anso quarterly data report q1 2011
DESCRIPTION
Report used as reference for Lt Col. Daniel Davis' report 'Dereliction of Duty II' also available in this library.TRANSCRIPT
ANSO and our donors accept no liability for
the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
-Not for copy or sale-
The Afghan i s tan NGO Sa fe t y Of f i c e
A acks against NGOs by armed opposi on have remained stable and low throughout the Q1 (p.3), although
the overall level of incidents, including criminal acts, has grown by 38%. The criminal sector saw an increase
of 50% (p.4) with a acks by AOG increasing by a lower rate of 29% (or just four actual a acks). A total of sev-
en persons have been killed, comparable to eight at Q1 2010, all by small arms fire either as a result of delib-
erate intent (mostly criminal), a personal dispute or collaterally in a acks on other targets (p.5). The per-
centage of total a acks occurring in the North East has jumped from 12% in 2010 to 22% this year with a
spike of incidents (mostly criminal) recently in Badakhshan; notably one of the provinces slated for early
’transi on’. The number of a acks occurring in the East has similarly jumped from 20% to 25%, mostly as a
result of a sharply deteriora ng Nangarhar province. Kine c a acks against NGOs have included improvised
explosive devices (5), rocket strikes (1), small arms fire (8) and armed robberies (6). In addi on there have
been four cases of abduc on, involving seven actual persons, all but one of which have been resolved to
date. Abduc on rates also remain consistent with 2010, which, coincidentally, also saw eight in the Q1.
The data at this stage con nues to support the conclusion that, despite an over all increase in the conflict
rate (p.8), NGOs are not rou nely targeted by the Taliban as a ma er of policy but are being impacted, as a
sta s cal inevitability, by an increase in ambient violence. ANSO currently ranks collateral damage and an
accidental strike with an IED as the highest risk factors facing the NGO community (p.6). Mi ga on strate-
gies for these specific risks would include reduced proximity to likely targets, adop on of a low visibility
movement profile and where possible, direct access nego a ons with opposi on forces to respect neutrality.
There have been no substan al changes in the strategic environment since the last report period. The IMF
remain engaged in establishing the condi ons for their exit, with data sugges ng that their regular force in-
terven ons have not significantly impacted AOG figh ng capacity at a strategic level. AOG a acks in Hel-
mand province have increased by 76% over the Q1 of 2010 (p.9). As an cipated, irregular armed forces con-
nue to develop (under the VSO/ALP rubric) well beyond the planned footprint (p.11) establishing poten al
obstacles to poli cal cohesion and state stability. Preliminary “transi on” areas have been announced, alt-
hough it remains too early to judge the impact of this in the Q1 data period.
Countrywide, the number of a acks by armed opposi on has already grown by 51% (p.8) on 2010, sug-
ges ng that AOG capacity was not significantly effected by last years IMF opera ons. We an cipate that
2011 will be the most violent year since we have been keeping records.
Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul, April 2011
SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT
J an 1s t—Mar 31s t 2011
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2011
The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily re-flect the views of ANSO donors or partners.
Page 2 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Part 1.Part 1.
NGO TRENDSNGO TRENDS
Page 3 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 1 A O G A t t a c k s A g a i n s t N G O s
AOG a acks against NGOs remain within normally low ranges, seeing a moderate rise over the Q1 period
of 2010 (up from 14 to 18, see below right). Just 35% of the total are assessed as being deliberately in-
tended to cause harm or loss, although this count also includes many incidents which look more like
AOGs se ling personal scores than airing a grudge against the NGO. Accidents, most commonly with IED
or RPG strikes, and informa on gathering exercises, most commonly through temporary deten ons, con-
nue to make up a large part of AOG interac on with NGOs. The data con nues to provide no evidence
of systema c or rou ne targe ng of NGOs by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).
