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Web version:www.csis.org/burke
1616 Rhode Island Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036
Anthony H. CordesmanPhone: 1.202.775.3270 Email: acordesman@gmail.com
Iran and the Gulf Military Balance
AnthonyH.Cordesman andAbdullahToukan
Working Draft October 3, 2016
Acknowledgements:
This analysis draws in part on the work of Charles Ayers and Joseph Kendall in preparing and updating the graphic
analyses and force comparisons, and Max Markusen in editing and updating.
10/3/16 2
Table of ContentsTitle Pages
The Changing Gulf Balance 4-7The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8-17The Military Spending Gap 18-22The Modernization Gap 23-40U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impactingon the Regional Balance 41-58Comparative Military Manpower 59-62The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence,and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors 63-77The Land Balance in the Gulf 78-89The Air Balance in the Gulf 90-119The Naval Balance in the Gulf 119-124Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-AirThreat to Maritime Traffic 125-146Missile Forces and Threats 147-169Missile Wars and Missile Defense 170-177The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat 178-196
10/3/16 3
The Changing Gulf Balance
10/3/16 4
The Changing Gulf Balance - I• The classic military balance in the Gulf region is driven by an accelerating arms race between Iran and its Arab Gulf Neighbors. The Arab countries are decisively winning this arms race.
• This aspect of the balance is also shaped by outside forces, particularly by the level of U.S. commitment and power projection capability to assisting its Arab security partners, although Russia and China are potential wild cards.
• The balance, however, is also increasingly shaped by internal conflicts and divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and the impact of “failed state wars” on the relative strategic influence of Iran versus other Arab states and U.S.
•It is also shaped by Iran’s steadily improving capabilities for asymmetric warfare in supporting pro-Iran elements in Arab states, in developing the capability to threaten maritime traffic in and near the Gulf, and to pose a ballistic and cruise missile threat to its Arab neighbors that compensates for its limited conventional capabilities.
10/3/16 5
The Changing Gulf Balance - II• The threat of violent religious extremism, and the growing impact of non-state actors both pose another major set of threats, and make counterterrorism and counterinsurgency increasingly important aspects of the military balance.
• The P5+1 (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran delays, but does not end the nuclear and WMD competition between Iran and its Arab neighbors and the U.S.
• The end result seems to be a high level of mutual deterrence between regional states, mixed with extremist challenges by non-state actors which do not show any such restraint. This does not, however, prevent threats to use force by state actors in “wars of intimidation,” low level incidents, or proxy wars in competing to support other forces.
• It is also a complex mix of different and asymmetric forces, and possible approaches to warfighting, creates a significant risk that Arab-Iranian conflicts can start or escalate through miscalculation in unpredictable ways.
10/3/16 6
The Changing Gulf Balance - III• The risk of conflict is also driven by the actions of non-state actors and violent extremists and the uncertain internal stability of many regional states.
• These internal stability risks are compounded by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions, particularly ethnic tensions between Arabs, Persians, and Kurds, and Sunnis and Shi’ites.
• There has been a massive regional increase in internal security activity, forces, and costs. The data on these aspects of the balance are so suspect, however, that it is not possible to assess the trend and scale in quantitative terms.
• The “civil balance” in terms of the nature of politics, quality of governance, corruption, economic development and sharing of wealth, social changes from factors like hyperurbanization, massive population growth and youth employment problems, has generally deteriorated since the uprisings of 2011, and is now affected by massive cuts in petroleum export and tourism income and limited investment.
10/3/16 7
The Iranian Threat:
An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives
10/3/16 8
Iran: Threat or “Competitor”Non-Military Competition
• Ideology, religion, and political systems • “Terrorism” and violent extremism vs. “counterterrorism” • Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts • Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports • International diplomacy
Military Competition
• W eapons of mass destruction • Conventional forces • Asymmetric and irregular warfare • P roxy use of state and non-state actors • Threat and intimidation
Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition
• G u l f Cooperation Council countries • Y emen • I r a q • Jordan • Syria • Lebanon • Israel • Gaza and West Bank • P akistan • Turkey • A fghanistan • Central Asia • Europe • R u s s i a • C h i n a • Japan and Asia • V enezuela, Cuba, Brazil
10/3/16 9
Assessing the Full Range of Competition
10
Rhetoric vs. Reality
• Reinforcement of Supreme Leader and political rhetoric vs. often solid military assessments and study of western and outside positions.
• Statements can defeat all attacks versus focus on defense in depth
• Capability to “close the Gulf” vs. steadily upgrading asymmetric capabilities and real world limits.
• Nuclear denial vs. nuclear efforts; exaggeration of missile capabilities.
• Claims of modernization versus real world limits and failures.
• Real but exaggerated progress in Asymmetric warfare.
• Exaggerated claims to military production and technology versus limited reality
• Claimed focus on US and Israel versus focus on Israel and GCC
• Denial/Understatement of links to non-state actors: Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan Northern Alliance10/3/16 11
Key Positives for Iran• The US is Iran’s “Secret Ally:” Invasion of Iraq and aftermath; Messing up Syria from the start, Uncertain & slipping nuclear “redline,” faltering effort in Afghanistan, loss of allied confidence, in Egypt.
• Success in Lebanon, growing Syrian dependence, ties to Iraqi Shi’ites, presence in Western Afghanistan and role with Hazaras.
• Lack of progress and coherence in GCC forces.
• Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen.
• Asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc.
• Missile and nuclear progress.
• Real progress in modernization, adaptation, selective imports.
• Integration of regular and revolutionary forces.
•Restructuring of Basij, internal security forces.10/3/16 12
US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces - I
MainBattleTanks:2003
MainBattleTanks:2012
CombatAircraft:2003
CombatAircraft:2012
Iran 1565 1663 283 336Iraq 2200 336 316 3
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Source:AdaptedfromIISS,TheMilitaryBalance2013,variouseditionsandJane’sSentinelseries.10/3/16 13
US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces – 2003 vs. 2013
10/3/16 14
The Limited Recovery of Iraq’s Forces: 2003 vs. 2016
10/3/16 15
Key Negatives for Iran• Unstable Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uncertain Hamas.
• US-led progress, C4I/ISAR, and training progress in GCC forces; Broad Arab treatment of Iran as threat.
• Rising Sunni versus Shi’ite tensions; limits to Shi’ite acceptance of Supreme Leader, any form of Iranian control or proxy role.
• High level of effectiveness in limits to arms, technology, and production imports.
•Lack of Power projection assets, maneuver capability, sustained air capability, and geography of Gulf
• Sanctions/delays in nuclear program, impact on military spending, stability.
• Lack of nuclear and other WMD weapons, long-rang precision strike capability. Israeli, Pakistani, US nuclear/missile forces in being; US conventional long-range strike capability.
• Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen.
• Limits to asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. 10/3/16 16
Key Potential Pivots Shaping the Future
• Iran deploys functional nuclear forces.
• US or Israeli preventive strikes.
• Missiles with terminal guidance, extreme accuracy. (w/ or w/o ,missile defenses.
• Serious (Shi’ite) unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
• US tensions with GCC states (and Egypt/Jordan). Excessive US force cuts, spending crisis
• Iran access to most modern Russian and Chinese arms: advanced fighters, S-300/S-400 etc.
• Major clash in Gulf
• Assad victory or defeat in civil war; clear polarization of Iraq.
• Serious Iranian political upheavals, power struggle.
• Hostile Iranian involvement in post-2015
• Real Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis.
• New Arab-Israel Conflict.10/3/16 17
The Military Spending Gap
10/3/16 18
Military Spending
• Trends sharply favor Arab states even if impact of U.S. and European spending on power projection is ignored.
• Estimates are uncertain. Iran and other Gulf states may conceal significant security spending off budget. But, unlikely to affect trends or scale of difference.
•Iran has advantage from low-cost conscription, control of state industries.
• Lack of coordination, standardization, and interoperability by Gulf states greatly reduces impact of their advantage in spending.
• But, Iran’s programs have uncertain management, and Iran has massive disadvantage because of lack of access to modern and high performance arms imports.
• Arab Gulf states can surge arms imports and funding of outside power projection support in a crisis. Iran cannot – to date.
10/3/16 19
Comparative Military Spending: 1997-2009
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, various editions
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Bahrain 387 427 472 342 355 352 350 191 559 498 550 552 697
Kuwait 3,827 3,614 3,401 3,933 3,614 3,720 3,720 1,275 4,539 3,640 4,002 6,810 6,650
Oman 2,126 1,913 1,701 2,232 2,551 2,445 2,657 2,764 3,210 3,410 3,298 4,657 4,060
Qatar 1,382 1,382 1,488 1,275 1,807 2,020 2,020 2,232 2,327 2,430 1,090 1,750 1,750
UAE 3,614 3,933 4,039 3,189 2,976 2,976 2,976 1,701 2,817 9,888 10,292 13,730 15,470
Saudi Arabia 22,323 23,386 19,878 23,386 26,256 23,599 23,599 20,515 27,000 30,810 34,020 38,200 41,200
GCC Total 33,659 34,655 30,979 34,357 37,559 35,112 35,322 28,678 40,452 50,676 52,142 65,699 69,827
Yemen 437 421 456 529 570 547 596 940 1,001 858 927 1,490 1,550
Iraq 1,982 1,382 1,488 1,488 1,488 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iran 4,996 6,165 6,060 7,972 2,232 3,189 3,189 3,720 6,590 6,759 7,310 9,590 10,000
Gulf Total 41,074 42,623 38,983 44,346 41,849 38,848 39,107 33,338 48,043 58,290 60,379 76,779 81,377
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
10/3/16 20
The Military Spending Gap – Less US, UK, France
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Def
ense
Spe
ndin
g (in
Mill
ions
USD
)
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE SaudiArabia Iraq Yemen Iran
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,1999-201310/3/16 21
The Military Spending Gap in 2015
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SaudiArabia UAE GCCTotal Iran Iraq Jordan Yemen
2015MilitarySpending 1.53 4.43 9.88 5.09 81.9 14.4 117.23 15.9 21.1 1.3 1.89
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2015
Defen
seSpe
ndinginbillionsofU
SD
10/3/16 22
The Modernization Gap
10/3/16 23
Military Modernization• The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states is even greater in terms of arms transfers than in military spending, and has grown sharply in favor of the Arab states in recent years.
• The broader failure of the GCC to achieve standardization and interoperability has been offset by the fact the two key Arab Gulf powers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have made massive and interoperable arms imports from the U.S.
• U.S. forward basing in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait aids their militaries, and compensates for some of their weaknesses.
• Far more is involved than arms import spending. A review of key Iranian force elements shows many weapons are obsolete, obsolescent, or of relatively low quality. Many date back to the Shah or were worn during the fighting in the Iraq-Iraq War. Non-operational rates are often high, and sustainability in combat low.
•Iran’s problems are made worse by a lack of access to upgrades to its systems, modern munitions, sensors, battle management, and IS&R equipment and sub-systems. These have a critical cumulative effect.10/3/16 24
The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total
2011-2014 56,400 500 4,000 8,800 6,200 9,100 85,000 21,700 - 200 106,900 2007-2010 29,600 500 3,300 3,000 1,000 13,500 50,900 5,600 700 900 58,100
-
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000 M
illio
ns o
f USD
GCC Orders from U.S. = -- $50.9B in 2007-2010-- $85.0B in 2011-2014
Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .
