iran and the gulf military balance ifinrev5...

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1616 Rhode Island Avenue NWWashington, DC 20036

Anthony H. CordesmanPhone: 1.202.775.3270 Email: [email protected]

Iran and the Gulf Military Balance

AnthonyH.Cordesman andAbdullahToukan

Working Draft October 3, 2016

Acknowledgements:

This analysis draws in part on the work of Charles Ayers and Joseph Kendall in preparing and updating the graphic

analyses and force comparisons, and Max Markusen in editing and updating.

10/3/16 2

Table of ContentsTitle Pages

The Changing Gulf Balance 4-7The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8-17The Military Spending Gap 18-22The Modernization Gap 23-40U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impactingon the Regional Balance 41-58Comparative Military Manpower 59-62The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence,and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors 63-77The Land Balance in the Gulf 78-89The Air Balance in the Gulf 90-119The Naval Balance in the Gulf 119-124Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-AirThreat to Maritime Traffic 125-146Missile Forces and Threats 147-169Missile Wars and Missile Defense 170-177The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat 178-196

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The Changing Gulf Balance

10/3/16 4

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The Changing Gulf Balance - I• The classic military balance in the Gulf region is driven by an accelerating arms race between Iran and its Arab Gulf Neighbors. The Arab countries are decisively winning this arms race.

• This aspect of the balance is also shaped by outside forces, particularly by the level of U.S. commitment and power projection capability to assisting its Arab security partners, although Russia and China are potential wild cards.

• The balance, however, is also increasingly shaped by internal conflicts and divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and the impact of “failed state wars” on the relative strategic influence of Iran versus other Arab states and U.S.

•It is also shaped by Iran’s steadily improving capabilities for asymmetric warfare in supporting pro-Iran elements in Arab states, in developing the capability to threaten maritime traffic in and near the Gulf, and to pose a ballistic and cruise missile threat to its Arab neighbors that compensates for its limited conventional capabilities.

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The Changing Gulf Balance - II• The threat of violent religious extremism, and the growing impact of non-state actors both pose another major set of threats, and make counterterrorism and counterinsurgency increasingly important aspects of the military balance.

• The P5+1 (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran delays, but does not end the nuclear and WMD competition between Iran and its Arab neighbors and the U.S.

• The end result seems to be a high level of mutual deterrence between regional states, mixed with extremist challenges by non-state actors which do not show any such restraint. This does not, however, prevent threats to use force by state actors in “wars of intimidation,” low level incidents, or proxy wars in competing to support other forces.

• It is also a complex mix of different and asymmetric forces, and possible approaches to warfighting, creates a significant risk that Arab-Iranian conflicts can start or escalate through miscalculation in unpredictable ways.

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The Changing Gulf Balance - III• The risk of conflict is also driven by the actions of non-state actors and violent extremists and the uncertain internal stability of many regional states.

• These internal stability risks are compounded by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions, particularly ethnic tensions between Arabs, Persians, and Kurds, and Sunnis and Shi’ites.

• There has been a massive regional increase in internal security activity, forces, and costs. The data on these aspects of the balance are so suspect, however, that it is not possible to assess the trend and scale in quantitative terms.

• The “civil balance” in terms of the nature of politics, quality of governance, corruption, economic development and sharing of wealth, social changes from factors like hyperurbanization, massive population growth and youth employment problems, has generally deteriorated since the uprisings of 2011, and is now affected by massive cuts in petroleum export and tourism income and limited investment.

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The Iranian Threat:

An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives

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Iran: Threat or “Competitor”Non-Military Competition

• Ideology, religion, and political systems • “Terrorism” and violent extremism vs. “counterterrorism” • Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts • Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports • International diplomacy

Military Competition

• W eapons of mass destruction • Conventional forces • Asymmetric and irregular warfare • P roxy use of state and non-state actors • Threat and intimidation

Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition

• G u l f Cooperation Council countries • Y emen • I r a q • Jordan • Syria • Lebanon • Israel • Gaza and West Bank • P akistan • Turkey • A fghanistan • Central Asia • Europe • R u s s i a • C h i n a • Japan and Asia • V enezuela, Cuba, Brazil

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Assessing the Full Range of Competition

10

Rhetoric vs. Reality

• Reinforcement of Supreme Leader and political rhetoric vs. often solid military assessments and study of western and outside positions.

• Statements can defeat all attacks versus focus on defense in depth

• Capability to “close the Gulf” vs. steadily upgrading asymmetric capabilities and real world limits.

• Nuclear denial vs. nuclear efforts; exaggeration of missile capabilities.

• Claims of modernization versus real world limits and failures.

• Real but exaggerated progress in Asymmetric warfare.

• Exaggerated claims to military production and technology versus limited reality

• Claimed focus on US and Israel versus focus on Israel and GCC

• Denial/Understatement of links to non-state actors: Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan Northern Alliance10/3/16 11

Key Positives for Iran• The US is Iran’s “Secret Ally:” Invasion of Iraq and aftermath; Messing up Syria from the start, Uncertain & slipping nuclear “redline,” faltering effort in Afghanistan, loss of allied confidence, in Egypt.

• Success in Lebanon, growing Syrian dependence, ties to Iraqi Shi’ites, presence in Western Afghanistan and role with Hazaras.

• Lack of progress and coherence in GCC forces.

• Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen.

• Asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc.

• Missile and nuclear progress.

• Real progress in modernization, adaptation, selective imports.

• Integration of regular and revolutionary forces.

•Restructuring of Basij, internal security forces.10/3/16 12

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US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces - I

MainBattleTanks:2003

MainBattleTanks:2012

CombatAircraft:2003

CombatAircraft:2012

Iran 1565 1663 283 336Iraq 2200 336 316 3

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Source:AdaptedfromIISS,TheMilitaryBalance2013,variouseditionsandJane’sSentinelseries.10/3/16 13

US Destruction of Iraq’s Major Forces – 2003 vs. 2013

10/3/16 14

The Limited Recovery of Iraq’s Forces: 2003 vs. 2016

10/3/16 15

Key Negatives for Iran• Unstable Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uncertain Hamas.

• US-led progress, C4I/ISAR, and training progress in GCC forces; Broad Arab treatment of Iran as threat.

• Rising Sunni versus Shi’ite tensions; limits to Shi’ite acceptance of Supreme Leader, any form of Iranian control or proxy role.

• High level of effectiveness in limits to arms, technology, and production imports.

•Lack of Power projection assets, maneuver capability, sustained air capability, and geography of Gulf

• Sanctions/delays in nuclear program, impact on military spending, stability.

• Lack of nuclear and other WMD weapons, long-rang precision strike capability. Israeli, Pakistani, US nuclear/missile forces in being; US conventional long-range strike capability.

• Instability of Yemen and Shi’ite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other GCC states, Yemen.

• Limits to asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc. 10/3/16 16

Key Potential Pivots Shaping the Future

• Iran deploys functional nuclear forces.

• US or Israeli preventive strikes.

• Missiles with terminal guidance, extreme accuracy. (w/ or w/o ,missile defenses.

• Serious (Shi’ite) unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

• US tensions with GCC states (and Egypt/Jordan). Excessive US force cuts, spending crisis

• Iran access to most modern Russian and Chinese arms: advanced fighters, S-300/S-400 etc.

• Major clash in Gulf

• Assad victory or defeat in civil war; clear polarization of Iraq.

• Serious Iranian political upheavals, power struggle.

• Hostile Iranian involvement in post-2015

• Real Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis.

• New Arab-Israel Conflict.10/3/16 17

The Military Spending Gap

10/3/16 18

Military Spending

• Trends sharply favor Arab states even if impact of U.S. and European spending on power projection is ignored.

• Estimates are uncertain. Iran and other Gulf states may conceal significant security spending off budget. But, unlikely to affect trends or scale of difference.

•Iran has advantage from low-cost conscription, control of state industries.

• Lack of coordination, standardization, and interoperability by Gulf states greatly reduces impact of their advantage in spending.

• But, Iran’s programs have uncertain management, and Iran has massive disadvantage because of lack of access to modern and high performance arms imports.

• Arab Gulf states can surge arms imports and funding of outside power projection support in a crisis. Iran cannot – to date.

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Comparative Military Spending: 1997-2009

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, various editions

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Bahrain 387 427 472 342 355 352 350 191 559 498 550 552 697

Kuwait 3,827 3,614 3,401 3,933 3,614 3,720 3,720 1,275 4,539 3,640 4,002 6,810 6,650

Oman 2,126 1,913 1,701 2,232 2,551 2,445 2,657 2,764 3,210 3,410 3,298 4,657 4,060

Qatar 1,382 1,382 1,488 1,275 1,807 2,020 2,020 2,232 2,327 2,430 1,090 1,750 1,750

UAE 3,614 3,933 4,039 3,189 2,976 2,976 2,976 1,701 2,817 9,888 10,292 13,730 15,470

Saudi Arabia 22,323 23,386 19,878 23,386 26,256 23,599 23,599 20,515 27,000 30,810 34,020 38,200 41,200

GCC Total 33,659 34,655 30,979 34,357 37,559 35,112 35,322 28,678 40,452 50,676 52,142 65,699 69,827

Yemen 437 421 456 529 570 547 596 940 1,001 858 927 1,490 1,550

Iraq 1,982 1,382 1,488 1,488 1,488 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Iran 4,996 6,165 6,060 7,972 2,232 3,189 3,189 3,720 6,590 6,759 7,310 9,590 10,000

Gulf Total 41,074 42,623 38,983 44,346 41,849 38,848 39,107 33,338 48,043 58,290 60,379 76,779 81,377

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

10/3/16 20

The Military Spending Gap – Less US, UK, France

$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Def

ense

Spe

ndin

g (in

Mill

ions

USD

)

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE SaudiArabia Iraq Yemen Iran

Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,1999-201310/3/16 21

The Military Spending Gap in 2015

Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar SaudiArabia UAE GCCTotal Iran Iraq Jordan Yemen

2015MilitarySpending 1.53 4.43 9.88 5.09 81.9 14.4 117.23 15.9 21.1 1.3 1.89

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2015

Defen

seSpe

ndinginbillionsofU

SD

10/3/16 22

The Modernization Gap

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Military Modernization• The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states is even greater in terms of arms transfers than in military spending, and has grown sharply in favor of the Arab states in recent years.

• The broader failure of the GCC to achieve standardization and interoperability has been offset by the fact the two key Arab Gulf powers – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have made massive and interoperable arms imports from the U.S.

• U.S. forward basing in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait aids their militaries, and compensates for some of their weaknesses.

• Far more is involved than arms import spending. A review of key Iranian force elements shows many weapons are obsolete, obsolescent, or of relatively low quality. Many date back to the Shah or were worn during the fighting in the Iraq-Iraq War. Non-operational rates are often high, and sustainability in combat low.

•Iran’s problems are made worse by a lack of access to upgrades to its systems, modern munitions, sensors, battle management, and IS&R equipment and sub-systems. These have a critical cumulative effect.10/3/16 24

The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC

Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total

2011-2014 56,400 500 4,000 8,800 6,200 9,100 85,000 21,700 - 200 106,900 2007-2010 29,600 500 3,300 3,000 1,000 13,500 50,900 5,600 700 900 58,100

-

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

180,000 M

illio

ns o

f USD

GCC Orders from U.S. = -- $50.9B in 2007-2010-- $85.0B in 2011-2014

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. “0” represents any value below $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .

10/3/16 25

The New Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC


Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total

2011-2014 16,000 400 1,600 3,100 900 6,800 28,800 6,600 100 100 35,600 2007-2010 10,900 500 1,300 500 200 2,000 15,400 2,600 500 400 18,900

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Mill

ions

of U

SD

U.S. Deliveries to GCC =-- $15.4B in 2007-2010-- $28.8B in 2011-2014

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The Gap in New Orders and Deliveries – Iran vs. GCC

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The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms Agreements in 2007-2010

Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen

All Others 100 - - - - - 200 200 100 All Other European 1,500 - - - - 1,500 100 500 300 Major West European 14,800 - - 2,800 700 1,700 - 500 100 China - - 300 - 100 100 - 100 -Russia - - 700 - - - 400 400 400 U.S. 13,200 500 2,300 200 200 10,200 - 3,900 -

-

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000 M

illio

ns o

f USD


10/3/16 28

The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms Agreements in 2011-2014


Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen

All Others 100 - - 1,000 - 300 - 3,400 -All Other European 2,200 100 - 300 900 700 - 1,500 100 Major West European 6,500 - 100 4,400 5,200 600 - 400 -China 600 - - - - - - 200 100 Russia - 100 400 - - 100 - 7,900 -U.S. 47,000 300 3,500 2,300 100 7,400 - 8,300 -

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Mill

ions

of U

SD

10/3/16 29

The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: Arms Deliveries in 2007-2014


Saudi Arabia '07-'10

Saudi Arabia '11-'14

Bahrain '07-

'10

Bahrain '11-

'14

Kuwait '07-'10

Kuwait '11-'14

Oman '07-'10

Oman '11-'14

Qatar '07-'10

Qatar '11-'14

U.A.E. '07-'10

U.A.E. '11-'14

Iran '07-'10

Iran '11-'14

Iraq '07-'10

Iraq '11-'14

Yemen '07-'10

Yemen '11-'14

All Others - 100 - - - - - - - - - - 100 300 100 - 100 -

All Other European 700 700 - 100 - - - 100 - 100 300 1,200 200 400 - - 100 100

Major West European 4,300 5,700 - - - - 500 2,300 200 700 500 1,300 100 500 - - - -

China 600 500 - - - 100 - - - - 100 - - 100 - - - -

Russia - - - - - 100 - - - - 300 300 200 2,200 400 100 200 -

U.S. 5,300 9,000 500 300 1,300 1,400 200 700 - 100 800 4,000 2,000 3,100 - - - -

-

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

Mill

ions

of U

SD

10/3/16 30

U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)

Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 10/3/16 31

Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Land

MBT1,663+:150M60A1;100ChieftainMk3/Mk5;540T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74;168M47/M48(480T-72Z?75+T-62?150Zulfiqar?)

LTTK80+:80Scorpion;

RECCE35EE-9CascavelAIFV610:210BMP-1;400BMP-2with9K111

APC(T)340+:140Boraghwith9K111Fagot(AT-4Spigot);200M113;BMT-2Cobra

APC(W)300+:300BTR-50/BTR-60;Rakhsh

SP292+:155mm150+:150M109;;175mm22M107;203mm30M110

TOWED2,030+;105mm150:130M101A1;20M-56;122mm640:540D-30;100Type-54(M-30);130mm985M-46;152mm30D-20;155mm205:120GHN-45;70M114;15Type-88WAC-21;203mm20M115

AIRCRAFT•10Cessna185;2F-27Friendship;4TurboCommander690PAX1Falcon20

ATK50AH-1JCobra

TPT173:Heavy20CH-47CChinook;Medium75:50Bell214;25Mi-171;Light78:68Bell205A(AB-205A);10Bell206JetRanger(AB-206)

MANPAD9K36Strela-3(SA-14Gremlin);9K32Strela-2(SA-7Grail)‡;Misaq1(QW-1Vanguard);Misaq2(QW- 18);9K338Igla-S(SA-24Grinch– reported);HN-54

SP180:23mm100ZSU-23-4;57mm80ZSU-57-2

NewTanks?

OAVs?

AttackCopters?

SPArty

SHORADS?

10/3/16 36

FTR184+:20F-5BFreedomFighter;55+F-5ETigerII/F- 5FTigerII;24F-7MAirguard;43F-14Tomcat;36MiG- 29A/U/UBFulcrum;upto6Azarakhshreported

FGA110:64 F-4D/EPhantomII;10MirageF-1E;30Su- 24MKFencerD;upto6SaeghehreportedATK10:7Su-25KFrogfoot;3Su-25UBKFrogfoot(incl.4+Su-25K/UBKdeployedinIraq;statusunclear)ASW5P-3MPOrion

ISR:6+RF-4EPhantomII*TKR/TPTB-707;ε2B-747TPT117:Heavy12Il-76Candid;Mediumε19C-130E/HHercules;Light75:11An-74TK-200;5An-140(Iran-140Faraz)(45projected);10F-27Friendship;1L-1329Jetstar;10PC-6BTurboPorter;8TB-21Trinidad;4TB-200Tobago;3TurboCommander680;14Y-7;9Y-12;PAX11:2B-707;1B-747;4B-747F;1Falcon20;3Falcon50HELICOPTERSMRH2Bell412TPT34+:Heavy2+CH-47Chinook;Medium30Bell214C(AB-214C);Light2+:2Bell206AJetRanger(AB-206A);someShabaviz2-75(indigenousversionsinproduction);someShabaviz2061

NewFighters?

ISR?

Tankers?

UCAVs?

S-300/S-400?

Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Air

10/3/16 37

AirDefenseForce

SAM529+:

250FM-80(Crotale);30Rapier;15Tigercat;

150+MIM-23BI-HAWK/Shahin;45S-75Dvina(SA-2

Guideline);10S-200Angara(SA-5Gammon);299K331Tor-M1(SA-15Gauntlet)(reported)

MANPADFIM-92AStinger;9K32Strela-2(SA-7Grail)

Army

SPHQ-7(reported)

MANPAD9K36Strela-3(SA-14Gremlin);9K32Strela-2(SA-7Grail);Misaq1(QW-1Vanguard);Misaq2(QW-11);Igla-S(SA-24Grinch- reported);HN-54

Note:RussiahasdeliveredtheTOR-M

RussianS-300inDelivery.

InitialdeploymentatFordow

Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Air Defense

10/3/16 38

FSGM2Jamaran(UKVosperMk5– 1moreundergoingseatrials)with2twinlnchr withC-802(CSS-N-8Saccade)AShM,2singlelnchr withSM-1SAM,2triple324mmMk32ASTT,176mmgun,1hellandingplatformFSG53Alvand (UKVosperMk5)with2twinlnchr withC-802(CSS-N-8Saccade)AShM,2tripleMk32324mmASTT,1114mmgun2Bayandor (USPF-103)with2twinlnchr withC-802(CSS-N-8Saccade)AShM,2triple324mmMk32ASTT,176mmgunPCFG14Kaman(FRACombattante II)with1–2twinlnchrwithC-802AShM,176mmgunMSI2Riazi(USCape)LSM3Farsi(ROK)(capacity 9tanks;140troops)LST4Hengam each withup to1hel (capacity 9tanks;225troops)LSL6Fouque

Upgrades?

Doesitmatter?

ASMs?

SSMs?

Air/UAVs?

Iran’s Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems – Naval

10/3/16 39

The GCC Threat to the GCC

• Vast lead in military spending and arms imports

• Support from US, Britain, France

But,

• Failure to create effective structures within the GCC for command, force planning, defense support. far too much a matter of façade and rhetoric.

• Lack of national unity, common facilities, de facto dependence on U.S. Far too much a Saudi-UAE alliance with Oman on the outside.

• Poor mission focus with limited coordination

• Poor adaptation to asymmetric/irregular warfare, effective cooperation in counterterrorism, internal security.

• Lack of integration, standardization, operational intreroperability

• Problems in large-scale exercises and training; military realism

• Problems in jointness – including security services, police, and intelligence – and combined arms.

• Lack of balanced force development: Manpower quality and sustainability10/3/16 40

U.S. and Outside Allied Forces:

The Other Forces Impacting on the Regional Balance

10/3/16 41

The Role of Outside Forces

• The balance is not simply regional. The U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey regularly support the Arab Gulf states, and they and other European states play an active role in Iraq and the coalition against ISIS.

• The U.S, Britain, and France all have bases in the Gulf region.

• The U.S. has a massive lead in global military spending and the deployment of new weapons and technology in spite of limited recent cuts in baseline spending.

• The West has given the Arab Gulf states a massive lead over Iran in modern weapons and imports of military technology.

• The U.S. role is not determined by the forces it deploys in the region at any given time, but by its power projection capabilities.

•The U.S. offers the Arab Gulf states a monopoly over Iran in access to satellite intelligence and advanced battle management and IS&R systems, and major assistance through common military exercises.

10/3/16 42

SIPRI Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2014-2015

Source: SIPRI, Trends in Global Military Expenditure, April 5, 2016, https://www.google.com/search?q=sipri+military+spending&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8,

NationalShareofTotalforTop15Spenders

43

ISIS Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2015

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2016, p. 19. 44

US Defense Budget: FY2001-FY2021

Source: (OSD) Comptroller,Defense Budget Overview, February 2016, p. I-5

BudgetsSince9/11

ProposedOutyearToplineforBaseBudget

10/3/16 45

US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - I

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52

ARABIANSEA:USCentralCommand•Navy•5thFleet:1DDGHM;1LHD;1LPD;1LSD;CombinedMaritimeForces•TF53:1AE;2AKE;1AOH;3AO

BAHRAIN:USCentralCommand•3,250;1HQ(5thFleet);2ADbty withMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3

BRITISHINDIANOCEANTERRITORY:USStrategicCommand•550;1Spacetrack OpticalTrackeratDiegoGarcia;1ground-basedelectroopticaldeepspacesurveillancesystem(GEODSS)atDiegoGarciaUSPacificCommand•1MPSsqn (MPS-2withequipmentforoneMEB)atDiegoGarciawith5logisticsandsupportships;1navalairbaseatDiegoGarcia,1supportfacilityatDiegoGarcia

DJIBOUTI:USAfricaCommand•1,200;1tpt sqn withC-130H/J-30Hercules;1specopssqn withMC-130H;PC-12(U-28A);1CSARsqn withHH-60GPaveHawk;1navalairbase

EGYPT:MFO692;1ARNGreccebn;1ARNGspt bn

INDIANOCEAN:USEuropeanCommand•USNavy•6thFleet:1DDGHMIRAQ:USCentralCommand•OperationInherentResolve3,500;1inf divHQ;1mne coy;1atk hel coywithAH-64DApache;MQ-1BPredator

ISRAEL:USStrategicCommand•1AN/TPY-2X-bandradaratMountKeren

JORDAN:USCentralCommand•OperationInherentResolve1FGAsqn with12F-16CFightingFalcon;1ADbty withMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3

KUWAIT:USCentralCommand•13,000;1armd bde;1ARNG(cbt avn)hel bde;1spt bde;1atk sqnwith12A-10CThunderboltII;4ADbty withMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3;1(APS)armd bde set;1(APS)inf bde set

10/3/16 46

US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - II

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52

MEDITERRANEANSEA:USEuropeanCommand•USNavy•6thFleet:4DDGM;1LHD;1LPD;1LSD;1LCC

MIDDLEEAST-UN:UNTSO2obs

PACIFICOCEAN:USPacificCommand•USNavy•3rdFleet:8SSBN;17SSGN;10SSN;4CVN;9CGHM;18DDGHM;6DDGM;4FFHM;3MCO;2LHD;1LHA;3LPD;3LSD;USPacificCommand•USNavy•7thFleet:1FFHM

GULF:USCentralCommand•Navy•5thFleet:2DDGM;10PCO;6(CoastGuard)PCC;CombinedMaritimeForces•CTF-152:4MCO;1AFSB

QATAR;USCentralCommand•8,000:1bbrsqnwith6B-1BLancer;1ISRsqnwith4RC-135RivetJoint;1ISRsqnwith4E-8CJSTARS;1tkrsqnwith24KC-135R/TStraotanker;1tptsqnwith4C-17AGlobemaster;4C-130H/J-30Hercules;2ADbtywithMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3;USStrategicCommand•1AN/TPY-2X-bandradar

SAUDIARABIA:USCentralCommand•350

TURKEY:USEuropeanCommand•1,550;1FGAsqnwith6F-15CEagle;6F-15EStrikeEagle;1atksqnwithA-10CThunderboltII;1CISRUAVsqnwithMQ-1BPredatorUAV;1specopsfltwithAC-130USpectre;1airbaseatIncirlik;1supportfacilityatAnkara;1supportfacilityatIzmir;USStrategicCommand•1AN/TPY-2X-bandradaratKurecik;NATO•ActiveFence:2ADbtywithPatriotPAC-2/3

UNITEDARABEMIRATES:USCentralCommand•5,000:1ftrsqnwith6F-22ARaptor;1FGAsqnwith12F-15EStrikeEagle;1ISRsqnwith4U-2;1AEW&Csqnwith4E-3Sentry;1tkrsqnwith12KC-10A;1ISRUAVsqnwithRQ-4GlobalHawk;2ADbtywithMIM-104E/FPatriotPAC-2/3

10/3/16 47

US Army Global Power Projection: 2016

Source: U.S. Army, February 2016, http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/BudgetMat.aspx?OfficeCode=120010/3/16 48

US Navy and Marine Corps Global Power Projection: 2016

Source: U.S. Navy, February 2016, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year-2017.aspx49

US 5th Fleet: 2016

Headquartered in Bahrain

Source: USCENTCOM. 8.9.16, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Task-Forces/.