6
1 1
6
3 3
10
4
7
2
6
4
6
3
87
3
12
20
17 17
8
65
1312
3
6
10
6
18
2
8
12
6 6
2 2
10
6
8
2
1211
15
98
3 3
9
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 - 2011(Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non‐kinetic, threats and abductions)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Q1-2008 Q1-2009 Q1-2010 Q1-2011
17
28
14
18
ANSO: AOG attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011
Deliberate & Hostile35%
Info Gathering23%
Accidental
24%
Influencing Populations
18%
ANSO: Assessed cause/purpose of AOG attacks on NGOs, Q 1 2011
Page 4 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 2 G e n e r a l N G O Tr e n d s – C r i m i n a l A t t a c k s
While s ll low in absolute terms, there has been a slight rela ve increase in the number of crimes
against the NGO community, rising from 10 to 15 over the Q1 (below right). The rate does not exceed
longer term norms however (above) and overall NGO exposure to crime appears to be dropping. The
majority of recent a acks have been armed robberies, both at the office and at home, with vehicles ,
cash and valuable electronics being stolen. That the majority of crimes (47%) occur in the North and
North Eastern regions is certainly reflec ve of NGO density there, but it could also suggest a general
growth in criminality invoked by the widespread forma on of irregular mili as. It is in these regions
par cularly that locals have claimed irregular forces to be nothing more than sanc oned criminals.
4
9 9
7 7
10
3
8
9 9
6
3 3
9
2
6
5
11
7
6
5
3
2
1
4
3
2
4
7
4
6
3
2
4
6
1 1
5
4
2 2
0
1
4
2
7 7
3
6
3
6
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC
JAN
FEB
MA
R
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, 2006-2011 (Includes all types of event kinetic and non‐kinetic)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Q1-2008 Q1-2009 Q1-2010 Q1-2011
14
9
10
15
ANSO: Criminal attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011
Armed Robbery
Intimidation by IED
Non-Fatal Assault
Abduction for Ransom (Persons)
Unarmed Robbery
Murder
5
3
3
1
1
2
ANSO: Types of crimes against NGO/NGO staff, Q1 2011 only
Page 5 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 3 N G O I n c i d e n t M a p p i n g — Q 1 2 0 11
As usual, serious a acks have occurred in prov-inces assessed both as calm as well as insecure with no specific geographic concentra on. That IED strikes have not, so far, occurred in the South, reflects the lack of road movement in those areas. A larger propor on of incidents occurred in the East as a result of a growing in-stability in Nangarhar, this will definitely be a province to watch in 2011. Of the seven NGO deaths occurring so far this year, five have been as a result of the small arms fire incidents, a change from last year when most were from IEDs. Most of these deaths have been assessed as being criminally (or personally) mo vated. The percentage of all incidents occurring in the North and North East has risen from 40 to 44%.
IED
Rocket
Small Arms Fire
Abduction
Armed Robbery
HELMAND NIMROZ
KANDAHAR
URUZGAN
ZABUL
PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
FARAH
HERAT
BADGHIS
GHOR
DAYKUNDI
BAMYAN
FARYAB
KHOST
BADAKSHAN
BALKH JAWZJAN
SAR‐E‐PUL
KUNDUZ
TAKHAR
SAMANGANBAGHLAN
WARDAKKABUL
PARWAN
NANGAHAR
LAGHMAN
KAPISA
ANSO: Province of serious NGO Incidents, Jan-Mar 2011
9%6%
16%
25%
22%
22%
ANSO: Regional distribution of NGO attacks, Q1 2011
West South Central East North North East
Page 6 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 3 S e c u r i t y R i s k A s s e s s m e n t M a t r i x ( S R A M )
The Security Risk Assessment Matrix is a common tool to assist NGOs in visualizing and ranking risk. The below pre-
sents our current ranking of the primary risks to NGOs, per ANSO opera onal area, along with the recommended
mi ga on tac c. We currently consider collateral damage and accidental IED strikes to be the highest ranked risks
to NGOs countrywide. NGOs might use the charts to further develop regionally specific mi ga on.