10/3/16 25
The New Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC
Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total
2011-2014 16,000 400 1,600 3,100 900 6,800 28,800 6,600 100 100 35,600 2007-2010 10,900 500 1,300 500 200 2,000 15,400 2,600 500 400 18,900
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
Mill
ions
of U
SD
U.S. Deliveries to GCC =-- $15.4B in 2007-2010-- $28.8B in 2011-2014
10/3/16 26
The Gap in New Orders and Deliveries – Iran vs. GCC
10/3/16 27
The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms Agreements in 2007-2010
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen
All Others 100 - - - - - 200 200 100 All Other European 1,500 - - - - 1,500 100 500 300 Major West European 14,800 - - 2,800 700 1,700 - 500 100 China - - 300 - 100 100 - 100 -Russia - - 700 - - - 400 400 400 U.S. 13,200 500 2,300 200 200 10,200 - 3,900 -
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000 M
illio
ns o
f USD
Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .
10/3/16 28
The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms Agreements in 2011-2014
Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .
Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen
All Others 100 - - 1,000 - 300 - 3,400 -All Other European 2,200 100 - 300 900 700 - 1,500 100 Major West European 6,500 - 100 4,400 5,200 600 - 400 -China 600 - - - - - - 200 100 Russia - 100 400 - - 100 - 7,900 -U.S. 47,000 300 3,500 2,300 100 7,400 - 8,300 -
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
Mill
ions
of U
SD
10/3/16 29
The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: Arms Deliveries in 2007-2014
Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .
Saudi Arabia '07-'10
Saudi Arabia '11-'14
Bahrain '07-
'10
Bahrain '11-
'14
Kuwait '07-'10
Kuwait '11-'14
Oman '07-'10
Oman '11-'14
Qatar '07-'10
Qatar '11-'14
U.A.E. '07-'10
U.A.E. '11-'14
Iran '07-'10
Iran '11-'14
Iraq '07-'10
Iraq '11-'14
Yemen '07-'10
Yemen '11-'14
All Others - 100 - - - - - - - - - - 100 300 100 - 100 -
All Other European 700 700 - 100 - - - 100 - 100 300 1,200 200 400 - - 100 100
Major West European 4,300 5,700 - - - - 500 2,300 200 700 500 1,300 100 500 - - - -
China 600 500 - - - 100 - - - - 100 - - 100 - - - -
Russia - - - - - 100 - - - - 300 300 200 2,200 400 100 200 -
U.S. 5,300 9,000 500 300 1,300 1,400 200 700 - 100 800 4,000 2,000 3,100 - - - -
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
Mill
ions
of U
SD
10/3/16 30
U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)
Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 10/3/16 31
U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)
Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 10/3/16 32
U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)
Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 10/3/16 33
U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)
Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 10/3/16 34
U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)
Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 10/3/16 35
Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Land
MBT1,663+:150M60A1;100ChieftainMk3/Mk5;540T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74;168M47/M48(480T-72Z?75+T-62?150Zulfiqar?)
LTTK80+:80Scorpion;
RECCE35EE-9CascavelAIFV610:210BMP-1;400BMP-2with9K111
APC(T)340+:140Boraghwith9K111Fagot(AT-4Spigot);200M113;BMT-2Cobra
APC(W)300+:300BTR-50/BTR-60;Rakhsh
SP292+:155mm150+:150M109;;175mm22M107;203mm30M110
TOWED2,030+;105mm150:130M101A1;20M-56;122mm640:540D-30;100Type-54(M-30);130mm985M-46;152mm30D-20;155mm205:120GHN-45;70M114;15Type-88WAC-21;203mm20M115
AIRCRAFT•10Cessna185;2F-27Friendship;4TurboCommander690PAX1Falcon20
ATK50AH-1JCobra
TPT173:Heavy20CH-47CChinook;Medium75:50Bell214;25Mi-171;Light78:68Bell205A(AB-205A);10Bell206JetRanger(AB-206)
MANPAD9K36Strela-3(SA-14Gremlin);9K32Strela-2(SA-7Grail)‡;Misaq1(QW-1Vanguard);Misaq2(QW- 18);9K338Igla-S(SA-24Grinch– reported);HN-54
SP180:23mm100ZSU-23-4;57mm80ZSU-57-2
NewTanks?
OAVs?
AttackCopters?
SPArty
SHORADS?
10/3/16 36
FTR184+:20F-5BFreedomFighter;55+F-5ETigerII/F- 5FTigerII;24F-7MAirguard;43F-14Tomcat;36MiG- 29A/U/UBFulcrum;upto6Azarakhshreported
FGA110:64 F-4D/EPhantomII;10MirageF-1E;30Su- 24MKFencerD;upto6SaeghehreportedATK10:7Su-25KFrogfoot;3Su-25UBKFrogfoot(incl.4+Su-25K/UBKdeployedinIraq;statusunclear)ASW5P-3MPOrion
ISR:6+RF-4EPhantomII*TKR/TPTB-707;ε2B-747TPT117:Heavy12Il-76Candid;Mediumε19C-130E/HHercules;Light75:11An-74TK-200;5An-140(Iran-140Faraz)(45projected);10F-27Friendship;1L-1329Jetstar;10PC-6BTurboPorter;8TB-21Trinidad;4TB-200Tobago;3TurboCommander680;14Y-7;9Y-12;PAX11:2B-707;1B-747;4B-747F;1Falcon20;3Falcon50HELICOPTERSMRH2Bell412TPT34+:Heavy2+CH-47Chinook;Medium30Bell214C(AB-214C);Light2+:2Bell206AJetRanger(AB-206A);someShabaviz2-75(indigenousversionsinproduction);someShabaviz2061
NewFighters?
ISR?
Tankers?
UCAVs?
S-300/S-400?
Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Air
10/3/16 37
AirDefenseForce
SAM529+:
250FM-80(Crotale);30Rapier;15Tigercat;
150+MIM-23BI-HAWK/Shahin;45S-75Dvina(SA-2
Guideline);10S-200Angara(SA-5Gammon);299K331Tor-M1(SA-15Gauntlet)(reported)
MANPADFIM-92AStinger;9K32Strela-2(SA-7Grail)
Army
SPHQ-7(reported)
MANPAD9K36Strela-3(SA-14Gremlin);9K32Strela-2(SA-7Grail);Misaq1(QW-1Vanguard);Misaq2(QW-11);Igla-S(SA-24Grinch- reported);HN-54
Note:RussiahasdeliveredtheTOR-M
RussianS-300inDelivery.
InitialdeploymentatFordow
Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Air Defense
10/3/16 38
FSGM2Jamaran(UKVosperMk5– 1moreundergoingseatrials)with2twinlnchr withC-802(CSS-N-8Saccade)AShM,2singlelnchr withSM-1SAM,2triple324mmMk32ASTT,176mmgun,1hellandingplatformFSG53Alvand (UKVosperMk5)with2twinlnchr withC-802(CSS-N-8Saccade)AShM,2tripleMk32324mmASTT,1114mmgun2Bayandor (USPF-103)with2twinlnchr withC-802(CSS-N-8Saccade)AShM,2triple324mmMk32ASTT,176mmgunPCFG14Kaman(FRACombattante II)with1–2twinlnchrwithC-802AShM,176mmgunMSI2Riazi(USCape)LSM3Farsi(ROK)(capacity 9tanks;140troops)LST4Hengam each withup to1hel (capacity 9tanks;225troops)LSL6Fouque
Upgrades?
Doesitmatter?
ASMs?
SSMs?
Air/UAVs?
Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Naval
10/3/16 39
The GCC Threat to the GCC
• Vast lead in military spending and arms imports
• Support from US, Britain, France
But,
• Failure to create effective structures within the GCC for command, force planning, defense support. far too much a matter of façade and rhetoric.
• Lack of national unity, common facilities, de facto dependence on U.S. Far too much a Saudi-UAE alliance with Oman on the outside.
• Poor mission focus with limited coordination
• Poor adaptation to asymmetric/irregular warfare, effective cooperation in counterterrorism, internal security.
• Lack of integration, standardization, operational intreroperability
• Problems in large-scale exercises and training; military realism
• Problems in jointness – including security services, police, and intelligence – and combined arms.
• Lack of balanced force development: Manpower quality and sustainability10/3/16 40
U.S. and Outside Allied Forces:
The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance
10/3/16 41
The Role of Outside Forces
• The balance is not simply regional. The U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey regularly support the Arab Gulf states, and they and other European states play an active role in Iraq and the coalition against ISIS.
• The U.S, Britain, and France all have bases in the Gulf region.
• The U.S. has a massive lead in global military spending and the deployment of new weapons and technology in spite of limited recent cuts in baseline spending.
• The West has given the Arab Gulf states a massive lead over Iran in modern weapons and imports of military technology.
• The U.S. role is not determined by the forces it deploys in the region at any given time, but by its power projection capabilities.
•The U.S. offers the Arab Gulf states a monopoly over Iran in access to satellite intelligence and advanced battle management and IS&R systems, and major assistance through common military exercises.
10/3/16 42
SIPRI Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2014-2015
Source: SIPRI, Trends in Global Military Expenditure, April 5, 2016, https://www.google.com/search?q=sipri+military+spending&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8,
NationalShareofTotalforTop15Spenders
43
ISIS Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2015
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2016, p. 19. 44
US Defense Budget: FY2001-FY2021
Source: (OSD) Comptroller,Defense Budget Overview, February 2016, p. I-5
BudgetsSince9/11
ProposedOutyearToplineforBaseBudget
10/3/16 45
US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - I
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52
ARABIANSEA:USCentralCommand•Navy•5thFleet:1DDGHM;1LHD;1LPD;1LSD;CombinedMaritimeForces•TF53:1AE;2AKE;1AOH;3AO
BAHRAIN:USCentralCommand•3,250;1HQ(5thFleet);2ADbty withMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3
BRITISHINDIANOCEANTERRITORY:USStrategicCommand•550;1Spacetrack OpticalTrackeratDiegoGarcia;1ground-basedelectroopticaldeepspacesurveillancesystem(GEODSS)atDiegoGarciaUSPacificCommand•1MPSsqn (MPS-2withequipmentforoneMEB)atDiegoGarciawith5logisticsandsupportships;1navalairbaseatDiegoGarcia,1supportfacilityatDiegoGarcia
DJIBOUTI:USAfricaCommand•1,200;1tpt sqn withC-130H/J-30Hercules;1specopssqn withMC-130H;PC-12(U-28A);1CSARsqn withHH-60GPaveHawk;1navalairbase
EGYPT:MFO692;1ARNGreccebn;1ARNGspt bn
INDIANOCEAN:USEuropeanCommand•USNavy•6thFleet:1DDGHMIRAQ:USCentralCommand•OperationInherentResolve3,500;1inf divHQ;1mne coy;1atk hel coywithAH-64DApache;MQ-1BPredator
ISRAEL:USStrategicCommand•1AN/TPY-2X-bandradaratMountKeren
JORDAN:USCentralCommand•OperationInherentResolve1FGAsqn with12F-16CFightingFalcon;1ADbty withMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3
KUWAIT:USCentralCommand•13,000;1armd bde;1ARNG(cbt avn)hel bde;1spt bde;1atk sqnwith12A-10CThunderboltII;4ADbty withMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3;1(APS)armd bde set;1(APS)inf bde set
10/3/16 46
US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - II
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52
MEDITERRANEANSEA:USEuropeanCommand•USNavy•6thFleet:4DDGM;1LHD;1LPD;1LSD;1LCC
MIDDLEEAST-UN:UNTSO2obs
PACIFICOCEAN:USPacificCommand•USNavy•3rdFleet:8SSBN;17SSGN;10SSN;4CVN;9CGHM;18DDGHM;6DDGM;4FFHM;3MCO;2LHD;1LHA;3LPD;3LSD;USPacificCommand•USNavy•7thFleet:1FFHM
GULF:USCentralCommand•Navy•5thFleet:2DDGM;10PCO;6(CoastGuard)PCC;CombinedMaritimeForces•CTF-152:4MCO;1AFSB
QATAR;USCentralCommand•8,000:1bbrsqnwith6B-1BLancer;1ISRsqnwith4RC-135RivetJoint;1ISRsqnwith4E-8CJSTARS;1tkrsqnwith24KC-135R/TStraotanker;1tptsqnwith4C-17AGlobemaster;4C-130H/J-30Hercules;2ADbtywithMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3;USStrategicCommand•1AN/TPY-2X-bandradar
SAUDIARABIA:USCentralCommand•350
TURKEY:USEuropeanCommand•1,550;1FGAsqnwith6F-15CEagle;6F-15EStrikeEagle;1atksqnwithA-10CThunderboltII;1CISRUAVsqnwithMQ-1BPredatorUAV;1specopsfltwithAC-130USpectre;1airbaseatIncirlik;1supportfacilityatAnkara;1supportfacilityatIzmir;USStrategicCommand•1AN/TPY-2X-bandradaratKurecik;NATO•ActiveFence:2ADbtywithPatriotPAC-2/3
UNITEDARABEMIRATES:USCentralCommand•5,000:1ftrsqnwith6F-22ARaptor;1FGAsqnwith12F-15EStrikeEagle;1ISRsqnwith4U-2;1AEW&Csqnwith4E-3Sentry;1tkrsqnwith12KC-10A;1ISRUAVsqnwithRQ-4GlobalHawk;2ADbtywithMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3
10/3/16 47
US Army Global Power Projection: 2016
Source: U.S. Army, February 2016, http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/BudgetMat.aspx?OfficeCode=120010/3/16 48
US Navy and Marine Corps Global Power Projection: 2016
Source: U.S. Navy, February 2016, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year-2017.aspx49
US 5th Fleet: 2016
Headquartered in Bahrain
Source: USCENTCOM. 8.9.16, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Task-Forces/.
