anso quarterly data report q.1 2010...anso quarterly data report page 3 1.1 direct intervention...
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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Of f ice
This early in the year the tactical level data is not as important to follow as are the changes in the strategic environment which will make 2010 substantively different from the last eight years.
Our best assessment is that the International Military Forces are indeed serious about implementing an exit strategy and that NGO’s should anticipate a post-ISAF environment, likely by the end of 2011.
We note that IMF have made their withdrawal contingent on being able to demonstrate two key metrics, or conditions, being a degraded armed opposition and an improved Government security force.
We assess, perhaps cynically, that there is an awareness that neither of these conditions can be genuinely extant by that time and so strategies to create the perception of them are being pursued instead.
For the first metric the plan appears to involve direct intervention of IMF, and presumably ANSF, in just 80 of the 398 districts with the remaining territory braced against AOG influence by an awkwardly stitched alliance of Government forces, tribal leaders and loosely endorsed ‘militias’.
A parallel effort will be made to address the assumed root causes of conflict, via the Peace and Reintegration program, although this stands a chance of backfiring and instead empowering opposition forces by enabling the allocation of their members to the local security apparatus.
For the second metric the simple plan is to outfit Government troops at a ‘minimally combat essential’ level and transfer lead security responsibility as soon as possible. A low starting point, unrealistic force generation targets and problems in hiring a contractor to deliver the training makes even this limited objective unlikely.
While still a little early to assess what comes next we are concerned that the intense devolution of authority occurring during this period could seed new rounds of factional conflict after the withdrawal. At the more im-mediate level we are concerned about the introduction of new armed actors and new conflicts, collateral dam-age and the intensified efforts by all parties to politicize and militarize NGO activities.
On the other side, with this particular conflict drawing down we assess that AOG now see some self-interest in not attacking impartial NGOs as they are likely to attempt to instrumentalize our activities for their own pur-poses in the near future. Resisting this effort will become a dangerous new challenge.
In response to this changed environment we make two policy recommendations. First, we reiterate the impor-tance of not engaging in civil-military coordination activities. Now more than ever NGO have nothing to gain and much to lose by interacting with the IMF who are only interested in leveraging advantage from your activi-ties. Second, we recommend a policy driven engagement with all Afghan parties to the conflict where such can be concluded safely and legally. NGO must develop and apply deliberate communication strategies to ensure that all current and future powerbrokers understand the purpose, and independence, of your activities.
Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul 2010
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
Jan 1st— March 31st 2010
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2010
The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not reflect the views and opinions of ANSO donors or partners.
Page 2 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1. OVERVIEW OF PRIMARY CAMPAIGN ELEMENTS
Page 3 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 1 D I R E C T I N T E R V E N T I O N ( S U R G I N G )
The first aspect of the exit strategy is a surge of direct intervention by International Military Forces or as General McChrystal referred to it in his Commanders Initial As-sessment (Aug 09, p.1-3) “a dis-crete “jump” to gain the initiative”.
The purpose of direct intervention is to use IMF advanced fighting skills and technology to degrade AOG capability, in key population areas, to a level where responsi-bility can be strategically consoli-dated in to the ANSF.
Lacking the ability to be strong every-where IMF have identified 80 Key Terrain Districts (recreated in Fig 1 from unclassified sources) which will provide a tactical and operational focus to Regional Command-ers. Although there will undoubtedly be deviation we can expect these areas to be the focus of the surge and ongoing in-country redeployments. It is notable that close to 30% of Key Terrain is in just two prov-inces, Kandahar & Helmand, while the entire North/North East region holds just 8 districts.
The ability of direct intervention to really degrade AOG capability is certainly disputable. The historical re-cord would suggest that AOG tactics in the face of major operations will be to (a) slow the attacking force with stand-off resistance then (b) completely disappear from the target area before (c) stepping up the attack levels during the softer ‘hold, build’ stages of the operation. You could say they employ a ‘Hold on, Clear out and Build up’ strategy.
