the nagorno karabakh conflict moving from power brokerage to relationship restructuring

7/27/2019 The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Moving From Power Brokerage to Relationship Restructuring

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International Negotiation 15 (2010) 5780 brill.nl/iner

Te Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict:Moving from Power Brokerage to Relationship

Restructuring

Ruben Harutunian*, 1

10761 Mist Haven errace, Rockville, MD 20852, USA(E-mail: [email protected])

Received 6 August 2008: accepted 7 July 2009

AbstractTe conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents the failure of mediation efforts in the context of a pro-longed and successful ceasefire which has created disincentives for compromise. odays difficult negotia-tion atmosphere originates from perceiving the conflict as primarily an ethnic problem couched in therhetoric of a territorial dispute. Further, a prolonged and successful ceasefire has entrenched powerful

economic and political interests on both sides which stand to gain from continued limbo. With this inmind, the Minsk Group should shift its focus to the implementation of confidence-building measuresbetween the authorities on both sides as well as the three societies involved. Secondly, the Minsk Groupco-chairs can no longer just serve as peace brokers, but must be co-signers to the negotiated agreement,emphasizing their role as guarantors of a long-term peace between Armenians and Azeris. Finally, anylong-term agreement will have to include aspects of mutual economic development, cross-culturalexchange, and socio-political understanding.

Keywordsrestructuring; confidence-building; guarantors; mutual development; ethnic conflict; territorialdispute

Te conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents the failure of mediation efforts inthe context of a prolonged and successful ceasefire that has created disincentivesfor compromise. Relative stability in the region over the past decade-and-a-half hasemboldened both sides to hold out for an imagined outcome of outright victory.Since the signing of a ceasefire agreement in May 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh

*) Ruben Harutunian became Deputy Press Attach at the Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in el

Aviv in August 2009. His previous position was as Vice Consul in the U.S. Embassy el Aviv ConsularSection. Prior to that, he served as a Tomas R. Pickering Fellow in the Office of Public Affairs at theU.S. Consulate General St. Petersburg in 2006, as well as a Bilateral Officer at the Office of Russian


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58 R. Harutunian / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 5780

conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has stalled within the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-Minsk Group2 negotiation

framework. Despite the extensive mediation efforts of the Minsk Group co-chairs (the United States, France, and Russia), neither Armenian nor Azeriauthorities seem to be wholeheartedly committed to the process. In fact, in therecent past, both sides have been walking the fine line of constructing domesticrhetoric to appeal to nationalistic and hard-line interests, while being very care-ful not to appear bellicose and intransigent in the eyes of the world community.As a result, Armenian and Azeri heads of state and high-level delegations engagein round after round of formal negotiations in exotic foreign locations, while athome they emphasize the constantly shifting geopolitical imbalance in the SouthCaucasus. Tey point to the ineffectiveness of the mediation mechanism as areason for proposing unilateral military action in the near future to resolve theconflict, and they exert a great deal of effort to shoring up regional and interna-tional support for their cause from urkey, Iran, Russia, the European Union,and the United States.

o a certain extent, todays difficult negotiating atmosphere originates fromthe perception of the conflict as an ethnic problem couched in the rhetoric of aterritorial dispute. Further, a prolonged and successful ceasefire has entrenched

powerful economic and political interests on both sides, which stand to gainfrom continued limbo. Compounding this, the Minsk Group mediation frame-work has produced no tangible results because it has focused exclusively on bro-kering a final settlement.

Tis article will argue that the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflictshould not lie in the signing of a document outlining national borders; rather, atrue resolution of the conflict will depend on a holistic approach to fundamen-tally restructure the relationships between all parties involved in the dispute.

Defining the Conflict

Ethnic Division Manipulated for Political Gain

Te solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cannot be based on a delinea-tion of national boundaries because the roots of the present hostility betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan are not rooted in a fight for territory; rather, they arepart of a complex network of multifaceted antagonisms between the two societ-

ies dating back to czarist rule over the ranscaucasus. In the Russian Empire,economic and social developments in the late nineteenth century led to a grow-


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R. Harutunian / International Negotiation 15 (2010) 5780 59

ing division along class lines between Armenians and Azeris. Te latter were gen-erally poor, unskilled, and rural, while the former inhabited the cities and

occupied profitable positions as entrepreneurs and merchants. Benefiting dispro-portionately from economic advances especially the establishment of a thrivingoil industry in Baku at the close of the 1800s and from frequent favoritism onthe part of their Russian rulers, the Armenians were able to rise to key economicand political positions in the major cities of ranscaucasia. Among the Azeris,these realities caused feelings of resentment that gradually coalesced into a per-vasive anti-Armenian sentiment.

While the growth of animosity between the Armenians and Azeris of ran-scaucasia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by no means madeinevitable the outright conflict between the two communities, czarist nationalitypolicies tended to exacerbate the already tense relationship. rue to its name, theczarist policy of divide and rule sought to promote jealousy and divisionamong neighboring ethnic groups to ensure the monarchys overall grip onpower. When central authority waned during the Russian Revolution of 1905,the tensions that had been building between the Armenian and Azeris explodedinto violence throughout the ranscaucasus.

As the rule of law in the region began to crumble throughout 1905, chaos

reached Bakus shores and environs. Hundreds of Armenian-owned oil wellswere set ablaze by Azeris in late September 1905 and the Armenians forcefullydefended their properties. Within a week, an estimated 1,500 people had beenkilled and over two-thirds of the regions oil wells had been destroyed (Croissant1998: 56). entative peace was restored to the ranscaucasus only with the col-lapse of the revolutionary movement in Russia at the end of the year and thegradual reestablishment of order throughout the Empire in 1907. Still, the firstdrops of blood had been shed between the Armenians and Azeris, setting a prec-edent for future conflict between the two ethnic groups.

