HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATIefficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustNATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FORsustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveneAN DEVELOPMENT responsiveness NATIONAL OWNNATIONAL OWNERSHIP effectiveness COORDINATIefficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP sustNATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FORsustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveneHUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATI

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United Nations Development ProgrammeEvaluation OfficeOne United Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017, USATel. (212) 906 5059, Fax (212) 906 6008Internet: http://www.undp.org/evaluation

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTSE V A L U A T I ON OF UNDP CONT R I B UT I ON SOMALIA

Sales #: E.10.III.B.10 ISBN: 978-92-1-126281-0

Evaluation Office, July 2010United Nations Development Programme

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTSE V AL UAT I ON OF UNDP CONTRI BUTI ON SOMALIA

EVALUATION TEAM

Team Leader CarrolFaubert

Team Members AbhijitBhattacharjee DaudiEkuam

Evaluation Office Task Manager AzusaKubota

Research Assistant ChelseyWickmark

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: SOMALIA

Copyright©UNDP2010,allrightsreserved.ManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.

TheanalysisandrecommendationsofthisreportdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,itsExecutiveBoardortheUnitedNationsMemberStates.ThisisanindependentpublicationbyUNDPEvaluationOffice.

Coverphotosprovidedby©UNDPSomalia/NoorKhamis/2010.

Design:GreenCommunicationDesigninc.Production: ConsolidatedGraphics

REPORTS PUBLISHED UNDER THE ADR SERIES

AfghanistanArgentinaBangladeshBarbadosandOECSBeninBhutanBosnia&HerzegovinaBotswanaBulgariaBurkinaFasoCambodiaChileChinaColombiaRepublicoftheCongoEcuador

EgyptEthiopiaGeorgiaGuatemalaGuyanaHondurasIndiaIndonesiaJamaicaJordanLaoPDRMaldivesMontenegroMozambiqueNicaraguaNigeria

PeruPhilippinesRwandaSerbiaSeychellesSudanSyrianArabRepublicTajikistanTurkeyUgandaUkraineUzbekistanVietNamYemenZambia

i i iA C R O N Y M S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S

ABER Area-BasedEarlyRecoveryprojectADR AssessmentofDevelopmentResultsAMISOM AfricanUnionMissioninSomaliaAU AfricanUnionBCPR BureauforCrisisPreventionandRecoveryCACAS CivilAviationCaretakerAuthorityforSomaliaCAP ConsolidatedAppealsProcessCBO Community-basedorganizationCISS CoordinationofInternationalSupporttoSomaliaCPD CountryprogrammedocumentCSO CivilsocietyorganizationDDR Disarmament,demobilizationandreintegrationDEX DirectexecutionDFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(UnitedKingdom)EC EuropeanCommissionEGER EmploymentGenerationforEarlyRecoveryprojectERM EnterpriseRiskManagementETA EmergencyTechnicalAssistanceProjectFAO FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsFPRM FiscalPolicyandReformsManagementUnitFSANU FoodSecurityandNutritionalSurveyGFATM GlobalFundtoFightAids,TuberculosisandMalariaHDEU HumanDevelopmentandEconomicsUnitIASC Inter-AgencyStandingCommitteeICG InternationalContactGrouponSomaliaIFCC IndependentFederalConstitutionalCommissionIGAD Inter-GovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentILO InternationalLabourOrganizationIOM InternationalOrganizationforMigrationJNA JointNeedsAssessmentJPLG JointProgrammeforLocalGovernanceMDGs MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsNEX NationalexecutionNGO Non-governmentalorganizationOCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsODA OfficialdevelopmentassistanceOECD/DAC OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment/

DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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PAC PolicyAdvisoryCommitteesPRSL PovertyReductionandSustainableLivelihoodsQUESTS QualifiedExpatriateSomaliTechnicalSupportProjectRBAS RegionalBureauforArabStatesRC ResidentCoordinatorRDP RecoveryandDevelopmentProgrammeRSL RecoveryandSustainableLivelihoodsprogrammeROAR Results-orientedAnnualReportROLS RuleofLawandSecurityprogrammeSIDA SwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgencySIDP SomaliInstitutionalDevelopmentProjectSPF SomaliPoliceForceSPU SpecialProtectionUnitSSS SomaliSupportSecretariatTFG TransitionalFederalGovernmentTNG TransitionalNationalGovernmentUIC UnionofIslamicCourtsUN-HABITAT UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgrammeUNCDF UnitedNationsCapitalDevelopmentFundUNCT UnitedNationscountryteamUNDAF UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFrameworkUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNEG UnitedNationsEvaluationGroupUNHCR OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNICEF UnitedNationsChildren’sFundUNOPS UnitedNationsOfficeforProjectServicesUNOSOM UnitedNationsOperationinSomaliaUNPOS UnitedNationsPoliticalOfficeinSomaliaUNSOA UnitedNationsSupportOfficeforAMISOMUNTP UnitedNationsTransitionPlanUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentWFP WorldFoodProgrammeWHO WorldHealthOrganization

A C R O N Y M S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S

F O R E W O R D v

This is an independent country-level evaluationcalled the Assessment of Development Results(ADR)inSomalia,conductedbytheEvaluationOffice of the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP). This evaluation examinedtherelevanceandstrategicpositioningofUNDPsupport and its contributions to the country’sdevelopmentresultsfrom2005to2010.ItassessedtheUNDPSomaliainterventionsunderthethreemainprogrammeareasandcross-cuttingthemes,withtheaimofprovidingforward-lookingrecom-mendationsthatareusefulfortheformulationofthenewUNDPcountryprogramme.

The UNDP Somalia programme is unique inmany respects and UNDP is implementingprogrammesunderextremelychallengingcircum-stances. Almost two decades after the collapseof the State, Somalia continues to experienceviolence, political instability, governance andhuman security challenges. Enhanced securitymeasures,asaconsequenceofgraveincidentsthataffected UNDP staff members in 2008, presentchallenges to UNDP operations on the ground.SomeoftheuniquecharacteristicsoftheUNDPprogramme in Somalia, such as the full directimplementation and remote management of itsprojects from the head office in Nairobi, reflectthe very special operating environment. In ana-lysingtheUNDPcontributioninSomalia,itwasimportantfortheADRteamtotakeintoaccountthesespecialcontexts.

The complex political process, continued armedconflictinmanypartsofthecountry,andgeneralinstability influenced decisions made by UNDPand its donors. The evaluation concluded thatUNDP assumed responsibility for certain tasksand services, which have, as a result, reducedthe credibility of the organization as a neutraland impartial development partner. A notableportion of UNDP expenditure has concernedactivitiesthateliminatedopportunitiesforUNDP

to take strong leadership in its core corporateareasofwork.Intherecentpast,however,UNDPSomaliahasstrivedtoaddressthis image-relatedchallengebydiversifyingitsportfolioinfavourofUNDP traditional areas, such as pro-poor andMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsupportactivities.

The evaluation found that theUNDPcontribu-tiontodevelopmentresultshasvariedconsiderablydepending on the region where activities wereimplemented. The regional diversity of Somaliawas not sufficiently reflected in UNDP pro-grammes and, oftentimes, UNDP corporateinstruments were not suitable for program-ming in Somalia. Also, policy and operationalguidance provided by UNDP headquarterswas often insufficient or untimely. Despite thechallengesandshortcomingsinprogrammeman-agement, UNDP Somalia continued to seizeopportunitiesastheyemergedthroughthepeaceprocess and enjoy a privileged relationship withthe authorities and donors. UNDP has initiateda process of change that should transform theinstitutionalculturebyemphasizingmorecohesionandsynergybetweenprogrammes,aresults-basedmanagement as well as the mainstreaming ofa rights-based approach and gender inprogramming. The evaluation strongly endorsedtheseapproaches.

Theevaluationidentifiedanumberof importantlessons and recommendations for UNDP pro-grammesoperatinginacomplexandchallengingenvironment. In a context of remote manage-ment of programmes, UNDP needs to ensuresufficient capacity to analyse and manage risksassociated with reduced access to beneficiariesandto information,hence,addressingchallengesofaccountabilityandefficiency,aswellaspoten-tial consequencesofdecisions andactions taken.UNDP should also focus its activities on theorganization’s core activities promoting humandevelopment. Such transformation is possible

FOREWORD

v i

onlythroughatransparentdialoguewithdonors.Despite the challenging circumstances, UNDPshould stop working in an emergency mode byfocusing on quality and long-term sustainabilityofeffortsandresultsachieved.Moreover,UNDPcorporate programming instruments, guidanceand support need to be more responsive to therealities faced by UNDP Somalia. For example,there should be clearer corporate guidance on‘remote management’ approaches or the statedrole of UNDP as a ‘provider of last resort’,a notion that has considerably influenced thecountry programme in Somalia. The EvaluationOffice sincerely hopes that this evaluation willgenerate meaningful discussions which can leadtoconcreteactionsbothat theheadquartersandcountrylevelsandhelpimproveUNDPeffortsinconflict-affected, complexenvironments, like theoneinSomalia.

Anumberofpeoplemadethisevaluationpossibledespite a very tight timeline and logistical chal-lenges.Firstandforemost,IwouldliketothanktheevaluationteamcomprisedofteamleaderCarrolFaubert, team members Abhijit BhattacharjeeandDaudiEkuamandtheEvaluationOfficetaskmanagerAzusaKubota.Iwouldliketoacknow-ledge the contributions made by the externalreviewerof thedraft report, JohnRogge, formerseniorUNDPandOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsstaffmember,AlanFox,theEvaluationOfficeinternalreviewer,aswellastheresearchassistantChelseyWickmark.Mysinceregratitudeisextendedtostakeholdersandpartnersof UNDP Somalia, including authorities, civil

society, international development community,theUNfamily,andmembersofthecommunities.Specialthanksgotopartnerswhoparticipatedinthe ADR at the stakeholder workshops held inMarch2010 inNairobi andhave sharedwrittencommentsonthedraftevaluationreport.

The evaluation would not have been possiblewithoutthecommitmentandleadershipdemon-strated by UNDP Somalia senior management:ResidentRepresentativeMarkBowden,CountryDirector Alvaro Rodriguez, Deputy CountryDirector (programme) Marie Dimond, DeputyCountry Director (operations) Sergio Valdini.All programme and project staff in Nairobi,Hargeisa and Garowe provided the ADR teamwith invaluable support. In particular, membersof the programme management support unit,LaurelPatterson,UgoOkoh,ClementGorrissenand Dennis Kenyanjui provided useful supportthroughout the ADR process. I would also liketo thank the UNDP Regional Bureau for ArabStates,inparticularSunilSaigalandMohammadYounus, and colleagues in the Bureau for CrisisPreventionandRecoveryforsupportingtheADRprocess.Finally,letmethankourcolleaguesintheEvaluation Office: Caroline Monyi, Thuy HangTo, Flora Jimenez, Anish Pradhan and MarinaBlinovafortheirsupport.

SaraswathiMenonDirector,EvaluationOffice

F O R E W O R D

v i iC O N T E N T S

CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations iii

Foreword v

Executive Summary ix

1. Introduction 1

1.1 ObjectivesandScopeoftheADR 11.2 ADRProcess 11.3 EvaluationMethodology 21.4 ConstraintsandLimitations 31.5 StructureoftheReport 3

2. The National Context and International Aid 5

2.1 NationalContext 52.2 InternationalAidtoSomalia 112.3 RoleoftheUnitedNations 12

3. UNDP Response and Strategies 15

3.1 OperationalContext 153.2 ManagementStructureoftheUNDPProgramme 153.3 DescriptionoftheUNDPProgramme 163.4 MajorCharacteristicsofUNDPProgramme 18

4. Contribution of UNDP to Development Results 21

4.1 GovernanceandReconciliationProgramme 214.2 RuleofLawandSecurityProgramme 264.3 RecoveryandSustainableLivelihoodsProgramme 334.4 Cross-cuttingThemes 404.5 AssessmentofUNDPProgrammeInterventions 424.6 AssessmentoftheStrategicPositioningofUNDP 474.7 SupportfromUNDPHeadquartersandGlobalNetworks 52

5. Conclusions and Recommendations 53

5.1 Conclusions 535.2 Recommendations 55

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Annexes

Annex1: FinalTermsofReferenceoftheADR 59Annex2: EvaluationMatrix 69Annex3: ProjectActivitiesVisited 75Annex4: ListofPersonsConsulted 77Annex5: MainDocumentsConsulted 83Annex6: SomaliaSupportStructuresatUNheadquartersandFieldOffices 85

Boxes

Box1. TheSomaliaConstitution-MakingSupportProject 23Box2. TheSpecialProtectionUnit 29Box3. UNDPandtheUniversityofHargeisaFacultyofLaw 31Box4. AsuccessstoryfromSouthandCentralSomalia 35Box5. Observationsonthetechnicalappropriatenessofsome

watershedmanagementinterventions 36

Tables

Table1.ChronologyofmajorpoliticaleventsinSomalia 6Table2.Selecthumandevelopmentindicators 7Table3.MajordonorstoSomaliabetween2002and2008 12Table4.Evolutionofcore/non-coreexpenditurebythematicarea(2005-2009) 16Table5.TenmajordonorstoUNDPSomalia(2007-2009) 17Table6.Governanceandreconciliationprogrammes(2005-2009) 21Table7.RuleofLawandSecurityprogrammes(2005-2009) 27Table8.RecoveryandSustainableLivelihoodsprogrammes(2005-2009) 33Table9.HIV/AIDSprogrammes(2005-2009) 41

Figure

Figure1.CAPfunding2005-2009 11

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INTRODUCTION

Between December 2009 and July 2010, theEvaluation Office of the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) carried outa country-level programme evaluation called anAssessment of Development Results (ADR) inSomalia. This report presents the findings ofthe ADR based on an analysis of relevance,effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability ofUNDP interventions implemented between2005 and 2010. The ADR also addresses thestrategic positioning of UNDP. The evaluationrelied on documents, interviews with approxi-mately 200 individuals, including beneficiaries,Somali authorities, donors, civil society, rep-resentatives of international organizations andindependentobservers.

CONTEXT

In 1991, after the collapse of the government,parts of the north-western area of the SomaliRepublic declared independence as the Republicof Somaliland. To this date, no country hasformally recognized it as a sovereign state. In1998, the leaders of the north-eastern region ofPuntland declared it an autonomous state butwithoutseekingsecessionfromSomalia.MostofSouth and Central Somalia remained in turmoildespite international military interventions man-datedbytheSecurityCouncilbetween1992and1995.LevelsofhumansecurityvarysignificantlyacrosstheseregionsandtheassessmentofUNDPcontributionsmustreflectthisreality.

A United Nations Political Office for Somalia(UNPOS)wascreatedin1995topromotepeaceand reconciliation. In 2004, a Somalia NationalReconciliation Conference convened in KenyaadoptedaTransitionalFederalCharterandsoonafterwards a Transitional Federal Government(TFG)wasformed.In2006,thetakeoverofmost

oftheregionbytheUnionofIslamicCourtswasfollowed by a military intervention by Ethiopia,in support of the TFG. UNPOS facilitated aconferenceinDjiboutiin2008thatestablishedabroader-basedtransitionalgovernment.TheTFGisnowinstalled inMogadishu,where itcontrolspart of the city with support from AMISOM,a military mission deployed by the AfricanUnion. The transition period is due to end byAugust2011,buttherearegrowingdoubtsaboutthepossibilitytoachieverequiredbenchmarks.

The Recovery and Development Programme(RDP)(2008-2012)isconsideredthemainframe-work for international support to Somalia. TheRDPformedthebasisfortheformulationoftheUnitedNationsTransitionPlan(UNTP)(2008-2010) for the UN country team (UNCT) forSomaliaand,consequently,ofthecurrentUNDPcountryprogramme.

UNDP PROGRAMMES

UNDP support during the evaluation periodwas delivered through the following main pro-grammes: Governance and Reconciliation; Ruleof Law and Security (ROLS); and Recoveryand Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL), as well assmallercross-cuttingprogrammescoveringHIV/AIDS,genderandeconomicandhumandevelop-ment.EightypercentofprogrammeexpendituresduringtheperiodcoveredbytheADRconcernedGovernance and ROLS programmes that havereceived strong donor backing. In comparison,expenditure related toRSLhas representedonlysome16percent,withhalf that amount coveredbyUNDPcoreresources.

Governance and Reconciliation programme: Over the years, UNDP has been called, andrespondedinatimelymanner,toengageinactiv-itiesinsupportofnational reconciliation, peace promotion and political processes such as the

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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organization of the Djibouti Conference (2008)that ledtoaceasefirebetweentheTFGandtheAlliancefortheRe-liberationofSomaliaandtheformationofabroader-basedgovernment.UNDPiscurrentlyinvolvedinthepaymentofsalariesforTFG parliamentarians and other officials. Apartfromimportantsupportforthedraftingofanewfederal constitution and some efforts to developgovernment capacities, mainly in Puntland andSomaliland,thevalueaddedofUNDPsupportinthis area in terms of the organization’s develop-ment mandate has been limited. While some ofthese activities are one-time inputs, others suchas thepaymentofsalarieswouldrequireaviableexit strategy. Such strategies have been difficultto implement owing to the complex politicalprocess,poorsecurityandthegeneralweaknessofthefederalGovernment.

Through the UN joint programme (2008-2012)and its preceding projects, UNDP supportedlocal governance and service deliveryatthedis-trictandcommunitylevels.Thejointprogrammeadopted a much-appreciated participatory pro-cess within communities and also mainstreamedgender.UNDPalsosupportedcapacity develop-ment of key Somali institutions. Support tofederalinstitutions,suchasthe‘start-uppackage’designed to facilitate the TFG installation inMogadishuin2009,hasoftenbeenadministrativemore than traditional capacity development. Incontrast, governance programmes in Somalilandand Puntland cover more traditional areas ofintervention through technical inputs, capacitydevelopment and some infrastructural work andprovisionof equipment, andhaveproduced tan-gible results and progress in, for example, civilservicereform.

ROLS is thesecond largestprogrammeandhasattractedconsiderabledonorsupport.In2008and2009,UNDP shifted theprogramme’s emphasisfrom the strong institutional-support approachsince2002tocommunitylevelinterventionsandamoreassertiverights-basedapproach.

UNDP has supported civilian police throughtraining,capacitydevelopment,provisionofbasic

operational equipment and infrastructure in allthree regions. It isnowa central elementof theprogramme, in terms of resources allocated and,unfortunately, controversy. UNDP support tocivilian police in South and Central Somalia,particularly the payment of stipends since 2007,has affected the perception of UNDP as a neu-tral partner and theorganization’s relationswithhumanitarianactors.InSomalilandandPuntland,UNDP continues to build the capacity of thecivilian police services while supporting SpecialProtection Units for international operations.UNDP support has significantly contributed toimprovedsecurityinthetworegions.Forallthreeregions,UNDPensured the inclusionofhumanrightsinthetrainingcurriculumforpoliceofficersand promoted gender considerations, includingthroughinnovativeinterventionssuchastheestab-lishmentofspecialdesksforwomenandchildreninpolicestations,incooperationwithUNICEF.

ThroughtheprojectsundertheAccess to Justice component, UNDP has supported the draftingof a code of conduct for the judiciary and pro-motedtheharmonizationofformalandcustomarylaws; the training of judges, prosecutors andassessors; the creation of legal clinics providingfree-of-charge legal aid to the vulnerable andthe poor. UNDP support has produced positiveresultsinSomalilandandPuntland,particularlyinimproving theoutreachof the judicial system toruralareas throughthecreationofmobilecourtsand mobile legal aid clinics. The cooperationestablished between the ROLS programme andvariousfacultiesoflawinallthreeregionsisalsoaverypositivedevelopment.ThisisanareawhereUNDP can achieve results and has developed astrongcomparativeadvantage.

In the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR),UNDPsupportedthedownsizingofsecurityforcesmainlyinPuntlandand Somaliland. In South and Central Somalia,thefragilityofthedifferentpoliticaladvancesandthe repeated resumptions of conflict have neg-atedanypossibilityofeffectivelyimplementingaDDR programme. UNDP has gradually movedaway from DDR operations in favour of small

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arms control programmes in Somaliland anda community safety approach under an armedviolence reduction programme. The latter pro-grammehasstartedonlyrecentlybuthasalreadydeveloped a promising participatory approachwithcommunities.

RSLprogrammeshavecontinuedtogrowinthepastthreeyears,indicatingthepriorityUNDPisgivingtoactivitiesdirectlyimpactingonthelivesoftheSomalipeople.Unfortunately,donorshavebeenlessforthcomingintheirsupporttothisthirdthematicarea.

Income generation through work for theimprovementofsocialandeconomicinfrastructurehas been one of the objectives of the employ-ment generation for early recovery (EGER),area-based early recovery (ABER) and water-shed management projects. For example, duringitsfirstyear,theEGERprojectgeneratedatotalof 430,000 workdays; 35 percent of the bene-ficiaries were women and 20 percent internallydisplacedpersons.Infrastructurethatwasrehabili-tatedincludedwatercatchmentareas,ruralaccessroads, irrigation canals and strengthened riverembankments.However,mostoftheincomegen-erated is short term innature, and theemphasishasbeenmoreongeneratingincomethanleavingbehindasustainableproductfromthatwork.Theintegrated watershed management project sup-ports the implementation of a wide variety ofcommunitypriorities,rangingfrominfrastructurerehabilitation to vocational training. Its imple-mentationhassufferedfromanumberoftechnicalweaknessesand itcalls forUNDPtodevelop itsexpertise in watershed management. UNDP hasmadetwoverysignificantinterventionsinpromo-tingtheprivate sector:strengtheningtheSomaliremittance sector to ensure that key remittancescompaniescompliedwithinternationalstandardsandsupportingtheSomalimeatexport industry.The environment component of the UNDPprogrammehasremainedsmallsofar.

Under HIV/AIDS programmes UNDPstrengthened the institutional capacity of thethreeAIDSCommissions,developed and tested

anumberof training tools forgeneral awarenessand worked with populations that are most atrisk. By December 2009, UNDP had trainedsome1,000religiousleadersinadvocacymethodstheycoulduseintheircommunities.Womenandyoutheducators,non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)andmembersof theuniformedservicesreceivedtrainingonbehaviourchange.Ingeneral,theprogrammeiswelltargetedinitsfocusonthemostvulnerableinsociety.

UNDP has supported authorities in differentregionsofSomalia in takingforwardthegender agenda. A national gender policy was developedby the Government of Somaliland in 2009 andgenderfocalpointsarebeingsetupineachmin-istry. In Puntland, UNDP has supported thedevelopmentofagenderpolicyandagenderstra-tegicplan.Gendermainstreaminginprogrammeshastoooftenbeenseenasquotastobeachievedin terms of women beneficiaries (30 percent inmost projects). While this is a positive step andgivesaconcretemeasureintheshortrun,amorenuancedandholisticunderstandingofgender inprogrammingneedstobereinforced.

In general, projects implemented in the morestablenorthernregionshavebeenmoreeffective.Despite a fewgoodexamplesof results achievedand sustained, many UNDP interventions inthe South and Central region have resulted ininputssuchasinfrastructure,equipmentandeventrainingbeinglostfollowingtheresurgenceofcon-flict.Inothercases,itistooearlytoassessresultsandsustainabilityasinterventions,particularlyforcapacity development and institutional building,requirealong-termcomprehensiveapproachthathas not often been present. The ADR found,however,thatUNDPwasstilloftenoperatinginanemergencymode,notpayingenoughattentiontotechnicalqualityandlonger-termsustainability.TheinstitutionalcultureofUNDPSomalianeedstobemorefocusedonresults.

The internal coherence inprogrammeshasbeenweak and there has been a ‘silo’ approach inprogramme management, but efforts are beingmade tocorrect thisbypromotingmoresynergy

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betweenprojectsandprogrammes.The inclusiveandparticipatoryinternalprocessputinplaceforthedraftingof thenext countryprogramme is agoodillustrationofsuchefforts.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

LikemostoftheorganizationsassistingSomalia,UNDPhasitsheadofficeinNairobi.Until2008,UNDP had a sub-office in Mogadishu (with aliaison office in Baidoa) in South and CentralSomalia,andsub-officesinHargeisa,Somaliland,and Garowe, Puntland. The grave security inci-dents of 2008 and the subsequent revision ofsecurityphases resulted in theclosureofUNDPofficesinSouthandCentralSomalia.UNDPnowoperates under severe security restrictions with asecurity phase V in Mogadishu and a phase IVintherestofthecountry.Toaddressaccessibilityissues,UNDPhasengagedNGOsandcommer-cialfirmstoconductmonitoringofprojects,andwheneverpossible,UNDPstaffmembersalsotrytomonitorprogressthroughfieldvisits,telephoneinterviewsandtheuseofphotographicevidence.This remote management formula has allowedUNDP to continue some activities despite thedifficulties of the situation. For UNDP as forall organizations operating in Somalia, the costof delivering assistance is extremely high, owingmainlytoexpenseslinkedtoremotemanagementandtosecurity.

During the period covered by this ADR, theprogrammecycleshavebeenlimitedtotwoyearswith the last CPD extended for a third year to2010.Thishasbeenareflectionoftheunpredict-abilityofthesituationinSomaliaandthefragilityof political advances. As most programmes arenational in their design, programme documentsdo not reflect sufficiently the vast differencesthat have emerged since 1991 among the threeregions that were part of the pre-1991 SomaliRepublic.Inaddition,thisshortplanninghorizonwas accompanied by the development of single-year workplans, a situation not conducive to thelonger-term approach needed for developmentworknortothepredictabilitysoughtbypartners.

TheADRalsofoundthatUNDPcorporatelyhadbeen somewhat inadequate in providing supportto the Somali programme. There is insufficientwritten institutional guidance for programmesoperating in special and complex circumstances,suchasfailedandfragilestateswithsecurityclas-sificationsashighastheonesappliedinSomalia.Thecountryofficeitselfwasperhapsnotproactiveenoughinseekingguidanceandtappingallpos-sibleinstitutionalresources.Morerecently,averyuseful strategic partnership agreement was con-cluded with the headquarters Bureau for CrisisPreventionandRecovery(BCPR),bringingbothresourcesandtechnicalsupporttotheprogramme.

STRATEGIC RELEVANCE, POSITIONING AND PARTNERSHIPS

UNDPisoftenseenasthe‘provideroflastresort’andsomemajordonorsaswellasUNPOSexpectthe organization to support the political pro-cess or dispense administrative services on theirbehalf. For many observers and organizationsinvolvedmainlywithhumanitarianassistance,thisassociation with the political process has dam-aged the image of the organization and reduceditscapacitytofullydeploysomeofitstraditionaldevelopmentactivities.

UNDP has often responded with nimblenessto requests to undertake new and unforeseenactivities in response to requests from donors orfrom UNPOS. It has not displayed, however,the capacity of analysis of the Somali contextthat would have helped guide strategic choicesor reorient someactivitieswhenneeded.UNDPhas been relying too exclusively on its own staffand partners, without sufficiently reaching outto independent and more varied sources ofinformation such as human rights, advocacy orwomenNGOsandprofessionalassociationswithabroadconstituency.

UNDP has maintained good partnerships withgovernmentauthoritiesinthevariousregionsandthe organization’s long presence in the countrymake it a trusted interlocutor. Government

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partners would be eager, however, to participatemore fully in the development of programmesalthoughtheyunderstandthattheycannotbethesoleimplementers.RelationswithNGOsandcivilsociety have concerned mainly the implementa-tionofprogrammesandhavethereforebeenofacontractualmorethanofapartnershipnature.

CONCLUSIONS

1. UNDPhasbeenpushed– andhas alloweditselftobepushed–intoassumingresponsi-bilityforcertaintasksandservicesthathavereducedthecredibilityoftheorganizationasa neutral and impartial development agent.This has resulted in a loss of ‘developmentspace’.Understandably,UNDPiscommittedvis-à-vissomedonorstopursuetheactivitiesthathavebroughtaboutthisnegativeimage.The organization cannot simply walk outof such commitments. UNDP will need tofindmeans,however,todevelopexitstrate-giesthatwouldenabletheorganization,withsupport from donors, to gradually concen-tratemoreofitsresourcesandenergyoncoremandateactivities.

2. The term ‘dealingwithavirtualSomalia’ isoftenusedtodescribeasituationwheremostof the international community handles allinterventions related to Somalia – whetherthey are of a political, humanitarian ordevelopmental nature – from the comfort-able distance provided by operational basesin Nairobi. Working from a distance orapplying ‘remote management’ to a situa-tion such as the one in Somalia means notonly reduced access, but more importantlyreducedinformation,amorelimitedcapacityof analysis and an increased exposure tooperationalrisksregardingeffectiveness,costefficiencyandaccountability.

3. UNDPisgenerallyperceivedasdisplayingaweakcapacitytoanalysetheSomalicontextandapplyinacomprehensivemannerconflictanalysis and risk management methods.Conflict analysis methods, however, havebeen emphasized in the formulation of the

next country programme, a clear indica-tion of progress in the right direction. Onthe other hand, for risk management, thefocus so far has been almost exclusively onoperational risks during implementation asopposedtotheinstitutionalrisksinvolvedinmakingstrategicdecisionsaboutwhetherornot to enter intonewareasof activity.Thesourcesof informationof thecountryofficeare considered too limited, based mainlyon staff and implementing partners andoften neglecting independent sources, suchashuman rightsNGOs, academics and thewebsites flourishing in Somalia and amongthediaspora.

4. The UNDP contribution to developmentresultshasvariedconsiderablydependingontheregionwhereactivitieswereimplemented.Thisregionaldiversityisnotreflectedsuffi-ciently in programming instruments. SouthandCentralSomaliahasimmensedifficultiesemergingfromaprotractedconflictsituationand still faces a severe humanitarian crisis.In Somaliland and Puntland, relative sta-bility and improving governance allow forgenuinedevelopment support to takeplace.While it is fully understood that UNDPcannot develop separate programme docu-ments,instrumentssuchasworkplanscouldadopt a pragmatic approach and reflect therealitymoreadequately.

5. Despite some of the problems describedabove,UNDPcontinuestoenjoyaprivilegedposition in Somalia based on its long-termpresence in the country, on the trust it hasestablished with authorities and donors, aswell as on results achieved over the yearsin many areas of intervention. The countryofficehas also initiated aprocessof changethatshouldtransformitsinstitutionalcultureby emphasizing more cohesion and synergybetween programmes, a results-based man-agement, as well as the mainstreaming ofa rights-based approach. The ADR teamstrongly endorses these recent efforts andapproach,andwouldarguethatmoreinten-sive support from UNDP headquarters

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and understanding from internationaland national partners will be helpful inenablingthecountryofficetomanageacom-prehensive change process. Some of thesechanges have to go beyond introducing orchanging systems and procedures, and willinvolve changes in the institutional cultureoftheoffice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP Somalia needs tore-anchor its countryprogramme to areaswhichbuild on its core competence and are central toits mandate. It should work towards finding analternative ‘provider’ or mechanism to take overactivities related toprovidingservices topoliticalprocesses or for simple administrative functionswhicharenotcentraltoitsmandate.

Recommendation 2: The next countryprogramme for Somalia should strike an appro-priate balance between interventions in supportof building capacity of government institutionsand initiatives to help address, in the short andmediumterm,thechronicdevelopmentneedsofthevulnerablegroupsofpopulation,withaviewtoachievingprogress towardsMDGs, includingonpressingissuesrelatedtoenvironment.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Somalia needsto reassert overall leadership on develop-ment issues within the UN community andensure that development needs of the SomalipopulationandsupportforachievementofMDGsreceive increasing attention from authorities aswell as development agencies, NGOs and thedonorcommunity.

Recommendation 4:Inlinewiththedecisiontopresentforapprovalafive-yearcycleforthe2011-2015countryprogramme,UNDPSomaliashoulddevelopthreeregion-specificfive-yearoperationalworkplansinfullconsultationwithrelevantpart-ners.Thisshouldbeaccompaniedbyasystemofannual participatory reviews in order to increaseownershipoftheplanningprocessandtoaddress

issuesofpredictabilityandtransparencyinUNDPplanningandbudgetingprocesses.

Recommendation 5: UNDP Somalia needs toengage with a wider range of actors, includingindependent observers, researchers, academicsand civil society in order to sharpen its analysisandunderstandingof the complex context of itsoperatingenvironment.

Recommendation 6: UNDP Somalia needs toensuregreatercoherencewithinandbetweenpro-grammesandestablishmechanismsthatpromotecoherence, complementarity and synergy as keyelementsoftheinstitutionalculture.

Recommendation 7: UNDP Somalia shouldincrease the presence of Nairobi-based staff inthe field by making full use of existing possibil-ities,includingslots,andincreaseinteractionwithSomalicounterpartsbyusingtemporaryproximityhubs easily accessible for the authorities withthe aim of ensuring timely decision-making andresolutionofproblems.

Recommendation 8: UNDP Somalia shouldpursueaconsciousstrategytoenhancethequalityofprogrammeplanningandthedeliveryofresultsandfinancialresourcesby:

�� Securingnecessarytechnicalinputsindesign/implementationandmonitoringprocesses

�� Mainstreaming a results-oriented culturethrough monitoring and evaluation byensuringthatallprogrammestaffaretrainedin monitoring and evaluation, seekingthe necessary monitoring and evaluationtechnical expertise, and assuring adequateinstitutionalarrangementsandincentives

�� Undertakingareviewofexistingprogrammemanagement capacity and taking correctiveactions to enhance quality and ensure goodfinancialmanagement

�� Undertakingasystematiccapacityassessmentof implementing partners and monitoringcontractorstoensurethattheyarecapableofdeliveringtoqualitystandards.

x vE X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

Recommendation 9: UNDP Somalia needs todevelop a gender strategy and implementationframework. There is a need for dedicated staffresources to ensure that thenecessary structures,systems and institutional culture are in place topromotegendermainstreaming.