The 72 hour attack rate data from Nad Ali/Marjah, Helmand Province, for instance (Fig 2) would indicate a small spike of resistance as OP MOSHTARAK got underway (Feb 11-23) a sharp drop off on the ’victory’ day (Feb 25th) and a slow return to the pre-operation attack rate thereafter.
The yellow dot inserts in Figure 1 show the ALDI districts discussed on the next page but are presented here to demonstrate that they are strategically positioned to cover the gaps in IMF direct coverage.
Qalay-I- ZalArchi
Imam Sahib
Chahar Dara
Ali Abad
Kunduz
Khan Abad
Nari
Pech
AsadAbadChapa
Dara
Chawkay
Narang
Khas Kunar
Sirkanay
Marawara
Qarghayi
Alingar
Daw lat Shah
Alishing
Mihtarlam
Puli Alam
Charkh
Muhammad Agh
KhushiBaraki Barak
RodatHisarak
Achin
Lal Pur
Dih Bala
Goshta
Dur Baba
Kama
Surkh Rod
Kuz Kunar
Dara-I-Nur
Shinwar
Bati KotChaparhar
Jalal Abad
Nazyan
Chahar Burja
ChakhansurChakhansur
Khash RodKhash Rod
Kang
ZaranjZaranj
MandolMandol WamaWama
Bargi Matal
Nuristan
KamdeshKamdesh
GomalGomal
DilaDila
Wor Mamay
Waza Khwa
Barmal
Sharan
Zarghun
Shah
UrgunOmna
SarHawza
Ziruk
Mata KhanKhan
Gayan
Nika
Zurmat
Jaji
Gardez
Jadran
Lija Mangal
Jani Khel
Shwak
Shamal
Hisa-I-Awali
PanjsherHisa-I-Duwum
Ghorband
Salang
Shekh Ali
Surkhi ParsaKohi Safi
Bagram
Jabalussaraj
Dara-I- SufDara-I- Suf
AybakAybak
Ruyi Du AbRuyi Du Ab
Khuram Wa Sa
Khuram Wa Sa
Hazrati Sultan
KohistanatKohistanatBalkhabBalkhab
Sari PulSari Pul
SayyadSayyad
SangcharakSangcharak
Sozma Qala WarsajWarsaj
RustaqRustaq
FarkharFarkharChalChal
TaluqanTaluqan
Bangi
KalafganKalafgan
Ab
Chah
Ab
Ishkamish
Khwaja Ghar
KhwajaGhar
ChoraChora
NeshNesh
DihrawudDihrawudTirin Kot
Tirin Kot
Khas Uruzgan
Khas Uruzgan
Shahidi HassShahidi Hass
Markazi Bihs
JalrezJalrez
Nirkh
Day Mirdad
Hisa-I-Awal
Wakhan
JurmJurm
ShighnanShighnan
KishimKishim
Darwaz
BaharakBaharak
RaghRagh
ZebakZebak
Kuran Wa MunKuran Wa Mun
Fayz Abad
KhwahanKhwahan
Ishkashim
Shahri Buzur
Shahri Buzur
QalatQalat
ShamulzayiShinkayShinkay
ShahjoyShahjoy
MizanMizan
AtgharAtghar
Tarnak Wa Ja
JawandJawand
QadisQadis
MurghabMurghab
Ab KamariAb Kamari
MuqurMuqur
Qalay-I- Naw
KahmardKahmard
DushiDushi
AndarabAndarab
NahrinNahrin
Tala Wa BarfTala Wa Barf
Khost Wa Fir
Khinjan
Burka
Baghlani JadBaghlani Jad
Dahana-I- GhDahana-I- Ghori
BaghlanBaghlan
KhulmKhulm
KishindihKishindih
ChimtalChimtal
SholgaraSholgara
ShortepaShortepa
Nahri ShahiNahri Shahi
KaldarKaldar
Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad
Chahar Kint
