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American Policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Implications forits ResolutionKamer KasimPublished online: 31 Jul 2012.

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American Policy toward the Nagorno-KarabakhConflict and Implications for its Resolution

KAMER KASIM

Abstract

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as one of the most destructive regional conflicts, hasbecame a problem not just for the conflicting sides but also for other regional and evennon-regional actors as well, such as the United States (US) which experiences diffi-culty in dealing with the conflict. The US policy toward the conflict was constrainedby its domestic politics and lobbies, which act on their narrow interests, compared withthe global role and interests of the US. On the one hand US interests require the pro-tection of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and stability, since it has substantialenergy resources. On the other hand, domestic constraints prevented the US admin-istration from playing the honest broker in conflict resolution, at least for Azerbaijan.The realization of projects advancing the transportation of Caspian energy resourcesto the world markets was delayed and despite the ceasefire agreement in 1994, theproblem continues. This paper analyses US policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict and focus on the US role during the peace process. The analysis points tothe need for the US to pay attention to the early settlement of the conflict withoutwhich the normalization of Turkey–Armenia relations, which remains one of themajor aims of the US regional policy, will also not be possible.

Introduction

The Caucasus was one of the new areas for the post-Cold War US foreign policy. Duringthe Cold War era the region was under the control of the Soviet Union. Thus the UnitedStates (US) has a lack of experience in dealing with the affairs of the Caucasus, which hasbecome a center of attention due to its energy resources. Besides its rich energy resources,and perhaps because of them, the Caucasus held a prominent place on the internationalpolitical agenda because of its conflicts. During the ColdWar, the leaders of the two polescould exert influence on their allies and control them in order to keep them within theparameters of alliance policies. This prevented regional conflicts and provided regionalstability on many occasions. After the end of the Cold War, the relative stability incertain regions was disturbed. This structure of world politics collapsed and manystates joined the international community.1 New states have faced territorial problemsand domestic instabilities, and were vulnerable to outside influences. Some regionslike the Caucasus featured a highly unstable character and the classical balance ofpower politics was dominant in the region.

The US as a superpower needed to protect its interests regarding the transportation ofthe Caucasian energy resources to the world markets. In fact until the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, the US strategy was focused on the politics of energy. However,after September 11, security dimension was also emphasized in the US policy towardthe Caucasus.2 The greatest challenge the US policy faced in the region was how to

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deal with its conflicts. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was among the most destructiveregional conflicts in the post-Cold War era. In fact, the conflict started before the end ofthe ColdWar as a domestic dispute within the Soviet Union and continued after the inde-pendence of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a result of the conflict about 16 to 20% of theterritory of Azerbaijan fell under the Armenian occupation and the conflict resulted inone million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). The Nagorno-Karabakhconflict impacted the realization of projects advancing the transportation of Caspianenergy resources to the world markets.3 The conflict damaged Turkey’s relations withArmenia and had a negative impact on Turkish–Russian relations. Although a ceasefireagreement was signed in 1994, the problem continued and the peace process has notbeen successful in brokering a deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia.The US experiences particular difficulty in dealing with the conflict. On the one hand

US interests require the protection of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and stability, sinceit has substantial energy resources. On the other hand, domestic constraints preventedthe US administration from playing the honest broker in the conflict’s resolution, atleast for Azerbaijan. In 1992, The U.S. Congress passed the Freedom Support Act.Due to the influence of the Armenian lobby, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Actprevented the US government from sending humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan,and has negatively impacted US–Azerbaijan relations for a long time. The US adminis-tration also has difficulty in analyzing the Russian role and implementing a strategytowards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The US was misguided with the Atlanticist orpro-American stand in the Russian foreign policy until 1993 and was careful not to chal-lenge Russia regarding the regional conflicts. The US had managed to have some sort ofrole only after the ceasefire of the conflict was brokered.In this article, I will analyze US policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and

focus on the US role during the peace process.

Basic Parameters of the US Caucasus Policy

The US Caucasus policy was a part of its general Eurasian strategy, focusing on the safetransportation of the region’s energy resources. The strategy was based on the creation ofthe east–west energy corridor through which to ensure Western access to the oil and gasresources of the region. The US supported the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline for the transpor-tation of the main Caspian oil. Although the US supported the east–west pipeline, itdid not object to Russian involvement in the development of the region’s energysector. One of the concerns of the US was Iran’s possible influence on the new statesof the region. To comply with the policy of isolating Iran, the US did not want Iran toget a role in the transportation of region’s energy resources.4

The US energy policy was drastically influenced by its relations with other regionalactors and particularly its relations with Russia. The US followed the “Russia First”policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dismantlement of Soviet mili-tary power and confinement of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was a priority for the US foreignpolicy.5 The US did not anticipate Russian competition and a possible Russian strategy tobecome a dominant actor in the former Soviet territories of the Caucasus until Russia’sannouncement of its “Near Abroad” policy and changing its policy from an Atlanticistline to the Eurasianist one. For this reason, the US was not particularly concernedabout Russian policies regarding energy and security in the Caucasus until 1993. TheRussian challenge forced the US to have a clearer and more comprehensive strategytowards the Caucasus.

