an israeli “plan b” for a nuclear iran

7/30/2019 AN ISRAELI PLAN B FOR A NUCLEAR IRAN

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52 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012)

AN ISRAELI PLAN B FOR A NUCLEAR IRANBy Ofer Israeli*

Assuming that Iran does indeed obtain nuclear weapons and Israel doesnt launch an attack on its

facilities, what is Israels plan B to deal with the new situation? This article analyzes the issue.

INTRODUCTION

Despite substantial sanctions designed tocurb its nuclear program, Iran has refused tobend to international pressure. It hasconsistently violated U.N. resolutions calling

for it to abandon its uranium enrichment andhas continually managed to trick the skilledinspectors of the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA).1 There have also been far-reaching Israeli efforts to stop Iran frombecoming nuclear. Nonetheless, Iran mayindeed acquire a nuclear arsenal.2 Such ascenario would pose a serious threat to theJewish state and would require it to takeimmediate action.

While neither the diplomatic channel norsanctions guarantee success, so a limited

military assault--Israeli, American, or a jointone--would not necessarily prevent Iran fromacquiring the bomb.3 Instead, a militaryassault could lead Tehran to toughen itspositions, act firmly to silence the oppositionmovements, rally the Iranian masses aroundPresident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, andprovide the ayatollahs with the necessarydomestic support to continue its pursuit ofnuclear power.4 A nuclear Iran would bedangerous to Israel and its containmentdifficult, but Jerusalem would have no choicebut to attempt to contain a nuclear Iran and toreduce the risks as much as possible.5

Before Iran becomes nuclear, andespecially if and once it does, Jerusalemshould clearly delineate to Tehran and theinternational community its red lines, which ifcrossed would automatically lead to an Israeliresponse. The first would be to make clear the

consequences of Tehrans use of the bombagainst Israel. Israel must display its strategicarsenal before Tehran. Jerusalem should alsorely on a triple American-British-Frenchnuclear umbrella, with which it should signprotection agreements very soon, before

Tehran were to acquire the bomb.This proposed strategy also seeks to reduce

the severe regional and global consequencesof a nuclear Iran. Jerusalem should make clearto other hostile actors in the region that anIranian bomb would not provide them withprotection. Jerusalem should also actdecisively toward the friendly Westerncapitals, some of which may conclude it bestto abandon the sinking Israeli ship before itsdecline and strengthen their relations withTehran instead.

Thus, Israel must develop two parallel yetseparate strategic channels. Even if thechances of preventing Iran from developingthe bomb are slim, Jerusalem should adhere toits efforts. Moreover, despite Irans built-inadvantages of land and population, Israelcould successfully cope with itsnuclearization. This, however, would requirethe development of an innovative andeffective strategy.

AN ISRAELI PLAN B FOR A NUCLEAR

IRAN: BACKGROUND

Iran is influenced by radical Islamist Shiiideology and has acted decisively to achieveregional power status. The country has notbeen deterred by the United States, despiteAmerican forces stationed on Irans borders, aclear manifestation of this ambition.6 Under


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An Israeli Plan B for a Nuclear Iran

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2012) 53

the shahs regime, Iran had already turned tothe nuclear option. After the IslamicRevolution, however, the plan was abandoned,since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini believednuclear weapons were against Islamic law. Yetfollowing its war with Iraq in the 1980s, when

Iran was attacked with chemical weapons andthe international community largely ignoredthis offense, Tehran decided to return to thenuclear option.7 For Iran, a nuclear arsenalserves several purposes: to obtain status as aregional power, to impress potential followersand allies in the region, to deter any attack onIran in retaliation for its foreign activities, andto build national pride and fear among theopposition so as to ensure the regimes powerat home.8

A nuclear Iran would be dangerous to

Israel, as Tehran could adopt a moreaggressive policy toward Israel. Consequently,the strategic environment within which Israelpresently operates would totally change.9During the first phase after becoming nuclear,Tehran might consider testing Jerusalemslimits. It could encourage its proxies,Hizballah and Hamas, under the protectiveIranian nuclear umbrella, to begin extensiveoperations against Israel. This could includethe launching of thousands of missiles androckets into population centers and at strategictargets. Jerusalem, therefore, must draw clearred lines. At the same time, Israel should beready for an automatic and strong response bythe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against anyprovocation by Irans proxies, which couldlead Tehran and its agents to adopt moremoderate behavior.

