currie value of honor based ticketing v1.0publictransportresearchgroup.info › wp-content ›...
Post on 05-Jul-2020
1 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
Understanding the Wider Value of Honor Based Ticketing in Light Rail
Professor Graham CurrieJames Reynolds
PUBLIC TRANSPORT RESEARCH GROUPInstitute of Transport StudiesMonash University, Australia
Light Rail 2016 – Transforming the urban transport landscapePullman Melbourne on the Park25th February 2016
1 Introduction
2 Research Context
3 Model Development
4 Results
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Agenda
2
• Passengers must have valid ticket
• Random ticket inspections for enforcement
• Allows passengers to board and alight at any door
Melbourne, like most Light Rail systems, uses HonorBased or Proof-of-Payment (POP) fare collection
3
All door boarding and alighting in Melbourne, Australia
This is often criticised in the media/community because of high fare evasion rates
4
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Far
e ev
asio
n r
ider
ship
sh
are
-w
ith
in
mo
de
Total lost revenue - share between modes
Lost Revenue
Tram
TrainBus
Source: ITS (Monash) analysis of the Fare Evasion and Valid Concession Percentage Survey - 2011
• Pay fare to driver on boarding, or show valid pass, transfer etc.
• Allows close monitoring of fare payment
• Requires all passengers to board by the front door
An alternative is Pay-on-Entry (POE) fare control such as adopted in Toronto
5
Front Door Boarding on a Toronto Transit Commission Streetcar
The trade-offs between POE and POP on LRT have not been fully explored
6
Pay-on-Entry (POE)Pay driverLonger boarding timesLower fare evasion
Honor Based / Proof-of-Payment (POP)Pre-purchase ticketShorter boarding timesHigher fare evasion
versus
Fare Revenue Increases?
Operational Costs / Savings?
Capital Costs?
Fare Evasion Losses?
Operational Costs / Savings?
Capital Savings?
THIS RESEARCH:
• Develops a model of the Melbourne Tram Network to directly compare the overall financial impacts of POE with POP, and
• Investigates how:
• Reduced fare evasion under POE fare control; compares to
• Costs due to slower boarding times compared to Honor Based/ POP system.
Currie G and Reynolds J (2016) ‘Evaluating Pay-on-Entry Versus Proof-of Payment Ticketing in Light Rail Transit’ Transportation Research Record - Transportation Research Board 95th Annual Meeting January 2016
1 Introduction
2 Research Context
3 Model Development
4 Results
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Agenda
77
Trams in Melbourne have open access, while trains and buses have more control of fare payment
8
Melbourne Rail Network
• Barrier gates at central stations
• Roving ticket inspectors
Melbourne Bus Network
• Enter by front door only
• Validate smartcard in front of driver
• Some roving ticket inspectors
Melbourne Tram Network
• Enter by any door (open access)
• No interaction with driver
• Roving ticket inspectors
Melbourne’s trams use the “myki” smartcard system, with passengers required to “touch on” after boarding
9
Touch On
myki Smartcard
Images source: www.ptv.vic.gov.au
Board
Ride
Touch Off
If travelling wholly in Zone 2
Alight
*Except in the FREE TRAM ZONE in the city center
Fare Evasion Trends
10
14% fare evasion
20% fare evasion
“myki” smartcard introduction period
Source: Public Transport VictoriaVictorian Official Fare Compliance Series May 2015
Victorian Fare Compliance Rate
6%
The Age Newspaper: October 3, 2011
The Age Newspaper: January 2, 2015
Would Melbourne Trams have been better off with POE instead of the myki POP system?
11
The Age Newspaper: June 2010, October 2011 and June 2011
Melbourne trams vs Toronto streetcars
12
Melbourne Toronto
• Some of the largest streetcar systems in the world
Melbourne = 167 kms (104 miles) Toronto = 71 kms (44 miles)
• Different Fare Control Systems
Melbourne = POP Toronto = mostly POE
Melbourne vs Toronto
13
Melbourne
– Tickets pre-purchased– Validated during or after
entry– No interaction with driver
Toronto
– Pay-on-Entry (POE) fare paid to farebox in front of driver
– Pass or transfer must be shown to driver
– Front door boarding only– Some Proof of Payment (POP)
zones but on only a limited number of routes
• Melbourne and Toronto dwell time surveys
• Regression models developed including one with a factor for fare control type
Previous Research - Currie, Delbosc and Reynolds (2012)
14
Dwell time = 3.7 + 0.9a + 0.7b + 13.4c – 6d + 3.4e + 9.8f
Where:a = Number of boardingsb = Number of alightingsc = 1 if 4 doors, else 0d = 1 if platform stop, else 0e = 1 if steps, 0 otherwise,f = 1 if pay-on-entry, 0 otherwise
Source: Currie, G., A. Delbosc, and J. Reynolds, Modeling Dwell Time for Streetcars in Melbourne, Australia, and Toronto, Canada. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2012. 2275: p. 22-29.