Recommendation 10:UNDPheadquartersneedsto provide more active and timely support toUNDP Somalia, to develop guidance for offices

operatinginconflictenvironmentswithrestrictedaccessandtofacilitatesharingofknowledgeandbest practices between offices operating in sim-ilar environments around the world. Additionalguidancewouldbeneededinteraliaontheappli-cationofthenotionof‘provideroflastresort’andon operations run through remote management,including quality programming and monitoringandevaluationofrelatedinterventions.

x v i E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

1C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE ADR

TheEvaluationOfficeofUNDPconductedanAssessment of Development Results (ADR)of UNDP programmes for Somalia betweenDecember2009andJuly2010.TheoverallgoalsofanADRareto:

�� Provide substantive support to the Admin-istrator’s accountability to the ExecutiveBoard

�� Support greater UNDP accountabilityto national stakeholders and partnersinthecountry

�� Serve as a means of quality assurance forUNDPinterventionsatthecountrylevel

�� Contributetolearningatcorporate,regionalandcountrylevels.

In addition, the ADR is intended to provideinputs to the design of the next country pro-grammedocument(2011-2015),tobesubmittedtotheExecutiveBoardinSeptember2010.

The ADR covers the period 2005 to 2010 andconcerns three UNDP programme documents.1Theevaluationconcentratesmainlyonactivitiesstill under implementation at the time of theevaluation as well as activities from precedingcyclesthatarecloselylinkedtocurrentones.

The evaluation criteria2 used for this ADR –effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, relevanceandresponsiveness,comparativeadvantagesand

promotingUNvalues– are consistentwith thedraft ADR Methods Manual. The ADR teamdidnotrestrictthescopeoftheevaluationtopro-grammeandprojectactivitiesbutalsoexaminednon-project interventions such as coordination,advocacy, advisory support, communicationandknowledge sharing,aswell aspartnershipswithkeystakeholders.

1.2 ADR PROCESS

TheEvaluationOfficecarriedoutanevaluabilityassessment in December 2009 and concludedthat an ADR was feasible despite the limitedtimeavailableandthedifficultiesofaccesstothecountryduetothesecuritysituation.TheADRprocesswasdividedinthreephases:

1. Preparation(December2009-February2010).In addition to the evaluability assessmentmentioned above, this first phase includedtheidentificationofthreeindependentcon-sultants to constitute an ADR team, anintensive review of documentation, as wellas an inception visit to New York by thetwointernationalconsultantsfordiscussionswith the Evaluation Office, the RegionalBureauforArabStates(RBAS),theBureauforCrisisPreventionandRecovery(BCPR),and relevant UN departments. This wasfollowed by a one-week scoping missionto Nairobi for discussions with the UNDPSomaliacountryoffice,basedinNairobi,andasmallrepresentativegroupofpartners.Thefirstphase resulted in thepreparationofan

CHAPTER1

INTRODUCTION

1 AssistancetoSomalia(2005-2006),NotebytheAdministrator(DP/2004/43),23August2004;DraftcountryprogrammeforSomalia(2007-2008)(DP/DCP/SOM/1),13July2006;andDraftcountryprogrammedocumentSomalia(2008-2009),September2007(thisCPDwasextendeduntilend2010).

2 ThepresentationofkeyfindingsandconclusionsinthisADRreportisnotnecessarilystructuredaroundtheseevaluationcriteria.

2 C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

inception report that spelledout thedesignandmethodologyoftheADR.Thetermsofreference (seeAnnex1)have been adjustedonthebasisofthisinceptionreport.

2. Conducting the ADR and report drafting(March-July2010):Themainevaluationmis-sionwasconductedduringthemonthofMarchandendedwiththepresentationofemergingconclusionsandareasforpossiblerecommen-dations at stakeholders’ workshops held on29and30March2010.Adraftreportwentthroughanextensiveprocessofqualityassur-anceinvolvingtheEvaluationOfficeandanexternal reviewer before it was shared withRBAS, the UNDP Somalia country office,BCPRandSomaliauthorities,whoprovidedcomments regarding factual corrections andomissionsanderrorsofinterpretation.

3. Follow-up:Thisphasecoversthefollow-upto the final report, including the manage-mentresponsepreparedbythecountryofficeas well as the monitoring of the follow-upactionsbyRBAS.

1.3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Theoverallmethodologyadoptedinthisevalua-tionwasguidedby the latestdraftof theADRMethods Manual and the terms of referencefor the present ADR. Through the applicationof triangulation,3 the ADR team attempted tostrengthenthevalidityoffindings.

The team applied the following methods ofdatacollection:

�� Document review,4 conducted mainlyduringtheintervalbetweenthescopingandthe main missions. An impressive quantityof pertinent documentation has beenassembled, thanks to the focal point forthe ADR and the programme staff of thecountry office as well as the EvaluationOfficeresearchassistant

�� Semi-structured individual or group interviews5 held during the main missioncomplementeddiscussionsthattookplaceinNewYork andduring the scopingmission.The ADR team met some 60 UNDP staffmembersand130otherpersonsfromSomaliauthorities, donors, UN agencies, UNDPimplementingpartners,membersofthecivilsociety, independent observers and projectbeneficiaries. The interviews sought toestablish trends in the assessment of theUNDPcontributionbyaskingsimilarques-tionstoawiderangeofpartners,independentobserversandexperts

�� Field visits organized over an eight-day period in Somaliland and Puntland.The field visits allowed the team to see12 sites7whereUNDPprojectactivitiesareor have been carried out and also to holddiscussions with local authorities, partnersand beneficiaries. Prevailing security con-siderations and logistical complications6largely determined the selection of sitesvisitedbytheteam.However,theendresultwas a fairly representative sample of keyUNDPinterventions.

The most important analytical framework isbased on the evaluation criteria and questionsdetailed in the evaluation matrix7 developed

3 ‘Triangulation’meansdeliberateattempttoconfirminformationthrough:referencetomultipledatasources;useofmultiplemethodsofdatacollection;datacollectionbymultipleevaluators;repeatedobservationovertime;andanalysisoffindingsagainstmultiplehypothesis(draftADRMethodManual–January2010).

4 AlistofmajordocumentsconsultedfortheADRisprovidedinAnnex5.5 AlistofpersonsconsultedduringtheevaluationexerciseisprovidedinAnnex4.6 Theteam’sitinerarytoandfromSomalilandandPuntlandwaslargelydeterminedbytheavailabilityofUnitedNations

HumanitarianAirServiceflights.Movementsinthefieldwerealsoconstrained,attimes,bylogisticalcomplicationsandsecurityrequirementsundersecurityphaseIV.

7 TheEvaluationMatrixappearsasAnnex2.

3C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

during the scoping mission. The ADR teamorganized information collected around thesecriteria and questions. The team also identifiedspecific examples to illustrate general findingsthat served as a basis for drawing conclusionsandrecommendations.Thelastweekofthemainmissionwasdedicatedtothisanalyticalworkthatprovidedthebasisforreportwriting.

1.4 CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

ThemajorconstraintfacedbytheADRresultedfromasecuritysituationthatpreventedtheteamfrom visiting Mogadishu or any part of SouthandCentralSomaliaandthuslimitedthepossi-bilityof interactionwiththe federalauthorities,project partners and beneficiaries. Fortunately,this could be compensated partly during thestakeholders’ workshop, held in March 2010,attended by a number of representatives of theTransitional Federal Government (TFG) andcivilsociety.

The difficulty of establishing a causal linkbetween the outputs of a programme and theanticipatedoutcomesiswellknowntoUNDP.8

Thescopingmissionconfirmed that thiswouldalsobethecaseforprogrammesimplementedin

Somalia.Thisproblemiscompoundedbyweak-nesses in the definition of outcomes that areoftenconfusedwithoutputs,thegeneralabsenceof baseline data or statistics related to Somalia,and a weak monitoring and evaluation func-tioninprogrammemanagement.Onlyalimitednumber of evaluations were carried out by thecountryofficeduringtheevaluationperiod,andtheir focus was most often limited to outputsandprojects.Also,theADRteamhaddifficultyobtaining financial data as explained later inthisreport.9

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

Thepresentreportisorganizedinfivechapters.Followingthisintroductionachapter2outlinesthedevelopmentchallengesfacingSomaliaaswellasthestatusofinternationalaidtothecountry.Chapter 3 presents UNDP strategies andapproaches,andprovidesanoverviewofthemajorcharacteristicsoftheUNDPprogramme.Chapter4examinesthecontributionofUNDPtodevelop-mentresultsanddiscussesitsstrategicpositioning.Finally, chapter 5 draws major conclusionsandoffersrecommendations.

8 Thisproblemismainlydiscussedinthe‘GuidelinesforanAssessmentofDevelopmentResults’(UNDPEvaluationOffice,January2009)and‘EvaluationofResults-basedManagementatUNDP’(UNDPEvaluationOffice,January2007).

9 Seechapter4,section4.5.2forfindingsonmonitoringandevaluation,andsection4.5.3forfinancialmanagement.

4 C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N

5C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

2.1 NATIONAL CONTEXT

2.1.1 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATIONLocatedontheeastcoastofAfricanorthoftheequator,SomaliabordersEthiopia,Djibouti,andKenya.ItcomprisesItaly’sformerTrustTerritoryofSomaliaandtheformerBritishProtectorateofSomaliland. In 1991, after the collapse of thegovernment of the Somali Republic, parts ofthe north-western area formerly under Britishrule declared independence and became theRepublic of Somaliland.10 In 1998, the leadersofthenorth-easternregionofPuntlanddeclaredit an autonomous state but without seekingsecession from Somalia. The remainder of theterritory,nowcalledSouthandCentralSomalia,spreads along the Indian Ocean up to Kenya.Somalia has one of the longest coastlines inAfricaextending2,720kilometres.Thecountryhasanestimatedtotalareaof637,657km2andapopulationof8.7million.11

About60percentofSomalis leadanomadicorsemi-nomadic life, raising cattle, camels, sheep,and goats. Close to a quarter of the popula-tion comprises settled farmers living mainly inthe fertile agricultural zone between the Jubaand Shebelle Rivers in southern Somalia. Theremainderisurban.12

Somalia is thought to have large unexploitedreservesofironore,tin,gypsum,bauxite,uranium,copper,andsalt-withalikelihoodofpetroleumandnaturalgasreserves.Thirteenpercentof the

landisarablewithonly2percentofthatarablelandactuallyundercultivation.

2.1.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT

Somalia has lacked a functional central gov-ernment for nearly 19 years. The internationalcommunity and virtually all of the country’sneighbours have been engaged in efforts atmediation of the Somali internal dispute. ForSomalia’s neighbours, stability in the region aswellasrelievingtheburdenofthelargenumberofrefugeestheyhostedwereparamountconsider-ations. The turning point in the reconciliationefforts was probably in 2000 when Djiboutihostedamajor reconciliationconference,whichculminated in the creation of a TransitionalNationalGovernment(TNG),whosethree-yearmandate expired in August 2003. Under theauspices of the Inter-Governmental AuthorityonDevelopment(IGAD),KenyaorganizedtheSomalia National Reconciliation Conference in2002, which adopted a Transitional FederalCharter in June 2004. A Transitional FederalGovernment(TFG)wasestablishedinOctoberof the same year. A UN-sponsored peace con-ference was held in Djibouti at the beginningof 2008, resulting in a ceasefire and power-sharingagreementbetween theAlliance for theRe-liberationofSomaliaand theTFG.AbriefchronologyofmajorpoliticaleventsinSomaliaisgiveninTable1.

10 TheinternationalcommunityhassinceinsistedthattheterritorialintegrityoftheformerSomaliRepublicshouldbemaintainedand,tothisdate,nocountryhasformallyrecognizedSomalilandasasovereignstate.

11 HumanDevelopmentReport2010.12 Thepercentagesgivenarebasedonapre-1991breakdownandhavenowmostprobablybeenalteredbyinternal

(internallydisplacedpersons)andexternal(refugeesanddiaspora)populationmovements.

CHAPTER2

NATIONAL CONTEXT AND INTERNATIONAL AID

6 C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

2.1.3 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

In the absence of a functioning centralgovernment, Somalia has not developed anationaldevelopmentstrategy.TheRecoveryandDevelopment Programme (RDP) is consideredthemainframeworkforinternationalsupportforSomalia. It was developed by the internationalcommunityunderthejointleadershipoftheUNandtheWorldBank,mainlybasedontheJoint

Needs Assessment (JNA) undertaken in 2005and 2006. The RDP went through intensiveconsultations with Somali authorities and thecivil society. It covers the period 2008 to 2012and is currently being updated. Authorities inSomaliland have formally endorsed the docu-mentwhilebothPuntlandandSouthandCentralSomalia have stated that they agree with thebroadprioritiessetoutinthedocument.

Table 1. Chronology of major political events in Somalia

PERIOD NOTABLE EVENTS

26 June 1960 BritishSomalilandgainsindependence

1 July 1960 ItalianSomaliabecomesindependentandjoinsSomalilandtoformtheSomaliRepublic(Somalia)

1991 SiadBarreisoverthrownandfleesthecountrytoNigeriathroughKenya

TheSomaliNationalMovement,amainlyIsaaqinsurgencygroup,declaresSomalilandindependent

1992 UNSecurityCouncilresolution794(1992)authorizesuseofallnecessarymeanstosecurehumanitarianrelief

UnitedStates-ledOperationRestoreHopebeginsitspeacekeepingroleinSomalia

1993 OperationRestoreHopehandsovertotheUnitedNationsOperationinSomalia(UNOSOMII)underSecurityCouncilresolution814(1993)

1995 UNOSOMIIwithdrawsfromSomaliafollowedbyheavylootinginMogadishu

1998 AMajerteenclanconferenceatGarowedeclaresanewStateofPuntland

2004 ATransitionalFederalCharterisadoptedinFebruary2004followingthenegotiationsfacilitatedbyKenya

AbdullahiYusufAhmediselectedpresidentinOctober2004andtheTransitionalFederalGovernment(TFG)isformedinNairobi

2005 June–TheTFGrelocatestoSomalia

2006 June–theUnionofIslamicCourts(UIC)gainscontrolofMogadishuandJowhar

December–EthiopialaunchesamajorassaultonUIC

2007 TheTFGmovestoMogadishuwithheavyEthiopianmilitarysupport

TheUNSecurityCouncilauthorizesthedeploymentofanAfricanUnionMissiontoSomalia(AMISOM)

2008 June–theTFGandtheAllianceforRe-liberationofSomaliasignanagreementattheDjiboutipeaceconferenceundertheauspicesoftheUN

December–resignationofTFGPresidentAbdullahiYusufAhmed

2009 EthiopiantroopscompletetheirwithdrawalfromSomalia

Re-emergenceofIslamistgroups,amongthemtheAl-ShabaabandHizbulIslaami

SheikhSharifSheikhAhmediselectedasPresidentoftheTFG

TheTFGextendsitsmandateandthetransitionprocessfor2yearsuntil2011

2010 January–aspokespersonclaimingtorepresentAl-ShabaabconfirmsofficiallythattheorganizationhasjoinedAlQaida’s‘internationaljihad’

aExcerptsfromLewisI.O.Understanding Somalia and Somaliland Culture, History, Society,HurstandCompany,London,2009.

7C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

Table 2. Select human development indicators

Indicators Year Data

Demographics Totalpopulation(millions)a 1990 6.6

2007 8.7

Urbanshareofthepopulation(percentageoftotal)a 2000 12

2010 15

Totalfertilityrate(birthsperwoman)a 1990-1995 6.5

2005-2010 6.4

Economicstatus Populationlivingbelow$1.00aday(%)b 2002 43.20

Health Lifeexpectancyatbirth(years)a 2007 49.7

Underfivemoralityratec 2007 142/1000

Prevalenceofunder-nourishmentintotalpopulationc(5) 2006 71

Childrenunderweightforage(%underage5)d 2000-2006 36

%ofpopulationw/outsustainableaccesstoanimproveddrinkingwatersource(%)

1999e.a 77

2006e.b 71

Maternalmortalityratiof 2006 1,044/10,000

Infantmortalityratef 2006 86/1000

Education AccesstobasiceducationintheNorth(%)g 2010 40

AccesstobasiceducationintheSouthandCentralSomalia(%)g

2010 22

Gender Seatsinparliament(%heldbywomen)h 1990 4

2007 8.2

Est.PrevalenceofFemaleGenitalMutilation(FGM)(%ingirlsandwomenaged15-49yrs)c

2006 98

Environment Forestandwoodland(%oftotallandarea)i 1988 14

2005 11.4

Othervulnerabilityindices

Internallydisplacedpeople(thousands) 2000j.a 300-350,000

2009j.b 1,550,000

Refugees(SomalisinDjibouti,Eritrea,Ethiopia,Kenya,Tanzania,Uganda,andYemenonly)k

2009 529,700

ECHOvulnerabilityandcrisisindexscoreg 2008/09 3/3(mostsevererank)

IASCEarlyWarning–earlyactionratingg RedAlert

Note: This table draws from various sources due to the limited availability of data in Somalia.

aUNDP,Human Development Report 2009,TableL.bUNDP,Somalia/WorldBank(2002).Socio-EconomicSurvey.cWHO,WHO World Health Statistics 2009.dUN(2009),‘MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsIndicatorsDatabase,’(http://mdgs.un.org.

AccessedJune2009based on a joint effort by UNICEF and WHO).eUNDP(2001),‘Somalia Human Development Report’;andUNDP(2009).Human Development Report 2009.fWHOEMRO,‘CountryProfile:Somalia’(accessed 2010).g‘UNConsolidatedAppeal:Somalia2010’.hUNDP,HDR 2007/2008,Table33:343-346.iUNDP,‘ArabHumanDevelopmentReport2009’.j‘UNConsolidatedAppeal:Somalia2000’;and‘UNConsolidatedAppeal:Somalia2010,’(Estimates maintained by the IDMC are based on various sources and are associated with high levels of uncertainty).

k‘UNConsolidatedAppeal:Somalia2010’.

8 C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

The long-standing political instability and theabsence of an effective government have had anegativeeffectonhumandevelopment,particu-larly in South and Central Somalia. Althoughaccurate and reliable socio-economic data arelacking,povertylevelsarehighwithanestimated43percentofthepopulationlivingonlessthanadollarperday.Povertyismoreprevalentintherural areas, where intractable conflicts, persis-tent droughts, lack of economic resources, andpaucity of infrastructure have rendered manypeoplehelpless.

UNICEFrealizedanationwidemultiple-indicatorcluster survey in 200613 that offered the lar-gest source of data for up-to-date monitoringofsomeoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs). It showed that achievingmostof theMDGs remained a formidable challenge unlessthereweredramaticchangesinsecurity,stabilityand good governance. The first full assessmentofSomalia’s position regarding theMDGswaspublished by UNDP in early 2007. Table 2provides some select indicators of the humandevelopmentsituationofthecountry.

Women’ssocialindicatorsconsistentlylagbehindthoseofmen.Forinstance,theadultliteracyrateis estimated to be 27 percent for females com-pared with 50 percent for males. The grossenrolment rate forgirls is15percent comparedwith 27 percent for boys. It is estimated that98 percent of Somali women and girls haveundergone some form of genital mutilation.14WomentendtooccupyalesserroleinthepublicsphereinSomalia.Theirpositionwasnotmade

any easier by their effective marginalizationduringtheformationoftheTransitionalFederalParliament where women were initially beinggranted a 25 percent representation, then 12percent,andeventuallyendedupwith8percentfollowingthenegotiationsof2004.

2.1.4 ROLE OF THE DIASPORA IN THE ECONOMY

The Somali diaspora, estimated at more thanone million persons,15 plays a central role insupporting both livelihoods and development.Remittances constitute the most importantexternal input into the economy.They total upto$1billionperyear16andrepresent71.4percentofthegrossnationalproduct,dwarfingeventheassistance of traditional international donors.The diaspora has, during certain periods, beenacriticalsourceoffundsforclanmilitias,whichhaveraisedfunds(sometimesviacoercion)fromclanmemberslivingabroad.17

A household survey in Hargeisa found thatup to 25 percent of households claim remit-tancesastheirsolesourceof income.18Anotherstudy in Hargeisa, Burco and Bossaso foundthat 40 percent of Somali households bene-fitedfromthemoneysentbythediaspora19and80percent of the start-up capital for small andmedium-sizedbusinesses inSomaliacamefromremittances.20Thereisnodefinitiveinformationabout thedecline in remittances after theonsetof the global economic crisis, but according toanecdotal information, remittances to Somaliadecreasedbyabout25percent.

13 ‘SomaliMultiple-IndicatorClusterSurvey2006’,UNICEFSomalia,2007.14 ‘FemaleGenitalMutilation/CuttingInSomalia’,(WorldBank,UNFPA,2005).15 ‘Somalia’sMissingMillion:theSomaliDiasporaanditsRoleinDevelopment’,HassanSheikhandSallyHealy,

UNDP-Somalia,March2009.16 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100423085705/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Press-releases/2008/

Better-deal-for-Somalis-who-send-money-home/17 ‘HumanDevelopmentReport:Somalia’,2001,UNDP,2001.18 ‘MigrantRemittancesintheContextofCrisisinSomaliSociety’,AnnaLindley,HumanitarianandPolicyGroup

BackgroundPaper,London,2006.19 ‘RemittancesandEconomicDevelopmentinSomalia’(WorldBank,SocialDevelopmentPapers,PaperNo.38,2006).20 ‘UNDP,CountryBrief:Somalia’,UNDPcountryoffice,updatedinSeptember2009.

9C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

2.1.5 ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY

A large number of civil society organizations(CSOs), many of them non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)haveemergedinSomaliasince1991,ofteninresponsetotherequirementof international organizations and donors fornational partners that could substitute for theabsenceof government structures.TheseCSOsare generally urban-based in their composition,comprise religious leaders, and other informalsocialandcommunitygroups, localNGOs,andprofessional associations of teachers, traders,medicalpersonnel, lawyers, journalists, and art-ists. Some have a very small constituency andoftenlimittheiractivitiestobeingimplementersfor externally financed projects. Others, par-ticularly the professional associations but alsosome human rights or women organizations,haveabroaderconstituencyandplayanincreas-ingly important role in society and even in thepoliticalsphereasshownintheirparticipationinnationalconferences.

Inparallel,moretraditionalformsofcivilsocietyarerepresentedbyasetofcustomaryinstitutionsforintermediationcomprisingmainlyclaneldersandlocalreligiousleaderswhotendtoholdswayintheruralareas.IntheSouthandCentralregionofSomalia,theseinstitutionshavedeclinedsig-nificantly as they are being either consumed oreliminated by militias. However, wherever theyremain independent of militant political pro-cesses, thesestill constituteadominant formofSomalicivilsociety,withsomeformofaccount-abilitytothecommunitiestheyrepresent.

2.1.6 SECURITY AND REGIONAL DIVERSITY

The international community has beenimplementing humanitarian, rehabilitationand development programmes for the Somalipeople in a complex and varied environment.The balance between humanitarian life-saving

needs and possibilities to undertake develop-mentworkvariesgreatlybetweenregions.SouthandCentralSomaliahas fallenback into activeconflictandMogadishuitselfhasbecomeapro-tracted war zone. The region continues to facesevere humanitarian needs despite the genuinehope generated by the 2004 establishment ofthe TFG and by the Djibouti Agreement of2008.Puntlandhasbeenrelativelystabledespiteweak governance and is advancing in its tran-sition from a post-conflict to a developmentsituation. Somaliland has achieved substantialprogress towards building a democratic Statedespite the recent instability resulting from ofthe postponement of presidential elections.21

OpportunitiesforgenuinedevelopmentworkarealreadyevidentinSomaliland.Thecapacitiesandresourcesoflocalgoverningauthoritiesalsovarywidely, with local authorities in Puntland andSomaliland being better established and morecapable of providing services than in the SouthandCentralregion.Similarly,theeconomicandhuman development situation varies across thedifferent regions, across rural and urban areas,andacrosssocialgroups.

Following tragic security incidents in 2008,22

the UN adopted a security phase IV for allregionsexceptMogadishuandBadhade(phaseV).Despitevisibledifferencesbetweenvariousloca-tionsandregions,phaseIVisstillbeingappliedacross the board and many observers questionthe appropriateness of such an undifferentiatedapproach.Withaviewtocomparingthissecurityclassificationwiththeoneappliedinothercoun-tries where the UN is operating under stressfulsecurityconditions, the teamobtained informa-tionabouttheUNclassificationforAfghanistan.It is worth noting that all of Afghanistan,including Kabul, has been classified as a phaseIIIsituation,theonlyexceptionbeingKandahar,wherephaseIVisapplied.Althoughitisunder-stood that a number of different considerations

21 Electionsplannedfor2008werefinallyheldon26June2010andresultedinapeacefultransferofpowertoanewlyelectedPresident.

22 TheHeadoftheUNDPofficeinMogadishuwaskilledinJuly2008andsuicidebombingsoccurredinHargeisaandBossasoon29October2008.InHargeisa,theUNDPofficewastargeted,killingtwoUNemployeesandinjuringsix.

1 0 C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

influence the securityclassificationand that thetwo situations are very different, this simplecomparison between Somalia and Afghanistanraisesquestionsabout the rigourof the securityassessmentprocess.Thisisofparticularimport-ance given the consequences of a phase IV onthe efficiency of operations and the cost ofdeliveringassistance.

2.1.7 SOMALIA IN THE REGION

SomaliaoccupiesastrategicpositionintheHornofAfrica.InadditiontotieswithotherAfricancountries, it has close religious and historicallinkswiththeArabandIslamicworldandhasaseat inboth theAfricanUnionand theLeagueof Arab States. Somalia is also a member ofthe regional Inter-governmental Authority onDevelopment(IGAD).

Worried about the stability of the region andoften concerned about the large presence ofSomali refugees, a number of Somalia’s neigh-bours intervened militarily or stepped in asmediators to facilitate reconciliation. In 2007,the African Union deployed a peace supportoperation, AMISOM, to Mogadishu withthe approval of the UN Security Council butAMISOM operations have been hampered bya lackof troopcontributions, logistical support,equipmentandotherresources.

2.1.8 SOMALIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Two recent trends have propelled Somalia tothe forefront of the international agenda. Thefirst concerns the rapid increase in the numberof piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia. The

risksassociatedwithpiracycouldaddconsider-ably to the costs of manufactured goods andoil from Asia and the Middle East. At a timeof high inflationary pressures, this is of graveconcern.Becauseoftheincreasinguseofpowerfulweaponrybypirates,thereisalsoagreaterriskofa major environmental disaster in the Gulf ofAden if a tanker is sunk or run aground or setonfire.23

TheuseofSomalia for the expansionofglobalterrorism is the second source of internationalconcern.TheHarakatShabaabal-Mujahidin24orAl-ShabaabwasthemilitantwingoftheUnionof IslamicCourts that tookovermostofSouthandCentralSomaliain2006tobedislodgedbyEthiopiantroopssupportingtheTFGattheendof that same year. Al Shabaab and the HizbulIslaami, a rival Islamicparty,nowcontrolmostof South and Central Somalia, with the excep-tion of parts of Mogadishu where the TFGreceivesprotection fromAMISOM. In January2010,Al-ShabaabconfirmedofficiallythatithadjoinedAlQaida’s‘internationaljihad’.25

The international community initially providedstrong backing to the TFG in the hope that alegitimate government would bring the peaceand stability required to stem the advance ofterrorism in Somalia and provide the secureenvironment conducive to combating piracy.The International Contact Group on Somalia26

hasbeenpersistentconcerningtheneedtosup-porttheTFG.ThefirstmeetingoftheGroup,in2006, calledon the international communityto “support the consolidation of representativeand effective governance inSomalia, capableofaddressing the needs of the Somali people aswell as common international objectives. The

23 R.Middleton,‘PiracyinSomalia:ThreateningGlobalTrade,FeedingLocalWars,’ChathamHouseBriefingReport(TheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,London,2008).

24 Literally‘MujahidinYouthMovement’.25 See:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2876199/26 TheICGwascreatedinJune2006andhasmetregularlysincethen.ThefirstmeetingwasattendedbytheEuropean

Union(PresidencyandCommission),Italy,Norway,Sweden,theUnitedRepublicofTanzania,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStateswiththeUNandtheAUparticipatingasobservers.The16thmeeting,heldinJeddahinDecember2009,wasattendedby34Statesand9internationalorganizations.

1 1C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

Transitional Federal Charter and Institutionsprovidealegitimateandviableframeworkforthecontinuedprocessof re-establishinggovernanceinSomalia.”27Thisinternationalsupporthascon-sistently emphasized the priority to be given tothesecuritysector,particularlysincetheadvanceof Al-Shabaab through most of South andCentralSomalia.Manyamongtheinternationalcommunity, however, have become increasinglydisenchanted with the lack of progress of theTFGanditsperformance.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL AID TO SOMALIA

External aid has always played a critical role inthe affairs of Somalia. In the past, the SomaliStatewas fundedalmostentirelybyColdWar-driven foreign aid.With the coldwarover, aidstarted declining as the Somali State began tocollapseinthelate1980s.Throughoutthe1990s,however,followingthecollapseoftheStateandthedeploymentofforeigntroops,donorinterestpickedupagain.

2.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL AID TO SOMALIA

In its 2010 Development Cooperation Report,the OECD/DAC indicated that total annualaiddisbursements forSomaliahavebeen in therange of $200 million to $380 million a yearduring2004-2007butthatitroseto$758millionin2008.

Mostoftheincreaseisduetoadramaticriseinhumanitarianfundingreflectingboththegreaternumber of people in need and the sharp risein commodity and delivery costs for Somalia.Figure1illustratestheevolutionofhumanitarian

fundingundertheUnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)--ledannualconsolidatedappealprocess(CAP).28As shown in Figure 1, actual humanitarianfundingstoodat$476millionin2008and$513millionin2009,whichrepresentsanincreaseofmore than 66 percent between 2007 and 2009.Taking the ODA data for volume of aid in2008,theaveragepercapitaaidforeverySomalistandsatabout$90peryear.However,thetrans-actioncost,mostlyintermsofleakages29throughcorruption, siphoning off by warlords andmilitiasandhighcostofaiddeliverymeansthatlittle of the total amount goes to the poor andvulnerablefamilies.

Table 3 shows the top five donors to Somaliabetween 2002 and 2008. The United States ofAmerica ranks as the first provider with 25.2percent of the total, followed by the EuropeanCommission(EC),Norway,theUnitedKingdomandtheNetherlands.

27 InternationalSomaliaContactGroup–Communiqué,PermanentMissionofNorway,NewYork,15June2006.28 UNDPparticipatesintheannualCAPforaverysmallportionofitsprogramme,dealingmainlywithurgentrecovery

assistance.29 See,inparticular,the‘ReportoftheMonitoringGrouponSomalia’(S/2010/91),March2010.

Figure 1. CAP funding: 2005-2009 (US$ million)

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

002005 2006 2007 2009

funded

required

99

186

384324

163

308

513

663

476

2008

852

Source:CAP2010–alldatafromOCHAFinancialTrackingSystemasat12Nov.2009

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IntermsofoveralldonorprioritiesforSomalia,theRDPidentifiesthreemainpillars:

�� Deepening peace, improving security, andestablishinggoodgovernance

�� Strengthening essential basic services andsocialprotection

�� Creatinganenablingenvironmentforprivatesector-led growth to expand employmentandreducepoverty.

In fact, priority has been given in recent yearstothefirstpillar,particularlythesupporttothesecuritysectorandtoAMISOM.

2.2.2 COORDINATION WITHIN THE AID COMMUNITY

Themaincoordinationforumoftheinternationalaid community is currently the ‘Coordinationof International Support to Somalia’ (CISS)whosemembershipincludestheSomaliaDonorGroup, the NGO Consortium and the UNcountryteam(UNCT).ItisguidedbyasmallerExecutiveCommitteeco-chairedbytheResidentCoordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator of theUNandtheRepresentativeoftheWorldBank.A Somali Support Secretariat (SSS) is respon-sible for providing secretariat support servicesto the Somali authorities and the internationalcommunity in order to facilitate their effortsof coordination of the humanitarian, recon-struction and development programmes for thecountry.A2009 reviewof theCISS concluded

thattherewere“toomanyoverlappingcoordina-tionstructuresforSomalia.Theseincludesectors(and a variety of working groups under them),clusters (linked to CAP) and the ProgrammeWorking Group and Outcome Groups (linkedto the UNTP). Supporting these are OCHA,the RC system, UNDP (through its supportto the coordination role of the authorities)and the SSS. The transaction costs of havingall these structures are excessive and by far thegreatest part of this problem lies in Nairobi– not only does coordination appear to workbetter in the field (a common finding) but theweight of international coordination in Nairobiis a source of great irritation to the Somaliauthorities who are trying to make progress intheirowncountry.”30

Thereisnowaconsensusamongdonorsandothermembers of the international community thatthe existing coordination structure is ineffectiveand that it has become at best an information-sharing mechanism. Discussions are under waytoreformtheCISS,ensureahigherlevelofpar-ticipationandimprovethelinkagewithpoliticalactorssuchasUNPOS.

2.3 ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II atthe beginning of 1995, the Secretary-Generalestablished the United Nations Political Officefor Somalia (UNPOS) to advance the causeof peace and reconciliation through contacts

30 ‘ReviewofCISSExcomandSomaliSupportSecretariat–FinalReport’,ChrisJohnson,August2009.

Table 3. Major donors to Somalia between 2002 and 2008 (US$ million)

Donor 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Donor Totals

Percentage of total

Rank

UnitedStates 35.4 33.8 31.9 36.9 95.2 58.7 242.7 534.6 25.21% 1

EC 8.5 26 22.9 57.3 88.5 78.6 139.3 421.1 19.85% 2

Norway 25.4 40 33.8 31.3 33.8 43.1 44.2 251.6 11.86% 3

UnitedKingdom

2.8 4.9 14.1 9.9 51.6 26.4 74.6 184.3 8.69% 4

Netherlands 13.1 10.3 18.9 14.2 14.1 12.4 18.7 101.7 4.80% 5

Source:OECDStatsExtracts,CreditorReportingSystem-http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW.