An Israeli plan B for a nuclear Iran mustdeal with two types of threats. The first wouldinclude three major actions: first and foremost,the use of Irans nuclear power directly against

Israel; second, the transfer of a nuclear devicefrom Tehrans hands to terrorist organizations,which would then use it directly againstIsrael; and third, heightened attacks on Israel--notably by Hizballah and Hamas--inspired bya belief in Irans new power. The second typeof potential threat involves four lower levelrisks: 1) Iranian leaders threats to destroyIsrael; 2) the sale of nuclear know-how to

countries hostile to Israel, such as Syria; 3)convincing the Gulf states to jump onto theIranian bandwagon, instead of balancing it;and 4) the expansion of nuclear proliferationin the Middle East.

No less serious would be the political-

military propaganda resulting from the Israelifailure to contain Tehran. Nuclear Iran wouldfully exploit its new position. Its leaderswould mock and attack the failed Israelipolicy. Jerusalems stated policy since theearly 2000s that Israel will not accept anuclear Iran would be portrayed as emptythreats and Israel a paper tiger. Suchpropaganda could be detrimental toJerusalems status, and this element should notbe played down. Israels rivals in the MiddleEast could interpret this as a rare opportunity

and may then adopt an aggressive policyaccompanied by defiant and threatening acts.Jerusalems few allies in the internationalarena may choose to stay away, seeing Israelsdays as numbered. Each of thesedevelopments would significantly increase thethreat directed toward the Jewish state.

While Iran is a dangerous and persistentrival, it is also well aware of its limitations ofpower, seeks to preserve its strength, andknows that it operates within an area ofregional and international hostility.10Moreover, if Jerusalem takes the necessarysteps before Iran goes nuclear, it couldsuccessfully reduce the risk from its easternborder and have relative security.

Extent and Quality of Iranian Nuclear

Arsenal and Degree of Risk to Israel

The degree of risk a nuclear Iran wouldpose to Israel depends directly upon the extentand the quality of its nuclear arsenal and

launching capabilities. Iran as a nuclearthreshold state constitutes a much smallerthreat than an actual nuclear Iran. Even a smallnuclear arsenal might make Iran believe itcould launch a successful first strike onIsrael.11 An Iran that thought it possessed areliable second-strike capability--even if thatassessment were wrong--would be even moredangerous.12


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As long as Iran holds limited-launchingcapabilities, covering only Israels territory, itscontainment would be difficult, since France,Britain, and the United States would remainoutside the direct threat. Nuclear weaponslaunched from Iran would not threaten them

directly, and they would not be bound toattack first. This could lead them to adopt asit and do nothing policy. During thistransition period, Jerusalem would need to actdecisively, even if at the risk of its actionsbeing interpreted as reckless and dangerous.Israel would also need to transmit a messageof being on the brink of action and set clearlines that Iran should not dare to cross. Anyintelligence warnings of Iranian preparationsto use the bomb would necessarily lead Israelto ready its strategic weapon. If Tehran did not

retreat, this would lead to an Israeli attack.Once Iran has gained long-term launching

capabilities, containment of Iran would beeasier. If Tehran were to pose a potentialthreat to important European countries and theUnited States, Western countries would nolonger be able to sit aside and do nothing.Instead, Washington, London, and Paris wouldput their own nuclear arsenals on alert, whichthey would not hesitate to use if Tehran wereto begin arming its own nuclear missiles. Theywould act without making any distinctionsbetween missiles aimed at Israel and at theirown territories.

American Willingness to Deter Iran and Its

Impact on Israel

Israels position regarding a nuclear Iran isdependent on how Jerusalem evaluates U.S.readiness and deterrence capability. There areseveral factors at play here: first, the overalldegree of American support for Israel, which

has been weaker under President Obamasadministration; second, U.S. willingness totake political and strategic risks to provideIsrael with the necessary security; and third,the global and regional leadership capacity ofthe United States in light of Washingtonsfailure to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear,as well as the U.S. response to this crucialfailure.13

The day after an Iranian bomb were toexist, Israel would find itself in an even morecomplicated international position. The UnitedStates, Israels greatest and most powerfulally, would be revealed as an unreliablepartner, unwilling or unable to protect Israel.

