anso q1 2012reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/anso... · 2012. 6. 6. · aog a...

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(c) INSO 2012

AOG a ack volumes have decreased by 43% in comparison to Q1 2011 providing the first reliable indicator that the

conflict may be entering a period of regression a er years of sustained, and compounded, growth by all actors in

the field. Despite this, one must s ll consider them an ascendant power, as they themselves clearly do, and a key

ques on remains as to whether this lack of ac vity is a deliberate act and if so, why. As last year was characterised

by AOG doing more earlier; this year has begun with them doing less later.

Of course, the same could be said for all actors in the field, as this years comprehensive incident volumes are 32%

lower than Q1 2011, sugges ng a level of synergy between the various par es to the conflict. An excep on to this

would be the ANSF, who are increasingly shouldering a heavier burden as the ISAF presence wanes, all part of the

ongoing processes of withdrawal and transi on. There are hints that this fundamental shi in responsibility may

result in posi ve developments, par cularly at the tac cal level. This apparent willingness between the remaining

players to reach local agreements may ul mately result in a broader space within which the NGO community is able

to operate, as the volume of ac vely contested space shrinks.

However, it may be some me for this to be fully realised as current NGO incident volumes remain aligned to long

term rate trends, though the authors of those incidents have shi ed into line with present dynamics, as criminality

had the greatest impact this quarter. In the majority of such cases, this criminality was financially mo vated at

both the individual and group levels, an early indicator that compe on over the diminishing pool of resources

ahead of 2014 may come to have a significant impact on the NGO safety context.

While some dynamics from this period should be met with cau ous op mism, this must be tempered by close

analysis of others that came into play last year, for example the upsurge in criminality, which con nue into this

period and provide early warning signs of new troubles on the horizon. The prolifera on of irregular mili as, an

element that may be feeding into this trouble, con nues to further complicate an already complex opera onal

environment. At best it disrupts exis ng, and at mes fragile, power sharing agreements at the local level and at

worst, it results in open conflict that impacts NGO accessibility due to road insecurity and a lack of clarity of who to

engage.

Ul mately, the first quarter of this year raises more ques ons than it answers by providing numerous indicators of

the increasingly fluid nature of the conflict. A new phase in the evolu on of the context is being realised, though

how this will play out in the coming months, and years, is unclear and only with further analysis of the interplay

between the various groups will this new reality become apparent.

Nathan Ronaldson, ANSO Director

Kabul, Afghanistan, 2012

SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

1s t J an ‐ 31s t Mar 2012

The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author.

QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2012


Part 1.Part 1.

Context OverviewContext Overview


1 . 1 C o n t e x t O v e r v i e w

The graph above is meant to provide a holis c view of the context in which the humanitarian community

finds themselves working in as of 2012. The further disaggrega on of this data in the graph below

provides a clear indicator that, at least un l recently, the momentum and ini a ve of the conflict

remained firmly in the hands of the opposi on, and that for all sides last year was the most vigorous on

record. In this quarter however, it would appear that all actors, with the possible excep on of the ANSF

(insert chart below), appear to be taking an opera onal pause. However, the reality is that the interplay

of an increasing number of compe ng armed actors, irrespec ve of their mandate or purpose, has

resulted in a progressively more complex and vola le environment for NGOs to navigate.

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ANSO: Total security incidents, countrywide, 2006‐2012(count includes all incident types, criminal & conflict related, all authors)

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

AOG

ANSF

ISAF

Criminal

ANSO: Conflict activity comparison, countrywide, by author, 2006‐2012

38%

40%

14% 8%

AOG

ANSF

ISAF

Criminal

ANSO: Q1 2012 activity volumes, by author


1 . 2 I n c i d e n t D i s t r i b u t i o n & C o m p a r i s o n

This table provides a comparison of the various actors ac vity levels, expressed as a percentage of the

total, which itself is a complete accoun ng of all incidents recorded per province in Q1. When using this

for analysis, readers are encouraged to take into account the Incident Total column as this will provide a

be er understanding regarding the actors rela ve ac vity levels. While some sectors could be viewed as

having a posi ve/nega ve impact on security, the data provides an overview of how ‘contested’ certain

areas are; not surprisingly those areas in the top 2 categories account for almost 80% of the NGO incident

total this quarter. However, this chart should not be used alone, as an analysis of local dynamics and

atmospherics must also be taken into considera on when assessing NGO safety and accessibility.