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The basic parameters of the US policy towards the Caucasus were described as

…strengthening the independence and prosperity of the new Caspian states,bolstering regional cooperation, enhancing global energy security through thefree flow of Caspian oil and gas to world markets, and increasing investmentopportunities for companies from the United States and other countries.6

After September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks security dimension has also been emphasizedin the US policy toward the Caucasus region. Caucasian republics became important inthe US strategy in the war against terrorism. The US received full support from Azerbai-jan and Georgia. They provided transportation corridor to the coalition forces and theyalso made military contribution to the forces in Afghanistan. Although it did not give fullsupport, Armenia also opened its airspace.7

After the independence of the former Soviet Republics, theUS faced organizational pro-blems in pursuing its objectives and dealingwith the affairs of theCaucasus. Between 1992and 1996, topics related to the newly independent states were assigned to different govern-ment departments and sub-departments. For example, the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) and the State Department were given the responsibility of sup-porting activities for the democratic development of the new republics. There was also alack of strong direction from the center to the government departments. In this atmos-phere, the US departments followed their own institutional policies.8 The US managedto take on active role in the regional structure and started to counter the Russian policyin the region when the deficiencies in terms of organizational capacity and knowledgeabout the region had been overcome. For example, the US initiative GUAM (Georgia,Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was founded in 1997.9

Azerbaijan is the most important country among the newly independent Caucasianrepublics and the center of attention forUSpolicy in the region, due to its strategic positioncombinedwith its rich oil andnatural gas resources.Azerbaijan’s cooperationwithGeorgiaanother US ally in the region especially after the “rose revolution” was also important forthe US regional strategy. Azerbaijan’s participation and support for the coalition forces inAfghanistan and participation in the Kosovo Force was valuable for the USA. The USAand Azerbaijan also work together in the Caspian Guard program, which is aimed at pre-venting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and smuggling. Theprogram also aims to protect energy development and transportation in Caspian.10

Despite Azerbaijan’s importance and cooperation, the US administration has not beenable to follow policies that reflected Azerbaijan’s strategic importance. The Armenianlobby was the main obstacle for the US administration in this regard. Besides Section907 of the Freedom Support Act, which will be discussed later, the lobby even interruptedthe appointments by theUS administration to posts related to theCaucasus. The interven-tion of the lobby in appointments was seen from the level of Head of the Bureau of Euro-pean and Eurasian Affairs to the appointments of Ambassadors.11

The problems that the US faced in its Caucasus policy, particularly, regarding itsrelations with Azerbaijan and Armenia arose from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Allregional conflicts and disputes in the Caucasus impacted America’s relations with thenew independent republics and regional powers of the Caucasus to some degree;however, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a special place in this matter.

Foreign and Domestic Policy Dilemma

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is the most destructive conflict in the Caucasus,began before the collapse of the Soviet Union as a domestic dispute. After the end of the

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Soviet Union and the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the conflict was trans-formed from a domestic to regional one. Autonomy was given to the Nagorno-Karabakhregion within the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan with the decision of the Caucasian Section ofthe Russian Communist Party Central Committee on July 5, 1921. The population struc-ture of Karabakh started to change with the Russian invasion of the Caucasus. The Arme-nian population was 8.4% of the total population of Karabakh in 1823, while thepercentage of the Muslim population of Karabakh was 91% Muslims represented64.8% of the total population of Karabakh in 1832, while Armenians represented34.8%. However, at the end of the nineteenth century the Armenian populationreached 53.3% and Muslims were now 45.3%.12 Nagorno-Karabakh was within theSoviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. During the Soviet era, Armenians demandedthe incorporation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region into the Soviet Socialist Republicof Armenia with the petition presented to Moscow in 1964.13 Another petition withthe same demand was presented in 1987. Violence started in 1988 and increased in1989, directed against Azerbaijani Turks in Nagorno-Karabakh, which caused demon-strations in Baku against Moscow. On January 20, 1990, the Soviet troops enteredBaku resulting in hundreds of deaths and many arrests.14

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict intensified after the disintegration of the Soviet Unionin 1991 and impacted on the relations of regional countries. The conflict caught attentionof the international media only with the Khojaly massacre.15 On the evening of February25, 1992, the Armenian forces attacked the town and killed 613 people, with hundredsmore missing and wounded. It is widely believed that the massacre was committedwith the help of the Russian 366thMotor Rifle Regiment. The Armenian occupation con-tinued beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts of Azerbai-jan were also occupied. The ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994 and the peaceprocess to find a solution has been continuing since then.16

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict created instability, which is at least one of the mainreasons in the delayed implementation of energy projects involving Azerbaijan’sCaspian resources. Due to the unresolved conflict, Armenia could not develop healthyrelations with its neighbors since its borders with its two neighbors; Azerbaijan andTurkey, had been and are still closed, which made Armenia dependent on Russia. Azer-baijan and Armenia spend substantial portions of their budgets for their militaries as aresult of the conflict.17

The US Policy and support for United Nations Resolutions

In the early years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US policy towards theCaucasus was mainly focused on the Caspian energy resources. The transportation ofthese resources to the world markets through the east–west energy corridor was the pri-ority. The US was not concerned with the Russian policy in the Caucasus. There washope that the Russian Atlanticist policy would be successful in terms of integratingRussia with theWest. In this period, the US did not maintain a high profile in the regionalconflicts of the Caucasus. The US was in the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE which until 1994 was known as the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe—CSCE) Minsk Group and Co-Chairmen of it since 1997.The US wanted the OSCE to be the major actor for the ceasefire, maintaining the cease-fire, and providing solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the US admin-istration was constrained by U.S. Congress, which was under the influence of the

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Armenian lobby. Misperceptions were created about the reasons for the Karabakh con-flict and what generally happened there.