Other Western countries would also noteWashingtons failure to impose order in theregion. Israels enemies may well concludethat the United States would no longer standfirmly by Israels side and even thatWashington had abandoned Israel in the faceof its enemies.

One element Jerusalem could strive for inthe face of a nuclear Iran would be additionalU.S. military aid. This could include thetransfer of F-22 jet fighters and advancedTomahawk missiles14 or placing missile

defense systems within Israeli territory.

AN ISRAELI PLAN B FOR A NUCLEAR

IRAN: DANGERS & MITIGATING THE

THREAT

Israeli strategy should respond to two keyquestions. First, what does Jerusalem seek todeter? Second, what is Jerusalem willing to dofor this? In order to deter Iran from using thebomb, Jerusalem has to send Tehran sharp andclear messages. Israel should set clear limitsfor Iran and propose a hierarchy of expectedresponses dependent upon the risks posed byTehran: first, and above all, an absoluteprohibition of the use of Irans nuclear poweragainst Israel; second, and no less significant,a complete ban on transferring a nucleardevice to terrorist organizations; and third, tostop using Hizballah and Hamas to causeindirect damage to Israel.

These red lines must be clear to Tehran onthe day it acquires the bomb. Jerusalem should

send a unified message to Tehran,Washington, and other Western andArab/Muslim capitals. It should be transmitteddirectly and indirectly, overtly and covertly,making clear the price Iran would pay for anyviolation. Jerusalems reaction would beaggressive. Israel would use all means,including its strategic arsenal, withoutrestraint. Crossing the third red line would


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also lead Jerusalem to respond decisively. Inthe case of an affront from Irans agents andallies--Hizballah, Hamas and Syria--Jerusalemwould react harshly in order to bring aboutHizballahs demise; a fatal blow to Syria,including overthrow of the regime and the

amputation of Assads dynasty; or eliminatingthe Hamas government in Gaza.

In order for these messages to be trulyeffective, they should be emphasized to theayatollahs long before Iran were to becomenuclear, and even more forcibly after.Consequently, Jerusalem should anticipate thisneed and create communication channels withTehran. Several players in the internationalcommunity maintain ties with Iran.Switzerland, for example, has an activeEmbassy in Tehran, which could be used for

transmitting messages. Initially, the messageswould be unilateral, from Israel. However,Jerusalem should invest a considerable effortin developing direct lines of communicationwith Tehran in order to create a two-sidedinteraction between the capitals.

Jerusalem should be aware that bothTehran and other regional players wouldperceive the nuclearization of Iran as Israelsfailure. Egypt and Turkey as well as Syria,Hizballah, and Hamas would focus on thecolossal Israeli failure. Therefore, Israel mustback its statements. If Teheran were to crossIsraels red lines, this should elicit animmediate Israeli response. If Israel commitsitself to firm red lines, the level of the threatwill rapidly fall, both from Tehran and theother actors in the region who attempt tochallenge Israel.

Absolute Prohibition on Iran Using Nuclear

Power Against Israel

An absolute prohibition on Iran on using itsnuclear power against Israel would bechallenging, but not impossible. Tehran mustrecognize the negative consequences of usingnuclear weapons against Israel. In order toenforce this prohibition, Israel would have toreduce the risk of Iran using the bomb. Thismight include a guarantee to Tehran that Israel

would not launch a preemptive attack andwould honor Iranian territorial integrity.

The prohibition should also includedeterrence elements, such as the creation of asecond- and third-strike capability as well asmutual defense agreements with Western

powers. Such developments should take placein complete secrecy. More importantly, theymust be presented to the ayatollahs slowly andcarefully. Jerusalem would be required tomaintain an element of surprise, while creatinga real but gradual and growing sense thatIsrael had the complete ability to deal with thepotential threat posed by Tehran.