PROVINCE NGO

INCIDENTS INCIDENT TOTAL

%AOG %IMF %ANSF %Crime

Khost 4 490 38% 26% 29% 7%

>200 Incidents

Kandahar 1 438 37% 7% 52% 4%

Nangarhar 5 419 32% 14% 43% 11%

Helmand 0 394 36% 28% 35% 1%

Kunar 0 310 82% 6% 9% 3%

Herat 3 214 19% 1% 67% 13%

Ghazni 0 186 52% 27% 18% 3%

100‐199 Incidents Kabul 3 182 1% 3% 79% 17%

Paktika 0 159 56% 22% 20% 2%

Uruzgan 0 156 42% 8% 48% 2%

Farah 0 154 46% 3% 46% 5%

Badghis 0 135 54% 4% 35% 7%

Faryab 3 116 49% 4% 26% 21%

Zabul 0 108 20% 26% 54% 0%

Balkh 0 85 19% 1% 46% 34%

50‐99 Incidents

Kunduz 0 84 15% 11% 57% 17%

Laghman 1 80 52% 9% 28% 11%

Logar 1 69 29% 29% 36% 6%

Paktya 1 66 24% 40% 27% 9%

Kapisa 0 65 59% 12% 26% 3%

Baghlan 0 62 24% 11% 49% 16%

Wardak 1 60 25% 28% 42% 5%

Takhar 0 39 10% 3% 67% 20%

< 50 Incidents

Nimroz 0 38 26% 16% 47% 11%

Jawzjan 1 37 32% 11% 35% 22%

Parwan 0 27 18% 4% 52% 26%

Badakhshan 0 26 30% 9% 39% 22%

Ghor 0 24 29% 4% 34% 33%

Nuristan 0 21 76% 5% 19% 0%

Samangan 0 21 10% 0% 52% 38%

Sar‐e Pul 0 20 50% 10% 15% 25%

Daykundi 0 10 10% 10% 30% 50%

Bamyan 0 5 40% 0% 60% 0%

Panjshir 0 2 0% 0% 50% 50%


Part 2.Part 2.

State of the ConflictState of the Conflict

Aug: 335Jul: 405

Aug: 634

Presidential ElectionsAug: 1093

Parlimentary ElectionsSept: 1541

Jul: 1713

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ANSO: Total AOG activity, countrywide, 2006‐2012


2 . 1 A r m e d O p p o s i t i o n G r o u p ( A O G ) A c t i v i t y

For the first me in 6 years the AOG a ack growth rate

marked a period of regression, for a considerable 74%

decrease this quarter (insert chart above). This breaks the

established trend in which opposi on groups built on their

gains, in both geography and capacity, year on year. With

last year marking a watershed for the conflict as all actors

had their most ac ve on record (see sec on 1.1), it may be

the case that efforts applied by security forces are now

having an effect on AOG tac cal capacity. However, one

must also factor into the analysis that this winter was the

harshest in many years, a reality that clearly impacted all

sides ability to operate, par cularly when considering opposi on supply lines. Of course, there could also

be an element of unwillingness to commit resources on a fight that is all but over. The final piece of this

puzzle is the reality that the conflict is slowly taking on a more poli cal structure as dialogue and talks

begin to feature more heavily ahead of 2014. The primary ques on at present is if this regression has

been chosen or forced, a ques on that will only be fully answered as the year progresses.

Despite the downturn the tac cal por olio has remained

rela vely consistent, as opposi on a ack volumes

expand and contract seasonally while the composi on

remains consistent in regards to the percentage by tac c.

As such, conven onal a acks (SAF, RPG, etc) con nue to

be the key expression at a tac cal level, followed by IED

and indirect fire a acks (chart right).