1 3C H A P T E R 2 . N A T I O N A L C O N T E X T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L A I D

with Somali leaders, civil organizations andthe States and organizations concerned. TheSpecialRepresentativeof theSecretary-Generalnow chairs the International Contact Groupon Somalia and has been actively involved insupporting the TFG and working towards amoreinclusiveGovernment,particularlythroughthe organization of the Djibouti Conference in2008.In2009,aUnitedNationsSupportOfficefor AMISOM (UNSOA),31 headquarteredin Nairobi, was established to provide logis-tical support to AMISOM. UNDP, like mostothermembersoftheUNCT,hasexpressedtheneed to receive more active political guidancefromUNPOS.Annex6 illustrates the complexstructure put in place by the UN to supportthe political, security (in cooperation with theAfrican Union), humanitarian, recovery anddevelopmentsprocessesforSomalia.

TheUNCT32playedanimportantroleinleadingtheinternationalcommunity’sefforttodevelopa

comprehensivestrategyforassistancetoSomalia.TheJointNeedsAssessmentcarriedoutin2005-2006under the joint leadershipof theUNandtheWorldBankformedthebasisfortheelabora-tionoftheRDP(2008-2012).AUnitedNationsTransitionalPlan(UNTP)forSomalia,coveringtheperiod2008-2010,hasbeendevelopedbasedon the RDP and is considered the equivalentof a UN Development Assistance Framework(UNDAF)bythecountryteam.

In parallel, the UN humanitarian agencies usethe OCHA-led annual CAP as the documentof reference andmeet as a group togetherwithNGOsandinteresteddonorsinthelocalInter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). UNDPparticipates in theUNCT, theUNTPworkinggroupsandtheIASC.UNDPistheleadagencyfor UNTP outcomes related to governance andtheruleoflawandsecurity.

31 UNPOSissupportedandoverseenbytheUNSecretariatDepartmentofPoliticalAffairswhileUNSOAisledbytheUnitedNationsSecretariatDepartmentofFieldSupport.

32 UNCTcomprises16UNagenciesandprogrammesaswellastheWorldBank,theInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)andtheCivilAviationCaretakerAuthorityforSomalia(CACAS).MeetingsoftheUNCTarealsoattendedbyUNPOS.

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1 5C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P R E S P O N S E A N D S T R A T E G I E S

3.1 OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

UNDP implements programmes in Somaliaunder extremely difficult circumstances in acontext of violence and attacks on staff and ina situation where a good part of the country iswithoutaneffectivegovernmentorsecularruleoflaw.Thekillingof theHeadof theMogadishusub-office in July2008and the carbombingoftheUNDPHargeisaofficeinOctober2008havebeen particularly traumatic and have impactedconsiderablyonthecapacityoftheorganization– and the whole UN – to operate. One of themanyconsequencesof thesegravesecurity inci-dentshasbeentheevacuationofstafffromSouthandCentralSomalia and the severe restrictionsontraveltoandwithinotherregions.Thecha-otic political process, continued armed conflictinmanypartsof thecountry, theemergenceofradical groups and general instability have alsobeenfactorsinfluencingdecisionsmadebybothUNDPanditsdonors.

Such a context makes the decision-makingprocess on strategic and operational mattersdifficult and implies an important element ofrisk-taking. UNDP had to seize opportunitiesthatemergedfromadvancesinthepeaceprocessalthoughsuchdecisionsmightappearmisguidedwith hindsight. The alternative would havebeen a posture of inaction that would have ahighcostintermsofdenyingsupporttothepoorand to moderate elements. Some of the char-acteristics of the programme described in thefollowingparagraphsresultfromtheveryspecialoperatingenvironment.

3.2 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE UNDP PROGRAMME

Most of the international and bilateralorganizations assisting Somalia have had theirhead offices in Nairobi since the beginning ofthe 1990s. In mid-2005, following the estab-lishment of the TFG and the hopes it carriedof expanding assistance activities, UNDP senta Management Change Team to examine theorganization and structureof the countryofficein anticipation of an increase in the volume ofoperations. The Management Change Teamrecommendedan increasedpresence inSomaliawith delegated authority to sub-offices. Thecountry office management decided instead tostrengthen the Nairobi office. The followingyear,however,anewofficemanagementreversedthedecision andmadeNairobi a supportofficeforthreeSomaliasub-officeswithalargedegreeofdelegatedauthority.33

Until the latter part of 2008, UNDP had asub-office in Mogadishu (with a liaison officein Baidoa) in South and Central Somalia, anadditional sub-office in Hargeisa, coveringSomaliland, and one in Garowe, for Puntland.Unfortunately,thesecurityincidentsof2008andthesubsequentintroductionofsecurityphasesIVandVresultedintheclosureoftheMogadishusub-office and its liaison office in Baidoa andcrippled severely the two remaining sub-officesof Hargeisa and Garowe. The role of Nairobiagain became prominent and the sub-officeguidancemanualwasamendedaccordingly,par-ticularly with regard to reporting lines. At the

CHAPTER3

UNDP RESPONSE AND STRATEGIES

33 A‘TaskForce’wascreatedandsubmitteditsfinalreporton15December2006.Indevelopingtheconceptofdelegationtosub-offices,theSomaliaCountryOfficereceivedsupportfromtheUNDPcountryofficefortheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,whereasimilarprocesswasalreadyengaged.Thiswasagoodexampleofcross-fertilizationbetweenUNDPfieldofficesworkingindifficultoperationalenvironments.TheexperiencegainedinSomaliaandinothercountriesservedasthebasisforthedevelopmentofaUNDPguidancenoteonthesubject(‘GuidanceNote:EstablishingaUNDPpresenceoutsidetheCountryOffice’,UNDP,NewYork,October2009).

1 6 C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P R E S P O N S E A N D S T R A T E G I E S

time of the ADR visit, the Hargeisa and theGarowe sub-offices were still operating withlimitedpersonnel,underasystemof‘slots’.34

IntheNairobi-basedcountryoffice,programmemanagement follows the structure of the pro-gramme(seesection3.3):threemainprogrammeunitsandtwostand-alonesmallerunitscoveringGender/HIV/AIDS and economic and humandevelopmentissues,respectively.

3.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE UNDP PROGRAMME

The programmes implemented by UNDP inSomalia between 2005 and 2010 are governedby threedifferentbasicdocuments approvedbytheExecutiveBoard.ThelastCPDcorrespondsto the timeframe of the UNTP and represents

the part of that common UN programme forwhichUNDPhasassumedresponsibility.Atthetime of the evaluation team’s visit to Nairobi,the country office had started the process ofpreparing its countryprogrammefor theperiod2011-2015 that will correspond to a new UNstrategyforthesameperiodbeingdevelopedbytheUNCT.

Over the period covered by this ADR, theinterventionsofUNDPcoveredthreebroadpro-grammeareas-GovernanceandReconciliation,RuleofLawandSecurity(ROLS)andRecoveryand Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL), as wellas some cross-cutting themes such as HIV/AIDS,genderandadvocacyforhumandevelop-ment issues. The programme areas adoptedby the country office do not correspond to the‘focus areas’ of UNDP corporate strategy for

34 AmaximumtotalnumberofUNpersonnel,bothnationalandinternationalisauthorizedforeachlocation,basedessentiallyonexistingsafeevacuationcapacity.Individualagenciesarethenallocatedanumberofauthorizedpersonnel(‘slots’),whicharerevisedregularlybytheUNCT.InMarch2010,UNDPwasoperatingwithsix‘slots’foreachofitstwosub-offices.

Table 4. Evolution of core/non-core expenditure by thematic area: 2005-2009 (US$ thousand)a

Year/Theme

Governanceandreconciliation

RuleofLawandSecurity

Recovery/sustain-ablelivelihoods

HIV/AIDS GRANDTOTAL

Sourceoffunding

Core Non-core Core Non-core Core Non-core Core Non-core

2005 1,756 6,021 1,390 7,288 2,913 1,008 328 376 21,080

2006 2,348 14,141 1,824 9,339 2,632 1,949 278 1,004 33,515

2007 3,043 24,293 1,514 11,207 2,385 5,097 564 340 48,443

2008 2,266 26,010 1,342 15,369 4,289 3,527 386 868 54,057

2009 1,613 21,708 2,291 14,799 4,709 4,267 307 946 50,640

TOTAL 11,026 92,173 8,361 58,002 16,928 15,848 1,863 3,534 207,735

%core/non-corepertheme

10.7% 89.3% 12.6% 87.4% 51.6% 48.4% 34.5% 65.5% n/a

Totalexp.pertheme

103,199 66,363 32,776 5,397 207,735

%themeagainsttotal

49.7% 31.9% 15.8% 2.6% 100%

aForthepurposeofthisanalysis,atotalexpenditureof$36.7millionthatcouldnotbeattributedspecificallytothematicareashasbeenexcluded.Thetotalexpenditurefortheperiod2005-2009thereforestandsat$244.4million.Thecountryofficeinformedtheteamthatunattributedexpenditureswereofacross-cuttingnatureandcouldnotbeapportionedbetweenthematicareas.

1 7C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P R E S P O N S E A N D S T R A T E G I E S

2008-2013.35Thus,a largepartof theactivitiesunder Governance and ROLS would normallyfall under Democratic Governance with someareas of ROLS belonging to Crisis Preventionand Recovery while most of the activities cov-ered under RSL would relate to either MDGsandPovertyReductionorsomeaspectsofCrisisPreventionandRecovery.

The relative importance of the three majorprogrammes and the ones related to HIV/AIDS36againsttotalexpenditureisillustratedbyTable 4. Nearly 82 percent of all expenditureoverthefive-yearperiodconcernedGovernanceand ROLS, a clear illustration of a UNDPprogramme heavily tilted in favour of sup-portingthepoliticalandsecurityagendaofmajordonors. The two programmes have receivedimportant support from donors as reflected inthehighpercentageofnon-coreresourcesmadeavailable for expenditure related to Governance(89.3percent)andROLS(87.4percent).

By comparison, RSL programmes account foronly 15.8 percent of total expenditure and themajority (51.6 percent) of these activities arefinanced from UNDP resources as opposedto non-core resources that are raised fromdonors and other resource mobilization mech-anisms. This situation is also a reflection of anopinion prevailing among several donors thatrecovery and livelihoods in Somalia belong tohumanitarian action and should be addressedmainlybyNGOs.

Activities in favour of poverty reduction andthe attainment of MDGs are neverthelessat the centre of UNDP activities worldwide(representing 30 percent of total programmeexpenditures in 2008)37 and UNDP has a

considerable experience and knowledge in thatcoreareaofitsmandate,applicablealsoincon-flictandpost-conflictsituations.

During the period under review, approximately80percentofUNDPSomaliatotalexpendituresrepresented non-core resources.38 Among thedonorswhocontributenon-coreresourcestotheUNDP Somalia programme, the EC remainsby far the largest contributor, followed by theUnited Kingdom Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) (until 2008, after whichits funding declined), Norway, United StatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)and the Italian Cooperation. The 10 majordonors to UNDP over the last three years arelistedinTable5.

35 UNDPcorporatestrategicplanhasidentifiedthefollowingfocusareas:MDGsandPovertyReduction,EnvironmentandEnergy,DemocraticGovernanceandCrisisPreventionandRecovery.Ingeneral,UNDPcountryprogrammesworldwide,aswellastheofficestructure,arestructuredaroundthesecorporatefocusareas.

36 Althoughmanagedasacross-cuttingtheme,HIV/AIDSisincludedintable4becausetherelatedactivitiesrepresentsome3percentoftotalprogrammeexpenditurefortheperiod2005-2009.

37 UNDPAnnualReport2009.38 UNDPAtlas.

Table 5. Ten major donors to UNDP Somalia: 2007-2009 (US$ thousand)

2007 2008 2009 TOTAL

1.EC 6,604 16,322 13,137 36,063

2.DFID 9,138 12,191 3,425 24,754

3.Norway 4,983 7,513 6,886 19,382

4.USAID 4,823 10,269 4,039 19,131

5.Italy 843 8,664 2,052 11,559

6.Denmark 1,181 3,907 5,392 10,480

7.Japan - 4,544 5,000 9,544

8.Sweden 2,514 3,096 607 6,217

9.Netherlands 185 1,014 - 1,199

10.Ireland 713 - 452 1,165

Allothers 6,977 4,657 5,844 17,478

GRAND TOTAL

37,961 72,177 46,834 156,972

Source: UNDPSomalia.

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3.4 MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDP PROGRAMME

TheweaknessoftheTFG,itscurrentincapacitytoexerciseeffectivecontroloutsideafewneigh-bourhoods of Mogadishu and the dominantpositionofextremistgroupsinmostofSouthandCentral Somalia have meant that programmesin Somalia are implemented under exceptionalcircumstances of insecurity, instability andunpredictability.Thishasbeenaccentuatedsince2008followingthegravesecurity incidents thatresulted in the adoption by the UN of securityphases IV for most of the country and phaseV in Mogadishu and Badhade. This situationincreases the cost of delivering assistance andhampers the capacity of international actors tointeractdirectlywithcommunitiesandpeople.Italsomeansthattheinternationalaideffortreliesheavily on a number of Somali intermediariesforthedeliveryofassistanceandforknowledgeaboutthesituationincountry.

Thechronic insecurityand lackofdirectaccessto most parts of the country have had theimplications for the implementation of UNDPprogrammesdescribedbelow.

3.4.1 DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION

The standard mode of implementation forUNDPprogrammesaroundtheworldisnationalexecution(NEX).Somaliaisoneofafewexcep-tions as all projects are implemented throughdirectexecution(DEX).39Thisisaconsequence

ofthespecialcircumstancesunderwhichUNDPis operating in the country, in the absenceof acentralgovernmentexercisingeffectiveauthorityandgovernanceinallpartsofthecountry.

InmostofitsSomaliprogrammes,UNDPentersinto contractual agreements with a governmententity, an NGO or a community-based organ-ization (CBO) generally through a Letter ofAgreement,40aMicro-CapitalGrantAgreementoraProjectCooperationAgreement.41AmajorityofprojectactivitiesunderGovernanceandROLSprogrammesareimplementedthroughLettersofAgreement with the TFG or the authorities ofPuntlandandSomaliland.

3.4.2 A SHORT PLANNING HORIZON

In Somalia, during the period under review,UNDP programme cycles have not exceededtwotothreeyears,contrarytothenormalprac-tice of five-year programmes. This was duemainlytothespecialcircumstancesprevailinginthe country. These special circumstances havealsomeant thatUNDPdidnot signaCountryProgrammeActionPlan42withtheGovernmentasitdoesinmostoftheothercountries.Instead,UNDPdevelopedannualworkplansonwhichitbased its discussions with authorities in variousregions. The authorities concerned, particularlyin Somaliland and Puntland, were themselvesdeveloping longer-term plans and would haveliked to see UNDP as a more predictable andtransparentpartner.

39 NEX(for‘nationalexecution’)impliesthatprojectsarefullyimplementedbynationalauthoritiessuchasministriesordepartmentswithinministries,semi-autonomousgovernmentinstitutions,regionalorlocalauthorities,includingmunicipalities.DEX(for‘directexecution’)applieswhenUNDPitselfisresponsiblefortheimplementationofprojectactivities.DEXisusedmainlyincountrieswithspecialcircumstancesandthatexceptionalmodeofimplementationhastobeapprovedbytheAssociateAdministrator.

40 LettersofAgreementgenerallyapplytosituationswhereUNDPwishestodeveloppartnershipsmorethancontractualrelationships.

41 LettersofAgreementaresignedbetweenUNDPandagovernmententityoranationalinstitutionincaseswhenpart-nershipandcapacity-buildingneedtobeemphasized.Micro-grantsorcreditsconcernmainlyNGOsorcommunity-basedorganizationsengagedinaspecificsmall-scaleactivity,whileProjectCooperationAgreementsapplytoNGOsundertakingthefullresponsibilityforaprojectonbehalfofUNDP.

42 AninstrumentadoptedbyUNDPtooperationalizetheCPDbyrefiningtheresultsframework,M&Eframeworkandrelevantprojects.ItisagreedandsignedbythehostprogrammeGovernment.

1 9C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P R E S P O N S E A N D S T R A T E G I E S

3.4.3 REMOTE MANAGEMENT

Thenotionofremotemanagementisnotuniqueto Somalia. It is applied in Iraq and to someextent inAfghanistanand theDarfur regionoftheSudan.SomaliaandIraq represent theonlycases,however,wherecountryofficesarelocatedoutside the programme country. Numerouspapers exist on this operational approach butmostofthemseemtohavebeendevelopedinthecontext of humanitarian assistance.43 Accordingto existing literature, there are three types ofremotemanagement:

1. Remote control: Evacuated internationalpersonnel works through national staff leftin the country but fully retain control anddecision-makingfunctions.Thisisgenerallyapplicableinsituationswhereagencieshopetoreturnrapidlytothefield;

2. Remotesupport:Asabove,butsomelevelofauthorityanddecision-makingislefttolocalstaff, the distant office providing guidanceandbackupservices;

3. Remote partnerships: The agency worksexclusively through local authorities andorganizations,includingNGOs.Thedistantoffice retains decisions on funding and theoversight of project execution. MonitoringfunctionsareimplementedmainlybyNGOsorprivatefirmsusedasproxies.Theselectionprocess for partners and monitors becomescrucialfortheeffectivenessoftheformula.

In South and Central Somalia, in the absenceof a UNDP sub-office, the formula of remotepartnerships is the most commonly used andprojects are implemented either through TFG

entitiesorthroughNGOsandlocalcommunitygroups.InPuntlandandSomaliland,wherestaffpresence is limited and travel outside Hargeisaand Garowe restricted, a combination of ele-ments of ‘remote control’ and ‘remote support’applies. In all regions, however, monitoring ofprojects rests largely with contracted NGOs orcommercialfirms.

3.4.4 UNDP AS A ‘PROVIDER OF LAST RESORT’

A number of strategic and programmaticdecisions thathave shapedUNDPprogrammesinSomaliahavebeenbasedonthenotionsharedby many donors that UNDP had an obligationto undertake an activity as the provider of lastresortwhennoreadilyavailableimplementationalternativeexisted.Someoftheseactivitieshavebeen one-time interventions and included forexample the rehabilitation of infrastructure andgeneral logistical support for special events.Onthe other hand, some activities have implied alonger-termcommitmentandamoredirectandvisiblesupporttotheTFGanditssecuritysectorinstitutions. As discussed later in this report,such activities, particularly the payment of sal-ariesandstipends,44havehadanegative impacton the image of UNDP as a neutral develop-mentpartner.This image issuehasbeenvoicedbyseveralpersonsinterviewed,particularlythoseinvolvedinhumanitarianwork.

The concept of ‘provider of last resort’ wasdeveloped in 2006 in the context of humani-tarian emergencies and as part of the ‘clusterapproach’.45Under that concept, thedesignatedhumanitarian cluster lead agency would haveanobligationtoactwhennootheragency is in

43 Seeinparticular:(i)‘RemoteProgramminginSomalia,’DiscussionPaper,OXFAMandMerlinfortheNGOConsortium,January2009;(ii)‘OperationalModalitiesinIraq’,BriefingPaper,NGOCoordinationCommitteeinIraq,January2008;and,(iii)‘CreatingHumanitarianSpace:acasestudyofSomalia’,ErikAbild,RefugeeStudiesCentre,Oxford,forUNHCR,January2009.

44 StipendsforthefederalpolicearecoveredundertheROLSprogrammewhereassalariestoofficialsarecoveredunderbothROLSandGovernanceprogrammes.

45 Thetermclusterisusedtodefineagroupofhumanitarianactorscooperatingtoensurethateachsectorofinterventionsforhumanitarianemergenciesbenefitsfromapredictableleadershipandincreasedaccountability.

2 0 C H A P T E R 3 . U N D P R E S P O N S E A N D S T R A T E G I E S

a position to deliver essential assistance.46 Theconcept has never been fully implemented andby October 2009, the Inter-Agency StandingCommittee (IASC) still had on its agenda theneedtoclarifytheformula.

UNDPitselfmentionedtheconceptofproviderof last resort in its strategicplanfor2008-2011inthefollowingterms:

“AspartoftheUNCTresponsetonationaldemand,UNDPwillstandreadytoserveasthe‘provideroflastresort’incaseofnationalcapacity deficit or crisis when specificallyaskedtodoso.WithinthecontextofoverallUnited Nations support for internationallyagreed development goals, including theMDGs and, when requested by nationalgovernments, UNDP, after consultationwithUnitedNationsorganizationsthathaveamandate for operational activities in theirrespective areas of work, may exceptionallyprovide support in areas outside the agreedfocusareas.”47

This particular paragraph has not beentranslated into any form of operational guid-ance and it is not clear how it would applyto the Somali context given the references todevelopmentgoalsandtheMDGs.Admittedly,therehavebeenprecedentselsewhereforUNDP

assuming unusual administrative functions. InAfghanistan, between 2002 and 2005, UNDPwas restricted largely to providing administra-tive services, including the payment of salariesfor civil service and the police, as well as cap-acity development in the formal institutions ofstate.Since2005,UNDPhasrefocuseditspro-grammesinAfghanistanandadoptedabroaderapproach encompassing support to the civilsociety, job creations and livelihoods.48 Thereis a notable difference, however, between theapproachestakenbyUNDPinAfghanistanandin Somalia. Afghanistan engaged rapidly in apost-conflict and state-building phase and theUNDP approach to the provision of adminis-trative services could incorporate developmentgoalsprovidinganexitstrategythroughtherapidtransferofresponsibilitytonationalinstitutions.InaconflictsituationsuchastheoneprevailinginSouthandCentralSomaliaandintheabsenceof external security presence in most areas, theUNDP commitment as a provider of adminis-trativeservicesappearsopen-endedandwithoutaviableexitstrategy.Thedifficultyhasbeentoimplement an exit strategy in an unpredictableenvironmentwherethepoliticalroadmapisnotlinear,whereoperationalalternativesarefewandwhere immense pressure is put on UNDP tocontinueplayingthisrole.

46 TheInter-AagencyStandingCommittee(IASC)‘GuidanceNoteonUsingtheClusterApproachtoStrengthenHumanitarianResponse,’ofNovember2006,describesthe‘provideroflastresort’conceptinthefollowingterms:“Wheretherearecriticalgapsinhumanitarianresponse,itistheresponsibilityofclusterleadstocallonallrelevanthumanitarianpartnerstoaddressthese.Ifthisfails,thendependingontheurgency,theclusterleadas‘provideroflastresort’mayneedtocommititselftofillingthegap”.

47 ‘UNDPStrategicPlan,2008-2011:Acceleratingglobalprogressonhumandevelopment’(DP/2007/43/Rev.1),para.55,22May2008.

48 ElementsofanalysisoftheUNDPprogrammeinAfghanistanaredrawnfromthe‘AssessmentofDevelopmentResults:EvaluationofUNDPcontribution:IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan’,UNDPEvaluationOffice,May2009.

2 1C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

4.1 GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME

Withatotalof$103.2millionspentduringtheperiod 2005 to 2009, activities under govern-ance and reconciliation account for nearly halfof total programme expenditure. This area ofintervention is also the one that received themost support from donors, with 89.3 percentof the total amount financed from non-coreresources. The management of the GovernanceProgramme undertook a major effort in recent

years to consolidate and streamline a numberof project activities implemented between 2005and2007andmainlyrelatedtocapacitydevelop-ment. The new programme started in 2008has evolved around the four major componentsidentified in Table 6. The table also indicatesactivities implemented before 2008 that wereconsolidatedunderthethreeactive49componentsof the streamlinedprogramme. Inaddition, thetablestatestheexpectedoutcomes(asperCPD2008-2010),aswellas the totalexpenditure fortheperiod2005to2009.

CHAPTER4

CONTRIBUTION OF UNDP TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Table 6. Governance and reconciliation programmes (2005-2009)Total expenditure: US$ 103.2 million

Expectedoutcomes(basedonCPD2008-2010):•KeyFederal,SomalilandandPuntlandgovernmentinstitutionsadministerandmanagecore

governmentfunctionsmoreeffectivelywithaccountabilityandinclusion•Reconciliationadvanceswithsignificantprogressonremainingtransitionaltasksunderthe

TransitionCharter•Selectedlocalgovernmentscontributetoreconciliationandplanningforequitableservicedelivery

inselectlocations

Component/mainactivities Projectactivein Sourcesoffunding

SC* PL** SL***

Component 1: Reconciliation and Peacebuilding

ConstitutionaldialogueandsupporttodraftingoftheConstitution

XDenmark,DFID,EC,Norway,SIDAandUSAID

Component 2: Local Governance

Developmentoflocalgovernance,includingcadastralsurveyinSomalilandandUNDPparticipationinthenewUNJointProgrammeforLocalGovernanceinthethreeregions

X X X

Denmark,DFID,Italy,Norway,SIDAandUSAID

Component 3: Somali Institutions Development Project

-Policyandlegislativesystemsdevelopment-Humanresourcedevelopment-Capacitydevelopmentandtraining-Publicfinancialmanagement-Infrastructuredevelopment

X X X

Denmark,DFID,EC,Norway,SIDAandUSAID

Conponent 4: Civil Society and Media X X X Projectnotstarted

*SouthandCentralSomalia,**Puntland,***SomalilandSource:UNDPSomalia,March2010.

49 Component4wasdevelopedin2009toaddresscivilsocietyandthemediabutithasnotreceiveddonorsupportyetandremainsunimplemented.

2 2 C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

Pre-2008: Two important activities werecompleted in2008andhavemarkedtheperiodleading to the consolidation mentioned above:the cadastral survey undertaken in Somalilandand the district- and community-based peace-buildingandreconciliationactivitiesinSouthandCentralSomalia.ThefirstSomalilandCadastralSurvey Project started in 2001 and representeda sustained effort to provide secure land-tenurearrangements for non-demarcated farms inSomaliland with the objective of reducing ten-sions arising from land-tenure disputes. Theproject resulted in 12,500 farms surveyed andsome12,000certificatesissued,althoughonly850actualtitleswereissued,largelyowingtotherela-tivelyhighissuancefeesleviedbytheMinistryofAgriculture.A2008evaluation50concludedthatthe project resulted in an important reductionofboundarydisputes.

The second completed activity concerned dis-trict- and community-based peacebuilding andreconciliation implemented under two separateprojects inSouth andCentralSomaliabetween2006 and 2008. The projects aimed at estab-lishing sustainable local government structuresthroughparticipatorycommunitydialogueandatprovidingmaterialsupportandcapacitydevelop-ment for councillors and administrative staff.The project supported the establishment of 18district councils through community participa-tion. Unfortunately, the return of violence andinsecurity weakened the sustainability of thesecouncils. A 2008 review51 concluded that thelaudableefforts tobuilda ‘bottomup’approachhad been compromised by a number of ‘topdown’ interventions by TFG institutions andpersonalities and that sustainability and owner-shiphadbeenweakenedbythegrantingofhighallowances and financial compensations to par-ticipantsintheprojects.Lessonslearnedthroughthe two community-based projects have beenimportant inputs for developing the new ‘JointProgrammeforLocalGovernance’(2008-2010).

Post-2008: Since 2008, UNDP has aligned itsinterventions to relevant outcomes identified intheRDPand theUNTP forSomalia.Most ofthe activities have been implemented under abroad strategic partnership agreement betweenUNDP and a group of donors (Denmark,DFID,Norway,SwedenandUSAID)aswellascontributionsfromtheECandUNDP/BCPR.

4.1.1 RECONCILIATION AND PEACEBUILDING

UNDP has been actively engaged in providinglogisticalandtechnicalservicesinsupportoftheprocess of national reconciliation and the pro-motionofpeaceduringthewholeperiodunderreview. This has included, among other initia-tives,therehabilitationofinfrastructureandtheprovision of equipment to help the Parliamentof the Transitional Federal Government moveto Baidoa (2005) and to Mogadishu (2009)or to facilitate the holding of the NationalReconciliation Conference also in Mogadishu(2007). UNDP was also instrumental in sup-porting the organization of the DjiboutiConference(2008)thatledtoaceasefirebetweentheTFGandtheAlliancefortheRe-liberationof Somalia (ARS). These activities have beenpunctualinterventionsthatservedthepurposeofreconciliation, although contributing only mar-ginally to developing good governance. UNDPiscurrentlyengagedinprovidingdirecttechnicalsupporttoparliamentariansandotherofficialsoftheTFGtowardsachievingspecifictasksoftheTransitionFederalCharter.Inaddition,UNDPismanagingthepaymentofcontributionstosal-ariesofpublicservantsandpoliticalleadershipatacostofapproximately$500,000amonth.

Support for the drafting of a new federalconstitution is also an important contributiontotheongoingtransitionalpoliticalprocessandcertainlyonethatcorrespondsmoretotraditionalareas of intervention of UNDP and to its coremandateandcompetence.

50 ‘EvaluationofSomalilandCadastreSurveyProject’,MarkA.Marquardt,UNDP,October2008.51 ‘TheDistrictBasedPeaceBuildingandReconciliationProjectandtheCommunityBasedPeaceSupportProject,

Somalia:ReviewReport’,JoakimGundel,KATUNIConsultforUNDP,October2008.

2 3C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

UNDP has shown a capacity to respond ina timely and efficient manner to requests forthe type of support described above. In imple-menting many of those activities, however,UNDPactsmainlyasaserviceprovideronbehalfofUNPOSandsomemajordonors.Whilesomeoftheseactivitiesareone-timeinputseffectivelysupportingreconciliation,otherssuchasthepay-mentofsalarieswouldrequireaclearandviableexitstrategy.

4.1.2 PROMOTING LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZED SERVICES

Two UNDP projects implemented in Southand Central Somalia between 2006 and 2008addressed the need for improved local govern-ance at the district and community levels andserved as the basis for developing activities inthe area of local governance in the post-2008restructured Governance and Reconciliationprogramme. In 2008, the UNCT decided to

Box 1. The Somalia Constitution-Making Support Project

Source: Interviewswithstaffanddonorrepresentatives/projectdocumentanddonorbriefingpapers.aTheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment(IGAD)inEasternAfricawascreatedin1996andincludessixmember

nations:Djibouti,Ethiopia,Kenya,Somalia,SudanandUganda.

Theadoptionofaconstitutionis

anessentialrequirementofthe

‘TransitionalFederalCharterof

theSomaliRepublic’,adopted

inFebruary2004followingthe

2002-2004roundofnegotiations

sponsoredbyIGADafacilitated

byKenya.Inthewordsofa

donorrepresentative,“UNDPhas

spentsixyearsontheprocessof

draftingaconstitutionandnot

asinglelinehasbeenwrittenso

far...”Thecase,however,isnot

sosimple.Theprocesssuffered

fromaseriesof‘stop-and-go’

decisionsonwhichUNDPhad

nocontrol,astheyweredue

mainlytosecurityandpolitical

considerations.

Indeed,theprocesssuffereda

numberofdelays.Afirstdelay

occurredwiththelateappoint-

ment,inMay2006,ofthe

15-memberIndependentFederal

ConstitutionalCommission(IFCC),

shortlyafterParliamentcon-

venedinBaidoa.Theprojectwas

thenputonholdfollowingthe

assassinationoftheMinisterfor

ConstitutionalAffairson24July

2006,thedayaftertheopening

oftheinauguralworkshopthat

wasintendedtokickoffthecon-

stitutiondraftingprocess.Itwas

onlyin2008,aftertheDjibouti

ConferencethatUNPOSandthe

donorsinsistedonrenewing

effortstodraftaconstitution,

butnewdelaysoccurred,owing

mainlytolatefundingand

organizationaldifficultiesforthe

recruitmentofprojectstaff.

ByMarch2010,theprojectwas

stillinacapacitydevelopment

phaseformembersoftheIFCC

andthepublicparticipation

phasewasduetostartinApril.

Afirstdraftoftheconstitutionis

nowexpectedforJuly2010with

afinaldraftbyDecember2010,

deadlinesthatappearunrealistic

tomanyobservers.Somehave

alsosuggestedthatUNDPhas

spenttoomuchtimeoncapacity

developmentattheexpenseof

publicparticipation.TheCharter

foresawthattheconstitution

wouldthenbeadoptedby

referendumbeforetheendofthe

transitionperiodinAugust2011.

Theorganizationofareferendum

isnotconsideredimplementable

giventhesituationinSomaliaand

asimpleadoptionbyParliament

iscurrentlybeingdiscussed.

Amajorachievementofthe

projecthasbeentheintroduction

ofaconsultativemanagement

structurethatensuresthefull

participationofdonorsaswell

asotherorganizationsinvolved

inprovidingsupporttothe

commoneffort.Inaddition

toalargenumberofdonors,

organizations,suchasAWEPA,

COSTI,InterPeace,theNational

DemocraticInstitute,theMax

PlanckInstitute,andUNPOShave

joinedUNDP(actingascoordin-

ator)intoa‘Consortium’that

overseestheimplementationof

thesupportproject.Theproject

alsomanagedtosecurethe

participationofrecognized

nationalexperts.

2 4 C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

merge ongoing initiatives by ILO, UNCDF,UNDP, UN-Habitat and UNICEF into afive-year ‘United Nations Joint Programme forLocal Governance and Decentralized ServiceDelivery’ (2008-2012). The stated purpose ofthe Joint Programme is to contribute to peaceby enhancing local governance and the deliveryofequitableprioritydecentralizedservicestotheSomali people in South and Central Somalia,PuntlandandSomaliland.

