THE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICS

Martin Baesler

martin.baesler@cantab.net

Is the zoon politikon (political animal) really the principle of a science of politics? Owing to the fact

that Aristotle is the founder of the principle of science, it would seem logical to explain a principle of

science that he himself originated. I have therefore chosen to focus on a theme which affects everyone

today and that addresses a problem still inadequately expressed, i.e. what the formal principle of

politics is, and what the material principle of politics, as the zoon politikon, actually means?

According to Aristotle, if we are to discover what man is, we must discover what his nature is: “nature

is itself an end; for whatever is the end-product of the coming into existence of any object, that is what

we call its nature – of a man, for instance.” (Pol 1252b31-32). Man is by nature a political animal

(zoon politikon): “anyone who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state, is either too bad,

or too good, either subhuman or superhuman.” (Pol 1253a3-4) Clearly, according to Aristotle, the state

is something natural and exists for the purposes of a good life (Pol 1252b30). The good life is what

politics must bring about. How can this good be facilitated? Is the good something absolute or is it

merely circumstantial? Man by his very nature is both rational and emotive. His emotions are wholly

dependent on the outside world, which influences his being. In this sense, we cannot neglect the fact

that man is subject to circumstances and that his action must therefore be considered in this light: “We

must take as a sign of states (hexis) the pleasure or pain that supervenes on acts.” (EN 1104b4)

However, man as a rational creature can become habituated to act in accordance with his rational

faculty and thereby be considered in terms of a generally valid principle. It is interesting then that

Aristotle defines techne (art) as circumstantial and concerned with the individual, which of course

relates to the form human life takes. He states: “All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. the

contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or

not being and who’s origin is in the maker […] and in a sense chance and art are concerned with the

same.” (EN 1140a10-12, 18) Chance obviously is concerned with the individual and things that are

circumstantial. We can see therefore that political science must in this sense be considered an art.

However, Aristotle explicitly states that politics judgement rests on phronesis (practical wisdom) and:

“practical wisdom cannot be knowledge nor art, not knowledge because that which can be done is

capable of being otherwise, nor art because action and making are different kinds of thing.” (EN

1140b2-4) Let us investigate more specifically why it is not knowledge and therefore science

(episteme). Aristotle states: “knowledge is belief about things that are universal and necessary, and

there are principles of everything that is demonstrated and of all knowledge.” (EN 1140b31) Because

political life cannot be subjected to rational demonstration, i.e. to a logical formula, and because

human life, which concerns the individual, cannot express the human being solely as a universally

binding principle, i.e. one that is the same in all cases and at all times, it must be said that the zoon

politikon as the principle of social life cannot fall under this category.

Now that we have ascertained that it is neither science nor art we must be dealing with a third

category, which Aristotle relates to the term prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis). Interestingly,

Aristotle defines prudence as the principle of ethics, which is the principle by which man can attain

moral virtue, i.e. be a good person. Practical wisdom is the faculty in man, according to Aristotle, that

enables us to live by the golden mean. Yet rather than habituate every emotion to be in accord with a

golden mean, i.e. to be temperate, it would appear that Aristotle considers prudence itself enough to

guarantee ethical action in all cases, as we see here: “For with the presence of the one quality, practical

wisdom, will be given all the excellences (virtues).” (EN 1145a1) It seems then that the politician has

mastered ethical understanding and is in a position to guide the citizens in each and every case.

Politics, therefore, concerns itself with the ethical, that is, the good action of human beings on the

whole. The faculty of practical wisdom is the principle by which man as zoon politikon can be brought

to his fulfillment.

We can see that politics is based explicitly on the faculty of practical wisdom: “Of the wisdom

concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom,

while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name

political wisdom; this has to do with action and deliberation.” (EN 1141b24) Hence, although the

politician must possess practical wisdom he is not per se a scientist. This is stated indubitably at the

introduction to the intellectual virtues where Aristotle differentiates the faculties according to their

objects: “for where objects differ in type the soul answering to each is different in kind, since it is in

virtue of its certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have. Let

one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate

are the same thing, but no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise.” (EN 1139a9-14) Hence,

our question as to whether the principle zoon politikon of politics is absolute or circumstantial has

been answered. It is dependent on material circumstance, but also pertains to a formal principle. It is

only the activation of our faculty of practical wisdom, the formal principle, which is absolutely

necessary for politics, as relating to an ethically applied principle. The only scientific aspect, if one

likes, is the activation of the principle itself, and the content of its application akin to art.

