between this and total

spoiler violence is that this type of violence is intended to obtain the objectives of the

perpetrators, but it can be done within the framework of the negotiated process and

agreement. In a way, there is hope: if the opportunities can be created for them to use the

existing constitutional non-violent methods to obtain their political goals, they can be

accommodated within the existing framework and become contributing members to the

peace.

∗ Maintaining law and order

This refers to excessive violence committed by the state in the process of implementing laws

and thus enforcing and protecting a certain political dispensation. For example, when the

police use teargas and rubber bullets to disperse an angry crowd of squatters who have

illegally occupied land in South Africa (Steenkamp, 17 July 2002). This violence aims to

uphold law and order and thus the existing political order and is commonly perpetrated by the

state’s security forces.

���� Economic

Violence in pursuit of economic objectives is in pursuit of material gain. Here violence is

primarily driven by economic interests and is part of a broader effort to make money. Drug

trafficking, theft, car hijackings, and most other organised criminal actions are committed

with this purpose in mind. Violence is often the by-product of crime for material gain. The

reasons individuals might have for joining groups that commit violence for economic gains

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might vary. For example, many youths join gangs because it provides them with social

acceptance and security. However, violence committed by them in an effort to gain

economically, falls under this category. Police corruption and involvement in organised

criminal activities also fall under this category.

���� Social

Violence in pursuit of social objectives could be the product of a desire for social cohesion in

a community, within an organisation or for power in a community, or family. Domestic

violence, with its implications for power structures within the family, thus fall in this

category of violence. This section looks at violence used in the pursuit of social power, for

example inter-gang warfare; vigilantism and pub brawls. Much of this violence in the social

sphere is often labelled ‘criminal’ because it has not been legitimised by the state. Much of

this social violence is often used by young men as an expression of their social

marginalisation. Socially motivated violence could take various forms, for example:

∗ Social cleansing

Violence associated with social cleansing has been reported in several Latin American

states (see Moser and Winton, 2002; Moser, 2000). The aim of this violence is to cleanse

society of unwanted individuals or groups, such as street children and gangs. In Latin

America, as Moser and Winton show, violence to this effect is often thought to be

perpetrated by the state. Attacks by vigilante groups on the houses of gangsters suspected

of involvement in drug trade in Cape Town, with the aim of driving them out of the

community, fall under this category. The perpetrators can be various - it can be mobs, it

can be vigilante groups, they can even be the army or police (as in Guatemala).

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∗ Maintaining social order

Here the motive for violence is to curb anti-social and criminal behaviour, if is often the

result of a lack of confidence or trust in the state’s capacity or will to police effectively.

Punishment beatings – whether perpetrated by militias or vigilantes - have this aim in

mind. It is different from social cleansing in that it does not aim to expunge the elements

from the community, but rather to discipline them and make them future, socially accepted

members of the community. It also serves as a warning to discourage future deviant

behaviour from other members of the community. Sometimes, it goes hand in hand with

traditional ways of performing justice. In these practices where the emphasis is on the

empowerment of the victim, victims are given the opportunity to punish their alleged

perpetrators in full view of the community. An example is a case in Guguletu township,

outside Cape Town, where a woman was given the opportunity to whip her alleged rapists

who were tied to a pole while the community watched on.

∗ Acceptance and status

Initiation rites of passage by new gang members that include rape to show worthiness of

membership of a certain group are included here. Especially in societies where a ‘culture

of violence’ is very strong - often a characteristic of societies coming out of war -

individuals who are capable of violence is revered and admired.

∗ Gratuitous violence

These include violent acts by individuals that take place in the public sphere, such as bar

brawls (see Moser and Winton, 2002). This is also closely associated with the ‘culture of

violence’ where violence as a means to vent frustration is accepted and practiced.