Funding came in only by March 2009 and thejoint programme encountered some delays. Italso became necessary to reduce the number oftarget districts in South and Central Somaliaowing to prevailing insecurity. The programmenevertheless succeeded indevelopingacompre-hensiveapproachbasedonaparticipatoryprocesswithincommunitiesandincorporatingaspectsofgender. The Somali authorities and the donorshave expressed their appreciation for themeth-odologydevelopedby the jointprogrammeandthe initial results achieved in terms of benefitsto communities. Some participating UN agen-cieshavenoted,however,thattheadministrativeprocessesappliedtojointprogrammesarecum-bersome and slow and that perhaps upstream‘joint programming’ should be pursued in thefuture, leaving the management of the projectsdirectlytoagencieswithaverylightcoordinationmechanismduringimplementation.

4.1.3 SOMALI INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPMENT

The Somali Institutional DevelopmentProject (SIDP, 2008-2010) is providing cap-acity development and general support to keySomaliinstitutionsinPuntland,SomalilandandSouth and Central Somalia. The SIDP bringstogetherfiveprojectsimplementedbetween2004and 2008: the Somali Institutional CapacityDevelopment Project (SICAD), the QualifiedExpatriate Somali Technical Support Project(QUESTS),theEmergencyTechnicalAssistanceProject (ETA), the Start-Up Package and theSomaliInstitutionalSupportProject(SISP).TheSIDPaddressesfourfundamentalpillarsofinsti-tutionaldevelopment:

�� The development of systems and processesfor the making and implementation ofpoliciesandlaws

�� Thedevelopmentofhumanresources

�� The improvement of public financialmanagement

�� Thedevelopmentofphysicalinfrastructure.

UNDPsupporttoTFGinstitutionsunderSIDPand predecessor interventions has representedthe largest financial input under this activity.As an indication, the six-month ‘Start-upPackage’ designed to support the TFG instal-lation in Mogadishu at the beginning of 2009was budgeted at $12 million. Interventions infavourof federal institutionshaveoftenbeenofan administrative support nature to respond tonewrequirementsresultingfromadvancesinthepolitical process and only a limited number ofinitiativesconcernmoredirectlytraditionalcap-acitydevelopmentsupportprovidedbyUNDPinmostdemocraticgovernanceprogrammesacrosstheworld.

By contrast, UNDP is not involved as aprovider of administrative services in PuntlandandSomaliland.Governanceprogrammesimple-mented in both regions cover more traditionalareas of intervention through technical inputs,capacity development and some infrastruc-tural work and provision of equipment. Theseinterventions have more effectively contributedto developing good governance in the tworegionsconcerned.

The QUESTS project stands out as aninnovativeandusefulinitiativeaimedatsecuringthe temporary injection of Somali diasporaexpertise to strengthen government administra-tionsforthedevelopmentoftheircountry.Theprojectisnowimplementedincooperationwiththe International Organization for Migration(IOM)andthusbenefitsfromthatorganization’sexperience and expertise developed through itsMigration for Development in Africa (MIDA)

2 5C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

initiative. The number of placements underthe new programme should soon reach 25 andSomali authorities have expressed appreciationforthescheme.

Anotherparticularlysuccessfulinterventionthatthe ADR team could document through fieldvisits concerned the support to public finan-cialmanagementinSomaliland.Throughfundsmade available ($246,000 per year) by UNDP,the Fiscal Policy and Reforms Management(FPRM) Unit, under the Ministry of Financein Somaliland, has been able to recruit senioreconomists and advisers with public financeexpertise, some brought in through theQUESTSprogramme.

TheFPRMfocusesonfivemainareasofoverallpublicfinancemanagement:

�� Expenditure management:Thebroadaimisto improvethe linksbetweenpolicymaking,planning and budgeting system throughensuringastablefiscalpolicy,andimprovedallocation of resources and spending ondevelopmentpriorities.

�� Revenue mobilization:Thelargelyinformalnature of the Somaliland economy makesit difficult to generate reliable statistics fortax purposes. Lack of data and poor taxregulation prevent policymakers and taxadministratorsfromintroducinganyeffectiveandefficienttaxmeasures.Althoughnotduesolely to theFPRMwork, it is tobenotedthat tax collection has increased from $38millionto$50millioninthepasttwoyears.

�� Financial sector development: The unitsupportstheMinistryofFinanceandtheBankofSomalilandinestablishingtheinstitutionalbase for the development of appropriatemacroeconomic policies. Currently, there isno functioning central bank in SomalilandandanewbankinglawhasbeendraftedforpresentationtoParliament.

�� Capacity development of integrity institutions: The FPRM facilitates theadoptionofbestpracticesandlearningfromother countries in order to ensure that the

OfficeoftheAuditorGeneralandtheOfficeoftheAccountantGeneralarecapacitatedtohandletheirmandatesefficiently,effectivelyandindependently.

�� Procurement systems: The FPRM unit isworking with the relevant department inthe Ministry of Finance to develop clearguidelines for procurement by governmentinstitutions.Acodeofethicsforallgovern-mentstaffdealingwithprocurementhasnowbeenadopted.

4.1.4 ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME

The outcomes stated for the Governance andReconciliation programmes appear overlyambitious in the Somali context. This appliesparticularlytotheSouthandCentralregionwithregard to the first outcome stated in Table 6:“KeyFederal(...)governmentinstitutionsadmin-ister and manage core government functionsmore effectively with accountability and inclu-sion”. The extremely limited territorial controloftheTFGandthecurrentsecurityandmilitaryquagmire in Mogadishu make it impossible forfederal institutions toworkeffectively andhavean impact on the quality of normal and essen-tial core government functions. Effective workongovernanceissuesrequiresaminimumofsta-bility and the presence of authorities exercisingtothelargestextentpossiblealltheprerogativesanddutiesofastate.Thisisclearlynotthecasein that part of the country and the programmeimplemented by UNDP has largely been oneof filling administrative gaps in support of anelusivepoliticalprocess.

In contrast, Somaliland and, to a lesser extent,Puntland have reached a stage where develop-ment work can be done effectively and theinstitution-building programmes, in particular,have achieved significant results. Activities insupport of the civil service reform and theintroductionoffiscalandfinancialmanagementprovide good examples of interventions havingproduced tangible results and progress towardsthefirstoutcomestatedabove.

2 6 C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

The second stated outcome – “Reconciliationadvanceswithsignificantprogressonremainingtransitional tasksunder theTransitionCharter”– is being addressed by UNDP support forthe drafting and adoption of a new FederalConstitution,oneofthekeybenchmarksoftheTransitional Charter. After major delays duemainly to security and political considerationsoutsidethecontrolofUNDP,theprojectisnowwell under way and UNDP has been praisedfor itseffortsatdevelopingavery inclusiveandparticipatorymethodforadvancingtheprocess.

The third outcome is linked to the promotionoflocalgovernance:“Selectedlocalgovernmentscontributing to reconciliation and planning forequitable services in select locations”.The jointprogramme for local governance represents avaluableexperienceintermsofa jointUNpro-cess but has suffered from delays and excessiveemphasis on processes rather than results. Onthe other hand, the very systematic approachpromotedtoensureeffectivecommunitypartici-pation is appreciated by the national and localauthoritiesaswellasdonors.Itistooearly,how-ever,toassesstheresultsofthisnewprogrammein terms of promoting both reconciliation andplanningprocessesforequitableservices.

In terms of management of the programme,better results could be achieved through morecohesion and synergy between the governanceand ROLS programmes. As mentioned in sec-tion 3.2 of the preceding chapter, many of theactivities implemented under each of the twoprogrammes are interlinked and would gener-ally be considered as falling under a broader‘democraticgovernance’focusareaoftheUNDPcorporatestrategicplan.

In the country office, two separate administra-tive units manage the Governance and ROLSprogrammes. There are valid reasons for thismanagement structure to handle two very largeportfolios but that only further underlines the

needforstrong jointprogrammingbetweenthetwounits.

4.2 RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

Withatotalexpenditureof$66.4millionduringthe period 2005-2009, ROLS has been thesecondlargestprogrammeofthecountryoffice.Ithasaccountedfor31.9percentofallprogrammeexpenditureandhasattractedconsiderabledonorsupport with some 87 percent of the fundingemanating from non-core resources. Since2002, successive programmes have pursued twomainobjectives:

�� The improvement of the securityenvironment in Somalia through securitysector reform, disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration, small arms control andmineaction

�� Better protection and improved access tojustice for the Somalis through the pro-motion of competent civilian police force,judiciary, and custodial corps operatingin compliance with international humanrightsstandards.

In 2008 and 2009, the management of theprogramme undertook to balance the stronginstitutionalsupportapproachthatcharacterizedprogrammessince2002withmoreemphasisoncommunity-level interventions, amore assertiverights-based approach and a stronger focus onaccountability.TheinternalreviewoftheROLSprogramme also emphasized the need for morecoherence and synergy between components oftheprogramme.

AsillustratedinTable7,theROLSprogrammeisorganizedaroundfourmaincomponentswithafifthonebeingacross-cuttingcomponentpro-motingthestreamliningofthethemesofgenderandhumanrightsinallotherinterventions.

2 7C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

4.2.1 CIVILIAN POLICE

Publicsecurity isacentralelementof transitionsfromcivilwar to stability throughout theworld.The paradox of post-conflict police reforms isthatthesesettingsofferbothunparalleledoppor-tunities to reconceptualize and reshape policinginstitutions and doctrines, and deeply hostileenvironments for the implementation of ambi-tiousreformplans.Internationaldonorsplayakeyroleinthesepolicereformsbyprovidingexpertiseandresourcestocountriesthatlackthem.52

UNDP has been involved in the training ofpoliceofficersinSomaliasincethe1990s.Withthe creation of the Rule of Law and SecurityProgramme in 2002, support to the civilianpolicewasgivenmoreprominenceandhasnowbecomeacentralelementofROLS,accountingforover40percentofUNDPtotalexpenditureforthatprogramme.53IthasalsobecomeoneofthemostcontroversialcomponentsofthewholeUNDPprogramme.Controversyarosefromthedecisiontorespondtodonorrequestsandassume

52 MelissaZieglerandRachelNield,‘FromGovernancetoPeace:PoliceReformandtheInternationalCommunity’,Arapporteurs’reportbasedonaNovember2001conferencesponsoredbyTheWashingtonOfficeonLatinAmericaandtheJohnsHopkinsUniversity,PaulH.NitzeSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies,2001.

53 AdamSmithInternational,‘EvaluationoftheUNDPStrategicPartnershipforSomalia’,table1,p.7,UNDP,July2009.Thefiguresgivenconcernyears2006to2008.

Table 7. Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programmes (2005-2009)Total expenditure: US$ 66.3 million

Expectedoutcomes(basedonCPD2008-2010):•ImprovedsecurityenvironmentinSomalia•Somalis,especiallyvulnerablegroups,havebetterprotectionunderthelawandimprovedaccesstojustice.

Component/mainactivities Projectactivein Sourcesoffunding

SC* PL** SL***

Component 1: Civilian Police (formerly law enforcement)

-Establishmentofcommunity-basedpolicing X X Denmark,DFID,EC,Norway,SIDAandUSAID-Rehabilitation,constructionandequipment

oftrainingfacilitiesandpolicestationsX X X

-Training X X X

-Paymentofstipends X

-SpecialProtectionUnit(SPU) X X X

Component 2: Access to Justice

-Judicialsystemreformandlegaleducation X X X Denmark,DFID,EC,Norway,SIDA,USAIDandUNDP/BCPR

-Infrastructurerehabilitation/construction,furniture,equipment

X X X

-Trainingofjusticepersonnel X X X

-Supportforlegalresourcesandlawreview,production,distributionandgazetting

X X

Component 3: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration and Armed Violence Reduction

-DDRprogrammes X X X Denmark,DFID,EC,Italy,Japan,Norway,SIDA,USAIDandUNDP/BCPR

-ArmedViolenceReduction(CommunitySafetyProject)

X X X

Component 4: Civil Society and Media X X Denmark,EC,Sweden

Component 5: Human Rights and Gender(Inclusionofhumanrightsandgenderinalltraining)

X X XDenmark,DFID,Norway

Source:UNDPSomalia,March2010*SouthandCentralSomalia,**Puntland;***Somaliland.

2 8 C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

responsibilityforthepaymentofstipendstotheTFG police force and from reports of humanrightsabusescommittedbypoliceofficers.54

Prior to 2007, UNDP support to the civilianpolice focused on capacity development ofnationalpartners,training,provisionofminimumbasic operational equipment and police stationinfrastructureinallthreeregionsofSomalia.

From 2007, UNDP became engaged at theurgingofitsprincipaldonorsintheprovisionofstipendstotheTFGpoliceforce(SomaliaPoliceForce–SPF).Atthebeginningof2008,UNDPsuspended the payment of stipends because ofthe human rights abuse allegations mentionedabove as well as general poor management ofthe police force and lack of financial transpar-ency and accountability. The donor insistedthat payments be resumed55 and UNDP did soonly for officers having undergone appropriatetraining with a human rights component andafterhavingputinplaceadditionalmechanismsfor control and monitoring. UNDP intensifiedits support to the SPF in 2009 when the newexpandedTFGand theParliamentwere estab-lishedinMogadishu.Outofthetotalprogrammebudgetestimatesof some$98million for2010,$12millionisearmarkedforthepaymentofthepolicestipend.

The International Contact Group, meeting inBrusselson26and27February2009,welcomed“the commitment of UNDP to continue to actas the implementing agency in the develop-mentofanaccountablecivilianpoliceforcewitha targetof10,000civilianpolice tobeachievedbythesecondquarterof2010”.56ByJune2010,UNDPwillhavetrained3,300policeofficersin

additiontopre-existingcontingentsaswellassome2,500otherstrainedunderbilateralprogrammes.

UNDP continues to build the capacity ofthe civilian police services in Somaliland andPuntlandwhileatthesametimesupportingtheSpecialProtectionUnits(seeBox2)inthehopethat authorities will eventually take over thatresponsibility. The support to the SPU placesmuch emphasis on improving command, con-trolandmanagementstructures,andtraining.Italso seeks to achieve a balance between recruittraining and specialized training for mid-rankandseniorofficials.

The programme also contributed to therehabilitation of various police stations andprisons, including one in Gardo that the ADRteamvisited.TheprisoninGardosufferedfromstructuralengineeringproblemsresultinginpartsof a wall collapsing and delaying the handovertoauthorities.

TrainingisprovidedattheArmoFederalPoliceAcademy for Puntland and South and CentralSomaliaandattheManderaPoliceAcademyforSomaliland.ThetwofacilitieshavebeenenlargedtohostanexpandedtrainingprogrammeandtheGardo Police Training School in Puntland hasalso been rehabilitated to take in recruits fromthat region.UNDPhas also supported the for-mulation of a new police training curriculumthatincludeshumanrights,gender,HIV/AIDS,community-basedpolicing,childprotection,andsexual-andgender-basedviolencemodules.Thisisindicativeofagenerallystrongerhumanrights-basedapproachinthemanagementoftheROLSprogrammeinrecentyears.

54 RobCrilly,TimesOnline,‘TheBritishtaxpayerfundsSomalipoliceforceforregimeaccusedofwarcrimes’,2June2008;andHumanRightsWatch,‘Somuchtofear’:WarCrimesandDevastationofSomalia,pp.98-102,December2008.

55 TheEuropeanCommissionerforDevelopmentandHumanitarianAidwrotetotheSecretary-GeneraloftheUNinJuly2008tomakethispoint.

56 ‘InternationalContactGrouponSomaliaCommuniqué’,UnitedNationsPoliticalOfficeforSomalia,27February2009.

2 9C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

UNDP helped create Police AdvisoryCommittees(PACs) inthethreeregionswhereit implemented civilian police support pro-grammes. The PACs are intended as a civilianoversight mechanism to ensure the respectof human rights standards. A UN SecurityCouncil report describes the Police AdvisoryCommittee functioning in Mogadishu as fol-lows: “The Committee is one of the civilianoversight structures that was established andassigned to all 18 Mogadishu police districts,following a 2008 Amnesty International reportthat documented gross violations of humanrights allegedly committed by the Governmentforces. The Committee’s membership includesparliamentarians, clan elders, journalists, rep-resentatives of thebusiness community and theAssociation of Women. Its fundamental role istoensurethatthepoliceofficersrespecttheruleoflawandhumanrightslaw.”57

UNDP also promoted the inclusion of womeninthevariouspoliceforces.In2006,thefirst46formallytrainedfemalepoliceofficersjoinedtheSomalilandPoliceForceandthesameyear,therewere19womenamongthefirst154policecadetsgraduating from the newly rehabilitated ArmoFederalPoliceAcademy.UNDPalsocooperatedwith UNICEF for the introduction of specialdesksforwomenandchildreninpolicestations.

Morerecently,theprogrammeofsupporttothecivilianpolicehasbeenemphasizing the serviceaspect of the police force over a strictly publicorderapproach.Thenewapproachencompassescommunitypolicing,crimepreventionandcom-munity/policedialoguetobuildcitizenconsensusandconfidence.

4.2.2 ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Projects implemented under this component oftheROLSprogrammecorrespondtotraditional

Box 2. The Special Protection Unit

Source: Projectdocumentandreports/discussionswithPoliceCommissionersandUNDPstaffinHargeisaandGarowe.

TheSpecialProtectionUnit(SPU)wasestablishedin2003and2005inSomalilandandPuntland,respectively,toprovideprotec-tiontoUNandinternationalNGOsoperatinginthenorthernpartsofSomalia.Thedecisiontocreatethatspecialforcewasaresultofanescalationoftheincidenceofkillingsandkidnap-pingsofaidworkers.Servicesincludetheprovisionofstand-byguards,personalprotectionandconvoyescorts.ThesespecialforcesremainunderthefullcommandandcontrolofPoliceCommissionersandarealsooccasionallyusedforothertaskssuchascrowdcontrolonspecialoccasions.

TheSPUhashaditsfairshareofpositivecommentsandcriticisms.

Mostpositivecommentshaverevolvedaroundtheimportantroletheyhaveplayedinenablingaidworkerstocontinuetoaccesspopulationsandsuperviseprojectsinotherwiseinsecureenvironments.UNDPstaffandauthoritiesalsocitedthepositiveroleofSPUasadisciplinedandprofessionalcrowdcontrolforceduringdemonstrationsbytheoppos-itioncallingforpresidentialelectionsinSomaliland.

Criticsfaultthelargeproportionofbudgetaryallocationcon-sumedbytheSPUforprotectingthehumanitariananddiplo-maticcommunityasopposedtomeetingtheactuallawenforce-mentneedsandexpectationsoftheSomalipeople.Thetotalcost

oftheSPUcurrentlystandsat$1.2millionannually.WhilethecostofprotectingNGOsisfullymetfromadonorcontribution,therewasanissue,nowresolved,aboutsharingthecostbetweenbenefitingUNagencies.Ensuringproperdisciplineandfinancialtransparencyinthegovernment-handleddistributionofsalariesandallowancesforescortsremainsaproblem.

InSomaliland,SPUstaffispaidasalarybythegovernment,whileclientorganizationsthroughUNDPpaythemadaily‘lunch’allowance.Thesituationisdif-ferentinPuntland,wheretheSPUofficersarepaidamonthlystipendandadailyallowancewhenevertheyareengagedinprotectionoperations.

57ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralonthesituationinSomalia,(S/2009/373),para.28.

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areasofinterventionofUNDPinpost-conflict,recoveryandstate-buildingsituations.Althoughsome projects were implemented in South andCentral Somalia between 2005 and 2007, mostactivities came to a halt in 2008 with the totalevacuationofUNDPstaff from that region. Inboth Somaliland and Puntland, interventionsrelated to access to justice have effectively con-tributed to the achievement of much-neededdevelopmentgoals.Activities implementedsuc-cessfullyinSomalilandduringafirstphasewerereplicatedinPuntland.Duringtheperiodunderreview, UNDP has contributed significantly tothefollowingactivities:

1. Assistancetotheauthoritiesforthedraftingofacodeofconductforthejudiciary,pros-ecutorsandthewiderlegalprofession;

2. Theharmonizationofformalandcustomarylaws;

3. The constructionor rehabilitationof courtsand prisons, including the establishment ofhealthfacilitiesincentralprisons;

4. The training of judges, prosecutorsandassessors;

5. The creation of legal clinics providingfree-of-chargelegalaidtothevulnerableandthepoor;

6. IncooperationwithUNICEF,thedevelop-mentofa Juvenile JusticeInitiativeandtheestablishment of special desks for womenandchildreninpolicestations;

7. Thetrainingandre-trainingofjudges,pros-ecutors and assessors, aswell as scholarshipprogrammes for students, particularly girls,incooperationwithFacultiesofLaw.

Theprogrammehasbeenparticularlysuccessfulin developing a working relationship with theacademic world. In the three regions, UNDPhasbeenassistingfacultiesof lawofestablisheduniversities and cooperating with them in the

implementation of various activities under theROLS programme. Box 3 (next page) providesexamples of the typeof cooperation establishedover the years, using the particular case of theUniversityofHargeisa.

Under this project, UNDP also undertook toassistintheformationofaprofessionalCustodialCorpsinbothSomalilandandPuntland,aswellas the construction of a modern prison facilityhandedover toSomaliauthorities inDecember2009, and another in Gardo in Puntland to behanded over to the authorities in the courseof 2010 following delays due to engineeringdeficiencies. In conjunction with the supportfor judiciary prosecution activities, this line ofengagement responded to core internationalconcerns around piracy and the prosecutionofpirates.

4.2.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION, ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION AND MINE ACTION

UNDP started its disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR) programme in 2003with theobjectiveofdownsizing security forcesmainlyinPuntlandandSomaliland,wherecon-ditionswerethoughttobeconduciveforsuchanapproach.InSouthandCentralSomalia,thefra-gilityof thedifferentpolitical advancesand therepeatedresumptionsofconflicthavenegatedanypossibility of effectively implementing a DDRprogramme.A2008evaluation58concludedthattheeffectivenessoftheprogrammesinPuntlandand Somaliland was adversely affected by theabsenceofafirmcommitmenttotheprocessbytheauthorities.

UNDP has gradually moved away from DDRoperations infavour initiallyofsmallarmscon-trol programmes, active only in Somaliland,andmorerecentlyacommunitysafetyapproachunderan‘armedviolencereduction’programme.Some results could be achieved in Somaliland

58 ‘UNDPROLS–DDR/SACProgramme,Somalia:EvaluationReport’,DesmondMolloy,TokyoUniversityofForeignStudies,andSheckuSilla,UNDP/BCPR,August/September2008.

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under small arms control with the adoption ofnew legislation, thebeginningof registrationofweaponsand the rehabilitationof arsenals.Thearmedviolencereductionprogrammehasstartedonlyrecentlybuthasalreadydevelopedaprom-ising participatory approach with communities.It has also strived to establish baseline data onviolence in communities targeted by the pro-gramme,despitethedifficultiesoftheterrainandthelimitedresourcesoftheproject.

Progresshasbeenachievedinestablishingfunc-tional Mine Action Centres in Puntland and

Somaliland, where the problem relates moreto unexploded ordnance than to actual mines.UNDP initially outsourced the implementationofthisprogrammetotheUNOfficeforProjectServices(UNOPS)andhasnowfullytransferredresponsibilitytotheUNMineActionService.

4.2.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

Thefirstanticipatedoutcomeidentifiedforthisprogrammeisan‘improvedsecurityenvironmentin Somalia’ while the second seeks to ensure

Box 3. UNDP and the University of Hargeisa Faculty of Law

Source: DiscussionswiththeChancelloroftheUniversityofHargeisa,theDeanoftheFacultyofLawandsitevisiton16March2010.

TheUniversityhasestablishedcooperationagreementswiththeUniversitiesofPretoria,AddisAbaba,KhartoumandtheKenyattaUniversityinNairobi.TheUniversityreceivesnosupportfromtheSomalilandgovernmentandisfinancedexclusivelyfromthefeeschargedtostudents($400/year),fromdonationsfromthediasporaandagreementswithotheruniversitiesandinternationalorganizations,suchastheIslamicDevelopmentBankandUNDP.TheChancellorwasparticularlyproudofhavingtheonlyinstituteforconflictanalysisandpeace-buildinginthewholeofSomaliahousedinhisUniversity.TheFacultyofLawoftheUniversityofHargeisawasestablishedin2002withsupportfromUNDP.

a) Legal Aid Clinics:UNDPhelpedthefacultyestablishaLegalAidClinicthathashelpednearly1,600vulnerableandpoorpersonswiththeircourtcasessince2003.Thenumberofpersonsseekinghelpfromtheclinicisincreasingsteadilyandhasnowreachedsome200permonth.Theservicesofthelegalaidclinicarefree

andmostsettlementsresultfrommediationthroughthevariousjusticesystems(sharia,customaryorformal).ThelegalclinichasnowextendeditsactiontoruralareasoutsideHargeisathroughasystemofmobileclinicsworkinginparallelwiththemobilecourtsalsoassistedbyUNDP.

b) Scholarships:Inanefforttopromotetheaccessofgirlsandrepresentativesofminoritygroupstolegalprofessions,UNDPhasbeenprovidingeightscholarshipstohelpstudentscompletetheirlegaltrainingatthefaculty.Sincethecreationofthefacultyin2002,therehavebeenatotalof185graduates.Thenumberoffemalegraduateshasincreasedsteadilyovertheyearsfromonly1outof32(or3percentoftotalgraduates)in2005to25outof69graduates(or36percentofthetotal)in2008.Mostofthegraduates,maleorfemale,findemploy-mentintheprivatesector,withinternationalorganizationsorasindependentpracti-tioners.Theyhavedifficultiesobtainingemploymentinthe

formaljudiciarysystemintheabsenceofapensionsystemthatwouldallowover-agedpersonneltoretireandmakeroomforthenewgeneration.

c) Training of judges and other legal personnel:ThefacilitiesoftheFacultyofLawarebeingusedfortheimplementationofUNDP-assistedtrainingofjudges,prosecutorsandregistrars.TheADRteamwasabletoattendtheinauguralcourseofthetrainingsessionorganizedinMarch2010forsome35judgesandprosecu-torsworkinginfirstinstanceandappealscourts.ThetrainerwasoneofthejudgesoftheSomalilandSupremeCourt.

d) Observatory of violence:UNDPiscurrentlycooper-atingwiththeUniversityfortheestablishmentofanObservatoryofviolencefinancedundertheROLScommunitysafetyproject.TheObservatoryisexpectedtobecomeoperationalduring2010andwillprocessandana-lysedataonviolencecollectedthroughcommunitiespartici-patingintheUNDPproject.

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that“Somalis,especiallyvulnerablegroups,havebetter protection under the law and improvedaccesstojustice”.Bothoutcomesconcernhumansecurity and represent essential needs not onlyfor the welfare and livelihoods of the popula-tion but also for the recovery and developmentof the country. As such, interventions promo-tingimprovedsecurityarecertainlyrelevant.Theeffectiveness of these interventions, however,needs to be assessed differently for the variouspartsofthecountry.

In South and Central Somalia, the generalsecurity situation has worsened since the endof 2006 after a period of stability imposedthrough the Union of Islamic Courts. Most ofthe pre-2008 UNDP investments in infrastruc-ture,equipmentandevenhumanresourceshavebeenlostduetotheresumptionofconflict.Since2007,theprogrammeofsupporttocivilianpoliceinthatpartofthecountryhasbeenemblematicofUNDPdifficultieswithactivitiesperceivedas‘political’.59Manyobservers60haveraiseddoubtsabout the exact nature between a paramilitaryforce and a democratic policing service of theSPFoperatinginMogadishu.Inabilitytoforeseethe different conflict scenarios and plan withthese in mind has exposed the programme tounnecessary criticisms where the humanitariancommunity views UNDP support to the TFGas contributing to the reduction of their ownhumanitarian space in Somalia, while UNPOSsees the role of UNDP as pursuant to variousSecurityCouncilresolutions.

TheUNDPsupporttothecivilianpoliceinthemore conducive environments of Somalilandand Puntland has significantly contributed toimproved security in the two regions. For allthree regions, UNDP effectively ensured the

inclusion of human rights in the training cur-riculumforpoliceofficersandpromotedgenderconsiderations, including through innovativeinterventionssuchastheestablishmentofspecialdesks for women and children in police sta-tions.RegardingthemanagementofsupporttotheSpecialProtectionUnits inSomaliland andPuntland, questions have been raised about therelevance of UNDP involvement and whetherother administrative arrangements could havebeenmade.

The new programme for armed violencereductionthroughacommunitysafetyapproachis also a good illustration of an innovative andimaginative approach to security. UNDP hasnowputtheemphasisonacommunityapproachfor many of its programmes and effectivenesswould be enhanced through more interactionand synergy, for example between communitypolicinginitiativesandthearmedviolencereduc-tion-communitysafetyprojectwithinROLSandbetweentheprogrammesofROLS,GovernanceandRecoveryandSustainableLivelihoods,manyofwhichalsofocusonlocalcommunities.

Interventions for the promotion of access tojustice have produced positive results inSomaliland and Puntland. This is particularlytrue for interventions aimed at improving theoutreach of the judicial system to rural areasthroughthecreationofmobilecourtsandmobilelegal aid clinics. The cooperation establishedbetweentheROLSprogrammeandvariousfac-ulties of law in all three regions is also a verypositivedevelopment.Theprogrammesofaccessto justice definitely represent an area whereUNDPcanachieve results andhasdevelopedastrongcomparativeadvantage.

59 ItshouldbenotedherethatUNPOSiscurrentlyexploringthepossibilityofpayingstipendsthroughaninternationalcommercialfirm.

60 Seeinparticularparagraph28ofthereportofthe‘MonitoringGrouponSomaliapursuanttoSecurityCouncilresolution1811(2008)’(seeS/2008/769),whichreads:“Althoughestablishedasacivilianpoliceforce,theSomaliPoliceForcehasbeenincreasinglydrawnintoSomalia’scivilconflictandeffectivelyservesasaparamilitaryforceengagedincounter-insurgencyoperations.Insomeareas,itisvirtuallyindistinguishablefromtheTransitionalFederalGovernmentmilitary.”

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4.3 RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME

The Poverty Reduction and SustainableLivelihoods (PRSL) programme, initiated in2006, built upon past interventions under theSomali Watching Brief/Poverty Reduction andEconomic Recovery programmes, and absorbedtheformerSomaliFinancialServicesProgramme,while incorporating findingsof the JointNeedsAssesment (JNA). Since 2007, this programmehas been renamed Recovery and SustainableLivelihoods (RSL). Initially small, the pro-grammehascontinuedtogrowinthepastthreeyears,indicatingthepriorityUNDPhascometo

attachtoactivitiesdirectlyimpactingonthelivesofSomalipeople.

This new emphasis is partly a response to theimage and perceptions problems that affectedUNDP following its more visible associationwith political processes and partly an attemptto refocus activities on the basis of the UNDPmandate for pro-poor interventions and sup-port for the attainment of MDGs. Between2005and2009,expenditureforRSLhasgrownmore than twofold, from$4million to$9mil-lion. For the five-year period between 2005and2009,UNDPdevoteda totalofnearly$33

Table 8. Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL) programmes (2005-2009)Total expenditure: US$ 32.8 million

Expectedoutcome(basedonCPD2008-2010):•Vulnerablecommunitieshaveincreasedincomefromequitableandsustainableemploymentopportunities

andarebetterabletomanagenaturalresources

Component/mainactivities Projectactivein Sourcesoffunding

SC* PL** SL***

Component 1: Employment Generation for Economic Recovery

-Employmentandincomegenerationthroughrehabilitationofpublicandsocialinfrastructure

-Jobcreationinitiatives-Capacitydevelopmentandvocationalskills

X X X

DFID,Italy,Japan,NorwayandUNDP/coreresources

Component 2: Area-Based Economic Recovery for Affected Communities in South and Central Somalia

-Income-generatingopportunitiesthroughtrainingandvocationsdevelopment

-Employmentgenerationandmicro-grants-Communitymanagementofnaturalresources

X

UNDP/BCPR

Component 3: Integrated Watershed Management

-Employmentandincomegenerationthroughinfrastructurerehabilitationandvocationaltraining

X X XNorway,UNDP/coreresources

Component 4: Private Sector Development

-Improvementofthelegal,regulatoryandinstitutionalframeworks

-ImprovementofthebusinessenvironmentX X

UNDP/coreresources

Component 5: Environment

-institutionalsupportandawareness-Enhancingalternativesourcesofenergy

X UNDP/coreresource

X

Component 6: Joint Programme for Internally Displaced Personss

-JointUNpilotprojectfornineIDPsettlementsinBossaso

XJapan

Source:UNDPSomalia,March2010*SouthandCentralSomalia,**Puntland,***Somaliland.

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milliontoRSLactivities,representing15.8per-centoftotalexpenditure.UNDPcoreresourceshavefinancedhalftheRSLprogrammes.RaisingfundsforRSLprogrammeshasbeenachallengeas several donors hold the view that UNDPought to concentrate on institutional sup-port to the government while donor fundsfor livelihoods activities can be channelledthroughNGOs.

The Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoodsportfolio61 comprises the major components assummarizedinTable8anddescribedbelow.

4.3.1 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION FOR EARLY RECOVERY

The (Employment Generation for EarlyRecovery) EGER project started during thefourthquarterof2008andaddressestheurgentneedfor incomeand jobs inSouthandCentralSomalia,PuntlandandSomalilandthroughworkfortheimprovementofbasic,socialandeconomicinfrastructure. It is a short-term interventionaimed at providing an injection of cash in thehandsofvulnerablefamilies.AllinterventionsareimplementedthroughNGOsandCSO.

During the first year of operations, the projectgenerated a total of some 430,000 workdays;35 percent of the beneficiaries were womenand 20 percent internally displaced persons.Infrastructure that was rehabilitated includedwatercatchmentareas,ruralaccessroads,irriga-tioncanalsandstrengthenedriverembankments.

The team could not visit South and CentralSomaliawhereEGERactivitiesareimplementedandisnotinapositiontocommentontheactualresultsof interventions. In similar activities vis-itedinPuntlandandSomaliland,however,itwasevident that, most often, the primary objectiveof the intervention was limited to providingincome and not enough attention was given tothequality62oftheproductgeneratedbyworkers.