In 1992 the U.S. Congress passed the Freedom Support Act in order to provide econ-omic assistance to the former Soviet Republics. However, Congress also acceptedSection 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which prohibited the US government from pro-viding government aid to Azerbaijan until “the President determines, and so reports tothe Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to ceaseall blockades and other offensive use of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh”.It is interesting that the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan by the Armenian forcesdid not lead to similar sanctions against Armenia. On the contrary, Armenia continued toreceive generous aid from the US, Armenia’s embargo on Nakhichevan was also ignoredby the Congress.18

Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act created obstacles for the US administration toimprove its relations with Azerbaijan. The decision was taken under the heavy influenceof the Armenian lobby in the US. Considering the fact that Azerbaijan is the most impor-tant state in the Caucasus with rich oil and natural gas resources, it might be argued thatCongress’ decision was against the US national interest, besides the fact that Section 907was misleading about the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.19 There wereattempts by the US administration to lift the restrictions of Section 907. In 1994, theClinton Administration introduced bill H.R. 3765 to lift the restrictions and facedstrong opposition from the supporters of the Armenian lobby. The discussions aboutthe issue in Congress indicated the ignorance and misperceptions related to the conflict.In March 1994, one Congressman argued that the prohibition of American assistance toAzerbaijan should be retained until Azerbaijani troops cease their occupation ofNagorno-Karabakh and stop their aggressive actions against Armenia. However,Svante E. Cornell correctly argued that

…at that date, Azerbaijan was not occupying Nagorno-Karabakh—it was noteven in control of the territory. Quite to the contrary, Armenian forces wereoccupying Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding homogeneously Azeriareas.20

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US created the atmosphere where the USplaced security concerns at the top of its foreign policy agenda. Azerbaijan’s strategic pos-ition increased its value, particularly, due to its support of the Operation EnduringFreedom and lifting the aid sanctions against Azerbaijan started to be discussed in theUS. As a result, permanent Presidential waiver authority for the ban on aid wasgranted to the US President. The President may use the authority if Azerbaijan supportsUS counter terrorism efforts, supports the operational readiness of the armed forces, if itis important for Azerbaijan’s border security, and if it will not harm peace talks betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia, but the Pre-sident must send a report to Congress indicating the nature of the aid to be provided toAzerbaijan. On January 25, 2002, President Bush used the waiver authority.21 “Although(Section 907) whittled down under Bill Clinton’s administration and suspended underGeorge W. Bush’s after 9/11, the legal caveat has never been officially lifted.”22 Theimplications of Section 907 have still continued which impact on the US position as amediator.

Despite the U.S. Congress decision on Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, theUS administration tried to follow a balanced approach toward the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict. Until the 1994 ceasefire, the US was not active in terms of stopping the conflict.

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This approach was contradictory regarding the US emphasis on energy security and thetransportation of Caspian oil and gas resources to the world markets. The US adminis-tration at least tried to find a way to establish some kind of regulations for the negotiationsprocess between the conflicting parties. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, as a head ofthe CSCE mission, introduced some rules agreed upon by the two sides of the conflict.“Baker rules” accepted Azerbaijan and Armenia as the principal parties and the two com-munities of Nagorno-Karabakh as interested parties.23 The Baker rules composed theformat of the negotiations.The US preferred initiatives in the framework of the CSCE (later OSCE) and sup-

ported the United Nations (UN) resolutions of 822, 853, 874 and 884. The UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 822 was passed on April 30, 1993. The resolution indicated theinviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for theacquisition of territory and demanded the withdrawal of all occupying forces from theKelbejar district and other occupied areas of Azerbaijan.24 The UN Security CouncilResolution 853 was passed on July 29, 1993. It repeated the inviolability of internationalborders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory and con-demned the seizure of the district of Agdam and of all other occupied areas of Azerbai-jan.25 Resolution 874 was passed on October 14, 1993 and repeated the arguments inprevious resolutions, and called for the immediate implementation of the reciprocaland urgent steps provided for in the CSCE Minsk Group’s “Adjustable timetable”including the withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and the removalof all obstacles to communications and transportations.26 Another UN SecurityCouncil Resolution before the 1994 ceasefire was taken on November 12, 1993. Oneof the important points of the resolution was its call for Armenia to use its influence toachieve compliance by the Armenians of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno Karabakh region with res-olutions 822, 853 and 874 and to ensure that the forces involved are not provided with themeans to extend their military campaign further.27

Until May 1994, the US did not use its weight on the process and preferred to use theMinsk Group. However, Russia, particularly, after the introduction of its “Near Abroad”policy was not happy with the active US role even in the Minsk Group. At the end, theceasefire was accomplished with the Russian mediation.