While there had been little progress on the part of the Azeris in developing acollective national consciousness prior to the late nineteenth century, the 1905bloodshed and the subsequent growth of Armenian irredentism sparked the riseof Azeri nationalism. Te Azeris contemptuous view of the Armenians as a priv-ileged class enjoying the favoritism of the Russians was complimented thereafterby a perceived fear of Armenian claims to what were regarded as rightfully andhistorically Azeri lands. As a result, Nagorno-Karabakh territory claimed byboth ethnic groups became a major center for the growth of Azeri nationalism.

Nagorno-Karabakh as a Symbol

With a total area of 48 000 square kilometers Nagorno Karabakh is only slightly


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nagorny, meaning mountainous). Although the ethnic makeup of Nagorno-Karabakh in the late Soviet period (140,000 Armenians and 48,000 Azeris) hasled many observers to portray the current situation as one of a predominantlyArmenian-inhabited enclave attempting to break away from Azerbaijan, the

Karabakh clash has far more to do with the construction of national historiesthan with demographics.

Armenian scholars have amassed a wealth of historical evidence to supporttheir claim that Nagorno-Karabakh has for centuries been the heartland ofArmenian civilization; namely, that the area encompassing the western region ofthe modern Republic of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, belonged tothe Armenians as far back as the formation of the Armenian people in the sev-enth century B.C. (Anassian 1969: 305). Although conquered by the ancientMede people of Iran in the sixth century B.C., the area was restored to Arme-

nian control in the second century B.C., and thereafter became the province ofArtsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh, even today) under the

Figure 1. Map of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

IRANAraz

Dzulfa

Ordubad Megri

Kadzaran

Kapan

GubadlyJabrail

Horadiz

GuruFizuliHadrul

Hakary

Araz

Goris

Shakbuz

Sisyan

Nakhchivan

Yekhegnadzor

Dzormuk

ARMENIA

Istisu

HaterkCheldran

Madagiz

Aghdere(Mardakert)

Vaghouas

Sirkhavend

Lachin

AskeranKnodjaiy

Shusha

Khojavond(Martuni)

Agdam

Stepanakert(Khankendi)

Kabadjar

Naftalan

Bardaer-er (Mir. Bashir)

Bash Karvend

Agdjabedi

Imishly

Khach

in

Garnar

Kura

Tarta

r

Tarta

r

Kutra

Lake Sevan

Ashaghy Aghjakend(Shaumanovsk)

Zangilan

Nagorno-Karabakh region

NAKHCHIVAN(AZERBAIJAN)

0 10 20 30 40 50Km

AZERBAIJAN


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bakh continued to preserve their traditions and cling to a semi-autonomousexistence, while the rest of their countrymen fell under foreign rule. Over the

next 1000 years, this precedent of Armenian autonomy was upheld, makingNagorno-Karabakh the only part of historic Armenia where a tradition ofnational sovereignty was preserved unbroken until the late medieval period(Walker 1991: 7374). Tus, even to the casual observer, the Armenians strongemotional and nationalistic attachment to the land is clear. As Hovanissiannotes, while the rest of Armenia was submerged under foreign control, a flickerof freedom was maintained in Karabakh (1988: 29).

Te view of contemporary Azeri scholarship, championed by Ziia Buniatovsmonograph (1965) entitled Azerbaijanis in the Seventh to Ninth Centuries,maintains that modern Azeris are descendants of the Caucasian Albanians. It isalleged that in antiquity the Albanians were one of the three major peoples ofCaucasia (along with the Armenians and Georgians), with a state extendingfrom Lake Sevan eastward to the Caspian Sea and from the Caucasus Moun-tains southward to the Arax River. Buniatov asserts that while Albanians wereinitially adherents of Christianity, the majority of the population converted toIslam in the seventh century A.D. and was linguistically urkified 400 years later(Vorochil 1974: 279).

Azeri scholars of this view refute the Armenian claim that the inhabitants ofmountainous Karabakh have been ethnically Armenian since earliest times, ascompared to the people living on the plains to the east who are descendants ofIslamized and urkified Albanians. In contrast, it is argued in Baku that begin-ning in the eighth century, immigrating Armenians forced the cultural, linguis-tic, and religious assimilation of the indigenous Albanian population ofKarabakh (Dudwick 1990: 379). Tus, Buniatov and others have argued thatthe modern Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are not Armenianper se, but are Armenianized Albanians, and thus, Azeris. According to Don-

abedian (1997: 64), the purpose of this approach is to show that the armenian-ness of Karabakh is only a myth and that the Albanians who live there shouldhave no reason to challenge their membership in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Illustrating the passion attached to the Karabakh issue by both sides, Arme-nian and Azeri scholars attempt to depict a clear and exclusive ethnic history ofthe region when the reality is much more complicated. As a result, the strugglefor Nagorno-Karabakh is presented not as a ploy for territorial gain, but as aninter-ethnic battle for self-assertion and self-identification. For the Armenians,the nationalistic affinity for Nagorno-Karabakh developed over centuries of

hardship brought about by foreign rule. Significantly, the Azeris own attach-ment to the land is a much more recent historical phenomenon, linked with the


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Armenian and Azeri people. For the Armenians, Karabakh is a refuge andbastion the final stronghold where a tradition of national autonomy was pre-

served nearly uninterrupted until modern times. For the Azeris, Nagorno-Karabakh is both a key repository of the ancient civilization to which they tracetheir ancestry and a focal point of their nationalization process. With the prolif-eration of mutually reinforcing nationalisms in Nagorno-Karabakh beginning inthe early 1900s, all that was needed was a spark to set off an explosion of emo-tions and violence on both sides. Tat spark was the dissolution of the SovietUnion.