This raises fear that the situation could be thesamefortheEGERproject,apotentialproblemthatshouldbeassessedindependently.

4.3.2 AREA-BASED EARLY RECOVERY

TheArea-BasedEarlyRecovery(ABER)projectalsostartedlatein2008,primarilyintheBayandMiddle Shebelle regions of South and CentralSomalia. It is fundedbytheUNDPBureauforCrisisPrevention andRecovery (BCPR): $2.28millionwasspentin2009.Theintendedoutcomeoftheproject is toensureatangible increase inincome levels within vulnerable communitiesthroughthecreationofsustainableemploymentopportunities and improved community capaci-ties tomanagenatural resources.Theproject isimplemented through pre-qualified NGOs andconsultingfirms.

During the first yearofoperations, some4,400personsin50communitiesbenefitedfromactiv-itiesthatincludedtraininginvariousagricultural,livestock management and small business skillsas well as hygiene, sanitation, participatoryapproaches, leadership, conflict management,early warning, drought management, HIV/AIDS, and gender. A micro-grant programmehelped 156 families and 134 women-headedhouseholds in getting stable income. In par-allel,220,000workdaysweregeneratedthroughone-time employment for the rehabilitationofinfrastructure.

Itisreportedthatthesuccessrateforthemicro-financegrantsisabout90percent,whichwouldbefarhigherthantheexperienceinothercoun-trieswheremicrofinanceisknowntohavebeensuccessful. Benchmarking with other organ-izations like World Vision, CARE and others,which have worked in the area of income-gen-eratingprogrammesinSomalia,wouldbeusefulforUNDPtoassessthesecond-handreportstheorganizationreliesonfortrackingperformance.

61 UNDP,‘CountryBriefSomalia’,updatedSeptember2009.62 SeeBox5foradescriptionofsomeofthetechnicalproblemswitnessedbytheADRteam.

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AsUNDPstaffhasnoaccesstotheregionwhereABERisbeingimplemented,allmonitoringwasdone throughprivate consultingcompaniesandthrough a combination of, inter alia, telephoneinterviews with beneficiaries, video recordings,radio interviews of beneficiaries. While thisapproach had challenges and shortcomings, theRSLprogrammehasexperimentedwithinnova-tiveapproachesinmonitoring.

4.3.3 INTEGRATED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

The integrated watershed managementproject supports the implementation of a widevariety of community priorities, ranging frominfrastructure rehabilitation (irrigation works,construction and rehabilitation of communalwater supplies, soil and water conservation,environmental health, access roads, market-places, floodcontrol, andsupport toagricultureinfrastructure and crop production) to voca-tional training. The project is active in SouthandCentralSomalia (JubaandShebellebasins)and in Somaliland (Hargeisa flood control). InPuntland, the active water development andconservation projects are financed mainly fromthe EGER project. The integrated watershedmanagementprojectappliesacommunity-basedapproach in the implementation of activitiesand involves the beneficiary communities in allphasesoftheproject,includingidentificationofpriorities,mobilizationofcommunitymembers,andimplementationthroughCSOs,CBOsandlocalstakeholders.

UNDP has in the past done considerable workinwatermanagement,particularlyintheMiddleShebelle region. Near Jowhar in South andCentralSomalia,UNDPworkedwiththeWorldFoodProgramme(WFP),theregionaladminis-trationandthelocalbeneficiarycommunitiesforthe rehabilitation of a 15-kilometre portion ofthe Duduble (China) canal across the ShebelleRiver(seeBox4).Oneoftheexplanationsforthesuccessoftheprojectisthestrongownershipdis-playedbybeneficiariesandauthorities,includingthrough direct participation in funding. Out of

thetotalcostof$1million,twothirdswerecov-eredbythecommunitiesandtheadministration,and one third was contributed by UNDP andWFP. The project was designed to respond toemergency flood disasters along the ShebelleRiverbasin.Divertedfloodwaterandagriculturepotentialofthesurroundingareaswereharnessedto increase foodproductionbenefitingthe largelocalpopulation.Theprojectwas completedbyJune2005.

However, some of the projects implemented inthe Puntland and Somaliland regions - at leastonthefewsitesvisitedbytheADR–havesuf-feredfromanumberoftechnicalweaknesses(seeBox5).UNDPneedstodevelopitsunderstandingandapproachtowatershedmanagementifitser-iouslywantstointerveneinthisarea.Watershedmanagement requires a more holistic under-standingoftheprinciplesoflandandwateruseinthelocalcontext.Moreover,asUNDPstaffhaslimitedaccesstosomeoftheareaswherewater-shedmanagementprojectsareimplemented,itisimportantthattheyrecruittheservicesofexpertsinwatershedmanagementtohelpinthedesign,

Box 4. A success story from South and Central Somalia

ThefollowingshortarticleappearedintheMarch2006editionof‘SouthandCentralSomalia:over-viewofhumanitarianenvironmentinSouthandCentralSomalia’,publishedbytheUnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UN-OCHA)forSomalia.

“Four months after the inauguration of the Duduble (China) canal in Jowhar, there has been a dramatic change, not only in scenery but also in the liveli-hoods of the people in the area. 14,000 hectares of simsim (sesame) have been planted fed by the waters of the recently rehabilitated 15-kilometre canal, some of which is now being harvested. Trucks are transporting the harvested grain to Mogadishu for sale and further for export to the Gulf. In Jowhar, the grain is being processed locally into sesame oil. The planting, harvesting and processing are all labour intensive and have created thousands of jobs in the area. The rehabilitation of the canal is a joint venture between the local community and adminis-tration, UNDP and WFP.”

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implementationandmonitoringofsuchprojects.Themonitoringcompanieshiredforthepurposehavecivilengineers,butnotwatershedexperts.

4.3.4 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Despitegoingthroughtwodecadesofunresolvedconflict, the private sector has developed inSomalia and in some cases can be said to havethrived amid political instability, particularly inthe areas of trade, commerce, transport, remit-tances and infrastructure services and in theprimarysectors,notably in livestock,agricultureand fisheries.65 Low-cost cell phone networkscoverthecountryandcashtransfersarehandledbyanefficientHawala66systemintheabsenceofanationalbankingsystem.

UNDP support to the private sector has beengeared towards improving the legal, regulatoryandinstitutionalframeworksandimprovingthebusiness environment for private initiatives toflourish.UNDPhasoverthepastfiveyearsmadetwo very significant interventions in promotingtheprivatesector:

Somali Money Transmitters Association: ThePoverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods(PRSL) programme originally focused onstrengthening, and increasing the capacity ofthe private sector in Somalia. In 2006, theprogramme initiateddialoguewith the authori-ties of Somaliland and Puntland, and helpedlaunchaprocesstoreviewandenhancethelegalregimeaffectingbusinessesinthesezones.Giventhat remittances serve as the backbone of the

Box 5. Observations on the technical appropriateness of some watershed management interventions

Source: FieldvisitsbytheADRteam.

TheADRteamvisited11sitesinSomalilandandPuntlandwhereUNDPhasundertakenconstruc-tionorrehabilitationofberkads,63watertanksorreservoirsandsoilandwaterconservationmeasuresthroughstaggered‘bunding’64.Berkadsseenwereofgoodqualityandwellmaintainedbyowners.Thesoilconserva-tionsstructures(bunds)insevensitesvisitedinSomalilandandPuntlandweremadeattheendof2009andarealreadydamagedorwashedawaybythefirstrains.Therearetwomainreasonsforthis:(a)whenthebundsweremade,theloosesoilneededcom-pactingandthiswasnotdone(thiswasalsothecaseinawater

reservoirwhichwasnewlycon-structedaboutfourmonthsago,butthesideembankmentshavealreadycollapsedandthesoilwashedbackintothetank);and(b)bundswerenotmadealongthecontoursofthelandterrain,andthelandbeingmoderatelyundulating,thiscausesunevenpressureonthebundsduringrains,leadingtocracksevenwithlowamountofrunoff.

Additionally,itwasobservedthatthesoilandwaterconservationstructuresweremadeonselectedplots,leavingsomeadjoiningplotsuntreated.Thisaccentu-ateserosionproblemsintheuntreatedlandofneighbouring

farmersasalargevolumeofrunoffwaternowflowsintolandsthathavenoobstructions(bunds).Alreadygulliescouldbeseenforminginsomeofthese‘leftout’plots,andunlesscor-rectivemeasuresaretaken,thesecouldleadtoconflictsbetweenfarmers.Itneedstobenotedherethattheveryconceptofwatershedmanagementimpliesthattheentirecatchmentormicro-catchmentisconsideredasonesinglewatershedrequiringappropriatetreatment.Thecur-rentapproachtakenbyUNDPisnotwatershed-based.Thesearesimplysoilandwatercon-servationstructuresonindividualfarmer’splots.

63 Shallowopenwellswhichconserverunoffwaterduringrainyseasonsforuseduringdryseasons–acommonpracticeinSomaliaandpartsofEthiopia.

64 Atechnicaltermusedinsoilandwaterconservationtodescribelowheightembankmentswithinfarmers’plotstoconservewater,and,whendonealongcontours,thesealsoreducerunofforsoilerosion.

65 WorldBank/UNDPCountryRe-engagementStrategy,2003.66 The‘client’informstheHawalacompanyofthepayee’snameandtelephonenumberandtheHawalaagentsonthe

grounddeliverthefunds.Oncethepayeeconfirmsbytelephonetotheclientthatthefundshavebeendelivered,theclientpaystheHawalacompanythefundsplusacommission.

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economy, a great deal of emphasis was placedon strengthening the Somali remittance sector.ThiswasdonethroughtheestablishmentoftheSomali Money Transmitters Association—anassociation of the key remittance companies ofSomalia. In addition, UNDP deployed a tech-nical expert to facilitate the compliance of keyremittancecompanieswithinternationalregula-tionsandanti-money-launderingprocedures.

Support to Somali Livestock Board Project (Phase II).InresponsetothedetrimentaleffectsofabanimposedontheimportoflivestockfromSomalia in 2000 due to the Rift Valley Fever,UNDP joined hands with FAO and the ArabOrganization for Agricultural Development tosupport the Somali meat export industry. Meattradersandslaughterhousepersonnelunderwenttrainingin2006tolearntheimportanceofqualityassurance of their products for exports. Theproject was complementary to the EC-fundedprogrammesharingthesameobjectiveofpromo-ting Somali meat trade, through the setting-upof a Quality Assurance System based on inter-nationalstandardsandtheupgradingoftheskillsoftheexportmeatoperators.

An earlier project funded by LICUS67 andimplemented through UNDP assisted Somaliauthoritiesinestablishingmorerigoroussystemsof health certification of livestock products forexport.Regionallivestockboardswereestablishedtostrengthenthemonitoringandcertificationoflivestockandchilledmeat,inordertoconformtothestandardsofimportingcountries.68

This set of concerted interventions producedvisibleandmeasurableresults:between2005and2009, the number of meat carcasses exportedfrom Somalia rose from 340,409 to 800,000, agrowthofalmost120percentinjustfiveyears.

As part of another interlinked initiative, alivestock marketing information system was

developed in Somaliland with UNDP support.Itcollectsanddisseminatesdatafromthreelive-stockmarkets,namelyHargeisa,BuraoandTogWajaale, as well as Berbera port. ImplementedbytheSomalilandChamberofCommercewiththe Ministry of Livestock, the system providesinformationon thenumberof exporters, statis-tics onpricespaid to suppliers and retail pricesof key staple foods commodities. Data are col-lected twice a week and disseminated to ruralareas through truck drivers, radio broadcasts,localpress, shortmessage services (SMSs), etc.,and covers about 300 villages, helping livestockowners to make informed decisions about thesaleofanimals.

4.3.5 ENVIRONMENT

UNDP supported the capacity development oftheSomalilandMinistryofEnvironmentthroughthe provision of basic equipment, training inenvironmental management and enhanced landdegradation monitoring, and the rehabilita-tion of government tree nurseries. The projectalso aimed at enhancing public awareness andadvocacy by providing environmental educationthroughthemedia.

TheMinistryhasnot yetdevelopedananalysisof the environmental issues in Somaliland, orhow it intends to address them. Currently, themain plank of the Ministry’s environmentalawareness campaign is about not cutting trees,amessage that ringshollow ina countrywherethesolesourceoffuelusedforcookingpurposesis firewood and charcoal, as no other alterna-tive is available in ruralorurbanareas.Amorenuanced approach to addressing the issues ofdeforestation which incorporates regenerativemeasures,scientificmethodsoftreecuttinganduse, introduction of firewood-efficient stoves,andmanagementofcommonland(pastures)willbeneededifthecurrentcampaignistohaveanyeffectonpeople.TheMinistrywill continue to

67 AspecialWorldBankfacilityfor‘Low-incomecountriesunderstress’.68 UNDP,‘CountryBriefSomalia’,updatedSeptember2009.

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need international support to move forward onthe complex range of issues related to environ-mentinSomaliland.

The environment component of the UNDPprogrammehasbeensmallsofar,adeficiencythatthenextcountryprogrammedocumentintendstoaddress.TheUNDPSomaliacountryofficehadanenvironmentprogrammeofficer,butthatposthasbeenvacantforsometime.UNDPSomaliasees environment as an important growing areafor UNDP future programmes. It is under-stoodthatearlyin2009,UNDPapproachedtheGarowe municipality to manage its solid wastethroughapublic-privatepartnership,butthishasnotmaterializedyet.

4.3.6 JOINT PROGRAMME FOR THE PROTECTION, REINTEGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

UNDP has been involved in providing supportto internally displaced persons and returneessince2001underaproject for the reintegrationof returning refugees and internally displacedpersons. The project was initially intended as ajointventurebetweenUNDPandUNHCRbutwaslaterimplementedsolelybyUNDP.A2006evaluation69concludedthattheprojecthadbeenoverlyambitiousintermsofstatedoutcomesandoutputs and should have been reviewed duringthecourseofimplementation.Itnoted,however,the positive inter-agency collaboration that theproject generated and recommended that jointprogrammingshouldbepursuedinthefuture.

The joint UN pilot programme for internallydisplaced persons70 involving FAO, UNDP,UN-HABITAT,UNHCRandUNICEFstartedinNovember2007asatwo-yearprogrammethat

hasnowbeenextendedtoJune2010.Thetotalbudget is about $4 million for two years, withthelargestsharegoingtoUN-Habitat($2.7mil-lion) and UNDP ($1 million approximately).The funds for theprogrammeare administeredbyUNDPundera‘pass-through’fundmanage-mentmechanism.71WithfinancialsupportfromtheGovernmentofJapan,thefiveUNpartnersare providing assistance to internally displacedpersonsandhostcommunitiesthroughanumberofinitiativesaimedat:

a) Strengthening protection and securityin nine existing temporary andpermanentsettlements

b) Improvinglivingconditionsinthesettlements

c) Providing durable solutions forlivelihoods,resettlementandreintegration.

UNDPparticipationinthejointUNprogrammehas involved legal assistance to internally dis-placed persons and vulnerable groups throughthe Puntland Legal Aid Centre. The Centrereferred legal cases from the traditional to theformaljusticesystem,raisedlegalawarenessandsettled 30 cases through mediation at the localcommunities and internally displaced personscampslevels.Theconstructionofasmallmarketis planned and should benefit both the inter-nallydisplacedpersonsandthehostcommunity.Finally,vocationalskill trainingfor250personsisprogrammedforthefirsthalfof2010.

There is no single focal point for this projectwithin UNDP to follow up on the implemen-tation, and this has caused some delays. Focalpointsexistinallotheragenciesinvolvedintheprogramme.AtthetimeoftheADRvisit,dis-cussionsweretakingplacebetweenUNpartnerson the future extensionof theprogrammewith

69 AndreKlapandMichaelAdair,‘OutcomeEvaluation:ReintegrationofReturningRefugeesandInternallyDisplacedPersons(RRIDP-UNDPcomponent)’,Nairobi,3March2006.

70 Accordingtoestimatesfromthelocalauthorities,therewouldbesome70,000internallydisplacedpersonsinBossaso,upfrom35,000estimatedfouryearsago.

71 UNDP,actingasadministrativeagency,receivesfundsfromthedonorandsimplytransfersthesefundstootherparticipatingagenciesaccordingtoagreedplans.Thereceivingagencyassumesthefullprogrammaticandfinancialresponsibilityandaccountabilityforsuchfunds.

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some agencies stating a clear preference for alighter form of ‘joint programming’ over ‘jointprogrammes’structures.

4.3.7 UNOSOM LEGACY PROJECTS

FifteenyearsafterthewithdrawalofUNOSOMII,UNDPcontinuestoadministertwoactivitiesthattheUNmissionhadassumedintheabsenceoffunctioningnationalauthorities:

�� Thefirstprojectconcernsthe‘CivilAviationCaretakerAuthorityforSomalia’(CACAS)operating from facilities in Nairobi, andcurrently handling some 500 flights and8,000 passengers each month. UNDP actsasafinancialadministratorforthisoperationsupervisedbyICAO.

�� The second is theMogadishuPortProject,underwhichUNDPheldintrustsome$1.3milliongeneratedfromtheoperationsoftheportpriortothewithdrawalofUNOSOMaswellassomeequipmentstoredinMombasa.

These projects are administered by the RSLprogramme unit although they are not relatedto the outcomes of that programme but theyhavehadanadministrativeandhumanresourcecost for that unit. UNDP has made persistentattempts to regularize thesituationandpassonthe responsibility to competent internationalor national institutions. Considerable progresshas now been made and the two activities arehopefully going to be transferred in the courseof2010.

4.3.8 ASSESSMENT OF THE RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME

The activities carried out under the RSLprogrammetargetedvulnerablecommunitiesandgroups in need of additional income and alsoaddressed broader economic needs, particularlyformeat exports in a countrywheremore thanhalfthepopulationearnsalivingfromlivestock.As such, interventions have been relevant topeople’sneedsandtonationalpriorities.

The RSL programme, however, would havebenefited from increased internal coherence.Theprogrammecomprisesawiderangeofactiv-ities, some of which have been inherited fromprevious programming cycles while others rep-resent more recent initiatives in an attempt toreorient theoverall strategyof thecountrypro-gramme more towards interventions benefitingthe poor and promoting MDGs. As such, theRSL programme remains more of an umbrellacovering various activities, some of which arenotinterrelated.

The expected outcome under the RSLprogrammeisthat“vulnerablecommunitieshaveincreasedincomefromequitableandsustainableemploymentopportunitiesandarebetterabletomanage natural resources”. Income generationhasbeenatthecentreofprojectssuchasEGER,ABERandwatershedmanagementanditisalsopresent in the UNDP project implemented aspart of the joint UN programme for internallydisplacedpersonsor someof the few initiativesconcerning environment. In addition to gener-atingthatincome,projectsaremostoftenlinkedto the rehabilitation of infrastructure or theconstruction of new facilities. The programmethus intends to pursue two parallel objectives:providing resources to economically or sociallyvulnerable groups and persons while at thesametimecontributingtocommunitywelfarebyrehabilitating damaged social infrastructure andservices, constructing new ones or undertakingwork benefiting the community. However, inactual implementation, the emphasis has oftenbeenputonproducingincomemorethanleavingbehind a sustainable product from that work,especiallyinEGERandwatershedprojects.

Opportunities have been missed to developcreativeandproductiveinitiativeswhileensuringgreater coherence and sustainability and morevisibility for UNDP. For example, in bothPuntland and Somaliland, management ofnon-degradable solid waste (plastics, householdscraps, etc.) is amajorproblemresulting in thecloggingofdrainagesystemsduringrains,aggra-vating floods that regularly affect larger towns.

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This is a problem that is not addressed andUNDP could provide short-term employmentthrough cleaning-up campaigns while helpingthe authorities in setting up waste collectionandprocessing facilities todealwith thismajorenvironmental and health hazard. It is under-stoodthatinearly2009,UNDPapproachedtheGarowe municipality to manage its solid wastethroughapublic-privatepartnership,butthishasnotmaterializedyet.

Although the ADR team was unable to gatheranyprimarydataontheperformanceofincome-generatingprojectsandmicrofinanceintheSouthand Central region, the EGER and watershedmanagement work visited in both Somalilandand Puntland lacked a holistic analysis ofvulnerability and livelihood strategies adoptedbypeople.

UNDP interventions in cooperation with theprivate sector, particularly for the support tomeat exports, have yielded positive results and,in general, cooperation with the private sectorisanareawhereUNDPcouldbuildonitscom-parative advantage. Government authorities inPuntlandweregenerallypositiveabouttheinter-nallydisplacedpersonsprojectinBossasoastheyfeltthatlocalauthoritieswerecloselyinvolvedinitsimplementation.

4.4 CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

4.4.1 HIV/AIDS PROGRAMMEWith an estimated prevalence of 0.5 percentamong the total population, HIV/AIDS infec-tionratesinSomaliaappeartobelow.Thereis,however, new evidence that infection rates arehigheratanestimated1percent.

This lack of reliable health data for Somalia isattributed to the absence of a comprehensivesurveyonHIV/AIDSprevalence,72yearsofiso-lationandcivilstrife,andoscillatingpopulationmigrationsintoandoutofSomalia.

Three Somali AIDS Commissions havebeen established. The first one was set up inSomaliland, the second in Puntland, and thethird in Baidoa (now moved to Mogadishu) inSouth andCentralSomalia.The threenationalcommissions have been successful in workingtogether above politics in spite of conflict anddivisionsbetweenandwithinregions.

The political commitment has uncharacteristic-allyremainedhigh,leadingtosecuringofmajorresponse resources, including from the GlobalFund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria(GFATM or ‘Global Fund’). Currently, theCommissions function almost exclusively withexternalassistanceandbenefitfromsalaryscaleshigher than those of the civil services. Theirlong-termsustainabilitywillrequirethattheybeincorporated in the respective civil services andtheirstatusandconditionsofserviceharmonized.

Withexpendituretotalling$5.4millionbetween2005and2009,UNDPprogrammes toaddressHIV/AIDSrepresentlessthan3percentoftotalprogramme expenditure for the period. UNDPHIV/AIDS programmes have been fundedlargely by the Global Fund supplemented bydonor contributions andUNDPcore resources.The GFATM has been the major contributorto the overall effort to combat HIV/AIDS inSomalia, with a total grant of $24 million fortheperiod2005-2010.UNICEFhasbeendesig-natedasprincipal recipientof theGlobalFundgrantandsignsLettersofAgreementwithotherparticipatingagencies,asrequired.

UNDP interventionshave concentrated on twomajor aspects: the strengthening of the institu-tionalcapacityof thethreeAIDScommissions;and advocacy programmes aimed at inducingbehaviourchanges.Table9providesanoverviewofUNDPinterventionscontributingtothefightagainstHIV/AIDS.

72Currentestimatesarebasedonsero-prevalencesurveyonwomenattendingante-natalclinics.

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UNDPhasstrengthenedinstitutionalcapacitybycooperating with the three AIDS commissionsto develop and test a number of training toolsforgeneralawarenessandtosupportworkwithpopulations that are most at risk. Support hasalsobeenprovidedforthedevelopmentofpoli-ciesandannualworkplansbythecommissions.

In Somalia, the stigma that is associated withHIV/AIDS is very high. Religious leadersplay a pivotal role in their communities andhave considerable influence and leverage. TheReligious Leaders Advocate Project, which hasbeen implemented since 2006, seeks to equipreligious leaders with necessary knowledge andskills to enable them to play a greater role inHIV/AIDS prevention. By December 2009,some 1,000 religious leaders had been trainedin advocacy methods. An additional initiative,theBehaviourChangeCommunicationProject,whichalsobeganin2006,supportsthetrainingof women and youth peer educators, religiousleaders, NGOs and members of the uniformedservices on behaviour change. UNDP has also

worked with NGOs representing people livingwithHIV/AIDSandpromotingtheirrights.Ingeneral, the programme is well targeted in itsfocus on the most vulnerable in society (inter-nallydisplacedpersons,minorities,transactionalsex workers, women, youths and truck drivers).In developing its advocacy interventions, thecountry office benefited from the support theCairo Regional Office through its HIV/AIDSRegionalProgrammeforArabStates.

The management of the country office hasemphasized the need to streamline HIV/AIDSconcerns in all programmes and this process iswellunderway.

4.4.2 ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

ThroughitsHumanDevelopmentandEconomicsUnit(HDEU),73UNDPhasbeensupportingthecapacity of authorities in the areas of macro-economic and poverty-related data collectionandanalysisinSomaliland,PuntlandandSouth

Table 9. HIV/AIDS programmes (2005-2009)Total expenditure: US$ 5.4 million

Expectedoutput(associatedwithCPD2008-2010outcome,whichreads“KeyFederal,SomalilandandPuntlandgovernmentsadministerandmanagecoregovernmentfunctionsmoreeffectivelywithaccountabilityandinclusion”)National HIV/AIDS commissions better able to coordinate an integrated response to HIV/AIDS

Component/mainactivities Projectactivein Sourcesoffunding

SC* PL** SL***

Component 1: Strengthening Institutional Capacity

-HIV/AIDSresponsemanagement-Multi-sectoralcapacity-building

X X X

Denmark,DFID,Norway,USAID,GlobalFund(UNICEF)andUNDP/Coreresources

Component 2: Advocacy and Behaviour Change

-Programmesformostatriskgroups-Religiousleadersadvocacy-Guidelinesforclinicalmanagementand

procurementofARTdrugs

X X X

DFID,GlobalFund(UNICEF),UNAIDS,WorldBankandUNDP/Coreresources

Source:UNDPSomalia,March2010*SouthandCentralSomalia,**Puntland,***Somaliland.

73TheHDEUwasestablishedasastandaloneunitin2007.

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and Central Somalia. The overall objective oftheseeffortsistogenerateasetofdatathatwillenhance the local and national administrationsin making data-driven development planningdecisions.

Accurate and up-to-date development data forSomaliaremains inadequate.Nevertheless,earlyin2007thefirstfullassessmentofSomalia’spos-ition regarding the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs) was published.74 This assess-ment shows that Somalia is set to miss mostof the MDG targets unless there is a dramaticturn-around in its economic and humandevelopmentprospects.

Some partners of UNDP, including amongdonors and Somali authorities, have expressedtheviewthatissuesrelatedtoMDGsappeartobeirrelevant–andevenaluxury–inthecontextofSomalia.ThisunderlinestheneedforstrongeradvocacybyUNDPtoensurethatMDGslieattheheartoftheSomalidevelopmentagenda.

In2009,UNDPlaunchedanewinitiative75withthe objective of supporting the Somali admin-istrations to identify thenecessary interventionsrequiredtomeetbasicservicedeliveryfunctionsand progress towards the MDGs. The pro-ject will support the production of the SomaliaHumanDevelopmentReport in 201076and theintroductionofahumandevelopmentcourse inselecteduniversities.

The project will also build andstrengthen the foundations for a nation-ally owned, participatory process to prepareMDG-aligned development strategies andstrengthen institutional capacity to achievedevelopment results by helping to build cap-acity of the ministries of planning and the lineministriesinallregions.

4.5 ASSESSMENT OF UNDP PROGRAMME INTERVENTIONS

4.5.1 RELEVANCE

UNDP interventions are fully aligned to thebasicstrategicdocumentsgoverningassistancetoSomalia. The basic strategic document guidinginternational assistance forSomalia is theRDP(2008-2012), which has often been perceivedas a donor-driven exercise and as a frameworkmore than an actual programme. Nevertheless,allSomaliauthoritieshaveaccepteditasavalidstrategicdocumentandanacceptedbasisfordis-cussionswithdonors.InlinewiththeRDP,theUNCThasdevelopedaUNTP for2008-2010.UNDPitselfhasbased itscurrentCPD(2008-2010)ontheUNTPandtheRDP.

The programme, however, has not addressedsufficiently some of the fundamental aspects oftheorganization’smandate.SupportingnationaleffortsinthepursuitofMDGsiscentraltotheUNDPmandate.UNDPhasbeentaskedwitharesponsibilitytoengageinadvocacyforMDGs,tohelpgovernmentsdeveloprelevantstrategies,to monitor and report on MDG progress andtoengageinrelatedoperationalactivities.77Thecontribution of UNDP to advocacy for MDGsin Somalia has largely been limited to thepublicationofanationalreportin2007.

As a result of circumstances in Somalia andthe emergency and short-term approach of theaid community, UNDP has also not given suf-ficient attention to addressing the needs of thevulnerable and the poor through developmentmeasures. There have been efforts recently toredress that situation but the approach taken,particularly in the RSL programme, still lacksstrategiccoherence.

74 MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsReportforSomalia,UNDPSomalia,2007.75 InclusiveDevelopmentforPovertyReductioninSomalia:ProjectDocument2009-2012,UNDPSomalia,2009.76 Thelastonewaspublishedin2001.77 UNCoreStrategiesonMDGsavailableathttp://www.undp.org/mdg/roles.shtml.

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Finally, the appropriateness of interventions interms of responding adequately to the require-mentsofend-usersandbeingtechnicallysoundisanimportantconsiderationwhenexaminingtherelevanceofprogrammes.Someoftheexamplesmentioned in this report and resulting fromsite visits by theADR team inSomaliland andPuntland illustrate this point. In all cases, theneed was genuine but the technical design wasflawed often due to insufficient consultationswiththedirectbeneficiaries(e.g.,themarkethallinGarowetown)orabsenceof technical inputsindesignorsupervision(e.g.,bundingworknearHargeisaortheGardoprison).

4.5.2 EFFECTIVENESS

TheanalysisintheADRsfocusesonoutcomes,intended or not, to which UNDP contributed.Inordertodoso,theexistenceofbaselinedatabecomescrucialtocomparesituationsbeforeandaftertheintervention.TheADRteamfoundthatstrategicdocumentssuchastheUNTPandCDPstateoutcomesinverybroadterms.Inaddition,therearegenerallynoreliableormeasurableindi-cators of progress towards achieving outcomes.Thefundamentaldifficultyisthatmostprojects,particularly the older ones, have been designedin the absence of reliable statistical baselineinformation. The emphasis therefore remainson inputs and outputs, a situation reflected inreports to donors. The mid-term evaluationof the UNTP conducted in 2009 noted thatthere was “very limited baseline data whichmakes assessment of the level of implementa-tiondifficult.Ithasledtoabsenceofquantifiableobjectives–itisnotpossibletomeasureiftargetshavebeen achieved”.The sameevaluation con-cludes that “stakeholders also see shortcomingsespecially in effectiveness and in adding value,they are particularly critical of the capacity tomeasureimpactorsustainabilityofoutcomes”.78

An analysis of the Results Frameworks of thethreesuccessiveprogrammedocumentscovering

the period 2005 to 2010 reveals, however, thatUNDP Somalia has improved its definitionof outcomes and outputs, most of which arenow being stated in terms of changes in thelivesofcommunitiesandvulnerablepopulationsand accompanied by more specific targets andindicators. It has nevertheless been noted thatoutcomesareoftentooambitiousforprogrammecyclesofonlytwoyearseach.

Some aspects of programme management inUNDP Somalia have not been clearly results-based. Interventions are still too often markedby an ‘emergency mode’ that has implied, forexample,thatpriorityisoftengiventothetem-porary income-generating objectives in someprojectsoverthequalityandsustainabilityoftheoutputoftheworkforce.Asoundresults-basedprogramme management implies a strong andefficient monitoring and evaluation function.Thereisaconsensusthatthisfunctionhasbeengenerally weak in the programme during theperiodunderreview.TheADRteamcouldtraceonlysevenprojectevaluationsundertakenduringthefive-yearperiod.Eachprojectisexpectedtodevelop annual workplans that are expected toincludeasectiononmonitoringandevaluation.Acursoryanalysisofsomeoftheworkplansindi-catesthatthefocusofmonitoringandevaluationis stillverymuchonquantitativeoutputs ratherthanoutcomesintermsofdocumentingachangeinthesituationthatprevailedattheinceptionoftheproject.

There are, however, several examples of goodpractice. The Joint Programme on LocalGovernance is developing a monitoring andevaluation system through a private companyexpected to provide regular feedback allowingadjustments in the project approach on a con-tinuousbasis.The same typeofeffortaimedatestablishingsoundbaselineinformationhasbeencarried out in developing the new communitysafetyprogramme(AVR).TheprojectforAccessto Justice provides another example of good

78 HenrikJespersenetal.,‘Mid-TermEvaluationoftheUNTPinSomalia’,May-June2009.

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practice:asampleof200courtusersinfourdif-ferentdistrictsofSouthandCentralSomaliawasinterviewedin2008toobtaininformationaboutthequalityandefficiencyofservicestheyreceivedfrom the judicial system. The HIV/AIDS pro-gramme has also developed means of assessingthe results of the advocacy programmes withreligiousleadersandgroupsatrisk.Itshouldbenoted thateffortsareunderway toaddress thisgeneral weakness in monitoring and evaluationbyengagingamonitoringandevaluationexpertinthedesignofthenewCPD.