The US Policy following the Ceasefire

After the ceasefire agreement, the development of a peaceful solution to the conflict wasthe expectation. The Clinton administration wanted to revive the peace process. FormerUS representative to the CSCEMinsk Group, Ambassador John Maresca made a propo-sal for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in July 1994. His plan was basedon associated statehood. According to the proposal Nagorno-Karabakh would be self-governed legal formation within the sovereign state of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakhmay have the right to have local security forces, including self-defense forces, but mustnot have offensive military forces. Armenia would have the right to maintain transitlinks with Nagorno-Karabakh via the Lachin corridor and Azerbaijan would have a linkwith Nakhichevan via the territory of Armenia. The OSCE and the UN SecurityCouncil should be the guarantors of the implementation of an agreement. The proposalwas not successful.28 Maresca’s proposal was personal, but since he was a former USrepresentative to the CSCE Minsk Group, the US’s possible role in the implementationwould be considered. However, the US would not be involved on the ground andwould play a leading role in building road connections. Maresca proposed that the US

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administration appoint a senior special envoy for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict. Maresca’s proposal was not accepted by the US administration. At that time, theUS was not keen on taking a leading position on the issue and directly challengingthe Russian role.29 However, each passing year the US became more assertive in usingthe OSCE in the conflict resolution and the US administration started contemplatingthe solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict seriously. One of the reasons for thiswas the developments regarding the extraction and transportation of Caspian oil. Asthe “Oil Contract of the Century” was signed in 1994, competition for the transportationroutes intensified. The US was supporting the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline. One of the poss-ible routes for the flow of the Azerbaijani oil to the world market in this route might bethrough Armenia. The US administration called this a “peace pipeline”.30 However,while 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory was under Armenian occupation, it was not possiblefor Azerbaijan to accept its oil passing through Armenian territory. Later the US also gaveup on the Armenian route option and the project became the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhanpipeline. The solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was still important because itwould impact the stability in Azerbaijan and created doubts about the security of thetransportation corridor in the minds of the investors in Caspian oil.

The US policy to activate the OSCE Minsk Group and coordinate its policy with theTer-Petrossian administration of Armenia had some results. In 1996, the OSCE LisbonSummit produced the principles which were recommended by the Co-Chairmen of theMinsk Group as part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as follows:

. The territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic ofAzerbaijan.

. The legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree ofself-rule within Azerbaijan.

. Guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population,including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the parties withthe provisions of the settlement.

These were the principles supposed to be taken as a basis for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Armenia did not accept these principles. Unlike Armenia,all other participating states accepted the principles.31 Ter-Petrossian faced difficulty indomestic politics, which put obstacles in implementing any proposal regarding solutionof this conflict.

The OSCEMinsk Group initiated three subsequent proposals. The first one proposedthe Armenian forces’ withdrawal from Azerbaijani territories outside of Karabakh andShusha within Karabakh and the deployment of the OSCE forces on these territorieswas also suggested.32 This plan provided package solution and separated the issues ofthe cessation of hostilities and the status of Karabakh. The proposal was a draft of a com-prehensive agreement. Azerbaijan supported the proposal on the condition of further workto improve it. The Armenian President also thought that the proposal could be improvedthrough negotiations. However, Armenians in Karabakh rejected the proposal.33

After the failure of package solution the OSCE Minsk Group came up with a step bystep approach in December 1997. The plan suggested that the Armenian forceslocated outside the frontiers of the Republic of Armenia would withdraw behind thosefrontiers. The Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh would withdraw behind the1988 boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh region with the exception of the LachinDistrict. It was proposed that after the withdrawal, a buffer zone would be located

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around the boundaries of the 1988 borders of Nagorno-Karabakh and OSCE peace-keepers would be deployed. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the issues of Shusha,Lachin and Shaumyan districts would be negotiated later. Although the presidents ofArmenia and Azerbaijan accepted the proposal as the basis for further negotiations, theNagorno-Karabakh administration rejected it.34

Another OSCE proposal was introduced in November 1998. This proposal was calleda “common state” proposal and it is also known as a Russian initiative. Since the“common state” proposal gave Nagorno-Karabakh de facto independence including theright to have its own constitution, flag, seal and anthem and also direct externalcontact with foreign states, Azerbaijan rejected it on the grounds that a “commonstate” is a threat to its territorial integrity.35

Change in US Policy after 9/11

After the failure of OSCE proposals, the US turned its attention to provide directnegotiations between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a result of the USdiplomacy, the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev and the President of Armenia,Robert Kocharian come together in Florida, Key-West in April 2001. The negotiationswere conducted confidentially between the two presidents with the observation of theMinsk Group specialists. After the meeting, it was mentioned by one of the mediatorsthat both parties reached agreement on 80 to 90% of the issues.36 It was mentionedthat territorial swap came on the agenda in the talks. A corridor would be given toArmenia between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan would be directlyconnected with Nakhichevan through Megri corridor. The same type of proposal wasmade by the former U.S. State Department Officer, Paul Goble in 1992.37 Despite theoptimistic atmosphere about the negotiations, the Key-West talks were not successfulto in achieving a breakthrough in the peace process, however, the format of directnegotiations continued.TheUS changed and broadened its policy toward theCaucasus after the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001. The security dimension became dominant with the launch ofOperation Enduring Freedom against terrorist networks in Afghanistan. Azerbaijanbecame an important supply route for the coalition troops in Afghanistan. Azerbaijanalso contributed militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq operations. As was mentioned beforeone important result of the changing US policy toward the Caucasus after September 11,2001 terrorist attackswas the Presidential waiver to lift the aid sanctions against Azerbaijan.Another result was the active US military involvement in the Caucasus, which increasedthe US influence in the region and Russia’s dominant role began to erode as a result.The US supported direct talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The process started

in 2004 called Prague process. With the US support, OSCEmade proposal including theArmenian withdrawal from five out of the seven districts surrounding Karabakh. Accord-ing to the proposal the status of Karabakh would be determined with a referendum to beheld 10 to 15 years later.38 After the failure of this proposal, the turning point cameregarding the US policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with the August 2008Russian–Georgian conflict.