Te Inadequacy of Drawing LinesTe background and history of the fight over Nagorno-Karabakh have won itthe distinction of being labeled an intractable conflict. Essentially, conflicts canbe classified as having conditions of intractability if they include elements ofidentity conflict, racial/ethnic conflict, conflict over subsistence resources, andconflict over governance and authority. Tese types of conflicts seem to share asense of perceived intransigence and longevity, making it difficult to distinguishbetween needs, interests, positions, and security. Tus, intractable conflicts entail

a relationship between parties that often view their objectives as incompatible.Such conflicts have the following two characteristics: 1) the antagonistic partiesare engaged in a struggle with excessive efforts to coerce each other, and 2) theadversaries persist too long in the struggle without trying to reduce the level oftension in a way that appears to be directed at reaching mutually acceptablesettlements (Kriesberg 1989: 110). It is precisely these types of conflicts thatrequire third-party involvement to set in motion elements of conflict transfor-mation, understood to be a continuous process aimed at fostering conditions ofpolitical will to advance a compromise solution. Te transformation process

may involve cultural, political, economic, psychological, regional, and interna-tional elements all of which can be combined and focused to empower partiesto reframe their differences. Tis must be the work of the Minsk Group co-chairs going forward: to move the conflict from a position of stalemate miredin blame and animosity to a forward-looking atmosphere, aimed at resolutionand rebuilding.

ouval and Zartman (1985: 73) discuss the concept of a hurting stalemateas a situation that is very uncomfortable for both sides, and that appears likelyto become very costly. In these situations, they argue, the warring or disagreeing

sides will see that the costs of continued struggle have become so high that thepotential benefits from a negotiated agreement are worth pursuing. According to


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flict Resolution, Zartman argues for a necessary link between the notion ofripeness of a conflict and the cost-benefit calculations involved in working

towards the resolution of that conflict. Zartman points out that a mutually hurt-ing stalemate, combined with the threat of a looming catastrophe, will lead par-ties to search for an attractive way out of the dispute through negotiation, ratherthan continued conflict (1991: 353). In the Nagorno-Karabakh context, it isclear that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have reached this point. In fact, it isevident that the prolonged ceasefire agreement of May 1994 has allowed theeconomies and societies in both countries to develop quite successfully, irrespec-tive of and despite the conflict.

As a corollary to their ideas regarding mutually-hurting stalemates, Simmonsand Zartman each go on to discuss the prerequisites of a peace agreement thatnot only ends present hostilities, but seeks to address the underlying issues ofpast enmity between contending parties. Simmons points out, favorable trendsin public opinion, as well as political will and a pressing need to devote moreattention to development, economic, and social issues, [have] set the stage forreconsidering, and with any hope rejecting, the more intransigent positions thathave characterized the past (Simmons 1999: 159). Within Armenia and Azer-baijan, not only does there seem to be a vacuum of political will, but leaders on

both sides continually incite political sentiment in their respective nations infavor of continued intransigence and unwillingness to compromise. Public opin-ion in Armenias capital, Yerevan, seems to indicate a fatigue with the struggleand points to greater interest in economic opportunity through open bordersand eased trade relations with its neighbors. On the other hand, the Azeri publicmood, particularly in Baku, remains contentious and highly charged. Whereasboth sides are searching for greater economic development opportunities, nei-ther sees the other as a partner in this quest. Indeed, Azerbaijan is focusing onselling its oil and gas to Western markets and Armenia is seeking closer ties

with Russia.Addressing these points, Zartman has suggested that the bridge linking the

enmity of the past with the hope of the future must be constructed throughforward-looking formulas that concentrate on expanding bilateral and interna-tional contacts and not on ideological and nationalist claims (Zartman & Kre-menyuk 2005). In an increasingly globalized and regionalized world, borderdisputes will only have negative repercussions by keeping the competing statesout of the arena of potential gain from trade and development. Although theroad to resolution is long and arduous, there is much to be gained from a firm

commitment to bilateral cooperation with the unwavering support of the inter-national community.


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formula that sticks. Although Browns analysis focuses on internal conflict andnot conflict between states, the Nagorno-Karabakh case seems to fit as it war-

rants a more fluid and flexible understanding of borders and national divisions.Tus, negotiations between Armenians, Azeris, and Karabakhis must considerand respond to the structural (ethnic geography), political (nationalization andelite politics), economic/social (paths to sustained and multi-track development),and cultural/perceptual (identity formation) factors that all played a hand in theinitiation of conflict in the South Caucasus (Brown 1996: 11). Similarly, negoti-ators must be frank in their discussions of triggers to the conflict, whether causedby elite-level or mass-level factors and whether triggered by internal or externaldevelopments. It seems clear that all four of the possible causal factors of ethnicconflict were present in the escalation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.Similarly, it is fair to say that mass support was manipulated by elite, domesticfactions, while the geo-strategic interests of regional and international powersexacerbated the already-tense situation.

Within this context, it is essential to rethink the model for third-party involve-ment in the Armenian-Azeri conflict. Tus far, the Minsk Group co-chairs haveserved as shuttle-diplomats and worked to devise a formula for an agreementand cessation of hostilities between the two conflicting sides. Bercovitchs com-

pilation of works on the theory and practice of mediation argues that mediationis, in many ways, a continuation of the parties own conflict-managementefforts and that this involves the non-coercive intervention of a third partywho seeks to influence or resolve a particular conflict (1996: 59). Mediators areto fulfill their primary objective ending a given hostility by relying on per-suasion, appeals to logic, the use of information, and the application of social-influence strategies. Within the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,while both parties welcome the involvement of the international community,neither is committed to the search for a solution through this mechanism. As a

result, the Minsk Group functions as a mediator as buffer (protecting the faceof adversaries by making the conflict not only a matter of regional struggle butalso giving it international stature) or mediator as coordinator (synchronizingdissonant negotiating conventions and setting a tone and context for talks).Instead, it must become a mediator as interpreter (bridging the interculturalcommunication gap between the two sides and fostering honest and open dia-logue between all sectors of the two societies (Bercovitch 1996: 107). In sodoing, the French, American, and Russian representatives will have advanced thepeace-building agenda to a state of ripeness and mutually-felt unacceptability for

the Armenian and Azeri sides.Since 1994, the Minsk process has been mired in the power-brokerage media-


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able 1. Four Sets of Indicators of Mediation Success