50

US Air Force Global Power Projection: 2016

Source: U.S. Air Force, February 2016, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/51

US Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 2016

Source: U.S. Air Forcehttp://www.afcent.af.mil/Units.aspx, accessed 8.9.16

AFCENTForcesdeploys5ExpeditionaryWingsintheregion:the379th,380th,386th,438th,and456th.

• The379thAirExpeditionaryWingisisthelargest,mostdiverseexpeditionarywingintheAirForcewithmorethan90combatandsupportaircraft,includingeightcoalitionairframes.AircraftcomefromeveryUSserviceaswellastheUnitedKingdom,SingaporeandAustralia.Combined,theseforcestprovidingprovidecombatairpowerandcombatsupportforOperationsNEWDAWN,ENDURINGFREEDOMandthroughsupportoftheJointTaskForceHORNofAFRICA.

• The380thAirExpeditionaryWingishometoapproximately3,000personnelcompletingoneofthemostdiversecombatwingsintheAirForce.Thewingiscomprisedofsixgroupsand26squadrons.ItsmissionpartnersincludeanArmyairdefensebattalionandaNavyaerialmaritimesurveillancedetachment.

• The386thAirExpeditionaryWinghasadiversemission,whichcanvasestheU.S.CentralCommandareaofresponsibility.The386thAEWprovidesairliftsupportforOperationEnduringFreedomandtheHornofAfrica.Thewingiscomprisedofthe386thExpeditionaryMaintenance,MissionSupport,MedicalandOperationsGroupsandthe387thAirExpeditionaryGroup.

• The386thAirExpeditionaryWingisaTrain,Advice,AssistCommand- Air(TAAC-Air),headquartered atForward OperatingBaseOqab, Kabul,Afghanistan,hastwoairadvisorygroups at HamidKarzai InternationalAirportandKandaharAirfield.TAAC-Air'smissionistotrain,advise,andassistourAfghanpartnerstodevelopaprofessional,capable,andsustainableAirForce.

• The455thAirExpeditionaryWingisoneoftwoAirForcewingsinAfghanistanandsupportsmembersdeployedthroughoutthecountryaspartofOperationEnduringFreedom.ItistheprimarycombatwinginAfghanistan.ThecommanderissupportedbyawingstaffandoverseesfiveAirForcegroupslocatedatBagramAirfieldandKandaharAirfield,withadditionalwithadditionaldetachmentswithinAfghanistan.

10/3/16 52

Source: USCENTCOM, http://www.afcent.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/4822/Article/217803/combined-air-operations-center-caoc.aspx

CombinedAirOperationsCenter(CAOC)atAlUdeidAirBase,Qatar

TheCombinedAirOperationsCenter(CAOC)atAlUdeid AirBase,Qatar,providescommandandcontrolofairpowerthroughoutIraq,Syria,Afghanistan,and17othernations.TheCAOCiscomprisedofajointandCoalitionteamthatexecutesday-to-daycombinedairandspaceoperationsandprovidesrapidreaction,positivecontrol,coordination,andde-conflictionofweaponsystems.(U.S.AirForcephotobyTech.Sgt.JoshuaStrang)

MissionTheCombinedAirOperationsCenterWeaponsSystem,alsoknownastheAN/USQ-163FalconerWeaponSystem,commandsandcontrolsthebroadspectrumofwhatairpowerbringstothefight:GlobalVigilance,GlobalReach,andGlobalPower.LocatedintheAirForcesCentraltheaterofoperations,theCAOCprovidesthecommandandcontrolofairpowerthroughoutIraq,Afghanistanand 18othernations.Servingastheoperationalbridgethatintegratesandsynchronizesstrategicdecisionstotacticallevelexecution,theCAOCiscomprisedofavastarrayofpeople,programsandprocessesthatexecuteday-to-daycombinedairandspaceoperationsandprovidesrapidreaction,positivecontrol,coordinationanddeconflictionofweaponssystems.

FunctionFunctioningasthenervecenteroftheaircampaign,theCAOCplans,monitorsanddirectssortieexecution,closeairsupport/precisionairstrike;Intelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance;airlift;airrefueling;aerialevaluation;airdrop,andcountlessothermissioncriticaloperations.

FacilityTheCAOCisatruejointandCoalitionteam,staffedbyU.S.AirForce,U.S.Army,U.S.Navy,U.S.MarineCorpsandCoalitionpartners.ConstructionbeganinJuly2002.ATotalForceteamofactiveduty,AirNationalGuardandReservepersonnelworkedontheproject.TheCAOC- bothteammembersandequipment- wasfullyoperationalFeb.18,2003.Builtatacostof$60million,theprojectinvolvedinstallationofmorethan67milesofhigh-capacityandfiberopticcable.Thiscapabilitycreatedthemostadvancedoperationscenterinhistory.Keepingthesesystemshummingrequireshundredsofpeople,workinginsatellitecommunications,imageryanalysis,networkdesign,computerprogramming,radiosystems,systemsadministrationandmanyotherfields.Withthousandsofcomputers,dozensofservers,racksofvideoequipmentanddisplayscreens,thefacilityresemblesthesetofafuturisticmovie.

10/3/16 53

US and Allied Air Operations in Iraq/Syria: 2014-2016

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve. ,

10/3/16 54

Illustrative Coalition of the Actually Deployed – ISIS/Syria War

IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, pp. 312 and 315

AirDeploymentsinU.S.-LedCoalitionFightingISIS inSyriaandIraq,andRussianAirUnitsinSyria:November2015,

UnitedStatesTurkey(IncirlikAirBase)„Ñ6F-15CEagleFtr ac„Ñ12A-10CThunderboltIIAtk ac„Ñ1+AC-130UAtk ac„ÑMQ-1BPredatorCISRUAVJordan(Mowafaq alSalti AirBase)„Ñ6F-16VFightingFalconFGAacKuwaitUnitedStates(AhmedalJaber AirBase)„Ñ12A-10CThunderboltIIAtk ac(AlialSalemAirBase)„ÑMQ-1BPredatorCISRUAV„ÑMQ-9AReaperCISRUAVQatar(AlUdeid AirBase)„Ñ6B-1BLancerBbr ac„Ñ4RC-135V/WRivetJointELINTacUAE(AlDhafra AirBase)„Ñ6F-22ARaptorFtr ac„Ñ12F-15EStrikeEagleFGAac„ÑU-2SISRacRQ-4BGlobalHawkISRUAV

FranceJordan(Mowafaq alSalti AirBase)„Ñ3Mirage2000DFGAac„Ñ3Mirage2000NFGAacUAE(AlDhafra AirBase)„Ñ6Rafale FGAac„Ñ1Atlantique 2MPac

UnitedKingdomCyprus(RAFAkrotiri)„Ñ8TornadoGR4FGAac„Ñ1SentinelR1ISRacKuwait(AlialSalemAB)„ÑMQ-9AReaperCISRUAVQatar(AlUdeid AirBase)„Ñ1RC-135WRivetJointELINTac

NetherlandsJordan(Mowafaq alSalti AirBase)„Ñ 4F-16AMFightingFalconFtr ac

AustraliaUAE(Minhad AirBase)„Ñ6F/A-18AHornetFGAac

CanadaKuwait(tobewithdrawn)(AhmedalJaber AirBase)„Ñ6CF-18AHornetFGAac„Ñ2CP-140AAuroraMPac

ItalyKuwait(AhmedalJaber AirBase)„Ñ4TornadoIDSFGAac(ISRonly)„ÑMQ-1BPredatorISRUAV

RussiaSyria(Baselal-AssadAirBase)„Ñ12Su-24MFencerFGAac„Ñ4Su-30SMFGAac„Ñ4Su-34FullbackFGAac„Ñ10Su-25SMFrogfootAtk ac„Ñ 2Su-25UBMFrogfootAtk ac„Ñ1Il-20MELINTac„Ñ12Mi-24PHindAtk hel„Ñ 6Mi-8AMTShHipTPThel

10/3/16 55

Illustrative Coalition of the Semi Deployed - Yemen

IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, p. 315.

DeploymentsinSaudi-UAE.-LedCoalitionFightingISIS inSyriaandIraq:November2015,andRussianAirUnitsinSyria

10/3/16 56

The “Wild Cards” in Outside Support• Uncertain U.S. domestic politics, future security commitments, and willingness to act decisively under pressure. Focus on terrorism threat versus other threats.

• Declining European military spending and uncertain future power projection capabilities, particularly as they affect Britain and France.

• Impact of China’s expanding forces, role in Indian Ocean, new Silk Road(s) and port facilities, and basing rights in Djibouti.

• Growing Russian tension with U.S. and West, future Russian arms sales to and alignments with Iran, use of power projection capabilities.

• Future Character and Role of Turkey.

• The impact on the Gulf of the civil wars and fighting against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, future roles of Iran, Kurds, and broader Sunni-Shi’ite tensions.

•Impact on the Gulf of any future Israeli conflict with Hezbollah, Palestinians.

• Impact of a major political upheaval in any Gulf State.

• Outcome of the fighting in Yemen,

10/3/16 57

Playing the “Wild Card:” Russian Forces Used or Deployed in Syria Through July 2016

Source: Adapted from Wikipedia and reporting in the New York Times and Washington Post. 10/3/16 58

Comparative Military Manpower

10/3/16 59

Military Manpower• Does reveal one key area of Iranian superiority: Total land force manpower.

• But,

• No metric is used more often in media or has less meaning. Largely irrelevant unless tied to function, quality, training, and readiness.

• Most data represent nominal authorized totals, may or may not relate to reality.

• Conscripts often poorly trained, supported. Lack effective ability to fight modern weapons.

• Paramilitary and internal security forces differ wildly in quality from elite forces to the equivalent of armed lamp posts.

• Uncertain, but real move towards giving junior officers and NCOs more authority and independence.

• Promotion sometimes not tied to valid performance; family or political.

•Reserves generally too low in quality to matter in most contingencies.

•Arab Gulf Forces often dependent on civilian contractors for sustainability and support.

10/3/16 60

Comparative Military Manpower: 2016

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016.