Impact of the 2008 Russian–Georgian Conflict

The Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008 changed the regional parametersand the views of Western countries regarding Russia. Another important consequence

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of the Russian–Georgian conflict was that it showed the danger of the frozen conflicts forregional stability. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has the potential to create full scalewar and is the most significant problem for stability in the Caucasus. Russia facedheavy criticism from the West due to its intervention in Georgian territories. Forexample, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accused Russia of using Sovietpower tactics to assert its dominance in the region. Rice stated: “This is no longer1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when a great power invaded a small neighborand overthrew its government”.39

The Russian occupation of Georgian territories and the lack of support, at least the per-ception of it, from the West to Georgia affected Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s policies. ForAzerbaijan, the West’s lack of support to Georgia and Russian willingness to use militarypower in the region opened discussions about relations with Russia. Azerbaijan’s agree-ment with Russia on the sale of gas might be interpreted as Azerbaijan consideringRussian help for the solution of the Karabakh conflict, since Russia showed its abilityto change the regional parameters in August 2008.40 Russia also implemented animage-making strategy after heavy criticism from the West. In the role of peacemaker,Russian President invited the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to discussa solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The three presidents met on November2, 2008 and the Moscow Declaration was signed. According to Moscow Declaration,Azerbaijan and Armenia will try to find a solution to the conflict on the basis of thenorms and principles of international law. The Moscow Declaration referring to theMadrid Principles and confirmed the commitment of the political solution for the con-flict. Since all adopted documents indicated a solution based on the territorial integrityof Azerbaijan, it might be argued that the Declaration confirmed Azerbaijan’s territorialintegrity. However, while supporting the political solution, the Moscow Declaration dis-regarded Azerbaijan’s argument of its right to use force to gain lost territories if the nego-tiations failed. There was no representative of Nagorno-Karabakh during the talks, whichindicated that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” is not a party of the conflict.41 TheMoscow Declaration did not open a way toward the solution of the conflict.

The US did not follow policies to discourage Russian attempts to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the main concern for the US was the increasing Russiandominance in the Caucasus. The Russian heavy influence on Armenia was seen asdangerous for the regional stability, particularly after what happened in August 2008.Armenia also started to evaluate the possible damaging effect of the dependency onRussia and the necessity of opening the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sincetwo-thirds of foreign goods come to Armenia from Georgian roads, which were closedduring the Russian–Georgian conflict, the episode badly affected the Armenianeconomy. Imports from Georgia were cut by $121 million and exports losses reachedabout $52 million.42 The US administration supported Armenia’s integration with theWest. To reach this objective, Armenia should normalize its relations with Turkey andAzerbaijan. The opening of the Turkey–Armenia border is particularly important forthis aim. That is why the US administration gave priority to the normalization ofTurkey’s relations with Armenia. However, as will be discussed below, the US did notrealize that the most important problem in the Caucasus is Nagorno-Karabakh andwithout the settlement of that conflict, peace cannot be established in the region.

After the impact of the August 2008 Russian–Georgian conflict eased, one importantdevelopment regarding the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict came with theG-8 Summit in L’Aquila on July 10, 2009. US President Barack Obama, Russian Presi-dent Dimitri Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy made a joint statement

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about the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The leaders of the OSCECo-Chairs declared thebasic principles upon which to solve the problem, such as the return of the territoriessurrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; a corridor linkingArmenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of the final legal status ofNagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; the right of all internallydisplaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and inter-national security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.43

To enforce the basic principles in the settlement of the conflict, comprehensive talksshould be started between Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the OSCE MinskGroup Co-Chairs were not able to force Azerbaijan and Armenia into continuous nego-tiations within the framework of the basic principles for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

US Policy toward Turkish–Armenian Rapprochement

The US policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict changed its focus after the August2008 Russian–Georgian conflict. The US administration gave priority to the normaliza-tion of Turkish–Armenian relations and put pressure on Turkey in order to hasten theprocess of Turkish–Armenian rapprochement, which was started with the Turkishpresident’s visit to Armenia to watch the football match between the two nationalteams. The Turkish–Armenian rapprochement process resulted in the signing ofprotocols on October 10, 2009. The Protocol on the Establishment of DiplomaticRelations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and the Protocolon Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and Republic of Turkeywere signed.The US supported the protocols and wanted their implementation as soon as possible.

However, controversial issues in the protocols caused problems and at the end, Armeniastopped the implementation process of the protocols. Besides the agreement to establishdiplomatic relations, the protocols confirmed the mutual recognition of the existingborder between the two countries as defined in the relevant treaties of internationallaw, where respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers is alsomentioned.One of the most important features of the protocols is an agreement to open the

common border within two months after ratification of the protocols. According to theprotocols, Turkey and Armenia also agreed to establish a sub-commission of a historicaldimension in order to provide an impartial scientific examination of historical records.44