Absolute Prohibition of Transferring

Nuclear Devices to Terrorists

The danger of Tehran transferring a nucleardevice to a terrorist organization still exists.15While this would be difficult to prevent, thechance that the ayatollahs would indeed do sois slim. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution,Iran has avoided crossing certain lines.Despite its strong support of Hizballah andHamas, Tehran has refrained from equippingthem with strategic weapons--whetherchemical or biological--which apparently existin its military arsenal.16 Despite the activesupport of movements acting against the U.S.presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the mullahshave not supplied them with weapons thatviolate the status quo--such as missiles forattacking American aircrafts like those that theUnited States supplied the guerrillas fightingthe Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan War.

The ayatollahs would probably not turn tothis channel for fear they would be removedfrom power. Despite their extreme views, theyknow that such actions would elicit severereactions from the United States and Israel.

Washington has made it clear that any transferof a nuclear device to terrorists would beperceived as a direct threat to U.S. nationalsecurity and lead to a military response.

If Iran were to violate this, Israel wouldhave two main options. The first option wouldbe to mobilize the United States into action. Inorder to do this, Israel must act soon to expandand deepen its intelligence network within


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Iran and along its borders. With thismonitoring system in place, Jerusalem couldprovide Washington with evidence of Iranianattempts to transfer nuclear devices, or theiractual implementation. The second optionwould be to threaten with a decisive response

if Tehran were to provide nuclear weapons toterrorist groups in conflict with Israel. IfJerusalem relays to the Iranian regime a clearand firm message that would threaten itsexistence, it would be reasonable to concludethat a nuclear Iran would refrain from takingthis route.

Ending the Use of Hizballah and Hamas to

Cause Indirect Damage to Israel

Iranian nuclear weapons may encourage

Tehrans agents in the region--Hizballah inLebanon and Hamas in Gaza--to provokeIsrael. Instead of acting with restraint, Israelshould respond harshly to any attempt by suchplayers to penetrate its territorial sovereignty,abduct soldiers, launch short/long-rangemissiles, or challenge its existence. Jerusalemshould confront these players with its fullconventional strength. Israel should alsointercept all Iranian ammunition transfers tothese organizationswhether sent directly orthrough Damascus--even at the cost of directconfrontation with Syria. What Jerusalemshould make clear is that it would no longerpractice restraint. It would act decisively toprevent the transfer of arms shipments toHizballah and Hamas. Firm messages fromJerusalem backed by decisive militaryoperations--but at the same time limited inscope--would lead Hizballah and Hamasleaders to desist from challenging Israel. Pastlessons would lead them to conclude that theywere alone in their confrontation with the

conventional power of the IDF.It is unlikely that Iranian leaders will actupon their declarations of solidarity and callsfor unity with Hamas and Hizballah. Pastexperience indicates that the priority of theayatollahs is the preservation of their power.While Iran openly challenges the UnitedStates and calls for the destruction of Israel,thus far, Tehran has not initiated any direct

military confrontation with either.17 Iran hasfrequently called for protecting thePalestinians and the Lebanese but refrainedfrom supporting militarily in confrontationswith Jerusalem. This was also the manner inwhich Iran behaved during the Second

Lebanon War between Hizballah and Israel.Nor did Teheran interfere in Operation CastLead in Gaza in 2009, when the IDF struckback at Hamas.

Iran itself does not possess significantconventional capabilities. Its capacity toprovide additional weapons systems toHizballah and Hamas has been exhausted overthe past few decades, during which Tehran hassupplied them with the best military arsenalavailable. Its ability to transport military forcethreatening Israels borders is limited and may

be easily thwarted. These attempts could beblocked by the U.S. military forces, a largenumber of which would remain in the Gulfafter the planned withdrawal from Iraq andAfghanistan. In addition, it is unlikely thatIrans conventional capacity will grow in theforeseeable future. To the contrary, if Iranwere to become nuclear, it would face agrowing weapons embargo and severesanctions on its already ailing economy. Thesemeasures would reduce Tehrans ability toconstitute a real conventional threat on Israel.

Preventing Iran from Using the Bomb

A nuclear Iran may turn to the bomb for thewrong reasons, as a result of certainmiscalculations or misperceptions of itsleaders. Teheran could launch a nuclear attackdue to false concerns of a preemptive Israeliattack, as a kind of revenge for past Israeliaggressions, or as a result of general feelingsof deprivation in comparison to the advanced

technology of the Western world. Israel andthe international community should thus worktogether to prevent this danger.