39%

36%

12%

6%5% 2%

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WEST

NORTH

CENTRAL

NORTHEAST

ANSO:Q1 2012 AOG attack distribution, by region

28%39%

46%

27%35%

‐74%

‐100%

‐80%

‐60%

‐40%

‐20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ANSO:Q1 AOG attack growth rate over previous year

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Robberies

Suicide Attacks

Intimidation Efforts

Abductions

Indirect Fire Attacks

IED Strikes

Conventional Attacks

ANSO: Q1 2012 AOG attack composition, total volume by tactic


2 . 2 A O G A t t a c k R a t e M a p p i n g

This map shows the AOG ini ated a ack count, per province, as of the end of the first quarter. As with

the retrac on in the growth rate countrywide, one can also see a clear downturn in AOG ac vity in those

areas where their opera onal footprint, and support base, has been limited in the past. This is

par cularly true for the northern ‘beachhead’ of Kunduz & Baghlan, which are repor ng their lowest

quarterly volume in years. The opposite to this would be in Faryab, which when taken along with

Badghis, note a con guous and ac ve opera onal area and the ‘3rd front’ for this period.

Not unlike the 1st quarter of last year, the ’2nd front’ of Loya Paktya/Ghazni con nues to factor heavily

into the conflict, with Khost accoun ng for both the second highest AOG and NGO incident volumes (see

4.2). The border lands in the East account for the most heavily contested terrain in the country at

present, and while this can be partly explained by seasonal limita ons, it may also be the result of the

planned ‘quaran ne’ of these areas by ISAF forces last year. Ostensibly, security forces act as a dam,

keeping AOG contained into a limited ba le space, which would appear to explain why incident volumes

drop precipitously in their neighboring provinces. As the South represents the most mature theatre in

the conflict (the ‘1st front’), it con nues to report generous incident levels, though the suicide a ack

campaign in Kandahar City this quarter represents the most significant manifesta on there.

HELMAND 143 NIMROZ

10 KANDAHAR 161

URUZGAN 66 ZABUL

22

PAKTIKA 91

GHAZNI 96

FARAH 71

HERAT 40

BADGHIS 73

GHOR 7 DAYKUNDI

1

BAMYAN 2

FARYAB 57

KHOST 188

BADAKSHAN 7

BALKH 16

JAWZJAN 12

KUNDUZ 13

SAMANGAN 2 BAGHLAN

15

WARDAK 15 KABUL 2

PARWAN 5

NANGAHAR 135

ANSO: AOG attack volumes, per province at Q1 2012(Please note this is an incident ratemap that enables comparison of areas seeing similar attack rates. It is not a threat map and a lack of incidents can indicate AOG dominance (see Nuristan). Areas shaded green are not implied to be safe, particularly those provinces bordered by highly insecure areas.

Area of special concern

+ 200 Attacks

100 ‐ 199 Attacks

50 ‐ 99 Attacks

20 ‐ 49 Attacks

Less than 20 attacks

No AOG activity recorded


2 . 3 I n t e r n a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y F o r c e s ( I M F )

Accep ng that ANSO data is not as comprehensive at the tac cal level as other sources, it nonetheless

provides insight on broader and longer term trends in regards to IMF ac vity (graph above). While this

quarter is the first to iden fy a significant reduc on in AOG a ack levels, contrary to the aggressive ISAF

messaging campaign of last year, the sustainability and purpose of this reduc on remains in ques on.

The progression of this year will note a shrinking ISAF footprint, with transi on Tranche II completed this

quarter and the third to be announced shortly. From a prac cal perspec ve, this means that the IMF

ability to prosecute the conflict at a tac cal level will decrease considerably this year and will ul mately

become more focused as a result. In addi on, a key element of this will involve a shi ing focus to special

opera ons (such as night raids), and to some extent airstrikes (insert chart above), as these will become

the key force mul pliers provided to the ever expanding role of the ANSF. However, despite this ongoing

reduc on, NGO incidents a ributed to interna onal forces were an issue throughout last year,

par cularly in the East, par cularly clinic searches (presumably by special forces) and collateral damage

being during armed clashes.