Let us now examine the zoon politikon in its political context, which both demands a governing body,

in accordance with the principle of practical wisdom, as well as the consideration of the political

animal itself, which we all are, in its circumstantial sphere, i.e. society. Aristotle asserts in the Politics:

“Furthermore, the state has the natural priority over the household and over any individual among us

for the whole must be prior to the part […] it is clear then that the state is both natural and prior to the

individual.” (Pol 1253a18-19, 22) Interestingly, the individual is viewed, in the first instance, in his

dependence upon the whole. Hence, prudence as a political and primary means to a good life, must be

seen as prior to the individual’s vocation and desires. The political will must bear on the circumstantial

life of the individuals, in order to achieve ethical life, as well as (and this can be seen as a different

aspect of human life) the fulfillment of the happiness of the individual. Once the human as zoon

politikon finds himself in a prudent society he can then and only then proceed to find his own

individual happiness, indeed fulfillment. It is for this reason that Aristotle argues for the importance

of the principle of political science, as prudence, in order that the individual might then be in a

position to aspire to his or her own vocation. The political is therefore always the exercise of the “art”

of prudence, although its premise lies in a necessary, unchanging content and therefore scientific

principle, i.e. the application of the faculty of prudence.

As soon as we look into the practical sphere, on any level, we are no longer dealing with science.

Indeed, we are not even concerned with an art form, but rather with action. Given the fact that the

circumstances of human life, in a given society, differ according to both material and theoretical

actuality, the political system will differ appropriately, in order to facilitate the overall happiness of the

citizens. The prudent regulator will recognize this situation and apply the appropriate form of

governance. In order for the citizen to be ruled in just agreement with the ruler’s intentions that citizen

must himself understand the ruling principle. Therefore, the citizens must also exercise prudence in

their life, which is not materially relevant to the ruler’s knowledge and exercise, but formally the

same. We can see this stated in Aristotle’s own terms: “this too is a healthy saying, namely that it is

not possible to be a good ruler without first having been ruled. Not that good ruling and good

obedience are the same virtue – only that the good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to

rule and to be ruled.” (Pol 1277b10-12) Hence, we can see that in a democracy, in particular, the ruled

must also exercise prudence, even although we cannot state definitively what, under given

circumstances, the content of prudent governance and life is. With this in mind, Aristotle explains in

Pol 1275b5: “A citizen will necessarily vary according to the constitution in each case. For this reason

our definition of citizen [a prudent one] is best applied in a democracy.”

We are not concerned here with the makings of a good person, but instead with the reasons why the

human being is a zoon politikon by his very nature. It is not necessary that a sound citizen be a sound

man as Aristotle explains at Pol 1276b34, and our question centres around why man is by nature a

political animal and desires to be a member of a prudent society. We must bear in mind here that all

forms of education, practical knowledge and, over and above this, material welfare, are a result of this

fundamental value. For a citizen to now turn away from the state is not to say man is not a zoon

politikon, but instead that he will have reaped the benefits, if they be taken as such, of the ability to

live, for example, on one’s own as a hermit. For we would not be contemplating life or using tools as

they were used 30.000 years ago, but instead as is done today, as a result of the sharing of all forms of

knowledge through human history. The sound citizen has indeed become what he is.

The fulfillment of the human being as an individual lies in the fulfillment of his capacities. These at

bottom are sense and understanding and are promoted by the state. But how are we to view the

dilemma of individuals in a state who, rather than acting prudently, live according to sense appetite,

which Aristotle does not deny to be a part of human nature, as can be seen above (1104b4). These

citizens, if they go against the general code of conduct, i.e. legislative maxims, are punished by the

law. However, this does not include those pleasures that are not contrary to legislation. Our sense

desires, our tendencies, are not to be overcome, but instead not to be brought into conflict with the

law. The law leaves room for individual circumstances, as can be seen where Aristotle addresses

equity as the “real” application of justice, where individual discrepancies are taken into account.

(1137a31-1138a2) Individuals are the focus of politics and the politicians and citizens alike should

apply prudence in their actions. Politics is not a science, it is not an art, but concerned with practice,

which involves prudence and considers individual circumstances. In Aristotle’s state the human being

is by nature both a material principle, as a political animal, and a formal principle thereof, as a prudent

being.

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