Mediation Model Evaluation Criteria Indicators ofMediation Success

I. Power-brokeragemodel

Actor: great powerime:short-term(10 years)Expectations:mediation is the only

way

Process:1. Representation of all relevantparties2. Degree to which parties volun-tarily reach an agreementOutcomes:1. Depth of agreements (short-

term versus long-term changes inrelationship)2. Degree of support among allparties (maximum support versusstrong protests of key players)

Source: Kleiboer 1998: 91

have internationalized the conflict and brought attention to it, they have not sit-uated it at the center of the regions political and economic development, and

have instead allowed those two trends to develop despite and to the detriment ofa comprehensive resolution to the conflict. As a result, political elites in Arme-


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suffocation. Consequently, they have emboldened the domination model byexcluding the grievances and legitimate claims of certain parties to the conflict

(internally displaced people (IDPs), nationalists, and Karabakhis). As a result ofthese three concurrent trends in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, the par-ties have not graduated to the restructuring relationship mediation model, wherefrank and open discussions between all relevant parties could take place, mea-sures for short and long-term changes would be sought, and the process wouldhave the voluntary and maximum support of all primary actors. o correct thistrend, the Minsk Group must radically redefine its role in the Nagorno-Karabakhnegotiation process, becoming a source of cross-party linkage and relationshipenhancement, or risk undermining its own legitimacy through a prolongedsearch for a perfect solution.

Te Minsk Process

Shuttle Diplomacy and Major Players

As Rothchild (1997) reminds us, the primary role of a mediator in a conflict is

to shift the balance of a cost-benefit analysis in favor of developing a solutionversus staying in the conflict. Te mediator must be free to use both coerciveand non-coercive measures to achieve a compromised deal. However, successultimately depends on the conflicting sides willingness to agree to a solution.Hartzell (1999: 39) develops the concept of successful mediation by pointing tothree primary elements of an effectively negotiated and lasting peace: 1) thesecurity dilemma (occurring when two or more states each feel insecure vis--vis the others) must be overcome through demilitarization and by dealing withissues of the possible use of coercive force in the future, 2) the control over eco-

nomic forces must be allocated disproportionately with more funding going tounderdeveloped areas, and 3) matters of concern regarding electoral, territorial,and administrative interests must be fully addressed. Finally, Stedman (2002:74) insists that mediators must carefully construct a strategy when approachinga conflict resolution process. Mediators must reduce the fear of agreement oneach side by the creation of trust and mutual-interest measures. Tey must com-bat the rhetoric of total victory by reassuring the parties that a compromise isthe best outcome. Tey must also encourage and foster contact between infor-mal elements on each side. Stedman goes on to point out that mediators must

view the implementation of a negotiated peace agreement as more importantthan the signing of a deal. Consequently, mediators must ensure follow-through


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officials from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran. No single entity has yet been equallyacceptable to all parties, and, since 1993, Russia has attempted to claim for itself

the role of sole peacekeeper in Karabakh and elsewhere in former Soviet terri-tory. Given the regions geographic placement wedged between Europe andAsia, a crossroads between East and West, and on the cultural border betweenIslam and Christianity trouble in the Caucasus naturally brings forth theinvolvement of Iran, urkey, and Russia. In addition, because of Bakus oilreserves and the insistence of the Armenian-American lobby, the United Stateshas become involved in this distant conflict. Also, strategic and security consid-erations will not allow European interest to wane, bringing in the OSCE as amediation force acceptable to most. None of these actors are honest brokers;however, their role in the peaceful evolution of this conflict is undeniable.

Te Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began towork on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in March 1992, soon after newly inde-pendent Armenia and Azerbaijan had joined the organization. Tis coincidedwith a unique historical moment where the Iron Curtain had been lifted andthere appeared to be mutual understanding among the CSCE participatingstates that cooperation was better than confrontation. Within this euphoricatmosphere, it seemed that the Soviet Unions successor states, especially the

Russian Federation, could be included in a world system of equals. Te CSCEtook the first steps by transforming itself into the OSCE in December 1994,and addressing issues of common interest in what may now appear a naive beliefin mutual trust and shared values prevailing over narrow national interests.

By 1994, the CSCE confronted a twofold task: first, to mediate, facilitate,and support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and sec-ond, to negotiate relations among its participating states and determine the roleof the CSCE and, specifically, the Minsk Process (the mediatory work of theMinsk Group) within the context of the conflict. Particularly in the initial phases,

friction between key CSCE players complicated both agendas (Jacoby 2005).Russia, in particular, has played a dual role as a member of the Minsk Group

and as the dominant regional actor, where its national objectives in the nearabroad (including the 14 former Soviet republics, now independent states) havenot necessarily been shared by other members of the Minsk Group. Tis contra-diction manifested itself in Russias competing mediation efforts. It was Russia,and not the Minsk Group, that brokered the May 1994 ceasefire. Te otherCSCE participating states honored this agreement, but were reluctant to agreeto sending peacekeeping forces. However, all parties to the conflict believed that

multinational troops would be preferable to only Russian troops and, in Decem-ber 1994, the now-OSCE established a High Level Planning Group in Vienna,


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between Armenia and urkey, a Minsk Group member state supporting Azerbai-jan, mounted in the aftermath of the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar in March

1993. urkey declared a blockade on Armenia and admitted to supplying Azer-baijans army with military hardware (Jacoby 2005).

In mid-1993, the Minsk Groups Swedish chair, responding to conflicts gen-erated by the different national agendas, moved to limit the circle of participantsin the peace talks. Minsk Group players seen as less important would henceforthbe informed, but would not take part in subsequent negotiations. After theceasefire, Russia assumed the role as Minsk Group co-chair along with Sweden,and, in 1997, a permanent troika of co-chairs, consisting of Russia, the U.S.,and France, was formed. Tis development was followed by an active period ofshuttle diplomacy to find a resolution, hampered by the fact that Minsk Groupco-chairs were less likely to act exclusively as individual mediators than as repre-sentatives of their respective states. Te only OSCE body in place on the groundwas the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, a post occu-pied by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk of Poland since 1997. His mandate, how-ever, did not include negotiation or mediation (Jacoby 2005).