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the solution of the problem were not mentionedin the protocols. For this reason, the protocols disappointed Azerbaijan, since accordingto the protocols Turkish–Armenian border would be opened within two months aftertheir ratification. For Turkey, to open the Armenian border without solution of theNagorno-Karabakh conflict would be a contradiction since Turkey closed its borderwith Armenia because of the continuing Armenian occupation of the territories of Azer-baijan in 1993. Azerbaijan lobbied in Turkey to prevent the possibility of the Turkey–Armenia border being opened before the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.Although the prime minister of Turkey openly declared that Turkey would not openits border with Armenia before any solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict duringhis visit to Baku in May 2009 before the signing of the protocols, Azerbaijan was nothappy to see that there was no mention of Karabakh in the protocols.45 Azerbaijan inten-

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sified its campaign against the protocols and the process of rapprochement betweenTurkey and Armenia after the protocols were signed. Furthermore, problems aroseabout the implementation of the protocols. Turkey expected progress in the solution ofthe Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The Armenian side also faced criticism regarding thesub-commission about historical events.46

The US underestimated the importance of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and ser-iousness of the issues between Turkey and Armenia. The US administration thoughtthat if the protocols were implemented and the Turkey–Armenia border opened, theNagorno-Karabakh conflict would be resolved. However, as is the case with any conflictresolution, the parties of the conflict should make concessions, and one side generallymakes more. Since the Armenian side occupied territories of Azerbaijan, it wouldmake more concessions in any kind of deal. Despite this fact, the Armenian side didnot face pressure to withdraw from at least some of the occupied territories. For thisreason, the opening of the Turkish–Armenian border might encourage Armenia to con-tinue its current policy regarding the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

The US criticized Azerbaijan’s policy toward Turkish–Armenian rapprochement.Azerbaijani President Aliyev was not invited to the Nuclear Security Summit held inApril 2010 in Washington, DC, while Armenian President Sarkissian was invited tothat Summit. The US priority to Turkish–Armenian relations and the US lack of efforttoward the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem caused a reaction fromAzerbaijan and it signaled closer cooperation with Russia. Azerbaijan’s military doctrineadopted on June 8, 2010 did not mention joining NATO as one of Azerbaijan’s strategicgoals.47 Azerbaijan’s mistrust of the US policy can only be overcome with a moreactive US role in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. As Vladimir Socorpointed out:

The U.S. Congress’ refusal to contribute to the financing of the strategic Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, support for Nagorno-Karabakh’s separatist regime, andWashington’s open lobbying of the opening of the Armenian–Turkish borderwithout solving the root cause of this problem, i.e. Armenia’s occupation ofAzerbaijan’s territory, have negatively affected the relationship between thetwo countries.48

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Azerbaijan in July 2010 was an importantstep to recover US–Azerbaijan relations, which is necessary for an effective US role in thesettlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Soft Power and US Policy

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict might be seen as a regional conflict whatever thedestructions and instability it creates and a regional conflict in the Caucasus might beconsidered a rather minor issue for US foreign policy. However, this approach wouldbe quite misleading as it can be seen during the August 2008 Russian–Georgian conflictwhere it was demonstrated that regional issues might create global problems if they arenot handled properly. Such regional problems and conflicts would challenge US pos-itions in world politics in the post-Cold War era.

The Russian advances in Georgian territory and the US decision not to take militaryaction was interpreted as the US having turned in its global sheriff badge.49 No matterwhether the US wanted to be a global sheriff, many states have expectations that theUS should have consistent policies in regional as well as in global issues. The US

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policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was constrained by domestic politics andlobbies, which act on their narrow interests, compared with the global role and interestsof the USA. Obviously in this case, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states like Russiahave the advantage in terms of decision making and implementing policies. However,the US has the advantage of soft power, which might save time and energy for theimplementation of its policies. As Joseph Nye argued:

…hard power can rest on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”). Butsometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats orpayoffs. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politicsbecause other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiringto its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it. Soft power rests onthe ability to shape the preferences of others.50

The US did not use its soft power effectively for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict. Domestic constraints and lack of interest regarding the settlement of the conflictwere the reasons.In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the US missed many opportunities

before and after the ceasefire. The US view regarding Russia as a major actor in theregion as well as stabilizer in terms of security was the major constraint for the USduring the first couple of years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The USadministration was quite hesitant to take a lead in a regional conflict going in “theRussian backyard”. The US changed its policy toward the Caucasus only after the USadministration realized that the Russian intention and “Near Abroad” policy wouldnot contribute to regional stability and that Russia was following the policy in which itwould not hesitate to use military power to have control over former Soviet republics.Although the US had domestic constraints, it is clear that the US intensified its effort to

solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Then question arose about the US capabilities toinfluence the conflicting parties and to impose the peace plan on them. Russia has thepower of influence even control over Armenia through economic, political, and militarymeans. However, it is the fact that Armenia also receives substantial portions of the USaid and that the US hosts the Armenian diaspora, which have an influence on the Arme-nian government. But these factors did not provide the US the same leverage that Russiahas over Armenia. Because the US administration could not use the aid card againstArmenia due to the Armenian lobby in the US. The same lobby also prevented the USattempts to support a solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since this case, anykind of deal would mean more concessions from the Armenian side than the Azerbaijaniside. The typical example of the Armenian diaspora’s uncompromising stand in theNagorno-Karabakh conflict was their strong objections of Ter-Petrossian and hisstance over the peace plan. In fact the Armenian diaspora in the US was one of themain factors of Ter-Petrossian’s forced resignation, since the Armenian diaspora wasnot happy with Ter-Petrossian’s approach toward the OSCE peace plan in December1997.51

Conclusion

Democratization of Azerbaijan and Armenia might increase the impact of US policyregarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and also the Caucasus. Through democratiza-tion Azerbaijan and Armenia will have closer ties with the West. However, this processwill take time and the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is an obstacle which may take a toll

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on the democratization process in both states. The US should pay enough attention forthe settlement of this conflict. As was clearly seen during the Turkish–Armenian rappro-chement process, without the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the normal-ization of Turkey–Armenia relations is not possible. The US wants the Turkey–Armeniaborder to be opened in order to integrate Armenia into the West. The first condition forthis to happen is the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Therefore, the settle-ment of the conflict is important for America’s entire Caucasus policy.