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Very Low 1 1 2 3 3 1 Negligible Risk
Low 1 2 3 3 3 2 Mild Risk
Moderate 2 2 3 4 4 3 Moderate Risk
High 3 3 3 4 5 4 Serious Risk
Very High 3 3 4 5 5 5 Unacceptably High Risk
Risk RatingImpact
Likelih
ood
RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (Likelihood x
Impact=Risk)
Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Collateral Damage Moderate High 4 Avoiding proximity to targets & hardening of facilities (protection)
Accidental IED Moderate High 4 Use a low profile vehilce (unless your logo is recognized) & travel off peak
Abduction for Interrogation High Low 3 Establish community legitimacy & deploy staff from local area only
Armed Robbery Moderate Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Collateral Damage Low High 3 Avoiding proximity to targets
Accidental IED Low V. High 3 Use a low profile vehilce & travel 'off peak'
Deliberate IED V. Low V.High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Armed Robbery on Road Moderate Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Deliberate AOG targeting V. Low V. High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Abduction at Illegal Checkpoint Low Moderate 3 Do not carry items linking you to an NGO (sanitized)
Direct Attack on Vehicle/Compound Low V. High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Accidental IED Low V. High 3 Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Collateral Damage Low High 3 Avoiding proximity to targets
Armed Robbery on Road Low Moderate 2 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Targeted Abduction Low Moderate 3 Deploy staff from the local area only and establish community support
Armed Robbery on Road Low Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Collateral Damage Low High 3 Avoiding proximity to targets
Accidental IED Low V. High 3 Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Deliberate AOG targeting Low V. High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Accidental IED High V.High 5 Reduce road movements, travel low profile & "off peak"
Collateral Damage High V.High 5 Avoiding proximity to targets
Deliberate AOG targeting Low V.High 3 Avoid association to IMF/GIRoA, maintain neutrality in projects
Deliberate IED Low V.High 3 Remain neutral & outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Accidental IED Very Low V.High 3 Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Accidental IDF strike Low Moderate 3 Avoiding proximity to targets
Collateral Damage Moderate V. High 4 Avoiding proximity to targets
Armed Robbery on Road Moderate Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Home/Office Break‐In High Low 3 Guards, perimeter fence & lighting
EASTERN REGION
NORTHERN & NORTH EAST REGIONS
WESTERN REGION
SOUTHERN REGION
CENTRAL REGION
COUNTRY WIDE
Page 7 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Part 2.Part 2.
State of the ConflictState of the Conflict
Page 8 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 1 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — C o u n t r y w i d e
AOG ini ated a acks have soared this quarter, up by 51% from last year. This ‘gain rate’ is also larger
than the 38% seen between the Q1 of 09-10. March 2011 saw 1,102 a acks, an average of 35 per day,
surpassing even the August 2009 summer peak during Presiden al elec ons. The data suggests that the
deep winter down turn (noted at Q4 2010) was simply an ordinary opera onal pause, and was not reflec-
ve of a permanently degraded capacity as some had suggested at the me. Considering the variety of
IMF tac cs and strengths that have been brought to
bear against the opposi on at different periods
throughout the 5.2 years recorded here, it is re-
markable how consistent the growth rate has been
and suggests that we need to think beyond the linear
logic that a stronger IMF equals a weaker AOG, as
this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is likely that a
more complex ‘co-evolu onary’ rela onship exists
within which the counter-insurgency actually
strengthens and exacerbates the insurgency,
through forced adapta on, rather than defea ng it.
The end result appears to be a perpetually esca‐
la ng stalemate which could sustain itself indefi-
nitely, or un l one side, or the other, transi ons out.