• Model implies that average dwell time for POE is 9.8 seconds higher per stop than for POP
1 Introduction
2 Research Context
3 Model Development
4 Results
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Agenda
1515
16
Model Structure - Outlinevs
Operational
Impacts
Ridership and Fare Payment
Impacts
Annual Revenue /
Cost Impacts
Capital Cost
Impacts
Discount Cash Flow Analysis
Pay-On-Entry (POE) fare
control
Proof-of-Payment (POP)
fare control
• Compares POE fare control impacts with the (existing) POP across 22 of the 26 tram routes in Melbourne
• Determines operational, ridership and fare payment impacts
• Calculates capital cost and annual revenue / cost impacts
• Uses a Discount Cash Flow Analysis to calculate a BCR of switching to POE
Overall model - Detail
Fewer Ticket Validation Machines
Longer Dwell Times
Longer Passenger
Journey Times
Decreased Ridership
Longer Vehicle
Journey Times
Increased Vehicle
Requirements
Higher Operational hours & km
Increased Operating
Costs
Increased Capital Costs
Larger Vehicle Fleet
Reduction in Fare Evasion
Removal of Inspection
Staff
Increased Fare Payment
Decrease in Fines Levied
Decreased Revenue
Increased Revenue
Decreased Operating
Costs
Decreased Capital Costs
Better Financial
Performance
Worse Financial
Performance
Less Maintenance
vs Pay-On-Entry
(POE) fare control
Proof-of-Payment (POP)
fare control
17
1 Introduction
2 Research Context
3 Model Development
4 Results
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Agenda
1818
Impact of Conversion – Honor/POP vs POE
19
10%Ridership Decline
49 Additional
LRV’s Needed
8 163
66
-280
-230
-180
-130
-80
-30
20
70
Red
uced
Far
eE
vasi
on
Sav
ed A
OC
osts
Sav
edV
alid
ator
Cos
ts
Sav
edV
alid
atio
nM
achi
nes
Savings Resulting from Pay the Driver Ticketing
Cost Savings
Cha
nge
in C
osts
(M
)
Costs Resulting from Pay the Driver Ticketing
Cost Increases
-17 -9 -30 -276
-280
-230
-180
-130
-80
-30
20
70
Far
e R
educ
tion
Less
Rid
ers
Low
er F
E F
ine
Rev
enue
Incr
ease
d T
ram
Ope
ratin
gC
osts
Less
Tra
m/L
RV
Veh
icle
s
Operating/ Annual Costs Capital Costs
Operating/ Annual Costs Capital Costs
Open access saves $29M p.a. operating costs & $210M in Capital – increases ridership 10% and saves 49 LRVs
20
Melbourne – Open Access; Proof of Payment Ticketing
Toronto – Pay the Driver Ticketing
Source: Currie, G and Reynolds J (2016) ‘Evaluating Pay-on-Entry vs Proof-of Payment Ticketing in Light Rail Transit’ Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board - 95th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board Washington DC January 2016
• +$29M p.a. in net Operating Costs each year
• +$210M in net Capital Costs• 10% less ridership due to delays• 49 additional LRV’s needed (+14%
of fleet)
21
Aggregate ResultsFinancial Analysis Annual Capital
POE Benefits ($AU)• Reduced fare evasion losses• Reduced staffing costs• Reduced maintenance of validation machines• Fewer ticket validation machines
8.1m15.8m3.1m
65.5m
POE Costs ($AU)• Lower fare revenue• Lower fine revenue• Increase vehicle operation costs• New vehicles
17.4m9.2m
29.8m276.0m
Total ($AU) Benefits – Costs -29.4m -210.5m
Discount Cash Flow Analysis BCR
• 30 years at 6% discount rate 0.44
22
Route Based Results
R² = 0.1851
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0 5,000,000 10,000,000 15,000,000
BC
R
Annual Ridership
Benefit Cost Ratio vs Route Ridership
R² = 0.1202
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
5 6 7 8 9
BC
R
Stops per Route Kilometer
Benefit Cost Ratio vs Stops per Route Kilometer
• BCR of POE goes downas stops per kilometre goes up
• BCR of POE goes up as ridership increases
• However R2 is < 0.2
23
Sensitivity Analysis
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60D
wel
l tim
e
AO
ann
ual c
ost
Ann
ual o
pera
ting
hour
s
Cre
w c
ost
per
vehi
cle
hour
Tic
ket
valid
ator
s pe
r tr
am
Rid
ersh
ip e
last
icity
Cap
ital c
ost p
er v
ehic
le
Far
e ev
asio
n ra
te
Cap
ital c
ost p
er t
icke
t va
lidat
or
Rev
enue
from
fin
es
Cos
t pe
r ve
hicl
e km
Ann
ual o
pera
ting
kms
Dis
coun
t rat
e
Val
idat
or m
aint
enan
ce s
taff
cos
t
Ann
ual r
ider
ship
Far
e re
venu
e pe
r pa
ssen
ger
Ben
efit-
Cos
t Rai
to
Most Sensitive to Dwell Time
1 Introduction
2 Research Context
3 Model Development
4 Results
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Agenda
2424
25
Findings• Melbourne trams have worse financial performance under POE than
POP
• $AU27.0m annual benefits and $AU65.5m capital savings
• But $AU56.4 annual costs and $AU276.0m capital expense
• BCR of only 0.44
• Costs associated with longer stop dwell times far outweigh the benefits of POE for reducing fare evasion and staffing costs
• Lower levels of ridership, increased fleet size and operating costs are significant financial penalties of operating a POE fare system
Toronto – should stop using POE!...
26
Front Door Boarding on a Toronto Transit Commission Streetcar
... AND THEY HAVE
27
www.worldtransitresearch.info
29
ALSO:
NEW PTRG WEBSITE
PTRG.INFO
Join the ITS (Monash) LinkedIn group to keep informed of our activities
top related