NOTES

1. For post-Cold War era stability discussion see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of Inter-national Politics”, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993, pp. 44–79; Charles Krauthammer,“The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1991, pp. 23–33; James M. Goldgeierand Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the post-Cold War Era”, Inter-national Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 467–491.

2. Kamer Kasım,”ABD’nin Kafkasya Politikası: Enerji, Güvenlik ve Demokrasi Denklemi” (USA’s Cau-casus Politics: Energy, Security and the Democratic Equation), inOrta Asya&Kafkasya Güç Politikası(Power politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus), ed. Turgut Demirtepe, Ankara: USAK, 2008,pp. 119–146.

3. See Kamer Kasım, “TheNagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional Powers”, in The Poli-tics of Caspian Oil, ed. Bülent Gökay, London: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 185–198; Kamer Kasım, “TheTransportation of Caspian Oil and Regional Stability”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp. 37–45.

4. Ariel Cohen, “US Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New Silk Road to EconomicProsperity”, Backgrounder, No. 1132, 24 July 1997.

5. Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia Since 1991”,Brookings Institution, available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/02foreignpolicy_hill.aspx?p=1, 1 February 2001. For the US approach to Russia see Strobe Tallbot, The RussianHand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, New York: Random House, 2003.

6. See Zeyno Baran, “The Caucasus: Ten years After Independence”, TheWashington Quarterly,Vol. 25,No. 1, 2002, pp. 221–234.

7. Baran, “The Caucasus: Ten years After Independence”, op. cit.8. Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia Since 1991”, op. cit.9. For the information about GUAM see http://www.guuam.org.

10. Available online at : http://www.azconsulatela.org/az_in_world/us_az_relations.htm11. “The Obama Administration’s Emerging Caucasus Policy”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs,

available online at: http://www.cria-online.org/CU_-_file_-_article_-_sid_-_37.html, 27 Nisan 2009.12. Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, the Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, London and

New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994, p. 158.13. Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, Causes and Implications, Westport, CT/

London: Praeger, 1998, p. 20; Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, the Caucasus and Post-SovietDisorder, op. cit., p. 161.

14. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, op. cit., pp. 36–37.15. Some of the examples of media coverage, The New York Times, “Massacre by Armenians”, 3 March

1992; Thomas Goltz, “Armenian Soldiers Massacre Hundreds of Fleeing Families”, The SundayTimes, 1 March 1992; Time, “Massacre in Khojaly”, 16 March 1992; The Washington Times,“Armenian Raid Leaves Azeris Dead or Fleeing”, 2 March 1992.

16. Kamer Kasım, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict from Its Inception to the Peace Process”, ArmenianStudies, Issue 2, June–July–August 2001, pp. 170–185; Thomas Goltz, “Eurasia Letter: The HiddenRussian Hand”, Foreign Policy, 1993, pp. 97–100.

17. “Azerbaijan has second highest military expenditure in the CIS”, available online at: http://www.trdefence.com/2011/02/22/azerbaijan-has-second-highest-military-expenditure-in-cis/, “2010 Arme-nian Military Budget Implemented % 99”, available online at: http://news.am/eng/news/59259.html.

18. Svante E. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, available online at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdf, Uppsala University Report No. 46, 1999, pp. 98–102;Svante E. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered”, Journal of

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South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1997, available online at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/1997_cornell_undeclared-war.pdf.

19. Kamer Kasım, “The U.S. Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-AmericanRelations”, in Turkish-American Relations, Past, Present and Future, eds Mustafa Aydın and, ÇagrıErhan, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 129–151. In general view about the lobbies impact on theUS policy see Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests”, ForeignAffairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, 1997, pp. 28–49.

20. Svante E. Cornell, “UndeclaredWar: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered”, op. cit., p. 11.21. JimNichol,Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congres-

sional Reserach Service, available online at: http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/1085.pdf, 11 March 2010, p. 35; Antonia Blua, “Azerbaijan: U.S. Lifts Restrictions on Aid”, RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty, available online at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1098626.html,29 January 2002.

22. Thomas Goltz, “Bad Blood in Baku”, Foreign Policy, available online at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/11/bad_blood_in_baku, 11 June 2010.

23. Javid Huseyinov, Adil Baguirov, Vugar Seidov and Tomris Azeri, “Karabakh Peace Process Must beFully Inclusive”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, available online at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Karabakh_Peace_Process_Must_Be_Fully_Inclusive_/1812056.html, 1 September 2009.

24. Available online at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/247/71/IMG/N9324771.pdf?OpenElement

25. Ibid.26. Available online at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/557/41/PDF/N9355741.

pdf?OpenElement27. Ibid.28. Ali Abasov and Haroutiun Khachatrian, The Karabakh Conflict, Variants of Settlement: Concepts and

Reality, Baku/Yerevan, 2006, available online at: http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatrian.pdf, p. 41.