As a new nuclear state, which holds alimited number of nuclear warheads but lacksa reliable second-strike capability, Iran wouldbe very dangerous. Tehran may challengeJerusalem the first chance it gets. Iran couldstrike first for fear of real or false plans to


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attack it. Therefore, Tehran would needreliable guarantees that Israel and/or theUnited States did not intend to impose astrategic attack on it. This would ensure thesafe crossing of the dangerous transitionperiod until Iran were to achieve the second-

strike capability, which is essential tomaintaining stability between nuclear rivals.

Internal divisions between the variousfactions of the Iranian regime could alsoendanger the application of credible andeffective central control over its strategicweapon systems. This could causeorganizational failures and splits leading to anattack on Israel neither planned nor approvedby the top leadership. In addition, Jerusalemshould convey a clear message to Teheran thatIsrael would launch a strategic first-strike

against it in any case of opening of launchingshafts, mechanical transfer of ballistic missilesfor their launch or fueling them, or sendingIranian jets or bombers into Israeli airspace.

Iran has been strongly opposed to allowingany external involvement in its internal affairs.This tendency was revealed to the West in theearly 1950s, when Prime Minister MuhammadMossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian OilCompany (AIOC), an action that won theoverwhelming sympathy of the Iranianmasses, who flooded the streets.18 The founderof the Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah, also actedin light of this tendency and was subsequentlyremoved from power by Britain. His son,Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, echoed thisand believed in Irans need to stand on itsown. However, understanding that this wouldultimately lead to his own removal from thethrone softened his opposition. Finally, theshah was forced to give up his seat for thesame reason: the demand of the elites andmasses to free Iran from the colonial forces

that controlled the palace and the king.

19

Reducing the fear of an Israeli attackagainst Tehran would reduce the danger ofIran initiating an initial nuclear attack. Israelshould send Iran official covert messagesthrough a trusted third party and, if possible,also directly. These should highlight Israelirespect for Irans culture and its territorialintegrity, and reassure Teheran that Jerusalem

does not intend to attack first withoutsignificant risk directed from Tehran.

At the same time, these messages shouldalso sanctify Israeli territoriality. They shouldinclude an explicit threat of a massive strategicIsraeli attack on Iran if Tehran were to target

Israeli territory. Accordingly, Israel shouldconvey the message that it would not hesitateto cause serious damage to those who were tochallenge its existence. This process should begradual. The messages should first bedelivered by junior representatives. Later, theprime minister should explicitly present themas Israels official policy.

If the ayatollahs feel their future might beendangered--whether a reasonable or falseconcern--this could lead them to take toextreme measures. In such a scenario, they

may order the use of the bomb as a last resort,turning them into eternal Islamic saints.However, it is still possible to contain such anextreme act. Iranian leaders should be floodedwith messages that such action would lead tothe complete opposite result: Any Iraniannuclear attack on Israel would lead to acomprehensive Israeli retaliation.

Deterrence

Deterrence is the most essential element forcontaining Iran. Such deterrence, however,should be of a completely different kind thanthe U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Unionduring the Cold War.20 The rational-Western/modern deterrence is based on mutualassured destruction (MAD), focusing onattacking power components, includingnuclear weapons and their launching sites.

Rational deterrence is simple. Jerusalemshould invest the necessary resources fordeveloping a reliable second-strike capability.

A total arsenal of six submarines carryingadvanced launching platforms wouldadequately serve this strategic goal. Theconstant presence of two or three of themoutside Israels territorial waters would send aclear message regarding Jerusalems ability todestroy Iran as a response to an initial Iraniannuclear strike.


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Jerusalem should not completely rely onthis solution, as it could fail; thus, it shoulddevelop additional elements. Based on modelsfrom South Korea and Japan, Jerusalemshould use the interim period before Iranbecomes nuclear to develop a third-strike

capability--mutual defense agreements signedwith the United States, Britain, and France.Accordingly, the ayatollahs would understandthat any nuclear attack against Israel wouldautomatically be considered an attack onIsraelis Western allies, which would havelarge-scale troops placed on Israeli soil inadvance. This agreement would put Israelunder the American nuclear umbrella.21 Itwould include a triple American-British-French commitment to launch a nuclearretaliation against Iran by using their strategic

forces stationed outside of Israel as well. Thiswould be regardless of Jerusalems second-strike capability, which would survive after anIranian nuclear assault.