Once stable working relationships had been established within the MinskGroup, its discussions began to focus on Nagorno-Karabakhs status and security,

as well as questions of refugees and IDPs and the problem of the once Azeri-dominated Karabakh town of Shusha. Between 1997 and 2001, four options,representing different methodologies of resolution, were discussed. Te first,referred to as the package solution, favored talking about all issues simultane-ously including Karabakhs final status to achieve the optimum balance. Itwas believed that given the number of issues on the table, this approach wouldoffer the most leeway for compromise. Te proposal presented by the Co-chairsin MayJuly 1997 consisted of two agendas: Agreement I on ending the con-flict, including troop withdrawals, deployment of peacekeepers, return of dis-

placed persons and security guarantees, and Agreement II on Karabakhs finalstatus. Te agendas were separate, as the 1997 OSCE Ministerial Councilreported, to allow the parties to negotiate and implement each at its own pace,but with a clear understanding that at the end of the day all outstanding issueswill have to be resolved. Reactions in Baku and Yerevan were encouraging, butthe leadership in Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakhs capital city) rejected it(Jacoby 2005).

A step-by-step solution, proposed in September 1997, was premised on ini-tially sealing Agreement I before dealing with Agreement II, with the question

of the Lachin Corridor the land passage, linking Nagorno-Karabakh withArmenia shifted to Agreement II. Nagorno-Karabakh would continue to exist


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military aspects and paving the road for negotiations on the more complex polit-ical issues. However, the Karabakh Armenians were not ready to agree to take

the first step by withdrawing from the occupied regions of Azerbaijan. Step-anakert argued that this buffer zone was its main source of leverage, which couldnot be given up without agreement on what concrete security guarantees itwould receive in return (Jacoby 2005). Once again, the Karabakh Armeniansdemonstrated that despite the restricted status accorded to them in the negotia-tions, they wielded significant veto power over possible settlement options.

Te common state proposal, presented in November 1998, anticipated avaguely defined common state between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, fea-turing more or less horizontal relations between Baku and Stepanakert. It wasrejected by Azerbaijan on the grounds that it violated its territorial integrity andthe principles set forth by the OSCE at its summit in Lisbon in December 1996.Tere, Armenia was alone in rejecting a statement that reiterated principles forany settlement stressing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Alstadt 1988: 247).

In 2001, President Robert Kocharian of Armenia and President Heydar Ali-yev of Azerbaijan discussed a proposal based on an exchange of access to terri-tory, though this never got as far as an OSCE draft agreement. In the course ofthe domestic debates launched only after the talks, Aliyev reported (and Kochar-

ian denied) that it had involved Armenia surrendering access to a strip of itssouthern district of Meghri, offering Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhijevanenclave, in return for accepting Armenian control over the Lachin Corridor(Jacoby 2005).

Significant steps forward were taken again during additional summits betweenPresidents Aliyev and Kocharian. Te first of these was held at Rambouillet,France, on February 1011, 2006, while the second took place on June 45,2006, in Bucharest, on the sidelines of a forum of Black Sea states. Unfortu-nately, despite heightened international media speculation prior to these meet-

ings, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian subsequently commented,the most serious difference between the two sides . . . wasnt solved [in Ram-bouillet] and it wasnt solved [in Bucharest] either. Many analysts assume cur-rent deliberations are revolving around the framework originally proposed in late2004 by NAO Parliamentary Assembly President Pierre Lellouche and formerSpanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio, calling for a compromise settlement thatwould give Armenia temporary control of the unrecognized Nagorno-KarabaghRepublic (NKR) in exchange for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azer-baijani territory with the final status of Karabakh to be determined by its inhab-

itants in a referendum in five or ten years time. Te International Crisis Groupunveiled a similar plan in the fall of 2007.


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details of the basic principles proposed by the mediators (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty). In April 2007, Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian sounded

upbeat in his assessment of the talks, insisting that he and his counterpart maystill be able to significantly minimize the conflicting parties remaining differ-ences on the basic principles of a Karabakh settlement and arguing that the par-ties have already created quite a solid base for reaching an agreement. Tere isa document on the table . . . we believe it is a fairly serious document that allowsfor a solution to the problem, Oskanian was quoted as saying (Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty). Formal and substantive discussions between the twosides were put on hold during the recent presidential elections in Armenia.

Te Failure of Mediation

Te typical approaches to conflict resolution have not produced concrete resultsin the case of Nagorno-Karabakh; instead, they have fashioned a process bywhich mediation has created a sense of false stability and entrenched positions.Azeri authorities have based their current position on the hope of future socio-economic and geo-political shifts in the balance of power in the South Caucasus,largely due to the continued development and export of Bakus oil reserves, as

illustrated by the newly inaugurated Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan (BC) pipeline.First, Azeri authorities have shifted the focus of negotiations to the status ofnon-Karabakh territories taken by Armenian forces during prolonged militarycampaigns in the early 1990s. Te Armenian side responds by stipulating thatthose territories came under Armenian control not only because there was dis-agreement about Nagorno-Karabakhs status, but also because Azerbaijan pressedfor the complete removal of all Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Second, the Azeris believe that if they do not realize their maximum demandsthrough negotiations, they can always resort to military solutions. However, a

realistic assessment of the situation on the ground shows that a successful mili-tary solution would require more than conventional arms against the people ofNagorno-Karabakh who are defending their own homes. Azerbaijan can succeedin its attempts to win back land by force only by expelling all Armenians fromNagorno-Karabakh.