50
US Air Force Global Power Projection: 2016
Source: U.S. Air Force, February 2016, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/51
US Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 2016
Source: U.S. Air Forcehttp://www.afcent.af.mil/Units.aspx, accessed 8.9.16
AFCENTForcesdeploys5ExpeditionaryWingsintheregion:the379th,380th,386th,438th,and456th.
• The379thAirExpeditionaryWingisisthelargest,mostdiverseexpeditionarywingintheAirForcewithmorethan90combatandsupportaircraft,includingeightcoalitionairframes.AircraftcomefromeveryUSserviceaswellastheUnitedKingdom,SingaporeandAustralia.Combined,theseforcestprovidingprovidecombatairpowerandcombatsupportforOperationsNEWDAWN,ENDURINGFREEDOMandthroughsupportoftheJointTaskForceHORNofAFRICA.
• The380thAirExpeditionaryWingishometoapproximately3,000personnelcompletingoneofthemostdiversecombatwingsintheAirForce.Thewingiscomprisedofsixgroupsand26squadrons.ItsmissionpartnersincludeanArmyairdefensebattalionandaNavyaerialmaritimesurveillancedetachment.
• The386thAirExpeditionaryWinghasadiversemission,whichcanvasestheU.S.CentralCommandareaofresponsibility.The386thAEWprovidesairliftsupportforOperationEnduringFreedomandtheHornofAfrica.Thewingiscomprisedofthe386thExpeditionaryMaintenance,MissionSupport,MedicalandOperationsGroupsandthe387thAirExpeditionaryGroup.
• The386thAirExpeditionaryWingisaTrain,Advice,AssistCommand- Air(TAAC-Air),headquartered atForward OperatingBaseOqab, Kabul,Afghanistan,hastwoairadvisorygroups at HamidKarzai InternationalAirportandKandaharAirfield.TAAC-Air'smissionistotrain,advise,andassistourAfghanpartnerstodevelopaprofessional,capable,andsustainableAirForce.
• The455thAirExpeditionaryWingisoneoftwoAirForcewingsinAfghanistanandsupportsmembersdeployedthroughoutthecountryaspartofOperationEnduringFreedom.ItistheprimarycombatwinginAfghanistan.ThecommanderissupportedbyawingstaffandoverseesfiveAirForcegroupslocatedatBagramAirfieldandKandaharAirfield,withadditionalwithadditionaldetachmentswithinAfghanistan.
10/3/16 52
Source: USCENTCOM, http://www.afcent.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/4822/Article/217803/combined-air-operations-center-caoc.aspx
CombinedAirOperationsCenter(CAOC)atAlUdeidAirBase,Qatar
TheCombinedAirOperationsCenter(CAOC)atAlUdeid AirBase,Qatar,providescommandandcontrolofairpowerthroughoutIraq,Syria,Afghanistan,and17othernations.TheCAOCiscomprisedofajointandCoalitionteamthatexecutesday-to-daycombinedairandspaceoperationsandprovidesrapidreaction,positivecontrol,coordination,andde-conflictionofweaponsystems.(U.S.AirForcephotobyTech.Sgt.JoshuaStrang)
MissionTheCombinedAirOperationsCenterWeaponsSystem,alsoknownastheAN/USQ-163FalconerWeaponSystem,commandsandcontrolsthebroadspectrumofwhatairpowerbringstothefight:GlobalVigilance,GlobalReach,andGlobalPower.LocatedintheAirForcesCentraltheaterofoperations,theCAOCprovidesthecommandandcontrolofairpowerthroughoutIraq,Afghanistanand 18othernations.Servingastheoperationalbridgethatintegratesandsynchronizesstrategicdecisionstotacticallevelexecution,theCAOCiscomprisedofavastarrayofpeople,programsandprocessesthatexecuteday-to-daycombinedairandspaceoperationsandprovidesrapidreaction,positivecontrol,coordinationanddeconflictionofweaponssystems.
FunctionFunctioningasthenervecenteroftheaircampaign,theCAOCplans,monitorsanddirectssortieexecution,closeairsupport/precisionairstrike;Intelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance;airlift;airrefueling;aerialevaluation;airdrop,andcountlessothermissioncriticaloperations.
FacilityTheCAOCisatruejointandCoalitionteam,staffedbyU.S.AirForce,U.S.Army,U.S.Navy,U.S.MarineCorpsandCoalitionpartners.ConstructionbeganinJuly2002.ATotalForceteamofactiveduty,AirNationalGuardandReservepersonnelworkedontheproject.TheCAOC- bothteammembersandequipment- wasfullyoperationalFeb.18,2003.Builtatacostof$60million,theprojectinvolvedinstallationofmorethan67milesofhigh-capacityandfiberopticcable.Thiscapabilitycreatedthemostadvancedoperationscenterinhistory.Keepingthesesystemshummingrequireshundredsofpeople,workinginsatellitecommunications,imageryanalysis,networkdesign,computerprogramming,radiosystems,systemsadministrationandmanyotherfields.Withthousandsofcomputers,dozensofservers,racksofvideoequipmentanddisplayscreens,thefacilityresemblesthesetofafuturisticmovie.
10/3/16 53
US and Allied Air Operations in Iraq/Syria: 2014-2016
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve. ,
10/3/16 54
Illustrative Coalition of the Actually Deployed – ISIS/Syria War
IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, pp. 312 and 315
AirDeploymentsinU.S.-LedCoalitionFightingISIS inSyriaandIraq,andRussianAirUnitsinSyria:November2015,
UnitedStatesTurkey(IncirlikAirBase)„Ñ6F-15CEagleFtr ac„Ñ12A-10CThunderboltIIAtk ac„Ñ1+AC-130UAtk ac„ÑMQ-1BPredatorCISRUAVJordan(Mowafaq alSalti AirBase)„Ñ6F-16VFightingFalconFGAacKuwaitUnitedStates(AhmedalJaber AirBase)„Ñ12A-10CThunderboltIIAtk ac(AlialSalemAirBase)„ÑMQ-1BPredatorCISRUAV„ÑMQ-9AReaperCISRUAVQatar(AlUdeid AirBase)„Ñ6B-1BLancerBbr ac„Ñ4RC-135V/WRivetJointELINTacUAE(AlDhafra AirBase)„Ñ6F-22ARaptorFtr ac„Ñ12F-15EStrikeEagleFGAac„ÑU-2SISRacRQ-4BGlobalHawkISRUAV
FranceJordan(Mowafaq alSalti AirBase)„Ñ3Mirage2000DFGAac„Ñ3Mirage2000NFGAacUAE(AlDhafra AirBase)„Ñ6Rafale FGAac„Ñ1Atlantique 2MPac
UnitedKingdomCyprus(RAFAkrotiri)„Ñ8TornadoGR4FGAac„Ñ1SentinelR1ISRacKuwait(AlialSalemAB)„ÑMQ-9AReaperCISRUAVQatar(AlUdeid AirBase)„Ñ1RC-135WRivetJointELINTac
NetherlandsJordan(Mowafaq alSalti AirBase)„Ñ 4F-16AMFightingFalconFtr ac
AustraliaUAE(Minhad AirBase)„Ñ6F/A-18AHornetFGAac
CanadaKuwait(tobewithdrawn)(AhmedalJaber AirBase)„Ñ6CF-18AHornetFGAac„Ñ2CP-140AAuroraMPac
ItalyKuwait(AhmedalJaber AirBase)„Ñ4TornadoIDSFGAac(ISRonly)„ÑMQ-1BPredatorISRUAV
RussiaSyria(Baselal-AssadAirBase)„Ñ12Su-24MFencerFGAac„Ñ4Su-30SMFGAac„Ñ4Su-34FullbackFGAac„Ñ10Su-25SMFrogfootAtk ac„Ñ 2Su-25UBMFrogfootAtk ac„Ñ1Il-20MELINTac„Ñ12Mi-24PHindAtk hel„Ñ 6Mi-8AMTShHipTPThel
10/3/16 55
Illustrative Coalition of the Semi Deployed - Yemen
IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, p. 315.
DeploymentsinSaudi-UAE.-LedCoalitionFightingISIS inSyriaandIraq:November2015,andRussianAirUnitsinSyria
10/3/16 56
The “Wild Cards” in Outside Support• Uncertain U.S. domestic politics, future security commitments, and willingness to act decisively under pressure. Focus on terrorism threat versus other threats.
• Declining European military spending and uncertain future power projection capabilities, particularly as they affect Britain and France.
• Impact of China’s expanding forces, role in Indian Ocean, new Silk Road(s) and port facilities, and basing rights in Djibouti.
• Growing Russian tension with U.S. and West, future Russian arms sales to and alignments with Iran, use of power projection capabilities.
• Future Character and Role of Turkey.
• The impact on the Gulf of the civil wars and fighting against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, future roles of Iran, Kurds, and broader Sunni-Shi’ite tensions.
•Impact on the Gulf of any future Israeli conflict with Hezbollah, Palestinians.
• Impact of a major political upheaval in any Gulf State.
• Outcome of the fighting in Yemen,
10/3/16 57
Playing the “Wild Card:” Russian Forces Used or Deployed in Syria Through July 2016
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia and reporting in the New York Times and Washington Post. 10/3/16 58
Comparative Military Manpower
10/3/16 59
Military Manpower• Does reveal one key area of Iranian superiority: Total land force manpower.
• But,
• No metric is used more often in media or has less meaning. Largely irrelevant unless tied to function, quality, training, and readiness.
• Most data represent nominal authorized totals, may or may not relate to reality.
• Conscripts often poorly trained, supported. Lack effective ability to fight modern weapons.
• Paramilitary and internal security forces differ wildly in quality from elite forces to the equivalent of armed lamp posts.
• Uncertain, but real move towards giving junior officers and NCOs more authority and independence.
• Promotion sometimes not tied to valid performance; family or political.
•Reserves generally too low in quality to matter in most contingencies.
•Arab Gulf Forces often dependent on civilian contractors for sustainability and support.