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PERPETRATORS

Many perpetrators of post accord violence act collectively and can be placed somewhere

along a continuum ranging from smaller, tightly organised permanent groups to large mobs

which gather largely spontaneously and whose existence is only temporary, although aimed

at achieving a specific short-term goal. There is often overlap between individuals’

membership to these groups - for example, a member of a paramilitary organisation can also

be a petty criminal involved in activities that are not directly related to his paramilitary

activities.

This categorisation according to type of perpetrator draws distinctions according to the

primary raison d’être of the group and the degree of organisation and hierarchy in its

structure. These perpetrators are found on the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis,

respectively.

State

On the macro level, the state’s security forces continue to commit excessive violence in the

post-accord phase of the peace process. Latin America has seen the continuance of extra-

judicial killings by the state and state forces also partake in social cleansing of gangs and

street children (Moser and Winton, 2002:12). The particular poignancy of violence

perpetrated by the state is that it installs fear of the security forces in the community and

makes efforts to create a trustworthy, effective security force impossible. This, in turn, would

give rise to other forms of violence perpetrated by vigilante groups or organised criminal

groups.

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The state could continually use violence through any of its many agents, such as the police,

army (also military police) or other branches (e.g. special forces). This violence is contrary to

the rule of law, and constitute human rights abuses. Yet, the state’s use of violence should not

be wholly surprising, because the state is often a major perpetrator of violence prior to

peacemaking.

Why would the state continue its use of violence? Firstly, because an institutional culture

inherited from the war-era (when peacetime restrictions on the state’s use of force are often

relaxed, especially in the context of martial law) may persist. Individual staff members might

have lingering personal ambitions and use their networks in the state’s apparatus and their

influence to achieve this. As is the case with rebel groups and militias, during the conflict the

state is often involved in organised crime. After the conflict the agents of the state might

decide to continue their lucrative connections and operations for personal financial gain, or

continue to carry out attacks on its oppponents. Popular support for extra-judicial action by

the Police and Army, often in the face of the weak judicial system, can lend legitimacy to the

state’s continued use of violence. Höglund and Zartman (2006) illustrate the extent to which

the Guatamalan military has continued its use of clandestine force and extra-judicial attacks

to further its interests. In Sri Lanka, after the end of the war in May 2009, Police are still

accused of using unnecessary force – to which the bodies of 32 people who have died in

custody that year bear testimony (Haviland, 2009).

The state thus perpetuate violence with political objectives (for example, the Guatemalan

army’s assassination of political opponents); social objectives are pursued through social

cleansing of ‘undesirable’ elements; and economic objectives are met when members of the

security forces engage in organised crime. The state’s use of economic and social violence

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does not stand in isolation from its experience in politically motivated violence. The civil war

provided impunity and a sense of unaccountability which often lingers, and the war has also

provided a smokescreen for their involvement in organised crime.

Organisation

On the meso-level, the perpetrators of post-accord violence are perpetrated collectively by

what, for the purposes of this analysis, shall be called organisations. The groups can be

loosely organised, or tightly organised, have various degrees of prior planning, and varying

degrees of hierarchy.

Militias

In different contexts, these armed groups go by different names. For example in Colombia,

right wing groups are called paramilitaries, whilst the left wing rebels are referred to as

guerrillas. In Northern Ireland, they are known as paramilitaries, and in South Africa were

referred to as guerrillas.

Militias generally have a high (often military-like) degree of organisation and structure.

These groups are often the same actors that were party to the conflict before the peace

accords and could even have been present at the negotiation table. They typically have

explicit political objectives, insofar as their raison d’être was to influence the distribution and

exercise of political power in their society. However, they do commonly also have other

objectives, such as economic objectives in the form of fundraising – often to support their

political objectives, or social objectives such as keeping social order within their

communities and their organisations (as illustrated by the practice of ‘paramilitary

punishment beatings’ in Northern Ireland. For more on this, see Steenkamp, 2008)