Note: Given current civil war, accurate and current force counts for Yemen are difficult to determine. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, force numbers from Yemen are drawn from the 2015 IISS Military Balance.

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenArmy 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000

Guard 125000 100000 6400 12000

Air 30000 4000 20000 1500 25000 5000 1500 4500 3000

AirDef. 3000 16000 2000

Navy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500 1700

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

10/3/16 61

Comparative Paramilitary Manpower: 2016

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenNavy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500

MOIForces

Militias 100,000 20000

Coastguard 4500 260 500 400 1200

BorderGuard 9000 10500

SpecialSecurity 500

Police 36000 9000

FacilitiesSecurityForce 9000

Guard 2000 6600 4000

Other 50000 50000

Basij

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

10/3/16 62

The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare:

Intimidation, Deterrence, and Warfighting from Iran and

Non-State Actors

10/3/16 63

Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare• There is no clear dividing line between terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and conventional warfare.

• There also is no clear line at which deterrence and intimidation move from limited or deniable acts of violence to war.

• Cyber and Internet warfare have become key components of the balance. Strategic communications/propaganda/political/ideological/warfare are often dominated by civilians.

• Coalition warfare is increasingly coalitions of willing and able state and non-state actors.

• Ideological, religious, political, and economic warfare may rely on the balance of deterrence and warfighting capability without using force or suddenly trigger its use in asymmetric forms.

• Laws and restraint are steadily weakening. Civilians and human shields have become de facto weapons of war.

• As Russian has shown, power projection can become a key form of asymmetric warfare.

10/3/16 64

The Growing Role of Non-State Actors

• Range from serious Non-State Forces to “Lone Wolf” attacks.

• Large-scale mass killings, IEDs and bombings

• Insurgents, however, are not “terrorists,” but asymmetric forces

• Emerging sectarian and ethnic forces forces play a growing role, particularly Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’ite and Sunni PMFs, Sunni Arab rebel groups in Syria, and various Kurdish Forces.

• Quasi-state actors also play a growing role through train and assist missions, embedded advisors, volunteers, groups like Iranian Al Quds force.

• Civilians increasingly play a role as both non-state actors and as hostages and human shields.

• Contractors and support personnel are de facto non-state actors if they support combat operations.

• So are covert Special Forces, personnel, and intelligence forces like the CIA and MOIS.

10/3/16 65

Non-State “Armies - IISIS, ISIL/Daesh

60,000 maximum including volunteers with little combat capability20,000-35,000 fighters10,000-15,000 inIraq

MBT M1A1 Abrams†*; T-55; T-62; T-72AV; T-72M1RECCE BRDM-2AIFV BMP-1; BTR-4*APCAPC (T) M113*; MT-LBAPC (W) M1117 ASV*PPV ILAV Cougar*; Dzik-3*ARTYSP 122mm 2S1TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46/Type-59; 155mmM198*MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21MOR 120mm M120ATMSL • MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14Spriggan); MilanRCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa (reported); 106mmM40A1*ADSAM • MANPAD FN-6; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)GUNSSP 14.5mm ZPU (tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4; ZSU-23 (tch);57mm S-60 (tch)TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60

Kurdish Pesh Merga

90,00-150,000 with police

MBT T-54; T-55; T-62RECCE EE-9 CascavelAIFV 2+ EE-11 UrutuAPC (T) MT-LB; YW-701 (Type-63)APC (W) M1117 ASV; Wer’wolf MkIIPPV HMMWV; M1114 (up-armoured HMMWV); ILAVCougar 6x6; Otokar APV; IAG Guardian; Streit Spartan;Caiman; Maxxpro; Reva; up to 14 Dingo 1ARTYSP 122mm 2S1TOWED 87.6mm 1+ 25 pdr: 122mm 6+ D-30MRL 107mm Type 63 (tch); 122mm BM-21 (inc mod);HM20MOR 60mm M224; 81mm M252; 120mm M120; 130mmM-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20ATMSL ●MANPATS HJ-8; 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger);9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14Spriggan); up to 60 MilanRCL 73mm SPG-9; 88mm Breda Folgore; 84mm up to 43Carl Gustav; up to 1,000 AT-4; 105mm M40RL 110mm up to 400 Panzerfaust 3ADGUNSSP 14.5mm ZPU-1 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-4 (tch)20mm 53T2 Tarasque (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MTLB);57mm ZSU-57; S-60 (tch)TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4: 20mm 53T2Tarasque; 57mm S-60ARV 1+ Type-653AIRCRAFTReported access to KRG transport/utility helicopters

RoughestimatebasedonIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016,pp.490-49210/3/16 66

Non-State “Armies - I

Hezbollah

7,000-10,000 actives (4,000-8,000 in Syria20,000 reserves

MBT T-72ARTY• MRL 122mm BM-21; 240mm Fadjr 3; 330mm Fadjr5; 610mm Zelzal 2 (reported)AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger);9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); MilanMSL • SRBM Fateh 110/M-600 (reported); SS-1D Scud C(reported); SS-1E Scud D (reported)AD • SAM• MANPAD some possibleUAV some*UCAV some

Rpugh estimatebasedonIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016,pp.490-49210/3/16 67

Most Likely Iranian ThreatsAre Not Formal Conflicts

• Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation)

• Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.

• Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions.

• Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force.

• Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents.

• Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation.

• Strike at critical node or infrastructure.10/3/16 68

The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity

Iranian Actors

Revolutionary GuardsAl Qaeda force

Vevak/other intelligenceArms transfers

Military and security advisorsClerics, pilgrims, shrines

Commercial trainingFinance/investment

Investment/training companiesEducation: scholarships, teachers

Cultural exchangesAthletic visits

Target/Operating

Country

IraqIsraelEgypt

KuwaitBahrain

SyriaYemen

LebanonAfghanistanVenezuela

Related States/Non-State Actors

IranSyria

HezbollahHamas

Mahdi ArmyYemeni Shi’ites

Bahraini Shi’itesSaudi Shi’ites

10/3/16 69

Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - I

• Close ties to Supreme Leader, steadily emerging power base relative to regular forces, in terms of impact on industry, role in Gulf and ballistic/cruise missiles.

• Estimates of total manning differ sharply, as do estimates of detailed order of battle.• Has range of different land-air-sea components plus Al Quds Force for support of foreign forces, and

Basij for defense in depth and internal security.• Estimate based largely on IISS 2016 Military Balance:

• Controls Iran’s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles.

• 100,000+ in land forces with heavy reserve elements, and external defense, and power projection roles. Nominal order of battle is 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran), 3 special operations divisions, 2 armored divisions, 3 armored brigades, 8+ light infantry divisions, 5+ light infantry brigades, 1 airborne brigade. (Equipment holdings not estimated separately.)

• Naval branch has 15,000 men plus 5,000 Marines with 1 Amphibious Brigade. Has some shore batteries plus HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) and other land-based anti-ship missiles. Has 46 missile patrol boats with mix of C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802;and HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) missiles, 35 larger patrol boats without missiles, 32 smaller patrol boats, speedboats with high explosives in prow, 4 LST landing ships (2 can lay mines).

• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force controls Iran’s strategic missile force. Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 missiles) and some Zelzal.

• Basij Resistance Force -- up to 1,000,000 men on mobilization. The IISS describes this as Paramilitary militia, with claimed membership of 12.6 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces.

Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.

10/3/16 70

Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - II

• IHS Jane’s indicates:

• Commanded by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari.

• Land forces train for both conventional and asymmetric warfare, and “mosaic warfare” in irregular defense in depth tactics for attrition warfare. They have some 100,000 personnel, two armored divisions, five mechanized divisions, up to 18 infantry divisions, as well as independent brigades, special forces elements, paratroop units in some 31 detachments. Armor has T-54/55/69/72 tanks, APCs. 48th "Fath" Brigade secures Iran’s Kurds. 33 province-based special units known as Saberin (Patients), able to conduct long-range operations of various types for a prolonged period of time, and with limited logistic support.

• Naval Branch has some 20,000 personnel, trained in asymmetric warfare, including up to four naval infantry brigades with limited sealift capabilities. Equipped withspme313 vessels including 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802 anti-ship missiles, morethan 40 other fast attack craft (with unguided rockets, missiles and some with mine-laying capabilities), coastal defense of anti-ship missiles, up to 20 midget-submarines and swimmer delivery vehicles. Based on islands and coastal areas like Siri Island, Farsi, Halileh, Abu Musa, Khorramshahr, Larak, and Bandar Abbas. Coastal defence forces have naval guns and HY-2 'Seersucker' land-based anti-ship missiles in five to seven sites along coast.

• IRGCAF has five brigades. Deploys 250 FROG 7, 200 Oghab, 250 Shahin-2, 500 Nazet/Iran130, Fateh 110, Fateh A-100, Fath-110D1, 200 Tondar 69, 250 Shahab-1, 50 Shahab-2, 25 Shahab-3, 18 BM-25,Qaim-1, and Emad.

• Some 600,000 Basij regularly train for internal security and defense in attrition forms of defense in depth.


10/3/16 71

The Iranian Al Quds/Qods/Jerusalem Force

• Part of IRGC, but reports directly to Supreme Leader.

• Commander is Major General Qasem Soleimani

• 2,000 to 30,000 personnel? More likely to be smaller, more elite.

• Origin is support Kurds against Saddam in Iran-Iraq War. Has steadily expanded into support of Lebanese Hizbollah, and roles in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Latin America.

• Supported creation of Hizbollahs in other countries.

• May be organized into regional directorates: Europe and U.S , Iraq, Israel/Lebanon/Jordan/Palestinian, Afghanistan/India/Pakistan, Turkey, North Africa, FSU/Latin America?

• Roles include combatants, forward advisors, train and assist, arms transfers, intelligence. Played key role in IED supply in Iraq in 2003-2011

• Coordinates with IRGC, and evidently with MOI/Vevak

10/3/16 72

Source:NewYorkTimes,http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-arabia-iran.html?_r=0

Iranian Influence

10/3/16 73

The “Shi’ite Crescent”

10/3/16 74Source:CIAFactbook

Bahrain’s Vulnerability

Ethnicgroups:Bahraini46%,non-Bahraini54%(2010census)

Languages:Arabic(official),English,Farsi,Urdu

Religions:Muslim(ShiaandSunni)81.2%,Christian9%,other9.8%(2001census)

Population:1,281,332July2013est.countrycomparisontotheworld:157note:includes235,108non-nationals

Agestructure:0-14years:20%(male130,097/female126,067)15-24years:15.9%(male113,973/female89,602)25-54years:56.2%(male472,537/female247,873)55-64years:5.2%(male43,884/female23,352)65yearsandover:2.6%(male16,262/female17,685)(2013est.)\

10/3/16 75Source:CIAWorldFactbook,September28,2016

Yemen and the Gate of Tears

10/3/16 76Source:EIA,https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC

Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series,and material provided by US and Saudi experts..

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenAmphibious Ships 1 1Landing Craft 23 16 9 5 1 28 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial

additional lift if can secure ports

10/3/16 77

The Land Balance in the Gulf

10/3/16 78

The Land Balance• IRGC has superior manpower and mass, as well as large artillery forces. Arab

Gulf states have better weapons, more armor.

• Iraq no longer has the forces to directly challenge Iran, but Iran would have to attack through Iraq by land to reach Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and would be exposed to massive precision air attacks.

• Neither side’s forces are designed, well-organized, or trained to sustain long-range maneuver warfare.

• Iran has limited forced entry amphibious warfare training, and any amphibious force could face a major air and naval threat.

• The balance in joint warfare favors the Arab Gulf states in defensive warfare, particularly with U.S. precision air strike support.

• But, the “Kuwaiti hinge” is vulnerable.

• Much depends on Iraq’s future military relations with Iran.