10/3/16 60
Comparative Military Manpower: 2016
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016.
Note: Given current civil war, accurate and current force counts for Yemen are difficult to determine. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, force numbers from Yemen are drawn from the 2015 IISS Military Balance.
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenArmy 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000
Guard 125000 100000 6400 12000
Air 30000 4000 20000 1500 25000 5000 1500 4500 3000
AirDef. 3000 16000 2000
Navy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500 1700
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
10/3/16 61
Comparative Paramilitary Manpower: 2016
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenNavy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500
MOIForces
Militias 100,000 20000
Coastguard 4500 260 500 400 1200
BorderGuard 9000 10500
SpecialSecurity 500
Police 36000 9000
FacilitiesSecurityForce 9000
Guard 2000 6600 4000
Other 50000 50000
Basij
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
10/3/16 62
The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare:
Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and
Non-State Actors
10/3/16 63
Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare• There is no clear dividing line between terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and conventional warfare.
• There also is no clear line at which deterrence and intimidation move from limited or deniable acts of violence to war.
• Cyber and Internet warfare have become key components of the balance. Strategic communications/propaganda/political/ideological/warfare are often dominated by civilians.
• Coalition warfare is increasingly coalitions of willing and able state and non-state actors.
• Ideological, religious, political, and economic warfare may rely on the balance of deterrence and warfighting capability without using force or suddenly trigger its use in asymmetric forms.
• Laws and restraint are steadily weakening. Civilians and human shields have become de facto weapons of war.
• As Russian has shown, power projection can become a key form of asymmetric warfare.
10/3/16 64
The Growing Role of Non-State Actors
• Range from serious Non-State Forces to “Lone Wolf” attacks.
• Large-scale mass killings, IEDs and bombings
• Insurgents, however, are not “terrorists,” but asymmetric forces
• Emerging sectarian and ethnic forces forces play a growing role, particularly Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’ite and Sunni PMFs, Sunni Arab rebel groups in Syria, and various Kurdish Forces.
• Quasi-state actors also play a growing role through train and assist missions, embedded advisors, volunteers, groups like Iranian Al Quds force.
• Civilians increasingly play a role as both non-state actors and as hostages and human shields.
• Contractors and support personnel are de facto non-state actors if they support combat operations.
• So are covert Special Forces, personnel, and intelligence forces like the CIA and MOIS.
10/3/16 65
Non-State “Armies - IISIS, ISIL/Daesh
60,000 maximum including volunteers with little combat capability20,000-35,000 fighters10,000-15,000 inIraq
MBT M1A1 Abrams†*; T-55; T-62; T-72AV; T-72M1RECCE BRDM-2AIFV BMP-1; BTR-4*APCAPC (T) M113*; MT-LBAPC (W) M1117 ASV*PPV ILAV Cougar*; Dzik-3*ARTYSP 122mm 2S1TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46/Type-59; 155mmM198*MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21MOR 120mm M120ATMSL • MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14Spriggan); MilanRCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa (reported); 106mmM40A1*ADSAM • MANPAD FN-6; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)GUNSSP 14.5mm ZPU (tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4; ZSU-23 (tch);57mm S-60 (tch)TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60
Kurdish Pesh Merga
90,00-150,000 with police
MBT T-54; T-55; T-62RECCE EE-9 CascavelAIFV 2+ EE-11 UrutuAPC (T) MT-LB; YW-701 (Type-63)APC (W) M1117 ASV; Wer’wolf MkIIPPV HMMWV; M1114 (up-armoured HMMWV); ILAVCougar 6x6; Otokar APV; IAG Guardian; Streit Spartan;Caiman; Maxxpro; Reva; up to 14 Dingo 1ARTYSP 122mm 2S1TOWED 87.6mm 1+ 25 pdr: 122mm 6+ D-30MRL 107mm Type 63 (tch); 122mm BM-21 (inc mod);HM20MOR 60mm M224; 81mm M252; 120mm M120; 130mmM-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20ATMSL ●MANPATS HJ-8; 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger);9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14Spriggan); up to 60 MilanRCL 73mm SPG-9; 88mm Breda Folgore; 84mm up to 43Carl Gustav; up to 1,000 AT-4; 105mm M40RL 110mm up to 400 Panzerfaust 3ADGUNSSP 14.5mm ZPU-1 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-4 (tch)20mm 53T2 Tarasque (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MTLB);57mm ZSU-57; S-60 (tch)TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4: 20mm 53T2Tarasque; 57mm S-60ARV 1+ Type-653AIRCRAFTReported access to KRG transport/utility helicopters
RoughestimatebasedonIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016,pp.490-49210/3/16 66
Non-State “Armies - I
Hezbollah
7,000-10,000 actives (4,000-8,000 in Syria20,000 reserves
MBT T-72ARTY• MRL 122mm BM-21; 240mm Fadjr 3; 330mm Fadjr5; 610mm Zelzal 2 (reported)AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger);9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); MilanMSL • SRBM Fateh 110/M-600 (reported); SS-1D Scud C(reported); SS-1E Scud D (reported)AD • SAM• MANPAD some possibleUAV some*UCAV some
Rpugh estimatebasedonIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016,pp.490-49210/3/16 67
Most Likely Iranian ThreatsAre Not Formal Conflicts
• Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation)
• Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.
• Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions.
• Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force.
• Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents.
• Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation.
• Strike at critical node or infrastructure.10/3/16 68
The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity
Iranian Actors
Revolutionary GuardsAl Qaeda force
Vevak/other intelligenceArms transfers
Military and security advisorsClerics, pilgrims, shrines
Commercial trainingFinance/investment
Investment/training companiesEducation: scholarships, teachers
Cultural exchangesAthletic visits
Target/Operating
Country
IraqIsraelEgypt
KuwaitBahrain
SyriaYemen
LebanonAfghanistanVenezuela
Related States/Non-State Actors
IranSyria
HezbollahHamas
Mahdi ArmyYemeni Shi’ites
Bahraini Shi’itesSaudi Shi’ites
10/3/16 69
Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - I
• Close ties to Supreme Leader, steadily emerging power base relative to regular forces, in terms of impact on industry, role in Gulf and ballistic/cruise missiles.
• Estimates of total manning differ sharply, as do estimates of detailed order of battle.• Has range of different land-air-sea components plus Al Quds Force for support of foreign forces, and
Basij for defense in depth and internal security.• Estimate based largely on IISS 2016 Military Balance:
• Controls Iran’s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles.
• 100,000+ in land forces with heavy reserve elements, and external defense, and power projection roles. Nominal order of battle is 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran), 3 special operations divisions, 2 armored divisions, 3 armored brigades, 8+ light infantry divisions, 5+ light infantry brigades, 1 airborne brigade. (Equipment holdings not estimated separately.)
• Naval branch has 15,000 men plus 5,000 Marines with 1 Amphibious Brigade. Has some shore batteries plus HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) and other land-based anti-ship missiles. Has 46 missile patrol boats with mix of C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802;and HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) missiles, 35 larger patrol boats without missiles, 32 smaller patrol boats, speedboats with high explosives in prow, 4 LST landing ships (2 can lay mines).
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force controls Iran’s strategic missile force. Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 missiles) and some Zelzal.
• Basij Resistance Force -- up to 1,000,000 men on mobilization. The IISS describes this as Paramilitary militia, with claimed membership of 12.6 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces.
Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.
10/3/16 70
Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - II
• IHS Jane’s indicates:
• Commanded by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari.
• Land forces train for both conventional and asymmetric warfare, and “mosaic warfare” in irregular defense in depth tactics for attrition warfare. They have some 100,000 personnel, two armored divisions, five mechanized divisions, up to 18 infantry divisions, as well as independent brigades, special forces elements, paratroop units in some 31 detachments. Armor has T-54/55/69/72 tanks, APCs. 48th "Fath" Brigade secures Iran’s Kurds. 33 province-based special units known as Saberin (Patients), able to conduct long-range operations of various types for a prolonged period of time, and with limited logistic support.
• Naval Branch has some 20,000 personnel, trained in asymmetric warfare, including up to four naval infantry brigades with limited sealift capabilities. Equipped withspme313 vessels including 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802 anti-ship missiles, morethan 40 other fast attack craft (with unguided rockets, missiles and some with mine-laying capabilities), coastal defense of anti-ship missiles, up to 20 midget-submarines and swimmer delivery vehicles. Based on islands and coastal areas like Siri Island, Farsi, Halileh, Abu Musa, Khorramshahr, Larak, and Bandar Abbas. Coastal defence forces have naval guns and HY-2 'Seersucker' land-based anti-ship missiles in five to seven sites along coast.
• IRGCAF has five brigades. Deploys 250 FROG 7, 200 Oghab, 250 Shahin-2, 500 Nazet/Iran130, Fateh 110, Fateh A-100, Fath-110D1, 200 Tondar 69, 250 Shahab-1, 50 Shahab-2, 25 Shahab-3, 18 BM-25,Qaim-1, and Emad.
• Some 600,000 Basij regularly train for internal security and defense in attrition forms of defense in depth.
Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.
10/3/16 71
The Iranian Al Quds/Qods/Jerusalem Force
• Part of IRGC, but reports directly to Supreme Leader.
• Commander is Major General Qasem Soleimani
• 2,000 to 30,000 personnel? More likely to be smaller, more elite.
• Origin is support Kurds against Saddam in Iran-Iraq War. Has steadily expanded into support of Lebanese Hizbollah, and roles in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Latin America.
• Supported creation of Hizbollahs in other countries.
• May be organized into regional directorates: Europe and U.S , Iraq, Israel/Lebanon/Jordan/Palestinian, Afghanistan/India/Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa, FSU/Latin America?
• Roles include combatants, forward advisors, train and assist, arms transfers, intelligence. Played key role in IED supply in Iraq in 2003-2011
• Coordinates with IRGC, and evidently with MOI/Vevak
10/3/16 72
Source:NewYorkTimes,http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-arabia-iran.html?_r=0
Iranian Influence
10/3/16 73
The “Shi’ite Crescent”
10/3/16 74Source:CIAFactbook
Bahrain’s Vulnerability
Ethnicgroups:Bahraini46%,non-Bahraini54%(2010census)
Languages:Arabic(official),English,Farsi,Urdu
Religions:Muslim(ShiaandSunni)81.2%,Christian9%,other9.8%(2001census)
Population:1,281,332July2013est.countrycomparisontotheworld:157note:includes235,108non-nationals
Agestructure:0-14years:20%(male130,097/female126,067)15-24years:15.9%(male113,973/female89,602)25-54years:56.2%(male472,537/female247,873)55-64years:5.2%(male43,884/female23,352)65yearsandover:2.6%(male16,262/female17,685)(2013est.)\
10/3/16 75Source:CIAWorldFactbook,September28,2016
Yemen and the Gate of Tears
10/3/16 76Source:EIA,https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC
Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series,and material provided by US and Saudi experts..
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenAmphibious Ships 1 1Landing Craft 23 16 9 5 1 28 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial
additional lift if can secure ports
10/3/16 77
The Land Balance in the Gulf
10/3/16 78
The Land Balance• IRGC has superior manpower and mass, as well as large artillery forces. Arab
Gulf states have better weapons, more armor.
• Iraq no longer has the forces to directly challenge Iran, but Iran would have to attack through Iraq by land to reach Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and would be exposed to massive precision air attacks.
• Neither side’s forces are designed, well-organized, or trained to sustain long-range maneuver warfare.
• Iran has limited forced entry amphibious warfare training, and any amphibious force could face a major air and naval threat.
• The balance in joint warfare favors the Arab Gulf states in defensive warfare, particularly with U.S. precision air strike support.
• But, the “Kuwaiti hinge” is vulnerable.
• Much depends on Iraq’s future military relations with Iran.