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Typically, militias’ use of violence is a focal point in peace processes and the accompanying

negotiations. Due to their explicit political motives, they are identified as an obvious threat to

political deal-making – when they would be labelled ‘spoilers’. Although disbandment of

militias and their reintegration into ‘normal’ society is usually an integral part of a negotiated

agreement, its implementation can prove to be more difficult. The activities of militias can

vary in the post-accord context, and sometimes their criminal activities (although these are by

no means new to the post accord phase) can overtake their political activities. They can also

retain their social policing role – as the continuation of punishment beatings in Northern

Ireland have shown (Knox and Managhan, 2002). Johnston (1996) distinguishes between

crime control (actions aimed at preventing or dealing with suspected criminals) and social

control (the maintenance of communal, ethnic or sectarian and values). While militias are

often involved in both forms of what can be called ‘social policing’ (Steenkamp, 2008), it is

important, for analytical purposes here, that they have a political motive for existing. If they

exert only social policing and lack a political root, then they are mere vigilantes. As long as

they retain their political motives for existence and still pose a threat to the stability of the

political process through their potential to political violence, they will be classified as

militias, rather than organised criminal groups or vigilantes.

Community groups

Community groups can take on various forms, but the most prominent such groups which

regularly use violence are vigilantes. Vigilante groups have a specific function: to maintain

social order (often related to crime control) in their communities. They tend to be permanent

groups (or as Johnston, 1996, puts it: social movements) with a specific purpose and a

structure. Militias can fulfil this function too (as they do in Northern Ireland, for example),

22

but in many societies that are experiencing high levels of crime after peace accords, vigilante

groups are a purpose-made solution. In El Salvador and South Africa organisations have been

formed with the express purpose of disciplining criminal and anti-social behaviour from other

members of the community, such as the infamous Pagad in South Africa (Dixon, 1999).

Actions by vigilantes are planned and often follow a certain pattern or ritual of violence,

which as Blok (2000) explained, gives meaning to violence. A simple example is when a

suspected criminal is beaten in public, as a warning to other members of the community.

Membership to a vigilante group is different from membership to a mob involved in the

lynching of a suspected criminal, due to the spontaneity associated with the formation of the

latter. For vigilantism to ‘succeed’, it has to be supported and tolerated by the community –

whether actively or passively.

Community groups which perpetrate violence could also be much less organised and more

temporary in existence. Mobs, for example, are particularly feared for their propensity for

rioting. The composition of mobs can be inspired by various factors and, in terms of their

broader political significance, ethnic mobs and inter-ethnic rioting can be the most

consequential. Although mob violence often involves a large degree of spontaneity, leaders

(who often hail from the ranks of paramilitaries or vigilantes) play an important role in the

mobilisation of the community (Horowitz, 2001). Violence perpetrated by mobs is hard to

ignore due to its size and its potential to ‘get out of hand’ because members join randomly

and control is limited. Mob violence can have different motives: it can be political or a form

of social control [for example, when they are involved in lynching in Guatemala (Moser and

Winton, 2002: 12).] Mobs are essentially temporary phenomena and are usually mobilised

around a specific issue. The targets of mobs can be from their own community or from other

ethnic groups, a situation that has dynamics of its own (see Horowitz, 2001). If the targets of

23

community groups are from an opposing ethnic group (for example in the case of inter-ethnic

rioting in Belfast), their use of violence is mainly politically motivated, although it could

have an economic aim to secure more resources. Equally, xenophobic violence in South

Africa could be seen as political in that it wants to send an indirect message to political

stakeholders about grievances in the community (Steenkamp, 2009a), but also social and

economic as it aims to rid communities of what are perceived as economic competitors or

agents of social degradation.