Chahar Kint
BalkhBalkh
MarmulMarmulDihdadiDihdadi
Chahar
YakawlangYakawlang
WarasWaras
PanjabPanjab
BamyanBamyan
ShibarShibar
Day KundiDay Kundi
GizabGizabKajran
ShahristanShahristan
Anar DaraAnar Dara
GulistanGulistan
Pur ChamanPur Chaman
Bala BulukBala Buluk
Lash Wa JuwaLash Wa Juwa
FarahFarah
Qalay-I-KahQalay-I-KahBakwaBakwa
Shib KohShib Koh
Khak-e Safid
Pusht RodPusht Rod
QaysarQaysar
AlmarAlmar
BilchiraghBilchiragh
KohistanKohistan
Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad
Shirin TagabShirin Tagab
QaramqolQaramqol
Pashtun Kot
AndkhoyAndkhoy
Khwaja SabzKhwaja Sabz
Khani ChaharKhani
Chahar
MaymanaMaymana
NawurNawur
Nawa
GiroGiro
QarabaghQarabagh
GelanGelan
Andar
Ab Band
Ab Band
Muqur
Jaghatu
Bahrami ShahShah Dih Yak
Ghazni
Zana Khan
ShahrakShahrak
ChaghcharanChaghcharan
TulakTulak
SagharSaghar
PasabandPasaband
TaywaraTaywara
Lal Wa SarjaLal Wa Sarja
RegReg
GarmserGarmser
DishuDishu
Nad AliNad Ali
WasherWasher
BaghranBaghran
Naw ZadNaw ZadKajakiKajaki
Girishk
GahLashkar
Gah
Sangin
BaraNaway i Bara
AdraskanAdraskan
GulranGulran
ShindandShindand
GhoryanGhoryan
ObeObe
KushkKushk
InjilInjil
KohsanKohsan
FarsiFarsi
KarukhKarukh
GuzaraGuzara
Zinda Jan
Zinda Jan Chishti SharChishti Shar
Pashtun ZargPashtun Zarg
HiratHirat
ShibirghanShibirghan
Qarqin
Darzab
Aqcha
Khwaja Du Ko
Mingajik MardyanMardyan
AbadFayz
SurobiDih Sabz
Khaki Jabbar
PaghmanBagramiKabul
Shakardara
Istalif
Chahar Asyab
Chahar Musayi
GuldaraQarabagh
Mir Bacha Kot
RegReg
PanjwayiPanjwayi
MarufMaruf
DamanDaman
Spin BoldakSpin Boldak
ShorabakShorabak
ArghistanArghistan
MaywandMaywand
Shah Wali KoShah Wali KotGhorak
Tani
Tere Zayi
Sabari Bak
Gurbuz
Nadir Shah Kot
Jaji Maydan
Nijrab
Tagab
Kohistan
Koh Band
Mazari Sharif
Kalakan
Alasay
Mahmud Raqi
Mando Zayi
Azra
Bolak
ANSO Fig 1: IMF Key Terrain Districts, March 2010
Key Terrain District
ALDI District
7
1
3
6
4
3
5
2
0
5
7
5
2
10
7
8
10
9
5
2
3
5
6
2 2
1
5
4 4
1
1‐3
4‐6
7‐9
10‐12
13‐15
16‐18
19‐21
22‐24
25‐27
28‐30
31‐2
3‐5
6‐8
9‐11
12‐14
15‐17
18‐20
21‐23
24‐26
27‐1
2‐4
5‐7
8‐10
11‐13
14‐16
17‐19
20‐22
23‐25
26‐28
29‐31
Jan Feb Mar
ANSO Fig 2: AOG attacks per 72 hrs Marjah/Nad Ali, Helmand, Jan‐Mar 2010
Period of Op Moshtarak
Pre-OP attack level
Page 4 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 2 L O C A L D E F E N C E I N I T I AT I V E S
The second aspect of the exit strategy is to develop resistance to AOG in-fluence in areas that IMF cannot cover with direct intervention.