• The uncertain unity of GCC and Arab Gulf forces makes teffective collective defense uncertain.
• The land threat also includes violent extremist and non-state actors. Civil conflicts are a real threat.
10/3/1679
80
Iran’s Strategic
Depth
10/3/16
Comparative Land Force Manpower
DerivedfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.Note:Kuwait’sReservesincludeallbranchesoftheirmilitary.Theiractualgroundreservemanpowerislower,butbyhowmuchisnotavailabletoIISS.Also,Iran’s1,000,000manBasijResistanceforceisnotincludedbecauseitwouldskewthebalanceofforces.
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenParamilitary 40000 145000 24500 11260 7100 4400 71200
Guards 100000 6400 12000
IRGC 125000
Reserves 350000 23700
Army 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1000000
10/3/16 81
Comparative Land Force Combat Units - I
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen
SFCompany
IndependentInfantryCompany
SFRegiment
GuardRegiment
SFBattalion
CommandoBattalion
GuardBattalion
SecurityBrigade
AirborneBrigade
SFBrigade
CommandoBrigade
MechanisedBrigade
ArmouredBrigade
GuardBrigade
InfantryBrigade
CommandoDivision
MotorDivision
MechanisedDivision
ArmouredDivision
InfantryDivision
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC10/3/16 82
Comparative Land Force Combat Units - II
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces
Units(sizeandtype) Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen
InfantryDivision 8 4
ArmouredDivision 2 1
MechanisedDivision 4
MotorDivision 2
CommandoDivision 1 1
InfantryBrigade 17 1 1 2 27
GuardBrigade 1 1 1
ArmouredBrigade 10 4 1 3 1 1 2 12
Mechanised Brigade 16 5 3 3 2 11
CommandoBrigade 6
SFBrigade 1 2 1
AirborneBrigade 2 1
SecurityBrigade 1
GuardBattalion 1
CommandoBattalion 1
SFBattalion 1
GuardRegiment 1
SFRegiment 1
IndependentInfantryCompany
SFCompany 1
10/3/16 83
Comparative Armor
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016duetotheongoingconflict.
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen
AIFV 240 610 1,667 25 40 0 432 765 405 200
APC 2,502 640 3,981 200 190 206 260 1,573 1,552 258
LTTK/RECCE 73 115 790 22 92 174 11 310 181 130
MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000GroundForcesLandEquipment
MBT LTTK/RECCE APC AIFV
10/3/16 84
Comparative Main Battle Tanks
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen
MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
ComparativeMainBattleTanks
MBT
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.10/3/16 85
Comparative Modern Tank Strength, 2016
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenM-1A2 218 200
M-60A1 150 6 50
M-60A3 180 73 290
Challenger2 38
Leclerc 340
M-84 75
T-72 120 480 70
OF-40 36
Zulfiqar 150
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
ComparativeModernTanks
Zulfiqar OF-40 T-72 M-84 Leclerc Challenger2 M-60A3 M-60A1 M-1A2
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.10/3/16 86
Comparative Artillery
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE GCC Yemen
Self-propelledartillery 48 292 82 28 24 106 224 181 645 25
TowedArtilliery 60 2,030 36 12 108 0 110 93 359 310
MultipleRocketLaunchers 3 1,476 9 6 0 27 60 74 167 294
Mortars 950 5,000 24 45 101 78 437 227 912 642
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
Artillery,Rockets,Mortars
Mortars MultipleRocketLaunchers TowedArtilliery Self-propelledartillery
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.10/3/16 87
“Power Projection” Limits• Army not structure for sustained maneuver outside Iran.
•Limited land/air and air/sea capabilities.
• Ethnic and/or sectarian limits on occupation and influence.
• Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hammas, Hazara not proxies
• Land movement must sweep through Iraq to “Kuwaiti hinge” or Ar Ar in Saudi Arabia.
• Very limited amphibious forced entry capability with no credible air cover.
• “Closing the Gulf” triggers major war Iran must lose, shuts on trade to Iran.
• Al Quds, arms transfer, volunteers, and training either need strong host country partner or are spoiler functions.
• “Spoiler function” more irritant than way of achieving goals.
• Proliferation breed proliferation, missile breed missiles and missile defenses.
•Intimidation leads to added reliance on US.10/3/16 88
The Kuwaiti “Hinge”
10/3/1689
90
The Air Balance in the Gulf
10/3/16
The Air Balance• The Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage in combat aircraft numbers and
quality, munitions quality, battle management, AC&W, and IS&R.
• This advantage is reinforced by U.S. ad European power projection, stealth,” real time targeting, and precision strike capabilities.
• Iran’s surface-to-air missile systems and land-based sensors are equally limited relative to Gulf Arab and U.S. Systems.
• Iran’s present vulnerabilities could give Arab and U.S. forces both air superiority and survivable deep strike capabilities in a matter of days.
• Iran’s infrastructure and military bases have many critical point targets that are vulnerable to civilian precision strike.
• Iran’s efforts to produce it own aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems have had very limited results, although Iran has been able to keep systems operable and make useful modifications of its own.
• Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile systems offer a potential counter to Arab Gulf and Western airpower, but now lack the required combination of precision strike capability and conventional warhead lethality to be effective.
• Russian and increasingly China can offer far more modern air and land-based air defense systems. The Russian sale of the TOR-M and S300 are cases in point.
10/3/16 91
9210/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Air/Missile Threats•Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack.
•Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.
•Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”•Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
•Strikes again tankers or naval targets.
•Attacks on US-allied facilities
•Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions)
But:
•Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder
•High risk of US and allied intervention.
•Limited threat power projection and sustainability.
•Unclear strategic goal.10/3/16 93
94
Range of Iran’s Air Power
10/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
95
Range of GCC Air Power
10/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Comparative Gulf Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. Note: Only armed or combat-capable aircraft are counted, not trainers, recce or other aircraft. Iraq has 6 Cessna AC-208Bs fulfilling dual recce and attack roles. Furthermore, 40-60% of Iran’s force are not operational.
40% to 60% of Iranian
inventory is not
operational
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen
FixedWingCombatAirStrength
10/3/16 96
Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenTyphoon-2 53 53
TornadoADV
TornadoIDS 69 69
Mirage2000 79 12 67
MirageF-1E 10
MiG-29 36 16
MiG-25
MiG-21/21U 18
Su-25 7 10
Su-24 30 31
Su-20/22
F-18 39 39
F-16 4 123 21 24 78
F-15S 70 70
F-15C/D 81 81
F-14 43
F-7M 24
F-5B/E/F 75 12 12 10
F-4D/E 64
JaguarS/B
L-159ALCA 9
Saegheh 6
Azarakhsh 6
0100200300400500600
ComparativeFighter/AttackAircraftin2016
Azarakhsh Saegheh L-159ALCA JaguarS/B F-4D/E F-5B/E/F F-7M F-14
F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-21/21U
MiG-25 MiG-29 MirageF-1E Mirage2000 TornadoIDS TornadoADV Typhoon-2
10/3/16 97
Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenTyphoon-2 53 53
TornadoADV
TornadoIDS 69 69
Mirage2000 79 12 67
MiG-29 36 16
MiG-25
Su-25 7 10
Su-24 30 31
Su-20/22
F-18 39 39
F-16 4 123 21 24 78
F-15S 70 70
F-15C/D 81 81
F-14 43
F-7M 24
F-5B/E/F 75 12 12 10
F-4D/E 64
Saegheh 6
0100200300400500600
HighQualityFighter/AttackAircraft
Saegheh F-4D/E F-5B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18
Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage2000 TornadoIDS TornadoADV Typhoon-2
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.
10/3/16 98
9910/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
10010/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
10110/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
10210/3/16
10310/3/16
10410/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance Aircraft, 2016
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenCH-2000 8
Cessna208B 3 8
SB7L-360 2
Da-20FalconELINT
RF-4E 6
Mirage2000RAD 7
E-3AAWACS
TornadoIDS 69
P-3MPOrion 5
P-F3Orion
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
ComparativeGulfAC&W,ELINT,andReconnaissanceAircraft
P-F3Orion P-3MPOrion TornadoIDS E-3AAWACS Mirage2000RAD RF-4E Da-20FalconELINT SB7L-360 Cessna208B CH-2000
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.10/3/16 105
Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenDa-20Falcon 3
P-3F 3
RF-4E 6
Mirage2000RAD 7
Cessna208B 8 8
SB7L-360 2
E-3A 5
TornadoGR1A 12
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
GulfReconnaissanceandAWACSAircraft
TornadoGR1A E-3A SB7L-360 Cessna208B Mirage2000RAD RF-4E P-3F Da-20Falcon
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.