The chart le iden fies where recorded IMF ac vity took place this

period, and when taken along with the map in 2.2, one can gain

insight as to the shape of the conflict as the year progresses; clearly

focused in the East and South. That Central accounts for the third

highest volume is telling, indica ng that ISAF is pu ng a clear effort

in minimizing the conflict’s impact in and around the capital. It is

also likely that the most vola le areas at present will be the last to

transi on, though as the interna onal military withdraws, so too

does the key impetus for AOG momentum. As IEA messaging iden fies, it is the presence of these forces

which has been a key driver of the conflict, so this year will be cri cal for assessing the evolu on of the

context in regards to the interplay between these two actors.

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ANSO: Total recorded ISAF activity, countrywide, 2006‐2012

33000 US 'surge' troops deployed

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ANSO:Q1 2012 IMF activity by region

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ANSO:Q1 2006‐2012 IMF airstrikes, countrywide


2 . 4 A f g h a n N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y F o r c e s ( A N S F )

The trend line in the above graph, which includes incidents a ributed to regular police (all types) and

army units along with ALP, gives a clear indicator the impact transi on and withdrawal is having on the

ANSF opera onal tempo, with Tranche II of transi on completed by the conclusion of this quarter. As

na onal forces become responsible for an ever increasing amount of terrain, their interna onal

counterparts con nue to downsize, and the ALP program con nues to expand, the disparity between

ISAF/ANSF ac vity levels is likely to increase through this year.

Unlike the IMF footprint, the ANSF one is a bit more diffused,

though it nonetheless appears greatest in those areas most

affected by the conflict (chart right). This broader distribu on

can be par ally explained by the pervasive presence of the ANP

(who account for 75% of all recorded ANSF ac vity) as well the

ever increasing presence of irregular mili as (incl. ALP), which

factor heavily into the transi on/withdrawal process. Due to

the limited understanding of these forces, par cularly regarding

presence, allegiance and oversight, their impact on the context

cannot be clearly assessed. However, it is understood that their

impact is not always a posi ve one, as illustrated by cases of

local resistance to their deployment, generally because of poorly

defined control mechanisms and disrup ons they have on

exis ng power dynamics.

As ANSF (thus ANP) efforts are consumed by the conflict, their

ability to manage criminality is degraded, a dynamic which is

further explored in Part 3 (chart right).

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ANSO: Total recorded ANSF activity, countrywide, 2006‐2012

34%

23%

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16%

7%6%

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CENTRAL

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NORTH

ANSO:Q1 2012 Total ANSF activity, by region

1%

5%7%

24%

63%

Anti‐Crime Op

Conflict Op

Criminal Arrest

AOG Arrest

IED Finds

ANSO:Q1 2012 Total ANSF activity, by type, countrywide


Part 3.Part 3.

CriminalityCriminality

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ANSO: Total recorded criminal ctivity, countrywide, 2006‐2012(Count includes all forms of criminal acts such as theft, murder, adbuction and internecine fighting)


3 . 1 C r i m i n a l i t y : O v e r v i e w

Through to 2009 overall levels of criminality noted stable and steady growth (roughly 15% per year),

albeit limited in rela on to the expanding state of the conflict. However, in late 2010 criminal ac vity

grew substan ally un l the peak recorded in August 2011 (graph above); a dynamic in line with the

considerable growth of the conflict during that period as well. Some drivers of this growth included

protracted internecine conflict in the East, banditry along many roads in the North, and a leavening of

opportunis c elements taking advantage of prevailing instability; as police forces were clearly focused on

conflict related ma ers during that me.

The above is sugges ve of a correla on between the

conflict and criminality, as is the reduc on noted in

criminal ac vity between this quarter and Q1 2011 (chart

le ). However, this 15% reduc on in criminal ac vity

could be explained by the rela ve stability in such places

as Kabul, where security forces have been afforded the

space to conduct tradi onal policing ac vi es as a result

of the limited conflict imprint there.

However, when comparing where criminality is occurring the

rela onship is less clear as the East and North accounted for the

highest regional volumes (chart right), with the former greatly

affected by the conflict and the la er to a much lesser degree

this quarter. Criminal rates in the South are undoubtedly

affected by the pervasive IEA presence outside of popula on

centers, as they are able to directly enforce their brand of

jus ce and keep criminal behaviors in check.