Fivecategoriesof interventionsemergefromananalysisoftheeffectivenessofUNDPoperationsoverrecentyears:

a) Interventions in which UNDP is actingas a provider of a service in support of thepolitical process or of international stra-tegic priorities. These include, for example,support for a particular conferenceor eventthrough the construction or rehabilitationof buildings and other forms of admin-istrative support, such as travel and perdiempaymentsforparticipantsortherentalof premises and conference services. Suchactivities do not have specific developmentobjectives and most of them are one-timeinterventions. UNDP has also entered intolonger-term administrative support for thepayment of some salaries and stipends rep-resenting roughly $1.5 million each monthin 2010. This second form of administra-tive support is not accompanied by a cleardevelopmentobjectiveintendedtocapacitatethe government to eventually assume thefinancial and administrative responsibilityforitsownfunctioning.Suchactivitieshavegenerally not lent themselves to the imple-mentation of any exit strategy, largely as aresultoftheincapacityofthegovernmenttofinanceandmanagetheactivity;

b) Interventions that provided the plannedoutputs but where expected results did notmaterializesincetheoutputsweredestroyedowingeithertotheresumptionofconflictor

topoorqualitycontrol indesignandmoni-toring. This category includes most of theinvestmentsininfrastructureandequipmentprovidedinSouthandCentralSomaliapriorto 2008 in the areas of law enforcement,accesstojusticeorinstitution-building.Theresults of training programmes have alsooftenbeenlostasadministrationsandserviceswere disbanded as a result of fighting, cor-ruptionorbynewpower-sharingagreementsthat implied that new incumbent ministerswouldchangemostof theseniorpersonnel.At times, as discussed earlier, results havebeen negated through poor design andqualitycontrol;

c) Interventions whose results – and thereforeeffectiveness–cannotbefullyassessedintheshort term. This concerns mainly capacitydevelopment programmes addressing stateinstitutions. Such programmes suffer froma short-term approach in programming, alack of predictability in funding and, moregenerally, an absence of comprehensivelong-term strategies and plans developedjointly between the authorities and theinternationalcommunity;

d) Some interventions where results are morevisibleandmeasurablestandoutasexamplesofgoodpractice.Amongmanyotherprojects,the support to chilled meat export, theimprovementofpublicfinancemanagementin Somaliland, the relationship establishedwith universities in all regions and theHIV/AIDS advocacy project with religiousleaderscanbementionedashavingachievedgoodresults;

e) For some new community-based projects,it is too early to assess results. But severalhave had a promising start by emphasizinggroundworkwithcommunities todevelopaparticipatory approach and establish a solidknowledgeof situationsbasedonadetailedanalysis of community dynamics. This hasbeen the case, for example, in the projectfor local governance and the one forcommunitysafety.

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4.5.3 EFFICIENCY

The nature of the operational environmentin Somalia implies costs of delivering assist-ance that are much higher than usual. Thefollowingfactorscontributetoexceptionallyhighoperatingcosts:

a) The UN classification of the security sit-uation as a phase IV or V necessitatesspecialprotectionmeasuressuchasarmouredvehicles, police escorts as well as protectedofficesandstaffcompounds;

b) Head offices of UN agencies have beenestablished in Nairobi since the beginningof the 1990s. Since the almost total evacu-ationof staff in2008, all services arebasedin Nairobi and operations are run through‘remote management’. This has resulted inhightravelandperdiemcostsforthelimitedstaffvisits toSomaliaand the setting-upofanexpensivenetworkofNGOsorcommer-cial firms contracted exclusively to monitorthe performance and outputs of otherNGOs or local CSOs contracted toimplementprojects;

c) The formula of remote management hasalso led to increased costs for liaising withSomalipartners.Forexample,mostconsul-tations with authorities and other partners,meetings, conferences and training sessionstake place outside the country and UNDPcovers fully the expenses of participants,including the processing of visas, air travel,per diem allowances and the logistics ofmeetings and conferences. In addition tothosedirectcosts,UNDPhashadtodevotean inordinate amountof valuable staff timeonsuchpurelyadministrativeissues.

The cost of delivering assistance in Somalia isexcessively high for all organizations and theADR team heard a number of ‘guesstimates’ranging from 40 to 70 percent. But little

documented information exists about these‘administrativecosts’,whicharenotevenclearlydefined.UNDPisinthesamesituationandthecountry office was not in a position to provideoverallestimatesthatwouldcoverthethreecat-egories of exceptional expenditure mentionedabove. A partnership evaluation carried out onbehalfofagroupofdonors in2009,states thatit “is interesting to note over the three yearsthat 63 percent has been spent on administra-tion,personnelandgeneralmanagement”.79Thestatement, however, is based on data relatingexclusively to the ROLS programme for theperiod 2006-2008 and that data was ‘reconfig-ured’bytheevaluators.Inaddition,thecategoriesofexpendituregivenintheevaluationreportarenotdefinedindetail.

DeliveringassistanceinthedifficultpoliticalandsecurityenvironmentofSomaliarequireseffectiveriskmanagement.Attheendof2008,inparallelwith the decision to pursue operations throughincreasedremotemanagement,UNDPinitiatedariskanalysisthatwassoonexpandedasajointUNCTexercise.Theinter-agencyteamworkingunder the guidance of the UNCT SteeringCommittee comprising UNDP, UNHCR,UNICEF,UNOPSandWFPproducedareportin June 2009 that outlined 19 different risksaffecting either the reputationof theUNor itscapacitytodelivereffectivelyandrecommendedmitigatingactionandprocedures.80

In 2009, UNDP Somalia (Operations Section)developed specific and very detailed guidelinesandprocedures toensureappropriate riskman-agement during the implementation phase ofprogrammes, particularly regarding the com-mercial procurement of goods and services andcontractingwithNGOsandCBOs.Onthepro-grammatic side, the countryoffice relieson theUNDPcorporateEnterpriseRiskManagement(ERM) framework, which is not as situation-specificasthetooldevelopedbytheOperations

79 ‘EvaluationoftheUNDPStrategicPartnershipforSomalia’,AdamSmithInternational,July2009,p.7.80 ‘Inter-agencyMissionReport:UNCTSomaliaRiskManagement’,UNCT,19June2009.

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Section.Ingeneral,theADRfoundthatstrongrisk management procedures existed for theimplementation of programme activities butthat they were much weaker for the decision-makingprocess related inparticular to strategicchoices for programme orientation and areasofintervention.

Thefinancialmanagementofprogrammesneedsto be strengthened. Programme managers arecompetent in their field of expertise and cancontribute effectively to the programme strat-egies and designs. They lack, however, specifictrainingonUNDPfinancialmanagementsystemandaregenerallynotinapositiontomanagethefinancialaspectsofprogrammes.Forexample,ithasbeenextremelydifficultfortheADRteamtoget precise information from the country officeregardingexpenditureforeachoftheprogrammecomponents.Thediscrepancythatexistsbetweenthe thematic areas of the Somalia programmeandthecorporatefocusareasfurthercompoundsthe problem as it becomes difficult to obtainfromthecentralAtlassystemfinancialinforma-tionthatcorrespondstotheSomaliaprogrammestructure.

Someinterventionshaveoftenneglectedqualitycontrolindesignandmonitoring.UNDPSomaliaputinplaceanelaboratesystemofvettingpoten-tial NGO or CSO implementing contractors.Asrequired,additionaltrainingwasprovidedtoensurebetterperformance.Thevettingand thetraining,however,addressedprimarilyskillsthathave to do with compliance with UNDP sys-tems and procedures, mainly for reporting andfinancial management. In a number of projectactivitiesvisitedbytheADRteam–admittedlyonlyasmallportionoftotalinterventions–itwasevidentthatneithertheimplementingagentnortheNGOorcommercialcontractoremployedtodoindependentmonitoringpossessedthespecifictechnicalknowledgethatcouldhelpidentifyandredressqualityfaultsthatendangeredtheresultsof projects. No independent technical expertisewassoughttocompensateforthisweakness.

A major effort has been undertaken in recentyearstoimprovecoherenceandsynergybetweenprojects and programmes. A ‘silo’ approach hasindeedbeenidentified inthepartnershipevalu-ation81 as one of the problems limiting botheffectiveness and efficiency. The managementis now enforcing regular coordination meetingsbetweenprogrammesandtheongoingprocessofdraftingthenextcountryprogrammeprovidesagoodexampleof a fullyparticipativeand inclu-sive process at the level of the Nairobi office.Theprocesswouldprobablyhavebenefitedfrommore intensive participation of sub-office staffintheinitialstages.Therewillbeaneedtofor-malizesuchprocessesfurthersoastoensurethattheybecomefully integratedintheinstitutionalcultureoftheoffice.

UNDP Somalia decided at the end of 2006 toestablish three sub-offices with a large degreeofdelegatedauthorityandtotransformNairobiintoasupportoffice.Followingthe2008securityincidents and more stringent security restric-tions, the delegation of authority had to bereduced. The long absence of heads of officesleft more junior staff without the necessaryfinancial and procurement training to imple-ment delegated authority. As a result, renewedover-centralizationinNairobiledtoconsiderableimplementation delays. An almost caricaturalexample of such delays was given to the ADRteam in Hargeisa: the Somaliland Chamberof Commerce, with support from UNDP, hasupdateditslistofmembersandprofessionalser-vicesinSomalilandtobepublishedasabooklet.UNDP ruled that the order be processed inNairobiand11monthslater,thebookletisstillnotprinted.

Most implementing partners complain of theslowproceduresandheavybureaucraticapproachofUNDP,particularly for the approval of con-tractsandforpayments.Thisisacomplaintthatis foundinmostprogrammesaroundtheworldand is often valid, as UNDP has developed aninstitutional culture that is very process- rather

81 ‘EvaluationoftheUNDPStrategicPartnershipforSomalia’,AdamSmithInternational,July2009.

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than results-oriented. It has to be mentionednevertheless that the special operating circum-stancesinSomaliaandtheremotemanagementformulaimposeprudenceonthepartofanorgan-izationthatwishestopromotefullaccountability.

4.5.4 SUSTAINABILITY

UNDP was engaged in certain activities wherethe results are either short-term or non-developmental in nature and, therefore, are notsustainable. In general, however, sustainabilityandtherelatedissueofnationalownershipneedtobeviewedfirstagainstthespecificbackgroundpertainingtoeachregionwhereprogrammesareimplemented,andsecondaccording to the typeofintervention.

Projects implemented in South and CentralSomaliahavesufferedfromaveryfragilesecuritysituation, the resumption and intensification ofconflict and the very hostile attitude of certainde facto authorities such as Al Shabaab. Therehavebeenexperiencesinthepastofinvestmentsininfrastructureandequipmentbeingtotallylostand capacity development programmes endingwith the disbandment of beneficiary organiza-tions and services. There is no strong evidenceto showthat theongoingcapacitydevelopmentactivities, most of which imply the exclusivefinancial responsibility of external actors, willresultinincreasednationalownershipandlong-termsustainability.Theinterventionsthatseemtohavehad longer-term results concernmainlythe rehabilitation of productive infrastructurebenefiting a community directly. Work under-taken in the past in the Middle and LowerShebelleregionsisoftenquotedasanexampleofsustainableresults.

By contrast, activities aimed at institutionaldevelopment, support to civilian police andaccesstojusticeundertakeninthetwonorthernregions offer more signs of national ownership.Thiscorrespondstoa levelofstability,effectivegovernment presence across the territory andimprovedgovernancethatcansupportinterven-tionsofadevelopmentnature.

Finally,thereisevidencethatinallregionspro-grammesthatputemphasisonlocalparticipationandownershipaswellastangiblebenefitsforthepeoplearemoresuccessful.Suchisthecasesofarforsomeinterventionsunderincomegenerationand job creation schemes, the local governanceprogrammeandsomeactivitiesconcerninginter-nallydisplacedpersons.

4.6 ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP

4.6.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

It isgenerally recognized that the three regionsthat constituted the Republic of Somalia up to1991 have evolved differently. Although theintegrityofSomaliaasasingleStateandterritoryissystematicallyreaffirmedbytheAfricanUnionand theSecurityCouncil, the reality is that thethreepartsofSomaliatodaypresentfeaturesthatjustify differentiated approaches in the assess-ment of needs and programme design. From asituationof active conflict to an emerging stateof development, the differences are importantand need to be accompanied by a pragmaticandrealisticapproach.Duringtheperiodunderreview, UNDP planning cycles were short andworkplans were developed on an annual basis,and often times, consultation has been limitedtointernalUNDPNairobi-basedstaffandpart-ners.WhileUNDPcannotdevelopregion-basedseparate country programmes for presentationto its Executive Board, workplans and actualimplementationwouldbenefitfromanapproachreflecting the specificities of each region andfrommoreintensivediscussionswithauthoritiesdirectlyconcerned.

Throughout the period examined, UNDPrespondedpromptlytounforeseenrequirementstoassistthepoliticalprocess(e.g.,logisticalsupportfor theestablishmentof theFederalParliamentin Baidoa and Mogadishu, for the NationalReconciliationConferenceinMogadishuandforthe Djibouti Conference) or to provide admin-istrative support functions on behalf of donors(payment of salaries and stipends, organizing

4 8 C H A P T E R 4 . C O N T R I B U T I O N O F U N D P T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S

the travel of parliamentarians for sessions ofthat body, etc.). This, however, was done in aroleof‘serviceprovider’morethanasmandateddevelopmentinterventions.

InasituationasvolatileastheoneinSomalia,anorganizationsuchasUNDPneedstoshowahighdegree of nimbleness and adaptability coupledwith a strong capacity to analyse developmentsanddrawstrategicandoperationalconsequences.UNDP is often perceived as weak for its cap-acity to obtain reliable information, to analysedevelopmentsandtoadjustitsprogrammesandapproaches accordingly. The UNTP foresawthree different scenarios ranging from ‘a bestcasescenario’toa‘mostlikely’oneandthentoa‘worstcase’scenario.ThesituationinSouthandCentral Somalia gradually evolved towards theworst-casescenario.UNDPrespondedmainlybyadaptingitsoperationalmodusoperandithroughrefinementsintheremotemanagementformulaor the adoption of additional risk managementprocedures. It did not, however, question thecontinued validity of strategic programmaticchoices and modified little in the contents ofprogrammes.

Several NGOs and independent observers havenotedthatUNDPoftenlimitsitselftoitstrad-itional partners and to its own staff to developknowledge about the Somali situation. Theyconsider that UNDP would benefit from moreinteraction with independent observers such asbroad-based human rights NGOs, journalists,and academics as well as from informationgathered more systematically through existingSomaliwebsites.

For the preparation of its next country pro-gramme, the country office has been usingconflict analysis methods with support fromBCPR. This will no doubt improve the cap-acityoftheorganizationtoberesponsivetotheSomali context. Previous programmes did notsystematicallyusesuchmethods.

4.6.2 PROMOTING UN VALUES

UNDP, as a lead development organization ofthe UN system, is expected to promote certainvaluesthatareembracedbytheUNsystem:

A human rights-based approach: The promo-tion of human rights and the incorporation ofthat concern in the design and implementationofprogrammesarenowacentralelementoftheglobalUNDPapproach.InSomalia, thedesignof projects in the past did not often emphasizethe inclusionofhuman rights as a central con-cern.Thishaschangedinrecentyears,inpartastheresultofcriticismsaboutviolationsofhumanrights by police forces. Corrective action hasbeentakenoverthelasttwoyearstoreintroducemoreforcefullyelementsofprotectionofhumanrights. The training curriculum used in policeacademiesnowincludesaspectsofhumanrightsandthistraininghasbecomeaconditionforeli-gibilitytoreceivestipendspaidthroughUNDP.Advocacy programmes under the HIV/AIDSprogrammealsopromotetherespectoftherightsofvictims.

Gender equality: UNDP global policies putemphasis on gender equality as one of the keyelements in programming. UNDP programmesneed to make women’s and men’s concernsand experiences an integral dimension of thedesign, implementation, monitoring and evalu-ation of the policies and programmes in allpolitical, economic and social spheres so thatwomenandmenbenefitequallyandinequalityisnotperpetuated.82

UNDP has supported authorities in differentregionsofSomaliaintakingforwardthegenderagenda. A national gender policy has beendevelopedbytheGovernmentofSomaliland in2009 and gender focal points are being set upineachministry. InPuntland,UNDPhas sup-portedthedevelopmentofagenderpolicyandagenderstrategicplan.

82 UNDPSomalia.‘GenderTrainingandStrategyFormulation’,Hargeisa,Garowe,andNairobi,21July–10August2007.

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Too often, gender issues in programming areseenasquotastobeachievedintermsofwomenbeneficiaries(30percentinmostprojects).Whilethisisapositivestepandgivesaconcretemeasurein the short run, a more nuanced and holisticunderstanding of gender in programming hasyet to emerge. In specific terms, the followinggaps were identified in programme documentsandreports:(a)situationsarenotanalysedusinggender disaggregated data on poverty, accessto services, the effects of violence, HIV/AIDSnordoestheanalysisshowhowgenderrelationsat the household, family and community levelsplay out in terms of decision-making or con-trol of resources; and (b) the monitoring toolsandreportsdon’t indicateanyspecificthrustontrackinghowUNDP-supportedprogrammesareaffectingthegenderrelationsatbothhouseholdandcommunitylevels.

For the past two years, the country office hasmore forcefully pursued the streamlining ofgenderequalityinbothprogrammingandofficemanagement. The Joint Programme for LocalGovernanceandDecentralizedServiceDelivery(JLPG)providesagoodexampleofanin-depthanalysis of the gender inequality situation. TheJPLG project has a component which aims atincreasing the participation of women in localcouncils.TheGalkayocouncilnowhassixwomenmemberswhereaspreviouslytheyhadnone.83

Otherexamplesofgoodpracticecanbefoundinseveralprojects.Inplanningforitsnextcountryprogramme,UNDPhasforeseenaspecificout-come on gender. It has also recruited a genderadviserforsixmonthstoworkwithprogrammeofficers and relevant authorities and help theofficedevelopitsowngenderstrategy.

TheADRnotedthattheUNDPSomaliaman-agementhasrecentlynominatedafocalpointforgenderinthecountryoffice.Itisunderstoodthatsimilarfocalpointshavealsobeennominatedinfield sub-offices, although itwasapparent from

discussions in Hargeisa and Garowe that thecapacity of these focal points to take forwardgender issues remains limited. Experience inother countries has persistently shown thatthe presence of fully dedicated staff resourcesrather than just focal points leads to moreeffective streamlining of cross-cutting issuessuchasgender.

South-South cooperation: Thisisastrongpointintheprogrammealmostbydefault,asmostofthe capacity-building programmes have to relyon training in neighbouring countries. Thereis nonetheless a quasi absence of a regionalapproach and of systematic cooperation andcross-fertilizationbetweenUNDPofficesintheregion. A notable exception is the HIV/AIDSprogramme that benefited froma regional pro-ject84developedbytheRegionalBureauforArabStates.Ingovernanceprogrammes,andparticu-larly for its project helping with the draftingof a new Constitution, UNDP has been usingregionalexpertiseinanefficientmanner.

4.6.3 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF UNDP IN SOMALIA

Through its long presence in Somalia, UNDPhasdevelopedastrongcapacitytomaintaindia-logue with both authorities and communitiesfor which the organization remains a credibleinterlocutor.DonorsalsoconsiderUNDPasanimportantelementofthe internationalresponsetoSomalia.

UNDPhasprovidedappreciatedsupporttotheJoint Needs Assessment leading to the formu-lation of the RDP and produced some usefulbasic documents, such as the study on remit-tancesandtheroleofthediaspora,andthe2007Progress Report on MDGs. UNDP Somalia iscurrently working on a new National HumanDevelopmentReport.Theoffice’sadvocacyroleon development issues has been valuable butcouldbefurtherstrengthened.

83 ‘GenderAuditProcess/ConsultancyReport’,UnitedNationsCountryTeamforSomalia(UNCT),January2010.84 TheHIV/AIDSRegionalProgrammeforArabStates(HARPAS).

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The following activities represented compara-tively strong areas of intervention on whichfutureprogrammesofUNDPcanbuild:

�� Activities insupportof institutionbuilding,particularlyintheareasofpublicfinanceandcivilservicereform

�� Support to increased access to justiceandthecooperationwithfacultiesof lawinallregions

�� Community development initiativesdeveloping a participatory and inclusiveapproach such as the local governance andcommunitysafetyprogrammes

�� Effective advocacy support in HIV/AIDSthrough religious leaders andpersons livingwithHIV/AIDS

�� Althoughfewinnumber,activitiestosupportprivate sector initiatives (meat exporters,chambersof commerce, etc.)havegenerallyyieldedpositiveresults.

4.6.4 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPORT TO COORDINATION

UNDP maintains relationships with theauthorities at the federal level and in Puntlandand Somaliland. In each case, the ministryresponsibleforplanningisthemainpartnerandrelationsarealsoestablishedwithlineministries.At the community level, UNDP has providedsupporttolocalauthoritiesandhasoftenhelpedcommunities form local councils for the man-agement of programmes. Consultations withauthoritiesoccurontheoccasionofthepresen-tation by UNDP of annual workplans, on theoccasion of ‘outcome meetings’ or for specialexercises such as the ongoing preparation forthe next country programme. Authorities havemadecleartotheADRteamthat,althoughthey

value the existing consultation processes, theywould appreciate more intensive interface withthecountryofficemanagementinordertohaveaclearerpictureoflong-termcommitmentsandimprove both the predictability of programmesand the transparencyof financial operations. Inboth Puntland and Somaliland, authorities feelthat the UNDP sub-offices could play a moreefficientroleifmoreauthorityandresponsibilityweredelegatedtothem.

Relationswithseveraldonorsarebasedonmulti-year partnership agreements85 concerning boththegovernanceandtheruleof lawandsecurityprogrammes. A number of donors express theopinion,however,thatUNDPreportsarelackingin quality, being poor on financial informa-tionandconcernedmainlywith listingoutputs.There is also a perception among donor part-ners thatUNDPdoesnotshareenoughitsriskmanagementanalysisandtheproblemsencoun-teredinimplementation.Theywouldappreciatea more transparent and forthcoming relation-ship.AsdonorsalsooperatefromNairobi,theyfeel a strong need for more intensive sharingof information on operations taking place inSomalia. UNDP instituted ‘breakfast meetings’with donors every Wednesday to serve as aninformal information- sharing forum, with nospecificagenda.The ‘breakfasts’havenowbeentransformed into bi-weekly ‘coffee meetings’ attheUNDPoffice,servingthesamepurposeandappreciatedbythedonorcommunity.

UNDPSomaliahasdevelopedpartnershipswithnon-traditional emerging donors. The Leagueof Arab States contributed $1 million to theUNDPprojecttopromotetheexportofchilledmeatandtheArabOrganizationforAgriculturalDevelopment participated in implementation.86On the basis of a global Memorandum ofUnderstandingbetweentheZayedFoundation87

85 UNDPhassignedmultiyearstrategicpartnershipagreementswiththeEC,Denmark,DFID,Norway,SwedenandUSAID.Internally,thecountryofficesignedsuchapartnershipagreementwithBCPR.However,intermsoffinancing,ECistheonlydonorthatprovidesmultiyearfinancing.Othersrelyonannualizedfinancing.

86 Seesectionchapter4,section4.3.87 TheZayedFoundationisacharitableandhumanitarianorganizationestablishedintheEmirateofAbuDhabiin

August1992.

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andUNDP,signedin2003,theUNDPSomaliaprogrammewasalsoabletosecureacontributionofnearly$1million to implementwater supplyprojectsin2007and2008.

Atthebroaderlevel,theinternationalcommunitycreatedin2006aforumcalledthe‘Coordinationof International Support to Somalia’88 (see sec-tion 2.2.2) together with a Somali SupportSecretariat (SSS). Over the years, UNDP hasprovidedsupporttoboththeSACBandtheSSS,throughUNOPS.

RelationsbetweenUNDPandNGOsandCSOsare intense in the Somali context. Support forcivil society is often advocated as a strategythat can promote peacebuilding by acting aspotential countervailing force to the power ofpredatory militia and weak government struc-tures.89 It is argued that by working with civilsociety,theinternationalaidsystemcansupportfragileor failedStates inmoving towardspeaceanddevelopment.

Theinternationalaidsystemhasfocusedstronglyon the modern CSOs, particularly NGOs, toact as conduits for external assistance. Manyof the projects implemented under the UNDPdirect execution mode are in fact contracted toNGOs and CSOs. Under the remote manage-ment mechanism, other NGOs or commercialfirms act as independent monitors on behalf ofUNDP. In such a context, NGOs and CSOshaveoftenbeen considered as contractorsmorethanpartnersandcapacity-buildingeffortshavebeen geared towards training in methods andproceduresenablingthemtobeefficient imple-menting agencies. In so doing, UNDP andotherorganizationsandagencieshavetendedto

createorganizationslackingdownwardaccount-ability, dependent on external support and notaddressingthewiderrolesforcivilsociety90asaninterfacebetweentheStateandindividuals.Thishighlightsalackoftransparencyandcommuni-cation between those carrying out the projectsand those being assisted, resulting in percep-tionsofcertaingroupsbeingmorelikebusinessesratherthansocialassistancebodies.91

UNDP is an active member of the UNCTand of its thematic groups. The two joint pro-grammes (local governance and internallydisplaced persons) created recently are goodexamples of innovative mechanisms promotedthrough the UNCT. UNDP Somalia providesvaluable support to the Office of the ResidentCoordinatorandassumesadministrativerespon-sibility for a number of other common serviceson a cost-sharing basis. Given the import-ance of humanitarian issues in the portfolioof the Resident Coordinator/HumanitarianCoordinatorandhisadditionalresponsibilitiesasUNDesignatedOfficialforsecurity,theincum-benthasmuchlesstimetodevotetohisroleasResidentRepresentativeofUNDP.Thedivisionof labour between the Resident Representativeand the Country Director provides a model ofefficiencyinsuchmanagementset-ups.

Important tensions have developed in recentyearsbetweenthedevelopmentandthehumani-tarianwingsoftheUN.SeveralorganizationsandgroupshaveperceivedUNDPasplayingapolit-icalroleandashavingtakensidesintheongoingconflictasaresultofitsroleinprovidingsupporttotheTFGandtoitslawandorderinstitutionsonbehalfofmajordonors.Theseorganizations,bothNGOsandUNagencies,havefeltthattheir

88 Itreplacedanearlierforumcalledthe‘SomaliaAidCoordinationBody’(SACB),whichexistedbetween1993and2005.

89 PaulHarvey,‘RehabilitationinComplexPoliticalEmergencies:IsRebuildingCivilSocietytheAnswer?’,InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,WorkingPaper60,1998.

90 Ibid.91 ThisissuewasextensivelydebatedintheSomaliCivilSocietySymposium,heldinHargeisa,inFebruary2003,which

broughttogethersome300civilsocietyactivistsandorganizersfromalloverSomaliaandSomaliland.Thereportcanbefoundat:http://somali-civilsociety.org/templates/oxfamtemp/downloads/conference.pdf.

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association with UNDP tainted the necessaryneutrality and independence of humanitarianaction and even implied additional securityrisks for their staff. Most observers considerthat the Resident Representative of UNDP, inhis dual capacity as Resident Coordinator andHumanitarian Coordinator, was in a particu-larlydifficultsituationbuttheunderstandingofrespectivepositionshasbeen improvedover theyears and tensions have been reduced. UNDPhas also started addressing its image problemand diversifying its activities in favour of morecommunity-baseddevelopmentwork.Inparallel,UNDP Somalia developed a communicationstrategy92inMarch2009.Thestrategyisdesignedto better inform partners and media about thetotality of UNDP activities, including the lessvisible ones addressing governance, access tojustice and community support. The applica-tionofthestrategyhassofarbeenmorereactivethan proactive and has concentrated mainly onthe media, neglecting tools such as the UNDPwebsite that needs urgent overhaul and thepublicationofperiodicalinformationbulletins.

4.7 SUPPORT FROM UNDP HEADQUARTERS AND GLOBAL NETWORKS

The ADR noted that interaction between theUNDP Somalia country office and the varioussupport hubs within the global UNDP set-uphave not been sufficient, with the exceptionof BCPR. The partnership agreement signedbetween UNDP Somalia and BCPR resultedinadditional resources and technical support toenhancethequalityofprogrammes.

The ADR team was informed that the UNDPsenior managers assigned to the Somalia officeovertheyearshaveoftenconsideredSomaliasomuch as a special case that they did not seemto have felt the necessity to seek support fromwithinUNDPinasystematicway.Inthesame

way, offers of support have not always beenforthcoming. Visits by staff of the RegionalBureau for Arab States have in the past beenratherinfrequent.Inrecentyears,however,therehasbeenmoreinteraction,withtwovisitsbystafffromtheRegionalBureauandsupportprovidedbytheUNDPRegionalServiceCentreinCairo,inparticularfortheHIV/AIDSprogramme.

In general, guidance from UNDP headquartersfor exceptional operating environments such asthe one in Somalia is inadequate. There is nospecificofficialguidance,forexample, foroper-ations undertaken under a formula of remotemanagementorfornotionssuchasthe‘providerof last resort’ which affect programmes imple-mented in Somalia. In addition, there are noeffectivecorporatemechanismsthatcouldfosterexchangeoflessonsandgoodpracticesonexcep-tional cases among country offices affected bysimilarchallengessuchastheofficesforIraqandSomalia.

ThecomplexUNset-upforsupporttoSomaliahasnotbeenhelpfulinpromotingUN-widedis-cussion, exchange of ideas and deployment ofsupport for UNDP Somalia. Somalia belongsgeographically to the African continent andis a member of the African Union. It is also amemberoftheLeagueofArabStates.SomeUNorganizations have included Somalia as part oftheirAfricanregionalset-up.UNDPforitspartensures the coverage from New York throughthe Regional Bureau for Arab States with aregional support office located in Cairo. Thisputs the UNDP Somalia country office in anawkward, and at times disadvantaged, positionvis-à-vis other UN organizations for participa-tion in events such as regional meetings anddiscussions among the UN agencies and theRegionalDirectors.

92 ‘ExternalCommunicationStrategy–2009-2010’,UNDPCountryOffice,12March2009.

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5.1 CONCLUSIONS

UNDP has been pushed – and has allowed itself to be pushed – into assuming responsibility for certain tasks and services that have reduced the credibility of the organization as a neutral and impartial development agent. This has resulted in a loss of ‘development space’.

A considerable portion of UNDP expenditurehas concerned the provision of administrativeandlogisticalsupportforeitherthepoliticalpro-cess or for a fragile federal government and itsinstitutions. Some interventions have steeredcontroversy and the result was that UNDP hasbeen increasingly perceived as a political actorand as an organization taking sides in a ragingconflict. This has compromised UNDP cred-ibility as a neutral and independent player intaking forward a pro-poor development agendaand has been detrimental to UNDP capacityto assume a strong leadership for developmentissuesrelatedtoSomalia.

UNDP Somalia has strived to address thisimage-related challenge and has succeeded, tosomeextent,inattenuatingthetensionswiththehumanitariancommunity. Ithasalsoattemptedto diversify its portfolio in favour of morepro-poor and MDG support activities. Theorganizationcontinues,however,tosufferfromacripplingimagedeficit.

Understandably, UNDP is committed vis-à-vissome donors to pursue the activities that havebroughtitsperceptionproblem.Theorganizationcannotsimplywalkoutofexistingcommitmentswithoutfindingalternativemechanisms.UNDPwill need to find means, however, to developexit strategies that would enable the organ-ization, with support from donors, to gradually

concentratemoreofitsresourcesandenergyoncore mandate activities. UNPOS, for example,is currently exploring a commercial alternativefor paying stipends to police officers inMogadishu. This could present an occasionfor UNDP to develop an exit strategy for thatparticularactivity.

The term ‘dealing with a virtual Somalia’ is often used to describe a situation where most of the international community handles all interventions related to Somalia – whether of a political, humanitarian or developmental nature – from the comfortable distance pro-vided by operational bases in Nairobi. Working from a distance or applying ‘remote manage-ment’ to a situation such as the one in Somalia means not only reduced access, but also more importantly reduced information, a more limited capacity of analysis and an increased exposure to operational risks regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency and accountability.

Over the years, UNDP Somalia has devised anumber of means and mechanisms that haveallowedUNDPtocontinuepartofitsoperationsthrough a remote management formula. Theapproachhadtobeintensifiedwiththeevacua-tionofmoststaffattheendof2008.ApartfromIraq,therearefewexamplesoftheUN,particu-larly itsdevelopmentwing,operatingwith suchanapproachandclearinstitutionalguidancefromUNDPheadquartershasnotbeenforthcoming.

Remote management has allowed UNDP tocontinue programmes in an extremely difficultsecurity environment. Most donors welcomedthispossibilitytohaveevenanimperfectconduitfor providing assistance and perhaps a con-venient means of transferring operational risksto an international organization. UNDP itself

CHAPTER5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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often welcomed the additional income that theformulaprovided.However,UNDPhasnotfullyanalysedthefinancialcostofdeliveringassistanceinasituationsuchastheoneinSomaliaandhasnotbeenabletoinitiateacompletelytransparentdialoguewithdonorsaboutsuchcostsandrisks.

Similarly, it has not sufficiently analysed risksassociated with the quality of deliverables orthe consequences for the image of UNDP.UNDP is exposed to the type of allega-tions that have recently been made by theUN Monitoring Group on Somalia93 aboutfoodaidmanagement.

UNDP is generally perceived as displaying a weak capacity to analyse the Somali context and apply in a comprehensive manner conflict analysis and risk management methods.

Conflict analysis methods have beenemphasizedintheformulationofthenextcountryprogramme,aclearindicationofprogressintheright direction. On the other hand, for riskmanagement, the focus so far has been almostexclusively on operational risks during imple-mentation as opposed to the institutional risksinvolved in making strategic decisions aboutwhetherornottoenterintonewareasofactivity.

The sources of information of UNDP Somaliaare considered limited, based mainly on staffandimplementingpartnersandoftenneglectingindependent sources such as human rightsNGOs, academics and the websites flourishinginSomaliaandamongthediaspora.

The UNDP contribution to development results has varied considerably depending on the region where activities were implemented. This regional diversity is not sufficiently reflected in programming instruments and, often times, UNDP corporate instruments are not suitable for programming in Somalia.

ThevariouspartsoftheformerSomaliRepublichave evolved in a very different manner sincethebreakdownof theState in1991.SouthandCentralSomaliahas immensedifficultiesemer-gingfromaprotractedconflictsituationandstillfacesaseverehumanitariancrisis.SomalilandhasengagedinaprocessofsecessionwhilePuntlandhas declared itself an autonomous region. Inthese twonorthernareas,conditionsof stabilityand improved governance allow for genuinedevelopment support to take place. While it isfully understood that UNDP cannot developseparate programme documents, workplans andother implementing instruments could adopt apragmaticapproachandreflectmoreadequatelytherealityanddiversityofthecountry.