10/3/16 106
Gulf Attack & Naval Helicopters
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenAH-1F 12
L-159 2
Mi-28NE 9
RH-53D 3
Mi-25 24
Mi-35 16 8
AS-332Exocet 7
CommandoExocet 8
SH-3D 10
AH-1E 16
AH-1J 50
SA-342HOT 11 13
AS-532Exocet 3 10
AS-560C3
AS-565 15 7
AH-64 16 39 30
0102030405060708090100
AH-64 AS-565 AS-560C3 AS-532Exocet SA-342HOT AH-1J
AH-1E SH-3D CommandoExocet AS-332Exocet Mi-35 Mi-25
RH-53D Mi-28NE L-159 AH-1F
10/3/16 107
Gulf Armed Helicopters in 2016
83
32
83
2225
16
39
78
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenIraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen
Helicopters 73 65 34 39 16 29 109 102 8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
ArmedHelicopters
Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.10/3/16 108
Gulf Land-Based
Air Defen
sesIn
2011
Country M a j o r SAM Light SAM AA Guns Bahrain 8 I Hawk MIM-23B 6 0 R BS-70 27 guns 18 FIM-92A Stinger 1 5 Oerlikon 35 mm 7 Crotale 12 L/70 40 mm Iran 16/150 I Hawk SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 1,700 Guns 3/10 SA-5 29 SA-15 ZSU-23-4 23mm 45 SA-2 Guideline S o me QW-1 Misaq ZPU-2/4 23mm 29 TOR-M1 ZU-23 23mm Some HN-5 M-1939 37mm 5/30 Rapier S-60 57mm 10 Pantsyr (SA-22) ZSU-57-2 Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat Some FIM-92A Stinge r ____________ Iraq Kuwait 5 / 24 I Hawk Phase III 1 2 Aspide 12 Oerlikon 35mm 5/40 Patriot PAC-2 1 2 S t a rburst Aspide Stinger Oman None Blowpipe 26 guns 8 Mistral 2 SP 4 ZU-23-2 23 mm 12 Panstsyr S1E 10 GDF-005 Skyguard 35 mm 34 SA-7 12 L-60 40 mm 6 Blindfire S713 Martello 20 Javelin 40 Rapier Qatar None 10 Blowpipe ? 12 FIM-92A Stinger 9 Roland II 24 Mistral 20 SA-7 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Saudi Arabia 1 6 /128 I Hawk 40 Crotale 1,220 guns 4-6/16-24 Patriot 2 5 00 Stinger (ARMY) 9 2 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm 17/73 Shahine Mobile 5 00 Mistral (ADF) 30 M-167 Vulcan 20 mm (NG) 16/96 PAC-2 launchers 5 00 FIM-43 Redeye 8 50 AMX-30SA 30 mm 17 ANA/FPS-117 radar 5 0 0 R e d e ye (ADF ) 1 2 8 G DF Oerlikon 35mm 73/68 Crotale/Shahine 7 3 -141 Shahine static 1 50 L-70 40 mm (in store) 130 M-2 90 mm (NG) UAE 2/6/36 I Hawk 20+ Blowpipe 62 guns 20 Mistral 42 M-3VDA 20 mm SP Some Rapier 20 GCF-BM2 30 mm Some Crotale Some RB-70 Some Javelin Some SA-18 Yemen S o me SA-2, 3 Some 800 SA-7 530 guns Some SA-6 SP Some SA-9 SP 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm Some SA-13 SP 50 ZSU-23-4 SP 23 mm Some SA-14 100 ZSU-23-2 23 mm 150 M-1939 37 mm 50 M-167 20mm 120 S-60 57 mm 40 M-1939 KS-12 85 mm Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 10/3/16 109
Comparative Land-Based Air Defenses: 2016
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series
Country MajorSAM LightSAM AAGunsBahrain Total:6 Total:7+ Total:24
6MIM-23BI-HAWK 7Crotale 12Oerlikon35mmRBS-70 12L/7040mmFIM-92AStinger
Iran Total:205+ Total:529+ Total:1,122+150+MIM-23BI-HAWK/Shahin SPHQ-7(reported) ZU-2323mm10S-200Angara (SA-5Gammon) 250FM-80Crotale Oerlikon37mm45S-75Dvina (SA-2Guideline) 30Rapier 100ZSU-23-423mm
15Tigercat 80ZSU-57-257mm299K331Tor-M1(SA-15Gauntlet )(reported) ZPU-214.5mmFIM-92AStinger ZPU-414.5mm9K32Strela- 2(SA-7Grail ) 300ZU-23-223mm9K36Strela- 3(SA-14Gremlin ) 92Skyguard 35mmMisaq 1(QW-1Vanguard ) M-193937mmMisaq2(QW-18) 50L/7040mm9K338Igla-S (SA-24Grinch )(reported) 200S-6057mmHN-54 300M-193985mm
Iraq Total:N/A Total:3+ Total:Unknown3+96K6Pantsir- S1(SA-22Greyhound ) ZU-2323mmM1097Avenger S-6057mm9K338Igla-S (SA-24Grinch )
Kuwait Total:40 Total:24+ Total:12+40MIM-104DPatriot PAC-2 FIM-92AStinger 12+Oerlikon35mm
Starburst12Aspide12Skyguard/Aspide
Oman Total:N/A Total:62+ Total:268Mistral2 4ZU-23-223mm14+Javelin 10GDF-00535mm9K32Strela- 2(SA-7Grail ) 12L/6040mm40Rapier
Qatar Total:N/A Total:33+ Total:N/A24Mistral9Roland IIBlowpipeFIM-92AStinger9K32Strela -2(SA-7Grail )
SaudiArabia Total:394 Total:940+ Total:1,380128MIM-23BI-HAWK 40+Crotale 122M163Vulcan 20mm108MIM-140D/FPatriotPAC-2GEM/PAC-3 400M1097Avenger 850AMX-30SA30mm73Shahine 500Mistral 128GDFOerlikon35mm68Crotale/Shahine FIM-92AStinger 150L/7040mm(stored)17AN/FPS-117Radar 130M290mm
UAE Total:Unknown Total:50+ Total:62MIM-23BI-HAWK Blowpipe 42M3VDAA20mmPatriotPAC-3 Mistral 20GCF-BM230mm
CrotaleRB-705096K6Pantsir -S1RapierJavelin9K38Igla (SA-18Grouse )
Yemen* N/A N/A N/A
S300inDelivery
10/3/16 110
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - I
10/3/16 111
112
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II
10/3/16
113
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II
10/3/16
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series
10/3/16 114
11510/3/16
11610/3/16
PrimeManufacturer
Designation Development/Production
Operation PayloadWt.
Endurance(hr.)
Range Ceiling(ft.)
Mission
Unknown Stealth Underway/Underway
Deployed 700km
R/S*
HESA Ababil(Swallow)
Complete/Underway
Deployed 45kg 1.5+ 150km
14,000 MultiplevariantsforR/S*- attack– ISR**
ShahbalGroup,SharifUniv.
Shahbal Underway 5.5kg 12km 4,500 R/S*
Asr-eTalaiFactories
Mini-UAV Underway Surveillance
FARC Sobakbal Underway/Underway
Deployed 0.35kg 2 2.7-13.5mi
19,686 Surveillance
QodsAeronauticsIndustries
MohajerII/III(Dorna);MohajerIV(Hodhod);SaeqehI/II;TallashI/Endeavor;TallashIIHadaf3000
Complete/Underway
Deployed MultiroleakaLightningBoltTargetdrone-akaTarget3000
Illustrative Iranian UAV Projects /Assets
Source: Adapted by Adam C. Seitz from AIAA Aerospace 9 Worldwide UAV Roundup; available at: http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf.
*R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; **ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance /Reconnaissance
Iran is developing a range of UCAVs, and has made recent claims to a long-range “stealth” UCAV bomber
10/3/16
117
Key Targets that Illustrate Iran’s Vulnerability
• Critical dependence on refineries with high cost, long lead facilities and on imports of product.
• Minimal power grid that can be crippled or destroyed selectively on a regional or national basis.
• Gas production and distribution facilities needed by Iran’s domestic economy.
• Key bridges, tunnels, overpasses and mountain routes for road and rail traffic.
• Gulf tanker loading facilities, oil storage and and tanker terminals – for mining or direct attack.
• Key military production facilities• Command and control centers.• Communications grids.• Airfield and air bases.• IRGC land, air, and naval facilities.
• Coastal naval bases and port facilities.10/3/16 118
The Naval Balance in the Gulf
10/3/16 119
The Naval Balance• There really is no naval balance in so limited an AOR, just a naval
component to joint naval-air-missile warfare.
• Surface, submarine, and air-sea warfare dominated by U.S. naval and air presence;
• Arab Gulf states have superior modern surface ships.
• Iran has lead in asymmetric warfare, land-based anti-ship missiles.
• Mine warfare is a key issue. Iran has over 6,000 mines and stocks of smart mines; can use virtually any surface ship to emplace them.
• Submarines and submersibles, dispersing smaller ships will allow Iran to operate for a while, but capability is uncertain, as is value of such operations.
• Both sides face reality that any major conflict can escalate to broader land and air, shut off or sharply cut petroleum exports.
• Arab-U.S. joint warfare advantage less clear if Iran can lock the conflict into a low level irregular war of attrition where decisive escalation is difficult.
• Balance would shift if Iran could gain basing in Yemen.
10/3/16 120
Naval Threats
• Low intensity naval war of attrition, random acts of mining, raids, etc.
•Iranian effort to “close the Gulf.”
• Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.
• Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”• Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
• “Deep strike” with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean.
• Attacks on US and allied (ally) facilities
But:
• Very weak air-sea capabilities, vulnerable escalation ladder.
•High risk of US and allied intervention.
•Limited threat power projection and sustainability.
•Unclear strategic goal.
10/3/16 121
Total Naval Forces
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenSupport 50 21 2 2 6 2 5 2
AmphibiousShips 17 1 1 1
LandingCraft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3
Mine 5 7 2 1
OtherPatrol 108 32 70 6 42 42 16 6 39
MissilePatrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20
Corvettes 7 4 2 2 9
Frigates 4 1 3
Destroyers 3
Submarines 29 2 10
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces10/3/16 122
Key Combat Warships and Submersibles in 2016
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenMissilePatrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20
MajorSurfaceCombatants 7 1 3
Submarines 29 2 10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Submarines MajorSurfaceCombatants MissilePatrol
10/3/16 123
Missile-Armed Combat Warships
Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.
.
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenCorvettes 7 4 2 2 9
Frigates 4 1 3
Destroyers 3
PatrolBoatswithGuidedMissiles(PBG) 8
FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissleswithCIWSmissileorSAM(PCFGM) 2
FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissles(PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6
FastPatrolBoatwithGuidedMissles(PBFG) 54 12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10/3/16 124
Closing the Gulf:
The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic
10/3/16 125
Closing the Gulf
• Far better for political leverage and intimidation than in actual fighting.
• So critical to world economy may well lead to immediate military intervention; so critical to Gulf economies that will push Arab states to decisive escalation to force Iran to halt.
• U.S. and Arab Gulf can achieve rapid air superiority, put Iranian targets at risk. Iranian conventionally armed missiles now too inaccurate to be real counter threat.
• Even conflict contained to Gulf affects exports and imports of Iran as well as Arab Gulf states.
• Also pushes all Arab Gulf states to act together.
• Limited military action and attrition might work, but still presents major risk of escalation.
• The key issue is can every incident or clash be controlled, what happens if Iran’s leadership feels it faces a critical threat to its survival.
10/3/16 126
Most Alternative Routes Have Little or No Surplus Capacity or Are Not Operating
EIA:http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/images/Oil%20and%20Gas%20Infrastructue%20Persian%20Gulf%20%28large%29.gif
10/3/16 127
IRGC Naval Forces
Source:AdaptedfromIISS,TheMilitaryBalance2011,variouseditionsandJane’sSentinelseries
The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around 5,000 men.
The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles.
The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.
The IRGC controls Iran’s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker land-based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.
The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.
IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities.
Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities.
Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.
Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.
Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.
10/3/16 128
Iranian Gulf Military Installations
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series,and material provided by US and Saudi experts..
Bandar-eKhomeini(30°25'41.42"N,49° 4'50.18"E)
Bandar-eMahshahr(30°29'43.62"N,49°12'23.91"E)
Khorramshahr(30°26'2.71"N,48°11'34.25"E)
KharkIsland(29°14'48.01"N,50°19'48.88"E)
Bandar-eBushehr(28°58'2.58"N,50°51'50.74"E)
Asalouyeh(27°27'21.08"N,52°38'15.55"E
Bandar-eAbbas(Navalbase:27° 8'35.79"N,56°12'45.61"E;IRGCNmissileboatbase:27° 8'30.91"N,56°12'5.58"E;IRGCNtorpedo&MLRSboatbase:27° 8'21.13"N,56°11'53.28"E;Hovercraftbaseandnearbynavalairstrip:27° 9'15.68"N,56° 9'49.97"E)
Jask(25°40'40.90"N,57°51'4.54"E)
Bostanu(27° 2'58.22"N,55°59'3.22"E)
ChabaharIRGCNbase.ItisthefarthesteastofallofIran’smilitaryportfacilities.
Qeshm(26°43'10.09"N,55°58'30.94"E)
SirriIsland(25°53'40.20"N,54°33'7.82"E)
AbuMusa(25°52'22.32"N,55° 0'38.62"E)OccupiedbyIranbutclaimedbytheUAE.SuspectedtohouseasmallnumberofIRGCNforces.AlsoknowntohouseHAWKSAMsandHY-2“Silkworm”anti-shipmissiles.
GreaterTunbandLesserTunb(GT:26°15'54.33"N,55°19'27.75"E;LT:26°14'26.08"N,55° 9'21.18"E)OccupiedbyIranbutclaimedbytheUAE.HometoheavilyfortifiedairstripsandAAguns.
12910/3/16
Abu Musa
Source: Google maps 10/3/16 130
Key Iranian and Gulf Ships for Asymmetric Warfare
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane’s Sentinel series; Saudi experts
A wide range of civilian ships,
including small craft and ferries, and
aircraft can easily be adapted for, or used
as is, for such missions
10/3/16 131
Patrol Boats
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenFastPatrolBoat(PBF) 51 6 25 32 3 7 58 10
PatrolBoats 42 20 64 33 20 31 9 59 28
PTG 15
Off-shorePatrolCraft(PCO) 2 4 1
CoastalParolCraft(PCC) 4 3
RiverinePatrolBoat(PBR) 6
PatrolBoatswithGuidedMissiles(PBG) 8
FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissleswithCIWSmissileorSAM(PCFGM) 2
FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissles(PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6
FastPatrolBoatwithGuidedMissles(PBFG) 54 12
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces10/3/16 132
Missile Armed Patrol Boats
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenPatrolBoatswithGuidedMissiles(PBG) 8
FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissleswithCIWSmissileorSAM(PCFGM) 2
FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissles(PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6
FastPatrolBoatwithGuidedMissles(PBFG) 54 12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces10/3/16 133
Midget Submarines
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series,and material provided by US and Saudi experts..