• The uncertain unity of GCC and Arab Gulf forces makes teffective collective defense uncertain.

• The land threat also includes violent extremist and non-state actors. Civil conflicts are a real threat.

10/3/1679

80

Iran’s Strategic

Depth

10/3/16

Comparative Land Force Manpower

DerivedfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.Note:Kuwait’sReservesincludeallbranchesoftheirmilitary.Theiractualgroundreservemanpowerislower,butbyhowmuchisnotavailabletoIISS.Also,Iran’s1,000,000manBasijResistanceforceisnotincludedbecauseitwouldskewthebalanceofforces.

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenParamilitary 40000 145000 24500 11260 7100 4400 71200

Guards 100000 6400 12000

IRGC 125000

Reserves 350000 23700

Army 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

700000

800000

900000

1000000

10/3/16 81

Comparative Land Force Combat Units - I

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen

SFCompany

IndependentInfantryCompany

SFRegiment

GuardRegiment

SFBattalion

CommandoBattalion

GuardBattalion

SecurityBrigade

AirborneBrigade

SFBrigade

CommandoBrigade

MechanisedBrigade

ArmouredBrigade

GuardBrigade

InfantryBrigade

CommandoDivision

MotorDivision

MechanisedDivision

ArmouredDivision

InfantryDivision

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC10/3/16 82

Comparative Land Force Combat Units - II

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces

Units(sizeandtype) Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen

InfantryDivision 8 4

ArmouredDivision 2 1

MechanisedDivision 4

MotorDivision 2

CommandoDivision 1 1

InfantryBrigade 17 1 1 2 27

GuardBrigade 1 1 1

ArmouredBrigade 10 4 1 3 1 1 2 12

Mechanised Brigade 16 5 3 3 2 11

CommandoBrigade 6

SFBrigade 1 2 1

AirborneBrigade 2 1

SecurityBrigade 1

GuardBattalion 1

CommandoBattalion 1

SFBattalion 1

GuardRegiment 1

SFRegiment 1

IndependentInfantryCompany

SFCompany 1

10/3/16 83

Comparative Armor

Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016duetotheongoingconflict.

Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen

AIFV 240 610 1,667 25 40 0 432 765 405 200

APC 2,502 640 3,981 200 190 206 260 1,573 1,552 258

LTTK/RECCE 73 115 790 22 92 174 11 310 181 130

MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000GroundForcesLandEquipment

MBT LTTK/RECCE APC AIFV

10/3/16 84

Comparative Main Battle Tanks

Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen

MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

ComparativeMainBattleTanks

MBT

Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.10/3/16 85

Comparative Modern Tank Strength, 2016

Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenM-1A2 218 200

M-60A1 150 6 50

M-60A3 180 73 290

Challenger2 38

Leclerc 340

M-84 75

T-72 120 480 70

OF-40 36

Zulfiqar 150

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

ComparativeModernTanks

Zulfiqar OF-40 T-72 M-84 Leclerc Challenger2 M-60A3 M-60A1 M-1A2


Comparative Artillery

Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE GCC Yemen

Self-propelledartillery 48 292 82 28 24 106 224 181 645 25

TowedArtilliery 60 2,030 36 12 108 0 110 93 359 310

MultipleRocketLaunchers 3 1,476 9 6 0 27 60 74 167 294

Mortars 950 5,000 24 45 101 78 437 227 912 642

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Artillery,Rockets,Mortars

Mortars MultipleRocketLaunchers TowedArtilliery Self-propelledartillery


“Power Projection” Limits• Army not structure for sustained maneuver outside Iran.

•Limited land/air and air/sea capabilities.

• Ethnic and/or sectarian limits on occupation and influence.

• Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hammas, Hazara not proxies

• Land movement must sweep through Iraq to “Kuwaiti hinge” or Ar Ar in Saudi Arabia.

• Very limited amphibious forced entry capability with no credible air cover.

• “Closing the Gulf” triggers major war Iran must lose, shuts on trade to Iran.

• Al Quds, arms transfer, volunteers, and training either need strong host country partner or are spoiler functions.

• “Spoiler function” more irritant than way of achieving goals.

• Proliferation breed proliferation, missile breed missiles and missile defenses.

•Intimidation leads to added reliance on US.10/3/16 88

The Kuwaiti “Hinge”

10/3/1689

90

The Air Balance in the Gulf

10/3/16

The Air Balance• The Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage in combat aircraft numbers and

quality, munitions quality, battle management, AC&W, and IS&R.

• This advantage is reinforced by U.S. ad European power projection, stealth,” real time targeting, and precision strike capabilities.

• Iran’s surface-to-air missile systems and land-based sensors are equally limited relative to Gulf Arab and U.S. Systems.

• Iran’s present vulnerabilities could give Arab and U.S. forces both air superiority and survivable deep strike capabilities in a matter of days.

• Iran’s infrastructure and military bases have many critical point targets that are vulnerable to civilian precision strike.

• Iran’s efforts to produce it own aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems have had very limited results, although Iran has been able to keep systems operable and make useful modifications of its own.

• Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile systems offer a potential counter to Arab Gulf and Western airpower, but now lack the required combination of precision strike capability and conventional warhead lethality to be effective.

• Russian and increasingly China can offer far more modern air and land-based air defense systems. The Russian sale of the TOR-M and S300 are cases in point.

10/3/16 91

9210/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016

Air/Missile Threats•Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack.

•Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.

•Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”•Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.

•Strikes again tankers or naval targets.

•Attacks on US-allied facilities

•Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions)

But:

•Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder

•High risk of US and allied intervention.

•Limited threat power projection and sustainability.

•Unclear strategic goal.10/3/16 93

94

Range of Iran’s Air Power


95

Range of GCC Air Power


Comparative Gulf Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. Note: Only armed or combat-capable aircraft are counted, not trainers, recce or other aircraft. Iraq has 6 Cessna AC-208Bs fulfilling dual recce and attack roles. Furthermore, 40-60% of Iran’s force are not operational.

40% to 60% of Iranian

inventory is not

operational

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen

FixedWingCombatAirStrength

10/3/16 96

Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016

Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Jane’s Sentinel series

Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenTyphoon-2 53 53

TornadoADV

TornadoIDS 69 69

Mirage2000 79 12 67

MirageF-1E 10

MiG-29 36 16

MiG-25

MiG-21/21U 18

Su-25 7 10

Su-24 30 31

Su-20/22

F-18 39 39

F-16 4 123 21 24 78

F-15S 70 70

F-15C/D 81 81

F-14 43

F-7M 24

F-5B/E/F 75 12 12 10

F-4D/E 64

JaguarS/B

L-159ALCA 9

Saegheh 6

Azarakhsh 6

0100200300400500600

ComparativeFighter/AttackAircraftin2016

Azarakhsh Saegheh L-159ALCA JaguarS/B F-4D/E F-5B/E/F F-7M F-14

F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-21/21U

MiG-25 MiG-29 MirageF-1E Mirage2000 TornadoIDS TornadoADV Typhoon-2

10/3/16 97

Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft

Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenTyphoon-2 53 53

TornadoADV

TornadoIDS 69 69

Mirage2000 79 12 67

MiG-29 36 16

MiG-25

Su-25 7 10

Su-24 30 31

Su-20/22

F-18 39 39

F-16 4 123 21 24 78

F-15S 70 70

F-15C/D 81 81

F-14 43

F-7M 24

F-5B/E/F 75 12 12 10

F-4D/E 64

Saegheh 6

0100200300400500600

HighQualityFighter/AttackAircraft

Saegheh F-4D/E F-5B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18

Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage2000 TornadoIDS TornadoADV Typhoon-2

Source:AdaptedfromtheIISS,MilitaryBalance,2016.AllnumbersfromYemenaretakenfromIISS,MilitaryBalance,2015duetolackofdatefrom2016becauseoftheongoingconflict.

10/3/16 98

10210/3/16

10310/3/16

Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance Aircraft, 2016

Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenCH-2000 8

Cessna208B 3 8

SB7L-360 2

Da-20FalconELINT

RF-4E 6

Mirage2000RAD 7

E-3AAWACS

TornadoIDS 69

P-3MPOrion 5

P-F3Orion

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

ComparativeGulfAC&W,ELINT,andReconnaissanceAircraft

P-F3Orion P-3MPOrion TornadoIDS E-3AAWACS Mirage2000RAD RF-4E Da-20FalconELINT SB7L-360 Cessna208B CH-2000


Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft

Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenDa-20Falcon 3

P-3F 3

RF-4E 6

Mirage2000RAD 7

Cessna208B 8 8

SB7L-360 2

E-3A 5

TornadoGR1A 12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

GulfReconnaissanceandAWACSAircraft

TornadoGR1A E-3A SB7L-360 Cessna208B Mirage2000RAD RF-4E P-3F Da-20Falcon


10/3/16 106

Gulf Attack & Naval Helicopters


Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE YemenAH-1F 12

L-159 2

Mi-28NE 9

RH-53D 3

Mi-25 24

Mi-35 16 8

AS-332Exocet 7

CommandoExocet 8

SH-3D 10

AH-1E 16

AH-1J 50

SA-342HOT 11 13

AS-532Exocet 3 10

AS-560C3

AS-565 15 7

AH-64 16 39 30

0102030405060708090100

AH-64 AS-565 AS-560C3 AS-532Exocet SA-342HOT AH-1J

AH-1E SH-3D CommandoExocet AS-332Exocet Mi-35 Mi-25

RH-53D Mi-28NE L-159 AH-1F

10/3/16 107

Gulf Armed Helicopters in 2016

83

32

83

2225

16

39

78

8

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenIraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait SaudiArabia UAE Yemen

Helicopters 73 65 34 39 16 29 109 102 8

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

ArmedHelicopters


Gulf Land-Based

Air Defen

sesIn

2011

Country M a j o r SAM Light SAM AA Guns Bahrain 8 I Hawk MIM-23B 6 0 R BS-70 27 guns 18 FIM-92A Stinger 1 5 Oerlikon 35 mm 7 Crotale 12 L/70 40 mm Iran 16/150 I Hawk SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 1,700 Guns 3/10 SA-5 29 SA-15 ZSU-23-4 23mm 45 SA-2 Guideline S o me QW-1 Misaq ZPU-2/4 23mm 29 TOR-M1 ZU-23 23mm Some HN-5 M-1939 37mm 5/30 Rapier S-60 57mm 10 Pantsyr (SA-22) ZSU-57-2 Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat Some FIM-92A Stinge r ____________ Iraq Kuwait 5 / 24 I Hawk Phase III 1 2 Aspide 12 Oerlikon 35mm 5/40 Patriot PAC-2 1 2 S t a rburst Aspide Stinger Oman None Blowpipe 26 guns 8 Mistral 2 SP 4 ZU-23-2 23 mm 12 Panstsyr S1E 10 GDF-005 Skyguard 35 mm 34 SA-7 12 L-60 40 mm 6 Blindfire S713 Martello 20 Javelin 40 Rapier Qatar None 10 Blowpipe ? 12 FIM-92A Stinger 9 Roland II 24 Mistral 20 SA-7 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Saudi Arabia 1 6 /128 I Hawk 40 Crotale 1,220 guns 4-6/16-24 Patriot 2 5 00 Stinger (ARMY) 9 2 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm 17/73 Shahine Mobile 5 00 Mistral (ADF) 30 M-167 Vulcan 20 mm (NG) 16/96 PAC-2 launchers 5 00 FIM-43 Redeye 8 50 AMX-30SA 30 mm 17 ANA/FPS-117 radar 5 0 0 R e d e ye (ADF ) 1 2 8 G DF Oerlikon 35mm 73/68 Crotale/Shahine 7 3 -141 Shahine static 1 50 L-70 40 mm (in store) 130 M-2 90 mm (NG) UAE 2/6/36 I Hawk 20+ Blowpipe 62 guns 20 Mistral 42 M-3VDA 20 mm SP Some Rapier 20 GCF-BM2 30 mm Some Crotale Some RB-70 Some Javelin Some SA-18 Yemen S o me SA-2, 3 Some 800 SA-7 530 guns Some SA-6 SP Some SA-9 SP 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm Some SA-13 SP 50 ZSU-23-4 SP 23 mm Some SA-14 100 ZSU-23-2 23 mm 150 M-1939 37 mm 50 M-167 20mm 120 S-60 57 mm 40 M-1939 KS-12 85 mm Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 10/3/16 109