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ANSO:2006‐2012 Q1 Criminal incident volume comparison

29%

21%15%

15%

10%

10%EAST

NORTH

WEST

CENTRAL

NORTHEAST

SOUTH

ANSO:Q1 2012 Criminal activity volumes, all types, by region


3 . 2 C r i m i n a l i t y : C a t e g o r y & G e o g r a p h y

From a tac cal perspec ve direct a acks (including SAF &

RPG) featured heavily this period (1st chart le ), primarily

involving the use of small arms to se le interpersonal

disputes. These ac ons resulted in the substan al death toll

of 196 civilians countrywide. Such disputes were also the

leading cause of most stand off a acks (including grenades

& IEDs), though such ac ons were also undertaken to se le

economic disagreements; a dynamic par cularly prevalent

in the East (2nd chart le ).

As the East and North factor heavily in overall criminal

ac vity rates this quarter it is not surprising that this

remains the case when looking at the combined volume of

criminal kine c a acks by region. However, as noted above,

the East is most affected due to a mix of long standing tribal

disputes, honor related ac ons, and both local and cross‐

border economic dynamics. In the North, the inclusion of a

poli cal dynamic into such a acks is common as a result of

various power brokers vying for dominance.

Looking deeper into the East, the provinces of Nangarhar

and Khost combined (both heavily affected by the conflict

this period) accounted for a full quarter of the countrywide

total for criminal a acks this period (3rd chart le ). As

noted, these involved a large amount of kine c ac vity,

including 80% of the IEDs used by criminals this quarter, 3 of

which directly impacted NGOs.

Robberies rounded out the criminal por olio, with banditry

and the during travel accoun ng for 57% of that total, an

element affec ng the North greatest (4th chart le ). It is

highly likely that all types of economically driven ac vity, be

they direct a acks or the , will con nue into this year and

beyond as groups compete for an ever diminishing pool of

resources ahead of 2014.

232

58

34

27

Armed Attacks

Robberies

Abductions

Stand Off Attacks

ANSO:Q1 2012 Criminal activities by type(figures provided mark total count per activity)

0 10 20 30

SOUTH

WEST

NORTHEAST

EAST

CENTRAL

NORTH

STATIC

IN TRANSIT

ANSO:Q1 2012 Robbery by region & type

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100

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ANSO:Q1 2012 Criminal kinetic attacks, by region(kinetic attacks include SAF, RPG, IED & grenades)

0 10 20 30 40

Nuristan

Paktya

Laghman

Kunar

Khost

Nangarhar

ANSO:Q1 2012 Criminal kinetic attacks, Eastern Region(kinetic attacks include SAF, RPG, IED & grenades)


Part 4.Part 4.

NGO TrendsNGO Trends


4 . 1 G e n e r a l N G O I n c i d e n t Tr e n d s

The total of 24 NGO incidents this quarter represents a decrease of 37% in comparison to this period in

2011, for a volume compara ve with 2010 (chart above le ). With criminal acts domina ng, for over 60%

of the total recorded (chart above right), it would be easy to conclude that criminality was having a

greater impact on the NGO community. However, closer evalua on of the data reveals it is the rela vely

limited number of AOG incidents this period which is resul ng in this dynamic. The opposi on typically

accounts for an average 44% of the total NGO incidents during the first quarter, with this year accoun ng

for 25%, likely related to the overall downturn in opposi on ac vity. Though accoun ng for a higher

percentage, the actual number of criminal incidents impac ng NGOs this period is in line with longer term

trends.

While the numbers have fluctuated over the years, it is clear that all actors are capable of impac ng

organisa ons in the field, as a ested by the inclusion of IMF and ANSF a ributed incidents this period in

propor ons similar to those recorded in previous years. However, it is worth no ng that their impact is

limited to specific areas and incident types, such asclinic searches in the vola le provinces in the East and

por ons of Central.