IS-120Qadir “midget”submarineNumberinService:16Displacement:120tonsSpeed:11kts surfaced/8kts submergedMaxDepth:UnknownArmament:2x533mmtorpedoes.Cancarryminesinsteadoftorpedoes.SomereportingindicatesthatMANPADsarecarriedaboard.Electronics:IBandsurfacesearchornavigationSonar:Active/Passive
Nahong-class:NumberinService:1Displacement:100tonsSpeed:8ktsMaxDepth:200mArmament:2x533mmtorpedoesindropcollars.Canalsocarry4MDM-6orEM-52smartmines.Electronics:Surfacesearchornavigationradar.Sonar:Bow-mountedactive/passivesonar.EW:ESMmastsimilartoRussian“StopLight”type.
Note:TheNahong isreportedlystationedintheCaspianSea,butcanbetransportedoverlandtotheGulf.
10/3/16 134
Mine Warfare Ships
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenOceanMineSweeper(MSO) 1
OceanMineHunter(MHO) 2
CoastalMineHunter(MHC) 3
CoastalMineCountermeasures(MCC) 4
InshoreMineSweeprs(MSI) 2
CoastalMineSweepers(MSC) 3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: A wide range of civilian and military ships, including small craft and aircraft can easily be adapted or used as is for mine laying, including the use of free floating mines10/3/16 135
Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenAmphibiousShips 17 1 1 1
LandingCraft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure ports.10/3/16 136
137
Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck
QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, February 2011,
• 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point.
•Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median
•Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km.
•Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes,
•Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment.
•Covert as well as overt sensors.
10/3/16 137
Hormuz: Depth EIA Estimate in 11/2014:
TheStraitofHormuzistheworld'smostimportantchokepointwithanoilflowof17millionbarrelsperdayin2013,about30%ofallseaborne-tradedoil.LocatedbetweenOmanandIran,theStraitofHormuzconnectsthePersianGulfwiththeGulfofOmanandtheArabianSea.TheStraitofHormuzistheworld'smostimportantoilchokepointbecauseofitsdailyoilflowof17millionbarrelsperdayin2013.FlowsthroughtheStraitofHormuzin2013wereabout30%ofallseaborne-tradedoil.EIAestimatesthatmorethan85%ofthecrudeoilthatmovedthroughthischokepointwenttoAsianmarkets,basedondatafromLloyd'sListIntelligencetankertrackingservice.Japan,India,SouthKorea,andChinaarethelargestdestinationsforoilmovingthroughtheStraitofHormuz.Qatarexportedabout3.7trillioncubicfeet(Tcf)peryearofliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)throughtheStraitofHormuzin2013,accordingtoBP'sStatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy2014.Thisvolumeaccountsformorethan30%ofglobalLNGtrade.KuwaitimportsLNGvolumesthattravelnorthwardthroughtheStraitofHormuz.Atitsnarrowestpoint,theStraitofHormuzis21mileswide,butthewidthoftheshippinglaneineitherdirectionisonlytwomileswide,separatedbyatwo-milebufferzone.TheStraitofHormuzisdeepandwideenoughtohandletheworld'slargestcrudeoiltankers,withabouttwo-thirdsofoilshipmentscarriedbytankersinexcessof150,000deadweighttons.
10/3/16 138https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.
The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point
10/3/16 139Source:EIA,https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.
Pipelinesavailableasbypassoptions
MostpotentialoptionstobypassHormuzarecurrentlynotoperational.OnlySaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)presentlyhavepipelinesabletoshipcrudeoiloutsideofthePersianGulfandhaveadditionalpipelinecapacitytocircumventtheStraitofHormuz.Attheendof2013,thetotalavailableunusedpipelinecapacityfromthetwocountriescombinedwasapproximately4.3millionbbl/d
OperatingpipelinesthatbypasstheStraitofHormuz
Map of Arabian Sea
10/3/16 140
141
Location of Gulf Oil Fields
Source: M. Izady, 2006 http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml
Hunbli
10/3/16 141
142
Avoiding Hormuz: Limited Options
Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, December 1, 2014
• Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d
• Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56- inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity.
• Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil.
• The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl/d.
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143
The Saudi Petro-Target Base
Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SAU; DOE/EIA, September 2104, 10/3/16 143
144
The UAE Petro-Target Base
Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=ARE; DOE/EIA, May 2015, 10/3/16 144
Iran’s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - IKharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d.
Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5.5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d.
Sirri Island serves as a loading port for the SirriBlend that is produced in the offshore fieldsoff the island. Its storage capacity is 4.5 million barrels.19
Neka is Iran's Caspian Sea port that was built in 2003 to receive crude oil imports from theCaspian region producers under swap agreements. The port has a storage capacity of 1 million barrels and can handle 100,000 b/d of crude oil, according to FGE.20 The terminal, which has not operated since 2011, was previously used to facilitate swap agreements withAzerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Under these agreements, Iran received crude oil at its Caspian Sea port of Neka, which was processed in the Tehran and Tabriz refineries. In return, Iran exported the same amount of crude oil through its Persian Gulf ports.21 Therehave been talks to revive the swaps, but it is unclear when they might restart.
The export terminals Bandar Mahshahr and Abadan (also known as Bandar Imam Khomeini) are near the Abadan refinery and are used to export refined product from the Abadan refinery.
Bandar Abbas, located near the northern end of the Strait of Hormuz, is Iran's main fuel oil export terminal Iran has an expansive domestic oil network including more than 10 pipelines that run between 63 and 630 miles in length.
EIA, Country Briefs, “Iran,” June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN10/3/16 145
Iran’s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - II
EIA, Country Briefs, “Iran,” June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN
Refineries Gas Infrastructure
10/3/16 146
Missile Forces and Threats
10/3/16 147
10/3/16 148
• Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack. Growing possibility of precision ballistic and cruise missile and UCAV attack with conventional warheads• Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.• Variation on 1983-1986 air confrontation tactics, “Fahd line”• Strikes on offshore facilities.• Strikes again tankers or naval targets.• Attacks on US-allied facilities• Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions) But:• Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder• High risk of US and allied intervention.• Limited threat power projection and sustainability.• Unclear strategic goal
Air/Ballistic and Cruise Missile/UCAV Threats
14910/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
15010/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014- I
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Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 - II
10/3/16 152
Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 -III
10/3/16 153
Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016 - I IISS Estimate:
• IRGC Controls Iran’s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCASF) controls Iran’s strategic missile force.
• Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). • Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2,
and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 missiles) and some Zelzal
Jane’s IHS Estimate: • IRGCASF), consists of five brigades, as follows:
• 15th Ghaem Missile Brigade, equipped with short-range missiles such as Fajr.
• 5th Ra'ad Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab-3/4, based in the Karaj area, northwest of Tehran.
• 7th Al-Hadid Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab 1 and 2 (Scud B and C) missiles, based in the Karaj area; facilities under the control of this brigade are said to include the Imam Ali Missile Site in Khorramabad, western Iran.
• 19th Zulfeqar Missile Brigade, equipped with Nazeat and Zelzal short-range missiles, based in the Karaj area.
• 23rd Towhid Missile Brigade, based at Khorramabad.
• Deployed Missiles Include:• 200 Oghab Tactical missile 200 (40 Km)
• 250 FROG 7 Tactical rocket system (70 Km)
• 500 Nazeat/Iran 130 Tactical missile (140-300 Km)
• ? 200 Tondar 69 (CSS-8/M-7) Ballistic missile (150 Km)
• ? Fateh 110 Ballistic missile (160-250 Km)
Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.
10/3/16 154
Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016- II • ? Fateh A-110 Ballistic missile (250-300 Km)• 250 Shahab-1 (SS-1c 'Scud B') Ballistic missile (300 Km) • 50 Shahab-2 (SS-1d 'Scud C') Ballistic missile (500 Km)• ? Fateh-110-D1 (Fateh 313) Ballistic missile (500 Km) Precision strike• ? Qiam 1 Ballistic missile (700 Km)• 25 Shahab-3 (No-dong 2) Ballistic missile (1,100-1,400 Km)• ? Emad Ballistic missile (1,700 Km)• 250 Shahin-2 Tactical missile (2,000 Km)• ? BM-25 (Zelzal) ballistic missile (18 reported) (2,500 Km
Other Claimed or Developing Types Include:• ? Khalij Fars (150-300 Km) Anti-ship variant of Fateh 110
• ? Hormuz-1 (300 Km) anti-radiation homing
• ? Hormuz-2 (300 Km) electro-optical guidance
• ? Qadr F (1,600 Km)
• ? Ghadr-1 (1,800 Km)
• ? Shahab 3A (1,500-1,800 Km)
• ? Shahab 3B (2,000-2,500 Km)
• ? Qadr H ( 2,000 Km) improved MRV
• ? Qadr S (2,000 Km) cluster munitions warhead
• ? KH-25/Soumar cruise missile (2,000-3,000 Km)
• ? Seiji-2 (ex-Ashura) ballistic missile (2,000-2,200km)
• ? ICBM
Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.
10/3/16 155
156
Source: Adapted by Dr. Abdullah Toukan from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.10/3/16
Arab Gulf Missile and Artillery Rocket Forces
Bahrain: 9 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units with 30 ATACMS missiles.Egypt: 26 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units plus; 48 BM-24 240mm artillery rocket fire units in storage. Missile forces include 42+ launchers: 9 FROG-7, 24 Sakr-80 and 9 Scud-B.Iraq: 3 TOS-1/1A artillery rocket launchersIsrael: Israel is “widely believed” to have a nuclear armed missile capability – with 3 Jericho squadrons with Jericho 1 SRBMs and Jericho 2 IRBMs, and Dolphin-class SSKs with land-attack cruise missiles.Jordan: 12 227mm HIMARS and 2+ 273mm WM-80 artillery rockets.Kuwait: 27 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets.Oman: N/AQatar: 4 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers.Saudi Arabia: 60 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Ballistic missiles include10+ DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM fire units with 40 missiles, and some DF-21 (CSS-5 – variant unclear) MRBM fire units.UAE: 20 227mm HIMARS and 6 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets.Yemen: The following forces were reported before Saudi Arabia claimed to have largely destroyed them in its April 2015 bombing campaign: 12 FROG-7 launchers, 10 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) launchers; and 6 Scud-B (33 missiles).Sources: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, 303-362; material form HIS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.