Coping with Additional Threats of a Nuclear

Iran

The integration of intent with practicalability could be catastrophic to Israel.Accordingly, Israel should send Tehran asharp message that it will no longer acceptsuch behavior on the part of Ahmadinejad andhis fellow leaders. The message should first besent indirectly. This may not initially have aneffect, thus highlighting the presence of Israelisubmarines off the coast of Bandar-e Abbasmay be a more practical response.

Second, Iran may sell nuclear know-how,which could find its way to Israels enemies.As Pakistan and North Koreas advancednuclear programs have been available for overa decade on the nuclear black market, it

unlikely Iran becoming nuclear would worsenthe situation. Nevertheless, credible threatsfrom the international community have led theUnited States to impose strong sanctions onIran, and Tehrans fear of an Israeli and/orAmerican strategic first-strike would deterTehran from pursuing this route.

Third, the plan to reduce U.S. forces in Iraqand Afghanistan could move Iran to challenge

its neighbors in the region. It could persuadethe Gulf States to jump on the Iranianbandwagon. This is more of a risk for thesmaller Gulf States, Bahrain and Kuwait,where there is a large Shii population, andless so for Saudi Arabia.

The United States is a trusted source ofsecurity for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh relies onWashington and recognizes the fact that theSaudi royal existence depends on petrodollarsand the White Houses commitment to the al-Saud dynasty. Iran is a strategic andideological rival to Riyadh. Tehran also lacksthe economic and military capabilities of theUnited States. Thus, it is not likely that Riyadhwill join its eastern Shii rival and forgo thecontinuous and reliable security provided bythe United States. It is more reasonable to

conclude that the Saudis would strengthentheir relations with Washington, call for theUnited States to expand its presence in theGulf, and ask for its nuclear protection.

If well-prepared for the new emergingreality, Jerusalem would be able to reap thebenefits of Irans nuclear buildup in theregion. Numerous Gulf States, first andforemost Saudi Arabia, may actuallystrengthen their ties with Washington, andthrough this with Israel as well.22

Fourth, Israel may find a nuclear Iran to beonly the beginning of a much largerconfrontation. Other countries in the region,such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, maypurchase the bomb.23 Israel should engage theUnited States to prevent regional proliferation,while cleverly using the last decade ofAmerican promises of preventing Iran frombecoming nuclear.

Past experience shows that countries in theregion will not automatically develop thebomb, despite their well-founded fear that

Israel has a nuclear arsenal. There is no reasonfor Jerusalem not to preserve the status quo,given its proper strategic conduct and skilleduse of the strong lever it has in Washington.Israel should conduct a comprehensivecampaign to encourage the White House andthe two houses of Congress to take action:Egypt depends on annual U.S. support of a$1.5 billion of advanced military equipment


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supply; Turkey depends on Washingtonssupport for joining the EU and maintaining itsposition within NATO. Ankara also needs theWhite House to reject the U.S. Congressionallaw recognizing the Armenian genocide; andRiyadh depends on Washington promising the

flow of petrodollars, ensuring the security ofthe kingdom, and protecting the perpetuationof the al-Saud dynasty.24

CONCLUSION

As goes the old Persian proverb, When itis dark enough, you can see the stars. If Iranwere to acquire the bomb, such a scenariocould also open the door to new opportunities.Jerusalem could improve its relations withEgypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. With

Washingtons help, a historic defense alliancecould be created among the four as acounterweight to an Iranian nuclear threat.

Acquiring the bomb would necessarily leadto Irans absolute military strengthening andcould lead Tehran to act against Israel.However, there is no reason to assume thatIran would use its nuclear weaponsimmediately.25 It would be more reasonable toassume that the regime would instead direct itsefforts toward producing a large nucleararsenal and a reliable second-strike capability.During this period, Tehran would discover thatits membership in the exclusive nuclear clubwould not be without its obligations andlimitations.