Gangs

As already mentioned, this category excludes militias involved in organised criminal

activities. Of course, there is the possibility of militias mutating into organised criminals,

whilst still retaining their old names, structure and many of the old members. In those cases,

where they have forfeited their political objectives and subjugated their social policing role to

the pursuit of economic gain, they will be grouped under this category. Especially in the early

post accord phase, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent militias have abolished their

political objectives and the distinction between the criminal and political nature of militias

can be extremely unclear. In Columbia, for example, the guerrilla groups have not forfeited

their political objectives, but are more active in the drug business than they are in overtly

pursuing a political agenda, although they still claim to have a political objective (Pécault,

1999:143). Therefore, since they still claim a political cause as their reason for existence and

they can be reasonably perceived to have a political agenda, they will be classified under

‘militias’

Gangs can, to a larger or lesser degree, be involved in organised crime, and usually has some

level of organisation and hierarchy. They often preceed the peace and have a history of co-

24

operation with political actors such as the militias or the state. According to Lee (1991:1)

organised criminal groups have three characteristics: There is continuity in their operations,

corruption is practised and they have the capacity to inflict violence. They thus do not

engage in once-off episodes of criminality, but have an organisational structure and operate

over the long-term. Drug cartels, hijacking syndicates, the “madras” of Latin -America and

gangs in Cape Town fall under this category.

Gangs use violence primarily in pursuit of economic objectives, but they can also serve social

interests when they use violence to maintain social cohesion within the organisation, or

engage in bonding exercises such as gang-rape. Politically, they sometimes collaborate with

political actors – often to do their ‘dirty’ work. In contrast to militias, gangs are primarily

economic actors who are focused on making money.

Various organisations and groups on the meso level also engage in violence with a variety of

motives after the war. Some of these groups share a direct link with the civil war by having

been political protagonists at that time, whilst others may be newly created after the conflict.

However, it could be argued that all community-based perpetrators have strong connections

to political violence, through the conditions which the war has bequeathed society (such as

weak, ineffective states) and which continue to play a role in creating conditions to ensure the

survival and operations of these groups.

Individuals

On the micro level, the perpetrators of post-accord violence can also be individuals who act

not as part of a larger group, but in their individual capacity (although they might be in small,

temporary groups of two or three). Common petty criminals and social violence perpetrated

25

by individuals in the public sphere (such as bar brawls and road rage – often under the

influence of drugs or alcohol) fall in this category. This is what Moser and Winton (2002: 18-

19) label ‘gratuitous’ violence. Violence by individuals are often spur-of-the-moment events

that require little or no planning and do not form part of a broader, collective and sustained

campaign. Due to the lack of planning and a broader campaign, individuals are unlikely to

carry out violence with political objectives – although such incidents do occur. For example,

when ex-Loyalist paramilitary Michael Stone attacked the Northern Irish Legislature at

Stormont in 2006 (BBC News, 2006). The construction of gender and masculinities can be

explored in their relationship to political violence to see how they sustain and reinforce each

other, thus also linking private, family-based violence to public violence.

Many of these individuals have had prior exposure to violence – either as perpetrators, or as

victims (or both) and one can argue that this sustained exposure to violence has desensitised

them to the use of violence (Steenkamp, 2003). The argument in favour of a link (see

McWilliams) between men’s exposure to violence and their propensity to domestic violence,

has long been made.

Conclusion

This paper has illustrated the interconnectedness between political violence and the non-

political forms of violence that often characterise the post-war period. This

interconnectedness exists in the causes of the violence (the war creates conditions that

stimulate violence) and in the perpetrators of violence (insofar as the perpetrators of political

violence are often also the perpetrators of other forms of violence).

26

Violence after peace accords is a common phenomenon worldwide. This paper has illustrated

how this violence is perpetrated by a variety of actors and in pursuit of various objectives.

This continued physical insecurity which populations experience are likely to have an effect

on the post-war environment.

The current UK inquiry into the Iraq war of 2003, heard recently testimony from senior civil

servants that one of the most important failures of the invasion was the failure to establish

security after the fall of Saddam Hussain. This paper illustrated the genesis and extent of that

failure to secure post-war security – which is a common phenomenon globally. Failure to

establish security makes the processes of reconstruction after conflict incredibly difficult – in

terms of political reconstruction (with the establishment of democracy, in particular); as well

as infrastructural, economic, military and social reconstruction.

27

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