10/3/16 157
Iran: Major Open Source Missile and WMD Facilities
Source:NTI,http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers,September201210/3/16 158
Source: AFP, https://www.google.com/search?q=Iran+missile+range+maps&tbm=isch&imgil=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%253B4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.nbcnews.com%25252Fid%25252F6643614%25252Fns%25252Fworld_news%25252Ft%25252Fnew-concern-iran-developing-long-range-missile%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%252C4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%252C_&usg=__YWqUhbXUBBDGOqaM_CLOxS9P8LU%3D&biw=1239&bih=726&ved=0ahUKEwiSgdiouP_NAhWFej4KHTlHBQ4QyjcIKw&ei=JBGOV5LfKYX1-QG5jpVw#imgrc=i0Bz7UEiTqz2IM%3A
Range of Deployed Missiles
10/3/16 159
Source: Stratfor, http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://digitaljournal.com/img/1/2/2/8/5/5/i/5/7/1/o/iran_missile_map.jpg&imgrefurl=http://digitaljournal.com/image/57146&h=364&w=400&sz=56&tbnid=nAmeBGGgErdwGM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=99&zoom=1&docid=fih86K5v8K5dAM&sa=X&ei=A947T_D9Ncbr0gHIvMjRCw&ved=0CDUQ9QEwAw&dur=235
Iranian Missile Range
10/3/16 160
How Estimates of Range-Payload Vary: Shehab 3
10/3/16 161
Missile Attack Range and Density
Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 10/3/16 162
163
Iranian Missile Range for 1,000 kg Payload
10/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
16410/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
16510/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Missile Attack Timing
Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 10/3/16 166
Missile Accuracy, Reliability, and Targeting
Source: Digital Globe And “2012 Annual Defense, Report,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, ,12 December 2012, p., 47
10/3/16 167
Illustrative Key Target: Ras Tanura
Source: Google maps 10/3/16 168
Illustrative Key Target: Desalination Plant
Source: Google maps 10/3/16 169
170
Missile Wars and Missile Defense
10/3/16
Missile Defenses• Many of the Arab Gulf states already have Patriot systems that provide limited point defense capability
against most Iranian ballistic missile missiles, and cruise missiles. • Qatar and the UAE have indicated they will acquire THAAD theater missile defense systems with wider
area coverage.• The U.S. has deployed two AEGIS/Standard missile defense ships, provides radar coverage, and has
indicated it will provide satellite launch warning and vector data.• The GCC has discussed an integrated missile defense system with an initial emphasis on
AEGIS/Standard.• No clear architecture for a missile defense system has been publically proposed, and there has been no
open discussion of a layered system to cover artillery rockets of the kind proposed by Israel.• Experts differ on Iran’s ability to create penetration aids, and launch salvos of missiles and rockets that
could saturate Arab Gulf and U.S. defenses.• Reliable public data are not available on the ability to discriminate between systems that could hit key
target categories vs. misses, between newer and older missile types, and single out precision-guided Iranian systems once deployed.
• Costs are an issue. Advanced anti-missile missiles are far more costly than older Iranian ballistic missiles.• Low flying cruise missiles pose a very different challenge.• There has been no open discussion of the level of mutual deterrence provided by the overall balance of
ballistic and cruise missiles. land-based air and missile defenses, and air strike capabilities.• Iran may acquire some missile defense capability from Russia with the TOR-M and S300 and obtain
more advanced systems.• The Arab Gulf states may acquire more offensive missiles, and/or obtain “extended deterrence” through
U.S. ballistic or cruise missile deployments. 10/3/16 171
Sea Based Air Defenses:U.S. Navy’s Role in Missile Defense Network
RoleoftheU.S.NavyAegisSystem:
• Willprovideanefficientandhighlymobilesea-baseddefenseagainstShortandMedium– RangeBallisticMissilesintheirmidcoursephase.
• ThesystemwillallowtheBMDCommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysites.• ThesystemwillhavetheEngagement&LongRangeTrackingCapability
• InterceptingShorttoMediumRangeBallisticMissilesinthemidcoursephaseoftheflightwithStandardMissile– 3.
• Servesasaforwarddeployedsensor,providingearlywarningandlongrangesearch&trackcapabilitiesforICBMsandIRBMs.
Contributions:
•WillextendthebattlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.TheNavalAegissystemextendstherangeoftheGroundMissiledefense(GMD)elementbyprovidingreliabletrackdatausedtocalculatefiringsolutions.• AegisBMDwillcoordinateengagementsofshortandmediumrangeballisticmissileswithterminalmissiledefensesystems.
• Astrackinginformationissharedamongthesesystems,theBMDSwillhavetheopportunitytofollowtheengagementofatargetduringthemidcoursesegmentwithcoordinatedterminalengagements.
(Source:MissileDefenseAgency.(MDA)DepartmentofDefense.“TestingBuildingConfidence”,2009) 17210/3/16
17310/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016 174
Country TBMDSystem
UAE • TheUAE issofarthefirstGCCcountrytobuytheTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)missilesystem.
• OnDec31,2011PentagonannouncedthattheUAEwillbebuying2fullTHAADbatteries,96missiles,2RaytheonAN/TPY-2radars,and30yearsofspareparts.TotalValue$3.34billion.
• In2008theUAEorderedPatriotPAC-3:10fireunits,172missiles,Firstdelivery2009.
Kuwait July2012,Pentagon informedCongressofaplantosellKuwait$4.2billioninweaponsystems,including60PAC-3missiles,20launchingplatformsand4radars.Thiswillbeinadditiontothe350Patriotmissilesboughtbetween2007and2010.In1992,Kuwaitbought210oftheearliergenerationPatriotsand25launchers.Kuwaitboughtafurther140morein2007.
SaudiArabia In2011Saudi Arabiasigneda$1.7billionUScontracttoupgradeit’sPatriotanti-missilesystem.
Qatar TheU.S.isbuildingaMissileWarningFacilityinQatarthatwouldutilizeanAN/TPY-2-XBandRadar.
(Source:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner,“IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance-1”July11,2012)
GCC Missile Defense Upgrades
17510/3/16
17610/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
177(Source:AbdullahToukan)10/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
178
The Uncertain Nuclear andWMD Threat
10/3/16
The Nuclear and WMD Balance
• The successful “Implementation Day” phase of the UN/P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran has deprived it if its known near-term ability to deploy a meaningful nuclear weapons force.
• Israel, India, Pakistan, the U.S. and Russia, however, are all nuclear powers.• Iran has kept all of its past weapon design technology, many key production
capabilities, and remains on the edge of the nuclear threshold. The problem is deferred, not solved.
• Precision-guided conventional missiles may, however, offer Iran a safer and more usable alternative.
• Arab state ability to actually develop and produce nuclear weapons is uncertain. But Pakistan might sell them, and/or the U.S. might offer extended deterrence.
• Iran and the larger Arab states are capable of developing and producing genetically engineered biological weapons. There are no reports of such activity, but they are very easy to conceal.
• Iran has reported that it is a chemical weapons state. It has said it no longer has such weapons, but has not provided a detailed inventory or indication of what happened to them.
10/3/16 179
SRBM:ShortRangeBallisticMissileMRBM:MediumRangeBallisticMissileIRBM:IntermediateRangeBallisticMissileICBM:IntercontinentalBallisticMissile
Missiles and States with Nuclear Weapons
Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016 180
The Impact of the JCPOAKey Positives
•Lost near-term capability to produce fissile material.
• Now under tight and demanding inspection regime.
• No-expiration date to non-proliferation, ten years of effective controls unless withdraws.
• Drop in oil prices sharply cuts benefits.
Key Negatives
• Retains nuclear technology and weapons design data, centrifuge upgrade capability: “Semi Threshold State.”
• Missile developments continue.
• Some covert capabilities: Design, simulation, components.
• Major increase in export capability, several $billion in income released.
• Uncertain “snap back” of sanctions.
• Easing of access to other arms sales10/3/16 181
What Happened on “Implementation Day”• VerifiablydismantledandstoredunderIAEAsealmorethan13,000centrifugemachines,
includingitsmoreadvancedcentrifuges,leavingTehranwith6,104first-generationIR-1machines,ofwhich5,104weretobeallowedtocontinuetoenrichuraniumtolowlevels(3.67percentU-235)forenergyproductionpurposes.Theremaining1,044centrifugeswerelocatedattheundergroundsiteinamountainatFordo,whichcanonlybeusedformedicalisotopeproduction.
• Agreedtolimituraniumenrichmenttotheagreedlevelsfor10years,afterwhichthetwosidesagreedthatIran’suraniumenrichmentcapacitywouldremainconstantforseveralyears,buttheIrancouldslowlyphaseinmoreadvancedcentrifugestoslowlyreplaceitIR-1s.
• Shippedover8.5tonsofallformsoflowenricheduraniummaterialtoRussia,leavingIranwithaworkingstockpileofjust300kilogramsofuraniumenrichedtonomorethan3.67percentU-235— farlessthannecessarytoenrichfurtherforonebomb.Thestockpilecapandprohibitiononenrichmentabove3.67percentwillremaininplaceforthenext15years.
• RemovedthecoreoftheArakreactorandfillthechannelswithcement,renderingitinoperable.Theworld’ssixmajorpowers,alsoknownastheEU3+3orP5+1,workedwithIranonanewdesign,whichwilloptimizemedicalisotopeproduction.Thechangeswillalsosignificantlylowertheoutputofweapons-gradeplutoniumtolessthanonekilogramperyear—farbelowtheamountnecessaryforoneweapon.Chinaagreedtoapprovedthemodifieddesign.
• AllowedtheIAEA’smonitoringandinspectionsauthoritytobestrengthened,inadditiontothestandardIAEAmonitoringalreadyinplace.ThisincludedtheimplementationofIran’sAdditionalProtocolagreementwiththeIAEA,whichgavetheU.N.nuclearwatchdogshort-noticeaccesstovirtuallyanysitetheagencybelievesmaybeinvolvedinillicitnuclearactivities,evenmilitaryfacilities.IranwasalsorequiredtoimplementCode3.1ofIran’sexistingcomprehensivesafeguardsagreement,whichrequiresearliernotificationofnuclearactivitiesandfacilitydesignchanges.
• IranbeganallowingcontinuousIAEAmonitoringofenrichmentactivitiesattheNatanzandtheFordofacilitiesandcentrifugeproduction.Themonitoringwillcontinuefor20years.IranalsoagreedtoallowtheIAEAtobegincontinuousmonitoringofallofitsuraniumminesandmills,arequirementthatwilllastfor25years.10/3/16 182
183
Gachin
Lashkar A’bad
Ardekan
Sitescircledinredunknownpre-mid2002
18310/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
184
Iran: The Broader Nuclear Target List: 54+
Source:AdaptedfromlistbyNuclearThreatInitiative,September2012,http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/facilities/.10/3/16
185
Natanz Upgrades in 2012
Source:Googlehttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-used-nuclear-weaponisation.html/10/3/16
186
20 SEP 02
Bunkered underground production halls
Admin/engineering office area
Vehicle Entrance Ramp (before burial)
DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image18610/3/16
187
21 JUL 04
Bunkered underground Centrifuge cascade halls
Dummybuildingconcealingtunnelentranceramp
Helicopterpads
New security wall
Vehicle Entrance Ramp (after burial)
DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image
Admin/engineering office area
18710/3/16
Natanz: Effective Concealment
10/3/16 188
189
Heavy Water Reactor Facility at Arak in 2011
Source:Googlehttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-used-nuclear-weaponisation.html/10/3/16
190
Fordow: 3,000 Centrifuges in a Mountain
Source:YnetNews:http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/PicServer2/13062011/3669116/AFP0661600-01-08809249_wa.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
10/3/16
191
Razed Test Site (?) At Parchin
Source:ISISandCNN,http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/30/cleanup-at-irans-parchin-site/10/3/16
Iranian Counter Vulnerabilities:• Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference.• Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that,
• Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl./d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.
• Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region).
• Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl./d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl./d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.
• Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable.• Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.
• Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Today’s precision strike assets allow to know out key, repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become “weapons of mass effectiveness.”
• EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.
• Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mixof radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.
• Needs imports of food and product.
• Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports.• Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, “inspect” all incoming shipping.• “No fly zone” would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.
Source: See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR & cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html for energy data. 192
193Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016
Nuclear Capability and Risk
Maps based on estimates by dr. Abdullah Toukan
Tehran:1Megaton TelAviv:20Kilotons
Population:410,000+Area:52 km2
(20 sq mi)
Population:8.3millionurban,14millionwiderareaUrban:730 km2 (280 sq mi)Wider Area:1,274 km2
(492 sq mi)10/3/16 194
Countervalue Targeting of Iran
10/3/16 195
Iran’s Ethnic Vulnerability to Nuclear Strikes
10/3/16 196
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