Tird, Azerbaijan is convinced that time is on its side. Tis belief is rooted inthe confidence that oil revenues will enhance the Azeri states military capacity.Using the same logic, Armenian authorities maintain that international tenden-cies today are moving towards reinforcing the right to self-determination, citingKosovo as an example. Furthermore, Armenia believes that the longer Nagorno-Karabakh maintains its de facto independence and reinforces its state institutions,


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ous concessions. Tis is a highly problematic assumption because it is the peopleof Nagorno-Karabakh who must first agree to concessions. Furthermore, both

Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have gone beyond mere economic survival andare recording high levels of growth, due to the cash inflow of remittances fromrelatives working and living abroad and through substantial international aid. Inthe words of the Armenian foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian:

Te solution will not be found either through military action or international resolutions, and nosolution can be imposed from the outside. Te only way to a solution is to demonstrate politicalwill and embrace realistic positions. Armenians remain faithful to their initial premises that therecannot be a vertical link between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, that it must have a geo-graphic link with Armenia, and that the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh must be

assured. For us, the basis of resolution is the affirmation of the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination and international recognition of that right. Azerbaijans acceptanceof this fact and its formalization in an agreement will open the way for the resolution of theconflict and the elimination of its consequences (Oskanian 2005).

For Azeri authorities, however, the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan cannot be asubject of compromise. Officially, Azerbaijan does not want war and remainscommitted to a peaceful resolution; however, recent hard-line rhetoric hasasserted that, if forced by deliberate actions to further the occupational status

quo, Azerbaijan will be ready to resort to all other available measures to restoreits territorial integrity.Azeri authorities assert that in order to veil its aggressive policy towards Azer-

baijan, the Armenian side frequently speculates on the international legal princi-ple of the right of peoples to self-determination. In reality, Azeris argue, thepractical realization of this right, as stipulated in relevant international docu-ments, does not involve unilateral secession, but rather represents a legitimateprocess carried out in accordance with international and domestic laws withinprecisely identified limits. Obviously, the critical factor in addressing the issue of

self-determination with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is that allactions aimed at tearing away a part of the territory of Azerbaijan are deemedunconstitutional and accompanied by violations of basic rules of internationallaw, particularly those prohibiting the use of force and the acquisition of territory.

Azeri officials adhere to the belief that the legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region can be worked out only with the full and equal participation ofthe citizens of both Azeri and Armenian communities and within the frameworkof a lawful and democratic process. For Baku, the resolution strategy would notbecome a reality without the restoration of Azerbaijans sovereign rights over alloccupied territories and the safe and dignified repatriation of the expelled Azer-baijani population.


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restoration of communications, and rehabilitation of lands. Tere must also besecurity guarantees for the population in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, includ-

ing the creation of local police forces in the region for both Azerbaijani andArmenian communities. Te Government of Azerbaijan seems ready to assist inall possible ways with the rebuilding of infrastructure and economic develop-ment, including investments at the local level.

Azeri authorities have also said that special attention in the conflict settlementshould be given to the area of land routes within the region. Te Azeri foreignminister, Elmar Mammadyarov, has offered the following glimpse into the Azeriposition:

Tose who are familiar with the conflict often encounter the notion of corridors or unimpededaccess. Azerbaijan suggests a policy of shifting from restricted, antagonistic understandings of thecorridor concept to the use of all communications in the region for the mutual benefit of bothsides. Tis approach acquires particular significance with regard to the so-called Lachin corridor,which is important for linking both the Armenian population in the Nagorno-Karabakh regionwith Armenia and Azerbaijan with its Autonomous Republic of Nakhijevan through the territoryof Armenia. Te use of the Lachin road in both directions can provide both Azerbaijan and Arme-nia with guaranteed secure connections . . . Tis road could become a road of peace of great polit-ical, economic and pan-regional importance (Mammadyarov 2005).

Of all these proposed solutions, the approach of a territorial swap offered duringthe 2001 meeting between the two sides in Key West, Florida possibly yieldedthe best ideas on resolving the conflict by addressing the majority of the under-lying issues security for Karabakh Armenians, Azerbaijans territorial integrity,unfettered access to enclaved populations, and greater regional integration. Aterritorial swap provided a resolving formula. Nevertheless, this approach had tobe rejected (and its very existence denied by the principals) because neitherconstituency had been prepared for the dramatic concessions it required of bothsides. A more constructive approach of debating the specifics of the proposal

through media outlets, bringing both sides closer to acceptance through reitera-tion of the proposals merits, and having the political will and domestic supportto follow-through on its implementation, could have potentially resulted in theconflicts resolution at the start of the second millennium. However, neitherparty could have taken such a step unilaterally and the mediators largely stayedout of the debate.

owards Restructuring Relations

Selling the Deal and Bringing in New Players


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Group must insist on the introduction of civil society elements to achieve a last-ing peace, and the main participants will not only have to compromise, but will

also have to stop propagandizing against the other side, particularly to domesticaudiences. Stories of the fight, as long as they are repeated, provide evidence ofthe enemys treachery and will only provide fuel to the flames of hatred for thenext generation. Part of the long-term peace process will sooner or later entailgetting past fruitless debates on issues that will not be resolved. Questions suchas whose patrimony is this really, who possessed the land in 1920, 620, or 200B.C., who started this round of bloodshed, or who committed the greater atroci-ties lead to ultimate dead ends. Efforts to put aside these questions may be metwith sneers that only the guilty will want to end calls to investigate or clar-ify the truth. Special courage will be required to break the cycle and look aheadto the well-being and survival of future generations. Civil society, includingindependent media, NGOs, and the diaspora, can have a tremendous impact onthis process.

Te capacity of civil society to influence the Karabakh peace process hasalways been subject to cycles of opportunity and constraint imposed by internalpolitical developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It may appear in the currentperiod that civil society faces more constraints than opportunities, and in some

senses the conflict is no closer to resolution, momentum is difficult to maintain,militant rhetoric is on the rise, and there is a danger that individual activists andorganizations will become disillusioned by the lack of progress. Even where theyenjoy access, civil society actors do not appear able to influence the decision-makers.