29. Gulshan Pashayeva and Nigar Göksel, The Interplay of the Approaches of Turkey, Russia and the UnitedStates to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, SAMReview, Baku 2011, p. 16. See also David Laitin andRonald Grigor Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a way out of Karabakh”,Middle East Policy,Vol. 7, No. 1, 1999, p. 162.

30. Michael P. Croissant, “Tensions Renewed in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July1997, pp. 308–311.

31. OSCE 1996 Lisbon Summit Document, available online at: www.osce.org/mc/39539, p. 15.32. Carol Migdalovitz, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict”, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, available online at:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib92109.pdf, 8 August 2003, p. 8.33. SeeDavidLaitin andRonaldGrigorSuny, “Armenia andAzerbaijan:Thinking awayoutofKarabakh”,

op. cit., p. 164. Gulshan Pashayeva and Nigar Göksel, The Interplay of the Approaches of Turkey, Russiaand the United States to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, op. cit., p. 17. For the details of the proposalsee Ali Abasov and Haroutiun Khachatrian, The Karabakh Conflict, Variants of Settlement: Concepts andReality, op. cit., Appendix 17. See Kamer Kasım, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Regional Impli-cations and the Peace Process”, in 20 Years of the Independence of Azerbaijan, to be published.

34. For the details of the proposal see Ali Abasov andHaroutiun Khachatrian, The Karabakh Conflict, Var-iants of Settlement: Concepts and Reality, op. cit., Appendix 18.

35. Ibid, Appendix 19, for the details of the proposal.36. Thomas de Wall, Black Garden, Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, New York and

London: New York University Press, 2003, p. 267.37. Paul Goble proposed handling over a part of Nagorno-karabakh to Armenia and handling over the

Armenian territory connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan. See Paul Goble, “Coping with theNagorno-Karabakh Crisis”, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 16, 1992, pp. 19–26; Ali Abasov and Har-outiun Khachatrian, The Karabakh Conflict, Variants of Settlement: Concepts and Reality, op. cit., p. 40.

38. Ömer Engin Lütem, “The Karabakh Problem”, in The Armenian Question Basic Knowledge and Docu-mentation, ed. Ömer Engin Lütem, available online at: http://www.avim.org.tr/bilgibankasi/en/index5_1_2.htm

39. “Peace Plan Signed, But Russian Forces Appear To Advance”, Eurasia Insight, available online at:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav081508_pr.shtml,15 August 2008. KamerKasım, “The August 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict And Its Implications: A New Era In The Cau-casus?”, Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 9, 2010, p. 70.

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40. Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Is Baku Offering a Natural Gas Carrot to Moscow for Help with Kar-abakh?”, Eurasia Insight, available online at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav042009a_pr.shtml , 20 Nisan 2009.

41. See Fariz Ismailzade, “MoscowDeclaration onNagorno-Karabakh:AView fromBaku”,Turkish PolicyQuarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2008, available online at: http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2008-03-tpq/fariz_ismailzade.pdf; Liz Fuller, “Moscow Declaration A Victiry for Armenia”, Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, available online at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Declaration_A_Victory_For_Armenia/1337592.html, 3 November 2008; Liz Fuller, “Azerbaijan Floats Principlesfor Karabakh Peace Settlement”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, available online at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Floats_Principles_For_Karabakh_Peace_Settlement_/1357686.html, 9December 2008; Kamer Kasım, Soguk Savas Sonrası Kafkasya (Caucasus after the Cold War),Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2011, pp. 40–41.

42. NairaMelkumian,“Armenia:EconomyHit byGeorgianWar”, IWPR,16October 2008 (availableonlineat: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=92760).

43. For Joint Statement of Minsk Co-Chairs see http://www.osce.org/item/51152, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-nagorno-karabakh-conflict

44. For the text of the protocols see Turkish Foreign Ministry, available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/t%C3%BCrkiye-ermenistan-ingilizce.pdf

45. Mina Muradova, “Azerbaijan: Turkish Prime Minister Offers Strong Support for Baku’s Position onKarabakh”, Eurasia Insight, available online at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051309a.shtml, 13 May 2009.

46. Kamer Kasım, “Türkiye-Ermenistan Iliskileri: Protokollere Giden Süreç ve Sonrası” (Turkish-Armenian Relations: The Process Leading up to the Protocols and its Aftermath), Ermeni Arastırma-ları (Armenian Studies), Nos. 37–38, 2010–2011, pp. 83–99.

47. Maxim A. Suchkov, “Re-engaging the Caucasus: New Approaches of U.S. Foreign Policy in theRegion”, Journal of Central Asian and Caucassian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 11, 2011, p. 144.

48. Interfax: Russia and CIS Military Infornation Weekly, 10 December 2010.49. Nicholas Kitchen and Michael Cox, “Illusions of Empire and the Specter of Decline”, in New

Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy, eds Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Mark Ledwidge,London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 245. In this article Kitchen and Cox argued that“decline must be a relative concept, in which a power advantage over other states ebbs away overtime; it is not the distance from omnipotence”, so it might be argued that they did not consider theUS policy during the Russian–Georgian conflict a decline of power. See p. 245, see also FareedZakaria, The Post-American World, London and New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009.

50. Joseph Nye, Soft Power the Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p. 5.51. See Kamer Kasım, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Basic Parameters of the Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan

Era”, The Review of Armenian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, pp. 90–104.

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