Comparative Land-Based Air Defenses: 2016


Country MajorSAM LightSAM AAGunsBahrain Total:6 Total:7+ Total:24

6MIM-23BI-HAWK 7Crotale 12Oerlikon35mmRBS-70 12L/7040mmFIM-92AStinger

Iran Total:205+ Total:529+ Total:1,122+150+MIM-23BI-HAWK/Shahin SPHQ-7(reported) ZU-2323mm10S-200Angara (SA-5Gammon) 250FM-80Crotale Oerlikon37mm45S-75Dvina (SA-2Guideline) 30Rapier 100ZSU-23-423mm

15Tigercat 80ZSU-57-257mm299K331Tor-M1(SA-15Gauntlet )(reported) ZPU-214.5mmFIM-92AStinger ZPU-414.5mm9K32Strela- 2(SA-7Grail ) 300ZU-23-223mm9K36Strela- 3(SA-14Gremlin ) 92Skyguard 35mmMisaq 1(QW-1Vanguard ) M-193937mmMisaq2(QW-18) 50L/7040mm9K338Igla-S (SA-24Grinch )(reported) 200S-6057mmHN-54 300M-193985mm

Iraq Total:N/A Total:3+ Total:Unknown3+96K6Pantsir- S1(SA-22Greyhound ) ZU-2323mmM1097Avenger S-6057mm9K338Igla-S (SA-24Grinch )

Kuwait Total:40 Total:24+ Total:12+40MIM-104DPatriot PAC-2 FIM-92AStinger 12+Oerlikon35mm

Starburst12Aspide12Skyguard/Aspide

Oman Total:N/A Total:62+ Total:268Mistral2 4ZU-23-223mm14+Javelin 10GDF-00535mm9K32Strela- 2(SA-7Grail ) 12L/6040mm40Rapier

Qatar Total:N/A Total:33+ Total:N/A24Mistral9Roland IIBlowpipeFIM-92AStinger9K32Strela -2(SA-7Grail )

SaudiArabia Total:394 Total:940+ Total:1,380128MIM-23BI-HAWK 40+Crotale 122M163Vulcan 20mm108MIM-140D/FPatriotPAC-2GEM/PAC-3 400M1097Avenger 850AMX-30SA30mm73Shahine 500Mistral 128GDFOerlikon35mm68Crotale/Shahine FIM-92AStinger 150L/7040mm(stored)17AN/FPS-117Radar 130M290mm

UAE Total:Unknown Total:50+ Total:62MIM-23BI-HAWK Blowpipe 42M3VDAA20mmPatriotPAC-3 Mistral 20GCF-BM230mm

CrotaleRB-705096K6Pantsir -S1RapierJavelin9K38Igla (SA-18Grouse )

Yemen* N/A N/A N/A

S300inDelivery

10/3/16 110

Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - I

10/3/16 111

112

Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II

10/3/16

113

Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II

10/3/16


10/3/16 114

11510/3/16

11610/3/16

PrimeManufacturer

Designation Development/Production

Operation PayloadWt.

Endurance(hr.)

Range Ceiling(ft.)

Mission

Unknown Stealth Underway/Underway

Deployed 700km

R/S*

HESA Ababil(Swallow)

Complete/Underway

Deployed 45kg 1.5+ 150km

14,000 MultiplevariantsforR/S*- attack– ISR**

ShahbalGroup,SharifUniv.

Shahbal Underway 5.5kg 12km 4,500 R/S*

Asr-eTalaiFactories

Mini-UAV Underway Surveillance

FARC Sobakbal Underway/Underway

Deployed 0.35kg 2 2.7-13.5mi

19,686 Surveillance

QodsAeronauticsIndustries

MohajerII/III(Dorna);MohajerIV(Hodhod);SaeqehI/II;TallashI/Endeavor;TallashIIHadaf3000

Complete/Underway

Deployed MultiroleakaLightningBoltTargetdrone-akaTarget3000

Illustrative Iranian UAV Projects /Assets

Source: Adapted by Adam C. Seitz from AIAA Aerospace 9 Worldwide UAV Roundup; available at: http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf.

*R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; **ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance /Reconnaissance

Iran is developing a range of UCAVs, and has made recent claims to a long-range “stealth” UCAV bomber

10/3/16

117

Key Targets that Illustrate Iran’s Vulnerability

• Critical dependence on refineries with high cost, long lead facilities and on imports of product.

• Minimal power grid that can be crippled or destroyed selectively on a regional or national basis.

• Gas production and distribution facilities needed by Iran’s domestic economy.

• Key bridges, tunnels, overpasses and mountain routes for road and rail traffic.

• Gulf tanker loading facilities, oil storage and and tanker terminals – for mining or direct attack.

• Key military production facilities• Command and control centers.• Communications grids.• Airfield and air bases.• IRGC land, air, and naval facilities.

• Coastal naval bases and port facilities.10/3/16 118

The Naval Balance in the Gulf

10/3/16 119

The Naval Balance• There really is no naval balance in so limited an AOR, just a naval

component to joint naval-air-missile warfare.

• Surface, submarine, and air-sea warfare dominated by U.S. naval and air presence;

• Arab Gulf states have superior modern surface ships.

• Iran has lead in asymmetric warfare, land-based anti-ship missiles.

• Mine warfare is a key issue. Iran has over 6,000 mines and stocks of smart mines; can use virtually any surface ship to emplace them.

• Submarines and submersibles, dispersing smaller ships will allow Iran to operate for a while, but capability is uncertain, as is value of such operations.

• Both sides face reality that any major conflict can escalate to broader land and air, shut off or sharply cut petroleum exports.

• Arab-U.S. joint warfare advantage less clear if Iran can lock the conflict into a low level irregular war of attrition where decisive escalation is difficult.

• Balance would shift if Iran could gain basing in Yemen.

10/3/16 120

Naval Threats

• Low intensity naval war of attrition, random acts of mining, raids, etc.

•Iranian effort to “close the Gulf.”

• Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.

• Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”• Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.

• “Deep strike” with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean.

• Attacks on US and allied (ally) facilities

But:

• Very weak air-sea capabilities, vulnerable escalation ladder.

•High risk of US and allied intervention.

•Limited threat power projection and sustainability.

•Unclear strategic goal.

10/3/16 121

Total Naval Forces

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenSupport 50 21 2 2 6 2 5 2

AmphibiousShips 17 1 1 1

LandingCraft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3

Mine 5 7 2 1

OtherPatrol 108 32 70 6 42 42 16 6 39

MissilePatrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20

Corvettes 7 4 2 2 9

Frigates 4 1 3

Destroyers 3

Submarines 29 2 10

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces10/3/16 122

Key Combat Warships and Submersibles in 2016

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenMissilePatrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20

MajorSurfaceCombatants 7 1 3

Submarines 29 2 10

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Submarines MajorSurfaceCombatants MissilePatrol

10/3/16 123

Missile-Armed Combat Warships

Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Jane’s Sentinel and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

.

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenCorvettes 7 4 2 2 9

Frigates 4 1 3

Destroyers 3

PatrolBoatswithGuidedMissiles(PBG) 8

FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissleswithCIWSmissileorSAM(PCFGM) 2

FastPatrolCraftwithGuidedMissles(PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6

FastPatrolBoatwithGuidedMissles(PBFG) 54 12

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

10/3/16 124

Closing the Gulf:

The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air Threat to Maritime Traffic

10/3/16 125

Closing the Gulf

• Far better for political leverage and intimidation than in actual fighting.

• So critical to world economy may well lead to immediate military intervention; so critical to Gulf economies that will push Arab states to decisive escalation to force Iran to halt.

• U.S. and Arab Gulf can achieve rapid air superiority, put Iranian targets at risk. Iranian conventionally armed missiles now too inaccurate to be real counter threat.

• Even conflict contained to Gulf affects exports and imports of Iran as well as Arab Gulf states.

• Also pushes all Arab Gulf states to act together.

• Limited military action and attrition might work, but still presents major risk of escalation.

• The key issue is can every incident or clash be controlled, what happens if Iran’s leadership feels it faces a critical threat to its survival.

10/3/16 126

baran48

Highlight

Most Alternative Routes Have Little or No Surplus Capacity or Are Not Operating

EIA:http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/images/Oil%20and%20Gas%20Infrastructue%20Persian%20Gulf%20%28large%29.gif

10/3/16 127

baran48

Highlight

IRGC Naval Forces

Source:AdaptedfromIISS,TheMilitaryBalance2011,variouseditionsandJane’sSentinelseries

The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around 5,000 men.

The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles.

The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.

The IRGC controls Iran’s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker land-based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.

The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.

IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities.

Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities.

Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.

Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.

Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.

10/3/16 128

baran48

Highlight

Iranian Gulf Military Installations


Bandar-eKhomeini(30°25'41.42"N,49° 4'50.18"E)

Bandar-eMahshahr(30°29'43.62"N,49°12'23.91"E)

Khorramshahr(30°26'2.71"N,48°11'34.25"E)

KharkIsland(29°14'48.01"N,50°19'48.88"E)

Bandar-eBushehr(28°58'2.58"N,50°51'50.74"E)

Asalouyeh(27°27'21.08"N,52°38'15.55"E

Bandar-eAbbas(Navalbase:27° 8'35.79"N,56°12'45.61"E;IRGCNmissileboatbase:27° 8'30.91"N,56°12'5.58"E;IRGCNtorpedo&MLRSboatbase:27° 8'21.13"N,56°11'53.28"E;Hovercraftbaseandnearbynavalairstrip:27° 9'15.68"N,56° 9'49.97"E)

Jask(25°40'40.90"N,57°51'4.54"E)

Bostanu(27° 2'58.22"N,55°59'3.22"E)

ChabaharIRGCNbase.ItisthefarthesteastofallofIran’smilitaryportfacilities.

Qeshm(26°43'10.09"N,55°58'30.94"E)

SirriIsland(25°53'40.20"N,54°33'7.82"E)

AbuMusa(25°52'22.32"N,55° 0'38.62"E)OccupiedbyIranbutclaimedbytheUAE.SuspectedtohouseasmallnumberofIRGCNforces.AlsoknowntohouseHAWKSAMsandHY-2“Silkworm”anti-shipmissiles.

GreaterTunbandLesserTunb(GT:26°15'54.33"N,55°19'27.75"E;LT:26°14'26.08"N,55° 9'21.18"E)OccupiedbyIranbutclaimedbytheUAE.HometoheavilyfortifiedairstripsandAAguns.