A number of operational issues have impaired the effectiveness and efficiency of programmes and require remedial action on the part of either the UNDP Somalia country office or UNDP headquarters.

The ADR noted the following points as themajorcurrentoperationalconstraints:

1. The three main programmes of UNDPSomalia, namely Governance, ROLS, andRSL, have until recently worked indepen-dently of each other, with little interactionbetweenthem.This‘silo’approachhasoftenmeant missing opportunities for leveragingcomplementaritybetweentheseprogrammes.Thecountryofficeistakingactiontoredressthatsituation;

2. Morefrequentanddirectinteractionbetweenprogramme staff in Nairobi and sub-officesaswellascounterpartswouldfacilitatebetterunderstanding of results intended and helpin course correction during implementationofprojects.Fieldstaffmembersfeelisolated,andconsiderinfrequentandshortvisitsfromthe Nairobi-based staff inadequate for sub-stantiveprogrammaticdiscussionsaswellasforlearningandexchangeofideas.Likewise,

93 ‘ReportoftheMonitoringGrouponSomaliapursuanttoSecurityCouncilresolution1853(2008)’,(S/2010/91).

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counterparts find long gaps betweenvisits by Nairobi-based staff unhelpful inresolvingoperationalproblemsandintakingpromptdecisions.

3. Insomeoftheprojectsvisitedbytheteam,the quality of design and delivery has beenextremely poor, raising questions about(a) the insufficiency of adequate expertisein-house;(b)theeffectivenessofmonitoringandabilitytotakecoursecorrectionmeasures;(c) the rigour of assessment of strengthsand weaknesses of implementing partnersand monitoring contractors; and (d) thecultureofaccountabilityintheUNDPoffice.As already acknowledged by the UNDPSomaliacountryoffice, theweaknessof themonitoringandevaluationfunctionmustbeaddressed and some concrete actions havealreadybeeninitiated.

4. Gender mainstreaming was weak in mostprojectsalthough,inrecentmonths,UNDPhas consciously begun to emphasize genderin its programming, and has identified afocal point in the country office to provideleadership on gender. Experience in othercountries, however, clearly shows that thefocal point approach is not sufficient andthatbestpracticesaredevelopedwhen full-time attention and expertise are devoted totheissue.

5. In the difficult operating environmentsuch as encountered in Somalia, policy andoperational guidance provided by UNDPheadquarters was often insufficient oruntimely.Todate,activesupporttoUNDPSomalia has been largely limited to BCPR.UNDPatthecorporatelevelhasnotdevel-oped comprehensive guidelines for issuesaffecting operations in a conflict environ-ment, forexampleon ‘remotemanagement’approaches.Noclearguidanceexistsonthestated role of UNDP as a ‘provider of lastresort’,anotionthathasconsiderablyinflu-encedthecountryprogrammeinSomalia.Inaddition, cross-fertilization between officesin different parts of the world dealing with

similar operational environments is notsystematicallyencouraged.

Despite some of the challenges – both internal and external to UNDP - UNDP Somalia con-tinues to enjoy a privileged position in Somalia based on its long-term presence in the country, on trust it has established with authorities and donors as well as on results achieved over the years in many areas of intervention.

UNDP Somalia has strived to improve its dia-loguewithboththeauthoritiesanddonors inaspiritofopennessandtransparency.UNDPhasdevelopedcomparativeadvantagesinmanyareasof interventions and should be in a position tobuildonsuchexpertise.

UNDP has also initiated a process of changethatshouldtransformtheinstitutionalculturebyemphasizingmorecohesionandsynergybetweenprogrammes,aresults-basedmanagementaswellasthemainstreamingofarights-basedapproach.The ADR team strongly endorses these recenteffortsandapproach,andwouldarguethatmoreintensivesupportfromUNDPheadquartersandunderstanding from international and nationalpartnerswill behelpful in enabling the countryoffice to manage a comprehensive change pro-cess.Someof these changeshave togobeyondintroducingorchangingsystemsandprocedures,andwill involve changes in institutional cultureoftheoffice.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS OF A STRATEGIC NATURE

Recommendation 1: UNDP Somalia needs tore-anchoritscountryprogrammetoareaswhichbuildon its core competence andare central toitsmandate. It shouldwork towards findinganalternative ‘provider’ormechanismto takeoveractivitiesrelatedtoprovidingservicestopoliticalprocesses or for simple administrative functionswhicharenotcentraltoitsmandate.

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Recommendation 2: The next countryprogrammeforSomaliashouldstrikeanappro-priate balance between interventions in supportof building the capacity of government institu-tionsandinitiativestohelpaddress,intheshortand medium term, the chronic developmentneeds of the vulnerable groups of the popula-tion,with a view to achievingprogress towardsMDGs, including on pressing issues related toenvironment.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Somalia needsto reassert overall leadership on developmentissues within the UN community and ensurethat development needs of the Somali popula-tion and support for achievement of MDGsreceive increasing attention from authorities aswell as development agencies, NGOs and thedonorcommunity.

Recommendation 4: In line with the decisionto present for approval a five-year cycle for the2011-2015countryprogramme,UNDPSomaliashould develop three region-specific five-yearoperational workplans in full consultation withrelevant partners. This should be accompaniedby a system of annual participatory reviews inorder to increase ownership of the planningprocess and to address issues of predictabilityand transparency in UNDP planning andbudgetingprocesses.

Recommendation 5: UNDP Somalia needs toengage with a wider range of actors, includingindependent observers, researchers, academicsandcivil society inorder to sharpen its analysisandunderstandingofthecomplexcontextofitsoperatingenvironment.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN OPERATIONAL NATURE

Recommendation 6: UNDP Somalia needs toensure greater coherence within and betweenprogrammesandestablishmechanismsthatpro-motecoherence,complementarityandsynergyaskeyelementsoftheinstitutionalculture.

Recommendation 7: UNDP Somalia shouldincrease the presence of Nairobi-based staff inthe field by making full use of existing possi-bilities, including slots, and increase interactionwith Somali counterparts by using proximitytemporary proximity hubs easily accessible forthe authorities with the aim of ensuring timelydecision-makingandresolutionofproblems.

Recommendation 8: UNDP Somalia shouldpursue a conscious strategy to enhance thequalityofprogrammeplanningandthedeliveryofresultsandfinancialresourcesby:

�� Securingnecessarytechnicalinputsindesign/implementationandmonitoringprocesses

�� Mainstreaming a results-oriented culturethrough monitoring and evaluation byensuringthatallprogrammestaffaretrainedin monitoring and evaluation, seeking thenecessary monitoring and evaluation tech-nical expertise, and ensuring adequateinstitutionalarrangementsandincentives

�� Undertakingareviewofexistingprogrammemanagement capacity and taking correctiveactions to enhance quality and ensure goodfinancialmanagement

�� Undertakingasystematiccapacityassessmentof implementing partners and monitoringcontractorstoensurethattheyarecapableofdeliveringtoqualitystandards.

Recommendation 9: UNDP Somalia needs todevelop a gender strategy and implementationframework. There is a need for dedicated staffresourcestoensurethatthenecessarystructures,systems and institutional culture are inplace topromotegendermainstreaming.

RECOMMENDATION FOR UNDP HEADQUARTERS

Recommendation 10:UNDPheadquartersneedsto provide more active and timely support toUNDPSomalia,todevelopguidanceforofficesoperatinginconflictenvironmentswithrestricted

5 7C H A P T E R 5 . C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

accessandtofacilitatesharingofknowledgeandbestpracticesbetweenofficesoperatinginsimilarenvironmentsaroundtheworld.Additionalguid-ancewouldbeneededinteraliaontheapplication

of thenotionof ‘provider of last resort’ andonoperations run through remote management,including quality programming and monitoringandevaluationofrelatedinterventions.

5 8 C H A P T E R 5 . C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

5 9A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

1. INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation Office of the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) con-ducts country programme evaluations calledAssessments of Development Results (ADRs)to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidenceof UNDP contributions to development resultsatthecountrylevel.ADRsarecarriedoutwithinthe overall provisions contained in the UNDPEvaluationPolicy.95TheoverallgoalsofanADRareto:

�� Provide substantive support to theAdministrator’s accountability function inreportingtotheExecutiveBoard

�� Support greater UNDP accountability tonational stakeholders and partners in theprogrammecountry

�� Serve as a means of quality assurance forUNDPinterventionsatthecountrylevel

�� Contributetolearningatcorporate,regionalandcountrylevels.

In particular, the Evaluation Office plans toconductanADRinSomaliaduring2009-2010.The ADR will contribute to a new countryprogramme,whichwillbepreparedbythecon-cerned country office and national stakeholdersforsubmissiontotheUNDPExecutiveBoardinSeptember2010.

2. BACKGROUND

Almost two decades after the collapse of theState,Somaliacontinuestobeawar-tornregion,

fraughtbyinternaldivisionsandhumansecurityconditions.Thelong-standingpoliticalinstabilityand absence of fully operational authority inSomaliahavenegativelyaffectedhumandevelop-ment. The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) forSomalia, led by the UN and World Bank withSomali partners in 2005-2006, found thatinsecurity deters investment and prevents ser-vice provision. Despite high remittance inflowstoSomalia,povertyiswidespread;in2002about43 percent were estimated to live on less than$1/day. Somalia is unlikely to reach any of theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.96

The JNA led to the development of theReconstruction and Development Programme(RDP), a five-year national plan for Somalia,which servesas amainbasis for supportby theinternational community. The RDP is builtaround three overall goals: deepening peace,improving security and establishing good gov-ernance; investing in people through improvedsocialservices;andcreatinganenablingenviron-ment for private sector-led growth to expandemploymentandreducepoverty.TheUNsysteminSomaliahastakentheRDPastheunderlyingdonor-supported Somali national develop-mentplan for2007-2011,anddevelopedaUNTransitionalPlan,whichoutlinestheelementsoftheRDPthattheUNwillworktowardsduring2008and2009.ThecurrentUNDPcountrypro-gramme(2008-2009,extendedthrough2010)isintended to support the implementation of theRDP,aswellasthelatestUNTP(2008-2009).

TheUNDPcountryprogramme2008-2009hasthreefocusareas:GovernanceandReconciliation(Governance);RuleofLawandSecurity(ROLS);

Annex1

TERMS OF REFERENCE94

94 ThisTermsofReferenceshasbeenupdatedasaresultofthescopingmissioncarriedoutbytheADRteamfrom8to12February2010.

95 http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf96 UNDPCountryProgrammeDocument2008-2009.

6 0 A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

andEarlyRecoveryandSustainableLivelihoods(RSL).Theprogrammeseekstoaddresshumansecurity and support democratic governance inall regions and provide targeted assistance toearlyrecoveryinaccessibleareas,supportingthetransition fromhumanitarian to recoveryassist-ance where possible, and balancing upstreamand downstream interventions by increasedfocus on community livelihoods recovery inpartnership with civil society and the privatesector. In addition, the UNDP Somalia pro-gramme has smaller components focusing onhumandevelopment-relatedissues,supportedbythe Human Development and Economic Unitsince 2007 and HIV/AIDS, mainly financedfrom the Global Fund resources to supportinstitutional capacity development of relevantcoordinatingauthorities.

The lack of sustained security and the volatilesituationhashad implications forUNDPoper-ations inSomaliaover theperiodunder review.Until 2006, UNDP was able to operate in allthree zones of the country (South and Central,Somaliland and Puntland), with a strong pres-ence through its regional sub-offices. However,during 2006 the security situation began todeteriorate across Somalia, and UNDP pres-encehasbeendiminishedasthesecurityphasesincreasethroughoutthecountry.

There is a wide variation in the political,economic and development situation acrossSomalia. In comparison to South and CentralSomalia, Somaliland and Puntland have beenexperiencingrelativestabilityandhavesucceededinestablishingnascent,ifyetweaklycapacitated,governmentinstitutions.However,thereremainconcerns for international aid and developmentworkersinthesezones.

In South and Central Somalia, instabilitycontinues. Following the ousting of the Unionof Islamic Courts (UIC) from Mogadishu andSouthandCentralSomaliaattheendof2006,theeffortsby theTransitionalFederalGovernment(TFG) to establish itself in Mogadishu havebeenlimiting.TheTFGcontinuestofacearmed

resistance.TheAfricanUnion(AU)AMISOMpeacekeeping mission, deployed since March2007,hasnotbeenabletomobilizetroopnum-bersinlinewithearlierpledges,andthefrequencyoffightingintheMogadishuareahasrisen.

As the programme cycle comes to an end, theADR presents an opportunity to the UNDPSomaliacountryoffice,aswellasitspartnerstotakestockofwhathasandhasnotworkedanduse the evaluation information in the designof the new country programme. In February2010 the ADR team completed the scopingmission, following the evaluability assessmentmissioncarriedoutbytheEvaluationOffice.TheTerms of Reference reflects the findings of thescopingmission.

3. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

TheobjectivesoftheSomaliaADRinclude:

�� Toprovideanindependentassessmentoftheprogressorlackthereoftowardstheexpectedoutcomes envisaged in the UNDP pro-gramming documents. Where appropriate,the ADR will also highlight unexpectedoutcomes (positive or negative) andmissedopportunities

�� To provide an analysis of how UNDP haspositioned itself toaddvalue inresponse tonational needs and changes in the nationaldevelopmentcontext

�� To present key findings, draw key lessons,and provide a set of clear and forward-lookingoptionsforthemanagementtomakeadjustmentsinthecurrentstrategyandnextcountryprogramme.

The ADR will review the UNDP experiencein Somalia and its contribution to the solutionof human security and development challenges.Theevaluationwill cover theperiod from2005to 2009/2010, including the ongoing countryprogramme (2008-2009, extended through2010), as well as the past country programme

6 1A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

(2007-2008)97 and assistance strategy and noteby the Administrator on assistance to Somalia(2005-2006). Although it is likely that greateremphasis will be placed on more recent inter-ventions (due tobetter availabilityofdata, etc.)effortswillbemadetoexaminethedevelopmentand implementation of UNDP programmessincethestartoftheperiod.

TheoverallmethodologywillbeconsistentwiththeADRGuidelinespreparedbytheEO(datedJanuary2009)andthelatestdraftADRMethodsManual(tobefinalizedlatein2009).However,given the unique situation of Somalia (e.g., awidevariationinthesituationacrossSomaliaandlack of sustained security and frequent changesin the conditions in which UNDP operates),the customization and definition of the evalua-tion criteria and questions have been carefullycarried out during the scoping mission. Theevaluationwillundertakeacomprehensivereviewof the UNDP programme portfolio and activ-itiesduringtheperiodunderreview,specificallyexamining the UNDP contribution to nationalefforts towards development results across thecountry.Itwillassesskeyresults,specificallyout-comes – anticipated and unanticipated, positiveandnegative,intentionalandunintentional–andwill cover UNDP assistance funded from bothcoreandnon-coreresources.

The evaluation has two main components,the analysis of development outcomes and thestrategicpositioningofUNDP.

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

The assessment of the development outcomeswillentailacomprehensivereviewoftheUNDPprogrammeportfolioofthepreviousandongoingprogramme cycles (2005-2009/2010). Thisincludes an assessment of development resultsachieved and the contribution of UNDP intermsofkeyinterventions;progressinachieving

outcomes for the ongoing country programme;factors influencing results (UNDP positioningand capacities, partnerships, policy support);and achievements/progress and contribution ofUNDP in practice areas (both in policy andadvocacy); analysing the cross-cutting linkagesand their relationship to MDGs, the RDPand the UNTPs for Somalia. The analysis ofdevelopment results will provide indications ofchallengesandstrategiesforfutureinterventions.Besides using the available information, theevaluation will document and analyse achieve-ments against intended outcomes and linkagesbetween activities, outputs and outcomes. Theevaluation will qualify the UNDP contribu-tion to outcomes with a reasonable degree ofplausibility. A core set of criteria related to thedesign, management and implementation of itsinterventionsinthecountry,andtheirrespectivekey evaluation questions98 will include thefollowing(examples):

�� Effectiveness: Did the UNDP programmeaccomplish its intended objectives andplanned results? What are the strengthsand weaknesses of the programme? Whatare the unexpected results it yielded? Didthe programme contain innovative activ-ities or approaches? Should it continue inthesamedirectionorshoulditsmaintenetsbe reviewed for thenewcycle?What couldbe done to ensure a more efficient use ofresourcesinthecountryandzonecontext?

�� Efficiency: How well did UNDP use itsresources(humanandfinancial)inachievingintended results? What could be done toensureamoreefficientuseofresourcesinthevariousregionsofthecountry?

�� Sustainability:ArethebenefitsoftheUNDPcontributionsustainable?Aretheremeasuresput in place to ensure that the develop-ment results achieved through the UNDPcontribution will be sustainable? Are thebenefits of UNDP interventions sustained

97 Thisprogrammecoveredonly2007asitwasreplacedbyanewCPDfollowingtheformulationin2007oftheRecoveryandDevelopmentProgrammeandtheUNTP.

98 Keyquestionsandsub-questionswereidentifiedduringthescopingmissioninFebruary2010.Thesub-questionscanbefoundintheEvaluationMatrix,Annex2oftheinceptionreportpreparedbytheevaluationteam.

6 2 A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

andownedbynationalstakeholdersaftertheinterventioniscompleted?

The evaluation will also consider the influenceof administrative and programme managementconstraints affecting the programme and spe-cifically the UNDP contribution (includingissues related to the relevance and effectivenessof the monitoring and evaluation system). Ifduring the initial analysis these are consideredimportant,theywillbeincludedinthescopeoftheevaluation.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING

The evaluation will assess the strategicpositioningofUNDPbothfromtheperspectiveof organization and the development prioritiesinthecountry,totheextentpossible,as identi-fied in existing documentation and interviews,taking intoconsiderationcomplexsecurity,pol-iticalandsocio-economicconditionsofSomalia.Thiswillentail:(i)asystematicanalysisofplaceandnicheofUNDPwithinthedevelopmentandpolicy space in Somalia; (ii) the strategies usedbyUNDPSomaliatostrengthenthepositionofUNDP in the development space and create apositionfortheorganizationinitscorepractice/resultsareas,asstipulatedinthecorporateplans;(iii) from the perspective of the developmentresults for the country, the ADR will evaluatethepolicysupportandadvocacyinitiativesoftheUNDPprogrammevis-à-visotherstakeholders.In addition, the ADR will analyse a core setof criteria related to the strategic positioningofUNDP:

�� Strategic relevance and responsiveness:Did UNDP apply the right strategy withinthespecificpolitical,economic,securityandsocial context of the country and regions?How did the organization respond toSomali needs and the pursuit of MDGs?What were the missed opportunities inUNDPprogramming?

�� Comparative advantage: What have beenthe comparative advantages of UNDP inSomalia?WastheUNDPstrategydesignedto maximize the use of its corporate andcomparative strengths? How has UNDPleveragedpartnershipswithintheUNsystemas well as with national partners and theinternationalcommunityatlarge?

�� Promoting UN values:DidUNDPactivitiespromote the core values of the UN and itsown corporate values (gender, South-Southcooperationandrights-basedapproach)?

It should be noted that special efforts will bemade to examine whether cross-cutting issuessuch as partnership and credibility/image/per-ception of UNDP have affected the UNDPcontribution to development results, as wellas its contribution to UN enhanced coherenceand coordination in programming in Somalia.WithinthecontextofpartnershipswiththeUNsystemandoverallUNcoordination,thespecificissue of the development of joint programmeswillbehighlighted.

4. EVALUATION METHODS AND APPROACHES

DATA COLLECTION

TheADRwillnormallyuseamultiplemethodapproachthatcouldincludedeskreviews,groupand individual interviews (at headquarters andthe country office) and project/field visits. Theappropriatesetofmethodswouldvarydependingoncountrycontext,Basedonthefindingsoftheevaluability assessment and the scoping mis-sion,99duringweek3ofthemaindatacollectionmission, the ADR team will visit Hargeisa,Somaliland and Garowe, Puntland to inter-view UNDP staff, authorities, implementingpartners and beneficiaries. Based on a set ofselection criterion (shown below), projects forin-depthexaminationhavebeenselectedduringthe scoping mission. The list of these selectedprojects or major initiatives is provided inAnnex3oftheinceptionreport.

99 Thescopingmissionisdescribedinsection5,ontheevaluationprocess.

6 3A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

– The balance between thematic areasoftheprogramme

– Representative of outcomes detailed intheCPD

– Thebalancebetweenupstreamanddown-streaminterventions

– Thegeographicalcoverageoftheproject

– Theevaluabilityoftheproject

– The possibility of accessing the ultimatebeneficiariesfordatacollection

– The possibility to see gender main-streamingatwork

– Projectswithlargebudgets

– Other considerations as indicated in therelevantcolumnofthetable.

VALIDATION

Theevaluationteamwilluseavarietyofmethodsto ensure that the data is valid, including tri-angulation. During the last week of the maindata collection mission, the team will comparerecorded data through interviews and groupmeetings, and document review summaries andanalyse them based on the framework estab-lishedintheEvaluationMatrix(Annex2oftheinception report). The Evaluation Office taskmanagerwillbepresenttoensurethesystematicanalysisofevidencebaseduringthatweekbeforethe ADR team presents findings and emergingconclusions and recommendations at thestakeholdermeeting.

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

While adhering to the principles ofconflict-sensitive evaluation and ethics incarrying out the evaluation, a strong participa-tory approach to the extent possible, involvinga broad range of stakeholders, will be pursued.Theidentificationofthestakeholders,includinggovernment representatives of ministries/agen-cies, civil society organizations, private sectorrepresentatives,UNagencies,multilateralorgan-izations, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries will

takeplaceduringthescopingmission.Tofacili-tate this approach, all ADRs include a processofstakeholdermappingthatwouldincludebothUNDP direct partners as well as stakeholderswhodonotworkdirectlywithUNDP.

5. EVALUATION PROCESS

The ADR process will also follow the ADRGuidelines, according to which the processcan be divided in three phases, each includingseveralsteps.

PHASE 1: PREPARATION

�� Desk review – Initially carried out by theEvaluation Office (identification, collectionandmappingofrelevantdocumentationandotherdata)andcontinuedbytheevaluationteam. This includes general development-relateddocumentationrelatingtothespecificcountryaswellasacomprehensiveoverviewof the UNDP programme over the periodbeingexamined.

�� Stakeholder mapping – A basic mappingofstakeholdersrelevanttotheevaluationinthe country carried out at the country level(this includes partners based in Nairobi).These may include ‘movers and shakers’ inthe national context, who may or may nothave direct relationships with the UNDPprogramme.Themappingexercisealsoindi-catestherelationshipsbetweendifferentsetsofstakeholders.

�� Inception meetings–DiscussionsatUNDPheadquarters with the EO (process andmethodology), the RBAS (context andcounty programme) as well as with otherrelevant bureaux (including the Bureau forDevelopment Policy and the Bureau forCrisis Prevention and Recovery, relevantUNdepartments,andothersasappropriate,includingUNmissions).

�� Evaluability assessment mission – Due totheuniquesituationoftheSomaliprogramme(e.g.,itsnewprogrammebeingpresentedto

6 4 A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

the Executive Board in September 2010,hence a compressed time to conduct theADR, uncertainty regarding the appropri-ateness in applying theADRapproachandmethods to the Somalia programme, etc.),The Evaluation Office task manager willconductaone-weekevaluabilityassessment,whichservesasthebasisfordeterminingtheconductoftheevaluation.

�� Scoping mission – A mission to Nairobiby the independent evaluation team andEvaluationOfficetaskmanagerinorderto:

– Identifyandcollectfurtherdocumentation

– Validate the mapping of thecountryprogrammes

– Get key stakeholder perspectives on keyissuesthatshouldbeexamined

– Address logistical issues related to themainmission,includingtiming

– Identify the appropriate set of datacollectionandanalysismethods

– Addressmanagementissuesrelatedtotherest of the evaluation process includingdivision of labour among the teammembers.

– Ensure that the country office and keystakeholdersunderstandtheADRobject-ives, methodology and process, as afollow-uptotheinitialmissionconductedbytheEO.

Attheendofthescopingmission,aninceptionreport is developed to spell out the design oftheevaluation.

PHASE 2: CONDUCTING ADR AND DRAFTING THE EVALUATION REPORT

�� Main ADR mission-Themissionofthreeweeks is conducted by the independentevaluation team and focuses on data col-lection and validation. The team will visitsignificant project/field sites in Somalilandand Puntland, as identified in the scopingmission and the mission will be concluded

byoneweekofdataanalysisbytheteam,andalsoastakeholdermeeting(seebelow).

�� Stakeholder meeting – At the end of themainADRmission,therewillbeameetingwiththekeynationalstakeholderstopresentthe emerging results of the evaluation anddiscuss emerging conclusions and possibleareasofrecommendations.Themainpurposeof the meeting is to enhance ownership ofthe evaluation and to ensure the relevanceand realism of emerging recommendations.Itmaybenecessarytoincorporatesomesig-nificantcommentsinproceedingtodraftthereportbytheteamleader.

�� Reporting – The information collected isanalysed in the draft ADR report by theevaluationteamwithinthreeweeksafterthedepartureoftheteamfromthecountry.

�� Review: The draft is subject to: (a) factualcorrections and views on interpretation bytheUNDPcountryofficeandRBAS; (b)atechnical review by the Evaluation Office;and (c) a review by an external reviewer.TheEvaluationOfficewillprepareanaudittrail to show how these comments weretakenintoaccount.TheteamleaderinclosecooperationwiththeEOtaskmanagershallfinalizetheADRreportbasedonthesefinalreviews.

�� Publishing and dissemination: Afterthe comments from ADR stakeholdershave been incorporated in the draft, theEvaluation Office will publish the ADR asanindependentevaluationreport.TheADRreport and brief will be widely distributedin both hard and electronic versions. Theevaluation report will be made available tothe UNDP Executive Board by the timeof approving anewCPD. Itwill bewidelydistributed inSomaliaandatUNDPhead-quartersandcopieswillbesenttoevaluationoutfits of other international organizationsaswellastoevaluationsocietiesandresearchinstitutions in the region. Furthermore,the evaluation report and the manage-ment responsewillbepublishedonUNDPpublicly available web-based database, the

6 5A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

EvaluationResourceCentre(erc.undp.org),aswellasontheUNDPwebsite(www.undp.org/evaluation).

PHASE 3: FOLLOW-UP

�� Management response: As stipulated inthe UNDP evaluation policy, the Somaliacountry office is responsible for preparinga management response to the ADR withsupport and oversight from the regionalbureau. As a unit exercising oversight, theRegional Bureau will be responsible formonitoringandoverseeingtheimplementa-tion of follow-up actions in the EvaluationResourceCentre.

The time frame and responsibilities for theevaluationprocessaretentativelyasfollows:

6. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

UNDP EVALUATION OFFICE

TheUNDPEvaluationOfficetaskmanagerwillmanage the evaluation and ensure coordinationand liaison with RBAS, other concerned unitsat headquarters level and the Somalia countryoffice management. The Evaluation Office willalsocontractaresearchassistanttofacilitatetheinitial desk review and a programme assistantto support logisticalandadministrativematters.TheEvaluationOfficewillmeetallcostsdirectlyrelated to the conduct of the ADR. They willincludecostsrelatedtoparticipationoftheteamleader,internationalandnationalconsultants,aswellasthepreliminaryresearchandtheissuanceofthefinalADRreport.TheEvaluationOfficeinprinciplewillcoverthecostoftheevaluation.

Activity Estimated Date

Collectionandmappingofdocumentationbytheresearchassistant Nov/Dec2009–Jan2010

EvaluabilityAssessmenttoNairobioffice December2009

DeskReviewbytheevaluationteam Jan-February2010

BriefinginNewYork Early-February2010

ScopingMissiontoNairobioffice Mid-February2010

Inceptionreport February2010

MainADRmissiontoNairobi/Somaliaandstakeholderworkshop March1-30,2010

Submissionoffirstdraftreport LateApril2010

CommentsfromEOandadvisorypanel Mid-May2010

FactualcorrectionsfromCO,RB,relevantstakeholders June2010

LessonslearninganddebriefingeventforHQ-basedbureausinNY June2010

Issuanceoffinalreport July2010

6 6 A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The team is constituted of three consultants,supportedbytheEvaluationOfficetaskmanagerandtheresearchassistant:

�� Consultantteamleader,withoverallrespon-sibilityforprovidingguidanceandleadership,andincoordinatingthedraftandfinalreport

�� Two consultant team specialists – inter-national and regional, who will provide theexpertise in the core subject areas of theevaluation, and be responsible for draftingkeypartsofthereport.

Theteamleadermusthaveademonstratedcap-acityinstrategicthinkingandpolicyadviceandintheevaluationofcomplexprogrammesinthefield, particularly in conflict-affected situations.All teammembersshouldhave in-depthknow-ledgeofcomplexissuesinSomalia.

All team members need to have experiences inconductingcomplexprogrammeevaluationsandunderstandconflict-sensitiveevaluationmethods,knowledge of Somalia and the region and sub-stantive knowledge of one or two of the focusareas of the UNDP programme in Somalia. AregionalNairobi-basedteammemberisexpectedto facilitate preparations for the main mission,includingliaisingwiththeSomaliacountryofficeto ensure that the office has arranged meetingsandprovidedrequireddocumentation.

The evaluation team will be supported by aresearchassistantbasedintheEvaluationOfficeinNewYork.ThetaskmanageroftheEvaluationOffice will support the team in designing theevaluation, will participate in the scoping mis-sion and provide ongoing feedback for qualityassurance during the preparation of the incep-tionreportandthefinalreport.TheEvaluationOfficetaskmanagermightparticipateinthelastpartofthemainmissionduringthedataanalysisstageandthestakeholderworkshop.The evaluation team will orient its work byUnited Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)

norms and standards for evaluation andwilladheretotheethicalguidelinesandtheCodeofConduct.100

THE SOMALIA COUNTRY OFFICE

The country office takes a lead role inorganizing dialogue and stakeholder meetingson the findings and recommendations, sup-portstheevaluationteaminliaisonwiththekeypartners, and makes available to the team allnecessary information regarding UNDP activ-ities inthecountry.Theoffice isalsorequestedto provide additional logistical support to theevaluation team, as required, including makingarrangements for interviews and field visits,and providing security-related support. Tosafeguard the independence of the evaluation,interviews with informants will be conductedin the absence of the Somalia personnel. Thecountryofficewillcontributesupportinkind(forexample,officespacefortheevaluationteam)butthe Evaluation Office will cover localtransportationcosts.

7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs from the evaluationteamare:

�� Aninceptionreport

�� Apresentationatthestakeholderworkshop

�� AcomprehensivefinalreportontheSomaliaADR(maximum50pagesplusannexes)

�� Atwo-pageevaluationbrief.

The team leader of the evaluation team isresponsible for putting the report together. TheEvaluationOfficehas theultimate responsibilityto ensure the quality of the report. The evalua-tionteammembersarerequiredtoparticipate inrelevant missions to New York and/or Nairobiandprovidenecessaryinputstothedraftingofthereportduringtheevaluationprocess,asdefinedbytheteamleaderduringthescopingphase.

100 TheUNEvaluationGroupGuidelines(UNEG),Norms for Evaluation in the UN System and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System(April2005).

6 7A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

8. DURATION

The evaluation team will be engaged in thisexerciseovertheperiodbetween25Januaryand302010onapart-timebasis,althoughmostofthework is concentratedaround themonthsofFebruary and March, when the team membersare expected to be in the field on a full-timebasis.Paymentswillbelinkedtothedeliveryofsatisfactoryoutputs,approvedbytheEvaluationOfficetaskmanager.

6 8 A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E

6 9A N N E X 2 . E V A L U A T I O N M A T R I X

Annex2

EVALUATION MATRIX

Criteria/Sub-criteria Main questions to be addressed by the ADR

Data collection methods and data sources

ASSESSMENT BY THEMATIC AREA

A.1RELEVANCE HowrelevantareUNDPprogrammestothepriorityneedsofthecountryandtheSomalipeople?DidUNDPapplytherightstrategywithinthespecificpolitical,economic,securityandsocialcontextoftheareaswhereitworks?TowhatextenthasUNDPbeenabletobalanceimmediateandlong-termdevelopmentneeds?

A.1aRelevanceoftheobjectives

•AreUNDPactivitiesalignedwiththestrategiesofthecountry?Aretheyconsistentwithhumandevelopmentneedsinthatarea(whethermentionedinstrategiesornot)?

Interviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivil

societyandindependentobserversDocumentreviewsandanalysis-RDP,UNTP,CDPs,annualworkplans,

datafromAtlas

A.1bRelevanceoftheapproaches

•AreUNDPapproaches,resources,models,conceptualframeworkrelevanttoachieveplannedoutcomes?Dotheyfollowknowngoodpractices?

A.2EFFECTIVENESS

DidUNDPprogrammeaccomplishitsintendedobjectivesandplannedresults?Whatarethestrengthsandweaknessesoftheprogramme?Whataretheunexpectedresultsityielded?Didtheprogrammecontaininnovativeactivitiesorapproaches?Shoulditcontinueinthesamedirectionorshoulditsmaintenetsbereviewedforthenewcycle?

A.2aProgresstowardachievementofoutcomes

•Didtheprogrammeimplementationcontributetoprogresstowardsthestatedoutcome?Oratleastdiditsetdynamicprocessesandchangesthatmovetowardsthelong-termoutcomes?

Documentreviewsandanalysis-UNDPanddonorevaluationdocuments-ROAR,monitoringreports,RCannualreports

-Reviewofexistingbaselinedata-UNTPmid-termreview-RDP,UNTP,CDPs

A.2bOutreach •Howbroadareoutcomes(e.g.localcommunity,district,region,national)?

A.2cPovertydepth/equity

•Whoarethemainbeneficiaries(poor,non-poor,disadvantagedgroups)?