335
405
634
1093
657
1541
1102
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC JAN
FEB
MA
R
AP
R
MA
Y
JUN
JUL
AU
G
SEP
OC
T
NO
V
DEC JAN
FEB
MA
R
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ANSO: Total AOG initiated attacks per month, 2006‐2011(Note: This is a clean count of AOG initiated kinetic attaks only, it does not include any criminal activity, kinetic or otherwise)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Q1-2007 Q1-2008 Q1-2009 Q1-2010 Q1-2011
434
707
1301
1791
2700
ANSO: Total AOG attacks at Q1 stage only, 2007-2011
Page 9 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 2 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — P e r P r o v i n c e
This table provides a comparison of raw AOG a ack rate data, per province, for the Q1 periods of 2010
and 2011. It shows the percentage change and the absolute figure. When using for independent analysis
readers are reminded that a low a ack volume can indicate AOG dominance and that a small absolute
change can be large when stated as a percentage. The ’average’ referred to is the 51% country rate. (p10)
PROVINCE
AOG Attacks
Q1 2010
AOG Attacks
Q1 2011 % Change
Absolute
Change PAKTYA 14 140 900% 126
NURISTAN 4 21 425% 17
JAWZJAN 12 33 175% 21
BADAKHSHAN 4 11 175% 7
FARAH 22 58 164% 36
PARWAN 6 15 150% 9
KHOST 147 326 122% 179
BALKH 14 31 121% 17
HERAT 27 58 115% 31
GHAZNI 71 152 114% 81
URUZGAN 49 93 90% 44
HELMAND 381 672 76% 291
NANGARHAR 76 128 68% 52
BADGHIS 65 97 49% 32
FARYAB 38 55 45% 17
LAGHMAN 26 32 23% 6
WARDAK 38 43 13% 5
PAKTIKA 43 48 12% 5
KANDAHAR 228 249 9% 21
KUNAR 312 338 8% 26
ZABUL 52 55 6% 3
SAMANGAN 0 2 0% 2
LOGAR 23 23 0% 0
GHOR 3 3 0% 0
KABUL 24 22 -8% -2
SAR-E PUL 21 19 -10% -2
DAYKUNDI 8 7 -13% -1
NIMROZ 21 14 -33% -7
KUNDUZ 79 46 -42% -33
KAPISA 37 19 -49% -18
BAGHLAN 35 16 -54% -19
TAKHAR 19 5 -74% -14
BAMYAN 1 0 -100% -1
NE
GA
TIV
E G
RO
WT
HA
BO
VE
AV
ER
AG
E G
RO
WT
HB
EL
OW
AV
ER
AG
E G
RO
WT
H
Page 10 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 3 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — I n s e c u r i t y R a t i n g
The most vola le area, again, has been Loya Paktya (P2K) plus Ghazni - which corresponds to some of ISAF
RC-EAST and AOG Miramshah Shura - which has seen an averaged growth rate of 287% per province. All
four provinces in this area are ranked as “extremely insecure” and are likely to remain so throughout 2011.
The northern half of ISAF RC-EAST (Nuristan, Kunar) remains ranked as “extremely insecure”, with at least
one district (Waygal) en rely under AOG command. In the south, Uruzgan and Helmand are seeing above
average growth rates, as AOG counter ISAF offensives, while Kandahar and Zabul remain steady and Nimroz
sees decline. We con nue to rank four of the five as “highly insecure” or above, with just Nimroz being
slightly more accessible. The four provinces of the west have seen an averaged growth rate of 82% and we
rank Herat as “deteriora ng” as it is slated for early transi on while seeing a 115% increase in a acks. In
the north west, Faryab is ranked as “moderate” having the regional highest a ack rate in absolute terms.
Jawzjan and Balkh rank as “deteriora ng” due to them having the regions highest percentage growth rates
(175% & 121% respec vely). Sar-i-Pul’s Sayyad district causes it to also be ranked as “deteriora ng”. In the
north east all provinces but Badakhshan have seen lower a ack rates than Q1 last year but con nue to be
ranked as “moderate” and “deteriora ng” due to the very high likelihood of a fresh AOG campaign in Q2.