Juxtaposed to this somewhat bleak picture, there is no doubt that since the1994 ceasefire, NGOs have played a key role by maintaining dialogue, promot-ing a culture of peace and human rights, working toward the release of POWs,and facilitating the meeting of representatives from the conflicting sides. Over

the years, NGOs have gained experience and developed new skills and capaci-ties, leading even the most conservative circles of government to recognize thepotential of civil society action. On June 14, 2005, a statement issued by theAzerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively supported prior internationalcalls for the establishment of direct contacts between Karabakhs Armenian andAzeri communities (Ministries of Foreign Affairs). According to the statement,direct inter-communal dialogue and associated confidence-building measureswill contribute to creating the prerequisite conditions for normalizing relationsbetween the two groups. Tis represents an important opening for these two

core constituencies to establish a dialogue for the first time since the war.Another trend is the growth of civil society in Karabakh itself, a nascent phe-


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Broad-based public participation in the peace process is essential for the regionsdemocratic development and the successful implementation of a compromise

solution to the conflict. Tis requires civil society to develop proposals on bothsubstantive and procedural issues for consideration by the negotiating parties. Italso demands outreach to marginalized communities and internal dialogue onpainful, often taboo subjects. Te accession of both Armenia and Azerbaijan tothe Council of Europe in June 2000 and their resulting obligation to resolve theKarabakh conflict by peaceful means should serve as indications to peacebuildersin the region that they can count on the support of European institutions. Ulti-mately, however, the challenge is to include disenfranchised populations in ameaningful dialogue on options for peace, and to thereby instill in them a senseof ownership over the resulting peace process.

Revamping the Minsk Process

None of the OSCE/Minsk Group-sponsored proposals succeeded in bringingthe sides closer to agreement because none were able to adequately reconcile theneeds for self-determination with the concept of territorial integrity. Based onthe Helsinki principles (named after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE),

the OSCE stands for the inviolability of the frontiers of its participating states.Although the principle of territorial integrity is stipulated with a view to inter-state conflicts, how this aspect should be dealt with regarding intrastate conflictsis addressed only implicitly. Te Final Act speaks of the right of people to self-determination in conformity . . . with . . . territorial integrity of States. Tis con-vinces some observers of the OSCEs inability to be a neutral arbiter in theNagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the Helsinki principles stipulate that anydecision to alter frontiers must take place by peaceful means and by agreement.Hence, there is no inherent contradiction between accepting the inviolability of

frontiers and being neutral at the same time, provided that any agreementreached is acceptable to the parties to the conflict.

Azerbaijan perceives the OSCE as an international executor that shouldhelp it regain through a negotiation process the territorial integrity it lost on thebattlefield. Tis problem has become clearly evident in the discussions regardingNagorno-Karabakhs involvement as a party to the conflict, where, at present, itis treated only as an interested party with lower negotiating status in theOSCE process than Armenia and Azerbaijan. Within the Minsk Group, it waswidely believed, on the one hand, that Yerevan would have enough influence in

Stepanakert to secure the Karabakh Armenians compliance with any peace dealreached, thereby obviating the need for their separate and equal representation


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tion process is not palatable for Azerbaijan. So far, the Minsk Group has notmanaged to bridge this gap.

Te assumption that an agreement can be personally negotiated between thepresidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan has also proven to be shortsighted. Arme-nias first post-independence president, Levon er-Petrossian, was forced by hisown ministers to step down in 1998 after publicly advocating concessions toAzerbaijan. In 2001, President Heydar Aliyev came under intense pressure whenhe returned home from talks with Kocharian at Key West. As a result, the break-throughs achieved in Florida evaporated in the face of domestic criticism. Com-menting on what happened in Key West, the Minsk Groups American co-chair,Carey Cavanaugh, commended both presidents for being ahead of their popu-lations. Yet, er-Petrossians resignation and Aliyevs rapid abandonment ofcompromise raised fundamental doubts regarding the sustainability of agree-ments reached by leaders in isolation from their societies. Without a strategy forinvolving the two populations, including the political opposition in both coun-tries, peacemaking is likely to fail. Te converse argument that it was er-Petros-sians attempt to include and inform the population that led to his downfall isinaccurate. Te 1997 press conference where he appeared to take the Armenianpeople into his confidence was his first press conference in five years, preceded

by a long silence and no substantial attempts to bring the Armenian populationon board with his peace project.Te work of the Minsk Process since its inception has been almost exclusively

focused on peacemaking achieving an agreement rather than orchestrating acomprehensive solution or a change in attitudes. In contrast, authentic peace-building requires changed attitudes to create an atmosphere in which an agree-ment is a feasible first step towards a comprehensive solution. Exclusive relianceon political leaders exposes any deals they may reach to the risk of political andsocial rejection at home. Te desirability of complementing peacemaking with

peacebuilding is underscored by this need for more communication within thewider societies, without which there can be no sense of public ownership of thepeace process. As the Karabakh case shows, no agreement is feasible withoutpopular support.

Te problem goes beyond questions of public relations, however, and touchesupon fundamental concepts of national identity and interest. For example,among Armenians, the differing positions in Stepanakert and Yerevan may eachdiffer from positions originating in the Armenian diaspora. On the Azeri side,there is also a need for greater internal dialogue among the different stakehold-

ers, in particular between official Baku and the IDP community. A range of con-ciliation processes within and among all the different social groups is required


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and in encouraging the parties to the conflict to embark on processes of estab-lishing a societal consensus on what is meant by national interest on each side

regarding Karabakh. Te resolution debate must become inclusive of all relevantviewpoints, so that the final outcome is perceived by all to have their interestsin mind.

Te OSCE has not yet taken up this issue nor worked with the leaders todevelop such a complementary approach. Tough unprecedented for the OSCE,track one (inter-governmental) negotiations should be complemented by tracktwo (unofficial) and track three (third-party) diplomatic efforts undertaken byother actors in an integrated multi-track approach. Obviously, this would meanallowing direct contacts between Armenians and Azeris. Given the rejection ofthis idea in Azerbaijan, one possible focus of the Minsk Group could be to con-vince the parties to agree on the complementary nature of peacemaking andpeacebuilding. Tis would also include accepting direct talks with the de factoauthorities in Stepanakert. Closely linked to such a step could be the role of theMinsk Group in advocating the opening of a direct road link (possibly underinternational control) across the line of contact, allowing international organiza-tions access to Nagorno-Karabakh without violating the integrity ofde jureAzeriborders.