There are a number of overlapping ini-tiatives currently operating on this theme. Chief amongst them is the Afghan Local Defence Initiative (ALDI) which as far as we know is operated directly by Special Opera-tion Forces. It entails teams of up to 30 individuals, including develop-ment officers with access to USG funding lines, embedding with tribal communities to help organize their resistance to AOG presence. At this point we believe the program is op-erational in nine districts being Nili, Barmal, Achin, Arghandab, Khakrez, Shindand, Chamkani, Delaram, Ghrishk. (Fig. 3)
The first ALDI to become active, with the Shinwari tribe in Achin/Shinwar of Nanagahar province, not only devastated those areas with inter-tribal conflict but also appears to have ignited a power struggle within neighboring Khogani district as tribal leaders there vie for a similar deal. The assassination of Haji Zaman in Chamtala on 22nd February, which also caused 15 collateral fatalities, was likely the opening shot of an ongoing leadership struggle which is already causing instability across that district. The ALDI in Daykondi is reported to be offering Government security positions to tribal networks, some with deep criminal associations. NGOs have legitimate concerns that these new actors will take a less benign ap-proach towards their work and presence.
Beyond ALDI parallel programs are providing coverage for the Northern Region focused on AOG strong-holds of Imam Sahib, Archi, Khanabad and Chahadara districts of Kunduz (the only overlap with Key Terrain) with very recent reports indicating the start of a new program in Farayab to establish militias forces in Gormach, Badghis and southern areas of Jawzjan. These ’pro-government militias’ are osten-sibly operated by Government security departments, or Presidential appointees with significant leverage in these provinces, and are intended to extend the coverage of the ANSF but reports are already emerg-ing of ‘inter-militia’ skirmishes and road robberies.
The final program of this type is the well known Afghan Public Protection Force (also called AP3) which cur-rently operates in Jalrez, Charkh, Maidan Shah, Nirkh and Sayadabad districts of Wardak province only. NGOs report the program has been successful in bringing some stability to those areas and yet it would appear to be the only program of its type not to have the support of the IMF despite having the full back-ing of the MoI and being transparently integrated in to the National ANP development strategy.
HELMAND NIMROZ
KANDAHAR
URUZGAN
ZABUL PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
FARAH
HERAT
BADGHIS
GHORDAYKUNDI
BAMYAN
FARYAB
KHOST
BADAKSHAN BALKHJAWZJAN KUNDUZ
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
WARDAK KABUL
PARWAN
NANGARHAR
ANSO Fig 3: Community Defence Measures, March 2010
ALDI
Pro‐Gov Militia
AP3
Page 5 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
1 . 3 P E A C E & R E I N T E G R AT I O N
The third main aspect will be to try and address the assumed root causes of opposition by offering incen-tives to mid/low level AOG fighters under the Peace & Reintegration (P&R) initiative which emerged, somewhat by surprise, from the London Conference. P&R is also expected to dominate centre court at the upcoming Kabul Conference which is why NGOs need to be aware of it. P&R is distinct from “reconciliation” in that it only targets combatants from the province level down while reconciliation re-fers to higher level settlements between the Government and senior AOG leaders.
It is hoped, by IMF, that by providing jobs and trainings, or by settling some specific local grievance, P&R will lure manpower away from armed opposition groups and so contribute to the metric of ‘degrading AOG capability’. The validity of this causal chain is certainly open to question. Anecdotal reports indi-cate that AOG have been insulted by the suggestion that they fight out of a lack of jobs and money and their spokesmen have dismissed any possibility of their participation.
Logistically it remains in the planning stages with the recent series of ‘Peace Jirgas’ held across the coun-try intended to garner local support ahead of the Kabul Conference launch. The program is expected to be operated by a Presidentially mandated commission linked to a trust fund operated by the Minis-try of Finance. Reports indicate that competition to lead the commission is fierce and that some senior Government figures are opposed. The process is currently being assisted by an IMF advisory team.