-Projectdocument,monitoringreports-Fieldvisits-MapsshowingUN/UNDPactivities

inSomalia

A.3EFFICIENCY

HowwelldidUNDPuseitsresources(humanandfinancial)inachievingintendedresults?Whatcouldbedonetoensureamoreefficientuseofresourcesinthevariousregionsofthecountry?

A.3aManagerialefficiency

•Havetheprogrammesbeenimplementedwithindeadlines,costsestimates?

•HaveUNDPanditspartnerstakenpromptactionstosolveimplementationissues?

•Hastherebeenadequatemonitoringandevaluationdespitethesecuritysituation?

-ROAR-WorkplansandminutesofOutcome

Boards/Steeringcommittees-Identifymajor(+30%)gapsinfunding-Documentthenotionof‘remotecontrol’-Monitoringreports-EvaluationPlanfortheCO

(cont’d) h

7 0 A N N E X 2 . E V A L U A T I O N M A T R I X

Criteria/Sub-criteria Main questions to be addressed by the ADR

Data collection methods and data sources

A.3bProgrammaticefficiency

•WasthereanyindentifiedsynergybetweenUNDPinterventionsthatcontrib-utedtoreducingcostswhilesupportingresults?

•WeretheUNDPresourcesfocusedtoachieveoutcomesidentifiedinCPDs?

-Projectdocuments,reportsandevaluations

-Coordinationmechanismsbetweenprogrammesandprojects

-Fieldvisits-InterviewswithUNDPmanagement,staff,partners,andnationalcounterparts

A.4SUSTAINABILITY

ArethebenefitsofUNDP’scontributionsustainable?AretheremeasuresputinplacetoensurethedevelopmentresultsachievedthroughUNDPcontributionwillbesustainable?ArethebenefitsofUNDPinterventionssustainedandownedbynationalstakeholdersaftertheinterventioniscompleted?

A.4aDesignforsustainability

•Wereinterventionsdesignedtohavesustainableresultsgiventheidentifiablerisksanddidtheyincludeanexitstrategy?Qualityofdesigns,conceptualmodels?

Interviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandtheinternationalcommunity

-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivilsocietyandindependentobservers

DocumentReview-Projectdocuments,reportsandevaluations

-Existence/absenceofoutcomeindicatorsandmonitoringofindicators

-Riskmanagementapproachinprojectmanagement/riskmanagementlog

-Changesinworkplans-Fieldvisits

A.4bIssuesatimplementationandcorrectivemeasures

•Whatissuesemergedduringimplementationasathreattosustainability?

•Whatwerethecorrectivemeasuresthatwereadopted?

A.4cUp-scalingofpilotinitiatives

•Iftherewastestingofpilotinitiatives,wasaplanforup-scalingofsuchinitiative,ifsuccessful,beingprepared?

-Projectdocuments

ASSESSMENT OF UNDP STRATEGIC POSITION

B.1STRATEGICRELEVANCEANDRESPON-SIVENESS

DidUNDPapplytherightstrategywithinthespecificpolitical,economic,securityandsocialcontextofthecountryandregions?HowdidUNDPrespondtoSomalineedsandthepursuitofMDG?WhatwerethemissedopportunitiesinUNDPprogramming?

u (cont’d)

(cont’d) h

7 1A N N E X 2 . E V A L U A T I O N M A T R I X

Criteria/Sub-criteria Main questions to be addressed by the ADR

Data collection methods and data sources

B.1aRelevanceagainstthechallengesandprioritiesofSomalia

•DidUNDPaddressthedevelopmentchallengesandprioritiesofSomalia?

Interviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivilsociety

andindependentobserversDocumentreviewandanalysis-PrioritiesasdefinedintheRDPand

existingregionaldevelopmentplans-YearlyCAPs(2005-2010)-Vulnerabilityassessmentsofvarious

agencies-FoodSecurityandNutritionalSurvey

(FSANU)-MonitoringreportsofInstitution

DevelopmentProjectsandROAR-Visitstotworegionalcapitals

B.1bFacilitatingimplementa-tionofnationalstrategiesandpolicies

•DidtheUNDPprogrammefacilitatetheimplementationofnationalandregionaldevelopmentstrategiesandpoliciesandprovideadequatesupporttoauthorities?

B.1cRelevanceofUNDPoperationalapproaches

•Istherebalancebetweenupstreamanddownstreaminitiatives?Balancebetweencapitalandregional/locallevelinterven-tions?Adequacyofresources?

-Projectdocuments-Fundinggaps(underCPD2008-2010)-Balancebetweencomponentsof

programmesinexpenditureovertheperiod

B.1dResponsivenesstochangesincontext

•HowdidUNDPanticipateandrespondtosignificantchangesinthenationaldevelopment,politicalandsecuritycontextandintheinternationalenvironment?DidUNDPhaveanadequatemechanismtorespondtosignificantchanges,inparticularincrisisandemergencies?

•Howdidthenotionof‘provideroflastresort’affectUNDPprogrammes?

-Identificationofmajorcrisispointssuchasrenewedfighting,staffsecurity,etcandchangesinthepoliticalcontext

-reportsoftheSecretary-General,ICGandotherobservers,media

-Staffinterviews-identificationofstandardcorporate

instruments(e.g.recruitmentandprocurementprocedure,‘fasttrack’)andtheirsuitabilityforthesituationofSomalia

B.1eBalancebetweenshort-termresponsivenessandlong-termdevelopmentobjectives

•Howaretheshort-termrequestsforassistancebytheauthoritiesandtheinternationalcommunitybalancedagainstlongtermdevelopmentneeds?

-Balancebetweenprogrammeareas-Analysisofprogrammesinterms

ofinternalcoherenceandcomplementaritieswithotherUNorbilateralinterventions

-AnalysisofactivitiesundertakenattherequestoftheUNMissionanddonorsandthoseinheritedfromUNOSOM.

B.2ASSESSINGHOWUNDPEXPLOITEDCOMPARATIVEADVANTAGES

WhathavebeenthecomparativeadvantagesofUNDPinSomalia?WastheUNDPstrategydesignedtomaximizetheuseofitscorporateandcomparativestrengths?HowhasUNDPleveragedpartnershipswithintheUNsystemaswellaswithnationalpartnersandtheinternationalcommunityatlarge?

u (cont’d)

(cont’d) h

7 2 A N N E X 2 . E V A L U A T I O N M A T R I X

Criteria/Sub-criteria Main questions to be addressed by the ADR

Data collection methods and data sources

B.2aComparativestrengthsofUNDPinSomalia

•ArethecorporatecomparativestrengthsofUNDPrelevanttothesituationinSomalia?

•WastheUNDPstrategydesignedtomaximizetheuseofitscomparativestrengths?

-StatementofcorporatecomparativestrengthsandcorporatefocusareasviewedagainstCPD

-CPDInterviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivil

societyandindependentobservers

B.2bAssistingGovernmenttouseexternalpartner-shipsandSouth-Southcooperation

•DidUNDPuseitsnetworktobringaboutopportunitiesforSouth-Southexchangesandcooperation?

-Projectdocuments-ROAR-RCreportsInterviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivilsociety

andindependentobservers

B.2cPartnershipwithintheUNandwithassoci-atedfundsandprogrammes

•DidUNDPhelpexploitcomparativeadvantagesofassociatedfunds(UNV,UNIFEM,UNCDF),e.g.inspecifictechnicalmatter?

•HastherebeenstrategicandprogrammaticcoordinationwithotherUNagenciesandwithinternationalfinancialinstitutions?

•WhathavebeenthemechanismsofconsultationandcoordinationwithUNPOS?

-Projectdocuments-ROAR-RCreports-ReportsoftheSecretary-General-FunctioningoftheUNCTandrole

ofUNDPInterviewsandgroupmeetings-SeniorUNPOSofficials-UNV,UNIFEM,UNCDFofficials

B.2dPartnershipsandcoordina-tionwithnon-UNpartners

•WhathasbeenUNDP’scontributiontocoordinationamongdonors?

•Whathavebeenthemechanismsforcoordinationandconsultationswiththecivilsociety,includingtheNGOsandtheprivatesector?

-CoordinationstructureinCISSandSSS-RoleofUNDPinWorkingGroups

underSSS-NGOconsortium-FieldvisitsInterviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-Keycivilsocietymembers

u (cont’d)

(cont’d) h

7 3A N N E X 2 . E V A L U A T I O N M A T R I X

Criteria/Sub-criteria Main questions to be addressed by the ADR

Data collection methods and data sources

B.3PROMOTIONOFUNVALUES

DidUNDPactivitiespromotethecorevaluesoftheUNanditsowncorporatevalues?

B.3aAssistingintheattainmentofMDGs

•IstheUNsystem,andUNDPinparticular,effectivelysupportingthepromotionoftheMDGandthemonitoringofachievements?

-MDGprogressreport(2009)-WorldBank-ActivitiesofHDEUandMDGOfficerInterviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivilsociety

andindependentobservers

B.3bContributiontogenderequity

•TheextenttowhichtheUNDPprogrammeisdesignedtoappropriatelyincorporateineachoutcomeareacontributionstotheattainmentofgenderequality?

•TheextenttowhichUNDPsupportedpositivechangesintermsofgenderequalityandwhethertherewereanyunintendedeffects?

-Projectdocuments-UNCTgenderaudit(2010)-Trainingactivitiesforstaff-ROAR-Genderprioritymatrix-UNCTthematicgroupongender

B.3cAddressingequityissues

•DidtheUNDPprogrammetakeintoaccounttheplightandneedsofvulner-ableordisadvantagedtopromotesocialequity?Didtheprogrammesemphasiseahumanrightsbasedapproach?

-UNTPandCPDs-ROAR-Progressreportsandevaluations-Fieldvisits

B.3.dCredibilityofUNDP

•IsUNDPconsideredcapableofprovidingleadershipandcontributingtosubstantiveandhigh-levelpolicydialogueonhumandevelopmentissuesinthecountry,particularlyonpotentiallysensitivetopics?

-Non-UNDPevaluationreports-Perceptionsbypartners-UNDP’sPartnersSurveys(selectquestions

complementedbyinterviews.Interviewsandgroupmeetings-KeyseniorUNandUNDPofficials-Keyrepresentativesofauthorities-Keyrepresentativesofdonorsandthe

internationalcommunity-SelectmembersoftheSomalicivilsociety

andindependentobservers

u (cont’d)

7 4 A N N E X 2 . E V A L U A T I O N M A T R I X

7 5A N N E X 3 . L I S T O F P R O J E C T A C T I V I T I E S V I S I T E D

SOMALILAND:

1. AccessroadprojectoutsideHargeisa*

2. Contour bunds, watershed managementproject,45kmsoutsideHargeisa*

3. Three‘Berkads’103outsideHargeisa*

4. UniversityofHargeisa:re-trainingforjudgesandprosecutors,legalaidclinic,observatoryonviolence

5. CivilServiceCommissionandCivilServiceInstituteinHargeisa

6. FinancialManagementTeam,MinistryofFinance

PUNTLAND:

7. MunicipalMarketinGarowe*

8. MunicipalMarketinGardo*

9. LegalaidclinicinGarowe

10. SoilErosionGabionsoutsideGardo

11. GardoPoliceTrainingSchool

12.GardoPrison

Annex3

LIST OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES VISITED IN SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND (16-23 MARCH 2010)

101 Shallowopenwellswhichconserverun-offwaterduringrainyseasonsforuseduringdryseasons–acommonpracticeinSomaliaandpartsofEthiopia.

*Indicatessiteswheredirectprojectbeneficiariescouldbeinterviewed.

7 6 A N N E X 3 . L I S T O F P R O J E C T A C T I V I T I E S V I S I T E D

7 7A N N E X 4 . L I S T O F P E R S O N S C O N S U L T E D

Annex4

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (TFG)

AbdullahiSheikhAli,MinisterofStateforPlanningandInternationalCooperation

ElmiAhmedDuale,PermanentRepresentative,PermanentMissionofSomaliatotheUnitedNations,NewYork

Kader,MemberofthePoliceAdvisoryCommittee(bytelephone)

AUTHORITIES IN PUNTLAND

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

AliMohamedAlnihusa,DirectorGeneral,Security/AVR

MohamedSabeHassan,DirectorGeneral,DDR

BurhanH.Husein,Director,RuralDevelopment

JamesHasanHussein,LocalGovernanceDepartment

AbdirisakIssaHussein,PMACManager

MohamedOmar,ActingDirectorGeneral

AlsalemDawodYusuf,DirectorofPlanning

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

AbdulkadirA.Hashi,MinisterofState

MohamedAliIsmail,ActingDirectorGeneral

MINISTRY OF WOMEN DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY AFFAIRS

AbdirisagDahirAli,ConsultantGender

HalimAliBiyod,GenderAffairsCoordinator

AbdirizakHassanFarah,Consultant

MariamOmarHajji,FocalPointGirlsLeadership

ZamZamMohamedSaroge,Consultant

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

AbdulkadirAhmed,ChiefJustice

GAROWE DISTRICT COUNCIL

AbdirashidIssaAbdi,ConsultantSocialServices

AbdulcadirAbdullahi,Consultant

AbdulazisN.Elmi,Mayor

A.FarahMohamed,MemberofCouncil

AUTHORITIES IN SOMALILAND

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

AdanElmiAhmed,Director

AhmedDayrCaydild,DirectorGeneral

AblibHassanFilfil,Minister

AbdiHalimM.Mussa,ViceMinister

MINISTRY OF FAMILY AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL WELFARE

FatimaSudiHassan,Minister

AlrahmanMohamedMal,DirectorGeneral

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

AhmedHassanFarah,AuditorGeneral

AhmedDaudGedi,DirectorGeneral

MohamedKasimHashi,BudgetAdviser

OmarIbrahimHussein,SeniorEconomist,FiscalPolicyReformManagement

7 8 A N N E X 4 . L I S T O F P E R S O N S C O N S U L T E D

HassanJans,FiscalPolicyOfficer

HassanMohamedMead,Director,MunicipalityAuditing

AhmedAwabdiShair,ViceMinister

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

HassanDimbil,SeniorAdviser,CivilianPolice

AbshirAbdillahiHassan,Consultant,SmallArmsControl

MohamedIbrahimMuse,NationalCoordinator,SmallArmsControl

MohamedSagadi,CommissionerofPolice

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL PLANNING, COORDINATION AND RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

AhmedHashiAbdi,ViceMinister

AhmedDalalFarah,InstitutionalDevelopmentandPublicSectorReformExpert,MacroeconomicManagementOffice

KaltaruS.Hassan,GenderExpert

MINISTRY OF PASTORAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

JumaMohamedAbdi,DirectorGeneral

AhmedDirieEhmi,Director,RangeandPastoralDevelopment

AbdikarimAdenOmar,Director,ForestsDepartment

OTHER OFFICIALS

OmarH.SaidAbdulahi,DirectorGeneral,CivilServiceCommission

MohamedAbdurahman,CivilServiceInstitute

MohamedHaupe,Director,MunicipalityofHargeisa

AbdirahimanIsmailHussein,Chairman,CivilServiceCommission

HersiAbdillahiIsmail,FinanceOfficer,CivilServiceInstitute

AhmedJuma,AdviserICT,OfficeofthePresident

MohamedMihekh,Director,CivilServiceInstitute

SOMALI CIVIL SOCIETY

GAROWE

Abdulkadir,Dean,FacultyofPublicAdministration,PuntlandStateUniversity

SaidAdenElmi,Administrator,PuntlandStateUniversity

YusufHajnour,Director,LegalAidCentre

MohamedHamid,DirectorandPresident,PuntlandStateUniversity

RomanoSalama,InstitutionalDevelopment,Kaalo/PuntlandStateUniversity

MohamedSaidSameer,Professor,PuntlandStateUniversity

MohamedYusuf,Dean,FacultyofLaw,PuntlandStateUniversity

HARGEISA

MahAbdullah,Engineer,SomaliConsultantsAssociation

HassanAhmedAden,LegalAidClinic

HusseinSh.Aden,ProjectManager,CommunityBasedNetwork

HodanMohadAli,Coordinator,WomenLawyersAssociation

HassanAlin,ProjectCoordinator,DosesofHope

MohamedAbdiAllamagen,ExecutiveDirector,CommunityBasedNetwork

OmarS.Abdilahi,Director,GeneralObservatory,UniversityofHargeisa

RodaAliAhmed,ObservatoryofViolence

DhadanAlrahim,AdministrativeOfficer,TabanTaabo

HusseinA.Bulhan,President/Chancellor,UniversityofHargeisa

MustafaElmi,ProgrammeCoordinator,HAVOYOCO

7 9A N N E X 4 . L I S T O F P E R S O N S C O N S U L T E D

AbdulkaderN.Gulalil,ExecutiveDirector,TRG

MohamedHassan,FocalPerson,SomaliConsultantsAssociation

MohamedSaidHevsi,SomalilandLawyersAssociation

JanaAliIsmail,LegalAidClinic

AbdullahiDirieJama,SecretaryGeneral,SomalilandChamberofCommerce,IndustryandAgriculture

DaudMohamedKhaire,ProjectManager,ARDA

A.IbrahimKhalif,ObservatoryofViolence

AhmedAbdiKijandhe,ExecutiveDirector,HEAL

MohamedAbokorMohamed,Director,LegalAidClinic

MohamedOsman,AdministrativeOfficer,ADO

JamalSamata,SomaliConsultantsAssociation

NAIROBI

IdhowNorAbdi,HealthandNutritionOfficer,MURADO(Mogadishu)

AminaAbdikadir,CoordinatorHIV/AIDS,COGWO(Mogadishu)

ZahraM.Ahmed,ExecutiveDirector,COGWO(Mogadishu)

YunisYarrowAli,ChiefExecutive,MURADO(Mogadishu)

AbdifatahOsmanHussein,ProgrammeOfficer,MURADO(Mogadishu)

AbdinasirA.Osman,Director,SomaliConsultantsAssociation

EMBASSIES AND BILATERAL AGENCIES IN NAIROBI

StefanoA.Dejak,AmbassadortotheTFG,EmbassyofItaly

JonathanHargreaves,DeputyHead,SomaliaProgrammes,DFID,(UnitedKingdom)

AbdubaMolluIdo,ProgrammeOfficer–Somalia,RoyalDanishEmbassy

EricWangusiKhaemba,SeniorProgrammeOfficer,DFID,(UnitedKingdom)

EmmaMorley,GovernanceAdvisor,DFID,(UnitedKingdom)

MichaelMorris,RegionalStatisticsAdviser,DFID,(UnitedKingdom)

AnnaSchmidt,GovernanceandSecuritySectionSomaliaOperationsUnit,EC

DanSilvey,ConflictAdvisor,DFID,(UnitedKingdom)

KaoruYokotani,Researcher,EconomicCooperationDivision,EmbassyofJapan

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN NAIROBI

FaisaAbdiLoyaan,ConflictAdvisor,CARE

ElNourAshraf,RegionalRepresentative,IOM

DavidGilmour,CountryDirector,CARE

NoorHassan,HumanitarianCoordinator,OXFAM

JeremiahKibanya,ProjectManager,SouthandCentralSomalia,WorldVision

DanielaKroslak,DeputyDirector,AfricaProgramme,InternationalCrisisGroup

PascalMauchie,HeadofDelegation,InternationalCommitteefortheRedCross(ICRC)

JerryMcCann,RegionalDirector,InterPeace

MohamedNurMohamud,SeniorProgrammeOfficer,NationalDemocraticInstitute

KarenMonteiro,PolicyandAdvocacyAdvisor,OXFAM

FarahRaoHansen,ConstitutionalProgramme,NationalDemocraticInstitute

TanjaSchümer,FocalPoint,SomaliaNGOConsortium

EdwinSiala,RegionalCoordinator,WorldVision

GeorgeWamushiyi,FianaceandAdministrationDirector,WorldVision

8 0 A N N E X 4 . L I S T O F P E R S O N S C O N S U L T E D

UNITED NATIONS (OTHER THAN UNDP)

NAIROBI

AhmedouOuldAbdallah,SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General,UNPOS

RuthAmtalo,SeniorProgrammeAssistant,WFP

DorotheevonBrentano,SeniorHumanSettlementsOfficer,UN-HABITAT

PaulCrook,ILO

GrahamFarmer,CountryRepresentative,FAO

KikiGbeho,HeadofOffice,OCHA-Somalia

BrunoGeddo,CountryRepresentative,UNHCR

TeklabKedamo,CountryRepresentative,UNAIDS

ChristopherDennisLaker,JointProgrammeManager,JPIDP,OfficeoftheResidentCoordinator

VidalMahunda,Coordinator,ProgrammeOfficer,UNV

JoanneMorrison,SeniorProgrammeManager,JPLGSD,OfficeoftheResidentCoordinator

TamaraNanitashvili,FoodSecurityTechnicalManager,FoodSecurityandNutritionAnalysisUnit,FAO

NiSha,RegionalDirector,UNIFEM

CharlesPetrie,DeputySRSG,UNPOS

KeithUrsel,HeadofProgramme,WFP

UN HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK

NanetteAhmed,TeamLeader,WestAfrica/Somalia,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

Fredericad’Andreagiovani,DeskOfficerforSomalia,OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

GillianCull,StrategicPlanningOfficer,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

FeliciaGordon,JusticePlanningOfficer,SomaliaTeam,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

JoaoHonwana,Director,AfricaIDivision,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

NaokiIshikawa,PoliticalAffairsExpert,SomaliaTeam,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

MichaelJensen,Head,FundingCoordinationSection,OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

WambuiMwangi,PoliticalAffairsOfficer,SomaliaTeam,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

KarenSmith,ProgrammeOfficer,CERF,OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

RaisedonZenenga,Director,AfricaIIDivision,DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

UNDP SOMALIA

UNDP SUB-OFFICE IN GAROWE

AbukarSh.Hassan,FinanceAssociate(onmissionfromNairobi)

AliFarah,NationalExpert,ROLS

MohamedAhmedYousuf,ProgrammeSpecialist,ActingHeadofOffice

MuseDualeAden,AreaProjectManager

OsmanMohamedAli,AdministrativeandLogisticsOfficer

YusufAliYusuf,SecurityGuardForcesManager

UNDP SUB-OFFICE IN HARGEISA

AbdikarimE.Ahmed,JointProgrammeforLocalGovernance

AbdillakimAhmed,ProjectAssociate,SIDP

AbdulhakimM.Abdi,AccesstoJusticeAdvisor

AdenNeerAbil,NationalOfficer,DDR

MohamedAbdilaiHussein

AliJibril,IntegratedWatershedManagementProject

SimonRidely,ProjectManager,AccesstoJustice(onmissionfromNairobi)

8 1A N N E X 4 . L I S T O F P E R S O N S C O N S U L T E D

IgnatiusTakawira,HeadofSubOffice

AbdiAkoborYusuf,JointProgrammeforLocalGovernance

AliYusuf,SIDPproject

UNDP COUNTRY OFFICE IN NAIROBI

YokubjonAbdukholikov,ProjectManager,ABER

AlejandroBendana,ProgrammeManager,ROLS

EddyBoyle,DeputyProgrammeManager,ROLS

MarkBowden,ResidentRepresentative(alsoUNResidentCoordinatorandHumanitarianCoordinator)

CatrionaByrne,ProgrammeSpecialist,HIV/AIDS

PhilipCooper,DeputyProgrammeManager,GovernanceandReconciliation

PeterCross,ProgrammeSpecialist,ROLS

ThimothyderWeduwen,ProjectManager,CivilianPolice

MarieDimond,DeputyCountryDirector,Programme

IdaEkedogoG.Mkenda,ContributionsAnalyst

AmitaGill,ProjectSpecialist,JPLG

KaltunMohamedHassan,MediaRelationsOfficer

CarstenHansen,ProcurementSpecialist

JohnKiyagaNsubuga,ProjectManager,SIDP

BarbaraAnneKrijgsman,ProgrammeSpecialist,Governance

DanielLadouceur,ProjectManager,DDR/AVR

EdwardMeaby,ProjectManager,MineAction

NamitaMediratta,DataCoordinationandDisseminationOfficer

MohamedBarreMusse,ProgrammeSpecialist,RSL

MohamedHassan(Col.),LiaisonOfficer,CivilianPolice

NoorHussein,ProjectManager,IntegratedWatershedManagement

ChinyelumugoOkoh,ProjectManagementSupportOfficer

SriramRajPande,SeniorEconomist

LaurelPatterson,AssistantCountryDirector,Programme

AprilPowell,ProgrammeManager,GovernanceandReconciliation

VarshaRedkar-Palepu,ProgrammeManagementSpecialist

AlvaroRodriguez,CountryDirector

CarolineRusten,ProjectManager,UNDP/JPLG

IndaiLourdesSajor,GenderConsultant

SergioValdini,DeputyCountryDirector,Operations

UNDP NEW YORK AND GENEVA

BrunoLemarquis,TeamLeader,PolicyTeam,BCPRNewYorkandformerUNDPSomaliaCountryDirector(bytelephone)

AnitaErnstorfer,ConflictPreventionSpecialist,BCPRNewYork

HibaQasas,ProgrammeSpecialist,ArabStates,BCPRGeneva

SunilSaigal,DeputyAssistantAdministratorandDeputyRegionalDirector,RBAS

MohammadYounus,ProgrammeAdviser,RBAS

8 2 A N N E X 4 . L I S T O F P E R S O N S C O N S U L T E D

8 3A N N E X 5 . M A I N D O C U M E N T S C O N S U L T E D

Annex5

MAIN DOCUMENTS CONSULTED*

AdamSmithInternational,‘EvaluationoftheUNDPStrategicPartnershipforSomalia:finalreport’,11June2009

Abid,Erik,‘Creatinghumanitarianspace:acasestudyofSomalia’,UNHCRandRefugeeStudiesCentreoftheUniversityofOxford,December2009

AmnestyInternational,‘Somalia:internationalmilitaryandpolicingassistanceshouldbereviewed’,2010

Bruton,BronwinE.,‘Somalia:Anewapproach’,CouncilonForeignRelations,CenterforPreventiveAction,SpecialReportNo.52,March2010

GovernmentoftheUnitedKingdom,DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID),‘UNDPSomalia,RuleofLawandSecurityProgramme:DFIDAssessmentMission,13-21December2004–FinalReport’,14April2005

EconomistIntelligenceUnit,CountryprofilesforSomalia,2004to2008

GovernmentofSomalia,‘TheTransitionalFederalCharteroftheSomaliRepublic’,Nairobi,February2004

Gundel,Joakim,‘TheDistrictBasedPeaceBuildingandReconciliationProjectandtheCommunityBasedPeaceSupportProject,Somalia:ReviewReport’,KatuniConsultforUNDPcountryoffice,October2008

Harvey,Paul,‘RehabilitationinComplexPoliticalEmergencies:IsRebuildingCivilSocietytheAnswer?’,InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,WorkingPaper60,1998

Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee,‘GuidanceNoteonUsingtheClusterApproachtoStrengthenHumanitarianResponse’,November2006

James,Victoria,‘UNCTforSomaliaGenderAuditReport’,January2010

Jespersen,Henriketal.,‘Mid-TermEvaluationoftheUNTPinSomalia’,May-July2009

Johnson,Chris,‘ReviewofCISSExcomandSomaliSupportSecretariat:finalreport’,August2009

Klap,Andreetal.,‘OutcomeEvaluation:ReintegrationofReturningRefugeesandInternallyDisplacedPersons(RRIDP–UNDPcomponent)’,3March2006

Marquardt,MarkA.,‘EvaluationofSomalilandCadastreSurveyProject’,UNDP,October2008

Menkhaus,Ken,‘Somalia:aCountryinPeril,aPolicyNightmare’ENOUGHStrategyPaper,September2008

Menkhaus,Ken,‘Somalia:WhatWentWrong’,RUSI Journal,August2009,vol.154,pp.6-12

Middleton,R.,‘PiracyinSomalia:ThreateningGlobalTrade,FeedingLocalWars’,ChathamHouseBriefingReport,RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,London,2008

Molloy,DesmondandSilla,Shecku,‘UNDPROLS-DDR/SACProgramme,Somalia:EvaluationReport’,TokyoUniversityofForeignStudiesandUNDP/BCPR,August/September2008

Ndirangu,Wangaietal.,‘ExternalEvaluationoftheDudubleCanal’,BatimentConsultingLtd.forUNDPcountryoffice,July2008

NGOCoordinationCommittee,‘OperationalModalitiesinIraq’,BriefingPaper,January2008

UnitedNations,OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,ConsolidatedAppeals(CAP)forSomalia,years2005to2010

OXFAMandMERLIN,‘RemoteProgramminginSomalia’,NGOConsortium,January2009

UNDPCountryOfficeforSomalia,‘ExternalCommunicationStrategy2009-2010’,March2009

8 4 A N N E X 5 . M A I N D O C U M E N T S C O N S U L T E D

UNDPCountryOfficeforSomalia,‘GuideforUNDPsub-offices’,draftversion,2December2007

UNDPCountryOfficeforSomalia,NationalHumanDevelopmentreports,1998and2001

UNDPCountryOfficeforSomalia,‘MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsReportforSomalia’,2007

UNDPCountryOfficeforSomalia,‘Non-GovernmentalOrganizationsCapacityAnalysis:atoolforassessingandbuildingcapacitiesforhighqualityresponses’,UNDP–RSLprogramme,Employmentgenerationforearlyrecovery(EGER)project,Hargeisa,23May2009

UNDPCountryOfficeforSomalia,‘Somalia’smissingmillion:theSomalidiasporaanditsroleindevelopment’,March2009

UNDPBureauforCrisisPreventionandRecovery(BCPR),‘UNDPSomalia–BCPR:StrategicPartnershipFramework,July2007-June2009’,20August2007

UNDP,‘AssistancetoSomalia(2005-2006),NotebytheAdministrator’(DP/2004/43),23August2004

UNDP,‘DraftcountryprogrammeforSomalia(2007-2008)’(DP/DCP/SOM/1),13July2006

UNDP,‘Draftcountryprogramme(2008-2009)’,September2007

UNDP,‘AssessmentofDevelopmentResults:EvaluationofUNDPcontribution:IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan’,EvaluationOffice,May2009

UNDP,‘GuidelinesforanAssessmentofDevelopmentResults’,EvaluationOffice,January2009

UNDP,‘EvaluationofResults-basedManagementatUNDP’,EvaluationOffice,January2007

UNDP,‘ADRMethodsManual’,EvaluationOfficedraftdocument,January2010

UNDP,‘IncreasedPresenceinSomalia:FinalReportoftheTaskForceforreviewofUNDPSomaliafieldstructure’,15December2006

UNDP,‘GuidanceNote:EstablishingaUNDPpresenceoutsidetheCountryOffice’,October2009

UNICEFSomaliaoffice,‘SomaliMultipleIndicatorSurvey(2006)’,2007

UnitedNations,‘ReportoftheMonitoringGrouponSomaliapursuanttoSecurityCouncilresolution1853(2008)’(S/2010/91),10March2010

UnitedNations,‘ReportoftheMonitoringGrouponSomaliaPursuanttoSecurityCouncilresolution1811(2008)’(S/2008/769),10December2008

UNCTforSomalia,‘Inter-agencyMissionReport–UNCTSomaliaRiskManagement’,19June2009

UNCTforSomalia,‘UnitedNationsTransitionPlan(UNTP)forSomalia,2008-2009’,UNCT,October2007(subsequentlyextendedto2010)

UnitedNationsandWorldBank,‘JointNeedsAssessment’,sixvolumes,2006and2007

WorldBank,DataprofileforSomalia,WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsdatabase,April2009

WorldBankandUNFPA,‘FemaleGenitalMutilation/Cutting–Somalia’,2005

WorldBank,‘Somalia,fromResiliencetowardsRecoveryandDevelopment:aCountryEconomicMemorandumforSomalia’,11January2006

WorldBank/UNDP,‘CountryRe-engagementStrategy’,2003

Ziegler,MelissaandNield,Rachel,From Peace to Governance: Police Reform and the International Community,Rapporteur’sreportonaconferenceheldinNovember2001bytheWashingtonOfficeonLatinAmericaandJohnHopkinsUniversity,Washington,D.C.,2002

* Projectdocuments,reportsandfinancialtables,aswellasnumerousbriefingnotesandinternalworkingdocumentsprovidedbytheUNDPcountryofficearenotlisted.

8 5A N N E X 6 . S O M A L I A S U P P O R T S T R U C T U R E S

Annex6

SOMALIA SUPPORT STRUCTURES AT HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD OFFICES

UNHQ New York

Department of Political Affairs (DPA)SomaliaDesk

Field Offices

Department of Political Affairs (DPA)Somalia Desk

Department of Peacekeeping

OperationsSomaliaCoordination

andPlanningTeam

Department of Field Service (DFS)UNSOAsupportteam

OCHA/DOCOOverseehumanitarian,recoveryand

developmentactivities

UN Department of Security Services (UNDSS)Providesassessmentofsecuritysituation

UNDSS (Nairobi, Somalia)Managefieldsecuritystructures.

Strengthening the political process

Support Somali security institutions

Support AMISOM

Enable UN field presence

Address humanitarian, recovery and development needs

AU Head Quarters (Addis Ababa)DirectandoverseeAMISOM

UN Planning Team (UNPT) (Addis Ababa)

ProvidetechnicalandexpertadvicetoAUHQonplanningandoperationsofAMISOM

African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Nairobi/Mogadishu)

UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) (Nairobi, Mombasa)

DeliveralogisticssupportpackagetoAMISOMunderresolution1863

UN Country Team for Somalia (Nairobi)UNDP;UNICEF;WHO;WFP;UNHCR;UN-HABITAT;UNFPA;FAO;UNESCO;UNAIDS;UNIFEM;OCHA;ILO;UNV;UNDSS;CACAS;UNOfficeforProject

Services;TheWorldBank

UNDP Somalia Country Office (Nairobi)SomalilandSub-Office(Hargeisa)

PuntlandSub-Office(Garowe)SouthandCentral:NoUNDPstaffpresence