HELMAND 672NIMROZ 14
KANDAHAR 249
URUZGAN 93
ZABUL 55
PAKTIKA 48
GHAZNI 152
FARAH 58
HERAT 58
BADGHIS 97
GHOR 3
DAYKUNDI 7
BAMYAN 0
FARYAB 55
KHOST 326
BADAKSHAN 11
BALKH 31 JAWZJAN 33
SAR‐E‐PUL 19
KUNDUZ 46 TAKHAR
5
SAMANGAN 2 BAGHLAN 16
WARDAK 43KABUL 22
PARWAN 15
NANGAHAR 128
LAGHMAN 32
KAPISA 19
ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, at Q1 2011(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 2011
indicated in map. A lack of AOG attacks can indicate uncontested AOG presence)
Extremely Insecure
Highly Insecure
Moderately Insecure
Deteriorating
Low Insecurity
RC‐South West
RC‐South
RC‐East
RC‐North
RC‐West
RC‐Capital
Page 11 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 5 I r r e g u l a r A r m e d F o r c e s ( I A F )
Irregular armed forces con nue to be developed, as a component of the IMF exit strategy. To deflect cri -
cism, all such forces are supposed to become enrolled in the MOI Afghan Local Police (ALP) program.
However, as the mapping exercise below shows, irregular armed forces are in fact mobilizing and oper-
a ng well beyond the reach of that program, mostly at the ini a ve of local poli cal and ethnic leaders
and generally with tacit knowledge and approval from IMF (US). The phenomenon presents only minor
immediate threats to NGOs, but may lead to sub-na onal conflicts as “transi on” progresses.
Tala Wa BarfTalaWaBarf
Khinjan
Qalay‐I‐ ZalArchi
Imam Sahib
Chahar Dara
Ali Abad
KunduzKhan Abad
WarsajWarsaj
RustaqRustaq
FarkharFarkharChalChal
TaluqanTaluqan
Bangi
KalafganKalafgan
Ab
Chah
Ab
Ishkamish
Khwaja Ghar
KhwajaGhar
Wakhan
JurmJurm
ShighnanShighnan
KishimKishim
Darwaz
BaharakBaharak
RaghRagh
ZebakZebak
Kuran Wa MunKuran Wa Mun
Fayz Abad
KhwahanKhwahan
Ishkashim
Shahri BuzurShahriBuzur
DushiDushi
AndarabAndarab
NahrinNahrinKhost Wa Fir
Burka
Baghlani JadBaghlani Jadid
Dahana‐I‐GhDahana‐I‐Ghori
BaghlanBaghlan
ANSO: Official ALP sites, North East, 2011
1. OFFICIALLY APPROVED AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP) DISTRICTS in NORTHEAST as of
JAN 2011
Tala Wa BarfTalaWaBarf
Khinjan
Qalay‐I‐ ZalArchi
Imam Sahib
Chahar Dara
Ali Abad
KunduzKhan Abad
WarsajWarsaj
RustaqRustaq
FarkharFarkharChalChal
TaluqanTaluqan
Bangi
KalafganKalafgan
Ab
Chah
Ab
Ishkamish
Khwaja Ghar
KhwajaGhar
Wakhan
JurmJurm
ShighnanShighnan
KishimKishim
Darwaz
BaharakBaharak
RaghRagh
ZebakZebak
Kuran Wa MunKuranWaMunjan
FayzAbad
KhwahanKhwahan
Ishkashim
Shahri BuzurShahriBuzur
DushiDushi
AndarabAndarab
NahrinNahrinKhost Wa Fir
Burka
Baghlani JadBaghlani Jad
Dahana‐I‐GhDahana‐I‐Ghori
BaghlanBaghlan
2. REPORTED ACTUAL PRESENCE of IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES in
NORTHEAST as of JAN 2011
ANSO: Irregular force activity, North East, 2011
Page 12 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
REPORT ENDS
For fur ther informat ion [email protected]
© ANSO, January 2011
This document will be stored in the public domain at www.afgnso.org
It may be reproduced, stored or transmitted without permission for non-commercial purposes only and with
written credit to ANSO. Where it is transmitted elec-tronically a link should be provided to ANSO website
www.afgnso.org
Acronyms:
IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)
AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH)
IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)
ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)
IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)
IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)
CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)
EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)
SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)