The basic stages of reintegration are (i) a combatant renouncing violence, (ii) a community agreeing to accept the return of the combatant, (iii) economic rewards for the community (iv) economic and oppor-tunity rewards for the combatant and (v) the reintegration of the combatant in to the host community. Two models of this approach are being considered with the only difference being at stage (iv) where one model will send combatants to a centralized national training & ‘de-radicalization’ centre while the other keeps it all at a local level.
Of immediate practical concern is that the National Solidarity Program (NSP) is one of the delivery mecha-nism being considered. This would presumably make NSP CDCs responsible for vouching for the sur-rendering combatant and managing community rewards. It is not difficult to see how this would put many NGO staff at risk and ANSO recommends that NGOs prepare to challenge this suggestion at the Kabul Conference or before if possible.
Of more strategic concern is the vagueness of the suggestions of what to do with reintegrating combat-ants after the process ends. Most recommendations seem centered on integrating them in to the local security apparatus be that official ANP or new community defense measures such as ALDI. The plan even considers allowing combatants to retain their light weapons for personal protection.
If this remains the intent by the time of the Kabul Conference it would seem to present a convenient mechanism for discretely turning the opposition in to the Government. This may indeed create local stability in the short term but may seed geographically based factionalism in the long term.
Page 6 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2. THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT & CRIMINALITY ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)
Page 7 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 1 G E N E R A L N G O T R E N D S
NGO have been involved in 25 incidents this quarter, significantly down from 37 in 2009. Figure 4 indicates that inci-dents remain within ‘normal’ ranges of fluctuation over the longer period also.
A single organization incurred an addi-tional ten (10) attacks but these are not included in the data for reasons ex-plained in 2.2
15 of the 25 incidents were attributed to AOG (Fig 5) this is down from 28 last year. The rate was especially low dur-ing Jan and February likely as a result of NGOs low profile during later winter months and AOGs preoccupation with the February Marjah campaign. Inci-dents escalated in March mostly as a result of a flurry of activity targeting NGO girls schools and compounds in Faryab.
Criminal incidents targeting NGO remain low with just 9 this period compared to 10 last year. No significant changes throughout the period.
3
5
2
11 11
1415
1112
8 8
6
10 10 10
13
10
13 1312
16
1112
7
9
12
10
13
8
23
27
2322
11
8
6
17
15
5
11
17
10
24
6
12
16
14
9
3
7
15
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ANSO Fig 4: Total # Security Incidents directly involving NGO per month
Jan Feb Mar
6
1 1
6
3
8
1312
32 2
11
ANSO Fig 5: NGO incidents caused by AOG, Jan‐Mar period, 07‐10
2007 2008 2009 2010
Jan Feb Mar
4
9 9
3
9
2
43
21
54
ANSO Fig 6: NGO incidents caused by ACG, Jan‐Mar period, 07‐10
2007 2008 2009 2010
Page 8 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 2 T Y P E S O F N G O I N C I D E N T S
In comparison with 2009 the types of NGO incidents caused by AOG (Fig 7) have been mild.
Although weapons have been present at most inci-dents the only solidly ‘kinetic’ attacks have been the IEDs in Uruzgan and Parwan, which sadly both caused fatalities (2 NGO and 2 Civ), and the armed entry of a demining compound in Kanda-har. Compare this with the three small arms at-tacks and four IED of Q1 2009.
Abductions too have become less severe with just 6 persons taken this period, compared to 20 last year, and all of them released without harm after no more than six days. The entry of school sites and NGO compounds in Faryab (x5) resulted in some theft and arson but no armed activity (except a school guard shooting at the AOG).
ANSO assesses that this good track record to date is at least partially due to AOG intent not to target genuinely impartial NGOs. AOG statements to this effect, the early release of NGO abductees and the ‘friendly warning’ given to an NGO in Takhar reinforce this assessment.