*Dr. Ofer Israeli teaches at the

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) at Herzliya.

From 2009-2011, he was a Visiting

Researcher at the Center for Peace & Security

Studies (CPASS) within Georgetown

Universitys School of Foreign Service (SFS).

His postdoctoral research is in the field ofComplexity of International Relations.

*The author gratefully acknowledges support

from the Center of Peace and Security Study

(CPASS), within Georgetown Universitys

School of Foreign Service and Prof. Daniel

Byman. He is also grateful to Robert J. Lieber,

Andrew Bennett, Ophir Falc, and especially

Judith Greenfor their most helpful comments.

NOTES

1 James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, After

Iran Gets the Bomb, Foreign Affairs(March/April 2010),http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66032/james-m-lindsay-and-ray-takeyh/after-iran-gets-the-bomb, pp. 1-12.2 Ofer Israeli, Iran Is a Nuclear State,News1, March 15, 2010 (Hebrew).3 Ofer Israeli, The Expected Implications of aNuclear Iran, in Alex Mintz et al. (eds.),Iran--The Day After Simulation, (Herzliya,Israel: Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)Herzliya, Lauder School of Government,

Diplomacy and Strategy, May 2011), pp. 37-41 (Hebrew),http://portal.idc.ac.il/He/schools/Government/Research/iran/media/Documents/ %20%20 %20 %20 %20 %2

0.pdf.4 Israeli, An Israeli Military Strike AgainstIrans Nuclear Sites Would Not Be theSolution, in Alex Mintz et. al. (eds.), Iran--The Day After Simulation (Herzliya, Israel:Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya,Lauder School of Government, Diplomacyand Strategy, June 21, 2010),http://portal.idc.ac.il/He/schools/Government/Research/iran/media/Documents/Israeli-IsraeliAttackIsNotTheSolution.pdf.5 Ofer Israeli, To Deal with a Nuclear Iran,

Haaretz, April 28, 2010 (Hebrew).6 Christopher de Bellaigue, Defiant Iran,The New York Review of Books, Vol. 53, No.17 (November 2, 2006).7 Erich Follath and Holger Stark, A Historyof Irans Nuclear Ambitions, Spiegel Online

(June 2010), pp. 1-14.8 Volker Perthes, Ambition and Fear: IransForeign Policy and Nuclear Programme,Survival, Vol. 52, No. 3 (June-July 2010), pp.95-114. For a theoretical discussion on whydo states build nuclear weapons? see: ScottD. Sagan, Why Do States Build NuclearWeapons? Three Models in Search of a


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Bomb, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3(Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86.9 Benny Morris, Using Bombs to Stave OffWar,New York Times, July 18, 2008.10 Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets the

Bomb, p. 7.11 Ibid, p. 5.12 For an opposing view, in which once Iranwere to develop nuclear capability, it wouldbecome more aggressive in supportingterrorist groups like Hizballah in Lebanon orHamas in Gaza, see: Amitai Etzioni, Can aNuclear-Armed Iran Be Deterred? Military

Review (May-June 2010), p. 123.13 Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets theBomb, p. 5.14 Bruce Riedel, If Israel Attacks, The

National Interest(August 2010), p. 7.15 David E. Sanger, Suppose We Just Let IranHave the Bomb,New York Times (March 19,2006); Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Getsthe Bomb, p. 4.16 Antony H. Cordesman, Iran as a NuclearWeapons Power (Washington, D.C.: CSIS,2009), p. 2.17 Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets theBomb, p. 3.18 Ofer Israeli, The Circuitous Nature ofOperation AJAX, Middle Eastern Studies(forthcoming).19 Israeli, Iran Is a Nuclear State; BarryRubin, Lessons from Iran, The WashingtonQuarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003), p.108.20 Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets theBomb, p. 7.21 For an American nuclear umbrella to Israel,see: Riedel, If Israel Attacks, p. 7.22 Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets theBomb, p. 3.23

Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, TheNuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of IransNeighbors, in Henry Sokolski and PatrickClawson (eds.), Getting Ready for a Nuclear-

Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2005),p. 51.24 Lindsay and Takeyh, After Iran Gets theBomb, p. 5.

25 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Point of No Return,The Atlantic (September 2010), p. 10.