Te OSCE can only be as strong as its participating states allow it to be. Yetantagonisms between the interests of OSCE participating states endure. TeOSCEs experience of mediating in the Karabakh conflict shows there are nogrounds to assume that an agglomeration of actors is stronger or more forward-thinking than its individual members. However, mediating in this conflict alsoposes the dilemma of simultaneous and gradual processes. One process is theArmenian-Azeri peace process, another is the development of OSCE capacitywithin the framework of the conflicting agendas of its participating states, andintra-societal discussions comprise a third. Tis list is not complete. Te inter-

connectedness of all these processes is evident, yet the conceptual and institu-tional frameworks designated to deal with such complex issues are not sufficientlyevolved. Peace processes elsewhere underscore the importance of third partiesmaintaining clearly defined roles and highlight the value of complementaryefforts between a range of different state and non-state actors in support of amulti-level peace process. Te efforts and constraints of OSCE mediation sym-bolize the world we live in and invite us to conceive a completely new, holisticstyle of negotiation tactics.

owards Ripeness


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embedded in a bitter and hateful rivalry to break free from that cycle of enmityand approach each other through new terms of cooperation and reconciliation.

Tis article has argued that vibrant economic conditions, manipulated publicopinion, and ineffective international involvement have kept the conflict fromrising to such a level of mutual discomfort that Armenia and Azerbaijan wouldboth feel compelled to search for a final, durable solution. Given the status quo,there is little incentive for the emergence of the political will necessary to opposethe nationalist sentiments pushing for continued rivalry. French, Russian, andAmerican diplomats must work tirelessly to create these incentives and bring theurgency of the matter to a head.

Te eventual agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh will have to be structuredalong the lines of territorial integrity (of Azerbaijan) now for self-determination(of Nagorno-Karabakh) later. However, the implementation of that formula willeither ensure its relevance and effectiveness or its eventual breakdown and fail-ure. For example, the final arbitrated ruling in the Peru-Ecuador dispute of 1999was deemed one of the most creative if not unusual transmissions of authorityby sovereign legislatures to foreign states. It sought not only to resolve the terri-torial dispute, but also to look to the future of the region in its complete andholistic approach to conflict resolution by addressing elements of cooperative

life, such as trade and navigation, electrical interconnection, and educationalcooperation (Zartman & Kremenyuk 2005: 262). Despite all this, the true meritof an eventual Armenian-Azeri rapprochement will not be predicated by thesigning of an agreement or the mere passing of time; only a permanent changein attitudes will achieve this goal.

Fundamentally, the idea of moving the Karabakh conflict to ripeness willinvolve its transformation from a state of intractability. Te International Nego-tiation Network (INN), based at Te Carter Centers Conflict Resolution Pro-gram, has had experience in implementing a new model for third-party

mediation in conflict situations, mostly in Africa, aimed particularly at con-structing a framework within which ripeness can be achieved. As such, the INNhas developed a third-party assistance model of participation in the process ofconflict transformation. Chief among INNs recommendations in addition topoints on studying contextual attributes, setting up early warning devices, andmobilizing resources is the notion that one of the best ways to reach the rightformula for the negotiation process is to make the design interactive to allow theparties to shape both the substantive agreements and the procedural paths toreaching them. Te INN approach assists disputants in creating the socio-politi-

cal support mechanisms that accompany the conflict transformation and trust-building components of a successful resolution to conflicts. In the context of the


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Azerbaijans leaders to find the way forward or pay the price for not doing so(Spencer & Spencer 1995: 195).

Conclusion

Te negotiations within the Minsk Group framework between Armenia andAzerbaijan have stalled not because the international framework has been unwill-ing or incapable of putting forward possible solutions. Rather, the idea of peacethrough compromise and negotiation has not become the best remaining alter-native for either confronting party. Azerbaijan hopes that with time and a grow-

ing economy through oil revenues, its military will become strong enough towin back by force all lost territory; Armenia is confident of its militarys abilityto hold off an Azeri victory through support from Russia and Iran. Te conflicthas not ripened enough and the parties are not facing a mutually hurting stale-mate situation.

Tis is not to say that the Minsk Group has made the most of its positionas the chief mediator in the Armenian-Azeri conflict. Rather than focusing allits efforts and attention on the signing of a peace deal between the belligerentparties, the group should shift its focus to the implementation of confidence-

building measures between the authorities on both sides as well as the three soci-eties involved Armenians, Azeris, and Karabakhis. Although it has been saidthat the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan are ahead of their people in termsof working towards resolution, a strong argument can be made for the prolonga-tion of the conflict by the elites in both Armenia and Azerbaijan for domesticpolitical gain. An exchange among civil societies, media representatives, youngpeople, and political and military leaderships will go a long way in humanizingthe conflict, breaking down convenient stereotypes, and instilling the notionthat neither country can rely on a stable and secure future without the othersparticipation and involvement. Armenians and Azeris must be readied for aneventual compromise without this sociological base, no political leader is goingto be willing or able to sell a brokered peace that either gives away Karabakh oraccepts its de facto annexation by a neighboring state.

Also, the role of the Minsk Group co-chairs must change they can no lon-ger just serve as peace brokers, but must be co-signers to the negotiated agree-ment, emphasizing their role as guarantors of a long-term peace betweenArmenians and Azeris. Tis measure will mitigate the insecurity felt by Arme-

nians and Azeris of Nagorno-Karabakh with regard to their rights of return andself-determination. Finally, the central pillar of the Minsk Group-brokered peaceagreement cannot be the end to hostilities at any cost Instead any agreement


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ing. Without these crucial elements, any agreement will be a temporary andsuperficial solution to a long-lasting and multi-layered conflict.

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