Jul & Sept: 16Sept: 17

Jul: 28Jul: 25

Aug-Oct: 18

Jun: 27

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ANSO: Total NGO Incidents, all authors, countrywide, 2006‐2012(Note:figures in red demark yearly incident peak)

0

5

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35

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45

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

IMF

ANSF

Crime

AOG

ANSO: Q1 2006‐2012 NGO Incident volume comparison

63%25%

8%

4%

ANSO: Q1 2012 NGO Incidents, by author

Crime

AOG

ANSF

IMF


4 . 2 N G O I n c i d e n t s : G e o g r a p h y & Ty p e

From a loca on perspec ve, a significant change this quarter

is the absence of incidents reported from Ghor and Balkh

which had reported the 1st and 4th highest incidents rates

by the close of 2011. However, as with much of the overall

ac vity recorded this period, NGO incident volumes were

highest in the East, for over 45% of the total (chart le ).

Nangarhar con nues to account for high volumes, finishing

2011 with the 2nd highest volume countrywide and the

highest by the close of this quarter.

There were 5 NGO staff casual es this period. The sole NGO staff fatality, along with the 4 wounded, were

all the result of criminal ac ons and are assessed as being unrelated to their employment. As was the case

last year, na onal staff con nue to suffer the highest casualty rates likely related to exposure due to

volume and presence; though fortunately this year accounts for the lowest Q1 casualty rate since 2009.

As noted, the criminal sphere impacted NGOs greatest this period reflec ng the reality that na onal staff

members are subject to the same risks that face the rest of civil society, though an NGOs higher profile,

and their perceived wealth, plays a part in this as well. As seen in the graph below, robberies accounted

for the greatest number of incidents when grouped by type, for a total similar to that reported in Q1 2011.

As noted in Sec on 3.2, instances of the are most likely to happen during travel and in line with this, 80%

of robberies involving NGOs this quarter occurred in transit.

Furthering analysis of the data provided in the chart below, the use of IEDs was used exclusively by

criminal elements, primarily as a method of in mida on with all instances occurring in the East (Khost‐2,

Nangarhar‐1). It would appear that a key driver behind these a acks is the perceived impact some NGOs

opera ons can have on livelihoods, for example the lucra ve medical sector in this region.

Abduc on rates are also down this period

which fits with the lower than normal

volume of AOG a ributed incidents, as

they typically account for the highest

number of NGO staff abduc ons and

deten ons.

Overall, historical trends show that NGO

incidents are not always in mately

associated to the state of the conflict so

how present dynamics impact the state of

NGO affairs this years remains a key

ques on to be answered.

0 1 2 3 4 5

Jawzjan

Kandahar

Logar

Wardak

Laghman

Paktya

Faryab

Herat

Kabul

Khost

Nangarhar

ANSO: Q1 2012 NGO incidents, provincial distribution

0 2 4 6 8 10

Robbery

Armed Attack

IED

Collateral Damage

Intimidation

Facility Searches

Abduction/Detention

Crime

AOG

ANSF

IMF

ANSO:Q1 2012 NGO incidents by type & actor


REPORT ENDS

For fur ther informat ion [email protected]

This document will be electronically archived at www.ngosafety.org three days after distribution. It may

be reproduced, stored or transmitted without further permission for non-commercial purposes only and with written credit to ANSO and link to www.ngosafety.org

© I N S O , M a r c h 2 0 1 2

‐‐‐‐‐ IMPORTANT INFORMATION ‐‐‐‐‐

ANSO is a project of the Interna onal NGO Safety Organisa on (INSO) of 2 ‐6 Cannon Street, London EC4M 6YH, United Kingdom, a company limited by

guarantee in England and Wales, registra on number 7496737 and a registered charity, number 1140276. Contact INSO at [email protected].

Acronyms:

AOG - Armed Opposition Groups specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbiddin (HIG)

IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

ALP - Afghan Local Police (militias)

IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

IDF - Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)

SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK-47)

ANSO REGIONS

For the purposes of this report, please note the following break-down of provinces for the various ANSO Regions:

CENTRAL: Bamyan, Daykundi, Kabul, Kapisa, Logar, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak

EAST: Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktya

SOUTH: Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Paktika, Uruzgan, Zabul

NORTH: Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul

NORTHEAST: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Takhar, Kunduz

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