12910/3/16

Abu Musa

Source: Google maps 10/3/16 130

Key Iranian and Gulf Ships for Asymmetric Warfare

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane’s Sentinel series; Saudi experts

A wide range of civilian ships,

including small craft and ferries, and

aircraft can easily be adapted for, or used

as is, for such missions

10/3/16 131

Patrol Boats

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenFastPatrolBoat(PBF) 51 6 25 32 3 7 58 10

PatrolBoats 42 20 64 33 20 31 9 59 28

PTG 15

Off-shorePatrolCraft(PCO) 2 4 1

CoastalParolCraft(PCC) 4 3

RiverinePatrolBoat(PBR) 6

PatrolBoatswithGuidedMissiles(PBG) 8




0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200


Missile Armed Patrol Boats

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenPatrolBoatswithGuidedMissiles(PBG) 8




0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80


Midget Submarines


IS-120Qadir “midget”submarineNumberinService:16Displacement:120tonsSpeed:11kts surfaced/8kts submergedMaxDepth:UnknownArmament:2x533mmtorpedoes.Cancarryminesinsteadoftorpedoes.SomereportingindicatesthatMANPADsarecarriedaboard.Electronics:IBandsurfacesearchornavigationSonar:Active/Passive

Nahong-class:NumberinService:1Displacement:100tonsSpeed:8ktsMaxDepth:200mArmament:2x533mmtorpedoesindropcollars.Canalsocarry4MDM-6orEM-52smartmines.Electronics:Surfacesearchornavigationradar.Sonar:Bow-mountedactive/passivesonar.EW:ESMmastsimilartoRussian“StopLight”type.

Note:TheNahong isreportedlystationedintheCaspianSea,butcanbetransportedoverlandtotheGulf.

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Mine Warfare Ships

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenOceanMineSweeper(MSO) 1

OceanMineHunter(MHO) 2

CoastalMineHunter(MHC) 3

CoastalMineCountermeasures(MCC) 4

InshoreMineSweeprs(MSI) 2

CoastalMineSweepers(MSC) 3

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: A wide range of civilian and military ships, including small craft and aircraft can easily be adapted or used as is for mine laying, including the use of free floating mines10/3/16 135

Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft

Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE YemenAmphibiousShips 17 1 1 1

LandingCraft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Note: Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure ports.10/3/16 136

137

Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, February 2011,

• 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point.

•Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median

•Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km.

•Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes,

•Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment.

•Covert as well as overt sensors.

10/3/16 137

Hormuz: Depth EIA Estimate in 11/2014:

TheStraitofHormuzistheworld'smostimportantchokepointwithanoilflowof17millionbarrelsperdayin2013,about30%ofallseaborne-tradedoil.LocatedbetweenOmanandIran,theStraitofHormuzconnectsthePersianGulfwiththeGulfofOmanandtheArabianSea.TheStraitofHormuzistheworld'smostimportantoilchokepointbecauseofitsdailyoilflowof17millionbarrelsperdayin2013.FlowsthroughtheStraitofHormuzin2013wereabout30%ofallseaborne-tradedoil.EIAestimatesthatmorethan85%ofthecrudeoilthatmovedthroughthischokepointwenttoAsianmarkets,basedondatafromLloyd'sListIntelligencetankertrackingservice.Japan,India,SouthKorea,andChinaarethelargestdestinationsforoilmovingthroughtheStraitofHormuz.Qatarexportedabout3.7trillioncubicfeet(Tcf)peryearofliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)throughtheStraitofHormuzin2013,accordingtoBP'sStatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy2014.Thisvolumeaccountsformorethan30%ofglobalLNGtrade.KuwaitimportsLNGvolumesthattravelnorthwardthroughtheStraitofHormuz.Atitsnarrowestpoint,theStraitofHormuzis21mileswide,butthewidthoftheshippinglaneineitherdirectionisonlytwomileswide,separatedbyatwo-milebufferzone.TheStraitofHormuzisdeepandwideenoughtohandletheworld'slargestcrudeoiltankers,withabouttwo-thirdsofoilshipmentscarriedbytankersinexcessof150,000deadweighttons.

10/3/16 138https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point

10/3/16 139Source:EIA,https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

Pipelinesavailableasbypassoptions

MostpotentialoptionstobypassHormuzarecurrentlynotoperational.OnlySaudiArabiaandtheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)presentlyhavepipelinesabletoshipcrudeoiloutsideofthePersianGulfandhaveadditionalpipelinecapacitytocircumventtheStraitofHormuz.Attheendof2013,thetotalavailableunusedpipelinecapacityfromthetwocountriescombinedwasapproximately4.3millionbbl/d

OperatingpipelinesthatbypasstheStraitofHormuz

Map of Arabian Sea

10/3/16 140

141

Location of Gulf Oil Fields

Source: M. Izady, 2006 http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml

Hunbli

10/3/16 141

142

Avoiding Hormuz: Limited Options

Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, December 1, 2014

• Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d

• Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56- inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity.

• Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil.

• The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl/d.

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143

The Saudi Petro-Target Base

Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SAU; DOE/EIA, September 2104, 10/3/16 143

144

The UAE Petro-Target Base

Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=ARE; DOE/EIA, May 2015, 10/3/16 144

Iran’s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - IKharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d.

Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5.5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d.

Sirri Island serves as a loading port for the SirriBlend that is produced in the offshore fieldsoff the island. Its storage capacity is 4.5 million barrels.19

Neka is Iran's Caspian Sea port that was built in 2003 to receive crude oil imports from theCaspian region producers under swap agreements. The port has a storage capacity of 1 million barrels and can handle 100,000 b/d of crude oil, according to FGE.20 The terminal, which has not operated since 2011, was previously used to facilitate swap agreements withAzerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Under these agreements, Iran received crude oil at its Caspian Sea port of Neka, which was processed in the Tehran and Tabriz refineries. In return, Iran exported the same amount of crude oil through its Persian Gulf ports.21 Therehave been talks to revive the swaps, but it is unclear when they might restart.

The export terminals Bandar Mahshahr and Abadan (also known as Bandar Imam Khomeini) are near the Abadan refinery and are used to export refined product from the Abadan refinery.

Bandar Abbas, located near the northern end of the Strait of Hormuz, is Iran's main fuel oil export terminal Iran has an expansive domestic oil network including more than 10 pipelines that run between 63 and 630 miles in length.

EIA, Country Briefs, “Iran,” June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN10/3/16 145

Iran’s Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - II

EIA, Country Briefs, “Iran,” June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN

Refineries Gas Infrastructure

10/3/16 146

Missile Forces and Threats

10/3/16 147

10/3/16 148

• Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack. Growing possibility of precision ballistic and cruise missile and UCAV attack with conventional warheads• Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.• Variation on 1983-1986 air confrontation tactics, “Fahd line”• Strikes on offshore facilities.• Strikes again tankers or naval targets.• Attacks on US-allied facilities• Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions) But:• Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation ladder• High risk of US and allied intervention.• Limited threat power projection and sustainability.• Unclear strategic goal

Air/Ballistic and Cruise Missile/UCAV Threats

Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014- I

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Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 - II

10/3/16 152

Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 -III

10/3/16 153

Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016 - I IISS Estimate:

• IRGC Controls Iran’s IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCASF) controls Iran’s strategic missile force.

• Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). • Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2,

and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 missiles) and some Zelzal

Jane’s IHS Estimate: • IRGCASF), consists of five brigades, as follows:

• 15th Ghaem Missile Brigade, equipped with short-range missiles such as Fajr.

• 5th Ra'ad Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab-3/4, based in the Karaj area, northwest of Tehran.

• 7th Al-Hadid Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab 1 and 2 (Scud B and C) missiles, based in the Karaj area; facilities under the control of this brigade are said to include the Imam Ali Missile Site in Khorramabad, western Iran.

• 19th Zulfeqar Missile Brigade, equipped with Nazeat and Zelzal short-range missiles, based in the Karaj area.

• 23rd Towhid Missile Brigade, based at Khorramabad.

• Deployed Missiles Include:• 200 Oghab Tactical missile 200 (40 Km)

• 250 FROG 7 Tactical rocket system (70 Km)

• 500 Nazeat/Iran 130 Tactical missile (140-300 Km)

• ? 200 Tondar 69 (CSS-8/M-7) Ballistic missile (150 Km)

• ? Fateh 110 Ballistic missile (160-250 Km)


10/3/16 154

Estimates of Iran’s Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016- II • ? Fateh A-110 Ballistic missile (250-300 Km)• 250 Shahab-1 (SS-1c 'Scud B') Ballistic missile (300 Km) • 50 Shahab-2 (SS-1d 'Scud C') Ballistic missile (500 Km)• ? Fateh-110-D1 (Fateh 313) Ballistic missile (500 Km) Precision strike• ? Qiam 1 Ballistic missile (700 Km)• 25 Shahab-3 (No-dong 2) Ballistic missile (1,100-1,400 Km)• ? Emad Ballistic missile (1,700 Km)• 250 Shahin-2 Tactical missile (2,000 Km)• ? BM-25 (Zelzal) ballistic missile (18 reported) (2,500 Km

Other Claimed or Developing Types Include:• ? Khalij Fars (150-300 Km) Anti-ship variant of Fateh 110

• ? Hormuz-1 (300 Km) anti-radiation homing

• ? Hormuz-2 (300 Km) electro-optical guidance

• ? Qadr F (1,600 Km)

• ? Ghadr-1 (1,800 Km)

• ? Shahab 3A (1,500-1,800 Km)

• ? Shahab 3B (2,000-2,500 Km)

• ? Qadr H ( 2,000 Km) improved MRV

• ? Qadr S (2,000 Km) cluster munitions warhead

• ? KH-25/Soumar cruise missile (2,000-3,000 Km)

• ? Seiji-2 (ex-Ashura) ballistic missile (2,000-2,200km)

• ? ICBM


10/3/16 155

156

Source: Adapted by Dr. Abdullah Toukan from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, “Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems,” April 12, 2016.10/3/16

Arab Gulf Missile and Artillery Rocket Forces

Bahrain: 9 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units with 30 ATACMS missiles.Egypt: 26 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units plus; 48 BM-24 240mm artillery rocket fire units in storage. Missile forces include 42+ launchers: 9 FROG-7, 24 Sakr-80 and 9 Scud-B.Iraq: 3 TOS-1/1A artillery rocket launchersIsrael: Israel is “widely believed” to have a nuclear armed missile capability – with 3 Jericho squadrons with Jericho 1 SRBMs and Jericho 2 IRBMs, and Dolphin-class SSKs with land-attack cruise missiles.Jordan: 12 227mm HIMARS and 2+ 273mm WM-80 artillery rockets.Kuwait: 27 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets.Oman: N/AQatar: 4 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers.Saudi Arabia: 60 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Ballistic missiles include10+ DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM fire units with 40 missiles, and some DF-21 (CSS-5 – variant unclear) MRBM fire units.UAE: 20 227mm HIMARS and 6 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets.Yemen: The following forces were reported before Saudi Arabia claimed to have largely destroyed them in its April 2015 bombing campaign: 12 FROG-7 launchers, 10 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) launchers; and 6 Scud-B (33 missiles).Sources: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, 303-362; material form HIS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

10/3/16 157

Iran: Major Open Source Missile and WMD Facilities

Source:NTI,http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers,September201210/3/16 158

Source: AFP, https://www.google.com/search?q=Iran+missile+range+maps&tbm=isch&imgil=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%253B4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.nbcnews.com%25252Fid%25252F6643614%25252Fns%25252Fworld_news%25252Ft%25252Fnew-concern-iran-developing-long-range-missile%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%252C4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%252C_&usg=__YWqUhbXUBBDGOqaM_CLOxS9P8LU%3D&biw=1239&bih=726&ved=0ahUKEwiSgdiouP_NAhWFej4KHTlHBQ4QyjcIKw&ei=JBGOV5LfKYX1-QG5jpVw#imgrc=i0Bz7UEiTqz2IM%3A

Range of Deployed Missiles

10/3/16 159

Source: Stratfor, http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://digitaljournal.com/img/1/2/2/8/5/5/i/5/7/1/o/iran_missile_map.jpg&imgrefurl=http://digitaljournal.com/image/57146&h=364&w=400&sz=56&tbnid=nAmeBGGgErdwGM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=99&zoom=1&docid=fih86K5v8K5dAM&sa=X&ei=A947T_D9Ncbr0gHIvMjRCw&ved=0CDUQ9QEwAw&dur=235

Iranian Missile Range

10/3/16 160

How Estimates of Range-Payload Vary: Shehab 3

10/3/16 161

Missile Attack Range and Density

Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 10/3/16 162

163

Iranian Missile Range for 1,000 kg Payload


Missile Attack Timing

Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 10/3/16 166

Missile Accuracy, Reliability, and Targeting

Source: Digital Globe And “2012 Annual Defense, Report,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, ,12 December 2012, p., 47

10/3/16 167

Illustrative Key Target: Ras Tanura


Illustrative Key Target: Desalination Plant


170

Missile Wars and Missile Defense

10/3/16

Missile Defenses• Many of the Arab Gulf states already have Patriot systems that provide limited point defense capability

against most Iranian ballistic missile missiles, and cruise missiles. • Qatar and the UAE have indicated they will acquire THAAD theater missile defense systems with wider

area coverage.• The U.S. has deployed two AEGIS/Standard missile defense ships, provides radar coverage, and has

indicated it will provide satellite launch warning and vector data.• The GCC has discussed an integrated missile defense system with an initial emphasis on

AEGIS/Standard.• No clear architecture for a missile defense system has been publically proposed, and there has been no

open discussion of a layered system to cover artillery rockets of the kind proposed by Israel.• Experts differ on Iran’s ability to create penetration aids, and launch salvos of missiles and rockets that

could saturate Arab Gulf and U.S. defenses.• Reliable public data are not available on the ability to discriminate between systems that could hit key

target categories vs. misses, between newer and older missile types, and single out precision-guided Iranian systems once deployed.