By way of contrast Figure 9 details the ten additional incidents targeting the single organization, men-tioned in 2.1. It is targeted so frequently because AOG perceive it as supporting IMF by implement-ing high profile projects in difficult areas. As a re-sult the majority of incidents are kinetic and se-vere. Comparing the two datasets provides a clear account of the relationships between pos-ture, perception and attacks.
Given the unique stance of this organization we do not include these incidents in the NGO count as they are not indicative of general threat trends.
NGO have remained vulnerable to robbery on the road and at home (Fig 8) and personal disputes have involved weapons but fortunately no NGO fatalities so far.
Abduction & Release (#persons)
Threats
Entry of School Site
Entry of Office/Compound
IED
8
4
3
2
2
ANSO Fig 7: Types of AOG incidents against NGO, Jan‐Mar 2010
Entry of Clinics
Entry of Compound
Road Robbery
Attempted Robbery
Personal Dispute
2
3
1
1
2
ANSO Fig 8: Types of ACG incidents against NGO, Jan‐Mar 2010
Armed Ambush (SAF/RPG)
IED
Suicide Attack
Robbery
Threat
3
3
1
1
2
ANSO Fig 9 : Types of incidents against one organization, Jan‐Mar 2010
Page 9 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
2 . 3 N G O I N C I D E N T M A P P I N G
The comparison of Q1 NGO incidents per region (Fig 11) shows that the percentage occurring in the North has grown from 8% in 09 to 28% of total this year. This caused mostly by the flurry of incidents in Faryab 2-12 March.
Also notable is the sharp drop in the West-ern region (from 10-1) although additional serious incidents occurred just outside the quarter period.
That the North and Northeast regions ac-count for 40% of the total is also reflective of the density of NGO presence in those areas.
Location of NGO incidents has no obvious correlation to conflict areas.
HELMAND NIMROZ
KANDAHAR
URUZGAN
ZABUL PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
FARAH
HERAT
BADGHIS
GHORDAYKUNDI
BAMYAN
FARYAB
KHOST
BADAKSHAN
BALKH JAWZJAN KUNDUZ
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN
WARDAK
KABUL
PARWAN
NANGAHAR
1. Entry of Site/Compound
2. Abduction & Release
3. IED4. Threat5. Robbery/Attemp
ted Robbery
ANSO Fig 10: Location of serious NGO Incidents, Jan‐Mar 2010
2008 2009 2010
5 37
3 5
3
9 8 5
7 8
4
610
1
6
5
5
ANSO Fig 11: Direct NGO incidents per region, Jan‐Mar, 08‐10
N N/E E S W C
Page 10 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3. CONFLICT TRENDS & ANALYSIS
Page 11 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 1 A O G I N I T I AT E D AT TA C K S
Data indicates that AOG initiated attacks have grown by more than 35% on Q1 of 2009. If the exit strategy is to gain traction IMF will be looking for a measurable downturn in this key metric.
Disaggregated data (Fig 9) indicates that the rate of suicide bombings has remained stable while the main growth has been within the close ranges and stand-off attack types. Use of IEDs especially has escalated .
NOTE: Where these key statistics differ from other reporting entities (specifically UNDSS) that is due to the use of different categorization sys-tems.
81111121
160
213
173
279
335
235261
206
159145129
160
255
329344
405376
344353332
276
189218
300
372
463
569602
634
508511487
420387381
533520
709741
811
1091
630
580
526533
611
523
658
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
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NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
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APR
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APR
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OCT
NOV
DEC JAN
FEB
MAR
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ANSO Fig 12: Monthly AOG initiated attacks, 06‐10 (NOTE: Includes only close range, indirect fire and suicide attacks, Does NOT include any criminal activity or events)
Election Period spike
2008 2009 2010
19 31 35
289
503
774398
767
983
ANSO Fig 13: Tactical composition of AOG attacks,Jan‐Mar, 08‐10
Suicide IDF CR
Q1 2009 attack level
Page 12 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 2 C O N F L I C T A R E A
Figure 14 maps AOG kinetic events only such as small arms fire, RPG’s, IED’s, mortar and missile strikes. It does not map any criminal activity. The data confirms a heavy concentration of at-tacks in four provinces, a notable presence in five others and some capability in thirteen more for a total 22 provinces within which AOG are conducting operations at this time (58% of country).