• Costs are an issue. Advanced anti-missile missiles are far more costly than older Iranian ballistic missiles.• Low flying cruise missiles pose a very different challenge.• There has been no open discussion of the level of mutual deterrence provided by the overall balance of

ballistic and cruise missiles. land-based air and missile defenses, and air strike capabilities.• Iran may acquire some missile defense capability from Russia with the TOR-M and S300 and obtain

more advanced systems.• The Arab Gulf states may acquire more offensive missiles, and/or obtain “extended deterrence” through

U.S. ballistic or cruise missile deployments. 10/3/16 171

Sea Based Air Defenses:U.S. Navy’s Role in Missile Defense Network

RoleoftheU.S.NavyAegisSystem:

• Willprovideanefficientandhighlymobilesea-baseddefenseagainstShortandMedium– RangeBallisticMissilesintheirmidcoursephase.

• ThesystemwillallowtheBMDCommandtomoveitsdefensecapabilitiesclosetotheenemysites.• ThesystemwillhavetheEngagement&LongRangeTrackingCapability

• InterceptingShorttoMediumRangeBallisticMissilesinthemidcoursephaseoftheflightwithStandardMissile– 3.

• Servesasaforwarddeployedsensor,providingearlywarningandlongrangesearch&trackcapabilitiesforICBMsandIRBMs.

Contributions:

•WillextendthebattlespaceoftheBMDsandcontributetoanintegratedlayereddefense.TheNavalAegissystemextendstherangeoftheGroundMissiledefense(GMD)elementbyprovidingreliabletrackdatausedtocalculatefiringsolutions.• AegisBMDwillcoordinateengagementsofshortandmediumrangeballisticmissileswithterminalmissiledefensesystems.

• Astrackinginformationissharedamongthesesystems,theBMDSwillhavetheopportunitytofollowtheengagementofatargetduringthemidcoursesegmentwithcoordinatedterminalengagements.

(Source:MissileDefenseAgency.(MDA)DepartmentofDefense.“TestingBuildingConfidence”,2009) 17210/3/16

Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016 174

Country TBMDSystem

UAE • TheUAE issofarthefirstGCCcountrytobuytheTerminalHighAltitudeAirDefense(THAAD)missilesystem.

• OnDec31,2011PentagonannouncedthattheUAEwillbebuying2fullTHAADbatteries,96missiles,2RaytheonAN/TPY-2radars,and30yearsofspareparts.TotalValue$3.34billion.

• In2008theUAEorderedPatriotPAC-3:10fireunits,172missiles,Firstdelivery2009.

Kuwait July2012,Pentagon informedCongressofaplantosellKuwait$4.2billioninweaponsystems,including60PAC-3missiles,20launchingplatformsand4radars.Thiswillbeinadditiontothe350Patriotmissilesboughtbetween2007and2010.In1992,Kuwaitbought210oftheearliergenerationPatriotsand25launchers.Kuwaitboughtafurther140morein2007.

SaudiArabia In2011Saudi Arabiasigneda$1.7billionUScontracttoupgradeit’sPatriotanti-missilesystem.

Qatar TheU.S.isbuildingaMissileWarningFacilityinQatarthatwouldutilizeanAN/TPY-2-XBandRadar.

(Source:AnthonyCordesmanandAlexanderWilner,“IranandtheGulfMilitaryBalance-1”July11,2012)

GCC Missile Defense Upgrades

17510/3/16

177(Source:AbdullahToukan)10/3/16 Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016

178

The Uncertain Nuclear andWMD Threat

10/3/16

The Nuclear and WMD Balance

• The successful “Implementation Day” phase of the UN/P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran has deprived it if its known near-term ability to deploy a meaningful nuclear weapons force.

• Israel, India, Pakistan, the U.S. and Russia, however, are all nuclear powers.• Iran has kept all of its past weapon design technology, many key production

capabilities, and remains on the edge of the nuclear threshold. The problem is deferred, not solved.

• Precision-guided conventional missiles may, however, offer Iran a safer and more usable alternative.

• Arab state ability to actually develop and produce nuclear weapons is uncertain. But Pakistan might sell them, and/or the U.S. might offer extended deterrence.

• Iran and the larger Arab states are capable of developing and producing genetically engineered biological weapons. There are no reports of such activity, but they are very easy to conceal.

• Iran has reported that it is a chemical weapons state. It has said it no longer has such weapons, but has not provided a detailed inventory or indication of what happened to them.

10/3/16 179

SRBM:ShortRangeBallisticMissileMRBM:MediumRangeBallisticMissileIRBM:IntermediateRangeBallisticMissileICBM:IntercontinentalBallisticMissile

Missiles and States with Nuclear Weapons

Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016 180

The Impact of the JCPOAKey Positives

•Lost near-term capability to produce fissile material.

• Now under tight and demanding inspection regime.

• No-expiration date to non-proliferation, ten years of effective controls unless withdraws.

• Drop in oil prices sharply cuts benefits.

Key Negatives

• Retains nuclear technology and weapons design data, centrifuge upgrade capability: “Semi Threshold State.”

• Missile developments continue.

• Some covert capabilities: Design, simulation, components.

• Major increase in export capability, several $billion in income released.

• Uncertain “snap back” of sanctions.

• Easing of access to other arms sales10/3/16 181

What Happened on “Implementation Day”• VerifiablydismantledandstoredunderIAEAsealmorethan13,000centrifugemachines,

includingitsmoreadvancedcentrifuges,leavingTehranwith6,104first-generationIR-1machines,ofwhich5,104weretobeallowedtocontinuetoenrichuraniumtolowlevels(3.67percentU-235)forenergyproductionpurposes.Theremaining1,044centrifugeswerelocatedattheundergroundsiteinamountainatFordo,whichcanonlybeusedformedicalisotopeproduction.

• Agreedtolimituraniumenrichmenttotheagreedlevelsfor10years,afterwhichthetwosidesagreedthatIran’suraniumenrichmentcapacitywouldremainconstantforseveralyears,buttheIrancouldslowlyphaseinmoreadvancedcentrifugestoslowlyreplaceitIR-1s.

• Shippedover8.5tonsofallformsoflowenricheduraniummaterialtoRussia,leavingIranwithaworkingstockpileofjust300kilogramsofuraniumenrichedtonomorethan3.67percentU-235— farlessthannecessarytoenrichfurtherforonebomb.Thestockpilecapandprohibitiononenrichmentabove3.67percentwillremaininplaceforthenext15years.

• RemovedthecoreoftheArakreactorandfillthechannelswithcement,renderingitinoperable.Theworld’ssixmajorpowers,alsoknownastheEU3+3orP5+1,workedwithIranonanewdesign,whichwilloptimizemedicalisotopeproduction.Thechangeswillalsosignificantlylowertheoutputofweapons-gradeplutoniumtolessthanonekilogramperyear—farbelowtheamountnecessaryforoneweapon.Chinaagreedtoapprovedthemodifieddesign.

• AllowedtheIAEA’smonitoringandinspectionsauthoritytobestrengthened,inadditiontothestandardIAEAmonitoringalreadyinplace.ThisincludedtheimplementationofIran’sAdditionalProtocolagreementwiththeIAEA,whichgavetheU.N.nuclearwatchdogshort-noticeaccesstovirtuallyanysitetheagencybelievesmaybeinvolvedinillicitnuclearactivities,evenmilitaryfacilities.IranwasalsorequiredtoimplementCode3.1ofIran’sexistingcomprehensivesafeguardsagreement,whichrequiresearliernotificationofnuclearactivitiesandfacilitydesignchanges.

• IranbeganallowingcontinuousIAEAmonitoringofenrichmentactivitiesattheNatanzandtheFordofacilitiesandcentrifugeproduction.Themonitoringwillcontinuefor20years.IranalsoagreedtoallowtheIAEAtobegincontinuousmonitoringofallofitsuraniumminesandmills,arequirementthatwilllastfor25years.10/3/16 182

183

Gachin

Lashkar A’bad

Ardekan

Sitescircledinredunknownpre-mid2002


184

Iran: The Broader Nuclear Target List: 54+

Source:AdaptedfromlistbyNuclearThreatInitiative,September2012,http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/facilities/.10/3/16

185

Natanz Upgrades in 2012

Source:Googlehttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-used-nuclear-weaponisation.html/10/3/16

186

20 SEP 02

Bunkered underground production halls

Admin/engineering office area

Vehicle Entrance Ramp (before burial)

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image18610/3/16

187

21 JUL 04

Bunkered underground Centrifuge cascade halls

Dummybuildingconcealingtunnelentranceramp

Helicopterpads

New security wall

Vehicle Entrance Ramp (after burial)

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

Admin/engineering office area

18710/3/16

Natanz: Effective Concealment

10/3/16 188

189

Heavy Water Reactor Facility at Arak in 2011

Source:Googlehttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-used-nuclear-weaponisation.html/10/3/16

190

Fordow: 3,000 Centrifuges in a Mountain

Source:YnetNews:http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/PicServer2/13062011/3669116/AFP0661600-01-08809249_wa.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/

10/3/16

191

Razed Test Site (?) At Parchin

Source:ISISandCNN,http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/30/cleanup-at-irans-parchin-site/10/3/16

Iranian Counter Vulnerabilities:• Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference.• Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that,

• Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl./d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.

• Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region).

• Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl./d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl./d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.

• Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable.• Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.

• Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Today’s precision strike assets allow to know out key, repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become “weapons of mass effectiveness.”

• EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.

• Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mixof radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.

• Needs imports of food and product.

• Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports.• Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, “inspect” all incoming shipping.• “No fly zone” would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.

Source: See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR & cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html for energy data. 192

193Source:Dr.AbdullahToukan,September24,2016

Nuclear Capability and Risk

Maps based on estimates by dr. Abdullah Toukan

Tehran:1Megaton TelAviv:20Kilotons

Population:410,000+Area:52 km2

(20 sq mi)

Population:8.3millionurban,14millionwiderareaUrban:730 km2 (280 sq mi)Wider Area:1,274 km2

(492 sq mi)10/3/16 194

Countervalue Targeting of Iran

10/3/16 195

Iran’s Ethnic Vulnerability to Nuclear Strikes

10/3/16 196

iran and the gulf military balance ifinrev5...

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