The surprises here are Baghlan/Kunduz, the main road between which has been the scene of intense conflict over the last 1.5 months, and Badghis/Faryab with the AOG in Bilchiagh, Pashtun Kot, Qaramqol, Gormach and Jawand having some successes in frus-trating the elevated security presence. Ongoing, and upcoming, community defense initiatives in these areas may alter the dynam-ics in either direction.
Regional disaggregation (Fig 15) shows the percentage of all attacks occurring in the N/NE has jumped from 5% in 08 to 11% this year with both North and Northeast doubling their actual counts. 2008 2009 2010
20 33 7618 56
137288
573
579297
516
845
63
150
117
78
116
137
ANSO Fig 15: AOG attacks occuring per region Jan‐Mar, 08‐10
North Northeast East South West Central
HELMAND 381
NIMROZ 21 KANDAHAR
228
URUZGAN 49 ZABUL 52 PAKTIKA
43
GHAZNI 71
FARAH 22
HERAT 27
BADGHIS 65
GHOR 3DAYKUNDI 8
BAMYAN 1
FARYAB 38
KHOST 147
BADAKSHAN 4
BALKH 14
JAWZJAN 12 KUNDUZ 79
SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN 35
WARDAK 38
KABUL 24
PARWAN 6
NANGAHAR 76
Area of special concern
Over 100 Attacks
50 – 99 Attacks
20 – 49 Attacks
Less 20 attacks
No AOG activity recorded
ANSO Fig 14: AOG attacks per province, Jan‐Mar 2010(This is NOT a threat map colors represent incident rates NOT level of accessibility)
Page 13 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
3 . 3 FATA L I T I E S
Gross fatality figures (Fig 16) show more deaths in all categories over Q1 09 except NGOs which remains at 2. Gross IMF fatalities are 79% higher (66-118). Figure 17 shows a 45% increase in civilian fatalities over Q1 09 (342-496). AOG remain responsible for bulk of these (76%) with IMF decreasing their per-centage of the total from 32% to 24% but increasing in actual terms from 109-116 persons. The leading cause of civilian death so far (Fig 18) is being caught in an IED while civilians deaths caused by suicide attacks have increased by more than 260% from Q1 last year (32-118). On the IMF side airstrikes have killed about 70% more civilians than ground operations and EOF deaths are up by 143% (7-17).
Caveat: Beyond the NGO sector our fatality counts are based on our reports only. We do try to verify major fatalities with hospitals, journalists and NGO at the scene but are often forced to take a ’middle ground’ estimate of counts. We have no independent means of verifying combat casualties and suggest this data be taken as in-dicative of trends rather than wholly accurate counts.
National International Male Female Child ANP ANA IMF
NGO Civilian Combatants
2 0
584
32 24
301
67
118
ANSO Fig 16: Gross fatalities, all causes, per sector, Jan‐Mar 2010
Suicide Bombing
IED's
SAF/RPG Attack
Ground Attack
Airstrike
Escalation of Force
AOG
IMF
118
164
89
35
62
17
ANSO Fig 18: Leading cause of conflict related civilian deaths, Jan‐Mar 2010
Jan Feb Mar Total
113 99
168
380
29 47
40
116
ANSO Fig 17: Total conflict related civilian fatalities and cause, Jan‐Mar, 2010
AOG IMF
Page 14 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
REPORT END
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© ANSO, Apr i l 2010